Can killing be justified: a dismissal of the replaceability argument

T. Visak

Can killing be justified: a dismissal of the replaceability argument

In: Ethical futures: bioscience and food horizons

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T. Visak

T. Visak Ethics Institute, Utrecht University, P.O. Box 80103, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands; T.Visak@uu.nl

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Type:: Chapter

Pages:: 165–169

DOI:: https://doi.org/10.3920/9789086866731_027

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I evaluate a utilitarian argument that justifies killing animals: the Replaceability Argument. According to utilitarianism, killing an animal, which would otherwise have continued to live a pleasant life, amounts to a welfare loss. The idea of the Replaceability Argument is that bringing another animal into existence, which is at least as happy as the killed animal, can compensate for the welfare loss. The Replaceability argument depends on the view that the possible welfare of possible individuals, such as the possible second animal, counts. This is the Total View. An alternative view is the Prior Existence View, which accepts as moral objects only individuals who already exist or who will definitely exist. Those whose existence depends on the moral choice in question do not count. So, the Prior Existence View would not take into account the possible welfare of the possible second animal while considering whether killing the first animal is acceptable. This is because the second animal does not exist and its existence depends on the moral choice that is contemplated, i.e. whether to kill the first animal. The Prior Existence View is initially attractive. It does not accept the creation of happy beings as a way of maximizing welfare that counts on a par with making existing beings more happy. The fact that a possible being would be happy is no reason for bringing it into existence. Though initially attractive, a powerful argument has been brought forward against the Prior Existence View. It has been argued that the Prior Existence View cannot accept the expected misery of a possible individual as a reason against bringing this being into existence. This problem for the Prior Existence View has famously been brought forward in the Case of the Wretched Child (Parfit, 1984). I argue, however, that the Prior Existence View can deal in an intuitively plausible way with the Case of the Wretched Child. The Case of the Wretched Child does not dismiss the Prior Existence View. The Prior Existence View has not been dismissed as a plausible view within utilitarianism. The Prior Existence View does not support the Replaceability Argument. Utilitarianism therefore might offer animals a stronger protection against killing than both utilitarians and their critics deemed possible.

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Ethical futures: bioscience and food horizons

E-Book ISBN:: 9789086866731

Publisher:: Wageningen Academic

Print Publication Date:: 30 Oct 2009

Subjects
- Life Sciences

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Can killing be justified: a dismissal of the replaceability argument

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Ethical futures: bioscience and food horizons

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