Live and let die â The distinction between doing and allowing harm and the veterinarianâs integrity
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In this paper I will address the relevance of the distinction between doing and allowing harm (DDA) in applied ethics focusing on veterinary ethics. Such a distinction can help professionals, in this case veterinarians, in reflecting on the demands inherent to their profession and how these relate to their personal identity. I will show this by first illustrating the DDA. According to this distinction â if we always have reasons to reduce harm â doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. Many utilitarians claim that such a distinction does not hold and that our positive duties are equivalent to our negative duties. Instead, advocates of the DDA hold that this distinction is necessary to grant an agent their integrity, meaning their capacity to pursue the life projects they are committed to and that constitute the image that they have of themselves. Were they responsible for all the harm they allow, they would have to give up on their life projects and instead pursue the projects that best maximise utility. This would lead them to think of themselves as an impersonal agent devoid of any idiosyncrasies and personal history. The DDA shows us how agents are depicted in different ways by its advocates and its opponents: on the one hand we are confronted with impartial agents, on the other, we are asked to consider the importance of oneâs personal identity. I will then show how this distinction is reflected also in practical contexts, such as those faced by veterinarians in catastrophic circumstances. I will argue that some essential elements of the veterinarian profession seem to demand to give equal consideration to the harm directly done and the harm allowed. This in turn threatens other aspects of the individual veterinarian. In fact, veterinarians are not just veterinarians, they are people with particular desires and life-projects. Assuming that there is no distinction between doing and allowing harm would threaten parts of their identity by burdening them with excessive negative responsibility.
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