Chapter 11 Saint Anselm and Platoâs Wrath
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Commentators have often focused on Anselmâs so-called two-wills theory in the context of discussions of Anselmâs view of free will. In this chapter, I approach the two-wills theory from a different angle. By exploring affinities between Anselmâs view of the will with Platoâs moral psychology, as laid out in the Republic, I highlight the complexity of motivation assumed by Anselmâs theory and the underlying distinction between two different senses of good, on which he insists. On the reading proposed, the distinction between the will to benefit and the will to rightness should be considered a counterpart to Platoâs distinction between epithÅ«mia and thÅ«mosâbetween appetite and passion. Some upshots of this reading are discussed. In particular, Platoâs psychology helps us see in more detail how Anselm thinks the two goods are related, which in turn throws new light on Anselmâs ethical outlook and his view of rationality.