1 Introduction
The neutral and non-aligned states (the N+N, or NNAâs) represented a third group of countries that had chosen, within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), not to be incorporated into one of the two antagonistic blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This group, which could be described as a loose coalition, emerged during the CSCE negotiations in Geneva (1973â1975) and did not extend beyond the Helsinki process. The most important and active N+N states were the four neutrals â Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland â and the non-aligned Yugoslavia. Besides these five countries, the group was composed of four smaller states or microstates, namely Cyprus, Malta, Liechtenstein and San Marino. It should be noted that not all neutral European countries were part of the group; for instance, Ireland and the Holy See, which participated in the CSCE, were not members of the N+N. The N+N took on an ambiguous role during the CSCE negotiations because they were both negotiators who made propositions to defend their national interests and mediators who helped the two blocs to find compromises. Accordingly, the N+N are often described as âintermediariesâ or âbridge-buildersâ.1
There is not much doubt that, by mediating between Eastern and Western positions that were often diametrically opposed and hence mutually unacceptable, the N+N contributed significantly to the success of the CSCE. The N+N were remarkably active on procedural issues such as setting the agenda or determining the structure of the negotiations â for example, by creating the concept of âbasketsâ.2 They also proposed the creation of informal working groups that would prove especially productive; they acted as coordinators of the talks; and, apart from these tasks of mediation or administration, they drafted joint proposals, depending on the topic.3
the neutrals acted as midwives to détente. From the late 1960s onwards, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland were influential players within the late Cold War context, pulling above their weight in a process that gave rise to a growing set of so-called Helsinki networks that, in the long term, undermined the totalitarian systems of Eastern Europe.6
Stefan Lehne and Hanspeter Neuhold, who were both part of the Austrian delegation in Vienna, explain that âthe contributions of the NNAâs to the success of the CSCE process have [â¦] exceeded their material power potential.â7 The importance of the N+N throughout the Helsinki process is thus rarely challenged.
In the first two Follow-up Meetings in Belgrade (1977â1978) and Madrid (1980â1983), which were held in extremely tense international contexts, the N+N are seen as the intermediaries that prevented the whole process from falling apart. Yet there is no such consensus regarding the third Follow-up Meeting, held in Vienna (1986â1989). From the outset, it was uncertain whether the N+N would play the same crucial role as before. It was felt, as Thomas Fischer has put it, that âthe role of neutral mediators was no longer needed in the CSCE at the Vienna meeting to the same degree as before.â8 One reason why their influence was challenged is that, since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power
Another reason why the N+N lost influence was that dissension within the group grew, especially with regard to military issues, thereby reducing the scope for common positions or joint proposals. The topic that created the most significant divisions among the N+N in Vienna was that of conventional disarmament and the statesâ eventual participation in the negotiations that were to take place after the conclusion of the third Follow-up Meeting. The N+N had divergent views on this question and hence could not agree on whether or not to take part in future negotiations on disarmament.
The paper will endeavour to explain why this subject was so contentious for the N+N and how they eventually managed to find a common ground. This specific issue is worth examining because it touches upon the very understanding of neutrality: the possible involvement of the N+N in disarmament talks raises the questions of what it means to be neutral and what the most appropriate diplomatic strategies are for a neutral state.
2 The N+N and Conventional Disarmament
The CSCE had addressed the issue of disarmament from its inception, even if no concrete measures were discussed. On this subject, the Helsinki Final Act stipulates that âthe participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament.â10 It was then decided, in the course of the second follow-up meeting in Madrid, that conferences on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) and on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) would be held in Stockholm to undertake ânew, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament.â11 The first stage, which took place from 1984 to 1986, consisted in the negotiation of a set of confidence- and
Yet here was the point of contention: the N+N states disagreed on whether they should participate in these negotiations or not. All N+N were proponents of confidence- and security-building measures, which appeared to them as effective means of guaranteeing European security and thus their own safety. Disarmament, however, was a completely different issue, chiefly because neutral states considered their military capabilities to be purely defensive and
therefore representing a threat to any country. Consequently, disarming neutral states would not improve European security. It would be meaningless at best, but it might even jeopardise the balance of power within the continent by weakening states that had no territorial ambitions. As possessors of armies, the N+N believed their neutrality to rely on their capacity to defend it against potential aggressors. Following this logic, disarmament would involve nothing less than undermining both their neutral status and their national security.
Yet the choice whether or not to participate in disarmament talks had to take into account another crucial element: the risk of potentially disastrous diplomatic isolation. The CSCE and the rule of unanimity had offered the N+N a remarkable opportunity to exert real influence on the international stage. Participation in the Helsinki process in itself represented an outstanding diplomatic success for the neutral and non-aligned states. Therefore, the N+N were understandably wary of being excluded from negotiations on disarmament, which would have left them unable to influence the discussions. Given the importance of the topic, this alarming possibility left the N+N states witht a choice between two unsatisfactory solutions: they could either participate in future negotiations on disarmament and risk being compelled to reduce their military capabilities, or they could preserve their freedom of action with regard to conventional forces at the cost of some diplomatic alienation.
Caught between undesirable alternatives, most of the N+N were uncertain how to address this dilemma. In this atmosphere of indecision, two countries
Neutral and non-aligned countries could well find themselves on the margin of events, i.e. they could be faced with a fait accompli should they fail to make adequate preparations in good time. This practically means that elaboration of their own, joint concept should commence at once.16
The fundamental interest in cutting conventional armaments in Europe and in the participation of the N+N in a negotiation process to that end is contrasted by a realistic assessment of their own military and political weight and by an awareness of the enormous complexity of the matter. A possible solution is seen by some in a negotiating structure divided into âconcentric circlesâ. According to this, the actual reduction negotiations would take place first in a subsidiary body of the CDE limited to the member states of the military alliances, in which the N+N could participate as observers. In parallel, negotiations on CSBM would continue among all 35 states.17
In order not to prejudice a later mediating role, Austria will not present its own proposal for a new CDE mandate in the initial phase of the Vienna follow-up meeting, but will await the development of the positions of the military allies and seek to bring about a coordinated position in the N+N framework.19
As for the smaller N+N, Cyprus and Malta supported the Swedish-Finnish-Yugoslavian line, while San Marino was relatively passive.20 Liechtenstein avoided taking a firm stance, but leant toward the Swiss point of view. Despite Liechtensteinâs tacit support and the veiled flexibility of the Austrian position, the Swiss were clearly isolated among the N+N on the major issue of disarmament. It should be noted that, during the opening debate, the N+N states, with the exception of Switzerland, supported the start of disarmament talks in the framework of the CDE.21
In a delegation report written in April 1987, half a year after the start of the Vienna negotiations, the Swiss expressed serious pessimism over the situation, stating unambiguously that their position could not be reconciled with that of other N+N countries.22 Moreover, the report disclosed the existence of tensions among the group, caused by the failure to find a compromise: âThese three months of interminable discussions between the N+N have resulted in a deterioration of the atmosphere within the group.â23 These tensions were especially apparent when, on 23 March 1987, Sweden presented its N+N partners with a draft position paper that provided for the involvement of non-military alliance states in disarmament negotiations. Dissatisfied with the draft, the
Yet if the Swiss were not in a fundamentally weak negotiating position, they had the other participating states to thank for it. Most NATO countries were reluctant to involve the N+N in disarmament talks, while the Warsaw Pact was satisfied with a negotiation format limited to the members of the two military alliances.25 In fact, the Western bloc was also divided on the issue of disarmament: whereas the United States wanted to negotiate as directly as possible with the Soviet bloc, the French were in favour of involving all 35 CSCE participating states in the talks.26 One of the twelve founding members of NATO, under President Charles de Gaulle France had decided to withdraw from the organisationâs integrated military structure in 1966; therefore, with regard to conventional armaments, French diplomacy supported a negotiation format in which it would be able to counterbalance its isolation within the North Atlantic Alliance by bringing in neutral and non-aligned states. As for the Warsaw Pact countries, although they had initially suggested that they endorsed the participation of all 35 CSCE members, it was becoming gradually clear that a negotiation structure limited to the 23 alliance members was perfectly acceptable to them.27 In sum, even if the Swiss were isolated within the N+N, their position was strengthened by the superpowersâ willingness to negotiate from alliance to alliance.
3 The Limassol and Bern Meetings
Two important meetings took place at the level of foreign ministers in May 1987 that would contribute to and coincide with a shift in the position of the N+N: the first was held in Limassol on 16 and 17 May, the second in Bern on May 26.
The Limassol meeting gathered the foreign ministers and state secretaries of the N+N in order to review the progress of the CSCE negotiations. It should first be noted that the participating countries appeared disunited with regard
After these preliminary remarks, the participants delved into the heated issue of negotiations on disarmament.30 Sweden, Yugoslavia and Cyprus declared that a disarmament forum had to be established within the framework of the CSCE, mainly because of two reasons: first, the Madrid mandate and the Stockholm document both stipulated this extension; second, there existed a âfunctional linkâ between confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament that justified a joint negotiation. Switzerland expressed its reservations but recognised all the same that the creation of a completely distinct negotiation forum was undesirable. As a consequence of Switzerlandâs isolation among the N+N, its position had evolved to resemble the aforementioned Austrian âconcentric circlesâ solution.
Switzerland proposed the institution of a âlinkâ between the CSCE and the future negotiations that would take place between the Warsaw Pact and NATO states. The arguments in favor of an intermediate solution were the following: informal meetings between the 23 alliance members had been set up in Vienna on the initiative of France, which wanted the negotiations on disarmament to be incorporated into the CSCE; by contrast, the United States was in favor of establishing a separate 23-state forum that would be unrelated to the Helsinki process; the N+N had to take advantage of this disagreement to advocate for a third way, which would consist in the institution of a relatively autonomous disarmament forum connected to the CSCE framework. The âlinkâ between the two settings would have to be conceived in a way that would enable the N+N not only to be informed of the progress of the discussions but also to be directly consulted about the negotiations. The N+N could also think of a
The N+N partners expressed interest in the idea of an intermediate solution. Even if much remained to be done, the seeds of a compromise were starting to grow. A second meeting took place in Bern between the State Secretaries of the four main neutral partners â Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland â on 26 May. It addressed the most important and contentious topic: how to integrate the issue of conventional disarmament into the CSCE framework. The Swiss again argued in favor of the intermediate solution and the creation of an âinstitutional link.â Both Austria and Finland suggested waiting before proposing an institutional link, arguing that it was preferable to be patient in the present situation. They wanted first to observe how the alliance members would structure their talks in Vienna. Furthermore, Austria wanted to wait for the results of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had resumed in March 1986 (and would ultimately lead to the signing of the INF Treaty on 8 December 1987). Although it had been continuously playing for time, Switzerland responded that a wait-and-see attitude would be a tactical mistake that would eventually result in the interests of the N+N being ignored.31
The debates within the N+N concerning conventional disarmament were approaching a turning point. In June 1987, all the N+N countries seemed to have accepted the idea of an intermediary solution, even if there was still no concrete design of the so-called âlinkâ.32 This agreement can be explained by the fact that, in the Western camp, the United States and France had reached a compromise at the NATO meeting of foreign ministers held in Reykjavik on 11 and 12 June. The allies had agreed to support a dual negotiation structure in which disarmament would be discussed among the 23 alliance members within the CSCE framework.33
After months of discussions, the N+N finally came to an agreement and in March 1988 drafted a ânon-paper on military issuesâ that reflected their common position.34 The non-paper devised a dual negotiation structure
4 Conclusion
The Vienna Follow-up Meeting witnessed the division of the N+N on the issue of disarmament and its place in the CSCE process. The N+N were facing a dilemma to which different countries gave different answers. They were forced to make a choice between two unsatisfactory solutions: either getting involved in disarmament talks but being bound by the obligations that would result from these negotiations, or remaining unrestricted in respect to military policy but being excluded from crucial negotiations in Europe. In other words, the N+N were worried about diplomatic isolation on the one hand and the loss of military independence on the other. Faced with this choice of evils, the N+N countries had divergent views on which was the greater. The dilemma faced by the N+N was all the more important given that neutral states need to continuously prove that their neutrality is credible by maintaining adequate defence capabilities while ensuring international support through an active diplomacy.
As the meeting progressed and the positions held by the two alliances became clear, the group managed to find a compromise that would be acceptable to all participating states. Regardless of their initial disunity, all the N+N countries were ultimately satisfied with the compromise solution that they had devised. Switzerland, which had been isolated within the group on the matter, avoided possible involvement in disarmament measures that would have jeopardised its military sovereignty. Although they had initially pushed for direct participation in the negotiations, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Finland were finally satisfied that disarmament was incorporated in the CSCE framework and that the N+N obtained the right to ask questions and make comments during the meetings to exchange views and information. As for Austria, it welcomed an
Even if Switzerland was isolated within the N+N on the topic of disarmament, its negotiating position was not weak since it was in agreement with most of the military alliancesâ members, including the US and the Soviet Union, which preferred to negotiate face-to-face without the involvement of potential troublemakers. Because of its disunity, the N+N group was never in a position to challenge the two blocsâ will with regard to this complex issue. It was only when it became clear that disarmament would be discussed among the 23 alliance members within the CSCE framework that the N+N managed to formulate a common position.
Thomas Fischer, Keeping the Process Alive: The N+N and the CSCE Follow-Up from Helsinki to Vienna (1975â1986), Zurich 2012, p. 13.
Thomas Fischer, Neutral Power in the CSCE. Baden-Baden 2009, p. 18.
Ibid., p. 365â369.
Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, London-New York 1988, p. 130.
Adrian Hyde-Price, âGeopolitics and the Concept of Neutrality in Contemporary Europeâ, in: Heinz Gärtner (ed.), Engaged Neutrality. An Evolved Approach to the Cold War, Lanham 2017, p. 121â142, on p. 121.
Jussi M. Hanhimäki, âNon-aligned to What? European Neutrality and the Cold Warâ, in: Sandra Bott/Jussi M. Hanhimäki/Janick Schaufelbuehl/Marco Wyss (eds.), Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War. Between or Within the Blocs? London 2016, p. 17â32, on p. 28.
Stefan Lehne/Hanspeter Neuhold, âThe Role of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries at the Vienna Meetingâ, in: Arie Bloed/Pieter Van Dijk (eds.), The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process. The Vienna Follow-Up Meeting and its Aftermath, Dordrecht-Boston-London 1991, p. 30â53, on p. 35.
Fischer, Keeping the Process Alive, p. 148.
Ibid., p. 17.
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, 1 August 1975, p. 13, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf, accessed 16.8.2023.
Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting 1980 of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-Up to the Conference, 6 September 1983, p. 8, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/d/40871.pdf, p. 9, accessed 23.10.2024.
Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 19 September 1986, p. 17, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/d/41238.pdf, accessed 25.6.2023.
Commentaires au texte du contre-projet suédois, 23.4.1987, Swiss Federal Archives, Bern, Aktenmaterial zur KSZE-Konferenz in Wien (1985â1987), E5812#2009/67#138*, 76.
Rapport final de la délégation suisse à la CDE de Stockholm, 24.11.1986, Swiss Federal Archives, Bern, KSZE: Folgekonferenz in Wien (1986â1988), E2200.49#1996/380#93*, 370.3.
Möte med NN-staternas utrikesministrar i Brioni, Jugoslavien, den 23â24 oktober 1986, 27.10.1986, Swedish National Archives, Täby, DU Utlandsmyndighet Repr. arkiv, ESK/OSSE Wien, 1920 Ã¥rs, dossiersystem F1:19, HP 79 NN.
Informal working paper (Yugoslavia), 20.11.1986, Ãsterreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÃStA), Archiv der Republik (AdR), BMAA, II-Pol, GZ 803.00/233âII.7/86.
Wiener Folgetreffen (WFT), 4.9.1986, ÃStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ 801.04/41âII.7/86 (translated).
Zur Zukunft der KVAE, 4.9.1986, ÃStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ 801.04/41âII.7/86 (translated).
Drittes KSZE-Folgetreffen Wien, österreichische Linie, 8.7.1986, ÃStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ 803.00/74âII.7/86.
NN-diskussion om militära frågor, 1.1987, Swedish National Archives, Täby, DU Utlandsmyndighet Repr. arkiv, ESK/OSSE Wien, 1920 års, dossiersystem F1:19, HP 79 NN.
Wiener Folgetreffen, Stand vom 14. November 1986, ÃStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ 803.00/223âII.7/86.
Rapport de la délégation suisse sur la deuxième session de la réunion de Vienne sur les suites de la CSCE, 27 janvierâ10 avril 1987, 4.5.1987, Swiss Federal Archives, Bern, KSZE: Folgekonferenz in Wien (1986â1988), E2200.49#1996/380#93*, 370.26.
Ibid. (translated).
Commentaires au texte du contre-projet suédois, 23.4.1987, Swiss Federal Archives, Bern, Aktenmaterial zur KSZE-Konferenz in Wien (1985â1987), E5812#2009/67#138*, 76 (translated).
Sammanträde 1987â04-27 om ESK: s uppföljningsmöte i Wien, 27.4.1987, Swedish National Archives, Täby, Delegationsarkiv, ESK Wien, 1920 Ã¥rs, dossiersystem F1:1, HP 79 A.
Frankreich und die KSZE, 16.9.1987, ÃStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ 801.04/33âII.7/87.
Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffen: Militärische Sicherheit, 23.6.1987, ÃStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ 801.04/24âII.7/87.
KSZE: N+N-Treffen auf Aussenministerebene in Limassol (Zypern), 16./17. Mai 1987, 21.5.1987, Swiss Federal Archives, Bern, KSZE: Treffen, Vorschläge etc. der Schweiz + N+N (1985â1988), E2200.49#1996/380#92*, 370.25.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Treffen der Staatssekretäre der vier neutralen Staaten am 26. Mai 1987 in Bern, 3.6.1987, Swiss Federal Archives, KSZE: Treffen, Vorschläge etc. der Schweiz + N+N (1985â1988), E2200.49#1996/380#92*, 370.25.
Réunion CSCE de Vienne, rapport de mi-session, 23.6.1987, Swiss Federal Archives, Bern, KSZE: Folgekonferenz in Wien (1986â1988), E2200.49#1996/380#93*, 370.26.
Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffen: Militärische Sicherheit, 23.6.1987, ÃStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ 801.04/24âII.7/87.
Rapport intermédiaire de la délégation suisse sur la 6ème session de la Réunion de Vienne sur les suites de la CSCE, 10.6.1988, Swiss Federal Archives, Bern, KSZE: Folgekonferenz in Wien (1986â1988), E2200.49#1996/380#93*, 370.26.