1 From Helsinki to Vienna, 1975â19891
The Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) represented a political compromise between Eastern territorial and security interests and Western human rights interests. Basket I contained a catalogue of ten âprinciplesâ that were to govern relations between the participating states, including cooperation in humanitarian areas. In addition, there was a âDocument on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmamentâ. Basket II enclosed guidelines for cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment. Basket III included concrete facilitations for family visits and reunions and improved working conditions for journalists.2
This chapter answers five questions: What course did the Vienna Follow-up Meeting take? How did its Concluding Document come about? What is its structure and focus compared with other final documents (1975, 1978, 1983 and 1986)? What outcomes were achieved? These questions are answered with reference to Austrian observations and judgements.
The CSCE Follow-up Meetings in Belgrade (1977â1978)3 and Madrid (1980â1983), which served to review and continue the policy of détente, were affected by the intensifying Cold War and failed to achieve any resounding success.4 By the time of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting (1986â1989), Cold War
2 The Course of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting and the Drafting of the Concluding Document from the Austrian Perspective
Due to the negative experiences with the Madrid preparatory meeting, which had lasted nine and a half turbulent weeks, the relevant final document had defined the mandate of the Vienna preparatory meeting in âvery narrowâ terms, as summarised in an Austrian foreign ministry report. The agenda, task list and modalities of the Madrid meeting were to be adapted only in points âwhich required amendment due to the change of date and place, the drawing of lots and the mention of other meetings held in accordance with the decisions of the Madrid meeting.â6 The Vienna Follow-up Meeting was officially held from 4 November 1986 to 19 January 1989 and was organised in six sessions, with opening and closing taking place at foreign ministerial level.7
The Concluding Document was drafted at Ballhausplatz, the seat of the Austrian Foreign Ministry until 2005. Although the material to be discussed of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting was available in full by Easter 1987, negotiations regarding the text took a long time to begin. The conclusion of the conference had been set for 31 July 1987. However, the date passed without a single sentence of the Concluding Document having been formulated and finalised. It was not until the autumn of 1987 that the drafting work got off even to a âslow
Until July 1987, the struggle of the NATO countries to reach a common position on military questions acted as a retarding force. The neutral and non-aligned (N+N) states also had difficulties in maintaining a common stance. Yugoslavia, Sweden and Finland had sought the participation of the N+N in the arms control negotiations, while Switzerland had âcompletely ruled outâ any such participation for itself. After the NATO states, with the agreement of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (the âWarsaw Pactâ), had de facto established the concept of the twenty-three NATO states acting as autonomous negotiators within the CSCE framework, all N+N countries fell in with this solution, which Austria had favoured for some time.9
The Warsaw Pact states used the delay of the Western proposal on military issues to âjustify slow progressâ in the human rights and humanitarian fields. From the perspective of the Ballhausplatz, the considerable problems in reaching new normative agreements had âdeeper-rooted reasonsâ.10
The reforms initiated in the USSR by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU,11 as well as those in the Central and Eastern European states had raised expectations in the Western camp regarding a positive conclusion to the Vienna Follow-up Meeting. On the one hand, the aim was to increase the pressure for implementation in areas where the realization of the Final Act was deficient â for instance, freedom to leave the country and freedom of religion â by means of concrete provisions, and on the other hand to set the existing âmechanismâ in motion through permanent monitoring of the human rights practices of the participating states as a result of the obligation to provide information, notification procedures, and bilateral and multilateral meetings. Due to the different political developments in the socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe, however, it was uncertain whether the negotiations in Vienna would produce a reliable result. As a result of this uncertainty, the Western states adopted a wait-and-see attitude, which initially was not conducive to progress in the negotiations.12
The representatives of the Warsaw Pact states were on uncertain ground. The already emerging power rivalries in the Kremlin and increasing differences
It was the representatives of the neutral states with their particular commitment to the âhuman dimensionâ who enabled effective negotiations on the text to begin. On 30 July 1987, an Austro-Swiss working paper was brought to bear on Basket III, organising the now confusing negotiating material on 11 pages and suggesting possible solutions for the relevant and still unresolved issues. In autumn 1987, a series of non-papers by the head of the Austrian delegation, Rudolf Torovsky, in his capacity as coordinator, served the same purpose for controversial issues in the area of human rights such as freedom of information, freedom of expression and freedom of travel.14
In Basket II,15 in which the work had been completed in Madrid after a relatively short time, negotiations in Vienna on the agreement on the drafting of the final text proved difficult. The Western camp was concerned chiefly with more openness on the part of the Central and Eastern European state systems and better conditions for economic cooperation.16 A new focus in Basket II was environmental protection. Austria submitted five proposals regarding cross-bloc cooperation for the further development of international environmental law.17
A revealing interim assessment from the Austrian diplomatic perspective concluded that the course and results of the fifth session of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting from 22 January to 25 March 1988 had so far been, in Torovskyâs view, âdisappointingâ. It became clear from the individual baskets that âlittle concrete progress had been made in the efforts to draft a concluding documentâ.18
The negotiations on military security were the most promising in terms of reaching an agreement, particularly among the states organised in blocs, which was not particularly surprising given that the discussions were primarily focussed on agreeing mandates for future substantive negotiations. According to Torovsky, an East-West climate favourable to arms control issues had a
Torovsky saw the CSCE and the follow-up meetings as parts of a long-term process with a âtendency towards processual development, in which phases of progress in negotiations alternate with phases of stagnation and setbacksâ. In his view, the negotiations in Vienna were characterised by plenary meetings and formal drafting groups, numerous informal forms of consultation, contact groups and task forces â all typical of the CSCE. Leaving aside limited problems in individual baskets, in which there was a difference between tactical reservations on the one hand and substantial political resistance on the other, Torovsky felt able to discern a possible outcome of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting in âbroad outlinesâ as early as April 1988. The final result seemed likely to fall âsomewhere between the very high expectations at the beginning of the [Vienna Meeting] and a Madrid-style outcomeâ, but Austriaâs leading diplomat at the CSCE did not rule out the possibility that âhardening positions on both the Western and Eastern (or both) side(s)â might, in extreme cases, âalso produce a short document with not much of a follow-up programme, as was the case in Belgradeâ.20
Against the backdrop of easing East-West relations and Gorbachevâs reforms in the Soviet Union, the question was repeatedly raised why the Vienna negotiations had so far been so âtoughâ and why the high expectations placed in the follow-up meeting had not yet been fulfilled and ârelative failureâ could not be ruled out. Torovsky cited two reasons:
Despite improved East-West relations, especially in terms of superpower dialogue, the conflicts of interest and differences in ideology and politics remained. Relations improved primarily in the fields of arms control and the resolution of regional conflicts, while many of the CSCEâs broad spectrum of issues had not yet been addressed.
According to Torovsky, the slowing of Gorbachevâs reform efforts had brought about only âmarginal improvements in relations between individuals and the state or partyâ by April 1988, which had âsignificantly reducedâ the likelihood of a greater willingness on the part of the USSR and other socialist states to implement the human dimension provisions.
In spite of all this, Torovsky felt entitled to hope that âmore precise and clearer commitments could be agreed in each of the baskets, which should serve greatly to improve respect for the Final Actâ. At the beginning of April 1988, he recognised for the first time the possibility in the CSCE process of creating âa co-operative monitoring system (or at least serious moves in that direction) of compliance with the CSCE provisions on the human dimensionâ. He also noted that âthe negotiating structures in the military field which are close to being agreed upon [â¦] may encourage moves in the direction of conventional disarmament and a consolidation of military confidence-buildingâ.22
The state of repeated deadlock in the negotiations continued until the spring of 1988. A turning point was reached on 13 May, when the N+N states presented a draft Concluding Document based on the previous negotiations. The initiative led to a re-examination of the Soviet position by the representatives of the N+N and resulted in more flexible instructions, which brought new momentum to the sensitive humanitarian and human rights issues. However, the Soviet delegation had difficulties persuading its less reform-minded allies to support its new course. The greatest resistance came from the Romanian delegation, which, even a month after the presentation of the N+N document, completely rejected any relevant regulations in the area of human rights and Basket III.23
In the autumn months of 1988, new progress was made in the work on the Concluding Document and in the consultations on the mandate for conventional arms control negotiations, which were taking place simultaneously. The particular focus lay on fulfilling the task of holding a conference on human rights and humanitarian issues in Moscow. The proposal presented by the Soviet delegation in the opening phase of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting had initially been met with scepticism and outright rejection by the Western states, especially the United States, Great Britain and Canada. The American delegation had demanded changes to the practice of the Soviet human rights regime as a precondition for its agreement, which in practice amounted to a rejection. As a result, the Soviet delegation had pursued its suggestion with
Although Romanian statements made it clear that the country would not implement Western aspects of the human rights agreements, and although demonstrations taking place in Czechoslovakia and the GDR were being suppressed at the same time, the adoption of the Concluding Document was welcomed as a historic event in East-West relations. This was also the general tenor of the final declarations issued by the foreign ministers of the participating states from 17 to 19 January.25
3 Organisation, Structure and Priorities of the Vienna Concluding Document
Including its appendices, the Vienna Concluding Document contains 81 closely-spaced pages in its German version, 41 of them form the main part. It is divided into first a section on security issues in Europe with 27 principles and their respective subsections, and second a section on CSBMâs and certain aspects of security and disarmament in Europe, based on the Conference on Security and Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in
A first meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension was to take place from 30 May to 23 June 1989 in Paris, a second from 5 to 29 June 1990 in Copenhagen and a third from 10 September to 4 October 1991 in Moscow. The agenda, timetable and other organisational modalities were contained in a separate appendix (X.).27
A seventh section of the Concluding Document deals with the consequences. The fourth main meeting after Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna was to be held in Helsinki from 24 March 1992 to assess the functioning of the procedures set out in the four resolutions and the progress made at the meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. The stated intention was to examine ways of further strengthening and improving these procedures and to pass resolutions accordingly.28
The results were to be duly taken into account at the main meeting in Helsinki. The remainder of the Concluding Document contains eleven major appendices and two sub-appendices.30
4 The Final Documents Compared31
A comparison of the five final documents of Helsinki, Belgrade, Madrid, Stockholm and Vienna (Table 1) provides initial insights regarding the frequency of certain terms. In terms of substance, the selection can be justified as follows: These terms were to be found in most of the final documents and they
Comparison of key terms in the final documents
| Helsinki 1975 | Belgrade 1978 | Madrid 1983 | Stockholm 1986 | Vienna 1989 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abrüstung (disarmament) | 7 | 0 | 10 | 9 | 14 |
| Energie (energy) | 12 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 10 |
| Entspannung (détente) | 6 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 2 |
| Fortschritt (progress) | 18 | 0 | 10 | 2 | 17 |
| Freundschaft (friendship) | 10 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 5 |
| Frieden (peace) | 20 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 4 |
| Gegenseitigkeit (reciprocity) | 4 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Gemeinschaft (community) | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 9 |
| Gerechtigkeit (justice) | 7 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Gleichheit (equality) | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Grenzen (borders) | 7 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 2 |
| Grundfreiheiten/Freiheit ([basic] liberties) | 13 | 0 | 11 | 2 | 34 |
| Integrität (integrity) | 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Klima (climate) | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kultur/kulturell (culture/cultural) | 84 | 1 | 21 | 1 | 71 |
| Menschenrechte (human rights) | 7 | 0 | 11 | 1 | 15 |
| Minderheiten (minorities) | 8 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8 |
| Selbstbestimmung (self-determination) | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Sicherheit (security) | 60 | 11 | 42 | 31 | 72 |
| Souveränität (sovereignty) | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Stabilität (stability) | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 7 |
| Umwelt (environment) | 51 | 8 | 1 | 31 | |
| Unabhängigkeit (independence) | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Verantwortung (responsibility) | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Verhandlungen (negotiations) | 4 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 67 |
| Verkehr [Transit] (traffic [transit]) | 27 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 8 |
| Vermittlung (mediation) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Verständnis/Verständigung (understanding/rapprochement) | 19 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Vertrauen (confidence) | 19 | 0 | 18 | 21 | 24 |
| Zusammenarbeit (cooperation) | 162 | 11 | 52 | 8 | 101 |
| Total | 585 | 26 | 232 | 100 | 523 |
These caveats in mind, what trends does this quantitative analysis suggest? âDisarmamentâ was prioritised in Vienna, âpeaceâ in Helsinki â joined, in Vienna, by basic liberties, freedom, human rights, security and confidence. Based on the frequency in which these concepts were mentioned, the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna Concluding Document can be identified as the two outstanding, most substantial, comprehensive and far-reaching documents of their kind â ground-breaking, that is, in terms of détente and security policy and decisive in terms of human rights. Vienna and Helsinki closed a circle. While Belgrade represented a clear step backwards, Madrid contributed to cohesion but did not achieve any significant progress, while the Stockholm document on âsecurityâ and âconfidenceâ acted as an essential link and indeed a catalyst between Helsinki and Vienna.
These findings are further emphasised when all significant uses of these terms are added up: Helsinki, with 585 mentions, and Vienna, with 523 mentions, are in the lead, with Madrid and Stockholm trailing far behind with 232 and 100 mentions, respectively. The Belgrade final document appears the least substantive due to the textâs very sparse content. To be fair, it must also be added that Stockholm addressed a more limited subject matter, namely âconfidence buildingâ and âdisarmamentâ. However, the importance of Vienna after Helsinki becomes abundantly clear in this type of word field analysis.
The agreement reached in Vienna went far beyond the texts negotiated in Belgrade and Madrid. It reaffirmed freedom of travel for citizens of participating states, gave them the opportunity to appeal against administrative decisions (e.g. on applications for exit visas), committed governments to tolerate Helsinki Monitoring Groups and established a procedure to monitor how well each state was implementing its CSCE commitments. The Western allies agreed to participate in conventional disarmament negotiations, a new round of talks on CSBMâs and the human rights conference in Moscow. In almost all points, the agreement met the criteria of glasnost and the ideas of Gorbachevâs âcommon European homeâ.32 In return, the document gave Gorbachev a new instrument to overrule his critics and justify further domestic reforms.33
During the 27 months of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting, relations between East and West developed with unprecedented dynamism. In complex and controversial negotiations, a Concluding Document was drawn up that translated the impetuses and impulses of previous years into provisions and regulations. This laid the foundations for further progress, particularly in terms of human rights and humanitarian issues. Agreements on human contacts, ease of travel, freedom of information and working conditions for journalists were intended to ensure greater openness between the participating states, the removal of barriers and a free flow of information between East and West. The negotiations on religious freedom, national minorities, control rights and legal remedies were starting points for the creation of pluralism and the rule of law. The newly created mechanism for the permanent monitoring of the implementation of the CSCE human rights agreements, in conjunction with an annual conference on the human dimension, was intended to strengthen the mutual responsibility of states for the fulfilment of their commitments.34
The USSRâs more conservative allies tried to prevent this move towards openness. Although most Central and Eastern European heads of state and government accepted the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty negotiated between Gorbachev and Reagan on 8 December 1987 (in force from 1 June 1988) and supported the Moscow Conference proposal, some Warsaw Pact states feared that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze would go too far. The East German foreign minister, Oskar Fischer, warned that the Soviets would give in to the Westâs âparticularly extortionateâ pressure on human rights, by means of which the Soviets would undermine Communist sovereignty, grant the West a âright to interfereâ and a âright to complainâ under the auspices of the CSCE, and ultimately help it to dismantle socialism by âinfecting the socialist states with bourgeois valuesâ. The Romanian delegates, who raised similar objections, declared that they would not regard any of the agreements reached in Vienna as binding. However, given Gorbachevâs determination to press ahead, opponents and sceptics had little chance of blocking the realignment of Soviet foreign policy.36 By the time of Vienna, the so-called Eastern bloc had long ceased to exist and was visibly disintegrating, and the Vienna Follow-up Meeting itself thus contributed to the end of the Cold War.
The course of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting negotiations was essentially divided into two phases: 1987/88 and 1988/89. Initially, no decisive breakthroughs were achievable. A combination of three âpositiveâ factors played a role in the final success from the second half of 1988 onwards. These were the resurgence of the Gorbachev effect with pressure on Eastern delegations, which led to their more or less willing concessions, the disarmament agreement between the superpowers on nuclear weapons in Europe, and the mediating influence of the neutrals in particular.
A comparison of the final documents shows that Vienna and Helsinki closed a circle in terms both of scope and of substance, while Belgrade and Madrid, in retrospect, appear as merely intermediate and transitional stages. Remarkable successes of mediation and agreement were achieved in the policy areas of âfreedomâ and âsecurityâ, so that Vienna can be seen as the fulfilment of Helsinki, especially with a view to further negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons systems in Europe. The Vienna Concluding Document thus also paved the way for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, one of the most important international agreements in helping to end the Cold War in Europe.
Under Torovskyâs leadership, the Austrian delegation was particularly committed to raising the profile of Vienna as a meeting place, presenting the outcome of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting as a success story of the Ballhausplatz for the benefit of Europe and thereby moving out of the shadow of the countryâs internationally largely isolated president, Kurt Waldheim.37 However, Austrian CSCE diplomacy was not crowned by the honour of hosting the adoption of the charter declaring the end of the Cold War in Vienna. This was to take place in Paris in 1990 at the request of the French president, François Mitterrand.
Previously untranslated German language sources were translated.
Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Schlussakte, Helsinki 1975, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/e/39503.pdf, accessed 16.08.2023; Michael Gehler, âMeilenstein der Friedenspolitik. Vor 45 Jahren, am 1. August 1975, wurde in Helsinki die KSZE-Schlussakte unterzeichnet, ein internationaler Vertrag neuen Typsâ, in: Extra. Die Wochenend-Beilage der Wiener Zeitung, 01.08.2020, p. 33.
On the follow-up meeting in Belgrade, see Wilfried von Bredow, Der KSZE-ProzeÃ. Von der Zähmung zur Auflösung des Ost-West-Konflikts, Darmstadt 1992, p. 79â88.
Jörg Kastl, âDas KSZE-Folgetreffen von Madrid. Verlauf und SchluÃdokument aus der Sicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschlandâ, in: Europa-Archiv 20 (1983), p. 617â626, also published in: Hermann Volle/Wolfgang Wagner (ed.), Das Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen. Der Fortgang des KSZE-Prozesses in Europa, Bonn 1984, p. 45â54; von Bredow, Der KSZE-ProzeÃ, p. 88â96. On the end of détente and subsequently the end of the Cold War in the 1980s see John Lewis Gaddis, Der Kalte Krieg. Eine neue Geschichte, München 2008, p. 243â292.
On the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna and the new quality of the CSCE process see von Bredow, Der KSZE-ProzeÃ, p. 111â132; for a summary see Wilfried Loth, âDer KSZE-Prozess 1975â1990: eine Bilanzâ, in: Matthias Peter/Hermann Wentker (eds.), Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975â1990 (Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte Sondernummer), München 2012, p. 323â331, on p. 330â331.
Bericht über Verlauf und Ergebnis des Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffens, Ãsterreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÃStA), Archiv der Republik (AdR), BMAA, politische Sektion II/Abteilung 7 Entwicklung (II-Pol.) 1989, GZ 804.00/2-II.7/89. The information can be found in BMaA-Abteilung II.7-1989, 804.00 to 804.02.02 OZ 1â120, there from photograph number (Bericht im Haus): 3222â3252 and again from (Bericht im Ausland): 3253â3362 (translated).
Ibid.; on Liedermann, see the article by Maximilian Graf in this volume.
Bericht über Verlauf und Ergebnis des Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffens (translated).
Ibid.
Ibid. (translated).
On the âGorbachev Factorâ see Bernd Stöver, Der Kalte Krieg. Geschichte eines radikalen Zeitalters 1947â1991, München 2007, p. 437â462.
Bericht über Verlauf und Ergebnis des Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffens.
Ibid. (translated).
Ibid.
See the article by Roland Laimer in this volume.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Zusammenfassung der Sitzungsperiode 22.1.â25.3.1988, Ãsterreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÃStA), Archiv der Republik (AdR), BMAA, politische Sektion II/Abteilung 7 Entwicklung (II-Pol.) 1988, GZ 803.12/16-II.7/88. (translated).
Ibid.
Ibid. (translated).
Ibid.
Ibid. (translated).
Bericht über Verlauf und Ergebnis des Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffens.
Ibid., on the Vienna Concluding Document see also Michael Cotey Morgan, The Final Act. The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War, Princeton-Oxford 2018, p. 244â245.
Bericht über Verlauf und Ergebnis des Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffens.
For this and the following, see AbschlieÃendes Dokument des Wiener Treffens 1986 der Vertreter der Teilnehmerstaaten der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, welches auf der Grundlage der Bestimmungen der Schlussakte betreffend die Folgen der Konferenz abgehalten wurde, Wien 1989. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/a/40883.pdf, accessed 30.6.2023.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
The analysis was based on the German versions of the documents. The overview table therefore contains both the English and German terms. Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Schlussakte, Helsinki 1975, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/e/39503.pdf, accessed 16.08.2023; AbschlieÃendes Dokument des Belgrader Treffens 1977 der Vertreter der Teilnehmerstaaten der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, welches auf der Grundlage der Bestimmungen der Schlussakte betreffend die Folgen der Konferenz abgehalten wurde, Belgrad 1978, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/c/40867.pdf, accessed 30.6.2023; AbschlieÃendes Dokument des Madrider Treffens 1980 der Vertreter der Teilnehmerstaaten der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, welches auf der Grundlage der Bestimmungen der Schlussakte betreffend die Folgen der Konferenz abgehalten wurde, Madrid 1983, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/c/40873.pdf, accessed 30.6.2023; Dokument der Stockholmer Konferenz über Vertrauens- und Sicherheitsbildende MaÃnahmen über Abrüstung in Europa, Einberufen in Ãbereinstimmung mit den einschlägigen Bestimmungen des abschlieÃenden Dokuments des Madrider Treffens der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Stockholm 1986, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/2/41240.pdf, accessed 30.6.2023; AbschlieÃendes Dokument des Wiener Treffens 1986 der Vertreter der Teilnehmerstaaten der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, welches auf der Grundlage der Bestimmungen der Schlussakte betreffend die Folgen der Konferenz abgehalten wurde, Wien 1989, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/a/40883.pdf, accessed 30.6.2023
Deborah Cuccia, âThe European Common House: The Soviet Prescription for Reshaping Europeâ, in: Michael Gehler/Wilfried Loth (eds.), Reshaping Europe. Towards a Political, Economic and Monetary Union, 1984â1989 (Publications of the European Liaison Committee of Historians Vol. 20), Baden-Baden 2020, p. 443â459 (translated).
Cotey Morgan, The Final Act, p. 244â245; see also: Rolf Steininger, âEntspannung und Abrüstung im Kalten Krieg. Der KSZE-Prozess und seine Auswirkungen auf die innenpolitischen Situationen in Ost und Westâ, in: Andreas H. Apelt/Robert Grünbaum/Jens Schöne (eds.), 2 x Deutschland. Innerdeutsche Beziehungen 1972â1990, Halle 2013, p. 111â126.
Bericht über Verlauf und Ergebnis des Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffens; on the major breakthrough of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting 1986â1989 from the Vaticanâs perspective see also Paul Wuthe, Für Menschenrechte und Religionsfreiheit in Europa. Die Politik des Heiligen Stuhls in der KSZE/OSZE (Theologie und Frieden Vol. 22), Stuttgart 2002, p. 174â208; on the Concluding Document: Ibid. p. 192â194; on human rights in the CSCE process: Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki effect. International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism, Princeton 2001; Sarah B. Snyder, âThe foundation for Vienna. A reassessment of the CSCE in the mid-1980sâ, in: Cold War History 10 (2010), issue 4, p. 493â512; Andrei Zagorski, âThe Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1975â1990â, in: Nicolas Badalassi/Sarah B. Snyder (eds.), The CSCE and the End of the Cold War. Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972â1990, New York 2019, p. 17â42.
Bericht über Verlauf und Ergebnis des Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffens.
Cotey Morgan, The Final Act, p. 245.
Michael Gehler, âDie Affäre Waldheim. Eine Fallstudie zur Instrumentalisierung der NS-Vergangenheit zur politischen Vorteilsverschaffung 1986â1988â, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 69 (2018), issue 1/2, p. 67â85.