1 European Political Cooperation and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
At their council session on 27 October 1970, the foreign ministers of the six member states of the European Community (EC) â Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany â adopted the so-called Luxembourg (or âDavignonâ) Report, committing themselves to greater cooperation in the field of foreign policy. By introducing European Political Cooperation (EPC), they provided themselves with an instrument for the coordination of foreign policy positions that was to flank economic cooperation.1 By taking this step, the EC sought to strengthen its cohesion and establish itself as a player on the international stage. The long-term goal, as formulated by the heads of state and government in a 1973 document entitled âThe European Identityâ, was a âEuropean Unionâ, in which EC and EPC would be merged, and the fostering of a European identity.2 From the outset, the CSCE was at the centre of this joint undertaking. This was in accordance with the stated intentions of the EC foreign ministers, who in 1970 had defined the CSCE, alongside the Middle East, as a further focus of EPCâs work.3 Last but not least, the member states of the EC â nine in number since Denmark, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973 â regarded the CSCE process as a suitable
However, its claim to act as a unit within the CSCE also made EPC an important forum for EC countries to present their own positions in order to gain the support of their partners for their national goals. This was particularly true for West Germany, part of a divided country in the middle of Europe. In the phase of the realisation and further development of the Final Act after 1975, it sought the backing of its EPC partners in order to push for improved rights for Germans beyond the Iron Curtain. France, on the other hand, which was not part of NATOâs military command structure, pursued its special interest in establishing a forum for disarmament and arms control within the CSCE process.6 Something similar could be said for the United Kingdom in its capacity as transatlantic âbridge builderâ7 or for the Netherlands with its pronounced interest in seeing human rights implemented. In December 1985, just under a year before the start of the Vienna follow-up meeting, the European Council adopted the Single European Act (SEA), which placed EPC on a new footing. With the SEA, the member states â twelve since the accession of Greece (1981) and Portugal and Spain (1986) â also made provisions for the organisational consolidation of their political cooperation. Specifically, this referred to the
How did the EC countries attempt to live up to this claim and implement their CSCE policies in a field where alliance solidarity, European identity and national interests existed in a state of tension? This question will be explored below with a focus on the Vienna Follow-up Meeting.
2 The Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting, 1986â1989
2.1 Preparations
The preparations for the Vienna Follow-up Meeting on the part of its Western participants served primarily for the formulation of goals and the agreement on a tactical approach rather than on reaching conclusions on points of substance. âA fundamental unity of purpose and leeway in individual proposalsâ, is how Ekkehard Eickhoff, the head of the West German delegation, summed up the general approach.10 Already at this stage, familiar national interests came to the fore. The United States once again saw the meeting as an opportunity to criticise the USSRâs human rights record and to press Moscow to make progress on humanitarian matters. Accordingly, Washington advocated an extensive phase of implementation criticism and a set end to the conference on 1 August 1987, the anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. West Germany, on the other hand, pursued a broader approach aimed at progress in all three baskets and the further expansion of the conference system. To this end, as the political director of the West German foreign ministry, Gerold von Braunmühl, put it, it was important to âintegrate our ideas into the starting positions of EPC and NATO for Vienna and at the same time to mould the political declarations of the Western bodies in our favourâ.11
- ââimprovement of the code of conduct contained in the CSCE framework;
- âintensification of the dialogue on security and stability including arms control with regard to the balance of conventional forces;
- âdevelopment of East-West cooperation in Basket 2: economics, science and technology, environment;
- âdevelopment of the contents of Basket 3: the human dimension, cultural identity, information, education.â12
In the course of discussions over the summer of 1986, the EC member states succeeded in asserting themselves in the NATO circle on important procedural issues, such as not aiming for a fixed end date for the conference.13 A compromise was also reached with the United States on the duration of the implementation debate, which was to be concluded at the beginning of February 1987 before entering the proposal phase.
In addition to procedural issues, substantive issues and possible proposals were also discussed during the preparatory phase. The United States, for instance, floated the idea of admitting âHelsinki monitorsâ in the participating states. Denmark endeavoured to set up a âsemi-permanent bodyâ to discuss issues relating to human contacts and family reunification. Greece, for its part, announced that it would propose a further meeting in Vienna on the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Netherlands wished to arrange a meeting of experts on tourism, while Turkey sought stronger protections for migrant workers.14 All proposals were initially only declarations of intent, but they showed in what material terms the Western participants intended to fill out the general guidelines.
2.2 The Conference
Indeed, there was at first no need for concrete proposals, the initial stage being traditionally given over to a critical survey of the implementation of CSCE agreements in the member states. In parallel, until December 1986, the EPC
Unlike the West, the Warsaw Pact states began to make proposals even during the implementation debate, the most striking of which was the Kremlinâs surprising proposal to discuss humanitarian issues in Moscow as part of a conference on human contacts, information, culture and education.16 The actual proposal phase, including for EPC, only began in February 1987. 154 proposals were on the table by the summer, although only a small number of them actually became relevant. The Western camp was responsible for a total of 30 proposals. The EPC group focussed on Basket II. The proposals, particularly in the area of trade but also on science and the environment, were tabled jointly.17
However, the EPCâs main interest was in its so-called âflagshipâ proposal (WT.19) in the humanitarian field. It was formally registered on 4 February 1987. This proposal provided for a mechanism aimed primarily at improved monitoring of compliance with humanitarian obligations, thereby increasing the pressure to fulfil them. This was achieved, first, by an obligation to provide information on questions of human rights and fundamental freedoms (including those of âprivate individualsâ and âprivate groupsâ), second, by the obligation to settle individual humanitarian cases bilaterally upon request, third, by establishing of a notification procedure to keep the other participating states informed and, fourth, by the right of each participating state to request special meetings of the 35 âwithin the shortest possible timeâ âto discuss and resolve specific situations or casesâ. In addition to this strengthened monitoring mechanism, the group was in favour of launching âcontinuous actionâ through a series of meetings that would culminate in a major âconference on
A look at the individual elements of this key Western proposal shows that its elaboration was exclusively the work of the EPC group. Consequently, it was planned to introduce it as a proposal by the Twelve and not as a âWesternâ proposal in Vienna. Naturally, this approach caused annoyance among the NATO partners, who felt excluded from having a say. The EPC approach was criticised for contradicting the usual consensus-building practices and weakening Western cohesion in the key area of human rights. Despite these concerns, however, the other NATO partners soon agreed to support the proposal without making any changes. The EPC group finally agreed to explicitly mention them as co-sponsors in the CSCE plenary sessions while âclearly emphasising the identity of the Twelve in the authorship of the proposalâ.20 This was finally achieved by naming the âmember states of the European Communityâ followed by the United States, Canada, Iceland, Norway and Turkey as co-sponsors in the proposalâs opening sentence.
The other Western proposals were presented in varying constellations. In Basket I, for example, only Belgium, the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA were responsible for a text on terrorism.21 Among the plethora of proposals for Basket III, it is worth mentioning the text on facilitating travel submitted by Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United States and West Germany.22 The different levels of support that characterised these proposals naturally reflected the national priorities that existed within the EPC group. Germany, for example, submitted a total of eight proposals to facilitate humanitarian contacts. It was particularly striking that a total of seven proposals were submitted jointly by Western and Eastern group members, an absolute novelty in the history of the CSCE.23
Concrete work on texts subsequently proved difficult, as the EPC states initially felt unable to enter into negotiations on their own âflagshipâ proposal (WT.19). Differences of opinion persisted, particularly with regard to the precise implementation of the individual measures, but also on the issue of the
Another factor that strongly influenced the EPC countriesâ coordination and approach in Vienna was the question of how to deal with Mikhail Gorbachevâs reform policy. The momentum with which the Kremlin leader pushed ahead with his project to transform the USSR unfolded in parallel with the Vienna Follow-up Meeting and also presented the EPC group with the task of rethinking its negotiating concept. The speech given by Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the
Genscherâs speech also caused quite a stir in Vienna. As the reactions showed, the EPC and NATO were divided into a majority that wanted to wait in Vienna until Gorbachevâs reform announcements were followed by concrete steps, and a smaller group of countries, led by West Germany, which considered it possible to conduct negotiations in a manner honouring Moscowâs willingness to reform.30 At a meeting of EPC foreign ministers in Konstanz on 5/6 March 1988, Genscher suggested holding an âin-depth discussion on human rights issuesâ in the EPC in light of the changed situation in Eastern Europe, which in turn might make it easier for the East to agree to the CAC negotiations.31 However, this approach met with resistance and exposed Bonn to the suspicion that it was forcing a conclusion of the conference at the expense of Western room for manoeuvre in negotiations on the humanitarian dimension.32
Finally, there was a great need for coordination within the Western group on the question of how to react to the Soviet proposal for a human rights conference in Moscow. Reactions in the Western camp ranged from tentative to openly hostile. The US government, recognising that the Kremlin had put itself in a demandeur position with its proposal, began an intensive human rights dialogue with Moscow, focusing on cases of emigration, the release of further prisoners, a reform of Soviet criminal law and religious freedom.33 On the other hand, Margaret Thatcher, the British prime minister, categorically rejected Moscow as a conference venue, while France, for its part, was not prepared to abandon its own proposed conference in favour of the Soviet capital.34
At a further meeting in Brussels on 22 March 1988, the EPC foreign ministers approved a compromise, which they also communicated to Torovsky, on their February non-paper. They reaffirmed the goal of the Twelve to create a mechanism that would enable each participating state to raise individual human
2.3 The âEndgameâ
In the summer of 1988, with the final stages of negotiations looming, further difficulties of coordination between EPC and NATO arose. On 13 May 1988 the coordinators of the neutral and non-aligned (N+N) states drew up a first full draft of a concluding document.36 Yet it soon became apparent that the time before the sixth period of sessions was scheduled to end on 27 June would not suffice. In spite of progress in many matters, some key points remained unresolved. Within the Western group of states the United States, Canada, Iceland, Norway and Turkey wanted to include further humanitarian improvements in the texts of Baskets II and III even at this late moment. These new requests for amendments in turn divided the EPC states. While some, in particular West Germany and France, did not want to jeopardise the N+N draft, others supported the demands â for instance, for an emphasis on the role of âpersons and institutionsâ in environmental matters â so that the EPC group was repeatedly forced to give in.37
In this situation, Genscher and his French counterpart Raimond travelled to Vienna in person to lobby for an early conclusion at the plenary session on 1 July. In so doing, they referred to the guideline that the European Council had set at its meeting three days earlier in Hanover, namely that a successful conclusion in Vienna would open the door to negotiations on conventional disarmament, and argued in favour of continuing the work on the text over the summer.38 This push did indeed at first enable further progress to be made on the text. However, this momentum fizzled out again in the course of the autumn. As far as the EPC and NATO were concerned, this was due to two
for the states of the European Community to call the attention of their American allies to their own positions and to remind them that, as far as they were concerned, the conditions for a swift conclusion to the VFM with a substantial and balanced outcome were in place. It was unacceptable for the countries of the European Community, disregarding their
own interests, to be kept silently waiting for the as yet uncertain conclusion of American-Soviet contacts, [a conclusion] which could scarcely bring any qualitative change to the highly satisfactory conclusion to the VFM that already lies within reach; yet by waiting any longer we ran the risk of losing what we have already gained.43
And indeed, the disagreement was resolved in early January 1989. Following further talks between American and Soviet negotiators, George Shultz, the US Secretary of State, confirmed in a letter to his Soviet counterpart, Edvard Shevardnadze, that his government acknowledged the progress made in the Kremlinâs human rights policy and agreed to holding a conference in Moscow.44 Once a precise mandate for entering into arms control talks had been completed, the delegates passed the Vienna Concluding Document on 15 January 1989, only a few days before a new administration took office in the United States.45
3 Conclusion
Since 1970, EPC provided a forum in which EC member states could coordinate their foreign policy in both its substantive and operative dimensions. Yet EPC did not constitute a homogeneous political bloc. On the contrary, its role at the third CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna was marked by a laborious process of negotiation in Brussels and Vienna. Further, no less difficult coordination took place within the NATO bodies, in which EPC diplomacy was confronted not only by the United States and Canada but also by the non-EPC countries Iceland, Norway and Turkey, which repeatedly felt sidelined by the unity of the EPC group. The EPC group showed itself to be a unified organisation, particularly in the area of Basket II, where it put forward joint proposals. In the humanitarian field, EPC was responsible for a proposal that served as its âflagshipâ. In addition, the EPC countries, in varying constellations, acted as co-sponsors to numerous other proposals.
All those involved took care to ensure that due consideration was given to their respective national interests. As the examples of the CRC mandate and the Moscow human rights conference illustrate, differences in content
Nevertheless, the Vienna Follow-up Meeting was a milestone in the development of EPC as well as in the CSCE process. In particular, the twelve succeeded in opening a new chapter in the CSCE with the âhuman dimensionâ mechanism developed in their proposal WT.19. With the Maastricht Treaty approved by the European Council on 11 December 1991, EPC was finally transferred to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and thus placed on a new footing. A platform for harmonising the foreign policy of the EC member states became the foreign policy instrument of the European Union. In a separate declaration on this chapter of the CFSP, the states named the areas in which they found cooperation to be particularly desirable. At the top of the list was the CSCE process.46
Bericht der AuÃenminister der EG-Mitgliedstaaten über die Politische Einigung vom 27.10.1970 (Davignon-Bericht), in: Europa-Archiv 1970, D 520â524.
âDeclaration on European Identityâ, 14.12.1973, in: Christopher Hill/Karen E. Smith (eds.), European Foreign Policy. Key Documents, London-New York 2000, p. 93â97; Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1973, München 2004, III, Dok. 422, p. 2059â2062; Berndt von Staden, âPolitische Zusammenarbeit der EG-Staatenâ, in: AuÃenpolitik 23 (1972), p. 200â209, on p. 202; Matthias Peter, Die Bundesrepublik im KSZE-Prozess 1975â1983. Die Umkehrung der Diplomatie, (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte Vol. 105), Berlin-München-Boston 2015, p. 56â59; Angela Romano, âThe European Community and the Belgrade CSCEâ, in: Vladimir BilandžiÄ/Dittmar Dahlmann/Milan KosanoviÄ (eds.), From Helsinki to Belgrade. The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting and the Crisis of Détente (Internationale Beziehungen: Theorie und Geschichte Vol. 10), Göttingen-Bonn 2012, p. 205â224, on p. 205â207.
Runderlass von Staden, 23.11.1970, in: AAPD 1970, München 2001, III, Dok. 564, p. 2100â2103.
On the significance of the first phase of the CSCE (1972â1975) for the development of the EPC see the detailed account in Daniel Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War. Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity, London-New York 2009, p. 99â139.
Möckli, European Foreign Policy, p. 109â123; Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau, âThe Nine and Détenteâ, in: Nils Andrén/Karl E. Birnbaum (eds.), Belgrade and Beyond: The CSCE Process in Perspective, Alphen aan den Rijn/Rockville, MD 1980, p. 17â25, on p. 20; Peter, Die Bundesrepublik im KSZE-Prozess, p. 314â317, p. 530â532; Romano, The European Community, p. 216â224.
Veronika Heyde, âNicht nur Entspannung und Menschenrechte. Die Entdeckung von Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle durch die französische KSZE-Politikâ, in: Matthias Peter/Hermann Wentker (eds.), Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975â1990 (Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte Sondernummer), München 2012, p. 83â98.
Kai Hebel, âDie âBrückenbauerâ? GroÃbritannien als transatlantischer Vermittler in der KSZE 1972â1978â, in: Peter/Wentker (eds.), Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt, p. 99â120.
Schrifterlass Schilling vom 10.7.1986, in: AAPD 1986, Berlin-Boston 2017, II, Dok. 189, p. 997â998.
Alting von Geusau, The Nine and Détente, p. 18.
Eickhoff an Auswärtiges Amt (AA), 16.9.1986, in: AAPD 1986, II, Dok. 244, p. 1298â1299. Previously untranslated German language sources were translated by the author.
Aufzeichnung Braunmühl vom 18.3.1986, in: AAPD 1986, I, Dok. 75, p. 430.
âCSCE Process and Vienna Follow-up Meeting (General Remarks)â (Fernschreiben Nr. 255 Coreu aus Bonn), Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin (PA-AA), B 28, Zwischenarchiv (ZA), Bd. 158449.
Eickhoff an AA, 16.9.1986, in: AAPD 1986, II, Dok. 244, p. 1298.
Eickhoff an AA, 16.9.1986, in: AAPD 1986, II, Dok. 244, p. 1296â1300 (cit. p. 1299).
Eickhoff an AA, 20.12.1986, in: AAPD 1986, II, Dok. 374, p. 1947â1957.
CSCE/WT.2, Vorschlag der UdSSR bezüglich der Einberufung einer Konferenz von Vertretern der KSZE-Teilnehmerstaaten über die Entwicklung der humanitären Zusammenarbeit, 10.12.1986, PA-AA, B 28, ZA, Bd. 153445.
Vorschläge zur Einberufung einer Ost-West-Wirtschaftskonferenz (CSCE/WT.58, 18.02.1987, von den USA unterstützt), zum Umweltschutz (CSCE/WT.89, 27.02.1987, co-sponsord by the USA), zur Biotechnologie (CSCE/WT.116, 13.03.1987, co-sponsored by Iceland, Canada, Norway, Hungary and the USA) sowie zur Reaktorsicherheit (CSCE/WT.E.8, 09.04.1987, EPCZ without Italy and Luxembourg), PA-AA, B 28, ZA, Bd. 153446 and 153448. See also Stefan Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation, 1986â1989. A Turning Point in East-West Relations (Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series), Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford 1991, p. 102, p. 200 (panel II).
CSCE/WT.19, Vorschlag über die menschliche Dimension der Schlussakte von Helsinki, 4.2.1987, PA-AA, B 28, ZA, Bd. 153445.
Eickhoff an AA, 12.3.1988, in: AAPD 1988, Berlin-Boston 2019, I, Dok. 92, p. 521, annot. 11.
Eickhoff an AA, 28.1.1987 (Drahtbericht Nr. 84), PA-AA, B 28, ZA, Bd. 153428.
CSCE/WT.116, 13.3.1987, PA-AA, B 28, ZA, Bd. 153446.
CSCE/WT/E.5, 3.3.1987, PA-AA, B 28, ZA, Bd. 153448.
Lehne, The Vienna Meeting, p. 102.
Non-paper, 19.2.1988, in: AAPD 1988, I, Dok. 92, p. 519, annot. 8.
Vermerk âSonder-PK zur Menschlichen Dimension der KSZE am 15.3.1988â, PA-AA, B 28, ZA, Bd. 133568; Aufzeichnung Richthofen vom 21.3.1988, in: AAPD 1988, I, Dok. 92, p. 516â522.
Aufzeichnung Hartmann, 10.10.1986, in: AAPD 1986, II, Dok. 279, p. 1452â1455.
Holik an AA, 11.6.1987, in: AAPD 1987, Berlin-Boston 2018, I, Dok. 174, p. 868, annot. 40.
CSCE/WT.129, 10.7.1987, PA-AA, B 28, ZA, Bd. 153446.
Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung 1987, Bonn 1987, p. 97.
Eickhoff an AA, 4.3.1987, in: AAPD 1987, I, Dok. 65, p. 305â308.
Vermerk über das informelle Treffen der EPZ-AuÃenminister am 5./6.3.1988 in Konstanz, in: AAPD 1988, I, Dok. 92, p. 517, annot. 5.
Aufzeichnung Richthofen vom 21.3.1988, in: AAPD 1988, I, Dok. 92, p. 516â522.
Anatoly Adamishin/Richard Schifter, Human Rights, Perestroika, and the End of the Cold War, Washington DC 2009, p. 161â181.
Aufzeichnung Richthofen vom 21.3.1988, in: AAPD 1988, I, Dok. 92, p. 520.
Fernschreiben Nr. 221 (Coreu) vom 17.3.1988 und Vermerk Haak vom 25.3.1988, in: AAPD 1988, I, Dok. 92, p. 516, annot. 3.
On the N+Nâs full draft see Aufzeichnung Richthofen, 16.5.1988, in: AAPD 1988, I, Dok. 153, p. 835â840.
Eickhoff an AA, 30.6.1988, in: AAPD 1988, I, Dok. 195, p. 1055â1077.
Eickhoff an AA, 2.7.1988, in: AAPD 1988, II, Dok. 196, p. 1059â1064.
Gespräch Kohl mit Mitterrand und Rocard, 4.11.1988, in: AAPD 1988, II, Dok. 313, p. 1661; Aufzeichnung Buerstedde, 11.11.1988, in: Ibid., Dok. 320, p. 1686â1688; Pfeffer an AA, 28.11.1988, in: Ibid., Dok. 343, p. 1797â1800.
Hartmann an AA, 5.11.1988 and 6.11.1988, in: AAPD 1988, II, Dok. 358, p. 1860, annot. 20.
Rantzau an AA, 23.12.1988, in: AAPD 1988, II, Dok. 372, p. 1911â1917.
Ibid., p. 1915.
Rantzau an AA, 28.12.1988 (Drahtbericht Nr. 2020), PA-AA, B 28, ZA, Bd. 153431.
The letter is reprinted in Adamishin/Schifter, Human Rights, p. 178â179. See also Rantzau an AA, 4.1.1988 (Drahtbericht Nr. 22), PA-AA, B 28, ZA, Bd. 158552.
Rantzau an AA, 15.1.1989 (Drahtberichte Nr. 91 und Nr. 92), PA-AA, B 28, ZA, Bd. 158552.
Runderlass Bettzuege, 16.12.1991, in: AAPD 1991, Berlin-Boston 2022, II, Dok. 431, p. 1729â1735. See also âConclusions of the Presidency of the European Council, 26./27.6.1992 in Lisbonâ, in: Bulletin of the European Communities, vol. 25 (1992), no. 6, Brussels 1992, p. 21â22.