1 Introduction
In Helsinki on 1 August 1975, 35 European and North American heads of state and government signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).1 This marked the end of a long process of negotiation which, its prehistory since the mid-1950s notwithstanding, had been initiated by Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) at the time. The purpose of the Final Act was to establish, even amid the conflict between East and West, a modus vivendi in Europe. At the time, both sides had secured important goals in tough negotiations. The Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc states received a guarantee of the status quo in Europe, even if they had to concede the possibility of peaceful boundary changes. Western demands, on the other hand, were met by the inclusion of human rights in the catalogue of principles (Basket I) and a commitment to improving human communication and contacts (Basket III), even if the phrasing used was far from binding. Basket II, which was of particular concern to the East, dealt above all with economic and technological exchange. Finally, Basket IV pledged the parties to periodic meetings in order to prevent the CSCE from remaining a one-off event.2
that it be repeatedly made clear to the East that the treaties and agreements made â not least the Final Act of the CSCE â are the foundations of international relations, respect for which is a precondition for the functioning of cooperation between states and for safeguarding peace.3
In addition, there was the processual nature of the CSCE inscribed in Basket IV. By establishing a system of expert conferences and follow-up meetings, a forum was created in which East and West were committed to a perpetual dialogue which, though it might falter in times of crisis, was never wholly abandoned. Accordingly, the CSCE rules have rightly been called âa Magna Carta of East-West relations in Europeâ.4
Second, once conventional arms control had been moved to the Vienna MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) talks in 1973, the dimension of security policy referred only to Confidence- (later Confidence- and Security-) Building Measures, which consisted primarily of transparency through information, inspection and control of manoeuvres and troop movements. Large-scale manoeuvres were to be announced and observers exchanged,
Third, consideration of the humanitarian dimension â the commitment, that is, to improve personal contacts and communication â can be traced to a demand made by the NATO foreign ministers in November 1969 for âfreer movement of people, ideas, and informationâ between East and West.6 The Soviet Union felt the risks associated with such a commitment to be manageable. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, saw the risk as limited because, as he reportedly said, âWe are masters in our own houseâ.7 Thereby, and by enshrining human rights in Basket I, the CSCE opened up new possibilities for dissident groups, which could cite the Final Act in support of their protests.8 Yet it was not only various Helsinki groups and human rights discourse in East and West that were given a boost but also movements to emigrate from Eastern bloc states, particularly the GDR.9
The Helsinki Final Act thus contained elements that were both stabilising and dynamic. This study deals, first, with the relation between stability and dynamics in the CSCE process between 1977 and 1986, when the international order entered a new period of turbulence known as the Second Cold War. It examines, second, to what extent rising tensions in international politics were reflected in the CSCE process. Third, it shows how, even before the Vienna Follow-up Meeting, the Soviet Union appeared ready to make far-reaching concessions, which is why this study focuses on that periodâs final years.
When the first Follow-up Meeting began in Belgrade on 4 October 1977, relations between East and West were already beginning to be strained by the Soviet Unionâs deployment of modern SS-20 ballistic missiles. Even before negotiations began, the Warsaw Pact states had agreed among themselves not to make any further concessions.10 The US delegation, however, was emphatic in its pursuit of human rights questions, meeting with no less fervent resistance from the Soviet Union. Neither the Federal Republic with its moderate attitude nor the efforts of the N+N participants could help produce a substantial concluding document.11 According to Per Fischer, the head of the West German delegation, there had been no real negotiations in Belgrade.12 Although the meeting ended only with a short, vague document, the Soviet Union did not renege on the acquis de détente, for it had not left the conference and had agreed to another Follow-up Meeting.13 Moreover, it remained committed to arms control talks with the United States, a commitment underscored by the signing of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaty (SALT II) by the two superpowers on 18 July 1979.14
The Second Cold War, which was triggered towards the end of 1979 by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the NATO Double-Track Decision, boded ill for the CSCE process. Yet at the beginning of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting in November 1980, relations between the Western and Eastern groups of states were much less confrontative than they had been three years earlier, as the Soviet Union from the outset was seeking a mandate for a European conference on disarmament. This was motivated by a desire to burnish its image as a power for peace, which had suffered from both the intervention in Afghanistan and its own nuclear rearmament. By doing so, the Soviets hoped in turn to
Although all Warsaw Pact states followed the Soviet lead, the Sovietsâ concessions had taken their alliance partners by surprise and massively compromised their interests. This was particularly true of East Germany, whose leadership under Erich Honecker was well aware that the easing of restrictions on family reunifications and marriages would act as a catalyst for the countryâs emigration movement.16
Moreover, following a promising start in the summer of 1981, negotiations stalled because the United States were now demanding even more Soviet concessions but were rebuffed. The proclamation of martial law in Poland in December 1981 placed a further burden on negotiations, with Washington now eager to âpunishâ Moscow and to make a Concluding Document conditional on improvements in the human rights situation in the Eastern bloc. Bonn, by contrast, was loath to jeopardise the CSCE process, and the West German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was able to persuade the United States not to abandon the talks.17
Although the delegations parted in May 1982, they agreed to resume the Meeting in November, as the Western states too were concerned not only with humanitarian improvements but also with a conference on disarmament. They were minded to implement the rearmament provisions of the NATO Double-Track Decision while signalling their continued interest in disarmament. Negotiations regained momentum in the spring of 1983. The Western states signalled increased flexibility, the Soviet Union, with its overriding interest in a disarmament conference, remained prepared to make concessions, while the N+N states offered their services as mediators in the drafting of a final document.18 The Meeting thus ended in September 1983 not only with a substantive Concluding Document but also with a mandate for a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
3 From Confrontation to Concessions: the CDE in Stockholm (1984â1986)
The CDE, which opened in Stockholm on 17 January 1984, was concerned less with disarmament than with Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMâs). Whereas the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act intended to provide transparency by means of information and inspection of the other sideâs manoeuvres and troop movements had been framed in general terms and placed on a voluntary basis, the aim of the CDE was to specify them, make them obligatory and to âprovide [them] with adequate forms of verificationâ.20
For its part, the Soviet leadership sought to use the CDE as a tribunal, as Boris Ponomarev of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU explained to the CC secretaries of the brother parties, in which to denounce the NATO states immediately after the decision to deploy Western medium-range missiles in Western Europe and to win over the public in favour of Soviet peace propaganda.21 As the propaganda function of the CDE was the main focus for Moscow, the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko explicitly instructed the leader of his countryâs delegation, Oleg Grinevsky, at the end of 1983: âNegotiate only on the major political measures. [â¦] Forget about any notifications and observations.â22 Furthermore, in his opening speech at the
Accordingly, the Warsaw Pact states, almost all of which subordinated themselves to the Soviet leadership, countered Western proposals to increase transparency in military affairs by demanding agreements to abstain from the use of force and a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons. They had no interest in CSBMâs, especially in verification measures, which might reveal details of their own military arrangements to their opponents.25 From the outset, therefore, there was a âfundamental disagreement in the conference goals between West and Eastâ in Stockholm,26 with the Warsaw Pact states loath to negotiate specific CSBMâs until the West had agreed to the aforementioned Soviet demands. This stance did not pay off, however, as the vast majority of the participating states were, according to Klaus Citron, the leader of the West German delegation, very keen on âreaching agreement on concrete CSBM sâ while showing little interest in the Soviet proposals.27 The Soviet Union also initially adopted an obstructive stance on procedural issues, with the result that both sides did not agreed to set up two working groups until the beginning of December 1984.28 The fundamental confrontation between West and East had not changed in Stockholm by the end of the year, nor did Citron anticipate any major substantial progress for 1985.29
The replacement of Konstantin Chernenko as general secretary of the CPSU in March 1985 and of Gromyko by Edvard Shevardnadze as foreign minister in July of the same year initially had no effect on the largely stagnating talks â not
The diplomats at the CDE, which was to terminate in September 1986, began drafting the Concluding Document in January 1986, with the delegates of the NATO states expressing cautious optimism regarding the outcome of the Conference. Yet by March, not one substantive issue had been resolved.33 Even at the end of May, Citron reported to Bonn that the drafting process was making no progress because the Soviet Union continued its obstruction on key points. He identified a âtentative and insecure conduct of negotiationsâ on the part of the East and recorded his impression âthat within the Soviet delegation, the political and military sides seem not always to be in agreementâ.34 This state of affairs also held true for Moscow. Although Gorbachev, addressing the Politburo on 24 April, pushed for greater flexibility in negotiations and instructed the Soviet delegation accordingly, the foreign ministry remained at odds with both the military leadership and the KGB.35 Although the Soviet side indicated the possibility of partial concessions in Stockholm, the chief of the general staff, Sergey Akhromeyev, speaking in the Politburo on 7 August, still opposed Gorbachevâs view that a limited number of inspections on Soviet territory did not pose a security risk. Ultimately, however, Akhromeyev had to give up his
4 Confrontation in Ottawa, Concessions in Bern
At the Meeting of Experts on Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Ottawa (7 Mayâ17 June 1985), East and West could still be found pitted against one another in the usual fashion. The Soviet delegation had been instructed to uphold the Soviet conception of human rights with particular emphasis on socio-economic human rights and to reject any criticism of Eastern bloc practices as interference with those statesâ internal affairs. Once more, therefore, East and West were set on a collision course in Ottawa, with a mediation proposal from the N+N states rejected by the Eastern side. No concluding document could be agreed on; the East stood isolated at the Meetingâs end.40 Remarkably, Gorbachev himself defended Soviet intransigence in Ottawa in a letter to Ronald Reagan: âHowever, there should be no misunderstanding concerning the fact that we do not intend and will not conduct any negotiations
By the time of the Meeting of Experts on Human Contacts in Bern (15 Aprilâ27 May 1986), which discussed questions such as family reunifications and travel and immigration regulations, the situation had fundamentally changed. Although the Soviet delegation pursued âthe buttoned-up Gromyko styleâ by rejecting, from the outset, Western demands for public involvement and distributing only selected speeches to the media, the âinfluence of the Gorbachev factor on the course of this meeting could hardly be ignoredâ,45 for as the Soviet ambassador, Yuri Kashlev, recalled, he had received flexible directives and hence enjoyed considerable leeway in negotiations. Although, at the beginning of the meeting, the West criticised the Eastern blocâs non-implementation of CSCE provisions, and despite East and West each finding the other sideâs proposals to be unacceptable, the Soviet side (unlike the GDR) indicated its willingness to make concessions. In any case, Kashlev was able to persuade the Eastern delegations to agree to a substantial Concluding Document on the basis of an N+N proposal, even if the East Germans felt that Soviet concessions went too far.46 From the Western European (and particularly the West German) perspective, too, the Meeting concluded with a text whose provisions were more binding than those
The Soviet leadership, which had struck observers in Bern by its willingness to make concessions, also appeared to have learnt from events. It is surely no coincidence that on 28 May 1986 Gorbachev, speaking in the foreign ministry, announced that âwe are making a turnaround on human rightsâ. He not only encouraged his audience to be less fearful in the human rights debate but also called for concrete measures to be taken with regard to family reunions as well as emigration and immigration.51 Moreover, a department of human rights was set up as part of a restructuring of the Soviet foreign ministry in 1986, a clear indication that the Soviet Union was preparing for the Vienna Follow-up Meeting.52
5 Conclusion
How then to describe the balance of stability and dynamism in the CSCE process between 1975 and 1986? On the one hand, it can be seen that, far from destabilising it, the agreements signed at the CSCE and its Follow-up Conferences recognised the post-war order. Yet they did unleash social dynamics, for
On the other hand, the basic positions from which East and West embarked on the Follow-up Meetings turned out to relatively stable. Neither in Belgrade nor in Madrid was the Eastern side prepared to surrender key positions. Any concessions made in Madrid were of a tactical nature, aimed at securing a propagandistically useful disarmament conference. Yet these concessions encouraged the emigration movement in East Germany, adding to that countryâs growing instability.
At the beginning of the CDE, which coincided with the peak of the Second Cold War, nothing had changed in the confrontation between East and West. Even Gorbachev, once he had taken office, could not simply flip the switch but had to expend considerable energy in order to overcome resistance to his policies from the military and the KGB. By accepting on-site inspections and making commitments on military transparency, Moscow could be seen to make a clear move away from its previously held basic positions â and this even before the Vienna Follow-up meeting. The background lay in the paradigm shift in Soviet policy inaugurated by Gorbachev, away from absolute security for the Soviet Union and towards a relative security that considered other statesâ security interests and which was to enable the government to reallocate funds from the military to the civilian sector. Against this background, the West had reason to hope that the Soviet Union and the states of the Eastern bloc would show a greater willingness to make concessions in Vienna than they had before.
The term âSecond Cold Warâ in the title strikes me as the most appropriate way of characterising the fundamental break with the era of détente. It began in the mid-1970s, culminated in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and ended with the INF Treaty in 1987. Gottfried Niedhart and Oliver Bange argue that, in view of the increased research focus on the policy of détente, the term âCold Warâ should either be dispensed with completely or used only to refer to the 1950s. This, however, would not do justice to the intensity of the conflict. See Gottfried Niedhart, âDer Ost-West-Konflikt. Konfrontation im Kalten Krieg und Stufen der Deeskalationâ, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 50 (2010), p. 557â594, on p. 588â594; Oliver Bange/Bernd Lemke, Einleitung, in: Idem (eds.), Wege zur Wiedervereinigung. Die beiden deutschen Staaten in ihren Bündnissen 1970 bis 1990, München 2013, p. 9â10, p. 13.
On the origins of the conference and the Final Act see most recently Michael Cotey Morgan, The Final Act. The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War, Princeton 2018.
Aufzeichnung der Arbeitsgruppe Auswärtiges Amt/Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 10.2.1976, in: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1976, München 2007, Dok. 45, p. 196â211, on p. 207. Previously untranslated German language sources were translated by the author.
Peter Schlotter, âHeiÃe Luft oder Magna Charta? Der KSZE-Prozeà nach dem dritten Folgetreffenâ, in: Hanne-Margret Birckenbach/Uli Jäger/Christian Wellmann (eds.), Jahrbuch Frieden 1990. Ereignisse, Entwicklungen, Analysen, München 1989, p. 76.
On the background see Morgan, Final Act, p. 95â100, 189â195.
Declaration of the North Atlantic Council 4./5.12.1969, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26760.htm, accessed 19.6.2023; cf. Matthias Peter, Die Bundesrepublik im KSZE-Prozess. Die Umkehrung der Diplomatie (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte Vol. 105), Berlin-München-Boston 2015, p. 82.
Quoted in Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence. Moscowâs Ambassador to Americaâs Six Cold War Presidents, New York 1995, p. 351.
Ernst Wawra, âEin Schandfleck der westlichen Diplomatie? Der KSZE-Prozess und die Bürger- und Menschenrechtsbewegung in der Sowjetunion 1976â1982â, in: Helmut Altrichter/Hermann Wentker (eds.), Vom Kalten Krieg zu einem neuen Europa 1975 bis 1990 (Zeitgeschichte im Gespräch Vol. 11), München 2011, p. 63â73; Gunter Dehnert, ââEine neue Beschaffenheit der Lageâ. Der KSZE-Prozess und die polnische Opposition 1975â1989â, in: Ibid., p. 87â98; Benjamin Müller, âVon der Konfrontation zum Dialog. Charta 77, Menschenrechte und die âSamtene Revolutionâ in der Tschechoslowakei 1975â1989â, in: Ibid., p. 99â110.
Anja Hanisch, Die DDR im KSZE-Prozess 1972â1975. Zwischen Ostabhängigkeit, Westabgrenzung und Ausreisebewegung (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte Vol. 91), München 2012.
Ibid., p. 188â191.
On the Belgrade Follow-up Meeting see Vladimir BilandžiÄ/Dittmar Dahlmann/Milan KosanoviÄ (eds.), From Helsinki to Belgrade. The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting and the Crisis of Détente (Internationale Beziehungen. Theorie und Geschichte Vol. 10), Göttingen 2012.
Per Fischer, âDas Ergebnis von Belgrad. Das KSZE-Folgetreffen in seiner Bedeutung für den EntspannungsprozeÃâ, in: Europa-Archiv 33 (1978), p. 221â230, on p. 226; Peter, Bundesrepublik, p. 316.
Ibid., p. 317.
Douglas Selvage, âThe Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1977â1983â, in: Matthias Peter/Hermann Wentker (eds.), Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975â1990, München 2012, p. 15â58, on p. 26.
Ibid., p. 28â30.
Hanisch, DDR im KSZE-Prozess, p. 261â264, p. 273â278, p. 285â286.
For a West German view see Peter, Bundesrepublik, p. 445â491.
See, with a special focus on Austria, Benjamin Gilde, Ãsterreich im KSZE-Prozess 1969â1983. Neutraler Vermittler in humanitärer Mission, München 2013, p. 406â430.
These were to be expert meetings on peaceful dispute settlement in Athens, on human rights and fundamental freedoms in Ottawa, on human contacts in Bern, a seminar on security issues in the Mediterranean in Venice and a cultural forum in Budapest: Sarah Snyder, âThe Foundation for Vienna: A Reassessment of the CSCE in the mid-1980sâ, in: Cold War History 10 (2010), p. 493â512, on p. 494â495.
Concluding Document of the Madrid meeting 1980 of representatives of the participating states of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held on the basis of the provisions of the Final Act relating to the follow-up to the conference, 1983, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/d/40871.pdf, p. 9, accessed 23.10.2024.
Douglas Selvage/Walter SüÃ, Staatsicherheit und KSZE-Prozess. MfS zwischen SED und KGB (1972â1989) (Analysen und Dokumente Vol. 54), Göttingen 2019, p. 443â444.
Quoted in in Oleg Grinevsky/Lynn M. Hansen, Making Peace. Confidence Building, New York 2009, p. 121.
Rede Gromykos, 18.1.1984, in: Andrei Gromyko, Auf dem Friedenskurs Lenins. Ausgewählte Reden und Schriften, Berlin (Ost) 1985, p. 411.
See Grinevsky/Hansen, Making Peace, p. 118â119.
Horst Bacia, âDie Stockholmer Konferenz über Vertrauensbildung und Abrüstung in Europa vor der entscheidenden Phase. Eine Zwischenbilanzâ, in: Europa-Archiv 41 (1986), p. 69â78, on p. 73â75.
Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Ruth, 18.1.1984, in: AAPD 1984, Berlin-München-Boston 2015, Dok. 11, p. 51â58, on p. 55.
Botschafter Citron, Stockholm (KVAE-Delegation), an das Auswärtige Amt, in: Ibid., Dok. 275, p. 1264â1265.
Bericht Citrons vom 14.12.1984, in: Ibid., Dok. 311, note 11, p. 1445.
Botschafter Citron, Stockholm (KVAE-Delegation), an das Auswärtige Amt, 19.12.1984, in: Ibid., Dok. 348, p. 1597.
This point is made with reference to 1984 in Selvage/SüÃ, Staatssicherheit und KSZE-Prozess, p. 447â449; for the more flexible attitude of Shevardnadze; Grinevsky/Hansen, Making Peace, p. 351â356.
Ibid, p. 393â398, p. 425â426, p. 430â450.
Erklärung Gorbatschows vom 15.1.1986, in: Michail Gorbatschow, Ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze, Vol. 3: Oktober 1985âJuli 1986, Berlin (Ost) 1988, p. 146â159, on p. 155.
Botschafter Hansen, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 24.1.1986, in: AAPD 1986, Berlin-Boston 2017, Dok. 21, p. 124â129, on p. 126; Botschafter Citron, Stockholm (KVAE-Delegation), an das Auswärtige Amt, 14.3.1986, in: Ibid., Dok. 71, p. 392â402, on p. 393.
Botschafter Citron, Stockholm (KVAE-Delegation), an das Auswärtige Amt, 23.5.1986, in: Ibid., Dok. 151, p. 778â788, the quotes p. 779, 780.
Grinevsky/Hansen, Making Peace, p. 493â499, p. 516â523.
Botschafter Citron Stockholm (KVAE-Delegation) an das Auswärtige Amt, 18.7.1986, in: AAPD 1986, Dok. 203, p. 1061â1070; Grinevsky/Hansen, Making Peace, p. 574â579.
Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe convened in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 19.09.1986, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/d/41238.pdf, accessed 23.10.2024. Although the document was not signed until 22 September, it is dated 19 September 1986 because the clock was stopped during the negotiations on that day.
Botschafter Citron, Stockholm (KVAE-Delegation) an das Auswärtige Amt, 22.9.1986, in: AAPD 1986, Dok. 253, p. 1337â1343, on p. 1342.
Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Hartmann, 30.9.1986, in: Ibid., Dok. 267, p. 1399â1403, on p. 1402; see also Horst Bacia, âDie Stockholmer Konferenz â SchluÃverhandlungen, Ergebnis und Ausblickâ, in: Europa-Archiv 42 (1987), p. 369â378, on p. 377.
Yuliya von Saal, KSZE-Prozess und Perestroika in der Sowjetunion. Demokratisierung, Werteumbruch und Auflösung 1985â1991, München 2014, p. 61â62; Ekkehard Eickhoff, âDas KSZE-Expertentreffen über Menschenrechte in Ottawa â eine Bewertungâ, in: Europa-Archiv 40 (1985), p. 573â580, on p. 578â579.
Gorbachev to Reagan, n.d. [June 1985], in: Ronald Reagan, An American Life, New York 1990, p. 619.
Snyder, âFoundationâ, p. 499; Selvage/SüÃ, Staatssicherheit und KSZE-Prozess, p. 486.
Bodo Karkow in einem Runderlass vom 26.6.1985, in: AAPD 1985, Berlin/Boston 2016, Dok. 168, note 24, p. 884.
Eickhoff, KSZE-Expertentreffen, p. 574â575.
First quotation in: Andreas Doepfner, âDas KSZE-Expertentreffen über menschliche Kontakte in Bern. Einordnung, Beschreibung, Bewertungâ, in: Europa-Archiv 41 (1986), p. 515; second quotation in: von Saal, KSZE-Prozess, p. 63.
See Ibid; Selvage/SüÃ, Staatssicherheit und KSZE-Prozess, p. 503â508.
Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Pleuger, 28.5.1986, in: AAPD 1986, Dok. 156, p. 808.
See Doepfner, KSZE-Expertentreffen, p. 517; Selvage/SüÃ, Staatssicherheit und KSZE-Prozess, p. 508.
Von Saal, KSZE-Prozess, p. 63. As one US senator observed, âThis is the first time that the Soviets have resolved such cases in the context of a CSCE meeting.â Quoted in: Snyder, âFoundationâ, p. 501.
Doepfner, KSZE-Expertentreffen, p. 520; Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Pleuger, 28.5.1986, in: AAPD 1986, Dok. 156, p. 810.
Grundsatzrede Gorbatschows im AuÃenministerium, 28.5.1986, in: Michail S. Gorbatschow, Gipfelgespräche. Geheime Protokolle aus meiner Amtszeit, Berlin 1993, p. 182â200, on p. 195â196.
Selvage/SüÃ, Staatssicherheit und KSZE-Prozess, p. 509.