We1 do not hear much of Proclus during the fourteenth-century Hesychast controversy, but we do hear mention of Pseudo-Dionysius, so I suppose the spirit of Proclus haunts this episode.2
This is what Ken Parry wrote in a brief overview of Proclean studies in Byzantium published a few years ago. Parry’s supposition is undoubtedly correct. The interpretation of Ps.-Dionysian apophaticism lay at the very heart of the controversy, since it appeared to define the possible modes and methods of human participation in God. And behind Ps.-Dionysius loomed Proclus.
To what extent the main protagonists of the controversy were also under the direct influence of the Platonic Successor is a question as thorny as it is intriguing. They were obviously familiar with his name. It crops up a couple of times in the correspondence between Gregory Palamas and Barlaam of Calabria.3 Both times the reference is to a couple of anecdotes reported by Marinus about phenomena observed in the vicinity of Proclus’ head: the light that surrounded it during a public lecture and the Aesculapian serpent that visited it shortly before the death of its possessor.4 Palamas connects the two anecdotes (obviously reinterpreting the serpent in a Christian sense) and suggests that they reveal the true provenance of pagan “enlightenment”, for which Barlaam had expressed his admiration. In his reply, Barlaam sarcastically hints that the “uncreated” light experienced by the Hesychasts may be a similar phenomenon. These passages only illustrate the fact that in fourteenth-century Byzantium Proclus’ name was indeed a byword for all the dazzling and dangerous temptations of pagan philosophy.
To what extent Barlaam made actual use of Proclus’ works in the context of the controversy is not so easy to determine, since most of his writings from this part of his career (notably, Against the Messalians) were destroyed in 1341.5 Still, Michele Trizio has not only discovered tacit borrowings from the Platonic Successor’s commentaries on Plato’s Alcibiades and Parmenides in Barlaam’s letters to Ignatius (Ep. 4–5); he has also identified a number of probable Proclean sources for the Calabrian’s lost works, on the basis of reports in Palamas’ works.6 Moreover, John Demetracopoulos has suggested that the notion of the universal usefulness of dialectic (also in theology) expressed in Barlaam’s earlier (mid-1330s) treatises Against the Latins (1, 1.3 and 2, 1.9) is “inherited” from Proclus’ description of Socratic dialectic.7 Demetracopoulos also suspects Proclean influence (from the Platonic Theology) on some of Barlaam’s terminology in the first treatise Against the Latins.8 As for Barlaam’s only surviving work in Greek with a more narrowly philosophical content, The Solutions to George Lapithes (mid-1330s), Robert Sinkewicz pointed out in a seminal paper that it features some distinctly Proclean terminology and occasional word-to-word correspondence to passages in Syrianus, Proclus’ revered teacher (In Metaph.).9
If, however, we limit ourselves to extant and printed texts related to the controversy, there is really only one author who makes explicit reference to Proclus’ doctrines. This is Nikephoros Gregoras, in two passages of his Roman History (Logos 23.2 and Logos 35.15–17). And these are the passages on which this paper will focus.10
Gregoras, it seems, harboured no doubts that Proclus exerted a direct influence over his main adversary, Palamas. In fact, he claims that the latter’s doctrines are partly copied from the former’s works. To ascertain the truth of this claim would require a more extensive study than I have been able to carry out for this occasion, but I will at least try to describe with some precision what it is in Palamas’ doctrines that Gregoras accuses him of having lifted from Proclus. The claim is made explicitly in Logos 23.2 and recurs implicitly in Logos 35.15–17.11 Both times it refers specifically to Palamas’ doctrine of participation, at which, Gregoras suggests, his adversary has arrived by adopting some of the least palatable views of Proclus, although his error has been compounded by additions of his own, of which the Platonists would never have approved.12
These passages in the Roman History were written from the vantage-point of an already defeated man, in the summer of 1352 and later.13 The final act of the Hesychast controversy had been played out in the early summer of 1351, when emperor John VI Kantakouzenos summoned all the bishops to a council in the palace of Blachernai, an event that Gregoras described as a Robber Council (
At the last session of the council, the triumphant Palamites made their first serious effort to codify their doctrines in the name of the Holy Orthodox Catholic Church. The results of their labours, published in the Synodal Tome,16 were summarized in six paragraphs by one prominent 20th-century orthodox theologian and Palamite scholar as follows:17
-
There is a distinction between Divine Essence (
οὐσία ) and Divine Energy (ἐνέργεια ). They differ from each other in that the Divine Energy is participated (μετέχεται ) and divided indivisibly, and is named and somehow comprehended, albeit dimly, from its effects, whereas the Divine Essence is unparticipated (ἀμέθεκτος ), undivided and nameless, that is, completely above names and incomprehensible.18 -
The Divine Energy is uncreated (
ἄκτιστος ).19 -
This does not give rise to any complexity in God.20
-
The Divine and uncreated Energy is called “Divinity” (
θειότης ) by the Saints.21 -
We know that the Divine Essence and the Divine Natural Energy are inseparable. For no energy can exist separately from the essence to which it belongs.22
-
The Light of the Lord’s Transfiguration is uncreated.23
According to his own account, Gregoras responded directly to the Synodal Tome with his Sixth Dogmatic Oration, which forms part of the third volume of his Roman History (Logos 35.3–46). This is where the claim that Palamas’ doctrine of participation is dependent on that of Proclus occurs for the second time in the Roman History.24 Most of the Sixth Dogmatic Oration, including the passage asserting Palamas’ dependence on Proclus, is a reproduction with minor changes of one of the Orations included in Gregoras’ unedited Antirrhetica posteriora, or Confutations of the Palamite Tome (?1356).25 Since Gregoras states in both Orations that he has demonstrated Palamas’ agreement with Proclus on many other points in his previous polemics (
Any such expectations, however, are futile.27 It is possible, in view of the fact that Gregoras in the same sentence equates Proclus’ views with Plato’s,28 that the reference is to the comparison of Palamas’ and Plato’s views in Antirrhetica priora 1.10.6.29 This would allow us, at any rate, to take the phrase “on many other points” literally, for the only comparison of Palamas’ and Proclus’ views in Gregoras’ extant works concerns their doctrines of participation. And true as it is that the Antirrhetica priora contain a discussion about participation (Logos 2, cf. Logos 3.4), it is entirely based on patristic sources. Accordingly, the only way to take the statement that he has previously demonstrated Palamas’ agreement with Proclus literally is to surmise that Gregoras really has in mind the passage in the Roman History in which the claim that Palamas’ doctrine of participation is lifted from Proclus first occurs (i.e. Logos 23).
Anyway, to proceed in order, let us first look at the last-mentioned passage. It belongs to the lengthy report, in the second volume of the Roman History, of a discussion between Gregoras and his former friend, the renegade Demetrios Kabasilas, which is supposed to have taken place in the aftermath of the Council of Blachernai, in the autumn of 1351, at the Chora Monastery (Logos 22.4–23.3). In the following I will summarize and paraphrase Gregoras’ texts rather extensively. My excuse is that these texts seem to be little known, in part, no doubt, because there are no other translations than the Latin ones accompanying Schopen’s and Bekker’s editions,30 plus van Dieten’s and Tinnefeld’s German summaries, which are sometimes exceedingly brief.31
The part of the discussion leading up to the passage in which Palamas is said to have copied Proclus contains some illuminating remarks on the relevance of pagan philosophy to theology. Gregoras’ approach to this question is a classic example of what has traditionally been known as “Byzantine humanism”. The world, he explains to Kabasilas, is the same for everyone, Christian or infidel, and so are the arts and the sciences. It is no wonder, then, if pagan and patristic authors, in spite of their religious differences, agree even on many points of theological significance.32 In his debates with the Palamites, he says, he had first expected to be assailed precisely for having recourse, on occasion, to the arguments of pagan authors; however, Palamas has saved him the trouble of defending this practice by himself invoking the agreement of the Holy Fathers and the philosophers.33 Consequently, Gregoras proceeds to examine the Palamite doctrines in the light of both pagan and Christian authorities.
He begins by laying out his opponents’ theses: there is a difference between essence and energy in the simple and incorporeal nature that is God, such that God’s essence is completely unparticipated by created beings, whereas His energy is participated (cf. the first paragraph of Chrestou’s summary of the Synodal Tome quoted above). Both essence and energy are uncreated, but the essence is causally prior to the energy. The energy divides into various forms (
Next Gregoras adduces passages from Plotinus and Aristotle to show that the pagan philosophers, contrary to what Palamas maintains, agree with the Fathers—he mentions Athanasius, Basil, Cyril and Theodore (Graptos) but quotes only Maximus the Confessor and Ps.-Dionysius—that there can be no such difference, either in God or in Intellect (which the Fathers alternately identified with God and His image). The same is obviously true of the One: Plotinus and Proclus, he says, testify to this.37
Clearly, then, Gregoras has no objection in principle to seeking guidance from pagan philosophers in general or Proclus in particular, even in theological matters. On the contrary, he first provides a rationale for seeking it and then acts accordingly. But he goes on to point out that it is all-important, in dealing with pagan material, to make sure that one does not, out of ignorance if not malevolence, adopt views that are in conflict with the traditional holy doctrines of the church. This, he explains, is what is so clearly illustrated by the case of the uneducated Palamites, who believe that there are no less than three natures involved in the transfiguration of the Saviour, one consisting in His humanity, and two in His two “divinities” (
At the root of the Palamite error, Gregoras says, is Proclus’ doctrine of participation. Whereas most of Proclus’ theological doctrines steer clear of heresy, Palamas in his ignorance chose to cleave to this particular one, which is particularly unsound.39 To prove his case, Gregoras quotes (both here and in the Sixth Dogmatic Oration) Prop. 24 of the Elements of Theology.40 Not only does he quote the full text of the proposition with its proof, he also provides his own critical commentary.
On Gregoras’ reading of Elements of Theology, Prop. 24, Proclus distinguishes three ranks (
It is tempting to read the last statement as a concession that Proclus had not read the works of Dionysius the Areopagite.43 If this is what Gregoras means, he has a different opinion from that of Nicholas of Methone, who adhered, in his Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, to the thesis, proposed already in the Suda, that Proclus plagiarized Dionysius.44 Apparently, then, Gregoras must have explained the similarity of Proclus’ and Ps.-Dionysius’ views in some other way, probably by assuming that they drew on the same Platonic tradition (he shows elsewhere that he has no qualms about assuming the dependence of the Fathers on pagan philosophers).45
Yet there can be no doubt that Gregoras’ remark about Proclus’ inconsistency is based on his reading of Nicholas. The resemblances are too close to be coincidental, not only as regards the general drift, but even down to some details of phrasing (see below). The charge of inconsistency between the Elements of Theology, Prop. 24 on the one hand and Prop. 1 and 5 on the other is made by Nicholas already in his proem (p. 4.3–15 Angelou) and repeated in his comment on Prop. 24 (p. 32.20–33.7 Angelou). And in his comment on Prop. 23 (p. 31.15–32.5 Angelou), Nicholas offers the same explanation as Gregoras does of Proclus’ reluctance to allow participation in the One, namely, that the philosopher lapsed into thinking in corporeal terms about incorporeal things and thus feared that the One if participated might suffer something like corporeal division and lose its unity. This fear, Nicholas implies, is unwarranted, since, he says, there are even corporeal things, like vocal sounds, as well as intelligible things of the lowest order, such as the individual thoughts of a teacher, which are shared by many (listeners), and to that extent divided, without losing their essential unity. There is all the more reason, then, he concludes, to think that incorporeal things of a higher order can be participated while preserving their unity.
Gregoras comes to the same conclusion, but uses a different counterexample to block the inference from participation to partition: after all, the soul is participated (albeit unparticipatedly) by all the body parts and yet exists as a whole in each of them. There are no special souls for special organs; rather, each body part is activated by the whole soul in accordance with its nature and position: if the hand were constructed like a mouth, it would presumably also be able to speak.46
Dependence is also suggested by the verbal correspondences between the following three passages (Gregoras on the left):
|
He seems to fear lest even the divine may be divided, like bodies, by the things that are affected.47 |
For he seems to fear lest, in saying that the one and whole is participated, he might divide it like a body (…).48 |
|
If this is the case, then a fortiori God, who is present everywhere and fills all things, will be participated by all things.49 |
How could that which is equally present in all things and fills all things not be participated by all things?50 |
|
For even when He becomes present in all things individually He is a whole, and He remains a whole in Himself and in all things and before all things, and the same [God] is as a whole participated and as a whole unparticipated.51 |
[For the incorporeal is not divided, but,] even when it becomes present in all things individually, it is a whole and remains a whole in itself, so that the same thing is in all things and before all things both participated as a whole and unparticipated as a whole.52 |
On the other hand, Gregoras’ two quotations of Proclus, Elements of Theology, Prop. 24, as transmitted in MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1095, f. 82v and f. 245v, provide no firm evidence for his dependence on any particular textual source. There is one notable variant in each of them.53 In Logos 23.2.6, p. 1101.1–2 Schopen (the first quotation), Gregoras writes (a)
In his quotation of the Elements of Theology, Prop. 3 (cf. n. 37 above),56 finally, Gregoras is closer to the MSS of Nicholas (and B, which belongs to the same family) than to any other MS, but there are also a couple of deviations from their text: p. 4.2
In sum, Gregoras may well have drawn on more than one MS of the Elements of Theology, but at least one of them also contained Nicholas’ refutation.
When Nicholas and Gregoras criticize Proclus for inconsistency, this may seem slightly disingenuous. After all, they both themselves affirm that God is both participated as a whole and unparticipated as a whole.57 What they really cannot accept, of course, is Proclus’ resolution of this apparent contradiction, that is, the introduction of a second rank consisting of participated things, whose function is to bridge the gap between divine immanence and divine transcendence.58 Now, what Palamas has done, according to Gregoras, is to follow Proclus both in positing an unparticipated and superordinate God and in positing a second rank consisting of participated and subordinate divinities (his
Gregoras later argues in much the same way concerning the relation between Plato and Palamas: Palamas follows Plato, except that he calls his secondary divinities “uncreated”, which neither Plato nor Pythagoras nor any other Greek philosopher would ever do.60 There is a complication here, in that Gregoras begins by comparing Palamas’ divinities to the created gods in Timaeus 41a–b, but then makes it clear that he in fact equates them with Platonic Forms, which he describes as “co-unoriginated and co-eternal [sc. with the creator], but other-natured”,61 and yet apparently denies that Plato (or any other Greek philosopher) would ever have called “uncreated”.62
In short, then, Gregoras in the second volume of the Roman History accuses Palamas of following Proclus in positing secondary and participated divinities and for departing from Proclus (and everybody else) in calling these divinities “uncreated” and “unoriginated”.
Turning now to the Sixth Dogmatic Oration (Logos 35.3–46), we will find that Gregoras has altered his interpretation of the Elements of Theology, Prop. 24, but still maintains that Palamas’ three-ranks theory is identical with that of Proclus, except in ascribing uncreatedness to the second-rank entities. The alteration consists in understanding Proclus’ second rank as being filled by entities both participating and participated, something which seems to throw the Platonic Successor’s entire system into confusion.63 Why has Gregoras altered his interpretation of Proclus in this peculiar way? One possibility is that he has adapted it to fit his interpretation of Palamas, whose uncreated light is also described in the same passage as both participating and participated.64 Whether—and if so, why—Gregoras’ interpretation of Palamas changed between the composition of Logos 23 and that of Logos 35, I cannot say, but Palamas does in fact seem to identify the divine energies with the participations-in-themselves (
The same conclusion is also reached by Gregoras, but via a different trajectory, in which the divine energies’ participation in being plays no part. At the end of his discussion of Palamas’ doctrine of participation,70 he attempts to prove his saintly adversary’s mistake with the help of a hypothetical syllogism. The phrasing is a bit messy, but the argument, I think, is this: If God surpasses all things, those participated as well as those participating, infinitely many times infinitely, as Maximus says and Palamas agrees,71 and if, as Basil the Great said,72 those things are equal which are in equal measure surpassed, it follows that the participated light must be equal to all participating things. Hence, since everything is either created or uncreated, and created and uncreated things cannot be equal, either the participated light is created or all participating things are uncreated.73 Since the latter disjunct is impossible, then, the former must be true.
If we turn back to Gregoras’ discussion of the identity of Palamas’ and Proclus’ doctrines in Logos 35.14–16, it is worth noting that it is immediately preceded by a passage (Logos 35.11–13) in which he attempts to show that the Council of Blachernai has distorted the sense of a patristic text that it adduced in support of a real distinction between two uncreated divinities (Synodal Tome of 1351, sec. 46). This text is a snippet from Maximus the Confessor’s Diversa capita ad theologiam et oeconomiam spectantia (1.7),74 according to which God, “in whose essence created beings do not participate (…) wills that those capable of so doing shall participate in Him according to some other mode.”75 Gregoras points out that the subsequent lines, not quoted in the Synodal Tome of 1351, state that “even that mode (
This appears not to be such an efficient argument against the visibility of the uncreated light, since the Palamites may reasonably reply that the visibility of the means or medium of participation in no way precludes the concealedness of the mode of participation (in other words, it may be possible to participate in God through uncreated light regardless of whether it is possible to understand how this could work). On the other hand, the quotation may be seen to support a general argument against any sort of attempt to explain how it is that human beings can participate in God, so that is probably how it is intended. After all, what is offered by the theory of the uncreated light is an explanation as to how it is that God can be participated in spite of being essentially unparticipated.
Gregoras’ own doctrine of participation is traditional but hardly intellectually satisfying. As Ps.-Dionysius said (quoted, as always, from the paraphrase in Euthymios Zigabenos’ Panoplia dogmatica),78 God is participated by everything, according to his essence no less than according to his “energies”, although, of course, unparticipatedly. And that is all there is to the matter.79 The upshot seems to be that Gregoras’ criticism of Palamas for having introduced a second rank of uncreated divinities is fundamentally motivated by his rejection of the applicability of the categories of the human intellect to the mysterious realm of the divine.
At the end of the day, I suppose the really interesting question is the one that I have evaded in this paper, namely whether Gregoras was right. Regardless of the dubious accuracy of Gregoras’ interpretations of Palamas’ and Proclus’ doctrines of participation, is there any reason to suspect that Palamas—who was not by any standards a “Byzantine humanist”—was indeed drawing directly on Proclus, or is all the Proclean influence on Palamism mediated by Ps.-Dionysius and his followers? Well, as I said at the outset, this is a question for a more extensive study. But in order to end on an encouraging note—and with another quotation—some scholars who have discussed the question seem to be inclined to think that Gregoras was right, for instance John Demetracopoulos, who argues in a recent paper that “Palamas consciously and directly integrated some of Syrianus’ and Proclus’ metaphysical tenets (…) in his description of the structure of divine reality.”80
A first version of this paper was presented at a workshop devoted to “Proclus in Byzantium”, organized by Charles Barber and Stephen Gersh at the University of Notre Dame’s London Centre in the Spring of 2013. I am grateful to Joshua Robinson for the opportunity to revise it for publication in this volume.
K. Parry, “Reading Proclus Diadochus in Byzantium”, in H. Tarrant, D. Baltzly (eds), Reading Plato in Antiquity (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), pp. 223–235, here p. 230.
Gregory Palamas, Epistula 1 ad Barlaam, ed. J. Meyendorff, in P.K. Chrestou (ed.),
Marinus, Vita Procli, ed. H.-D. Saffrey, A.-P. Segonds (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2002), p. 23.14–29; p. 30.12–21.
R. Sinkewicz, “The Solutions Addressed to George Lapithes by Barlaam the Calabrian and Their Philosophical Context”, in Mediaeval Studies 43(1981), pp. 151–217, here p. 192.
M. Trizio, “ ‘Una è la verità che pervade ogni cosa’: La sapienza profana nelle opere perdute di Barlaam Calabro”, in A. Rigo (ed.), Byzantine Theology and its Philosophical Background (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), pp. 108–140.
In his commentary on the Parmenides? He does not say. Cf. J.A. Demetracopoulos, “Thomas Aquinas’ Impact on Late Byzantine Theology and Philosophy: The Issues of Method or ‘Modus Sciendi’ and ‘Dignitas Hominis’ ”, in A. Speer, P. Steinkrüger (eds), Knotenpunkt Byzanz: Wissensformen und kulturelle Wechselbeziehungen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), pp. 333–410, here pp. 349–350.
J.A. Demetracopoulos, “Further Evidence On the Ancient, Patristic, and Byzantine Sources of Barlaam the Calabrian’s Contra Latinos: À propos de A. Fyrigos (ed.), Barlaam Calabro, Opere contro i Latini”, in Byzantinische Zeitschrift 96(2003), pp. 83–122, here p. 85. The phrase concerned is
Sinkewicz, “The Solutions”, pp. 174–182.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, ed. L. Schopen, vol. 2 (Bonn: Weber, 1830), p. 1094.7–1111.12, and Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae libri postremi, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn: Weber, 1855), p. 481.22–483.11. For the sake of completeness I should also mention the quotation of Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, 139 (ed. A.D. Angelou, Athens / Leiden: Academy of Athens / Brill, 1984, p. 129, l. 13–25), in a polemic against John VI Kantakouzenos, preserved in Vat. gr. 1096 and tentatively attributed by its editor, Polemis (Theologica varia inedita saeculi XIV, ed. I.D. Polemis, [Turnhout: Brepols, 2012]), to John Kyparissiotes, but more likely to be the work of the scribe himself, Gregoras’ erstwhile student Isaac Argyros (see A. Gioffreda, M. Trizio, “Nicholas of Methone, Procopius of Gaza and Proclus of Lycia”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes, Vol. 2. Translations and Acculturations (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2020), pp. 94–135, here pp. 124–128). Proclus is mentioned in this work (Adversus Cantacuzenum 158.1 TLG), but only in his capacity as author of the work refuted in the work from which the author of Adversus Cantacuzenum quotes (which the latter apparently believed to have been written by Procopius of Gaza: for the latest contribution to the debate over the authorship of Nicholas’ Refutation, see Gioffreda, Trizio, “Nicholas of Methone”).
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.6, p. 1103.1–6:
It seems to have been Gregory Akindynos who first thought of comparing Palamas’ views on participation to those of Proclus. Unfortunately, the work (
According to J.L. van Dieten, Logoi 18–27.8 were composed during Gregoras’ house arrest between June and August 1352. J.L. van Dieten, Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte / Historia Rhomaike, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1994), pp. 1–5.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 20.7.8, p. 995.13, et alibi.
On the other hand, it is celebrated by some modern Palamites as the concluding part of the Ninth Oecumenical Council—the Eighth being the council of Constantinople in 879.
Edited by I.N. Karmiris and most recently by F. Lauritzen. Cf. I.N. Karmiris,
P.K. Chrestou,
Cf. the Synodal Tome, secs 19–29.
Cf. the Synodal Tome, secs 30–31.
Cf. the Synodal Tome, secs 32–33.
Cf. the Synodal Tome, secs 34–37.
Cf. the Synodal Tome, secs 38–45.
Cf. the Synodal Tome, sec. 46.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae, 35.14–17, p. 481.5–483.11.
MS Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 56.14, ff. 83r–90v (Logos 6) ≈ Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae, 35, p. 474.7–497.16. The passage on Palamas and Proclus is found at 85r–v. An edition of the Antirrhetica posteriora in preparation by M. Paparozzi is mentioned by H. Hunger, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1978), vol. 1, p. 52 n. 43, but has never appeared. The Laurentianus is codex unicus. On the work and the manuscript, see M. Paparozzi, “Appunti per lo studio degli inediti Antirrhetici posteriores di Niceforo Gregoras”, in Atti della Accademia dei Lincei 1973, Rendiconti: Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, ser. 8, vol. 28, fasc. 7–12 (Roma: Tipografia della Accademia, 1974), pp. 921–951.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae, 35.14, p. 481.5–9; Antirrhetica posteriora 6 (MS Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 56.14, f. 85r). Text in n. 28 below.
F. Tinnefeld maintains that the reference (in the Roman History) is indeed to the Antirrhetica priora, where Gregoras alludes “an drei Stellen ohne Namensnennung auf Proklos-Formulierungen”; but none of the three passages he cites can be described as a demonstration of Palamas’ agreement with Proclus. F. Tinnefeld, Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte / Historia Rhomaike, vol. 6 (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 2007), p. 132 n. 430.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae, 35.14, p. 481.5–9: (…)
Nikephoros Gregoras, Antirrhetica I, ed. H.-V. Beyer (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1976), p. 213.1–17. On this passage, see further below, nn. 36 and 59.
By Schopen for vol. 2; by Reisacker and Rosenstein for vol. 3, book 35.
van Dieten, Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte, vol. 4; Tinnefeld, Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte, vol. 6.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.4, p. 1099.3–21; cf. Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.1.4–5, p. 1086.16–1087.13, especially p. 1087.7–9:
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.1.2, p. 1082.14–1083.1; 22.4.10, p. 1074.6–10; 22.4.11, p. 1076.9–11; p. 1079.7–11.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.1.4, p. 1086.2–16:
Although Palamas does say, apparently paraphrasing a scholion on Maximus the Confessor, Ad Thalassium 61 (
Nikephoros Gregoras, Antirrhetica I, 1.10.6, p. 213.12–17; cf. Nikephoros Gregoras, Antirrhetica I, 1.8.2, p. 183.4–5 (with Beyer’s n. o.).
No difference between essence and energy in God: Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.1.6–7, p. 1088.1–1090.4; in Intellect: Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.1.8–9, p. 1090.4–1091.19; in the One: Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.1.10, p. 1091.19–1093.12. The Plotinus citations in 23.1.6–9 are from Enneads 6.7–8 (for details, see van Dieten, Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte, vol. 4, p. 331 n. 558 and p. 333 n. 562). The Aristotelian passages are (a) a free rendition of De interpretatione 13, 23a21–23 with Ammonius’ commentary (ed. A. Busse, Berlin: G. Reimer, 1897), p. 248.27–30 (or perhaps of a commentary or paraphrase based on the latter); (b) a free rendition of De caelo 2.3, 286a8–10 (or of a paraphrase of it); and (c) Theodore Metochites’ paraphrase of De anima 3.5 (MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 303, f. 175v; as van Dieten points out [Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte, vol. 4, 333 n. 562], 26 words of this quotation are missing in Schopen’s text). Ps.-Dionysius is consistently quoted from Euthymios Zigabenos’ Panoplia dogmatica, presumably because the original works were inaccessible to Gregoras in Chora. On Gregoras’ claims to have been deprived of his copies of the Bible and the Fathers, see van Dieten, Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte, vol. 4, p. 332–333 n. 561. The Plotinus citations in 23.1.10 are from Enneads 6.9; for details, see van Dieten, Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte, vol. 4, p. 333 n. 563. The Proclus testimony consists of Elements of Theology 3, proposition and proof, quoted in extenso, although Gregoras leaves it to his audience to ascertain Proclus’ general agreement in the Elements of Theology with Plotinus, “since my headache does not allow me to pore over it” (Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.1.11, p. 1093.12–16).
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.4–5, p. 1099.23–1100.20.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.6, p. 1101.11–14:
Proclus, Elements of Theology, ed. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 24, p. 28.8–20 in Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.6 (p. 1100.22–1101.11); and Proclus, Elements of Theology, p. 28.8–18 in Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae, 35.14 (p. 481.11–21).
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.6, 1101.15–1102.7. Cf. Proclus, Elements of Theology 1, p. 2.1:
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.6, p. 1102.7–11:
Cf. (Ps.‑)Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus, 2.5, ed. B.R. Suchla (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990), p. 128.17–129.3.
In his comment on the Elements of Theology 122 (ed. Angelou, p. 117.25–29). Cf. Suda, ed. A. Adler (Leipzig: Teubner, 1928–1935),
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.1.1, p. 1080.6–1081.4:
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.6, p. 1102.11–19:
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.6, p. 1102.7–8:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 23, p. 31.17–18:
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.6, p. 1102.19–21:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 23, p. 32.12–13:
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.6, p. 1102.21–1103.1:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 23, p. 32.14–17:
I refer to Proclus MSS by the sigla employed by Dodds: B = MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 237; C (Nicholas’ Refutation) = MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 626; D (Nicholas’ Refutation) = MS Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, P 206 sup. (Martini-Bassi 648); M = MS Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, gr. Z 512 (coll. 678); P = MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 2423; Q = MS Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, gr. Z 521 (coll. 316); E (Nicholas’ Refutation) = MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1256; O = MS Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud gr. 18. Readings are as reported by Dodds, except for E, which I have collated myself, since it is only occasionally cited by Dodds. I’d like to thank Carlos Steel for helpful discussion of M.
The second quotation is identical to that in MS Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 56.14, ff. 85r–v (see n. 25 above).
There are also a few variants common to both quotations: p. 28.10
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.1.11, p. 1093.19–1094.6; MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1095, f. 80v.
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 69, p. 69.28–71.5; 81, p. 84.5–19; see further J. Robinson, “Dionysius Against Proclus: the Apophatic Critique in Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation of the Elements of Theology”, in D.D. Butorac, D.A. Layne (eds), Proclus and His Legacy (Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, 2017), pp. 249–269, here pp. 257–263.
As observed, in the case of Gregoras, by E. von Ivánka, and, in the case of Nicholas, by Robinson. E. von Ivánka, Plato Christianus: Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Väter (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1964), p. 403. Robinson, “Dionysius Against Proclus”, p. 263.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.7, p. 1103.1–1104.4. The allegation that Palamas ascribes uncreatedness and unoriginatedness to third-rank entities is baffling:
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.9–10, p. 1106.18–1108.20. The argument also occurs in Nikephoros Gregoras, Antirrhetica I, 1.10.6, p. 213.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.10, p. 1107.10–11: (…)
It may of course well be true that no Greek philosopher described the Forms as
Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae, 35.15, p. 481.22–482.12:
Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae, 35.15, p. 482.8–12 (text in the preceding note).
(Ps.‑)Dionysius the Areopagite, De Divinis nominibus, 5.5, p. 184.11–16; 12.4, p. 225.17–20.
(Ps.‑)Dionysius the Areopagite, De Divinis nominibus, 5.5, p. 184.12–15: (…)
Gregory Palamas, Epistula 3 ad Acindynum, ed. J. Meyendorff, in Chrestou (ed.),
Gregory Palamas, Capita CL, ed. R.E. Sinkewicz (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988), 87–89, pp. 184–188.
Gregory Akindynos, Refutatio magna, ed. J. Nadal Cañellas (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), 2.19, ll. 53–76, p. 112.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae, 35.16–17, p. 482.17–483.11.
Maximus the Confessor, Capita ducenta ad theologiam Deique Filii in carne dispensationem spectantia 1.49, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris: Migne = PG90, 1865), col. 1101A; Gregory Palamas, Pro hesychastis 3, 2.7, p. 662.16–21 et alibi; see also Beyer in Nikephoros Gregoras, Antirrhetica I, p. 178 n. b.
Basil the Great, Adversus Eunomium 1.27 (Paris: Migne = PG29, 1857), col. 569C.
Cf. Nikephoros Gregoras, Antirrhetica priora, I, 3.4.14–15, pp. 403–405.
Maximus the Confessor, Diversa capita ad theologiam et oeconomiam spectantia (Paris: Migne = PG90, 1865), coll. 1180C–1181A.
The Philokalia: The Complete Text, transl. G.E.H. Palmer, P. Sherrard, K. Ware, vol. 2 (London: Faber & Faber, 1982), p. 165.
The Philokalia, p. 165. Gregoras actually quotes the main clause as “(…) is comprehensible to God alone and concealed to all other [beings]” (Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae, 35.13, p. 481.1–2).
Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae, 35.13, p. 480.22–481.5; “visible”: Nikephoros Gregoras, Historiae Byzantinae, 35.16, p. 482.14.
Euthymios Zigabenos, Panoplia dogmatica (Paris: Migne, 1865) PG 130, 132A; cf. (Ps.‑)Dionysius the Areopagite, De Divinis nominibus, 2.5.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, 23.2.8, p. 1104.5–1105.10. Cf. Nikephoros Gregoras, Antirrhetica posteriora 4, MS Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 56.14, f. 47r–v.
J.A. Demetracopoulos, “Palamas Transformed”, p. 278; cf. pp. 355–356 with n. 293. See also Carlos Steel’s contribution to this volume. A cautionary note is struck by S. Mariev, “Neoplatonic Philosophy in Byzantium: An Introduction”, in S. Mariev (ed.), Byzantine Perspectives on Neoplatonism (Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, 2017), pp. 1–29, here pp. 16–18.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Manuscripts
Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, P 206 sup. (Martini-Bassi 648) (with Nicholas’ Refutation)
Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud. gr. 18
Printed Sources
Aristotle, De interpretatione, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949.
Aristotle, De caelo, ed. P. Moraux, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1965.
Gregory Palamas, Capita CL, ed. R.E. Sinkewicz, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988.
Marinus, Vita Procli, ed. H.-D. Saffrey, A.-P. Segonds, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2002.
Nikephoros Gregoras, Antirrhetica I, ed. H.-V. Beyer, Wien, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1976.
Plato, Timaeus, ed. J. Burnet, vol. 4, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1902.
Plotinus, Enneads, ed. P. Henry, H.-R. Schwyzer, 3 vols, Leiden, Brill, 1951–1973.
Proclus, Platonic Theology, ed. H.-D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink, 6 vols, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1968–1997.
Secondary Sources
Constas, M. see Maximos the Confessor. On Difficulties in Sacred Scripture.
Demetracopoulos, J.A., “Thomas Aquinas’ Impact on Late Byzantine Theology and Philosophy: The Issues of Method or ‘Modus Sciendi’ and ‘Dignitas Hominis’”, in A. Speer, P. Steinkrüger (eds), Knotenpunkt Byzanz: Wissensformen und kulturelle Wechselbeziehungen, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2012, pp. 333–410.
Klemes (2012) = Κλήμης Ἐπίσκοπος Γαρδικίου, “Οἱ Ἡσυχαστικὲς Σύνοδοι τοῦ ΙΔ´ αἰῶνος ὡς ἡ Θ´ Οἰκουμενικὴ Σύνοδος τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας”, https://www.imoph.org/pdfs/2012/12/05/20121205aHsyxastSynodoi-11-12/20121205aHsyxastSynodoi-11-12.pdf.
Robinson, J., Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation of Proclus: Theology and Neoplatonism in 12th Century Byzantium. A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Graduate Program in Medieval Studies, Notre Dame (Indiana), 2014.