1 Introduction
In Christian teaching, analogy as a method primarily connects ontology with epistemology, where the former precedes the latter, according to the application of consistent realism, which the exponents of the analogical method adopt. The fact that analogy is related both to descriptions and interpretations of sensible beings and to the reduction of their content to metaphysical realities also emphasizes its close relevance to natural theology. Furthermore, since natural theology considers the eternal immanence of the divine in nature through various ways that can be captured by human perception and cognitive elaboration to some extent, analogy is also about how causality will be analyzed, which constitutes one of its most crucial foundations.
In this paper, we will attempt to study the principle of analogy in Nicholas of Methone (c. 1110–c. 1165), one of the most emblematic anti-Neoplatonist thinkers of Byzantium. We will focus on Nicholas’ Refutation of the Elements of Theology by Proclus (412–485). We need to mention in the first place that Nicholas, like other Christian thinkers, argues for the principle of causality as the foundation of the determinations which the metaphysical world emits to the natural level, both ontologically and epistemologically (while at the same time we should not ignore questions that pertain to the fields of ethics and aesthetics). And the principle of analogy is based exactly on this holistic presence of causality in every particular case, which is used quite extensively, but without being absolutized as to the possibility of its linguistic depictions and semantic extensions, since any accuracy of them is contended that it is defined by the range of human capacity. The first question that we will deal with is whether analogy is transferred by Nicholas into the metaphysical world, as is the case, for example, of Proclus’ hierarchically structured metaphysical world, which is formed by direct and mediating dependencies of the lower gods upon the higher. By extension, is analogy for Nicholas a term, or method, to understand the metaphysical world? In a broader sense, what is its exact function as also a strictly methodological mode, in order for valid epistemological products to be formed?
We should first clarify that both Christianity and Neoplatonism adopt ontological monism—that is, the idea that all things depend on one cause grounding the plurality of beings. The difference between them is that the former embraces monotheism, while the latter defends polytheism. This theoretical detail is crucial, for it defines the degree of analogy between the metaphysical and natural world as to their essence, structure and functions. In a monotheistic model, analogy is not as complicated as it is in a polytheistic model that functions with intermediaries, since there are many causes that are hierarchically structured. Having in mind intertextuality, one should also note that Proclus refers to analogy in all of his treatises, such as the Theologia Platonica, which was likely written after the Institutio theologica, which Nicholas criticizes.1 Our examination of the two thinkers is limited to the texts that Nicholas focuses on. This also affects the range of the theories.
2 Analogy as a Method to Refute Proclus’ Metaphysical Positions
For Proclus, as we have already mentioned in our introduction, metaphysical hierarchy within a manifold of causes or gods is presupposed. A typical example is prop. 72 of the Institutio theologica, where Proclus contends that “all those characters which in the participants have the relative position of a basis proceed from more complete and more universal causes.”2 According to Nicholas, this proposition leads Proclus to accept that matter—which, Proclus demonstrates in the next prop. 73,3 comes from the One—is superior to the “forms”, which come from Being.4 But this hierarchical structure, as Nicholas describes it, implies that matter participates in an exclusive way in the One, body in Being and the ensouled body in Soul.5 According to the principle of analogy, if the One is superior to Being and if Being is superior to Soul, then matter is superior to body, and what is shapeless and formless is superior to that which is shaped and formed.6 Therefore, it follows that the soulless body is superior to the ensouled. In other words, any relationship between the causes will also be applied by extension to its effects. But according to Nicholas this syllogism cannot be true either for the Christian or generally for the philosophical tradition,7 for the ensouled is closer and more akin to the divine and the formal is superior to the formless, since, according to the argument presented, the opposite of “form” is privation. Furthermore, if we accept this hierarchy, we will also have to apply it to the higher levels. Or else, through reversal back toward the lower level of being, if the ensouled is superior to the soulless and if body is superior to matter, then Soul must precede Being and Being must precede the One. But this is a hierarchy that is contradicted by both Christian and Neoplatonist frameworks.8 In this case of production, analogy as a methodological mode can only function according to both these directions, but not in an inflexible way, since in Proclus causal interventions are explicit.
However, this analogy, from both sides, cannot be accepted by Nicholas, since the One would then become equivalent to nothing:9 in other words, it would lead to an indirect but inevitable identification of God with nothingness. In this rationale, it is assumed that matter has no “form” and that is why it is deprived of existence. It is therefore ontologically eliminated and, by extension, any possible cause of it also becomes non-existent. However, this conclusion is absurd, since even Proclus could not eliminate the existence of matter, much less the existence of the One.10 By extension, we could contend that the whole position is completely absurd. And this judgment is not just a theological conclusion but also an existential one for any Christian or Neoplatonist thinker, since the philosophical framework for both, regardless of their differences, is based on the presence of the supreme Principle, on which all other things depend, not only for their being but also for their well-being. Or, in other words, since the systems of both are under metaphysical foundations realistic, analogy here proves that under such associations realism could be completely disproved. According to their principles, logic confirms theology and ontology—both the metaphysical and natural—and describes the two in various ways, with precise articulation of causality being the main goal. One sees this in Eastern Christian authors, such as Leontius of Byzantium, John of Damascus and Arethas of Caesarea, who are some of the most emblematic exponents of Aristotelian logic, especially as transmitted through Porphyry.
Nicholas argues that Proclus’ analogies are mistaken—at least methodologically or syllogistically—when taking into account what is mentioned in Genesis as well as Basil the Great’s interpretation of Genesis:11 for both, God creates the material universe as a particular formed being, namely with the ontological categories of quantity and quality, which also include all the other categories.12 In particular, God creates corporeal substance, which includes the extremes, such as heaven and earth and those kinds of beings between them, that is to say, the natural elements as syntheses.13 And this corporeal substance is obviously created, that is to say, clearly inferior to the Creator and is also a composition of matter and form. This composition results in formed hypostases with their properties, functions and inclusion in the broader realm of being. From a general historical-philosophical point of view, certain of these properties are primary (namely, necessary for being), such as life, and others secondary (that is, accidents not decisive for being), such as the color of the skin. Every created being participates in the divine according to these properties in various ways, such that the quality and the intensity of participation defines only the hierarchy between created beings and God, and not due to the ontological capacities and interventions-determinations of created beings by themselves.
As we attempt to evaluate Nicholas’ critical analysis of Proclus’ prop. 72, we could say more specifically the following: Nicholas makes a formally declarative reading of this proposition, without taking into account Proclus’ general positions on how causality works. For Proclus, the fact that the One is the cause of matter does not mean that it is not the cause of the other realities, including metaphysical and natural ones. In his view, the supreme Principle creates first and foremost, through mediation, the substrate which is necessary for the formation of all the natural bodies or conditions: i.e. matter. But this does not mean that matter is superior to what is later produced: rather, matter is a requirement for the development of formed and ensouled bodies, which are the superior aspects of a composite hypostasis which is a unified organism. In this sense, the One is also the cause of things whose substrate is matter, which at the same time have received greater degrees of specification from metaphysical principles posterior to the One. For instance, the fact that the forms come from Being does not mean that they do not also come from the One, which is the cause of Being: in other words, the forms, as coming proximately from Being, also come ultimately from the One. This multi-causal relationship can be confirmed in the entire ontological system of Proclus.
Nicholas attempts to apply the principle of analogy without considering these aspects from Proclus. The result is that he presents Proclus as being opposed to the previous metaphysical tradition, including that of the classical period of Ancient Greek philosophy. In all his treatises, Proclus elucidates in detail a series of metaphysical causes, each of which has the power to intervene in matter depending on its position in the metaphysical hierarchy. However, we should specify further: according to Proclus’ commentaries on Plato’s Parmenides and Timaeus,14 matter is the product of the combinations which take place between metaphysical realities and thus, from the moment it is created, it is also the container of what we may call natural reasons (logoi). These reasons are the natural results of the metaphysical combinations and are found in a constant active state, while at the same time, since they have eternal life, do not suffer any changes.
In another section, Nicholas focuses on how participation works and criticizes how a property is transferred from a superior to an inferior being within Proclus’ hierarchical system. While he criticizes prop. 111, Nicholas also takes into account the claims of prop. 110. In these propositions Proclus contends that the modes of communication between superior and inferior beings are developed according to the method of analogy.15 Here he specifically focuses on the ranks of the Intellects, Souls and Natures, with the last referring to the direct source of natural formations. According to both propositions, every ontological rank participates in its superior not as a whole but partially: in other words, the most perfect part of every inferior rank is able to be connected with the most imperfect of its superior.16 Following this rationale, the superior property is not transferred per se to the manifold of the parts of the following rank. It should also be mentioned that such a transmission would lead only to a horizontal growth in entities, i.e. within the same horizontal series, and not a descending multiplication of vertical series. According to Proclus and Nicholas’ commentary there are three levels in every rank: namely the unparticipated, participated, and the participant.
The first two communicate with the former with an intensity that is defined by the analogy between them with respect to the ontological possessions, while the third one is not able to take part in a participation like this. At this point Nicholas uses by analogy everything that Proclus mentioned about the Intellect, Soul and Nature and applies them to the henads. He thus stresses that the henads should also be distinguished into three levels.
Their third level is not able to participate in a superior deity, in this case the One.17 But he then considers this judgment impossible, and so he contends, in a reversed analogy, that everything included in a rank of beings, from Proclus’ system, participates as a whole in the properties of the former rank.18 And this follows the principles that define the ontological relationships. Consequently, Nicholas clarifies that in every rank described by Proclus the first level is unparticipated, the second is participated and the third is that which participates—in other words, by itself it possesses no property belonging to the unparticipated and participated.
We need to mention, however, that according to the Neoplatonist philosopher the third level constitutes the possibility of transition from a higher to a lower metaphysical being and, in this sense, has from a point onwards an active responsibility for providing gifts and being immanently present to what follows. It must then communicate with what precedes, by which it receives the foundations for its own manifestations.
In commenting on Proclus’ proposition, Nicholas does not consider that the henads, for Proclus, are not hierarchically distinguished and that they are the participated projections of the One.19 They function neither in the same way nor in an analogous way—only perhaps by expressive economy—with the other metaphysical beings, which hold an unparticipated and a participated part. The unparticipated part is transcendent while the participated is productive-immanent. The former corresponds to “remaining” and the latter to “procession”.20 We then meet these two different ways of presence in all the metaphysical beings. Nicholas, therefore, does not accurately understand analogy in Proclus. For the latter, analogy is applied to all metaphysical beings, but not to the henads. Within every metaphysical reality there is hierarchy, which is not identified in the henads. The henads give hypostasis to these realities, in order through their hierarchical structure to form the requirements for the production of the sensible world, but without violating metaphysical unity, which they have formed a priori. They are also found, after specific transformations, in the natural world.21
In props. 109, 110 and 111 Proclus attempts to elaborate his metaphysical hierarchical system in individual branches.22 The main position that he intends to point out is that within every divine reality there is a hierarchy of its parts, that is, there are higher and lower particular ontological fields. However, the fact that a lower field is not capable of participating in its own terms and directly in the higher reality with respect to its own does not mean that it is excluded from participation. And this participation takes place through intermediates, a detail which ontologically and epistemologically dominates in Proclus’ system. Specifically, the fact that the lower part of a reality participates in its higher—and provided that they both hold the same properties, but in a different intensity—contributes to the fact that the lower participates, after the intervention of the higher, in the former reality. Otherwise, the course of the development of the sensible world would end. This kind of procedure is not confirmed in the ontological field of the henads, which for Proclus, especially according to his later works like the Platonic Theology, are not hierarchized according to their particularity or even somehow the divisibility of their uniform ontological state but only with respect to their emanating range. Analogy is thus found in all the metaphysical realities, without this state of theirs affecting how the henads exist. By extension, there is no analogy between these realities and the henads. According to all these, Nicholas is right when he mentions that there are three ranks in every reality, an unparticipated, a participated and a participating but one cannot contend that there is an analogous distinction in the henads, which only represent existing modes of the One, its inner self-founding predicates.23
In the same theoretical context, Nicholas criticizes the way in which Proclus discusses the concept of analogy in prop. 113 of the Elements of Theology. This is the proposition in which Proclus begins to discuss his theory on the divine henads systematically, which he elaborates in his following works, in which through further arguments he concludes that the henads are the participated part of the One or those emanating powers in which he forms metaphysical world or the world of gods. In this proposition Proclus mentions that the cause of the divine number (namely, the number of the henads) is the One, while the cause of the intellective number is the Intelligence and of the psychical number is Soul. The context in which he describes these causal relations is the principle of analogy within a particular ontological field, according to which every manifold which appears through emanation is analogous to its cause. The number of the divine henads is then characterized as united, since its cause is the One. That is, in the field of the henads the One’s unity becomes a property possessed by them, each in a particular way, for their independent existence, as it were, from the original absolute unity to be realized. In this rationale he also characterizes the other, lower relationships: i.e. the manifold of intellects is intellectual and the manifold of the souls is psychical.24 In any case, however, the cause, as a particular natural monad, can have the property of the particular one, which produces its own manifold. This manifold is similar and akin to its cause and multiplies its property. This is actually the function which begins to develop in the first place in the metaphysical universe and in this way it receives archetypal content in relation to those which by analogy will take place in the natural world. Proclus then does not build an analogy between the pair One-henads and the pair Intellect-intellects and the rest of the metaphysical pairs with respect to their strict ontological content but as regards the relationships they develop during their causal manifestation, which can be described after the compound term “one-manifold”, which works analogously depending on the particular ontological field in which it appears. At the highest level, however, distinction between the one and the manifold is not as distinct as in the following particular gods, where the manifold appears more intensively.
Nicholas criticizes Proclus’ syllogism following specific aspects of the principle of analogy. The first thing that he says is that the Neoplatonist philosopher co-ranks the One with all the principial causes, basing his critique on the claim that this supreme Principle is transcendent and, by extension, cannot be placed with what comes after it.25 From a Christian point of view, this comment is justified and clearly examines the multi-causality which Proclus suggests. The second point of Nicholas’ criticism, however, does not follow what we said before on Proclus’ positions, since it stresses that the One is analogous to all the principial causes.26 As we have already confirmed, there is no such relationship and Proclus’ analogy refers only to forms of being and causality. In conclusion, Nicholas attempts here to criticize Proclus based on a Christian position—thus his argument is still a refutation—in a way that does not rely on the contradictions which would potentially (or otherwise) be found in Proclus’ text. It should also be noted that, while intellects participate in their cause, i.e. Intellect, in a hierarchical way, one cannot find something analogous to the field of the henads, which are essentially the direct emanations of the One and form a second One. Only in an analogous way could one contend that they participate in the One without actually doing so. That is to say, they are two particular ways in which the One exists.27
In another section and focusing on the question of whether and how the unparticipated becomes participated, Nicholas criticizes Proclus’ position that the first One (and, more generally, whatever cause is related to all beings) is not participated by any being:
This proposition is generally accepted by the Christians, based on the distinction—which however never introduces separations—between the divine essence and the divine energies (
3 Analogy as a Way of Understanding the Existence and Function of the Created
With participation revealing the degree of ontological similarity between the uncreated and created, as well as the possession of divine properties by natural beings, Nicholas uses analogy to describe the way in which the created works within the regulatory frame which has been defined by God. In other words, to speak ontologically, every property which is possessed in a complete degree by the absolutely transcendent divine being is transferred to the created beings according to the possibilities that each one of them possesses. Analogy is then applied between those beings which participate in a divine property. This means that every being participates in that property in its own way. Thus, the same concept is used to describe states between different beings, provided that every being possesses this state according to its capacity. Polysemy then obtains between beings: that is to say, an ontological property is known in a number of ways. One can also see from Plato’s Parmenides (131a–133a) onward that the property’s metaphysical presence in things, by way of participation, does not imply a division of that property, but rather a universal presence over each being, although each receives it in its own way.
In the refutation of prop. 25, Nicholas is clear: if we compare the uncreated with the created, the uncreated is perfect while the created is constantly imperfect. Perfection however is not removed from the created world, at least as a future possibility. If we focus on the created, every being can be considered perfect, since it is able to accomplish its own perfection in the domain of its own nature which is produced by the supreme Principle.34 In this case, analogy classifies created beings according to two perspectives: a) in relation to their Creator, stressing the ontological otherness of the two naturally different levels, and b) in relation to the created world, insofar as it places them in a hierarchy formed by the range of participation that their natural hypostasis has in the divine gifts. And the particular nature of every being in this case means closeness to the Divine and possession to a greater or lesser degree of a divine property, which can be given either as a primary bestowment or in sequence.35 For instance, man is considered to be more perfect than an irrational being and, due to this perfection, has a natural capacity to reach universal perfection through becoming assimilated to the image of God, by which the likeness of God may be actualized.36 In this regard Nicholas is dealing with the sensible world, and engages, in a manner of speaking, in an empirical way. One should also note that Nicholas explicitly refutes polytheism and multi-causality in the proposition’s commentary, and hence he also refutes Proclus’ ontological analogies which support polytheism and multi-causality.
However, since Nicholas also accepts that there is a non-sensible—or intelligible—created world, analogy is used for the level of the angels as well. Nicholas thus mentions that these self-perfect intellects were also produced by the supreme Principle which gave them their perfective properties, according to which they maintain their intellectual nature and incline toward the divine cause according to each intellect’s respective position in their hierarchical ranking.37 We can identify the schema of “procession” and “reversion” here: namely, the supreme Principle works creatively and produces the angels, giving them not only being but also additional properties, where intellect is the main property; by this inherent property, they are capable of “reverting” on their primary cause. But, if we attempted to determine what precedes, i.e. the being of the intellects or their intellectual properties, we could not give an answer. The only thing that Nicholas makes clear is that the powers of the angelic ranks, as modes of being given to them by God, are analogous to the divine “processions”. The powers reflect in a concrete way the gifts that are given by the divine “processions” during the process of production, which the Holy Trinity possesses in a supreme way, as the sole cause of the gifts.38 These gifts are transferred by the superior angelic ranks to the inferior ones, so this is the only sense in which the principle of intervention functions, which is not ontological: in other words, the gifts transmitted between angelic ranks originate not from their respective level but rather from God alone. In the refutation of the prop. 92 of Institutio theologica, Nicholas names them “powers”, while in the refutation of the prop. 177 he calls them “divine illuminations”, and in the refutation of the prop. 146 he refers to them as “divine effulgences”.
More specifically, in the refutation of prop. 92, Nicholas is clear regarding Christian causality: God is all-powerful insofar as he possesses power in a complete degree and in a way that only originates in him, and through this he intervenes in created beings by giving plenitude to their existence. The power given to created beings by God is then assimilated by them and becomes a capacity for their inherent properties which they bring about through their own initiation. Furthermore, God’s power is infinite in the sense that God endlessly produces gifts. However in the case of transmission, namely in the process in which it is indivisibly divided, power becomes finite in the beings which receive it, and in this sense analogous to the substances to which it is given.39 Here analogy shows the way in which complete power is transmitted as such but becomes finite within created beings, since each can only receive that power up to a point. This difference is due to the ontological otherness between God and creatures, and the absolute priority of the former over the latter, although divine providence remains unaffected.40
In the second refutation of prop. 177, Nicholas mentions that some divine illuminations are more uniform and more universal while others are more multi-form and more specific, once again depending on the beings which receive the illuminations. The powers of the different angelic ranks then correspond to the way in which each receives the same illuminations given by God according to their analogous position in God’s providential [or teleological] plan.41 That is to say, some angelic ranks are closer to the supreme Principle and some others are farther from it. The same structure is maintained also in the case of souls and ensouled beings.42 Here as well, the properties given to a rank of beings define the rank in which a being belongs according to the divine plan.
In the third refutation of prop. 146, the illuminative “procession” is characterized as perpetual and is revealed through the divine economy and the endless bestowment of properties in correspondence, here as well, with the degree of the acceptability of every being. The divine effulgences “proceed” by analogy from the higher to the lower ranks of the world, in order that every created being can “revert” from its respective foundation appropriate to it by analogy, following an ascending way to the supreme Principle.43 This movement is constant and adds a dynamic orientation to the divine teleological-eschatological plan. Focusing on those beings subject to generation and corruption—in other words, beings which fall under the domain of time—Nicholas mentions in the same paragraph that their “procession” has been completed since the sixth day of creation, according to their respective archetype or universal, while what remains is their perfection after the seventh day, namely on the eighth day.44 It is at this point that the creative plan is supposed to be accomplished, namely with the actions performed by created beings in their analogous position. The position here is explicit: the realization of God’s providence or teleology cannot be completed without each creature’s respective, appropriate initiative.
In the refutation of prop. 130 of the Elements of Theology we find one more detail of the difference between Neoplatonic polytheism and Christian monotheism, which also defines the epistemological models adopted. Here Proclus presents his multi-causal system and the structural way of the hierarchy in it in relation to all the forms of being,45 a position which is refused by Nicholas. According to Nicholas, all properties—chiefly those of “being”, “life” and “intellect”—are completely possessed by God as logoi and are transmitted in a lesser degree, not as gifts but as receptions, to produced beings analogously to their position in the metaphysical hierarchy.46 One can see, in connection with this, that the discussion of the logoi of beings brings out the doctrine of creation from nothing. Everything which exists in the created world as a composition of properties has been created only due to the divine activation, which classifies the created natures into categories analogously to the logoi of their productive power: the logoi are then what brings about each, which God knows in an absolute degree. The natures of the created beings are, then, nothing but hypostasized divine logoi, or archetypes which are not autonomous or self-constituted realities, since no ontological existence is attributed to them inasmuch as they are divine wills existing within God’s unity. Accordingly, the logoi express the divine providence and project the divine will in the created universe.
It should also be mentioned that the logoi also define the particular way in which created beings exist and function. Specifically, created beings’ position
By extension, deification by grace can then only be accomplished according to the kind of simplicity reflected in the superior property which a created being possesses. In particular, if a being’s superior property is intellect, its deification becomes possible through the simplicity of this property, which analogously affects the rest of that being (e.g. its body or matter), in comparison with the other properties it possesses (such as, again, the body or matter). This principle correspondingly applies for all other kinds of beings analogous to the highest property they possess. In every case, hypostatic composition then gains its unity (
Furthermore, although all created beings “proceed” from the supreme principle, that is, they are created out of nothing, and then “revert” to it, according to the Christian teaching upheld by Nicholas, the kind of motion of the “procession-reversion” process is unique for every created being. As Nicholas explains in the refutation of prop. 33 of the Institutio theologica, the kind of motion for created beings is cyclical, although rather in a straight line.49 Nicholas specifically utilizes analogy to show the descending creative movement and, then, the ascending movement which completes and restores beings to their original status. The angelic ranks, for instance, are subject to a lesser straight descending course and follow a lesser straight ascending course. But the course of those which are farther from God is greater, and so on. Man makes an even greater ascending course to God in comparison to the angels.50 Combining all those mentioned on the divine illuminations and “reversion”, we could argue that there is a mode of analogous similarity in distinction between the divine illuminations as descending gifts and the created beings as ascending. In other words, the first and only divine source “proceeds” and through the same course the created beings “revert” to the divine source’s respective metaphysical level. This is where an already-mentioned conclusion arises once again: exactly because the productive manifestation is performed by the source and the “reversion” of the produced moves towards that source, the whole process could be considered to be cyclical. That is to say, while the course towards likeness to God develops in a straight line, the communication with the end brings back the beginning. End and beginning are identical, but between them there is the initiative of the created, which in every case is in straight line.51 As an extension, according to Nicholas “reversion” is not a spiral motion. But, according to Proclus, it is due to the interventions of other, higher causes which take place and which are present to the completion of the ascending process.
4 Conclusions
Since, for Christian thought, a produced being is not defined in its essence autonomously, but in terms of what it receives from above, and since, according to the framework adopted, all produced beings are projections of theophany, we can see in Nicholas’ system a correspondence between the metaphysics of immanence as Ontology and natural theology52 as Epistemology. What connects these two fields is causality, which functions as both an ontological and epistemological category. In fact, since causality is defined within a monotheistic framework, the natural universe is considered as ontologically dependent on the divine energies (which, it should be stressed, are volitional and not subject to analogies)—and the providential plan implied in the energies. This kind of approach to metaphysics and natural ontology clearly affects the epistemological procedures as well, which are analogously reduced from the effects to the causes and obviously, more or less, differentiate one another regarding the way of ascending. For instance, man’s reduction from becoming to being requires going beyond the sensory-representational level and an introduction of the process of intuition.
Regarding the metaphysical names, we have to note that under the terms of Nicholas’ monotheism they refer to the projections of the divine energies, in which there is no hierarchy nor are they determined or dependent on anything else. That is, they arise from a particular energy, or manifestation, arising from the divine essence and contextualize the ontology of the divine immanence. In this sense, analogy is not found on the metaphysical level between the divine energies, amongst themselves, or between the divine energies and the divine essence, but only between that which appears as a new reality with a particular sensible form and its cause (i.e. the divine energy), which is manifested in endless ways. We can also observe that the divine energies through their combinations form natural cores, which lead to an immense number of substances found in the natural world.
In addition, we find an extensive and quite fascinating discussion on natural logoi in Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, almost with the same rationale: i.e. as products of the divine plan. Names, which arise from the dialectics of thinking with becoming and being, appear to be dependent on Ontology, with realism being explicit in any case. And exactly in this sense the predicates are attributed to God, as active causality, according to the representations emitted by the entire created world as defined according not only to the general projection of theophanies but also to the identification, as far as possible, of their special modes. At the same time, God cannot be completely known in himself, not even with respect to his energies or manifestations: as transcendent, God is not subject to the conceptual schemata of the human intellect, which can be applied as predicates only in the world of the natural phenomena. In this sense, one can refer to Nicholas’ Christian framework as a kind of Byzantine Kantianism, and less so a Byzantine Neoplatonism. One can recognize the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s De mystica theologia as establishing a tradition in this light, insofar as it has placed the method of analogy in a pragmatological context.
The ontological status of causality goes with the status of “participation”. But since participation cannot be measured and cannot be cognitively understood fully, the principle of analogy—the precise function of which needs to be ontologically based on the acceptance of the divine immanence or epistemologically on equivocation or even allegorical interpretation—fills cognitive gaps up to a point. This takes place in a way that facilitates the limited cognitive and theoretical capacity of man. Since man is unable to grasp the immanent causality of God, nor is he able to understand how it is manifested or assimilated by created beings, he follows an ascending course towards the divine through the investigation of created beings. This is obviously not a nominalist approach, since realism in the Christian context is unquestionable, and defines both the knowledge of the self as created by the divine and the knowledge of beings, all of which are theophanies. The question is, then, how the principle of causality makes possible the analogies between cause and effect. And since the relation between these two terms appears in multiple ways, analogy must also appear in multiple ways, without obviously affecting monotheism, or also monism, where, as noted earlier, the one divine cause appears in a dynamic, multidimensional way with respect to its presences. One should also note that participation, in both Christianity and Neoplatonism, appears in many ways (namely, it is epistemological, moral, aesthetic and, more summarily, existential), which means that there is no one, straightforward way to realize it. This affects the application of analogy as well.53
Therefore, the principle of analogy, according to what Nicholas has said, cannot be accepted in a simplistic way as referring only to one sense, such as to the phenomenal or material world: an acceptance like this would mean the domination, at least implicitly, of a broader material empiricism and the subordination of metaphysical Ontology to the phenomenon or at least to its epistemological reflections. Or, else, the sensible world would be considered that it completely reveals being and that it somehow decodes it. Rather, in Christian thought the natural world gains value but the supernatural level preserves its complete autonomy regardless of any providential relationship. In this sense, the function of analogy is as follows: it keeps intact the divine transcendence at the same time that it explains how the two levels, the transcendent and the natural one, communicate through the projections of the divine energies in the realm of creation and how this creation assimilates them. In this way, Nicholas avoids agnosticism without affecting the divine mystery and affirms natural theology.54 However, this does not mean that he was successful in his critique of Proclus’ framework, unless one investigates his view under a Christian framework. But there is another detail which constitutes an unsurpassable difficulty: the difference between polytheism and monotheism, which is such that a comparison of these two frameworks is not easy. In general, not just in relation to analogy, it is necessary to specify the possibilities of comparisons, so that to draw a conclusion through the reduction in a third term. The realistic model adopted is common in the two worldviews, but not able to lead always to parallel examinations.
Regardless, however, of the similarities and differences between the two worldviews of Christianity and Neoplatonism, analogy serves as an optimistic methodological model for three main reasons: a) it re-evaluates the natural universe as a theophany in an ontological and axiological scale; b) it demonstrates the human intellect’s ability to ascend, as far as possible, to the projections of the divine causality; and c) it offers ways for Philosophy to engage with Theology beyond mere methodology. This proves a fruitful encounter for the development of the theory of spirit, since philosophy has traditionally been characterized as being based on dualism in contrast to Christianity as being based on monism. Nevertheless, this deference did not lead to an unbridgeable theoretical gap, for in both cases goodness maintains a central role as the cause (both the creative and final) of creation.55 In this, goodness expresses the intentional function of causality. Importantly, intention does not lead to an absolute analogy, thereby ensuring an Ontology with clear norms.
Cf. Proclus, Theologia Platonica [Théologie Platonicienne
Cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, ed. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), prop. 72, 68.17–18:
Cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 68.19–29.
Cf. Nicholas of Methone,
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 74.9–12:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 74.12–19:
Cf. for instance Plato’s Parmenides, Timaeus and Philebus alongside Aristotle’s Physics II and Metaphysics
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 74.28–32: “
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 75.5–6:
Proclus systematically discusses the One as a foundational issue for ontology not only in the first propositions of Institutio theologica but also in Theologia Platonica II, esp. in the apodeictic chapters. On the Institutio theologica, apart from E.R. Dodds’ comments, cf. also S. Breton, “La théorème de l’Un dans les Éléments de Théologie de Proclus”, in Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 58/4(1974), pp. 561–583.
Cf. Basil the Great, Homilies in Hexaemeron 1 and 2, ed. J.-P. Migne, (Paris: Migne = 29b, 1857), 4A–52B.
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 75.10–15:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 102.30–32:
Cf. for instance In Platonis Timaeum III, 1.1–18.19, where the combination of the historical and the systematic aspect in which Proclus approaches this topic by exposing details on the content of each natural element—each of which is a particular body of the natural reasons (logoi)—is quite fascinating. Also interesting is that Proclus raises the question of the characterization of natural reasons, which are per se sensibly conceived not as bodies but as corporeal traits.
Cf. e.g. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop. 110, 98.1–5, esp.:
Cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop. 111, 98.18–23, esp.:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 107.32–108.2:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 108.5–7:
The subject which refers to the ontological nature of the henads and the hierarchy between them is one of the most difficult in terms of their analysis. There are two basic details that must be taken into account: a) they belong together with the One in the area of Henology, from which they derive without any mediation and b) one is not produced from the other, with the consequence that no dependencies and determinations develop between them. Proclus, however, is not explicitly declarative in his relevant remarks. Nevertheless, on considering Proclus’ Theologia Platonica III, ch’s. 1–7 (6.7–30.13), one can see that any hierarchy between the henads results solely from the nature of their products. As a whole, the henads are defined as uniform, unutterable, hyper-essential and completely similar to the One. They constitute the hyper-essential multitude which emanates from the One, which successively assigns to each its particular emanating mission, so as to produce a category of gods. From this point onwards, the hierarchies between these gods begin. Besides, among the realities included in the branch of Henology, the state of otherness is explicitly absent. The henads are exclusively emanations of the One.
For a systematic discussion of the relationship of the pair “unparticipated-participated” with the ternary emanating scheme for the formation of the metaphysical world “remaining-procession-reversion”, cf. Theologia Platonica, IV, 6.6–17.14, where Proclus elaborates the top metaphysical triad—after the One and the henads—of the principles of “Being-Life-Intellect”. The characteristic is that the above two schemes are repeated multiple times, since each metaphysical monad multiplies within itself, which means that it determines the next one in a uniform and multiplicative sense. This happens with “Being” in relation to “Life” as well as with “Life” in relation to “Intellect” under hierarchical terms. A similar discussion we find in Theologia Platonica, III, 6.14–11.15.
Cf. for instance, Proclus’ Theologia Platonica VI. The same topic is also discussed in Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, where one finds fascinating analyses. We could say that the third book of this commentary is possibly the most emblematic in the history of philosophy regarding metaphysics of immanence. It is a complete treatise for the geographic and arithmetic structure of the natural world and the method of analogy is used exhaustively.
E.R. Dodds presents a diagram of these propositions in order to represent the series of reality which come from their own monad. According to his analysis, Proclus describes a double “reversion” which indicates a double causality. Especially for props. 110 and 111, Dodds says that they refer to a principle which “is required to make it consistent with prop. 62 cor. If the lower order is always more numerous than the higher, a one-to-one correspondence between the two series, such as Pr. postulates, obviously cannot extend to the whole of the lower series: at its further extremity there will be terms which have no analogue in the superior order and are therefore not directly attached to that order. This is clearly true of the relation of
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 106.20–23. According to J. Robinson: “It does seem that Nicholas has identified a contradiction. The answer is that, for Proclus, even though the monad is the first of each series, some particulars are “firsts” in a broader sense” [J. Robinson, Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation of Proclus: Theology and Neoplatonism in 12th-century Byzantium, A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Graduate Program in Medieval Studies, Notre Dame (Indiana), 2014, p. 349]. Obviously, this meaning refers to the particular first fields of the multiplications that take place in each case.
Cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 100.5:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 110.18–20:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 157.14–15.
Proclus was very concerned with this topic in his other treatises. H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink in their introduction to Proclus’ Theologia Platonica III (Paris 1978, xi–xvii) discussed in a thorough way the phases in which the philosopher passed to deal with this question.
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 32.29–30.
Cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 1.1. According to E.R. Dodds (Proclus, The Elements of Theology, pp. 188–189): “This prop. is placed at the head of Pr.’s system in order to exclude the assumption of a world of pure quantitative plurality devoid of that qualitative shaping which Neoplatonism attributed to the operation of a transcendent unity and which we call individuality. Proclus found his authority for this exclusion in Plato Parmenides 157 C ff., where it is shown that every manifold
Cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 6.2–3. According to E.R. Dodds (Proclus, The Elements of Theology, p. 191): “This proposition demonstrates that the Absolute Unity whose existence was established in prop. 4 is at once completely transcendent, in the sense of being uninfected by plurality, and completely immanent, in the sense that all plurality ‘participates’ it or is determined by it.” For an extremely systematic reading which also takes into account the general context and presents a number of diagrams, cf. Saget, L’architecture du divin, pp. 235–243, where we read the following on the prop. 5—in combination with props. 19 and 2—of the Institutio Theologica with references to the horizontal and vertical ontological procedures, which show the main characteristics of Proclus’ hierarchical world and with insistence on how hypostatic particularities are formed (pp. 239–240): “Première indication sur la structure de chaque ordre. Cette structure se présente comme l’application dans la dimension horizontale du schéma vertical de P5: toute pluralité dépend de l’Un. Ainsi, tout ordre (
In the Eastern Christian tradition, the most systematic treatise that has been written regarding the distinction between the divine essence and energies is Gregory Palamas’
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 32.33–33.4:
Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus, ed. J.-P. Migne, Patrologiae Graecae Cursus Completus 3 (Paris: Migne, 1857), 644 A, where we read:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 33.28–33:
Cf. Nicholas’ commentary on prop. 71 (Refutation, 73.9–14) of The Elements of Theology:
For a multidimensional analysis of this question, cf. V. Lossky, À l’image et à la ressemblance de Dieu (Paris: Aubier, 1967). Cf. also, É. Gilson, L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale (Paris: Aubier, 1989), pp. 175–213, who references the ancient Greek aspects of the topic, insisting on Plato’s and Aristotle’s positions.
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 67.1–5:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 136.17–20:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 91.27–92.2:
On this, cf. S. Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), pp. 204–217, who analyzes the topic of potency in relation to activity, stressing that the status which is appropriate for God is activity. This holds true for both Neoplatonic and Christian thinkers, with the obvious difference that the former hold to a plurality of gods in their metaphysical system, unlike the latter. In addition, the impassivity attributed to the divine does not mean passivity but transcendence even of passivity (p. 215). The state of “potentiality” is not found in the divine, only in the sense of what will be formed after its manifestation.
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 155.20–26:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 67.5–6:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 134.7–13:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 134. 13–18:
Ann. Ch. Saget, who relies on prop. 130 of the Proclus, The Elements of Theology, discusses how ontological hierarchy is defined in Proclus’ system, which, by extension, defines how analogy works (Saget, L’architecture du divin, p. 288): “Cette proposition […] met bien en lumière la fausse proximité des êtres inférieurs: ceux-ci sont moins distants de leurs causes prochaines en ce que la transcendance s’atténue avec l’éloignement du Principe. Mais ils sont davantage impuissants et à se rassembler eux-mêmes et à s’unir à leurs causes. Si bien que, moins séparés de leurs causes (que l’intelligible de son principe, par exemple), ils en sont pourtant, par leur faiblesse, plus distanciés.”
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 123.22–24: […]
Cf. once again Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 67.1–5.
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 128.22–25:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 42.31–43.29:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 42.18–30:
We should keep in mind that the difference between cause and effect raises explicit limits in analogy, which excludes a precise likeness. L. de Raeymaeker (“L’analogie de l’être dans la perspective d’une philosophie thomiste”, in L’analogie. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 87(1969/1), pp. 89–106) points out that, according to Thomas Aquinas, a particular being possesses its esse, in its own way, through participation, such that it participates in the perfection of the perfections, i.e. God, and becomes thus a created being according to the “image of God”. For de Raeymaeker, these constitute the authentic basis for affirming the existence of particular beings not as phenomena or imaginary reflections but as true, self-subsistent beings. They participate in a superior being and, at the same time, the conditions which bring them into being, which are closely related with the world of becoming, depend on its gifts. At this point a detail arises regarding what a produced being is according to the Christian teaching. It is only a created being with no autonomous metaphysical presence or function. On the other hand, in Proclus we find the distinction between metaphysical and natural produced beings, so that there are two categories of “reversion” with clear differences, which also affect how analogy works.
I.e. the manifestation of divine activity in nature: cf. the Introduction, above.
But in almost all Christian and Neoplatonic approaches the relation of analogy to participation is obvious and its particular content depends on the emphasis given to this relation. Cf. for instance É. Gilson’s following comment (L’Esprit de la philosophie médiévale, p. 100): “Les notions de participation et d’analogie se déploient avec une luxuriance excessive dans les cosmogonies primitives ou même médiévales; elles s’y étalent dans leur crudité, sans critique, sans méthode, sans justification rationnelle; mais il ne résulte pas de là qu’elles ne correspondent pas à un aspect authentique du réel et ne soient, par conséquent, indispensables pour l’expliquer ou même simple ment le décrire, d’autant moins que la naïveté de l’idée d’analogie est beaucoup moindre qu’on ne l’imagine communément.”
The topic of analogy is dominant in medieval philosophy, and has proven notoriously difficult to understand for the modern scholar: cf. É. Gilson’s points (L’Esprit de la philosophie médiévale, pp. 97–99): “La notion d’analogie est une de celles qui offrent le plus de difficultés au lecteur moderne d’un traité médiéval; il s’en faut d’ailleurs de beaucoup que les penseurs du moyen âge se soient accordés sur sa définition et saint Thomas ne semble pas avoir cherché à l’élucider complètement pour elle-même. Ce que l’on peut dire, c’est qu’elle exerce deux fonctions, l’une qui est unitrice, l’autre qui est séparatrice. L’analogue est toujours à la fois relié à son principe du fait qu’il en est un analogue, et séparé du fait qu’il n’en est qu’un analogue […]. Sans la doctrine de l’analogie, l’identification de Dieu et de l’être donne naissance au panthéisme. Le cas s’est produit plusieurs fois dès le Moyen Âge […] on pourrait montrer que si l’idée d’image divine est au centre de tant de mystiques médiévales, celle de saint Bernard, par exemple, c’est justement parce qu’elle permet une déification mystique sans confusion de substance, l’homme n’étant plus alors, sous l’action assimilatrice de la grâce, que le sujet informé par la ressemblance de Dieu.”
This is a topic with a long historical course, regarding both the primary sources and the secondary literature. Once again, we follow É. Gilson’s thought, who provides us here the basis for a more comprehensible framework (L’Esprit de la philosophie médiévale, p. 94): “Déjà, dans le Timée, c’est la libéralité, l’absence d’envie du Démiurge divin, qui est invoquée pour rendre raison de son activité ordonnatrice. Mais si le bien est la raison dernière de la création, quelle est la raison de ce bien lui-même? Poser une telle question à Platon serait s’exposer à demeurer sans réponse, puisqu’il considère le Bien comme la réalité suprême. Poser la question à Denys l’Aréopagite serait se mettre dans le môme cas. Profondément pénétré de platonisme, ce chrétien ne parvient pas à surmonter le primat du Bien pour s’élever au primat de l’Être. On voit clairement qu’il en est ainsi dans le texte capital des Noms divins (V, 1), où Denys développe sa conception de l’existence divine. Pour lui, lorsque Dieu nous enseigne qu’il est l’Être, on doit entendre que de toutes les participations à la bonté, qui est son essence, l’être est la première. Commentant à son tour le commentaire de Denys, saint Thomas se déclare d’accord avec lui, mais on a justement remarqué qu’il ne l’est pas, car au lieu de voir dans l’être une participation du bien, ce que le texte de Denys suppose, il voit dans le bien un aspect de l’être.”
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