1 Introduction
Nicholas of Methone and Ioane Petritsi wrote their commentaries on Proclus’ Elements of Theology, Nicholas of Methone in Greek, Petritsi in Georgian.1 Both were educated in Byzantium. Both lived in the twelfth century. The exact dates of Petritsi’s life are unknown, so we are not aware whether he lived before Nicholas, was his contemporary, or lived later. Their commentaries are radically different,2 though both of them reflect the atmosphere around Proclus’ philosophy: the renaissance of his theories in the eleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantine cultural milieu, on the one hand (represented in this case by Petritsi, who was a follower of Psellos’ and Italos’ tradition), and the reaction against this renaissance, on the other (represented by Nicholas of Methone).3 Whenever the time of Petritsi’s life may have been, it is useful and interesting to compare their commentaries in order to learn more about the variety of medieval interpretations, receptions and refutations of Proclus’ philosophy, and of Ancient Greek philosophy generally. Moreover, it is in a certain sense (at least, formally) even easy to make such comparison because both Petritsi and Nicholas commented on Proclus’ Elements chapter by chapter.
I aim to briefly expose and compare Nicholas of Methone’s and Ioane Petritsi’s theories of intellect, based on certain fragments from Petritsi’s prologue and his commentaries on Proclus’ Elements, on the one hand, and Nicholas’ commentaries on propositions 160–184 of Proclus’ same treatise, on the other. I shall attempt to concentrate on the main differences between Nicholas of Methone’s and Petritsi’s understanding of intellect and see if there is any agreement between these two commentators in their interpretations of Proclus’ theory of intellect.
But why intellect? Certainly, any particular issue or concept of Proclus’ philosophy is worthy of study in medieval commentaries on the Elements. Intellect is the first, most important hypostasis (I use this word here in a Neoplatonic and not Christian sense) in Proclus’ philosophy. For Proclus and Petritsi, intellect is a very important entity because it embraces Forms and is, therefore, the basis for all kinds of beings.4 Generally, the hypostases in Proclus’ and, consequently, Petritsi’s metaphysical systems are self-constituted, and unlike Nicholas’ point of view, they are not placed in the supreme One / God or identical with it / Him;5 nor are they simply manifestations of the relations which can be viewed in created things. In Nicholas’ Refutation, certain ontological levels distinguished by Proclus are assimilated to God, so that the self-constituted substances turn into a relation of some kind, as, for example, the first limit and the first infinity.6 For Petritsi, in his commentary the hypostases are self-constituted and complete in themselves, albeit ultimately dependent on the transcendent One.7
I shall start with an overview of Petritsi’s theory of intellect, continue with Nicholas of Methone’s point of view, and then compare their positions with each other, taking into consideration their relevance to Proclus’ philosophy of intellect.8
2 Intellect in Petritsi’s Commentary
2.1 Definition of Intellect: Intellect and Being
What is intellect for Petritsi? The first intellect is a hypostasis which is “after” the supreme One, the first limit / first infinity, and henads. It is the true being and basis of all kinds of beings. The true being is, according to Petritsi, the summit of intellects. It is produced by henads and is divine. It is the first cosmos and the first composed thing. It is a kind of monad of all intellects and all those substances that possess form and figure. Each realm of intellects is a part of the first intellect. The first intellect is like a god and seer of everything that it has produced. The first pure intellect is the image of the One and, at the same time the monad of intellects. As an entity which contains parts, the first intellect is not one, though as the monad of intellects it is one and the image of the One.9 Petritsi characterizes true being as the universal intellect, and calls it “the sky of intellects”,10 “the sky of intellects and intelligible altar”,11 “the sky of intellects and souls”.12 It is an unparticipated intellect and the principle of all other intellects.13 Moreover, the true being is the principle of everything, including the physical cosmos—“sky”.14 While the intelligible intellect is the true being, all other subsequent intellects are intellectual. The last ones, as Petritsi says, are filled with the light of the true being.15
In some cases, Petritsi even claims that the true being is superior to intellect.16 He probably means that it is superior to other kinds of intellects, not the first one. Thus, in chapter 101 Petritsi distinguishes between the first being and intellect. As he claims, the first being is the true being, it is the image (Georgian ხატი, corresponds to Greek
2.2 Classification of Intellects
Like Proclus, Petritsi makes a threefold classification of intellects. As he says, there are three kinds of intellect. One is unparticipated and it is the true being. Here, again, Petritsi follows Proclus, because according to Proclus too, the true being “is a divine intelligible, and unparticipated.”19 Moreover, as Proclus claims (and Petritsi follows him), true being “fills Intellect by itself, and Intellect too is a being, as far as it is filled with being.”20 Like Proclus, Petritsi asserts that true being precedes all other subsequent intellects.21 The other two kinds of intellect are participated: one by the universal (whole) soul and those souls which are superior to bodies, the other by bodies through the mediation of souls. Sky and all stars and spheres participate in intellect because they are animated and intellectual. According to Petritsi, the cosmos participates in the first intellect through the mediation of the individual (particular) intellect (here Petritsi probably means the intra-mundane intellect).22 Petritsi mentions the threefold classification of intellects again in chapter 184. As he says, an intellect can be either divine, or a pure intellect, or an intellectual being.23 In a short commentary on prop. 173 Petritsi distinguishes three kinds of intellect as follows: that which is by participation in its priors and principles; that which is equal to its own substance and its own self; that which is a cause in regard to its consequents and effects.24
2.3 The Activity of Intellect: ousia-dynamis-energeia and Cognition
Petritsi analyzes the activity of intellect. As he claims, all intellects act in a twofold manner: on the one hand, they see those entities which precede them and, on the other, take care (განაგებს, i.e. exercise their providential activity) of those that are inferior.25
Petritsi explains that each being which is able to revert completely upon itself is incorporeal. Though “sky” is able to revert, imitating soul and intellect, it cannot do so completely with all its parts. Petritsi compares intellect to the sun: in intellect substance and activity are inseparable, like sun and its rays are.26 Thus, Petritsi compares the act of intellect’s cognition to the sun and its rays, which immediately follow the solar disc.27 Like Proclus, Petritsi claims that intellect is invariable and eternal according to its substance and activity, and that what it produces is perpetual (სამარადისო).28
Like Proclus, Petritsi asserts that intellect’s substance, potency, and activity are fixed in an unmoved condition in eternity, since everything that is as a whole in eternity, is unmoved. As far as activity generally depends on substance, if the substance is simple, then the activity is also simple, and if the substance is composite, then the activity is also a composite one. Consequently, as Petritsi sums up, the manner of intellect’s cognition, i.e. its knowledge, is simple, unlike soul, since its substance is simple.29 Neither intellect’s potency nor its activity is greater or lesser, but it is rather stable in its identity. Intellect acts toward itself and looks toward itself because it possesses the object of intellection in itself. Thus, thinking its own self, intellect thinks everything, and it is the latter which is the object of its intellection, i.e. the intelligible. Therefore, in the case of intellect, the intelligible and the intellectual (i.e. the knower) are the same: the intelligible is the intellectual and, vice versa, the intellectual is the intelligible, while the activity of intellect is intermediate between them. The intellectual activity is inseparable from intellect: intellect possesses it permanently. Consequently, unlike soul, intellect never transitions from a state of ignorance to that of knowledge.30 Intellect has in itself such a source of cognition which can never expire. Therefore, intellect is always thinking an object that it knows from the very beginning.
Intellect’s substance is always accompanied by the activity and vice versa, none of them being second in rank to the other. Thus, intellect always exists in one and the same circular realm of eternal identity.31 Petritsi claims that when Proclus mentions three aspects of intellection—namely, the intellectual, the intelligible, and intellect (i.e. the act of intellection) between them—we should understand this to mean the mode of soul’s thinking, which contains three different aspects: the intellectual, the intelligible, and the act of intellection. Intellect, in turn, is simultaneously the intellectual and the intelligible, and it does not multiply, unlike soul’s mode of cognition, which consists of three “parts”.32
Petritsi, like Proclus, analyzes the kinds of intellect also in the context of the ousia-dynamis-energeia dialectic. He claims that every intellect acts in a threefold manner: (1) it can be equal to itself, i.e. it is a pure intellect, because its activity is identical with its substance; (2) it knows also that which is consequent upon it, and has, therefore, an activity which is weaker than its own substance; and (3)
it thinks its own causes, and possesses the intellection that is better than itself, because it becomes a member of its own noetoi,33 i.e. of the intelligibles, and thinks, therefore, also its own self better; and it is the intellect and the intelligible, because all intelligibles are better than the intellectual[s].34
Furthermore, Petritsi explains again that every intelligible is better than the intellectual, and knowledge of principles and causes is, at the same time, a better knowledge of self and of that which is consequent upon it. According to Petritsi, knowledge is twofold: (a) knowledge of the cause as of that which is better than self, and (b) knowledge of self in the cause as its producer.35 In intellect the act of cognition and the object of cognition are the same.36 The differences between intellect’s simultaneous knowledge and soul’s discursive reasoning is Petritsi’s favourite theme.37
2.4 Intellect and the Forms, the Act of Intellection and Creation, and Participation
What kind of relationship is between intellect and Forms? Petritsi compares the unity of Forms in the intellectual “womb” (საშო) with the unity of seeds in the womb until their separation by the “creative reason”.38
According to Petritsi, some intellects are more universal and superior, others more partial and inferior. The first ones spread their power further than the latter ones, embracing more forms and substances; numerically they are less but their power is greater.39 As Petritsi claims, every intellectual Form produces those which are perpetual, such as souls and substances of immortal bodies, like that of Apollo, Hermes and others.40 Moreover, Petritsi like Proclus claims that the act of intellection is creation. Intellect creates beings, and it is the father and creator of everything that has a form. Thus, intellect’s power reaches those beings which have a form but it cannot reach those entities which are formless, either superiors or inferiors in regard to the intellect.41 Like Proclus, Petritsi claims that:
The lower [intellects] are more in number, though they possess less power, while the higher ones, though less in number, are more powerful.42
Then Petritsi explains why it is so and how we should understand it:
because they imitate better the highest supreme transcendence. But when you hear “high” or “low”, don’t imagine it in a local sense, i.e. don’t think about incorporeal and non-dimensional [entities] [by means of concepts of] ogkoi [i.e. material substrates: Petritsi uses the Greek word
ὄγκος in Georgian transliteration] and dimension, but take into consideration rather the capacities of substances, [their] powers, and [their] actuality.43
Petritsi, like Proclus, speaks also about intellects as producers and causes of the effects: the higher intellects produce more effects by means of fewer forms, while the lower ones produce fewer effects by means of more forms.44
Like Proclus, Petritsi draws a scale of participation descending from intellect: first is the universal soul, which exercises its activity in time, but is perpetually attached to the intellectual forms, and enjoys their contemplation, though in a psychical and temporal mode that lasts perpetually. Furthermore, the celestial soul contemplates the true being by the mediation of a partial intellect and the universal soul. As for those souls which are sometimes intellectual, they cannot participate either in the universal soul or in a partial intellect without mediation.45 Petritsi claims that the first soul is similar to the divine intellect, and generally, soul participates in henads by means of intellect. The return to the universal intellect occurs through a partial intellect: as Petritsi says, the cosmos and all the stars and spheres are endowed by souls and intellects,
and when cosmos participates in the first intellect, it does it by means of the partial intellect.46
Petritsi calls intellect “father of soul”. He explains that intellect possesses the Forms of beings, and transmits them to soul like a natural father does for his natural descendants. Intellect possesses Forms purely and in a superior manner, while soul contains them in a psychological and inferior manner. However, not all souls possess Forms in a same manner: there is a difference between, for example, Sun and Kronos etc., according to the differences between their substances.47
Thus, Petritsi claims that soul proceeds from an unmoved and eternal cause, i.e. from intellect. And everything which proceeds from an unmoved cause is immortal. Reverting upon itself, it reverts first upon its own substance. “Therefore, a soul which is reverted upon itself, makes by its presence intellectual beings.”48 Thus, soul’s reversion upon its own substance is reversion to its cause, i.e. the intellect. This is why a soul which is reverted upon itself, according to Petritsi, makes a being, which is provided with such a soul, intellectual. However, a soul which is only at certain times intellectual is unable to participate either in the universal soul or in a partial intellect without mediation.49 As Petritsi says, our soul is changeable,
it changes from intellect to unintelligence, dismissing intellect. And there is [also] another soul, intermediate between these two [i.e. between the divine and changeable souls], which is permanently connected with intellectual [beings], and is unchangeable; such is [the soul] of sun and of other similar [beings].50
As for an intellectual soul, it is, according to Petritsi, “a knower of itself”,51 though losing connection with the intellect, the soul becomes a non-intellectual entity, because “the wings of soul are its intellect”.52 However, a soul can regain its wings, i.e. it can get back to the intellect, flying back to the “father of soul”. As Petritsi says, without intellect, the soul is like Adam who, because he was separated from his father (i.e. from the intellect), was embodied. However, by means of the intellectual way of life, the soul can drop its “leather chitons” (ნივთებრივთა მათ ქეტონისკთა, i.e. the body), start to purify itself and rise back to its father—the intellect.53
3 Intellect in Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation
3.1 Definition of Intellect: Being and Intellect
For Nicholas of Methone, the first Intellect is God, and all other intellects are divine by participation and grace. All differences from Proclus and Petritsi’s understanding of intellect are the results of this thesis. Thus, for Nicholas, God is beyond intellect, though the primally Intellect is itself God.54
As we know, for Petritsi the true being is a very important entity in the ontological hierarchy. What about Nicholas? Again, for him the true being is not an entity after God but God is, as he claims, “both primally being and super-being”.55 Unlike Nicholas, for Proclus and Petritsi, God / the One is above being. Nicholas seems to share Proclus’ (i.e. Petritsi’s too) view that the intelligibles and intellectuals “that have eternal being from Him truly are.”56 However, this “He” for Nicholas is not the first intellect which is a hypostasis after the supreme One / God, as for Proclus and Petritsi, but it is rather God himself. Unlike Proclus and Petritsi, Nicholas claims that “He alone is unparticipated”.57 Nicholas does not accept Proclus’ (and Petritsi’s) mode of using “unparticipated intellect” in plural and claims that “unparticipated intellect is doubtless one”.58 As for the divine intellects, they are, according to Nicholas, “not gods by nature nor according to union with divinity, but according to participation in the divine illumination bestowed upon them.”59 Again, Nicholas claims that against “polytheist error”, according to which the super-cosmic or encosmic souls are also gods, “God is one, the unparticipated intellect is also believed to be one, the same also remaining unparticipated in being participated.”60 Thus, as Nicholas asserts, “we do not admit that there is a multitude of gods whether super-cosmic or en-cosmic.”61
3.2 The Act of Intellection: Actuality and Potentiality. Intellect Moved or Unmoved?
Nicholas disagrees with Proclus’ idea that every intellect thinks itself.62 According to Nicholas, “the one and only God, the one and very first intellect, alone thinks himself as He is; for none of the other intellects thinks Him thus.”63 Moreover, Nicholas does not share Proclus’ thesis that the primal intellect knows itself only,64 but claims that “He does not think only himself, but thinks also all the beings of which he himself is cause.”65 Nicholas’ argument in favour of this thesis is as follows: “For if [He did] not also [think] these things, He would not think himself as cause of these, which indeed is absurd.”66 Furthermore, Nicholas specifies that “it would more properly be said that He pre-thinks these [i.e. effects] which indeed would not reasonably be called a turning to the inferior.”67 The last part is again directed against Proclus, prop. 167: “if the last is true, this will mean that intellect reverts upon its inferior.”68
Furthermore, Nicholas says something that, in my opinion, would be also acceptable for Proclus: “And we say also that the beyond-intellect Intellect alone knows and thinks itself as it is, but none of the other intellects knows it thus […] but in a lesser way.”69 Then Nicholas tries to prove once again that, unlike Proclus, the intellect knows all things after itself too:
If the intellect, knowing what is before it, knows both that it is a cause and of what it is cause, and [knows that] it is a cause of all things after it, then the intellect knows even the things that are after itself; for if it is ignorant of these, it will be ignorant both of itself and what is before itself.70
As we already mentioned, for Nicholas, unlike Proclus and Petritsi, the first unparticipated intellect is nothing else but God himself. In Nicholas’ opinion, again unlike Proclus and Petritsi, the first intellect thinks not only itself but all things that are after it. This knowledge is a kind of “providence”, pronoia. This thesis, in principle, was acceptable for Proclus and Petritsi too, though it has another meaning in their theories: it is a kind of ontological necessity and does not imply any personal relation between cause and effect.
Nicholas agrees with Proclus that immaterial intellects perceive only by actuality. However, he criticizes Proclus for using the word “actually” in this context (Proclus: “every intellect perceives actually that it intellects”, prop. 168), because, as he claims,
potentiality holds no place in regard to the immaterial intellects […]. By much more indeed does potentiality not find place in the beyond-intellect Intellect; so that the addition of “actuality” is redundant.71
As for our individual intellect, Nicholas, like Petritsi,72 shares Aristotle’s opinion that our intellect is “sometimes active, sometimes not, because of the mist of corporeal matter that obscures it.”73 So, at least in this case we have an agreement between Proclus and Petritsi on the one hand, and Nicholas of Methone, on the other. But in the following chapter, we have again a declaration of disagreement with Proclus (consequently, also with Petritsi). Nicholas repeats that intellect “does not intellect only itself”.74 What follows from this thesis? As Nicholas says,
and so intellect and intelligible are not the same, nor therefore is intellection the same as these two, but all intellection is proper to the intellecting agent and sometimes is superior to the things intellected, and other times inferior.75
What can we say about this thesis? I suppose that if we divide it in two parts, the first one (“and so … as these two”) contradicts Proclus’ and Petritsi’s points of view. As for the second part of the thesis, both Proclus and Petritsi would accept it, i.e. the statement that “all intellection is proper to the intellecting agent.” Generally, I suppose that Proclus (and Petritsi), on the one hand, and Nicholas of Methone on the other, understood the act of intellection by intellect differently: for Proclus and Petritsi it always meant intellect’s activity directed toward own self (even if intellect views the superior object, it views it in itself), while for Nicholas it seems that he understands the act of intellection as an activity directed toward an external object, i.e. that which is “outside” the intellect. This kind of intellection is for Proclus and Petritsi rather a discursive mode of thinking (dianoia), which is appropriate to souls but not a kind of pure intellection that characterizes intellect.
Furthermore, Nicholas does not agree with Proclus’ (and Petritsi’s) thesis that “the intellect is unmoved”.76 He justifies his position with a famous quote from Gregory of Nazianz, Or. 29 (“moved toward a dyad”).77 Obviously, for Nicholas the overflowing of God’s goodness (and God is the first Intellect for him) is a kind of movement too,78 unlike Proclus’ and Petritsi’s understanding of movement. However, Nicholas admits that such movement “is super-temporal and eternal”,79 and he agrees with Proclus (and, we can add, also with Petritsi) that “every intellect is without magnitude and incorporeal and, in virtue of this, without parts.”80 According to Nicholas, angels move in both ascending and descending way, “serving the divine providence and entirely moved even if not according to nature but according to choice.”81 As Nicholas explains,
renouncing the motion of the intellects according to choice, he [i.e. Proclus] thereby removes also their self-determination, and will be compelled to grant that some [intellects] are unwillingly good, while others unwillingly evil, with the further result that he would assign to the one God and first Cause of all things not only the responsibility for good [things] but also [bad things].82
Unlike Nicholas, in Petritsi as well in Proclus, the activity of intellect does not depend on choice but on substance. Nevertheless, all of them, i.e. Proclus and Petritsi, on the one hand, and Nicholas of Methone on the other, “assign to the one God and first Cause of all things” the “responsibility” only for good, but not for evil.
3.3 Intellecting and Making
Another thesis of Proclus not accepted by Nicholas is that “every intellect simultaneously thinks all things” (prop. 170), because, as Nicolas maintains, if we accept this thesis in combination with the thesis from prop. 174, according to which “making is the same as intellecting”, then as a result we shall have a statement that “every intellect makes all things”.83 But if, as Proclus says, intellect “does not ‘think the things after itself, but [thinks] itself and its priors’ ”, then, as Nicholas concludes, “it [i.e. intellect] makes itself and its priors”,84 which is absurd for Nicholas. As he claims, “the beyond-Intellect alone […] both thinks and makes all things.”85 However, later on Nicholas specifies the meaning of the expression that It makes Itself:
Since It is both transcendent Intellect and the Being before all things, It also thinks Itself as being and pre-being, wherefore It is not said to make Itself; for Being, or rather Pre-Being, is not made, and since It has nothing before It, It would neither be said to make nor to think anything before It.86
Obviously, “intellecting as making” has another meaning for Methone than it has for Proclus and also Petritsi. Nicholas’ Intellect, unlike that of Proclus and Petritsi, as it is God, does not intellect anything before It, because there is nothing before It, as the first cause, but It thinks (again unlike Proclus’ and Petritsi’s understanding) things that are after It. Like Proclus and Petritsi, for Nicholas the first Intellect is Being, but unlike Proclus’ and Petritsi’s Intellect, this first Intellect, which is Being and also Pre-Being, is the supreme principle and cause of everything—God. For Proclus and Petritsi, unlike Nicholas, the supreme One is beyond any kind of being.
3.4 Participation and Subsistence
The concept of “participation” has a different meaning for Nicholas than it had for Proclus and also Petritsi. For Nicholas, it is “grace”: “According to participation, that is grace”, as he says.87 Nicholas claims that God alone is the true cause of all things, and the divine intellects are not themselves causes of the things after them, but they only transmit the causes projected from God.88 As he says,
these divine intellects [i.e., for Nicholas, Thrones, Cherubims and Seraphims], since they produce nothing from themselves, would not be said “to be participated”, but rather [would be said] to transmit and carry over to those after them the divine participations and distributions.89
Thus, Nicholas concludes that the divine intellects neither produce nor beget anything,
unless then someone should wish to call a begetting the initiation and distribution of the divine illumination coming down from the higher to the inferiors.90
In addition, Nicholas disagrees with Proclus’ thesis that “every intellectual Form is subsistence—giving of things perpetual.”91 As Nicholas claims, this is false because “there is not besides God something else that makes substance to subsist.” Moreover, Nicholas says that “the one and only God would be cause of all things both perpetual and corruptible.”92
Nicholas also criticises Proclus over the way in which he uses the term “unparticipated”. In Nicholas’ opinion, Proclus’ thesis that “all that is unparticipated is divine” is false because the particulars which are specific and individual (
4 Conclusion
Ioane Petritsi’s and Nicholas of Methone’s understanding of intellect are radically different from each other. Petritsi attempts to follow Proclus, while Nicholas criticizes him. For Petritsi, the first (unparticipated) intellect is a hypostasis “after” the supreme One, the first limit / first infinity, and henads. For Nicholas, the first unparticipated intellect is God himself and nothing else. All other disagreements between Petritsi and Nicholas can be explained by means of this primary difference. For Proclus and Petritsi, the first intellect is the true being, while the supreme One transcends any kind of being. In Nicholas’ opinion, the first intellect is God and He is the first true being and super-being.
For Proclus and Petritsi, there is a plurality of “unparticipated intellects”. Nicholas rejects this opinion. He claims that only God is unparticipated intellect. Moreover, he tries to overturn Proclus’ theory that the intellects which are closer to the One are unparticipated. Nicholas claims that this is not correct because they are universals, while “unparticipated” must be those that are specific, furthest from the One and therefore, participated by nothing. Nicholas does not agree with Proclus’ and Petritsi’s thesis that intellecting and making are the same in intellects; for Nicholas, this thesis is true only in respect of God. Furthermore, Nicholas does not accept Proclus’ and Petritsi’s thesis that the first intellect does not intellect those things that are subsequent to it; in Nicholas’ opinion, the first intellect, i.e. God, thinks them, and this kind of intellection is providence; nor does Nicholas accept Proclus’ and Petritsi’s thesis that the first intellect thinks that which is before it, because, in Nicholas opinion, nothing precedes the first intellect / God.
These are some differences (among many others) between Petritsi’s and Nicholas’ understanding of intellect. This kind of comparison of their commentaries helps us, I think, in uncovering the diversity of approaches to Proclus’ philosophy in the twelfth century Eastern Christian philosophical thought.
5 Addendum
There are at least two other interesting parallels in Petritsi’s and Nicholas’ commentaries which concern intellect. These are specific, concrete themes that show differences as well as similarities between Petritsi’s and Methone’s understanding of how far intellect can spread its power.
5.1 Intellect’s Inability to Grasp Matter
The first case concerns matter. Petritsi, like Plato, claims that matter, insofar as it is formless, cannot be grasped by the mind. Therefore, Petritsi says, only “bastard thought” can understand it. Because of its formlessness, matter is unperceivable (i.e. unreachable) for an intellect, both human and universal. Matter can then be grasped only by a kind of unclear and nothos94 opinion (reasoning).95
Interestingly, this idea of Plato that matter can be grasped only by a “bastard thought” is present also in Nicholas’ Refutation, ch. 48:96
And common to all is the confession that matter is deprived of all form; therefore, Plato even says that it is similar to God dissimilarly […] and it lacks perfection and self-sufficiency to the extent that it is even nothing in actuality, being understood and impressed only upon a bastard intellect.97
Thus, matter cannot be known by intellect.
5.2 Intellect’s Inability to Grasp God
Now let us see another case of intellect’s inability. In their prologues, both Petritsi and Nicholas wrote generally about Proclus and his Elements. Both of them claimed that this work is logically constructed. Both Petritsi and Nicholas wrote about Proclus’ education and his philosophical activity, though Petritsi characterized them in a very positive manner while Nicholas’ judgment of Proclus’ work was extremely negative. Both Petritsi and Nicholas claimed that God, the principle and creator of everything, is beyond any kind of thought and understanding. However, there is a radical difference between Petritsi’s and Nicholas’ assessment of Proclus’ approach to this issue: according to Petritsi, Proclus, having studied everything, going upward through the stages of the disciplines such as logic, physic, mathematics, geometry, music, cosmology, and metaphysics (furthermore, Petritsi claims that Proclus even tried to explore the One as far as it is possible), had reached the level where “the goodness of creative activity of God, producer of all things, transcends the seer.”98
Unlike him, Nicholas claims that Proclus, as Joshua Robinson says, “has failed to recognize the inaccessibility of God to human understanding”.99 To put it in Nicholas’ own words, Proclus
aimed not only to reach the heaven, but even to surpass the super-celestial intellects by means of knowledge, and to run up to God himself, the Principle of all things, and to grasp the ungraspable.100
Thus, both Petritsi and Nicholas agree that God is ungraspable by knowledge. However, Petritsi was certain that Proclus recognized it, but Nicholas claimed that he did not.
For Nicholas’ text, I use Angelou’s edition: Nicholas of Methone,
For a comparison of Petritsi’s and Nicholas’ commentaries, see L. Alexidze, “Ioane Petritsi”, in S. Gersh (ed.), Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 229–244, and M. Mtchedlidze, “Two Conflicting Positions Regarding the Philosophy of Proclus in Eastern Christian Thought of the Twelfth Century”, in S. Mariev (ed.), Byzantine Perspectives on Neoplatonism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), pp. 137–152.
Cf. M. Trizio, “Eleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantium”, in Gersh (ed.), Interpreting Proclus, p. 203: “the Anaptyxis [i.e. Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation] clearly reflects the intellectual climate of Nicholas’ time, which is characterized by frequent spreading of Proclus’ work.” In some cases, Petritsi’s commentary even makes an impression of a polemic against Nicholas of Methone’s critic of Proclus’ Elements. This is why I suppose that Petritsi could have composed his work as a response to Nicholas’ criticism of Proclus. Alexidze, “Ioane Petritsi”, p. 242.
On Petritsi’s theory of intellect, see T. Iremadze, Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter. Dietrich von Freiberg—Berthold von Moosburg—Joane Petrizi (Amsterdam / Philadelphia: B.R. Grüner, 2004), pp. 220–241; L. Gigineishvili, “The Doctrine of Logos and Intellect in the Philosophy of Ioane Petritsi: Evagrian-Origenist Influences”, in L. Perrone (ed.), Origeniana Octava. Origen and the Alexandrian tradition. Papers of the 8th International Origen Congress. Pisa, 27–31 August 2001 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), pp. 1139–1148, and L. Gigineishvili, The Platonic Theology of Ioane Petritsi (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2007), pp. 145–175; L. Alexidze, “Michael Psellos and Ioane Petritsi on Intellect”, in F. Lauritzen (ed.), Michael Psellos, special issue of Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai. Studia Theologia Orthodoxa, 66.1(2021), pp. 7–38.
As Michele Trizio says, “Nicholas’ strategy in criticizing Proclus consists of denying entities other than God and causative power in order to avoid polytheism. So, under the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius, Nicholas (79, 10–12 [Angelou]) contends that the ideas of beings are not self-subsistent realities, but God’s ‘divine and good volitions’ ” (Trizio, “Eleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantium”, p. 207).
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 93, p. 92; ch. 94, p. 93. See also J. Robinson, “ ‘A Mixing Cup of Piety and Learnedness’: Michael Psellos and Nicholas of Methone as Readers of Proclus’ Elements of Theology”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 2. Translations and Acculturations (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2020), pp. 69–70.
Alexidze, “Ioane Petritsi”, p. 232, 241–242.
I shall not discuss the famous citation from Gregory of Nazianz, Oratio 29 in Petritsi’s so called epilogue (Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, epilogue, pp. 209–210) quoted also many times by Nicholas of Methone, though it concerns intellect too. On this issue see M. Mtchedlidzé, “Les interpretations d’un passage du Discours 29 de Grégoire de Nazianze par les auteurs byzantins et géorgiens des XIe–XIIe siècles”, in V. Somers, P. Yannopoulos (eds), Philokappadox. In memoriam Justin Mossay (Leuven / Paris / Bristol: Peeters, 2016), pp. 247–268.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 2, p. 21.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 24, p. 67: ცაჲ გონებათაჲ.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 130, p. 166: ცად გონებათად და გონებითად საკურთხეველადცა უწოდეს.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 136, p. 169: დადვეს იგი ვითარ ცად გონებათა და სულთა.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 181, p. 192. According to Petritsi, all other intermediate intellects produced by true being are also called ‘intellects’ “up to the intellectual intellect, where the intellectual Apollo and Chronos and Rhea and Dia are visible, which look at the sky of intellects, which is the true being, and they too become gods by means of it.” (და კუალად შემდგომითი შემდგომად გონებად ყოველთა უწოდა ვიდრე გონიერისა გონებისამდის, სადა გონიერი აპოლლო და კრონოს და რეა და დია გამოჩნდეს, რომელნი ხედვენ ცასა გონებათასა, რომელ არს ნამდჳლ მყოფი, და ღმერთ იქმნებიან მის მიერ).
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 140, p. 171. Here, taking into consideration other parts of Petritsi’s commentary, we can add that by “everything” he does not mean prime matter, but everything that has form, cf. Petritsi, II, ch. 11, pp. 42–43.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 181, p. 192. On true being in Petritsi, see also L. Alexidze, “The Demiurge in Ioane Petritis’s Commentary on Proclus’ Elements of Theology”, in Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 47.1 (2021), pp. 149–165.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 128, p. 165.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 101, p. 148.
See also Petritsi’s translation of prop. 161 and 166 in Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, pp. 96–97 and 99–100.
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop. 161, p. 140, 14–15:
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop. 161, p. 140, 17–18:
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 161, p. 182.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 166, p. 185. I think “the individual (particular) intellect” (ნაწილებითი გონებაჲ) sounds quite strange here. This is why I suppose that Petritsi means the intra-mundane intellect, as it is in Proclus’ prop. 166 and also Petritsi’s own translation of this proposition. Obviously Petritsi here calls the intellect of the cosmos “individual (particular) intellect”.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 184, p. 193: რამეთუ განყვნა გონებანი სამ დასად: საღმრთოდ გონებად, და თჳთ ოდენ გონებად, და გონიერად არსებად.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 173, p. 188.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 135, p. 169.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 171, pp. 187–188.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, prologue, p. 7.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 172, p. 188.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, prologue, p. 8.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 20, pp. 57–58.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 129 (the proposition which corresponds to this commentary is absent in all Greek manuscripts), p. 165.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 169, p. 186. On the modes of cognition in Petritsi see L. Alexidze, “Dianoia in Ioane Petritsi’s commentary on Proclus’ Elements of Theology”, in Chôra. Revue d’études anciennes et médiévales. Philosophie, théologie, sciences, 14(2016), pp. 177–194.
Petritsi uses here the Greek word in Georgian transliteration.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 167, p. 185: კუალად გაიგონებს მიზეზთა დასაბამთა თჳსთა ნოიტოთა, რომელ არიან გასაგონონი, შორის ექმნების და იგონებს თჳსსაცა თჳთებასა უმჯობესად, და არს ვითარ გონებაჲ და გასაგონოჲ უმჯობეს გამგონესა.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 167, p. 185.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 168, p. 186.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 169, p. 186; ch. 170, p. 187; ch. 171, p. 187; ch. 175, p. 189 etc.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 176, p. 189, 31–190, 3: სიტყჳსა მიერ შემოქმედებითისა. This also can be translated as “creative word”; Georgian სიტყვა corresponds to Greek
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 177, p. 190.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 178, p. 190.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 174, pp. 188–189.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 177, p. 190: რამეთუ უქუენაესნი სიმრავლითა უკუე უფრო, ხოლო ძალითა უკნინეს; ხოლო უზენაესნი რაჲზომობითა სიმრავლისაჲთა უმცრო, ხოლო დაზესთაებითა ძალთაჲთა უფრო.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 177, p. 190: რამეთუ უმეტეს ჰბაძვენ მას ზესა ზესთაობისასაცა. ხოლო შენ ოდეს ზეობაჲ გესმას ანუ ქუეობაჲ, ნუ ადგილთა წარმოიკერპებ და ჰაზროჲ უსხეულოთათჳს და განუზიდველთა, ონკოთა და განსაზიდთა, არამედ სიმარჯუენი არსებათა და ძალთანი და უფრო მოქმედიერობაჲ გაიგონე.
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop. 177, p. 156. Cf. Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 177, p. 190.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 175, p. 189.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 166, p. 185.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 194, p. 198.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 193, p. 198: ვინაჲ ვიეთცა წარმოუდგეს სული, ვითარ უკუნქცეული თჳსდამი, გონიერ ჰყოფს მათ.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 175, p. 189.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 184, p. 193: და კუალად არსო სული ქცევადი, ესე იგი არს ჩუენი, ოდესმე გონებისადა შეყოფილი და ოდესმე უგუნურებისადა, ვითარ გამგდე გონებისაჲ. და ამათ საშუვალ არსო სხუაჲ სული, სამარადისოდ გონიერთადა შეყოფილი და უქცევი, ვითარ მზისაჲ და სხუათა ესვითათაჲ.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 197, p. 200: რამეთუ მეცნიერ თჳსისა აობისა გონიერი სული.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 206, p. 204: რამეთუ ფრთე სულისა გონებაჲ.
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 209, p. 205; ch. 210, p. 205; ch. 211, p. 206. Alexidze, “Dianoia in Ioane Petritsi’s commentary”, p. 186.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 160. Here and elsewhere, I use Joshua Robinson’s English translation of Nicholas’ Refutation.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 161, p. 143, 21:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 161, p. 143, 22–23:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 161, p. 143, 23:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 163, p. 145, 2:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 165, p. 146, 10–12:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 166, p. 147, 6–7:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 166, p. 147, 18–19:
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop. 167, p. 144, 22.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 167, p. 147, 29–30:
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop. 167, p. 144, 22–23.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 167, p. 147, 32–33:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 167, p. 147, 33–148, 1:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 167, p. 148, 2–5:
See Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 167, p. 144, 28.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 167, p. 148, 13–14; 21:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 167, p. 148, 25–28:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 168, p. 149, 3–4; 6–7:
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, prologue, pp. 8–9.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 168, p. 149, 2–3:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 169, p. 149, 10:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 169, p. 149, 10–12:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 169, p. 149, 14:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 169, p. 149, 15:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 169, p. 149, 15–21.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 169, p. 149, 26–27:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 171, p. 150, 29–30:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 169, p. 149, 18–21:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 171, p. 151, 4–8:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 170, p. 150, 3:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 170, p. 150, 5:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 170, p. 150, 7–8:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 174, p. 153, 22–25:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 173, p. 152, 12–13:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 173.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 175, p. 154, 3–5:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 177, p. 155, 27–29:
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop. 178, p. 156, 25.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 178, p. 156, 10–11; 14–15:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, ch. 181, p. 158, 12–19.
Greek word
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 59, p. 126. With this phrase and especially with the word nothos Petritsi refers to Plato’s Timaeus 52ab. Plato uses this word, like Petritsi, as a definition of thought which attempts to grasp that what we call “matter”. The similar definition of reasoning, which attempts to grasp matter, with reference to Plato, we find in chapters 6, p. 30, also in ch. 32 of Petritsi’s commentary; cf. Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, ch. 32, p. 83: “The one of the formless matter [unlike the supreme One, which is above all kind of form and definition] lacks any kind of limit and form. It is completely figureless and has no stability. As Plato says, it can be grasped only in spontaneity of unclear and untrue opinion.” (ხოლო ერთი ნივთისა უგუაროჲსა დაკლებულ ყოველთა საზღვართა და გუართაგან, და უსახო და უმდგო ყოვლითურთ, ვითარ პლატონ იტყჳს, ვითარმედ ოდენ ნამრღუევსა და ეს ვითა ნაცთსა გულმყისიერებასა შორის მონაგონი). See also L. Alexidze, “Matter in Ioane Petritsi’s Commentary on Proclus’ Elements of Theology”, in A. Le Moli, L. Alexidze (eds), Prote Hyle. Notions of Matter in the Platonic and Aristotelian Traditions. Palermo, Palermo University Press, 2017, pp. 127–128.
This issue is discussed in detail by J. Robinson, “Proclus as Heresiarch: Theological Polemic and Philosophical Commentary in Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation (Anaptyxis) of Proclus’ Elements of Theology”, in Mariev (ed.), Byzantine Perspectives, p. 108.
Nicholas, ch. 48, p. 54, 22–24; 29–31:
Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, prologue, p. 4: და თუ ვითარ ამათ მიერ კეთილმეჴელოვნეობაჲ ყოველთა ღმრთისა დამბადისაჲ დაუზესთავდების მხედველსა. Furthermore, Petritsi claims again that the supreme One is inaccessible even for intellect. Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria, prologue, p. 5.
Robinson, Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation, p. 80.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, prologue, p. 3, 26–29:
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Ioane Petrizi, Opera, t. II: Commentaria in Procli DiadochiΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΝ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗΝ. Textum Hibericum ediderunt commentariisque instruxerunt S. Nutsubidse et S. Kauchtschischvili, Tbilisiis, Sumptibus Universitatis Tbilisiensis 1937. [იოანე პეტრიწის შრომები. ტომი II. განმარტებაჲ პროკლე დიადოხოსისა და პლატონურისა ფილოსოფიისათჳს. ტექსტი გამოსცეს და გამოკვლევა დაურთეს შ. ნუცუბიძემ და ს. ყაუხჩიშვილმა. ტფილისის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტის გამომცემლობა, ტფილისი 1937].
Nicholas of Methone, “Explication of the Elements of Theology of Proclus of Lycia the Platonic Philosopher: That those who read (this book) might not be seized by its seemingly compelling persuasion and be tempted against the true faith”, (English translation by J. Robinson), in Robinson, Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation of Proclus, pp. 162–459.
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Alexidze, L., “Dianoia in Ioane Petritsi’s commentary on Proclus’ Elements of Theology”, in Chôra. Revue d’études anciennes et médiévales. Philosophie, théologie, sciences, 14(2016), pp. 177–194.
Iremadze, T., Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter. Dietrich von Freiberg—Berthold von Moosburg—Joane Petrizi, Amsterdam / Philadelphia, B.R. Grüner, 2004.
Robinson, J., Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation of Proclus: Theology and Neoplatonism in 12th Century Byzantium. A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Graduate Program in Medieval Studies, Notre Dame (Indiana), 2014.