According to Athanasios D. Angelou, the editor of the 1984 critical edition of Nicholasâ Refutation, Nicholas challenges Eustratiosâ Neoplatonism in his commentary on Posterior Analytics II.1 The Byzantine theologian and Aristotelian commentator Eustratios of Nicaea (d. after 1120â¯AD) is one of the most prominent medieval readers of Proclus and undoubtedly one of the most crucial Neoplatonic philosophers of the Middle Ages. The man rose to prominence under Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081â1118) and stood out as a prolific writer of theological and philosophical works.2 His philosophical writings include a commentary on Nicomachean Ethics I and VI and a commentary on Posterior Analytics II. Eventually, Eustratios fell into disgrace in 1117, but his commentaries were destined to enjoy an everlasting fortune thanks to Robert Grossetesteâs thirteenth-century Latin translations of the commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics I and VI. These commentaries became the standard reference works for medieval and renaissance scholars interested in Aristotleâs ethics.3
Eustratiosâ Neoplatonism has already been thoroughly studied regarding the aforementioned commentaries.4 Written after the request of Alexiosâ daughter, princess Anna Komnena (d. ca. 1154), these texts display a vast and original appropriation of the writings of the Neoplatonist Proclus. Eustratiosâ adaptation of Proclusâ Åuvre is remarkable both because of the authorâs nuanced and sophisticated strategy of appropriation and because of the hostility towards Proclus evident in the texts and documents of this period, including Anna Komnenaâs rebuttal in her Alexias of the Neoplatonism of Eustratiosâ former master, John Italos (d. after 1082).5 However, Eustratios also wrote another commentary, namely on Posterior Analytics II. Even though this text displays a similar fascination for Neoplatonism, it has not yet received the same attention as Eustratiosâ other commentaries.6 This paper fills the gap by investigating the Neoplatonic background of the most relevant passages from this commentary.
Written after the request of his contemporaries, Eustratiosâ commentary is the first medieval commentary on the Aristotelian work at hand.7 In the late eleventh to early thirteenth centuries, readers could surely use Philoponusâ commentary on book I and Themistiusâ paraphrase of the whole work, but probably the latter was not enough for Eustratios. He felt compelled to produce a full line-by-line commentary on Posterior Analytics II, which nevertheless often depends on Themistius for the literal explanation of the text.8 The text is extremely long (270 pages in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca edition), maybe the most extended Byzantine commentary ever written on a classical philosophical work (or on a part of it).
Perhaps this, along with the abundance of technical language, has discouraged modern readers from approaching the text. Even Aristotle scholar Paul Moraux, who did extensive research on the commentary to detect citations from Alexander of Aphrodisiasâ lost commentary on the same work, dismissed the commentary as prolix, pedantic, and verbose.9
However, as it is well known, reading a Byzantine text through the eyes of the classical scholar may result in misleading judgments. That is why Morauxâs evaluation of Eustratiosâ commentary, like many other modern evaluations of Byzantine texts, is somewhat unfair. As I anticipated, historians of eleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantium will find the text under discussion extremely interesting. Eustratios wrote in a time when medieval Greek readers of the aforementioned pagan philosopher Proclus were viewed with suspicion, something that makes the commentatorâs distinctive Neoplatonizing exegesis of Aristotle extremely interesting.10 It is not by chance, then, that Eustratiosâ commentary has been regarded as the target of Nicholas of Methoneâs Refutation of Proclusâ Elements of Theology.
This paper discusses Eustratiosâ Neoplatonism in his commentary on Posterior Analytics II, emphasizing causation theory, knowledge and epistemology, and metaphysics.
1 Causation Theory
One of the most prominent features of Eustratiosâ Neoplatonism is his acceptance of the Neoplatonic causation theory. This is evident from the beginning of the commentary on Posterior Analytics II. Following a rather traditional methodology, in the preface to his commentary the commentator addresses issues such as the subject of Aristotleâs work at hand and its place within the traditional division of philosophy. Writes Eustratios:
ΤεÏÏá½±ÏÏν δὲ á½Î½ÏÏν αἰÏá½·Ïν καÏá½° á¼ÏιÏÏοÏέλην ÏεÏὶ Ïοῦ εἰδικοῦ á½ Ïλεá¿ÏÏÎ¿Ï Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï Î±á½Ïá¿· á¼Î½ÏÎ±Ï Î¸Î¿á¿ ,διόÏι καὶ ÏοῦÏο á¼Î½ Ïαá¿Ï á¼ÏοδείξεÏι μέÏον á½¡Ï á¼Ïὶ Ïὸ Ïλεá¿ÏÏον ÏαÏαλαμβάνεÏαι .Ïὸ μὲν Î³á½°Ï á½Î»Î¹Îºá½¸Î½ Ïεá¿Ïον Ïῶν αἰÏá½·Ïν ,καὶ ἡ á¼Îº ÏούÏÎ¿Ï Î³Î½á¿¶ÏÎ¹Ï á¼Î¼Î±Ï ÏοÏá½³Ïα ,ÏÏ Î¼ÏαÏομαÏÏοῦν á¼ÏÎ¿Ï Ïα Ïὸ Ïá¿Ï ÏοιαύÏÎ·Ï Î±á¼°Ïá½·Î±Ï á¼ÏÎ»Ï á¿¶Î´á½³Ï Ïε καὶ á¼Î²á½³Î²Î±Î¹Î¿Î½ .Ïὸ δέ γε ÏοιηÏικὸν καὶ Ïὸ Ïελικὸν á¼¢ á¼Î¼ÏÏ á¼Î¾á¿ÏηÏαι Ïοῦ οὠá¼ÏÏιν αἴÏια ,á¼¢ εἴ ÏοÏε ÏούÏÏν θάÏεÏον á¼ÏεÏαι ,Ïαá½Ïὸν Ïá¿· εἴδει á¼ÏÏι Î ÏοῦÏο δέ á¼ÏÏι Ïὸ Ïá½³Î»Î¿Ï .11
Among the four Aristotelian causes, the present treatise mainly concerns form, insofar as in scientific demonstrations, the formal cause is mostly considered as the middle term. Matter is the weakest of all causes, and the related knowledge is less certain, for it carries the obscure and unstable nature of such cause. By contrast, the efficient and final cause either transcends the effect, orâanytime the second of these is presentâit is identical with the form, which is the end.
According to Eustratios, Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics II primarily concerns the formal cause as the middle term in a scientific demonstration. Possibly Eustratios has in mind the discussion of the four causes in II.11, where Aristotle claims that (94a35â36) âThe middle term has also been proved to be explanatory of what it is to be something.â12 Indeed the problem of this chapter is that the Philosopher also mentions the other causes, thus leaving the impression that in demonstrations the middle term can sometimes be the formal cause, whereas in other instances it can be the material, efficient or final cause. By contrast, there seems to be quite an agreement among scholars that the middle term is always the form or definition (like Aristotle himself implies in Posterior Analytics II, chs. 8â10), even though this element is âin some cases an eternal ground of the consequent (viz. when the consequence is itself an eternal fact), in some cases an efficient or a final cause (when the consequence is an event).â13 Because of this, it seems that Eustratios claims that Posterior Analytics II deals with form or the formal cause is a sound one.
However, this is not relevant to the purpose of my analysis, nor is Eustratiosâ claim that in Aristotleâs theory of causation the formal and the final causes overlaps.14 (re vera in Physics II.7 all causes are said to be identical with eidos except matter).15 This latter point is undoubtedly true. However, what strikes my attention is the commentatorâs claim that the efficient and final cause âtranscend the effectâ (
According to Proclus every cause must transcend its effect and cannot be immanent in it. The background for such a claim is that among Aristotleâs four causes form and matter are only to be regarded as concomitant causes, whereas the efficient and final cause are causes properly so called, insofar as they act within the intelligible world and actual causation only concern this realm.18 More importantly, the Neoplatonists did not simply accept Aristotleâs four causes. They also added two new causes as a further Platonic correction to Aristotleâs theory, namely the paradigmatic cause and the instrumental one, the former being a cause properly so called, the latter a concomitant one.19 Eustratios is perfectly aware of this, and elsewhere in the commentary he acknowledges the existence of the paradigmatic and instrumental cause as well. However, he disguises the Platonic origin of the addition by claiming that Aristotle himself has left aside the paradigmatic and instrumental cause in light of the nature-based approach widespread in his work.20 The explanation witnesses Eustratiosâ deep knowledge of the Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle, for this very same explanation occurs in the commentary on Physics by John Philoponus, according to which Aristotleâs approach to causation is that of a scholar interested in nature alone.21
Another fascinating text is found at p. 185.21â27. As the commentator comments on II,13, 96a24â32, he notices an aporia in the text. Aristotle writes:
Τῶν δὴ á½ÏαÏÏόνÏÏν á¼Îµá½¶ á¼Îºá½±ÏÏῳ á¼Î½Î¹Î± á¼ÏεκÏείνει á¼Ïὶ Ïλέον ,οὠμένÏοι á¼Î¾Ï Ïοῦ Î³á½³Î½Î¿Ï Ï .Î»á½³Î³Ï Î´á½² á¼Ïὶ Ïλέον á½Ïá½±ÏÏειν á½ Ïα á½Ïá½±ÏÏει μὲν á¼Îºá½±ÏÏῳ ÎºÎ±Î¸á½¹Î»Î¿Ï ,οὠμὴν á¼Î»Î»á½° καὶ á¼Î»Î»á¿³ .οἷον á¼ÏÏι Ïι á½ Ïá½±Ïá¿ ÏÏιάδι á½Ïá½±ÏÏει ,á¼Î»Î»á½° καὶ μὴ ÏÏιάδι ,á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ Ïὸ á½Î½ á½Ïá½±ÏÏει Ïá¿ ÏÏιάδι ,á¼Î»Î»á½° καὶ μὴ á¼Ïιθμῷ ,á¼Î»Î»á½° καὶ Ïὸ ÏεÏιÏÏὸν á½Ïá½±ÏÏει Ïε Ïá½±Ïá¿ ÏÏιάδι καὶ á¼Ïὶ Ïλέον á½Ïá½±ÏÏει (καὶ Î³á½°Ï Ïá¿ ÏενÏάδι á½Ïá½±ÏÏει ),á¼Î»Î» âοá½Îº á¼Î¾Ï Ïοῦ Î³á½³Î½Î¿Ï Ï Î á¼¡ μὲν Î³á½°Ï ÏενÏá½°Ï á¼ÏÎ¹Î¸Î¼á½¹Ï ,οá½Î´á½²Î½ δὲ á¼Î¾Ï á¼Ïιθμοῦ ÏεÏιÏÏόν .
Some of the items that hold something always extend further than it without going outside its kind. (I say that they extend further if they hold of it universally and also hold of something else.) E.g. there are items which hold of every triplet and also of non-triplets: existence holds of triplets and also of non-numbers; odd holds of every triplet and extends further (it also holds of quintuplets), but it does not go outside its kind-for quintuplets are numbers, and nothing outside number is odd.
Eustratios expands the text and ponders if items such as âbeingâ and âexistenceâ are said according to genus, species, proper, or accident. He concludes that these terms are only said according to the ten categories, not as genus, species, etc. In the same vein, the ten categories do not instantiate âbeing in generalâ, but only âbeingâ according to each. Yet, at a certain point, it seems to me that the wording introduces non-Aristotelian elements. Here is Eustratiosâ comment:
ÏάνÏα Î³á½°Ï Î´á½´ ÏαῦÏα á¼Îº Ïοῦ ÏÏá½½ÏÏÏ á½Î½ÏÎ¿Ï Î¼ÎµÏεÏÏηκόÏα Ïοῦ Ïε εἶναι καὶ Ïοῦ á½Î½Ïα λέγεÏθαι οἰκείÏÏ á¼Î±Ï Ïá¿· á¼ÎºÎ±ÏÏον αá½Ïῶν Ïὴν κλá¿Ïιν ÏαύÏην á¼ÏομεÏίζεÏαι ,Ïὸ μὲν á½¡Ï Î¿á½Ïία ,Ïὸ δ âá½¡Ï ÏοÏόν ,Ïὸ δ âá¼Î»Î»Î¿ Ïι Î Ïᾶν Î³á½°Ï Ïὸ μεÏá½³Ïον οἰκείÏÏ á¼Î±Ï Ïá¿· μεÏá½³Ïει Ïá¿Ï Ïοῦ μεÏεÏÎ¿Î¼á½³Î½Î¿Ï Ïá½»ÏεÏÏ .οἰκείÏÏ Î¿á½Î½ á¼Îºá½±ÏÏῳ á¼ÏαÏμοζόμενον Ïὸ á½Î½ καὶ Ïὸ εἶναι καὶ Ïὸ á¼ÏÏὶν οἰκείÏÏ ÎºÎ±ÏηγοÏούμενον λέγεÏαι ,καὶ οá½Ïε Î³á½³Î½Î¿Ï Î¿á½Ïε Îµá¼¶Î´Î¿Ï Î¿á½Ïε διαÏοÏá½° οá½Ïε ἴδιον οá½Ïε ÏÏ Î¼Î²ÎµÎ²Î·Îºá½¹Ï .22
In fact, since all these things are said both to be and exist as beings insofar as they participate in that which is firstly Being, each of them is classified according to its respective denomination, one as substance, the other as quantity, and so on. All participants participate in the nature of the participated according to their own capacity. In this manner, existence, being, and being qualified fit according to the recipientâs proper nature and are predicated accordingly (not as genus, species, difference, proper, or accident).
As I said before, âbeingâ is not predicated according to genus, species, etc., but according to the ten categories. However, whereas this fits in with Aristotleâs ontology, Eustratiosâ claim that each thing participates in that which is Being properly so called according to each thingâs capacity and nature introduces the idea that somehow Being is a Form in the Platonic sense and that the ten categories are subordinated to Being as a Platonic form. Also, in this case it seems to me that Eustratios introduces a causation theory based upon Proclusâ theory of participation developed in the Elements of Theology (and elsewhere), according to which participation takes place according to the nature and capacity of the participant.23 We are far away from Aristotelian ontology as we know it today.
2 Knowledge
Knowledge is another crucial issue in Eustratiosâ philosophy, one that makes his allegiance to Proclusâ Neoplatonism clear. I shall now present a few pieces of textual evidence supporting this view. In a doxography found in our commentary concerning knowledge and concept formation in the Platonists and Aristotle, Eustratios adds his view and writes:
á¼Î½ Ïá¿ Ïάξει Ïῶν εἰδῶν Ïá½° ÏÏοÏεÏá¿¶Ï Î¼ÎµÏá½± Ïι μεÏá½³Ïει ÏÏανόÏεÏον Ïοῦ ÏÏοÏεÏá¿¶Ï ÏÏὸ αá½Ïῶν .á¼Ïεὶ οá½Î½ ἡ ÏÏ Ïá½´ ÏÏοÏεÏá¿¶Ï Î¼ÎµÏá½° νοῦν ,μεÏá½³Ïει Ïοῦ νοῦ μᾶλλον ἤÏÎµÏ Ïá½° Ïá½¹ÏÏÏ Ïοῦ νοῦ ,καὶ ÏούÏÎ¿Ï á¼Î½ αá½Ïá¿ á¼ÏηÏήμαÏα αἱ κοιναὶ καὶ αá½Ïá½¹ÏιÏÏοι á¼Î½Î½Î¿Î¹Î±Î¹ ,δι âὧνÏÎµÏ Ïá½³Ïει Ïινὰ ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïá½°Ï á¼Î¼á½³ÏÎ¿Ï Ï Ïοῦ νοῦ á¼ÏÎ¹Î²Î¿Î»á½°Ï á¼ÏομίμηÏιν ,αἳ δὴ á¼Î¾ á¼ÏÏá¿Ï μὲν αá½Ïá¿ á½¡Ï á¼Î¼ÏÏ ÏεύμαÏα á¼Î½ αἰθάλῠá¼ÏοκεκÏá½»ÏαÏαι Ïá¿ á¼ÏικÏαÏείᾳ Ïῶν ÏειÏόνÏν Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÏν ÏÏ Î³Ïεόμεναι ,Î»á½³Î³Ï Î´á½´ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïικá¿Ï Ïε καὶ ζÏÏικá¿Ï ,διὰ Ïὸ ÏθανούÏÎ±Ï ÏαύÏÎ±Ï á¼Î½ÎµÏγεá¿Î½ á¼Î½ Ïá¿· ÏώμαÏι γενεÏÎ¹Î¿Ï ÏÎ³Î¿á½»Ï Ïε οá½ÏÎ±Ï Ïá¿· Ïε ÏώμαÏι ÏÏοÏεÏá¿¶Ï ÏοÏηγούÏÎ±Ï Ïὴν Ïá½»ÏÏαÏιν ,καὶ ÏοῦÏο á¼ÏιÏήδειον ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïá½°Ï Î´Î¹ âαá½Ïοῦ á¼Î½ÎµÏÎ³Îµá½·Î±Ï ÏαÏαÏÎºÎµÏ Î±Î¶Î¿á½»ÏÎ±Ï ÏῠκÏείÏÏονι .ὧν á¼Î½ÎµÏÎ³Î¿Ï Ïῶν Ïὺν ÏÏοδÏá½¹ÏηÏι á¼ÏÏοÏεκÏεá¿Î½ á¼Î±Ï Ïá¿ ÏÏ Î¼Î²Î±á½·Î½ÎµÎ¹ Ïὴν λογικὴν á½Ïὸ Ïá¿Ï á¼ÎºÎµá½·Î½Ïν καÏαÏÏ Ïομένην á½Ïμá¿Ï καὶ á¼ÏείÏÏÏ á¼Ïι á¼ÏÎ¿Ï Ïαν Ïá¿Ï á¼Î½Ïαῦθα θεÏÏá½·Î±Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏάξεÏÏ ,καὶ ÏÎ¿Î´Î·Î³á½·Î±Ï Î´ÎµÎ¿Î¼á½³Î½Î·Î½ ,ἵν âá¼Î±Ï Ïá¿ Ïὴν á¼ÏιÏÏήμην καὶ Ïá½°Ï á¼Î³ÎºÎµÎ¹Î¼á½³Î½Î±Ï á¼Î½Î½Î¿á½·Î±Ï ÏÏοβάληÏαι .24
Within the hierarchy of forms that which follows immediately after something participates in a clearer manner in that which is located immediately before it. Therefore, since the soul comes immediately after the Intelligence, it participates in the Intelligence more than that which is located farther than it and has common and self-evident notions as echoes in itself of the Intelligence, by means of which the soul preserves a particular imitation of the immediate intuitions of the Intelligence. These notions are indeed like live coal covered in ash and are confused because of the predominance of the lower potencies, I mean the nutritive and vegetative ones. Since these become first apparent as they act in the body, they are related to the generation process and they contribute directly to the constitution of the body, and this fits the following purpose: these potencies make sure that the bodily operations function in a better way. [Yet] when these potencies act, it happens to the same soul that its rational part becomes vehemently inattentive; since the impulse of those potencies drags the soul, it still possesses an imperfect knowledge and practice of this world, and needs assistance in order to bring forth the science found in itself and its innate notions.
The passage at hand should be read in parallel with an earlier passage from the same commentary, where Eustratios describes common notions as âechoesâ of the Intelligence in us (i.e. the intelligible contents in our soul that allows it to imitate the perfect knowledge of the same Intelligence), and claims that this innate knowledge is somehow inactive due to the shock of the birth. Yet, the commentator continues, if correctly stimulated, the flame of knowledge may burn in us once more, a metaphor implying that we can activate the innate knowledge in us through training or experience.25 As I have argued elsewhere, here Eustratios is indebted to Proclus and his thesis that concepts assembled from the manifold particulars are somehow inferior to the innate knowledge in the soul. However, these later-born conceptsâas Proclus calls themâare helpful in that they stimulate the inner knowledge of the soul.26
In what follows, I shall discuss the passages at hand in more detail:
i) Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 257.35â37:
âWithin the hierarchy of forms that which follows immediately after something participates in a clearer manner of that which is located immediately before it. Therefore, since the soul comes immediately after the Intelligence, it participates in the Intelligence more than that which is located farther than it.â (
á¼Î½ Ïá¿ Ïάξει Ïῶν εἰδῶν Ïá½° ÏÏοÏεÏá¿¶Ï Î¼ÎµÏá½± Ïι μεÏá½³Ïει ÏÏανόÏεÏον Ïοῦ ÏÏοÏεÏá¿¶Ï ÏÏὸ αá½Ïῶν .á¼Ïεὶ οá½Î½ ἡ ÏÏ Ïá½´ ÏÏοÏεÏá¿¶Ï Î¼ÎµÏá½° νοῦν ,μεÏá½³Ïει Ïοῦ νοῦ μᾶλλον ἤÏÎµÏ Ïá½° Ïá½¹ÏÏÏ Ïοῦ νοῦ .)
This passage is taken from Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 193:
ii) Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 257.38â258.2:
âAnd [the soul] has common and self-evident notions as echoes in itself of the Intelligence, through which the soul preserves a particular imitation of the immediate intuitions of the Intelligence. These notions are indeed like live coal covered in ash and are confused because of the predominance of the lower potencies.â (
καὶ ÏούÏÎ¿Ï á¼Î½ αá½Ïá¿ á¼ÏηÏήμαÏα αἱ κοιναὶ καὶ αá½Ïá½¹ÏιÏÏοι á¼Î½Î½Î¿Î¹Î±Î¹ ,δι âὧνÏÎµÏ Ïá½³Ïει Ïινὰ ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïá½°Ï á¼Î¼á½³ÏÎ¿Ï Ï Ïοῦ νοῦ á¼ÏÎ¹Î²Î¿Î»á½°Ï á¼ÏομίμηÏιν ,αἳ δὴ á¼Î¾ á¼ÏÏá¿Ï μὲν αá½Ïá¿ á½¡Ï á¼Î¼ÏÏ ÏεύμαÏα á¼Î½ αἰθάλῠá¼ÏοκεκÏá½»ÏαÏαι Ïá¿ á¼ÏικÏαÏείᾳ Ïῶν ÏειÏόνÏν Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÏν ÏÏ Î³Ïεόμεναι .)
Here Eustratios claims that the soul has been granted by the Intelligence common and self-evident notions, echoes of the intelligible contents found in the same Intelligence.27 He also compares this innate knowledge to burning coal and claims that due to the shock of the birth and the connection with bodily powers, the soul is unaware of these innate contents.28
Fire-related images are frequently present in Neoplatonic literature to describe knowledge. The Neoplatonists were paying tribute to the Chaldean Oracles when comparing knowledge to fire or flames.29 Also, the form epibolai, here used for describing the immediate intuitive knowledge proper to the Intelligence, occurs frequently in Neoplatonic literature for accounting for the intuitive nature of knowledge-intellection properly so called vis-Ã -vis the non-intuitive character of discursive reasoning.30 More importantly, Eustratios calls the innate reasons in the soul, namely the echoes of the Intelligence or Nous, âcommon and self-evident notionsâ (
Also, this passage equates the innate reasons in the soul as echoes of the separate Intelligence; however, here, common notions are said to be the result of the soulâs operation, as it assembles concepts made out of sense-perception data, whereas the innate reasons in the soul are said to be noêmata. This is undoubtedly consistent with Proclusâ epistemology. In fact, in his commentary on Platoâs Parmenides Proclus famously wrote:
οá½Ïε δ âοá½Î½ Ïοá¿Ï ÏαÏá½± ÏιÏι ÎºÎ±Î»Î¿Ï Î¼á½³Î½Î¿Î¹Ï á¼Î½Î½Î¿á½µÎ¼Î±Ïιν Îµá¼°Ï Ïαá½Ïὸν á¼Î³ÎµÎ¹Î½ ÏÏοÏήκει Ïá½° νοήμαÏα ÏαῦÏα Ïá½° Ïῶν οá½ÏιÏδῶν λόγÏν ,κá¼Î½ á½ Ïι μάλιÏÏα á¼ÏικοινÏνῠÏαá¿Ï ÏÏοÏηγοÏá½·Î±Î¹Ï âá¼Î½ÎµÏγήμαÏα Î³á½±Ï á¼ÏÏιν á¼ÎºÎµá¿Î½Î± á¼Ïὸ Ïῶν ÏανÏαÏιῶν á¼Î½ÎµÎ³ÎµÎ¹Ïόμενα . (âWe should not, therefore, equate these thoughts arising from essential reason-principles with what are called by some ânotionsâ even though the terms are almost identical, for these latter are objects stimulated by sense-impression.â)34
This Proclus passage is the source of Eustratiosâ text. Thus, apparently, readers face an inconsistency: in his commentary on Posterior Analytics II, Eustratios refers to the innate reasons in the soul as common notions, whereas in his commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VI, Eustratios speaks of common notions as concepts assembled from sense-perception data. Yet, scrupulous research into Proclusâ vocabulary suggests a way out, for even this Neoplatonist seldomly uses the expression âcommon notionsâ concerning the innate reasons in the soul.35 In short, I am inclined to believe that Eustratiosâ allegedly inconsistent terminology reflects a certain ambiguity in his beloved Neoplatonic sources.
iii) Finally, in the very end of this passage, Eustratios writes that:
â[Yet] When these potencies act, it happens to the same soul that its rational part becomes vehemently inattentive; since the impulse of those potencies drags the soul, it still possesses an imperfect knowledge and practice of this world, and needs assistance in order to bring forth the science found in itself and its innate notions.â (
ὧν á¼Î½ÎµÏÎ³Î¿Ï Ïῶν Ïὺν ÏÏοδÏá½¹ÏηÏι á¼ÏÏοÏεκÏεá¿Î½ á¼Î±Ï Ïá¿ ÏÏ Î¼Î²Î±á½·Î½ÎµÎ¹ Ïὴν λογικὴν á½Ïὸ Ïá¿Ï á¼ÎºÎµá½·Î½Ïν καÏαÏÏ Ïομένην á½Ïμá¿Ï καὶ á¼ÏείÏÏÏ á¼Ïι á¼ÏÎ¿Ï Ïαν Ïá¿Ï á¼Î½Ïαῦθα θεÏÏá½·Î±Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏάξεÏÏ ,καὶ ÏÎ¿Î´Î·Î³á½·Î±Ï Î´ÎµÎ¿Î¼á½³Î½Î·Î½ ,ἵν âá¼Î±Ï Ïá¿ Ïὴν á¼ÏιÏÏήμην καὶ Ïá½°Ï á¼Î³ÎºÎµÎ¹Î¼á½³Î½Î±Ï á¼Î½Î½Î¿á½·Î±Ï ÏÏοβάληÏαι .)36
In a purely Neoplatonic fashion, Eustratios claims that the body and its powers are an obstacle that makes it difficult for the soul to attain intellectual knowledge. Under these constraints, the soul cannot bring forth the innate reasons or notions found in itself. The occurrence here of the form proballein, literally âto bring forthâ or âto projectâ is extremely important insofar as post-Iamblichean Neoplatonists consistently refer to this form to describe knowledge as anamnesis or recollection.37 Once again, the presence of this form in Eustratiosâ passage is far from coincidental.
So, is Eustratios a Neoplatonist? In a certain way, answering this question is not easy, for Eustratios wants his readers to believe he is not supporting what he deems as the Platonic view. As I said at the beginning of this chapter, the passage here under scrutiny presents the commentatorâs view on how we grasp concepts as an alternative to the Platonic and the Aristotelian views.38 Against Aristotle, the commentator claims that knowledge properly so-called involves more than grasping some common trait from sense-perception data. By contrast, knowledge is recollection. However, if this is the case, why does Eustratios feel he must distance himself from the Platonic view? Because accepting such a view in its entirety also entails pledging allegiance to metempsychosis and, in general, to the pre-existence of souls over their bodies, two doctrines incompatible with Eustratiosâ Christian beliefs. By contrast, according to the commentator, the innate reasons in the soul have been placed in our soul at the time of its creation along with the body.39 If this is the case, however, one cannot help but notice that despite this Christian corrective to what he defines as the Platonic doctrine, Eustratiosâ support for innatism is firmly rooted in what we now call âNeoplatonismâ.
True, elsewhere in this commentary Eustratios claims that the human intellect acts by imitating, insofar as possible, the divine mind and strives to become perfect by assimilating to God,40 but nowhere in his philosophical commentaries is he obsessed by coloring his Neoplatonism with Christian undertones. On the contrary, in most of the cases he simply compares the imperfect human intellect with the perfect knowledge of the Nous, the separate Intelligence of the Neoplatonists. At times he goes even further than that and speaks of the One that exists beyond knowledge. Like when he states that, concerning knowledge, human intellect first knows things by imitating their causes, namely by imitating the perfect knowledge of the Intelligence that contains all forms. Afterward, however, âit is allowed to go beyond the sensible world of nature, to join the divine things and to connect with the Intelligence intellectually; finally, it connects with the One that exists beyond knowledgeâ (
This is a fantastic endorsement of the late Neoplatonic theory of ascent to different stages of knowledge.42 For example, that the One lies beyond the intelligible world and human knowledge is one of the key-doctrine in Neoplatonism. Furthermore, the need for the soul to unite with the One is vastly found in Neoplatonic literature. To mention just one of the best-known examples, consider, for instance, Plotinusâ emphasis on the need for the soul to unite with the One.43 Furthermore, in his commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 1, Eustratios explains in a purely Proclean fashion that the union with the One takes place because there is a trace of the One itself in the soul, namely âthe bloom of the intellectâ.44 True, Christian sources also potentially provided Eustratios with a similar vocabulary.45 However, as I have argued elsewhere, when reading Eustratiosâ commentaries one gets the impression that the existing similarities between pagan and Christian Neoplatonic texts allow the commentators to fill his exegesis with the vocabulary of pagan Neoplatonists.46
3 Metaphysics
As I demonstrated in the previous sections, the commentatorâs causation theory and epistemology are imbued with Neoplatonic doctrines that in most cases hark back to Proclusâ writings. It is now time to discuss Eustratiosâ metaphysics. By âmetaphysicsâ I mean the general view of how reality is structured. My analysis of Eustratiosâ causation theory and epistemology highlighted that he believes in a sharp distinction between the sensible and the intelligible world. Causation properly-so called only takes place in the intelligible world. The same holds for knowledge: actual knowledge involves knowing the intelligible forms in the separate Nous. Several passages in our commentary allow expanding on these findings concerning Eustratiosâ metaphysics. In what follows, I will discuss only a few of these.
In the very beginning of book 2 of his Posterior Analytics Aristotle writes: âThe things we seek are equal in number to those we understand. We seek four things: the fact, the reason why, if something is, what something isâ (
Eustratiosâ interpretive strategy here is consistent with what he does elsewhere in his commentaries on Aristotle. At first, he provides readers with a primary and safe explanation of the meaning of the lemma; then, he develops his interpretation. After interpreting Aristotleâs text literally,49 Eustratios explains how knowledge takes place by imitating the Intelligence and uniting with the One.50 Afterward, he offers further considerations of what has already been explained âfrom the point of view of logical argumentationsâ (
ÎογικώÏεÏον μὲν λέγεÏαι ÎºÏ Ïá½·ÏÏ Î´Î¹Î±Î»Î±Î²Îµá¿Î½ Ïὸ Ïá½° ÏÏ Î¼Î²ÎµÎ²Î·Îºá½¹Ïα ζηÏεá¿Î½ Ïῶν ÏÏαγμάÏÏν ,ÏÏ ÏÎ¹Îºá¿¶Ï Î´á½² Ïὸ Ïá½°Ï Î¿á½Ïá½·Î±Ï Î¶Î·Ïεá¿Î½ ,Î¸ÎµÎ¿Î»Î¿Î³Î¹Îºá¿¶Ï Î´á½³ á¼ÏÏι Ïόθεν ÏÏοá¿Î»Î¸Î¿Î½ á¼ ÏανÏα καὶ Ïὴν á¼ÏÏὴν Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ ÏÏá½±ÏεÏÏ á¼Îºá½±ÏÏÎ¿Ï Î¶Î·Ïεá¿Î½ .52
In the proper sense, what is called âto deal with in a more logical wayâ is to inquire into the accidents of realities; in a physical way, to inquire into substances, [and] in a theological way, to investigate whence all things have proceeded, and the principle of the constitution of each thing.
I associate precisely this theological perspective with the notion of âmetaphysicsâ discussed in the present chapter. Eustratios at first associates the four Aristotelian causes with the four things we seek referred to by Aristotle in the lemma. The commentator concludes that the âwhat something isâ (
The commentatorâs primary focus is, however, on the final cause. Eustratios writes:
καὶ αá½Î¸Î¹Ï á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ Ïὸ á¼Î½ ÏÏá½½ÏιÏÏον á¼ÏάνÏÏν á¼ÏÏὶ καὶ á¼Î¾á¿Ïημένον Ïῶν á¼Î¾ αá½Ïοῦ ÏÏοÏόνÏÏν ,á¼ÏÏηÏόν Ïε ÏανÏὶ λόγῳ καὶ á¼ÏÏαÏÏον καὶ á¼Î³Î½ÏÏÏον Ïá½±ÏῠγνώÏει καὶ á¼Î»Î·ÏÏον ,αἰÏία ÏÏÏÏá½·ÏÏη διὰ ÏάνÏÏν ÏÏÏοῦÏα Ïῶν á¼Î¾ αá½Ïá¿Ï καὶ Î¼Î·Î´ÎµÎ½á½¸Ï Ïῶν Î¼ÎµÏ âαá½Ïὴν á¼ÏολειÏομένη ,Ïὸν αá½Ïὸν ÏÏá½¹Ïον καὶ ἡ Ïοῦ εἰ á¼ÏÏι ζήÏηÏÎ¹Ï Ïá½±ÏÎ·Ï Î¶Î·Ïá½µÏεÏÏ á½ÏεÏá½µÏλÏÏαι καὶ καθ âá¼Î±Ï Ïὴν ÏÏὸ Ïῶν λοιÏῶν ÏεθεώÏηÏαι καὶ Ïαá¿Ï á¼Î»Î»Î±Î¹Ï ÏαÏá½³ÏεÏαι ,οá½Îº Îµá¼¶Î´Î¿Ï Î¶Î·ÏοῦÏα καθ âá¼Î±Ï Ïήν ,οá½Îº αἴÏιον ,á¼Î»Î» âαá½Ïὸ Ïὸ εἶναι á¼ÏÎ»á¿¶Ï .54
Furthermore, once again, just like the One exists as the most supreme of all beings and transcends its effects, and is ineffable by all language, incomprehensible, unknown by all knowledge, unintelligible, the supreme Cause that advances towards everything that comes from it and never abandons that which comes after it; so in the same way also the quest over âif something isâ transcends all other questions concerning its simplicity, and must be in itself considered before the remaining ones, as it is involved in the others. In fact, [such question] does not investigate the form per se, nor the cause, but the very same Being in general.
This text assimilates the final cause, which is the most important among the previously mentioned questions, to the One through analogy. The way Eustratios describes the One pays tribute to Proclusâ Platonic Theology, where concerning the one, transcendent, and unparticipated Cause, the Diadochus writes:
á¼ÏάνÏÏν δὴ Ïῶν á½Î½ÏÏν καὶ αá½Ïῶν Ïῶν Ïá½° á½Î½Ïα ÏαÏαγόνÏÏν θεῶν μία καὶ á¼Î¾á¿Ïημένη καὶ á¼Î¼á½³Î¸ÎµÎºÏÎ¿Ï Î±á¼°Ïία ÏÏοÏÏá½³ÏÏηκεν ,á¼ÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï Î¼á½²Î½ ÏανÏὶ λόγῳ καὶ á¼ÏÏαÏÏÎ¿Ï ,á¼Î³Î½ÏÏÏÎ¿Ï Î´á½² Ïá½±ÏῠγνώÏει καὶ á¼Î»Î·ÏÏÎ¿Ï ,ÏάνÏα μὲν á¼Ï âá¼Î±Ï Ïá¿Ï á¼ÎºÏÎ±á½·Î½Î¿Ï Ïα ,ÏάνÏÏν δὲ á¼ÏÏá½µÏÏÏ ÏÏοÏÏá½±ÏÏÎ¿Ï Ïα ,καὶ ÏάνÏα μὲν ÏÏá½¸Ï á¼Î±Ï Ïὴν á¼ÏιÏÏÏá½³ÏÎ¿Ï Ïα ,ÏάνÏÏν δὲ οá½Ïα Ïá½³Î»Î¿Ï Ïὸ á¼ÏιÏÏον .55
Of all beings therefore, and of the Gods that produce beings, one exempt and unparticipated cause pre-exists, a cause ineffable by all language, incomprehensible, unknown by all knowledge and unintelligible, unfolding all things into light from itself, subsisting ineffably prior to [all things], and converting all things to itself, but existing as the best end of all things.
At this point, Eustratiosâ strategy becomes clear. The four questions referred to by Aristotle correspond to the logical level. The physical level entails associating the four questions to the four Aristotelian causes that are explanatory of the phenomena studied by physics. The theological level entails discussing through analogy the four Aristotelian questions and causes with the causation of the One and, in general, with causation in the intelligible world.
At times, however, the commentator simply distinguishes between the causation that takes place âthereâ (
When presenting his theological interpretation of Aristotleâs four questions and causes, Eustratios often refers in general to what âthey sayâ.58 I argue that on all these occasions Eustratios is thinking of the Neoplatonists, particularly his beloved Proclus. The latter is, for instance, the shadow lurking behind Eustratiosâ claim that just like Being in the intelligible world is a third element resulting from the mixture of Limit and Unlimitedness, so here in the sensible world the question of the âreason whyâ (
That Eustratios had this Proclean text on his desk when composing his commentary is evident in the following passage, where the commentator develops the aforementioned analogy between Being as Mixture and Aristotleâs âreason whyâ (
καὶ αá½Î¸Î¹Ï á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ Ïὸ á½Î½ ÏÏιαδικὸν διὰ Ïὴν μá¿Î¾á½·Î½ ÏαÏιν ,á½ Ïι ÏÏιῶν ÏούÏÏν á¼Î½ ÏανÏὶ μικÏá¿· δεῠ,Îºá½±Î»Î»Î¿Ï Ï á¼Î»Î·Î¸Îµá½·Î±Ï ÏÏ Î¼Î¼ÎµÏÏá½·Î±Ï ,οá½ÏÏ Î´á½´ καὶ á¼Î½ Ïá¿ Ïοῦ διόÏι á¼Ïοδείξει Ïá½¹ Ïε εá½ÏÏημον Ïοῦ Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï Î¸ÎµÏÏεá¿Ïαι ,Îºá½±Î»Î»Î¿Ï á½Î½ ÏÏοÏá¿ÎºÎ¿Î½ αá½Ïá¿· ,καὶ Ïὸ á¼Î»Î·Î¸á½²Ï Ïῶν ÏÏοÏá½±ÏεÏν ,καὶ Ïὸ ÏύμμεÏÏον Ïá¿· á¼Î¾ á¼Î½á½±Î³ÎºÎ·Ï εἶναι Ïá½±Ï Ïε ÏÏοÏá½±ÏÎµÎ¹Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïὸ ÏÏ Î¼Ïá½³ÏαÏμα .61
Furthermore, once again: just like they say that Being is triadic because it results from mixture (so far as in every mixture, these three things are necessary, namely beauty, truth, and symmetry), so in demonstrations that are explanatory of the âreason whyâ the soundness of the argument is taken into consideration, namely the beauty that belongs to such demonstration, the truth of the premises and the symmetry resulting from the essential nature of the connection between the premises and the conclusion.
I suggest comparing this passage with Proclusâ Platonic Theology where the Diadochus discusses Philebus 65a2:
Îαὶ Î¼Î¿Î½á½°Ï Î¿á½Î½ á¼ÏÏι Ïὸ μικÏόν ,διόÏι μεÏá½³Ïει Ïοῦ á¼Î½á½¹Ï ,καὶ Î´Ï Î¿ÎµÎ¹Î´á½³Ï á¼ÏÏι ,καθ âá½ Ïον á¼Îº Ïῶν δύο ÏÏÎ¿ÎµÎ»á½µÎ»Ï Î¸ÎµÎ½ á¼ÏÏῶν ,καὶ ÏÏÎ¹á½±Ï ,καθ âá½ Ïον á¼Î½ ÏανÏὶ μικÏá¿· ÏÏιῶν ÏούÏÏν δεῠκαÏá½° Ïὸν ΣÏκÏá½±Ïην ,Îºá½±Î»Î»Î¿Ï Ï ,á¼Î»Î·Î¸Îµá½·Î±Ï ,ÏÏ Î¼Î¼ÎµÏÏá½·Î±Ï .62
That which is mixed therefore, is a monad, because it participates of the One; and it is dual-formed, so far as it proceeds from the two principles; but it is a triad, so far as in every mixture, these three things are necessary according to Socrates, viz. beauty, truth, and symmetry.
Clearly, this Eustratian text depends upon Proclus. What follows bears, even more, the trace of the Diadochus. In fact, at a certain point, Eustratios insists on his theological explanation of the four Aristotelian questions. This time, however, he will leave aside the One and the first principles that come right after the One and discuss the Neoplatonic notions of Being, Life, Nous, and Soul. However, even the way Eustratios moves onto another topic reveals his acquaintance with Neoplatonism. Eustratios writes:
εἰ δὲ βούλει ,Ïá½° μὲν ÏÏῶÏα Ïιγῠá¼á½±ÏθÏν á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ á¼Î½ á¼Î´á½»ÏÎ¿Î¹Ï á¼±ÎµÏοá¿Ï á¼ÏοκεκÏÏ Î¼Î¼á½³Î½Î± ,Ïá½¹ Ïε αἴÏιον á¼Î½ καὶ Ïá½° á¼Î¾ á¼ÎºÎµá½·Î½Î¿Ï Î´ÎµÎ¹ÎºÎ½Ï á½¹Î¼ÎµÎ½á½± Ïε καὶ á¼ÎºÏαινόμενα ,οὠÏοιούμενα οá½Î´á½² ÏαÏαγόμενα .63
If you wish, let us pass over in silence the first principles, things hidden in innermost holy sanctuaries, namely the one cause and the realities that the One manifests and reveals, which are neither produced nor caused.
This is an extraordinary text. Eustratios elegantly wishes to shift his focus from the One to the lower realities. However, in doing so, he provides readers with a clear glimpse of the Neoplatonic principle according to which the One and that which is around the One, namely the henads firmly established in the One (and are distinct from it only from an external point of view), are unknowable and must be approached through silence.64
Accordingly, the commentator discusses the analogy between these lower levels of reality and the four Aristotelian questions. First comes being (
Îαὶ Î³á½°Ï Ïὸ νοηÏὸν μάλιÏÏα ÏοῦÏá½¹ á¼ÏÏιν ,á¼Ïειδὴ Î½Î¿á¿¦Ï Î¼á½³Î½ á¼ÏÏι Ïὸ γνÏÏÏικόν ,ἡ δὲ ζÏá½´ νόηÏÎ¹Ï ,νοηÏὸν δὲ Ïὸ á½Î½ .66
For the intelligible is especially this. Since intellect indeed is that which is gnostic, life is intelligence, and being is intelligible.
Afterwards Eustratios develops the analogy between the four Aristotelian questions and Life, Being, Intellect, Soul:
Ïὸ μὲν οá½Î½ εἰ á¼ÏÏι ÏεÏὶ Ïοῦ εἶναι ζηÏοῦν á¼ÏÎ»á¿¶Ï Ïοῦ á¼ÏÎ»á¿¶Ï á½Î½ÏÎ¿Ï á¼ÏÏιν εἰκών Î Ïὸ δὲ Ïá½· á¼ÏÏιν á¼Ïεὶ Ïὸ γνώÏιÏμα Ïοῦ á½Î½ÏÎ¿Ï Î¶Î·Ïεῠκαὶ á¼ÎºÎµá¿Î½Î¿ á¼ÎºÏαίνει ὡÏÏεÏεὶ κÏÏ ÏÏόμενον ,καὶ ÏÏá½¹Î¿Î´Î¿Ï á¼ÎºÎµá½·Î½Î¿Ï Îµá¼°Ï Ïοá½Î¼ÏÎ±Î½á½²Ï á¼Îº Ïοῦ á¼ÏÎ±Î½Î¿á¿¦Ï Î³á½·Î½ÎµÏαι ,Ïá¿Ï ζÏá¿Ï á½¡Ï Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÏÏ Î¿á½ÏÎ·Ï á¼¢ á¼Î½ÎµÏÎ³Îµá½·Î±Ï ,δι âá¼§Ï Ïὸ á½Î½ νοεá¿Ïαι καὶ καÏαλαμβάνεÏαι Î Ïὸ δὲ εἰ á½Ïá½±ÏÏει Ïῷδε Ïόδε ,Ïοῦ νοῦ á½¡Ï á¼Î¼ÏÏ á¼Î±Ï Ïá¿· ÏÏ Î½á½±ÏÏονÏÎ¿Ï ,νόηÏίν Ïε καὶ Ïὸ νοηÏόν ,Ïὸ μὲν á½¡Ï á½Ïοκείμενον ,Ïὴν δὲ ÏεÏὶ αá½Ïὸ á¼¢ ÏÏá½¸Ï Î±á½Ïὸ á¼ÏοÏεινομένην .Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï δὲ Ïὸ διὰ Ïá½· á¼ÏÏιν ,á½ Ïι Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï Î±á½Ïη á¼ÏÏὶ καὶ Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï Ï Ïῶν á½Ïὸ λόγον καὶ αἰÏá½·Î±Ï Ïῶν á½Ï âαἰÏίαν καὶ μέÏα Ïῶν á¼Î¼Î¼á½³ÏÏν á¼Î½Î±Î¶Î·ÏεῠÏε καὶ á¼Î½ÎµÏ Ïá½·Ïκει Πὠθεν δὴ καὶ Ïὸ Ïόθεν Ïοῠκινεá¿Ïθαι αá½Ïá¿ á¼Ïὸ ÏÏοÏá½±ÏεÏν á¼Ïὶ Ïá½° ÏÏ Î¼ÏεÏá½±ÏμαÏα .67
Thus posing the question in general terms âif something isâ is an image of pure Being, whereas posing afterwards the question âwhat something isâ addresses a token of being and reveals it as hidden. The procession coming from Being moves from unclarity to clarity, Life being a sort of power or act by means of which Being is known and grasped. The question âif something existsâ as such and such involves the Intellect connecting in itself both knowledge and intelligible, the latter as subject, the former as extending around and towards it. âThe reason whyâ concerns the Soul, for the Soul is reason and investigates and discovers the reasons that exist under the class of reason, the causes that fall under the class of cause, and the middle terms among the intermediate ones. Moreover, from whatever source and place, it is moved by itself from the premises to the conclusions.
This text must be understood within Eustratiosâ previous distinction among different interpretive levels. Aristotleâs logic is an explanatory model valid in the sensible world: thus, posing the questions âif something isâ and âwhat something isâ within this logical approach only grasps an image of pure Being and a faint likeness of it. By contrast, following his Neoplatonism, the commentator implies that true Being only exists in the intelligible world.68 That this is the case, it is clear from a similar passage in the same commentary where Eustratios explains in detail the existing relationship between the logical, physical, and theological approaches concerning knowledge. According to the commentator, knowledge moves from the logical level, whereby we connect premises and conclusions within syllogisms to the natural one, insofar as by considering the species of the natural beings we come to know Nature itself. Finally, while considering the species in the demiurgic reasons, we move to the one and First Cause. In the end, claims Eustratios, in these three levels knowledge works in the same way, striving for the more universal terms and causes.69
Regarding the reference to Life as that through which Being is first known, surely Eustratios has in mind Proclusâ triad of Life, Being, Intellect, and the Diadochusâ claim âthat Life communicates the movement inherent in it, inasmuch as Life is the first procession or movement away from the steadfast substance of Beingâ (
All the evidence suggests that Eustratios accepts the general outlines of Proclusâ metaphysics. The commentator allows the existence of the One and the henads. At a lower level, he allows the existence of the intelligible world, which he describes as true Being, along with Proclusâ triad of Life, Being, and Intellect. Then comes the level of the soul. But there is more: in our commentary Eustratios writes:
á¼Îµá½¶ Î³á½°Ï Ïαá¿Ï καÏαδεεÏÏá½³ÏÎ±Î¹Ï Ïῶν á½ÏοÏÏá½±ÏεÏν ἡ μεÏÎ¿Ï Ïία Ïοῦ á¼Î³Î±Î¸Î¿á¿¦ διὰ Ïῶν ÏÏοÏεÏá¿¶Ï Î±á½Ïῶν ÏÏοÏÏÏαμένÏν ÏαÏá½³ÏεÏαι ,οἷον Ïοá¿Ï ÏώμαÏι διὰ Ïá¿Ï Ïá½»ÏεÏÏ ,Ïá¿ Ïá½»Ïει διὰ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï ,Ïá¿ ÏÏ Ïῠδιὰ Ïοῦ νοῦ ,ÏούÏῳ διὰ Ïá¿Ï ζÏá¿Ï ,ÏαύÏῠδιὰ Ïοῦ á½Î½ÏÎ¿Ï .73
In fact, for the weaker hypostases participating in the Good always takes place through the levels that come right before them, like Nature for the bodies, Soul for Nature, Intellect for Soul, Life for Intellect and Being for Life.
This is a summary of participation among different levels of reality discussed at length by Proclus in his Platonic Theology.74 Even the expression âparticipation in the Goodâ (
Elsewhere in his commentary, Eustratios also refers to Proclusâ theory of whole and parts and the idea that wholes are unparticipated monads that generate a plurality of terms coordinated with them.76 However, whereas this latter view is ascribed to âthe followers of Platoâ in the guise of a doxography, the present paper suggests that the commentator identifies his own position with that of the Platonists.
4 Conclusions
In my conclusive remarks I would like to address two issues, namely Eustratiosâ position within eleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantine Neoplatonism and the importance of the Byzantine commentators on Aristotle in the Greek Middle Ages.
Regarding the first issue, the main character in the Byzantine reception of Neoplatonism and Proclus is noticeably the consul of the philosophers, Michael Psellos (d. after 1076). After Zervosâ 1920 consequential Un philosophe néoplatonicien du XIe siècle: Michel Psellus, the consul of the philosophers was granted the title of a steady reader of Proclus and that of a true Byzantine Neoplatonist.77 Indeed, Michael himself famously elected Proclus as the highest peak ever reached by ancient philosophy. Furthermore, Michaelâs writings are rife with excerpts, citations, and references of all sorts to this Neoplatonist.78 Yet, recent research shows that Psellosâ use of Proclus needs to be qualified: at times, Michael produces personal notes with excerpts from Proclus; on other occasions, he uses Proclusâ vocabulary for his theological writings, or he relies on Proclus for his view on literature and authorship.79 Finally, he often harshly criticizes Proclusâ paganism as incompatible with Christianity.80 In short, it is unclear whether or not Michael fully endorsed any of Proclusâ tenets in metaphysics or epistemology.
By contrast, in light of what has been said in the present paper, I suggest shifting our attention from Psellos to Eustratios. The latter is one of the most significant medieval readers of Proclus, one who heavily relied on Proclus to present his views on causation, concept-formation, and metaphysics. In short, I argue that our commentator is the crucial figure in what has been called the âProklosrenaissanceâ in Byzantium.81
In this regard, I would like to mention a few words on the potential link between Eustratios of Nicaea and Nicholas of Methone. As previously mentioned, according to the editor of Nicholasâ Refutation, Athanasios D. Angelou, Nicholas challenges Eustratiosâ Neoplatonism, precisely in his commentary on Posterior Analytics II.82 Indeed, identifying Eustratios as Nicholasâ target is fascinating. As Angelou has promptly suggested, at first glance Eustratiosâ consistent appropriation of Proclean texts and doctrines is unparalleled in the Middle Byzantine period, and because of this a link with Nicholas would seem obvious. However, is it so? Did Nicholas have in mind Eustratios when writing his Refutatio Procli? Even though that may seem disappointing, I have doubts about such a connection. Here is why.
First, the chronology of Eustratiosâ philosophical commentaries does not fit in with Nicholasâ floruit. As far as I know, there is no precise dating for the composition of Eustratiosâ commentary, but all the evidence suggests the early twelfth century as a reasonable guess. As anticipated above, Nicholas composed his Refutatio Procli around the mid-twelfth century, some forty years after the commentary on Posterior Analytics II. Since Nicholas addresses contemporary readers of Proclus, I find it hard to imagine that he is reacting to a work written four decades earlier.
Second, recent scholarship on Nicholas suggests that in rejecting Proclusâ metaphysics the bishop of Methone addresses contemporary theological debates,83 whereas Eustratiosâ commentary hardly counts as a text addressing theological matters. True: Eustratios was condemned in 1117, but on that occasion the synod condemned his Christology, not his Neoplatonism. It is worth recalling that Eustratiosâ philosophical commentaries were written after the request of his contemporaries (i.e., the Commentary on Posterior Analytics II) and Princess Anna Komnene (Commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics I and VI). These texts were not meant to circulate outside these circles and cannot be regarded as official theological documents aiming at establishing one or more dogmata.
Third, in his philosophical commentaries Eustratios does not exclusively focus on Proclusâ Elements of Theology. Surely, he cites from the Elements, but he also dwells on a vast array of other Proclean works like the Commentary on the Parmenides, the Platonic Theology, and the Commentary on Alcibiades I. In short, Proclusâ Elements of Theology does not play any specific role in Eustratiosâ ambitious project of commenting on Aristotle through the looking glass of Proclus. That is why it is unlikely that, when writing the Refutatio Procli, Nicholas had the Metropolitan of Nicaea as his target in mind.
Concerning the second issueânamely the place and importance of Eustratios as a commentator in Byzantine intellectual historyâin a recent paper, Dimitri Gutas and Niketas Siniossoglou wrote that the Byzantines did not produce philosophical works worthy of the name. In particular, the authors harshly dismissed the Byzantine Aristotelian commentators as mere scholars, writers who simply repeated what Aristotle said without adding anything new because medieval Greek commentators were oppressed by hordes of ignorant monks ready to charge them with heresy.84 Leaving aside the fact that, just like the Byzantines, Medieval Islamic and Latin Christian philosophers (and mutatis mutandis, the philosophers living in pre-modern societies) were also not granted unlimited and undisputed intellectual freedom, this paper proves that Gutasâ and Siniossoglouâs hasty dismissal of the Byzantine commentary tradition is questionable. The case of Eustratiosâ creative and passionate adoption of Proclus demonstrates that the Byzantine Aristotle commentators deserve scholarly attention. Eventually, Eustratios was condemned in 1117, but his condemnation was due to his alleged subordinationism in Christology. His Neoplatonic commentaries of Aristotleâs Nicomachean Ethics I and VI and of Posterior Analytics II were not involved in the trial against our commentator. The time has come for scholars to carefully read the commentaries on Aristotle produced by Eustratios and others in the Greek Middle Ages in order to avoid the generalizations and prejudices of the past.
A.D. Angelou, âIntroductionâ, in Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclusâ Elements of Theology. A critical edition with an introduction on Nicholasâ life and works by A.D. Angelou (Athens / Leiden: The Academy of Athens / Brill, 1984), pp. lvâlxii.
On Eustratiosâ career, see A. Rigo, M. Trizio, âEustratios of Nicaea: An Hitertho Unknown âMaster of Rhetorsâ in Late Eleventh Centuryâ, in C. Dendrinos, I. Giarenis (eds), Bibliophilos, Books and Learning in the Byzantine World (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), pp. 359â368.
See H.P.F. Mercken, The Greek Commentators on Aristotleâs Ethics, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 407â443 and M. Trizio, âFrom Anne Komnene to Dante: the Byzantine Roots of Western Debates on Aristotleâs Nicomachean Ethicsâ, in J. Ziolkowski (ed.), Dante and the Greeks (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 105â139.
See K. Giocarinis, âEustratios of Nicaeaâs Defense of the Doctrine of Ideasâ, Franciscan Studies, 12 (1964), pp. 159â204 and M. Trizio, âNeoplatonic Source-Material in Eustratios of Nicaeaâs commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethicsâ, in C. Barber, D. Jenkins (eds), Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2009), pp. 71â109.
See Anna Comnena, Alexias, 5.9.1, ed. D.R. Reinsch, A. Kambylis (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 165, l. 39â46. On this text see G. Arabatzis, âBlâme du philosophe. Ãloge de la vraie philosophie et figures rhétoriques: Le récit dâAnne Comnène sur Jean Italos revisitéâ, in Byzantinische Zeitschrift 95.2(2003), pp. 403â415. On Neoplatonism in this period see M. Trizio, âEleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantiumâ, in S. Gersh (ed.), Interpreting Proclus: From Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 182â215 and S. Mariev, âNeoplatonic Philosophy in Byzantiumâ, in S. Mariev (ed.), Byzantine Perspectives on Neoplatonism (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), pp. 1â29, 7â13.
A preliminary study of a few passages from this commentary is found in M. Trizio, Il Neoplatonismo di Eustrazio di Nicea (Bari: Pagina, 2016), at p. 80, 82, 85, 88, 165, 167, 170, 178. The present paper expands on these findings and discusses previously unstudied passages.
See Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin: Reimer, 1907), p. 123.27â29. On the Byzantine commentary tradition on this work, see S. Ebbesen, âThe Posterior Analytics 1100â1400 in East and Westâ, in J. Biard (ed.), Raison et démonstration. Les commentaires médiévaux sur les Seconds Analytiques (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), pp. 11â30, at 11â14. I follow Ebbesen (here at p. 14) in disregarding the commentary on Posterior Analytics 2 edited as Philoponus by Wallies in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 13.3 (Berlin: Reimer, 1909) as a later product.
See Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 10.5. This is the only explicit quotation of Themistiusâ paraphrase. Nevertheless, even a cursory look at Eustratiosâ literal explanation of the text suggests that often Eustratios tacitly relies on Themistius.
P. Moraux, Le Commentaire dâAlexandre dâAphrodise aux Seconds Analytiques dâAristote (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1979), at p. 81.
See n. 4.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 4.24â30.
All English translations of Aristotleâs text are taken from Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, transl. J. Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19932).
See Aristotle, Prior and Posterior Analytics, a revised text, with introduction and commentary by W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), at p. 640.
See e.g. Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19702), 8.3.1044a32â1044b1.
Aristotle, Physics, ed W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 2.7.198a24â27.
See also Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Nicomachean Ethics, 6, ed. G. Heylbut (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), p. 267.21â22. See Trizio, Il neoplatonismo, pp. 76â79.
Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 75, ed. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19632), p. 70.28â29.
R.J. Hankinson, Causes and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 444â446; C. Steel, âWhy Should We Prefer Platoâs Timaeus to Aristotleâs Physics? Proclusâ Critique of Aristotleâs Causal Explanation of the Physical Worldâ, in R.W. Sharples, A.D.R. Sheppard (eds), Ancient Approaches to Platoâs Timaeus (London: Institute for Classical Studies, 2003), pp. 175â187; J. Opsomer, âThe Integration of Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and Divisibilityâ, in R. Chiaradonna, F. Trabattoni (eds), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Neoplatonism (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2009), pp. 189â230; A. Falcon, Aristotelianism in the First Century BCE: Xenarchus of Seleucia (Cambridge / New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 158â160.
See e.g. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, 3 vols, ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903â1906), 1, p. 3.14â19; 1, p. 263.19â30; 2, p. 29.3â7. Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physicorum libros commentaria, ed. H. Diels, 2. vols (Berlin: Reimer 1882â1895), p. 3.16â19; 11.29â32; 316.22â29; In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. K. Kalbfleisch (Berlin: Reimer, 1908), p. 327,10â15.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 139.7â9:
John Philoponus, In Aristotelis Physicorum libros commentaria, ed. H. Vitelli (Berlin: Reimer 1887â1888), p. 5.16â20:
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 185.21â27.
See e.g. Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 24, p. 28.8â10:
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, pp. 257.35â258.9.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 22.24â28. On this passage, see Trizio, Il neoplatonismo, pp. 170â172.
See Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 20.4â30. On this text, see Trizio, Il neoplatonismo, pp. 170â172. On the description of concepts resulting from abstraction from the particulars as âlater-born conceptsâ, see C. Steel, âBreathing Thought: Proclus on the Innate Knowledge of the Soulâ, in J.J. Cleary (ed.), The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997), pp. 293â309, at 302â304.
See Trizio, âNeoplatonic Source-Materialâ, pp. 90â108 and Trizio, âEleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantiumâ, pp. 196â199. On the imagery of echo or echoes in Neoplatonism, see K. Ierodiakonou, âMetaphysics in the Byzantine Traditionâ, in Quaestio 5(2005), pp. 67â82, at 81, nt. 30 and Trizio, âNeoplatonic Source-Materialâ, p. 92. See also Proclus, In Platonis Alcibiadem, ed. L.G. Westerink (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1954), p. 99.13â19; Proclus, Platonic Theology, ed. H.-D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964â1997), 1, p. 125.3â8; Proclus, Elements of Theology, 129, p. 114.26â28.
On the Neoplatonic origin of this theory, see Steel, âBreathingâ, p. 297.
See e.g. R.J. Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles. Text, Translation, and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1989), pp. 189â190; 211.
See e.g. Plotinus, Enneades, VI.3 [44].18, ed. P. Henry, H.-R. Schwyzer (Leiden: Brill, 1951â1973), p. 117.11â12:
See e.g. Syrianus, In Aristotelis Metaphysica, p. 18.9â10 and 21.31â34; Proclus, In primum Euclidis Elementorum librum commentarii, ed. G. Friedlein (Leipzig: Teubner, 1873), p. 240.11â14. On this topic, see A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 21.
See R.M. van den Berg, âAs we are Always Speaking of them and Using their Names on Every Occasion. Plotinus, Enneades, III.7 [45]: Language, Experience and the Philosophy of Time in Neoplatonismâ, in F. Trabattoni, R. Chiaradonna (eds), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2009), pp. 101â121. See also. M. Bonazzi, âThe Platonist Appropriation of Stoic Epistemologyâ, in T.E. Pedersen (ed.), From Stoicism to Platonism. The Development of Philosophy, 100â¯BCEâ100â¯CE (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 120â140.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Nicomachean Ethics, 6, p. 317.22â23.
Proclus, Commentary on Platoâs Parmenides, 896.10â13, English translation by G.R. Morrow, J.M. Dillon (Princeton: University Press, 1987).
See e.g. Proclus, In Platonis Alcibiadem, p. 104.18â21. On this nuance, see C. Helmig, Forms and Concepts. Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition (Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2012), pp. 270â272. Something similar also happens in Syrianus. See A. Longo, Siriano e i principi della scienza (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005), pp. 181â201.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 258.5â9.
See Helmig, Forms, pp. 289â299.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 258.21â23.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 258.23â25.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 150.16â25; p. 215.1â9.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 9.22â23.
For the expression
See e.g. Plotinus, Enneades, III.8[30], p. 9.19â23; cf. also V.3[49], p. 14.1â6; V.6[24], p. 6.32â5.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Nicomachean Ethics 1, p. 4.37â38. See Trizio, âEleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantiumâ, pp. 199â200; Trizio, Il neoplatonismo, pp. 203â221.
See e.g. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, De divinis nominibus, ed. B.R. Suchla (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990, p. 219.10â11); Maximus Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium, ed. C. Laga, C. Steel (Turnhout: Brepols, 1980â1990), v. 1, p. 27.178; v. 2, p. 55.156. see Trizio, Il neoplatonismo, p. 211.
See Trizio, âEleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantiumâ, pp. 199â200 on Eustratiosâ usage of the expression âbloom of the intellectâ.
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.2, l. 89b23â25.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 7.17â11.31.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 7.17â9.20.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 9.20â25. This text has already been discussed in chapter 2 of the present paper.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 9.25â27.
Ammonius, In Porphyrii Isagogen, ed. A. Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1891), p. 45.5â7. English translation by M. Chase, Ammonius. Interpretation of Porphyryâs Introduction to Aristotleâs Five Terms (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), p. 52. On the physical and theological perspectives, see also Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentarium, v. 1, p. 8.4â5; v. 2, p. 91.30â31. It is worthy of mention that the logical, physical, and theological perspectives are also mentioned in the title of one of Eustratiosâ theological treatises written against the Armenians.
See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1.3.983a30â31. See also Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin: Reimer, 1891), p. 22.6â7.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 9.35â10.2.
Proclus, Platonic Theology, v. 3, p. 29.10â16. English translation by C. Taylor, The Six Books of Proclus, the Platonic Successor, on the Theology of Plato (London: A.J. Valpy, 1816) [slightly modified]. All English translation of Proclusâ Platonic Theology are taken from Taylor.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 10.9â14.
Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 90, p. 82.7â8.
Cf. e.g. Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 10.17; 10.23.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 10.19â22.
Proclus, Platonic Theology, v. 3, p. 36.12â19.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 10.22â27.
Proclus, Platonic Theology, v. 3, p. 38.4â7.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 10.27â29.
There is a tremendous number of texts that could be cited here. I shall only cite a few passages from Proclus, Eustratiosâ favorite authority. See e.g. Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem, p. 1171.5â8:
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 10.30â32.
Proclus, Platonic Theology, v. 3, p. 36.8â10; v. 4, p. 7.23â24; but see v. 3, pp. 1.18â2.3, where the levels of soul and body are said to participate in the divine henads after the triad Life, Being, Intellect.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, pp. 10.32â11.4.
Unsurprisingly, Eustratiosâ claim that in the sensible world one only finds âan image of pure Beingâ (
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 40.4â33.
Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 102, p. 92.8â10.
Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum, v. 1, p. 244:
On the soul acting discursively, see Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Nicomachean Ethics, 6, p. 303.16â26. On the Neoplatonic flavor of this doctrine, see Trizio, Il neoplatonismo, pp. 155â165.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 254.6â9. On this text, see Trizio, Il neoplatonismo, pp. 90â91.
For this scheme, see L. Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-Platonic Science and Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), pp. 123â125.
See e.g. Proclus, Platonic Theology, v. 2, p. 36.6; p. 56.5; v. 3, p. 64.9.
Eustratios, On Aristotleâs Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 195.26â36. On Proclusâ whole and parts theory, see Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 67, p. 67.1â2. I discussed this passage at length in Trizio, Il neoplatonismo, pp. 87â90.
C. Zervos, Un philosophe néoplatonicien du XIe siècle: Michel Psellus. Sa vie, son Åuvre, ses luttes philosophiques, son influence (Paris: E. Leroux, 1920).
On the breadth of Psellosâ scholarship on Proclus, see D.J. OâMeara, âMichael Psellosâ, in Gersh (ed.), Interpreting Proclus, pp. 165â181.
See S. Papaioannou, Michael Psellos: Rhetoric and Authorship in Byzantium (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 88â128.
On this array of approaches to Proclus, see G. Miles, âPsellos and his Traditionsâ, in S. Mariev (ed.), Byzantine Perspectives on Neoplatonism (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), pp. 79â102. See also J. Robinson, ââ¯âA Mixing Cup of Piety and Learnednessâ: Michael Psellos and Nicholas of Methone as Readers of Proclusâ Elements of Theologyâ, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Vol. 2. Translations and Acculturations (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2020), pp. 56â93.
The expression first appears in G. Podskalsky, âNikolaos von Methone und die Proklosrenaissance in Byzanzâ, in Orientalia christiana periodica 42(1976), pp. 509â523.
See Angelou, âIntroductionâ, pp. lvâlxii (and above footnote 1).
See J. Robinson, âProclus as Heresiarch: Theological Polemic and Philosophical Commentary in Nicholas of Methoneâs Refutation (Anaptyxis) of Proclusâ Elements of Theologyâ, in S. Mariev (ed.), Byzantine Perspectives on Neoplatonism (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), pp. 103â136; M. Trizio, A. Gioffreda, âNicholas of Methone, Procopius of Gaza, Proclus of Lyciaâ, in Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus, Vol. 2, pp. 94â135, at 105â114.
D. Gutas, N. Siniossoglou, âPhilosophy and âByzantine Philosophyââ¯â, in A. Kaldellis, N. Siniossoglou (eds), The Cambridge Intellectual History of Byzantium (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 271â295, at 294.
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