1 Background
[t]ransport and communications are also sectors where unified planning is needed. Roads, railways, waterways, airlines must be made to serve Africa’s needs, not the requirements of foreign interests. (Nkrumah 1965, 30)
unless the issue of infrastructure development is addressed on a planned basis – that is, linked to regional integrated development – the renewal process of the continent will not take off. (African Union 2001, §194)
on mainstream development agendas, with Western donors and international development banks returning to previous development strategies
after decades of disregarding infrastructure investments. (Wethal 2019, 473–474; see also Nugent 2018)
Debates within the AU and African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have been consistently characterised by expectations that the improvement of economic infrastructure will boost intra- and interregional trade on the continent, spur economic growth, and promote the continent’s integration into the global economy (Ncube et al. 2017). Indeed, the African Development Bank (AfDB) acknowledges that the relationship between infrastructure and economic growth is, even among mainstream economists, controversial and, ultimately, ‘heterogeneous and heavily dependent’ on other, not least political, contextual factors (AfDB 2018, 68). Nonetheless, African decision-makers, AU officials and technocrats, external development partners (such as the European Union (EU) and the People’s Republic of China), as well as development banks and foreign investors, commonly agree that infrastructure deficits constitute a negative locational factor that undermines Africa’s competitiveness and, hence, inhibits the unlocking of the continent’s economic potential (see, for instance, Schwab 2019, 13). Poor economic infrastructure is notably a main driver of logistics costs, driving up both prices for consumer goods and overall costs for doing business on the continent (AfDB 2018, 66; see Arvis et al. 2018). Overall, it is assumed that ‘the economic benefits that Africa could draw from improved infrastructure are higher than those for other regions’ (AfDB 2018, 66).
A long-term legacy of colonial spatial planning and exploitation, Africa’s infrastructure still trails behind by global comparison. In 2013, Africa had a density of paved roads of 2 km per 100 km2, compared to Latin America (3 km), Asia (25 km), and Europe (122 km) (AfDB 2018, 76). According to World Bank statistics, only 47.7 per cent of people in sub-Saharan Africa had access to electricity in 2018, compared to 96.5 per cent of the population in the Middle East and North Africa, 98 per cent in East Asia and the Pacific, 98.3 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 100 per cent in both Europe and North America (World Bank [2021]). Equally, access to safely managed drinking water and sanitation services remains severely restricted in many parts of Africa (see UNICEF and WHO 2019, 7–8). Africa’s ICT infrastructure also lags behind: About 300 million Africans live more than 50 kilometres away from a fibre or cable broadband (OECD and ACET 2020, 12).
Unsurprisingly, infrastructure features very prominently in the AU’s Agenda 2063. ‘[B]ased on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance’, the AU aspires to ‘[h]ave world class, integrative infrastructure that criss-crosses the continent’ by 2063 (African Union 2015, §20). Agenda 2063 emphasises the role of rail, road, sea, and air transport as well as gas and
will foster the transformation of African economic geography with new cross-border linkages within the continent and to the global economy. However, lack of quality infrastructure is a binding constraint on the development of regional value chains. (OECD and ACET 2020, 12)
[t]he success of the AfCTFA depends on [i]nfrastructure development. We must all drive the implementation of the Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative, so that priority and high-impact projects act as catalysts for the AfCFTA. (African Union 2020a)
The emergence of infrastructure as a distinct policy field at the AU level has been accompanied by several institutional reforms to promote coordination among continental, regional, and national actors and programmes.
2 The Institutional Landscape
In the first decades following the establishment of the AU, infrastructure policy and programmes were rather loosely coordinated among relevant departments within the AU Commission (AUC), NEPAD’s Planning and Coordinating
In 2012, the continental institutional landscape in regard to infrastructure underwent major reform. To streamline cooperation within the infrastructure sector among AU institutions, the RECs, member states, and other stakeholders, the 18th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29–30 January 2012) adopted the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) as well as the Institutional Architecture for Infrastructure Development in Africa (IAIDA) (AU Assembly 2012). PIDA brings together all key players that are involved in infrastructure development at the continental level, notably the AUC; the AU Development Agency, which emerged from NEPAD (hence its composite acronym AUDA–NEPAD); the AfDB; and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).
The IAIDA, in turn, has a dual structure comprising decision-making and implementing bodies. Within the former, the AUC’s Department of Infrastructure and Energy oversees infrastructure policies and prepares decision-making information on infrastructure-related matters for the Council for Infrastructure Development (CID). The AUC is advised by the Infrastructure Advisory Group, which convenes meetings with infrastructure experts and high-level officials from relevant bodies at least biannually. The CID is composed of top officials from the AUC, the RECs, the AfDB, and UNECA and provides programmatic guidelines for the infrastructure sector, arbitrates and approves programmes and harmonisation measures in the sector, and advises the STCs and the AU Executive Council, which in turn is answerable to the AU Assembly of Heads
[t]he PICI must play a key role in meeting the aspiration of Agenda 2063 of increasing inter and intra-regional trade[,] of improving road[,] rail and port infrastructure in the region, of using financial institutions to collaborate with the private sector to expand on the continent, and of identifying and promoting practical opportunities based on complementary national endowments.2
In October 2018, the AUC chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, appointed Raila Odinga, Kenya’s former prime minister (2008–2013), to become the AU’s high representative for infrastructure development, underlining the importance the AUC attaches to infrastructure as a supranational policy field. While the PICI, in a sense, reflects deeply entrenched logics of intergovernmentalism (and presidentialism) in AU politics, the high representative for infrastructure development can plausibly be seen as an attempt at strengthening the Union’s supranational agency in setting the agenda in the policy field and in actively engaging both the RECs and member states on infrastructure-related matters of common concern.
Just as other policy realms, development of the AU’s infrastructure portfolio was crucially affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. On 21 April 2020, tourism ministers met under the umbrella of the STC-TIIIET’s Subcommittee on Tourism to discuss measures to cushion the tourism industry from the detrimental effects of the pandemic. The subcommittee set up a high-level task force to develop a Post-Covid-19 Continental Tourism Recovery Strategy (African Union 2020b). Two days later, the STC-TIIIET’s Subcommittee on Transport discussed strategies in the transport sector to support the fight against the spread of the pandemic. The transport ministers urged member states and relevant agencies to ensure the circulation of critical cargo, including foods and medical supplies, on the sea, on land, and in the air. At the same time, the subcommittee called on member states to put in place appropriate measures ‘to avoid transport to be a vector of spreading of the pandemic’ (African Union 2020c). On 5 May 2020, with the aim of increasing the continent’s resilience to health crises, the Bureau of the STC-ICT convened to discuss enhancing IT-based cooperation and exchange of information as well as best practices to contain the pandemic as well as to accelerate the implementation of the Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020–2030) (see also Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 6). The meeting also considered the establishment of an AU Digital Fund to leverage finance for the improvement of ICT infrastructure and digitalisation on the continent (African Union 2020d).
The Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa was previously adopted by the 33rd AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9–10 February 2020). It foresees the realisation of an African Digital Single Market by 2030. Concrete goals of the strategy include the digital empowering of all Africans by providing safe and secure access to bandwidth of at least 6 mb/s at a price of no more than $0.01/mb all across the continent, whereby at least 30 per cent of e-services and content should be developed and hosted in Africa. By 2030, 99.9 per cent of Africans should also have a digital legal identity as part of a civil registration process (African Union 2020e, 3). Needless to say, these objectives will require immense efforts to expand (cross-border) ICT infrastructure on the continent. Another sector that received considerable attention in 2020 was electricity.
3.1 Establishing a Single Electricity Market
[s]ignificant mobilization and coordination strides are required to effectively engage stakeholders in addressing the key barriers to energy sector development on the continent including policy, regulatory, technical, financing and market barriers. (African Union 2020g)
The AfSEM policy paper, road map, and framework were approved during the 1st Extraordinary Meeting of the STC-TIIIET (14–15 December 2020) in preparation for the upcoming 34th AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6–7 February 2021). Going forward, the study recommends the establishment of a permanent technical unit responsible for the masterplan, which will ensure effective coordination as well as skills transfer between the AU and the five regional power pools and will align the plan with existing infrastructure projects, including PIDA energy projects (ibid.).3 The speedy realisation of the AfSEM is not least highly dependent on the success of major energy generation projects across the continent as well as on connective hard infrastructure, such as transmission lines. The revision and reorientation of PIDA towards an Integrated Corridor Approach (ICA) was therefore a crucial development in 2020.
3.2 Realigning the Continental Infrastructure Agenda: PIDA’s Second Priority Action Plan
resulted in an increase of 16,066 KM of roads, 4,077 KMs of railways, 3,506 KM of power transmission lines, and 17 additional Member States connected with regional fibre optic cables. Through constructed and operational PIDA projects, 112,900 jobs were directly and 49,400 indirectly created. (AU Commission 2021, 15)
As diagram 9.1 shows, by the end of the PAP 1 period projects had reached different stages of implementation. While a mid-term review of PIDA PAP 1 attested to the overall positive social and economic impacts of the programme, it also revealed that ‘not all of the selected PIDA projects were considered priorities at their country level, leaving them without the much-needed political support and hindering their progress’ (AUDA–NEPAD 2020, 28).
These findings are emblematic of the overall slow implementation of cross-border and regional infrastructure projects on the continent and are notably a result of divergent priority-setting at national, regional, and continental levels of infrastructure governance – a problem that is exacerbated by the scarcity of infrastructure finance. As national governments bear the brunt of infrastructure financing costs, project prioritisation is ultimately often determined by national political considerations despite governments’ official commitments to AU and regional initiatives. An evaluation report on regional infrastructure development commissioned by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) finds that ‘national governments have a tendency to look inwards at their national priorities’ and identifies a ‘shift in priority by Member States in terms of infrastructure projects that they are implementing’ – from regional towards national projects, with the former usually not being factored in in national budget planning (SARDC 2019, 59, vii). Inconsistencies have also arisen from the fact that infrastructure development plans of the RECs have not always been well aligned with AU programmes, a governance challenge that the AU has tried to address when redeveloping PIDA for its second PAP.
The evaluation of PAP 1 further identified challenges related to fiscal limitations and infrastructure financing, constraints in both the construction sector and administrative capacities, constraints arising from climate change and the environment, issues of political stability and political commitment, and concerns about gender inclusivity (AUDA–NEPAD 2020, 29). To prepare the transition to PAP 2, the AUC in 2019 commissioned a market and demand study to determine regional infrastructure needs across the sectors of transport,
Implementation stages of PIDA PAP 1 projects (as of February 2021)
In consultation with the member states and RECs as well as with stakeholders from civil society, the AUC and AUDA–NEPAD developed the ICA as the guiding concept for PIDA PAP 2 with the aims of addressing identified constraints, incorporating Agenda 2063 principles, and improving the effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of PIDA projects. The ICA has two main characteristics: (1) it prioritises cross-sectoral infrastructure, whereby different infrastructure sectors, such as transport, energy, and ICT, are planned in a coordinated manner and linked to create synergies; and (2) it emphasises projects that maximise employment creation, gender sensitivity, climate friendliness, and urban-rural connectivity (ibid., 31; African Union 2020h, 7–8). The ICA also revised the selection criteria for PAP 2 projects. Eligibility criteria includes ‘Strategic alignment and Regional Commitment’ of the project and the ‘Regional nature of the project’, which should ‘ensure only regional projects that are priority for RECs and MS [member states] will be considered’ (African Union 2020h, 11). Once eligible, projects were assessed according to the following criteria: multi-sectoral planning of physical assets, job creation, environmental impact and climate resilience, gender-sensitive planning and implementation, urban-rural connectivity, economic viability, fundability and bankability, innovation, and smart technologies (African Union 2020h, 12–13; AUDA–NEPAD 2020, 32).
3.3 Infrastructure and Gender Sensitivity
we want to make sure that the sector generates jobs for skilled women professionals, ensure gender-responsive procurement, enhance the
participation of women-led enterprises in the supply and value chains, and help women to make the best out of digitalization. (quoted in AU–PIDA 2020)
AUDA–NEPAD has aimed to strengthen gender sensitivity in the infrastructure sector by aligning all PIDA instruments with the GRID guidelines that were developed by ANWIN during the stakeholder consultations in preparation of PIDA PAP 2 (ibid., 35). The review of PIDA PAP 1 revealed that ‘gender issues have not been sufficiently addressed or mainstreamed in the design or project selection criteria’ (African Union 2020i, 28). Among the challenges identified has been the limited participation of women in the infrastructure value chain, with access to finance remaining one of many obstacles for women-owned businesses and (sub)contractors (ibid., 29–30). Each PIDA PAP 2 project was thus screened for determining the focus on increasing the share of women in the infrastructure value chain through appropriate gender-sensitive measures in the procurement process. To this end, the AU suggests that these measures may include preferential treatment of women-owned small and medium-sized businesses or gender-certified businesses as subcontractors; capacity-building for both contractors and procuring authorities to increase women’s participation; training of female business owners to obtain national certification; the inclusion of evaluation criteria in bidding documents that aim at encouraging female contractors, suppliers, or vendors; the establishment of standards for bidders to demonstrate gender-inclusiveness; and the establishment of gender-responsive monitoring and reporting systems (ibid., 30). It is too early to determine the success of these measures. In the last section I shall now turn to Africa’s chronic ‘infrastructure funding gap’ and recent changes in the landscape of infrastructure finance on the continent.
4 Africa’s Infrastructure Financing Gap and the Changing Landscape of External Involvement
Access to finance for infrastructure development has remained a major challenge in Africa. The African Development Bank estimates Africa’s infrastructure yearly infrastructure financing gap to be $68–108 billion (AfDB 2018, 63). In order to attract funding for capital-intensive investments in infrastructure, the AU depends on cooperation with external actors, such as the EU and China, which over the past decade has become a key player in Africa’s infrastructure sector. According to Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) figures, infrastructure finance totalled $100.8 billion in 2018, with $37.5 billion
Funding for African infrastructure by source (in $ million)
| 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ICA members(1) | 19,832 | 18,615 | 19,650 | 20,243 |
| France | 2,445 | 2,887 | 2,123 | 1,936 |
| Germany | 1,139 | 1,127 | 838 | 1,608 |
| Japan | 1,768 | 1,941 | 2,361 | 517 |
| United States | 307 | 292 | 297 | |
| South Africa | 929 | 1,211 | 497 | 1,055 |
| AfDB | 4,166 | 3,956 | 3,364 | 4,538 |
| European Investment Bank | 1,414 | 1,250 | 1,852 | 2,225 |
| World Bank Group | 6,285 | 4,055 | 7,516 | 7,989 |
| Other ICA members | 1,379 | 2,188 | 807 | 78 |
| Non-ICA members | 51,687 | 45,766 | 59,592 | 68,736 |
| African governments | 24,000 | 30,700 | 34,345 | 37,525 |
| China | 20,868 | 6,413 | 19,403 | 25,680 |
| India | 524 | 1,197 | 704 | 762 |
| African regional development banks | 419 | 924 | 541 | 328 |
| Arab Coordination Group | 4,412 | 5,528 | 2,985 | 2,442 |
| European Bank for Reconstruction &
Development |
638 | 105 | 1,327 | 744 |
| New Development Bank | 180 | 500 | ||
| Other non-ICA bilaterals/multilaterals | 826 | 719 | 287 | 755 |
| Private sector | 7,400 | 2,600 | 2,320 | 11,824 |
| Total financing | 78,919 | 66,981 | 81,562 | 100,803 |
Note (1): Membership: G8 members (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, USA), South Africa, the World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), European Commission (EC), European Investment Bank (EIB), Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), African Development Bank (AfDB), and Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).
SOURCE: AUTHOR’S COMPILATION, BASED ON ICA (2018, 8)
4.1 Cooperation with the European Union and the United States
Reflecting the AU’s general challenge of donor dependency (see Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 3), the AU’s IAIDA and PIDA have been heavily co-funded by development partners. External actors, such as the European Commission, the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the UK’s former Department for International Development, have financed overhead or project costs and/or provided technical advice to PIDA (see AUDA-NEPAD [2021]).
In 2020, the EU, through the African Union Support Programme, also stepped in to fund PIDA’s capacity-building programme, which was previously supported by the AfDB (AUDA–NEPAD 2020, 60). Considering the EU’s crucial role in co-funding the IAIDA and AU infrastructure policy formulation and evaluation, some developments in Brussels are noteworthy, as they can be expected to co-determine AU infrastructure policies. In March 2020, the European Commission proposed a new comprehensive strategy with Africa in anticipation of the 6th AU–EU Summit in October, which was later postponed to 2021. It clearly underscores the strategic importance the EU attributes to cooperation
EU funding for infrastructure projects in Africa underwent changes in 2020, as the EU Infrastructure Trust Fund for Africa (EU ITF), which had been launched by the European Commission and 13 member states in 2007, was discontinued at the end of 2019. During these 12 years, the EU ITF had raised €763 million in grants for 123 infrastructure projects and leveraged investments in the sector worth €11.4 billion. Crucial to AU infrastructure programming, the fund had a dedicated regional envelope that specifically targeted cross-border projects (EIB [2021]). As of 2020, EU grants and concessional loans for African infrastructure projects are now administered under the EU External Investment Plan and, hence, compete with many other sectors for EU finance. Generally, a significant increase in EU funding for African infrastructure seems unlikely, considering that the post-pandemic recovery of European economies will incur immense costs for at least a decade.
A rapid increase in US loan finance and/or investments in Africa’s infrastructure sector under the Biden administration cannot be expected either. The memorandum of understanding that governs US–AU cooperation under the Power Africa programme, former President Obama’s signature initiative that aims at boosting Africa’s electricity generation capacity, was renewed on 17 September 2020 in a virtual ceremony attended by the US ambassador to the AU, Jessica Lapenn, and AUDA–NEPAD CEO Ibrahim Mayaki (AUDA–NEPAD 2020, 61). It is possible that Power Africa might pick up momentum under the new US administration, which will have to offer viable alternatives to Chinese loan-debt investments in Africa instead of only criticising the latter, as happened under Trump.
4.2 Chinese Infrastructure Loans and the Question of Debt Sustainability
Over the past decade and a half, Chinese policy banks and firms have become increasingly important in financing, constructing, and, in some cases, operating infrastructure on the African continent – a context that that has, according to some, caused a ‘Global Race to Build Africa’s Infrastructure’ (see Gil et al. 2019). Since 2013, mostly under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative
to explore and advance cooperation and projects promoting continental, regional and sub-regional connectivity. China has decided to jointly formulate a China-Africa infrastructure cooperation plan with the African Union. (quoted in Otele 2020, 9)
This has led some observers to suggest that the ‘China-Africa partnership in infrastructure development has taken a transformational shift from a national orientation to a regional and continental approach’ (Vhumbunu 2016, 271).
China’s bilateral approach in funding regional infrastructure projects is also threatening regionalism. … China in its engagement on the continent appears to ignore regional institutions key to setting Africa’s regional infrastructure agenda. … China’s bilateral approach in the region … [acts] as a regional sub-system wrecker. (Otele 2020, 12–13)
it would be prudent to share lessons learned from one country to another on how to negotiate with China given that the balance of power will often be tilted in China’s favour. Another option for greater leverage in negotiations would be to negotiate as a block where relevant, for example under the umbrella of the African Union …. (Phiri and Mungomba 2019, 20–21)
Besides the FOCAC, the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation has become an increasingly important institutional platform for African governments to collectively raise prevailing mutual concerns in the context of BRI infrastructure projects. The former deputy chairperson of the AUC, Erastus Mwencha, as well as former Egyptian prime minister, Essam Sharaf, are currently members of the Advisory Council of the BRI Forum. The Advisory Council met virtually on 18 December 2020. According to official Chinese sources, the council recommended enhanced cooperation within the BRI to coordinate Covid-19 responses of participating states and to boost economic recovery in the post-pandemic era. Infrastructure construction and the enhancement of digital infrastructure connectivity through the expansion of 5G networks and big data technology were seen as playing a key role in such efforts (China MFA 2020).
5 Outlook
The year 2021 will be decisive to kick-start PIDA PAP 2 as well as to accelerate cross-border and regional infrastructure development in line with the Agenda
The research for this chapter was conducted under a European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant for the project African Governance and Space: Transport Corridors, Border Towns and Port Cities in Transition (AFRIGOS). [ADG-2014–670851]
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Zajontz, Tim 2020. ‘The Chinese Infrastructural Fix in Africa: Lessons from the Sino-Zambian “Road Bonanza”’, Oxford Development Studies, https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2020.1861230
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Websites
African Development Bank Group – Infrastructure Sector. URL: <https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/sectors/infrastructure>.
Africa Infrastructure Knowledge Program. URL: <http://infrastructureafrica.opendataforafrica.org/>.
AU Department of Infrastructure and Energy. URL: <https://au.int/en/ie>.
AU Programme for Infrastructure Development for Africa. URL: <https://www.au-pida.org/>.
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa. URL: <https://www.icafrica.org>.
It took until March 2017 that the STC-TIIIET convened for its first ordinary meeting in Lomé, Togo. At this occasion it established three sub-committees on energy, on transport and on tourism.
‘Ramaphosa Highlights Importance of Supporting the Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative’, South African Broadcasting Corporation [Johannesburg], 8 February 2020. URL: <https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/ramaphosa-highlights-importance-of-supporting-the-presidential-infrastructure-champion-initiative/> (accessed: 30 June 2021).
The five power pools are the Central African, East African, Southern African and West African Power Pools as well as the Maghreb Electricity Committee. For their respective membership and a discussion of energy governance on the continent, see Medinilla et al. (2019).