1 Introduction
Trade has been on the very top of the African regional and continental integration agenda for decades. For this reason, the signing of the 2018 Agreement on the Establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) at the 10th Extraordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Assembly (Kigali, Rwanda, 21 March 2018) was seen as a major breakthrough (AU Assembly 2018a, §5). Up to the present day, the AfCFTA brings together 54 out of 55 member states of the AU, covering a market of more than 1.3 billion people and a combined GDP of $3.4 trillion (Malizewska and Ruta 2020, 1). It is the biggest free trade area (FTA) outside the World Trade Organisation (WTO), founded in 1995. The establishment of the AfCFTA raised high expectations: the United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA), for instance, estimates that the elimination of import duties would boost inter-African trade by 52.3 per cent, and even double this trade if non-tariff barriers would also be reduced.1 The World Bank reckons that real income gains from full implementation of the AfCFTA ‘could increase by 7 percent by 2035, or nearly $450 billion (in 2014 prices and market exchange rates)’ (ibid., 3). With regard to poverty and employment, the AfCFTA ‘can lift an additional 30 million people from extreme poverty (1.5 percent of the continent’s population) and 68 million people from moderate poverty’ (ibid., 5).
For this reason, the AfCFTA is celebrated as a major step towards continental economic integration and an important contribution to Agenda 2063 (African Union 2014; see also Luke and MacLeod 2019; Nwankwo and Ajibo 2020). Both the AfCFTA and Agenda 2063, a ‘master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future’ (African Union 2021), imply grandiose teleological narratives of progress reiterated by national and regional elites. At the same time and given the rampant ‘crisis of implementation’ on the
Depositary of the agreement is the chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC) (African Union 2018a, §24[1]). The agreement was to ‘enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the twenty second (22nd) instrument of ratification’ (ibid., 23). The minimum number of instruments of ratification was received on 29 April 2019 (AU Assembly 2019a, §2).2 Accordingly, the agreement entered into force on 30 May 2019. Initially 1 July 2020 was designated as the implementation date (see AU Assembly 2020a, §9), but because of SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19, it was decided on 17 June 2020 to postpone the official launch of the AfCFTA to 1 January 2021.3
This chapter proceeds as follows. After this introduction, in the second section, the historical background to regional integration and trade on the African continent is briefly sketched out, including an overview on current levels of regional integration and intraregional trade. The third section details the more immediate background, objectives, and principles of the AfCFTA as well as its institutional framework. The fourth section reviews the ratification process of the agreement and discusses resistance by some member states. The fifth section recapitulates the launching of the AfCFTA in 2020. This is followed by a brief outlook, highlighting some of the challenges and still unresolved issues around the AfCFTA.
2 Background on Regional Integration and Intraregional Trade
The history of regional integration on the African continent goes back to the formation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the oldest of its kind in the world, which was founded in 1910.4 Continental integration thrived with the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. And even before that, in 1959, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso), and Dahomey (present-day Benin) formed the Conseil de l’Entente (later joined by Togo). Among other
Today, regional integration efforts are playing out at two policy levels, the AU and the RECs (see also the book review section, this Yearbook, part 3). According to the second Africa Regional Integration Index 2019, jointly produced by the AU, the African Development Bank (AfDB), and UNECA, contemporary levels of regional integration on the continent differ widely between not only the RECs, but also their respective member states (African Union et al. 2020). On a scale from 0 to 1, the eight RECs officially recognised by the AU5 show a very mixed record in this respect (see Table 11.1), usually with above-average scores on the free movement of people, and below-average scores on productive integration and infrastructural integration. However, in comparison to the Africa Regional Integration Index 2016 all average scores were lower in 2019 (African Union et al. 2017).6
African regional integration scores, 2019
| Regional average | Free movement of people | Trade | Production | Macro-economics | Infra-structure | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 2016 | ||||||
| Africa | 0.327 | 0.470 | 0.441 | 0.382 | 0.201 | 0.339 | 0.220 |
| CEN-SAD | 0.377 | 0.395 | 0.508 | 0.377 | 0.256 | 0.441 | 0.302 |
| COMESA | 0.367 | 0.415 | 0.385 | 0.445 | 0.328 | 0.365 | 0.317 |
| EAC | 0.537 | 0.540 | 0.664 | 0.440 | 0.434 | 0.660 | 0.555 |
| ECCAS | 0.442 | 0.454 | 0.469 | 0.357 | 0.323 | 0.684 | 0.373 |
| ECOWAS | 0.425 | 0.509 | 0.733 | 0.438 | 0.220 | 0.469 | 0.298 |
| IGAD | 0.438 | 0.457 | 0.540 | 0.444 | 0.321 | 0.423 | 0.480 |
| SADC | 0.337 | 0.531 | 0.490 | 0.340 | 0.239 | 0.422 | 0.214 |
| UMA | 0.488 | 0.459 | 0.438 | 0.481 | 0.449 | 0.571 | 0.509 |
Note: CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States), COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), EAC (East African Community), ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), SADC (Southern African Development Community), and UMA (Arab Maghreb Union).
SOURCE: AFRICAN UNION ET AL. (2020, 23–25); AND AFRICAN UNION ET AL. 2017 (14F.).
Differences between the regions are substantial, for instance with regard to infrastructural integration, ranging from a very low score in SADC (0.214) to a well-above-average score in the EAC (0.555). And in terms of trade integration, there is a considerable spread between SADC on the low end (0.340) and the UMA on the highest end (0.481).
Historically, intraregional trade in the African RECs has been fairly low compared to other world regions. In 2017, only up to 17 per cent of all trade on the African continent was between AU member states. This was partly because
Direction of African trade, 2000–2017 (%)
| Exports | Imports | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intra-REC | Other African | Non-African | Intra-REC | Other African | Non-African | |
| CEN-SAD | 7 | 5 | 88 | 6 | 4 | 90 |
| COMESA | 9 | 8 | 83 | 9 | 5 | 86 |
| EAC | 20 | 18 | 62 | 17 | 14 | 69 |
| ECCAS | 2 | 4 | 94 | 3 | 5 | 92 |
| ECOWAS | 9 | 7 | 84 | 8 | 6 | 86 |
| IGAD | 14 | 12 | 74 | 14 | 12 | 74 |
| SADC | 19 | 3 | 78 | 16 | 3 | 81 |
| UMA | 3 | 2 | 95 | 3 | 2 | 95 |
SOURCE: UNCTAD ET AL. (2019, 5–6).
there were deeper levels of integration in SADC (84.9 per cent), followed by COMESA (59.5 per cent), CEN-SAD (58.4 per cent), ECOWAS (56.7 per cent), AMU (51.8 per cent), IGAD (49.0 per cent), EAC (48.3 per cent) and ECCAS (17.7 per cent). (UNCTAD 2019, 21)
Poor trade logistics and, to a lesser extent, infrastructure are major obstacles to further trade integration in the region. These bottlenecks are particularly important for landlocked and low-income countries. (IMF 2019, 40)
At the same time, the IMF cautions that the removal of trade barriers to foster intraregional trade ‘may unevenly affect countries in the region’ (ibid.). In a few countries that still apply high export tariffs, fiscal revenue losses may be significant. And, finally the IMF warns that deeper trade integration ‘can have adverse effects on countries’ income distribution, particularly in countries with more diversified economies and large shares of skilled labor’ (ibid.).
3 The African Continental Free Trade Area
The 2011 decision by Heads of State and Government of three Eastern and Southern African RECs – COMESA, the EAC, and SADC – to launch negotiations on the establishment of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), cutting across their regions and bringing together almost half of the AU member states (26 out of 55), introduced a new momentum to the continental debate on trade integration (AU Assembly 2012a). Subsequently the 18th AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29–30 January 2012) endorsed the Framework, Road Map and Architecture for Fast-tracking the Establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) and the Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade (AU Assembly 2012b, §3). Rather ambitiously, the AU Assembly also decided ‘that the CFTA should be operationalized by the indicative date of 2017’ – this was based on three milestones: (1) finalisation of the COMESA, EAC, and SADC TFTA initiative by 2014, (2) completion of other, complementary FTA(s) across the continent between 2012 and 2014, and (3) ‘consolidation of the Tripartite and other regional FTAs into a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) initiative between 2015 and 2016’ (ibid., §4). Official negotiations for the establishment of the CFTA were launched in June 2015 – just days after the COMESA, EAC, and SADC TFTA was finally established. Basically, the Union ‘aimed at integrating Africa’s markets in line with the objectives and principles enunciated in the Abuja Treaty’ (AU Assembly 2015, §3).
The negotiation process was led by the president of the Republic of Niger, Issoufou Mahamadou (2011–2021), and was under the oversight of the AU ministers of trade (AMOT). The dossier is coordinated by the AU Specialised
3.1 The Agreement
In March 2018, these talks led to the signing of the 2018 Kigali Agreement on the Establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area. In the preamble to the agreement, the AU highlights ‘the need to create an expanded and secure market for the goods and services of State Parties through adequate infrastructure and the reduction or progressive elimination of tariffs and elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade and investment’ (African Union 2018a, 1). At the same time, the AU is conscious of ‘the challenges of multiple and overlapping trade regimes to achieve policy coherence’ (ibid.). In the agreement, the principle of national sovereignty of member states is reaffirmed, and the historic role of the eight officially recognised RECs as building blocks working towards the establishment of the AfCFTA is acknowledged (ibid., 2). In this respect, the AfCFTA agreement clearly reflects a compromise (see Woolfrey et al. 2019, 3).
- a.progressively eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods;
- b.progressively liberalise trade in services;
- c.cooperate on investment, intellectual property rights and competition policy;
- d.cooperate on all trade-related areas;
- e.cooperate on customs matters and the implementation of trade facilitation measures;
- f.establish a mechanism for the settlement of disputes concerning their rights and obligations; and
- g.establish and maintain an institutional framework for the implementation and administration of the AfCFTA (African Union 2018a, §4).
Overall, the agreement is based on a number of principles, including – but not exclusively – that the FTA of the RECs serve as building blocks for the AfCFTA, Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment, reciprocity, and consensus in decision-making (African Union 2018a, §5). The areas not covered by the AfCFTA
3.2 Institutional Framework
In contrast to, for example, the EAC or SADC, the AfCFTA is not a legal person. The ultimate decision-making body of the AfCFTA is the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (see African Union 2018a, §9), providing oversight of and guidance on the AfCFTA. The Council of Ministers comprises ministers for trade or other nominees from state parties. The council takes decisions in accordance with the AfCFTA agreement. It reports to the AU Assembly through the AU Executive Council and makes recommendations to the AU Assembly for the adoption of an authoritative interpretation of the AfCFTA agreement (in general, also see Erasmus 2020a, 2020b). The development of programmes and action plans is the domain of the Committee of Senior Trade Officials, which consists of permanent secretaries or other designated officials. The AfCFTA Secretariat is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the agreement (ibid., §13). The Dispute Settlement Mechanism is modelled upon the WTO dispute settlement system (ibid., 54–76). Litigation is only possible for signatories, that is to say, state parties, not private ones.8
3.3 Ratification and Reluctance
After 8 countries had ratified and deposited the legal instruments relating to the AfCFTA in 2018, and another 20 did so in 2019. This was followed by another 6 countries in 2020: the Central African Republic (22 September), Angola (4 November), Lesotho and Tunisia (both 27 November), Cameroon (1 December), and Nigeria (5 December) – bringing the total number of countries who have ratified and deposited to 34 (African Union 2020). One of the 55 AU member states still has yet to sign the AfCFTA agreement: Eritrea. In Algeria, Somalia, and Zambia, parliamentary approval is pending. Among those 20 states who have not yet ratified and deposited by the end of 2020 are a substantial number of SADC member states: Botswana, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Seychelles, and
Domestic opposition from trade unions and influential private sector actors with direct access to the President led to a significant delay in Nigeria’s signature of the AfCFTA Agreement. (Vanheukelom et al. 2020, 8 – with reference to the detailed ECDPM case study of Woolfrey et al. 2019)
Trade liberalisation is a challenge – particularly for the 32 LDCs negotiating the AfCFTA.10 Thus, in the negotiation process a difference was introduced between LDCs and non-LDCs. For full trade liberalisation, non-LDCs were given a grace period of 5 years and LDCs 10 years. And another group of African states, called the G6 countries,11 asked for a 15-year period (see AU Assembly 2019a, §9). On designated sensitive goods, non-LDCs have 10 years to eliminate tariffs and LDCs 13 years. At that stage, the grace period for G6 countries was still to be determined (see Hartzenberg 2019). In support of G6 countries in particular, the day after the summit Africa’s biggest trade bank, the Cairo-based African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), announced a $1-billion
4 Launching the African Continental Free Trade Area
While Phase I of the negotiations centred around the founding agreement and protocols on trade in goods, trade in services, and dispute settlement, Phase II took off after the 10th Extraordinary AU Assembly (Kigali, Rwanda, 21 March 2018). These negotiations focused, and are still focusing, on investment, intellectual property rights, and competition policy (AU Assembly 2018a, §13). The subsequent 31st Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly (Nouakchott, Mauritania, 1–2 July 2018) adopted the annexes to the 2018 Protocol on Trade in Goods and the Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes (AU Assembly 2018b, §4).
that the application of these percentages will be subjected to double qualification and anti-concentration clauses, where the excluded products shall not exceed 10% of total import value from other State Parties. Thus, products to be excluded from liberalization will represent no more than 3% of tariff lines, accounting for no more than 10% of the value of imports from other African countries. (ibid.)
The operational phase of the AfCFTA was launched at the 12th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly (Niamey, Niger, 7 July 2019). A decision was also taken to host the AfCFTA Secretariat in Accra, Ghana (AU Assembly 2019c, §4). The hosting agreement was ratified by the Ghanaian parliament on 3 August 2020, and the official opening took place two weeks later.13 The summit also launched the African Trade Observatory (ATO), a trade information portal.14
In February 2020, the 33rd AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9–10 February 2020) appointed Wamkele Keabetswe Mene for a four-year term as the secretary general of the AfCFTA. He was born in Eastern Cape, South Africa. He holds a BA in law from Rhodes University (Mhakanda, previously Grahamstown, South Africa), an MA in international studies and diplomacy from the School of Oriental and African Studies, and an LLM in banking law and financial regulation from the London School of Economics and Political Science (both London). Among others, Mene was the deputy head of the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the WTO, the chief director for Africa economic relations in the country’s Department of Trade and Industry, and, since March 2016, has been South Africa’s the lead negotiator in the AfCFTA. It was also decided that the AfCFTA Secretariat in Accra should start operating by 31 March 2020
On the eve of the SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 pandemic reaching the African continent, the AU Assembly pushed for the conclusion of Phase I negotiations on trade in goods, services, and rules of origin – focusing on five priority areas: business services, communications, finance, tourism, and transport. The AU Assembly called for a special session to be held on 30 May 2020 ‘to approve all instruments required for the start of trading under the AfCFTA on 1 July 2020’ (AU Assembly 2020a, §9). It also upheld the decision to conclude all Phase II negotiations on investment, intellectual property rights, and competition policy by December 2020 (ibid., §22). The summit furthermore agreed on new Phase III negotiations on the AfCFTA 2020 Protocol on E-Commerce immediately after conclusion of Phase II negotiations. All these plans later had to be postponed because of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Endorsing the outcomes of the 3rd Meeting of the AfCFTA Council of Ministers (virtual, 20 November 2020), the 13th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly (virtual, Johannesburg, South Africa, 5 December 2020) noted the transfer of the coordination of the AfCFTA negotiations from the AUC to the AfCFTA Secretariat. The AfCFTA finally was to commence on 1 January 2021 (AU Assembly 2020b, §14; AU Assembly 2020c, §1). By the time of the session, 41 countries had submitted their schedules of tariff concessions and 34 countries their initial offers in respect of trade in services (AU Assembly 2020c, §§10, 12; on the negotiation see also Cattaneo 2020, 49–53). The session also endorsed the previous ministerial decision to conclude the negotiations on Phase II and Phase III by 31 December 2021 (ibid., §15).
5 Outlook
The year 2020 saw substantial progress in moving towards the operationalisation of the AfCFTA and fostering regional integration on the continent. However, a lengthy process of negotiating the conditions for intra-African trade will remain on the agenda of the African Union, the AfCFTA Secretariat, the RECs, and member states. This affects Phase II negotiations on investment, intellectual property rights, and competition policy as well as Phase III negotiations on e-commerce. If Phase II negotiations are concluded in time by the end of June 2021, interim measures based on the unilateral tariff offers and rules of origin proposals made so far will only have to be in place for half a year.15 But still, they call for a number of proactive adjustments by member states (see Erasmus 2020d).
Regardless of progress made on the AfCFTA negotiations and the continental trade governance architecture, the degree to which member states implement the AfCFTA will depend largely on national dynamics. These include the incentives and interests of political elites and influential private businesses, as well as the ‘rules of the game’ that govern state-business relations.
This can be seen when turning to the state of borders in Africa. Nigeria’s closure of its border with Benin for a wide range of products in August 2019 serves as a reminder that protectionist national perspectives can easily get the upper hand (the move was justified with reference to curbing smuggling). In October 2019, Nigeria also closed the remaining land borders for trade with all its other neighbours.17 It was only on 16 December 2020 that border posts were partially reopened. In addition to trade-related border closures, between mid-March and early April 2020, 43 AU member states had fully closed their borders as a result of restrictions imposed to contain the Covid-19 pandemic (see also the Annual Interview, this Yearbook, chapter 2). By the time of the Extraordinary AU Assembly (Niamey, Niger, 7 July 2019), still 40 borders were fully closed and further restrictions in other countries imposed.18 First and foremost, this affected the movement of people, but it also slowed down border-crossing trade quite considerably.
In other areas of trade and regional integration, a profound lack of progress in adopting and domesticating legal instruments has continued across the continent (see African Union 2020). So far only 22 member states have
And in structural economic terms, according to a joint assessment by UNECA, the AU, the AfDB, and UNCTAD, regional integration on the African continent continues to be challenged ‘by limited energy and infrastructure development, insecurity and conflicts, multiple and overlapping membership of RECs, poor sequencing of the regional integration arrangements and limited financial resources’ (UNECA et al. 2019, xi). In addition, large infrastructure gaps hinder regional integration (discussing some of the policy challenges, see Fofack 2020).
Finally, three major trade policy themes are still lurking beneath the surface: (1) the complicated spaghetti bowl of overlapping REC memberships, intra-REC/FTA harmonisation, and their respective interfaces with the AfCFTA (see Olayiwola 2020), (2) future negotiations between some AU member states and the European Union on the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) (with the exception of the one with SADC, none of the regional EPAs have been ratified), and (3) new talks between the European Union and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) community to replace the 20‐year‐old 2000 Cotonou Agreement under which the European Union, among others, had granted preferential access to the European market.
References
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Literature
Cattaneo, Nicolette 2020. ‘Africa’s trade in services and the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement’. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs (= Special Report).
Erasmus, Gerhard 2020a. ‘How will the AfFCTA State Parties manage Trade Relationships with Third Parties?’. Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre (= Working Paper S20WP08/2020).
Erasmus, Gerhard 2020b. ‘Governance under the AfCFTA: Linkages between Implementation and Gains’. Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre (= Working Paper S20WP09/2020).
Erasmus, Gerhard 2020c. ‘Will the AfCFTA tackle Non-Tariff Barriers as a Governance Issues?’ Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre (= Working Paper S20WP10/2020).
Erasmus, Gerhard 2020d. ‘African Continental Free Trade Area according to its Legal Instruments’. Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre (= Working Paper S20WP13/2020).
Fofack, Hyppolite 2020. ‘Making the AfCFTA work for “The Africa We Want”’. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Africa Growth Initiative (= Working Paper).
Hartzenberg, Trudi 2019. ‘The African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement – what is expected of LDCs in terms of trade liberalisation?’, UN LDC Portal [New York], n.d. URL: <https://www.un.org/ldcportal/afcfta-what-is-expected-of-ldcs-in-terms-of-trade-liberalisation-by-trudi-hartzenberg/> (accessed: 30 June 2021).
Luke, David and Jamie MacLeod (eds.) 2019. Inclusive Trade in Africa. The African Continental Free Trade Area in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge.
Maliszewska, Maryla and Michele Ruta 2020. ‘The African Continental Free Trade Area. Economic and Distributional Effects’. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
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Websites
AUC Department of Economic Development, Trade, and Mining. URL: <https://au.int/en/etim>.
Trade Law Centre (tralac, Stellenbosch). URL: <https://www.tralac.org>.
‘UNECA – AfCFTA: an opportunity to boost Africa’s economic transformation, eTrade for all [Geneva], 16 March 2018. URL: <https://etradeforall.org/news/uneca-afcfta-an-opportunity-to-boost-africas-economic-transformation/> (accessed: 30 June 2021).
For a good reason, the African Union refers to this process as ‘an unprecedented record attainment of the minimum number of instruments of ratifications’ (AU Assembly 2019c, §2). The 13-month period indeed compares rather positively to, for instance, the 60 months it took the Union to reach the minimum number of ratifications for the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (which was signed on 30 January 2007 and only entered into force on 15 February 2012).
Decision Assembly/AU/OSP/Dec.1(06.20)II of 17 June 2020 was not officially published on the Union’s website. It was adopted through ‘Silent Procedure’.
Today comprising Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa.
There are also five other RECs not enjoying the same kind of relations with the Union. These are the Arab Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement (AGADIR, 2001), the Economic and Monetary Union Community of Central Africa (CEMAC, 1964), the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA, 1997), the Indian Ocean Commission (1982), and SACU (1910).
The composite indicator on trade is made up of the average intraregional import tariffs, the share of intraregional exports over GDP, the share of intraregional imports over GDP, the share of intraregional trade, and ‘AfCFTA’ (African Union et al. 2020, 20). The methodology was slightly refined compared to the first report, resulting in scores not really being comparable across time (African Union et al. 2017, 11).
Discussing the challenge of reducing non-tariff barriers (NTBs), see Erasmus (2020c). See the monitoring platform: <www.tradebarriers.org>.
See also tralacBlog [Stelllenbosch], 28 July 2020. URL: <https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/14802-what-disputes-could-be-heard-by-the-afcfta-dispute-settlement-mechanism.html> (accessed: 30 June 2021). In this blog, tralac founder Gerhard Erasmus details the various regional, continental, and global dispute mechanisms that will eventually have precedence in the context of the AfCFTA. See also Mthandazo Ngwenya, ‘The Africa investment protocol: a prickly pear for Africans’, Mail & Guardian [Johannesburg], 9 November 2020.
See, for instance, Asmita Parshotam, ‘South Africa, Nigeria and the AfCFTA: 6 key questions answered’, Africa Portal [Johannesburg], 3 May 2018. URL: <https://www.africaportal.org/features/south-africa-nigeria-and-afcfta-6-key-questions-answered/> (accessed: 30 June 2021). See also Africa Research Bulletin. Economic, Financial and Technical Series [Southern Gate, Chichester], 1 May 2018, 55 (3): col. 22060A–22062A. The Nigerian president claimed he needed more time for consultation following objections from Nigerian business leaders and trade unions, and the South African president was waiting for parliament approval first.
For a case study on Malawi, see Ndonga et al. (2020).
Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Afreximbank, ‘Press release’, 8 July 2019. URL: <https://www.afreximbank.com/afreximbank-announces-1-billion-adjustment-facility-other-afcfta-support-measures-as-african-leaders-meet/> (accessed: 30 June 2021).
See Africa Research Bulletin. Economic, Financial and Technical Series [Southern Gate, Chichester], 9 October 2020, 57 (8): col. 23107A–23107B.
African Union ‘Press Release’ [Addis Ababa], 15 October 2020. See URL: <https://ato.africa/en> (accessed: 30 June 2021). The mechanism is being implemented by the Geneva-based International Trade Centre (ITC) and co-financed by the European Union.
For existing and potential levels of tariff liberalisation within the various RECs, see Viljoen (2020).
This is the case for the EAC, ECOWAS, and SADC, as well as for the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). See UNCTAD et al. (2019, 62).
‘Africans want open borders, but can they overcome stumbling blocks?’, Deutsche Welle [Bonn], 18 December 2019. URL: <https://www.dw.com/en/africans-want-open-borders-but-can-they-overcome-stumbling-blocks/a-51716938> (accessed: 30 June 2021). See also ISS Today [Pretoria], 22 March 2021.
Africa CDC, ‘COVID-19 Scientific and Public Health Policy Update’, 6 April 2020 & 14 July 2020.