1 Introduction
This volume, which explores a curated selection of classical sources in Islamic ethics, requires an analytical introduction that first addresses the general sources of Islamic ethics. This preliminary discussion is crucial before diving into the detailed analysis of the selected sources within the volume. By situating these sources within a broader scholarly context, we recognise their significance, especially given the evolving boundaries and sources of this nascent field. In this chapter, we address three main issues. First, we emphasise the imperative of discussing and exploring the sources of ethics. Second, we examine how the notion of ethics shapes both the perception of this field and its foundational sources within the contemporary scholarly milieu. Third, we explore the methods contemporary scholars use to monitor, chronicle, and categorise the sources of Islamic ethics. Additionally, a fourth issue warrants further investigation: the categorisation of Islamic ethical heritage. Should it fall within a philosophical or non-philosophical framework? This involves considering different fields of knowledge, philosophical analytical concepts, source text formats, author methodologies, and other criteria. A comprehensive exploration of this fourth issue will be the topic of a future separate study, God willing.
2 The Question of Researching Ethical Sources
The investigation into ethical sources within the Islamic tradition emerged in the early twentieth century, unfolding within multiple scholarly frameworks. The first focuses on exploring Greek heritage, preserved primarily through Arabic translations after the loss of the original Greek texts. This historical curiosity spurred scholars to investigate the assimilation and perpetuation of Greek philosophical ideas in Arab and Islamic cultures. A notable example is the work on Islamic philosophy of scholars like Richard Walzer (d. 1975) (Walzer 1962), who explored the reception and preservation of Greek philosophy.
The second framework arises from efforts to establish an independent discipline of ethics or ethical philosophy within the Islamic tradition, chronicling its origins and interactions with other fields and traditions. This is exemplified by the works of Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā (d. 1963) (Mūsā 1945) in mid-twentieth-century Egypt. He particularly focused on debates initiated in the late nineteenth century over the existence of a distinct Islamic ethical philosophy—or more broadly—Islamic philosophy in general.
The third framework relates to the quest for a uniquely Arab or authentically intellectual identity, aiming to refute foreign influences and address political stagnation attributed to external ethical influences. This perspective is represented by scholars like Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī (d. 2010) (al-Jābirī 2001), who examined the impact of foreign values on Arab-Islamic culture.
Discussing Islamic ethical sources involves several aspects: historical, theoretical, analytical, and methodological. The historical aspect primarily depends on the historian’s perspective on the sources and their categorisation methods—determining what is included in and excluded from the field of ethics. This is particularly relevant as some contributors to the historiography of Islamic ethics have relied fundamentally on either presenting its history by focusing solely on specific authors without a thorough investigation of these figures or fully contextualising them (see, for example, Mūsā 1953, 160–220; 1945). Others have analysed classical sources and offered summaries based on a rushed reading, hence coming up with a biased perspective, as can be observed in the case of al-Jābirī, for example.
Theoretically, the richness or scarcity of ethical sources largely depends on our conceptualisation of ethics. Are we searching for a specific style, such as the Greek tradition in ethical philosophy, or a broader spectrum of ethical writings encompassing various styles, formats, and methodologies? Are we concerned only with theoretical ethics, or are we also including practical ethics, which, although indirectly, imply an underlying theoretical structure that requires elucidation? In this context, the question of whether Islamic ethical sources are abundant or sparse is inevitable.
Analytically, it is essential to examine the ethical content these sources contain. This is particularly the case for comparative studies, regardless of whether it concerns the comparison between different approaches within the Islamic tradition or between the Islamic tradition and other ethical traditions. This involves challenging the premature conclusions of some scholars preoccupied with finding the “origins” of Islamic ethical heritage, either to attribute merit to these origins or to dismiss the heritage merely because it belongs to a foreign influencer. Some researchers have made such hasty generalisations, either regarding the overall Arab and Islamic contributions to ethical thought or about specific ethical works by judging them as belonging to a foreign heritage (such as Greek or Persian). It is crucial to clarify that the obsession with origins differs from the study of the history of ideas, which undertakes the challenging task of tracing the emergence and evolution of ideas and the modifications they undergo, as well as discovering the common or shared moralities between different moral traditions. Ethical thought, in particular, presupposes the existence of commonalities among nations, which either stem from remnants of prophetic heritages—even if there is no explicit textual source—or from shared human reason, where different individuals may independently think about the same ethical issue in parallel, and a cultural tradition might come up with an idea that later gains acceptance among other cultural traditions. Since ethical thought is based on human reason which transforms into a universally accepted part of human heritage. Such is the case with some Platonic ideas like the powers of the self and the virtues derived from it, which Muslim scholars saw as human intellectual heritage that many of them adopted and built upon.
Methodologically, this volume’s scope cannot exhaustively cover all Islamic ethical sources. Therefore, a representative selection is necessary, but it is also essential to provide a preamble that offers a critical analysis of the various perspectives on Islamic ethical sources. This helps to grasp the overall picture of the field of ethics on one hand, and to avoid the reductionism that could occur by limiting ourselves only to the chapters of this book on the other.
3 Islamic Ethics as an Academic Field
Developments in Islamic ethical studies in the modern era highlight two prominent perspectives on the science of ethics: a restrictive perspective and an expansive one. Different conceptions of the field of ethics have emerged through a set of questions related to the history of ethics in Islamic civilisation as an independent discipline, its nature and its characteristics. These questions include: Have ethics been favoured? Are they limited to the Greek philosophical tradition only or do they include other rational patterns? Does focusing on ethics on a religious basis exclude it from being part of philosophy? And are the sources of ethics scarce or numerous? These points will be addressed in the following sections.
3.1 Two Perspectives on the Science of Ethics
The first perspective narrows the boundaries of the discipline of ethics, restricting it only to the Greek pattern:
It is a science which is in fact connected with the tradition of Greek philosophy, whether it be with the oral traditions transmitted by the schools and convents of Egypt, Syria and Persia, or with the written traditions handed down and restored by the work of the translators.
Carra de Vaux 1927, 1:231
The science of akhlāq, in this sense, revolves around self-discipline and self- governance by exploring the self, its powers, virtues, and vices. According to this perspective, khuluq means moral character traits, whether commendable or reprehensible. This perspective was adopted by Carra de Vaux (d. 1953) in the first edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam in 1913, then prevailed in the 1930s and 1940s in Egypt with Aḥmad Amīn (d. 1954) and Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā and others who followed them (Amīn 1921, 115–116; Mūsā 1953, 222–225). Although the “Akhlāḳ” entry was developed in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam in 1960 by Richard Walzer and Hamilton Gibb (d. 1971), who monitored the kinds of moralities in Islamic history, and dealt with ethics in ḥadīth (Prophetic traditions), Sufism, and adab literature, philosophical ethics remained the dominant concept of ethics. Thus, they stated at the beginning of the article: “Islamic ethics took shape gradually, and the tradition of the different elements of which it is composed was not finally established before the 5th/11th century” (Walzer and Gibb 1960, 1:325), which refers to the era of Abū ʿAlī Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) who followed the Greek framework of ethical philosophy, as expressed by Walzer in the second part of the article that he solely authored, considering Miskawayh’s Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq (“The Refinement of Character”) as “the most influential work on philosophical ethics,” which had a significant impact within the Islamic tradition through Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111). The book also found its way into Persian writings through Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī (d. 918/1512) (see Walzer and Gibb 1960, 1:325–328).
More scholars continued to follow this narrow perspective. For example, Fahmī ʿAlwān1 agreed with those who preceded him on two main points. First, the claim that ethical thought among Muslims was minimal. He asserts:
Ethics as an independent science from other branches of knowledge among Muslims seems minimal compared to other forms of scientific and philosophical thought. Much of what you read from them about aspects of ethical thinking that are characterised by a scientific or philosophical nature was provided to them by foreign thinking that was available to them since they connected with the heritage of ancient nations.
ʿAlwān 1989, 12
The second point he reiterated is that Muslims did not know ethics except as a practical science, a study of moral character traits in an educational form. He said:
Therefore, we find it abundant in books of adab and among historians and narrators of historical reports, and it is no secret that the Qurʾān and the Prophetic tradition contain a great number of testaments (waṣāyā) and wisdoms (ḥikam), but all these are practical ethics (akhlāq ʿamaliyya).2 Even the ethics that reached the Muslims from the Greeks were not theoretical, but rather a collection of practical advice, or about establishing rules for a set of virtues correspond to a set of practical advice.
ʿAlwān 1989, 12
Based on these two points, ʿAlwān concluded that Miskawayh’s book is “the most complete (akmal) scientific study in the field of ethics”; despite most of it being derived from Aristotle, and that al-Ghazālī was the greatest Islamic thinker concerned with practical ethics. Thus, we find that the greatest writings in the philosophy of ethics were by Miskawayh on the one hand, and the Muslim Sufis on the other, “and besides that, there is not much scope for the philosophy of ethics among Islamic thinkers” (ʿAlwān 1989, 12). Nevertheless ʿAlwān—as will be discussed later—used the objectives of Sharīʿa to link legislation and ethics, but he followed—in the introduction to his book—the traditional conception of the origins of the science of ethics, and it seems that he traced it back to Aḥmad Amīn, who in turn followed the path of Carra de Vaux. ʿAlwān did not notice the inconsistency between what he wrote in his introduction and the content of his own book which investigates ethics in legislation—especially “the five necessities”3 —through the work of Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388). The idea of the necessities (ḍarūriyyāt) is a cornerstone of the theory of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa (the higher objectives of Sharīʿa).
The second perspective broadened the boundaries of the science of ethics to include various ethical discussions (mabāḥith) that were contained in other related disciplines, such as kalām (Islamic theology), Sufism, fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), uṣūl al-fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence), and adab literature. According to this view, the science of ethics focuses on three matters: self-disciplining, the assessment of human actions, and the sources that assist in this, which are broad and belong to diverse fields. Thus, the science of ethics, according to this perspective, was liberated from being restricted to the Greek framework of philosophy. It expanded the scope of “ethical thinking” and “ethical rationality,” and thus the sources of ethical thought multiplied. According to this perspective, ethical thinking encompasses three aspects.
The first aspect consists of the various cultural legacies that contributed to ethical thinking in Islamic civilisation, such as pre-Islamic Arabian, Islamic, Greek, and Persian heritage. Here, multiple questions arose, two of which we mention here. The first deals with the search for these different ethical frameworks, the channels of their transmission and representation in some sources, how they were received, and attempts to synthesise them. For example, the book ʿUyūn al-Akhbār (“The Book of Chosen Narratives”) by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889) is presented as an attempt to synthesise these different cultural frameworks. As Walzer and Gibb state:
It is the most comprehensive manual of Islamic ethics, brought together and to a remarkable degree integrated the Qurʾānic, ḥadīth, pre-Islamic, and Persians contributions, and by excluding the irreconcilable elements of the two latter, practically defined standardised the component elements of the orthodox morality in its pre-philosophical and pre-ṣūfistic stage.
Walzer and Gibb 1960, 1:326
Likewise, some works of Ibn Abī l-Dunyā (d. 281/894) can be read as synthesising the pre-Islamic and Islamic legacies. The second question dealt with the search for signs of originality and contribution to the Islamic ethical heritage through comparison with other heritages, especially the Greek and Persian. It appears that this emerged as a result of the prominence of Greco-Arabic studies, which found its origins in the nineteenth century.4
The second aspect is the ethical discussions that can be found in the various fields of Islamic knowledge, such as the Qurʾān, ḥadīth, theology, Islamic jurisprudence, the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, Sufism, and adab. The first to explore this is perhaps Dwight M. Donaldson (d. 1976), a Presbyterian missionary. He published a work entitled Studies in Muslim Ethics in 1953, which clarified how “Muslim ethical literature … covers an exceedingly wide field” (Donaldson 1953, ix), and he presented “what is essentially an anthology of quotations by everybody, including major Sufis and the Persian poets” (Gutas 1997, 171). After him others took the same direction, including George Hourani (d. 1984), Jamāl Naṣṣār, Andrew March, and Tariq Ramadan (Hourani 1975; Naṣṣār 2004; March 2009; Ramadan 2019), producing works of varying value.
The third aspect concerns the diverse forms and methodologies. The search for features of ethical thinking and its contents encompassed sources that took different forms and applied different methodologies. These are not only limited to the Greek philosophical framework, nor books of philosophy in the traditional sense; as theoretical and methodical thinking is not only limited to the field of philosophy, and is not only the craft of philosophers.
3.2 Ethical Sources: Scarcity or Abundance
Based on the three aforementioned aspects, Islamic ethical sources had to expand with the expanded perspective on ethics, while the restrictive perspective led its proponents to claim that Muslim writings in the field of ethical thought are scarce. The reason is that ethics in this case follows the Greek model and embodies two characteristics: rationality and theoretical inquiry that connects ethics as a branch of philosophy (or practical wisdom).
Carra de Vaux was one of the pioneers of the restrictive perspective on ethics, which adheres to the Greek philosophical pattern, thereby considering only sources that follow that model as ethical sources. He traced Greek ethical books known to or translated by Arabs, irrespective of them being authentic or apocryphal in their attribution to their original authors. He mentioned Aristotle’s (d. 322 BCE) three books on ethics, especially the Nicomachean Ethics, and referred to some of its commentaries like the one by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) on the introduction to the book, the commentary by Abū l-Walīd Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), and the commentary attributed to the physician Abū l-Faraj ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 435/1043). He also mentioned several other books but did not provide a comprehensive list. He observed that Plato’s (d. 347 BCE) moral writings are more about politics than moral philosophy, and among the Greek ethical writings known to the Arabs, he mentioned the Pythagorean Golden Verses, which are poems that fall under the category of wisdom, noting that the Arabs knew the wisdom of the philosopher Secundus (fl. second century BCE), and that Miskawayh preserved an interesting moral treatise, entitled Lughz Qābis (“Riddle of Gabes”) which seems to be a work of the Stoic school. When Carra de Vaux came to Muslim writings on ethics, he reached two conclusions that would be problematic for subsequent researchers. First, “we must conclude that moral philosophy, considered as a pure and independent science, has not been cultivated with great predilection in the Muslims world.” Second, Muslim authors “who have written in a methodical manner about moral philosophy are comparatively few,” and “those amongst them who are famous have nearly all of them earned their fame by other writings” (Carra de Vaux 1927, 1:233).5
Based on this perception, Carra de Vaux concluded that ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 142/759) was “the first moralist who wrote in the Arabic language,” and that “after him, the principal writers on ethics are the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al-Ṣafā), Ibn Miskawayh, al-Ghazālī, and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.” He added to these sources Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī’s Akhlāq-i Jalālī (“Jalālī’s Ethics”), Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAlī al-Kāshifī’s Akhlāq-i Kāshifī (“Kāshifī’s Ethics”), made a reference in passing to Abū al-Fatḥ al-Abshīhī (d. 852/1448), and mentioned in his list of sources Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī’s (d. 450/1058) Adab al-Dunyā wa-l-Dīn6 (“The Etiquettes of Worldly Life and Religion”), but did not discuss it in the body of the article. However, the mention of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ here, for example, does not align with the criterion that Carra de Vaux imposed on himself, because Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ did not follow a philosophical approach in the two books attributed to him, Al-Adab al-Kabīr (“The Comprehensive Book of Rules of Conduct”) and Al-Adab al-Ṣaghīr (“The Lesser Book of Rules of Conduct”). Walzer and Gibb saw that
these two works are not based on any philosophical principle, but rather remind the reader of Greek rhetoric, giving the rulers, ‘civil servants’, and persons who wish to advance in life advice on how to be successful. The Islamic allusions contained in this literature are at first scanty and formal, but the connection of this tradition with religion is steadily emphasized.
Walzer and Gibb 1960, 1:326
The conception of Carra de Vaux appears to have had an impact on subsequent Arab researchers. Aḥmad Amīn, Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā, and others concluded that the sources of Islamic ethical philosophy are scarce and that writing on ethics deteriorated due to two factors. The first is the reliance on religion in ethical studies, and the second factor is the overall decline of philosophy, from which ethical philosophy deducted. Regarding the first factor, Aḥmad Amīn says:
Few of the Arabs—even after they became civilised—studied ethics scientifically because they were satisfied to take ethics from religion and did not feel the need for scientific research into the basis of good and evil. Hence, religion was the pillar for many who wrote about ethics, as seen in the works of al-Ghazālī and al-Māwardī. The most famous who researched ethics scientifically were Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), Ikhwān al-Ṣafā in one of their epistles, and Abū ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037). These had studied Greek philosophy, thus their studies included Greek views on ethics. Perhaps the greatest Arab scholar of ethics is Ibn Miskawayh, who passed away in the year 421/1030.
Amīn 1921, 115
Regarding the second factor, Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā concluded that the science of ethics, as a branch of philosophy, declined after the demise of philosophy in al-Andalus, and that “as time passed, the philosophical character gradually faded from ethical studies—as we have seen—until they became purely religious with no trace of novelty and philosophical thinking. This remained throughout those times until the era we live in” (Mūsā 1953, 225). According to this conception, initiated by Carra de Vaux, ethics is a purely philosophical science and must be distinguished—in itself—from Sufism, asceticism, and other practical branches that do not fall within the scope of philosophy. The inclusion of the religious factor corrupts philosophical thinking!
The rational inclination, theoretical inquiry, and methodical construction are conditions of what is called ethical philosophy or what deserves to be a source of it, leading to two consequences. The first, restricts these characteristics to Greek philosophical thinking only, as ethics is a branch of practical wisdom and should not be sought outside the field of philosophy. The second consequence excludes many sources from the field of ethics, such as books of testaments (waṣāyā), books of proverbs and wisdoms, books of advice to kings and princes, treatises on asceticism and piety, and books of ḥadīth and literature, despite all of them containing ethical material or embodying ethical principles, because they do not meet the required characteristics of ethics either in form or content.
The development of ethical studies, whether by those engaged in philosophy or researchers from other fields, has led to the expansion of the concept of ethics and the emergence of what I have termed “the expanded perspective on ethics.” Thus, ethics ceased to be merely a branch of philosophy according to the old Greek model, and two new aspects emerged. Firstly, it has become a field that interacts with multiple other disciplines, hence the boundaries of the science of ethics expanded, in search of an ethical philosophy or ethical theory (or theories) in Islam, without being confined to the Greek philosophical pattern. The second novel aspect is that rationality and theoretical thinking are not limited to philosophy. Thus the search for this rationality in a certain or multiple branches of Islamic knowledge ensued. The multiple ethical studies that emerged since the mid-twentieth century and beyond serve as evidence to support these two points. In the 1940s, for instance, Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh Drāz (d. 1958) attempted to explore an ethical theory in the Qurʾān (Drāz 1998), while others failed to identify any theoretical ethical dimensions in the Qurʾān.7
In the late 1960s, Aḥmad Maḥmūd Ṣubḥī (d. 2004) argued that there is an Islamic ethical philosophy in the fields of Sufism and Islamic theology, criticising the adherence to the Aristotelian ethical model (Ṣubḥī 1983). In the early 1970s, George Hourani explored Islamic ethical rationality through Islamic theology, in particular the Muʿtazilī school and the ethics of the judge ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025).8
In the 1980s, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Qābīl (d. 2020) concluded that there are two major ethical theories in the Islamic tradition: wājib (duty) and saʿāda (happiness). He derived these from the rich ethical discussions in the texts of the Qurʾān, ḥadīth, Islamic theology, Islamic philosophy, jurisprudence, and Sufism (Qābīl 1984). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, others turned to the study of uṣūl al-fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence) as a form of philosophical thought. Fahmī ʿAlwān used Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī’s al-Muwāfaqāt (“The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law”) to establish the idea of al-qiyam al-ḍarūriyya (necessary values) and to link between Islamic legislation and ethics in the context of discussing the application of Sharīʿa in Egypt in the 1980s. Moreover, ʿAlwān attributed the scarcity of sources in ethical philosophy—according to his narrow perspective—to the idea that
the science of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence has obscured thinking in ethics as an independent science. Islamic thinkers did not feel that there was a deficiency that needed to be filled in the branches of knowledge, because the science of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence was sufficient to substitute for the science of ethics. The science of Islamic jurisprudence was akin to the practical application of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence.
ʿAlwān 1989, 13
Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (b. 1944) regarded the science of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence as the science of ethics (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993), and later developed an Islamic ethical philosophy distinct from Greek philosophy, connected with the Islamic heritage and its rationality, prominently featuring Sufi and purposive (maqāṣidī) components. In all of these theories, various Islamic disciplines were involved, notably the Qurʾān, Sufism, theological works, and the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Simultaneously, the search for the theoretical nature of ethics was retained, to prove that there is ethical rationality outside the Greek philosophical system, to be found in the aforementioned fields.
Based on the preceding discussions, George Hourani’s later work exemplifies a significant advancement in the classification of ethical writings. He used two primary criteria: methodology and sources. Hourani identified two types of ethical thinking based on methodology: “normative,” shaped by higher authorities, and “analytical,” a result of rational deliberation. He opted for “analytical” rather than “philosophical” due to the presence of theological theories that explicitly oppose philosophical approaches. Regarding the sources of ethical knowledge, he delineated two traditions: “secular ethics,” derived from worldly sources, and “religious ethics,” rooted in religious foundations. This framework led to a fourfold categorisation: (a) normative religious ethics, (b) normative secular ethics, (c) ethical analysis within the religious tradition, and (d) ethical analysis by philosophers (Hourani 1975, 128–135; 1985, 15–22). Mohammed Arkoun, following Hourani’s methodology, divided ethical writings into on the one hand narrative normative discourse, including religious texts like Prophetic traditions and secular texts like adab (literature), and on the other hand analytical normative discourse, which encompasses theological and philosophical currents (Arkoun 1990, 89).
This rich trajectory of ethical research allows us to identify the key shortcomings present in the work of Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī which was published in 2001. In his work, he challenged the traditional adherence to the Greek model and “judging ethical thought in Arab culture by the standards of European culture (whether Greco-Roman or modern European).” He then provided summaries of a variety of classical ethical sources, going beyond the philosophical ethics to include Sufi ethics, some books on Islamic political theory, and works by figures such as ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām (al-Jābirī 2001). At the same time, he ignored entire fields such as the Qurʾān, ḥadīth, fiqh, uṣūl al-fiqh, and previous studies addressing the ethical dimensions within these fields. Consequently, his work lacked theoretical coherence and fell short by disregarding earlier developments in the field of ethics. I will address some of the shortcomings in his work later.
The expanded perspective on ethics can trace its roots to early-twentieth- century debates initiated by Orientalists and Muslim scholars concerning the existence of an Islamic philosophy. Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Rāziq, in his Tamhīd li-Tārīkh al-Falsafa al-Islāmiyya (“Introduction to the History of Islamic Philosophy”), made a significant contribution to this debate through his and his students’ works, advocating for a philosophical exploration beyond traditional boundaries. Aḥmad Maḥmūd Ṣubḥī, particularly influenced by his mentor, ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār, a direct disciple of ʿAbd al-Rāziq, explored whether an Islamic ethical philosophy exists, continuing the ongoing discussions.9 ʿAlwān’s acknowledgement of ʿAbd al-Rāziq’s influence highlights the philosophical depth considered within the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (ʿAlwān 1989, 5).
4 Ethical Sources from a Contemporary Perspective
With ethics moving beyond the traditionally narrow confines of philosophy, and the reconceptualisation of ethics beyond merely being a branch of philosophy, a fundamental challenge concerning its sources has arisen. This section identifies the sources of ethics as depicted in pivotal works that have aimed to encapsulate ethical thought or aspects thereof. This is done to provide a general assessment of ethical sources in the Islamic library, introduce Islamic ethics, compile and publish some ethical texts to help understand them, and present a history of ethics. The focus here is on Islamic ethical sources as interpreted, defined, and evaluated in the works of contemporary researchers.
In the 1940s, Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh Drāz presented a critical assessment of ethical sources in the Islamic library from the angle of searching for theoretical ethics in Islam. He distinguished two levels: individual writings and ethical discussions. At the level of individual writings, he noted that:
We can only find two kinds of moral teaching. Either it is practical advice meant to train young people by inspiring them with the love of virtue, or it is a description of the nature of the soul and its faculties, followed by a definition and division of virtue which mostly imitates the Platonic or Peripatetic models. It is not rare to see both methods succeeding one another in the same text.
Drāz 1998, 4; 2008, 2
At the level of ethical discussions, he identified discussions in the writings of theologians and scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh on the criterion of good and evil (or in their own terminology: the beautiful and the ugly); in the writings of jurists he identified discussions on the capacity and conditions for responsibility; and in the works of “moralists and Sufis” he identified discussions on the value of effort and the purity of intention and purpose.
Drāz was primarily focused on theoretical ethics, so he overlooked what he termed “practical advice” and criticised individual writings in theoretical ethics for two main reasons. First, they are confined to the Greek model, and second, the Qurʾān is marginalised or absent in some of them. The ethical discussions across various fields of Islamic studies remained fragmented and did not coalesce into a clear doctrine in Drāz’s view, as they “did not always strictly concern themselves with a specifically moral point of view” (Drāz 1998, 4–5; 2008, 3). In his view, they were not approached from the perspective of philosophical ethical research and did not formulate an ethical theory, which was Drāz’s concern in his book. Drāz aspired to transcend the Greek model that dominated theoretical ethics texts at the expense of revelational texts, thus aiming to establish a Qurʾānic ethical theory. However, he still confined ethics to a philosophical type that resembles or parallels the European model in its form or structure at least, albeit differing in details. Therefore, he did not engage with practical ethics texts, reducing ethical sources to only two types: books of practical advice and books on the description of the nature of the soul and its faculties in the Greek manner, although ethical sources in the Islamic library are much more diverse. Al-Jābirī considered that Drāz’s book “adopts the same issues discussed in European thought under the title of ethics and tries to read them in the Qurʾān, the Sunna, and the Islamic religious heritage” (al-Jābirī 2001, 14). However, what al-Jābirī did not realise is that Drāz expanded the boundaries of ethical rationality beyond the realm of philosophy by pursuing a Qurʾānic ethical theory rooted in the Qurʾānic text and Islamic heritage, particularly its theological and jurisprudential dimensions. This pursuit laid the foundation for further research in theological and jurisprudential ethics. Additionally, Drāz critically engaged with the dominant moral theories of his time, notably Kant’s (d. 1804) deontology, which was prevalent among his contemporaries.
In the early 1950s, Dwight M. Donaldson followed a similar path to Drāz in distinguishing between philosophical ethical writings and writings with different ethical contents, but he referred to the former as “the narrower sense of systematic moral philosophy,” and to the latter as “Muslim ethical literature.” According to Donaldson, the sources of the narrower sense of systematic moral philosophy revolve around one distinctive book, Miskawayh’s Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq, and subsequent works built upon it, such as those by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī. In contrast, ethical literature covers a vast area and addresses many ethical topics, including the general ethics of pre-Islamic Arabs, prominent ethical teachings in the Qurʾān, the exemplary character of the Prophet, theological discussions on fate and responsibility, the influence of Greek thought in the Islamic world, the Neo-Platonic reconciliation between religion and philosophy, the Stoic illuminating conception of a universal law of nature, and contributions by Christian ascetics and mystics, as well as individual efforts by Sufis to reform the inner self and care for the rights of God (Donaldson 1953, ix–xi). It is evident that “ethical literature” for Donaldson is broader than “ethical discussions” (mabāḥith akhlāqiyya) for Drāz, a distinction reflected in the chapters of Donaldson’s book. This stands in stark contrast to Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī’s later work, which completely separated the four heritages—Greek, Persian, Arabian, and Islamic—searching for the question of authenticity in what he called “the value systems (nuẓum al-qiyam) in Arabic culture” (al-Jābirī 2001).
In 1960, Walzer and Gibb followed Donaldson’s approach, attempting to transcend Carra de Vaux’s restrictive conception while preserving the specificity of “ethics” as influenced by Greek philosophy. They divided the section on “Akhlāḳ” in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam into two parts: a survey of ethics in Islam and philosophical ethics, thus distinguishing—following Donaldson—between ethical thought and ethical philosophy. They noted that ethics in Islam
appear in their matured state as an interesting and, on the whole, successful amalgamation of a pre-Islamic Arabian tradition and Qurʾānic teaching with non-Arabic elements, mainly of Persian and Greek origins, embedded in or integrated with a general-Islamic structure.
Walzer and Gibb 1960, 1:325
The subsequent sections of the article detailed this comprehensive vision, referring to new virtues introduced by “the preaching of Muḥammad,” which replaced tribal morality, and noted that “the whole corpus of ḥadīth constitutes a handbook of Islamic ethics.”
They referenced compilations on makārim al-akhlāq (noble character) by Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, Muḥammad Ibn Jaʿfar al-Kharāʾiṭī (d. 327/939), and Raḍī al-Dīn al-Ṭabarsī (d. 548/1153). Walzer and Gibb also discussed the disagreement between the Muʿtazilīs and Ahl al-Sunna regarding the moral judgment of actions and personal responsibility, and how Sufism produced a divergent type of Islamic ethics, which eventually became more influential and almost dominated the Islamic world. They mentioned al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857), who had a decisive influence on al-Ghazālī in making Sufism a part of Islamic ethics in his Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn (“Revival of the Religious Sciences”). They noted that “the introduction of Persian moral thought into the Islamic tradition preceded the acquaintance with Greek ethics,” referring to the writings of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and Ibn Qutayba’s ʿUyūn al-Akhbār, which “defined and standardised the component elements of the orthodox morality in its pre-philosophical and pre-Sufistic stage,” and integrated elements in ethics from the Qurʾān, ḥadīth, pre-Islamic Arabic tradition, and Persian heritage.
Walzer and Gibb briefly mentioned other genres of literature such as marāyā al-umarāʾ (mirrors for princes) and popular wisdom in apophthegmatic form, before concisely discussing philosophical ethics derived from the Greeks. They mentioned in this context the books of Miskawayh and the works of al-Ṭūsī and al-Dawwānī, which built on Miskawayh’s work. Walzer, in the second part of the article, reviewed the development of the study of philosophy among Muslim philosophers and expanded on the Greek ethical sources known to the Arabs, such as the works of Plato and Aristotle, the commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, the three treatises by Galen (d. 216) translated into Arabic, and some writings of Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (d. 256/873) such as his treatise on warding off sorrows, his lost book on ethics which Miskawayh may have known and al-Ghazālī recognised, and al-Kindī’s lost al-Ṭibb al-Rūḥānī (“Spiritual Medicine”). They also mentioned Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s (d. 313/925) al-Ṭibb al-Rūḥānī, Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī’s (d. 364/975) Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq (“Refinement of Character”), Miskawayh’s Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq, and al-Māwardī’s book Adab al-Dunyā wa-l-Dīn, which illustrate the influence of philosophical ethics on adab. Walzer stated that al-Māwardī presented the traditional ethical materials “refreshed and modernised by the inclusion of materials from the later centuries, including both philosophical and ascetic ideas; these are combined with the older materials somewhat unsystematically, but in a direction not dissimilar from that taken later by al-Ghazālī.” Walzer concluded that al-Ghazālī followed this path of synthesis to a much further extent and more substantively connected to the essence, and again mentioned the works of al-Ṭūsī and al-Dawwānī (Walzer and Gibb 1960, 1:329–325). This development highlighted the distinction between ethical thought, which spans several knowledge branches with a complex historical trajectory, and ethical philosophy, which matured in the fifth/eleventh century according to Walzer and Gibb, following the Greek path.
In 1978, Majid Fakhry (d. 2021) wrote that the Arab output in the field of ethics is substantial, but has not been sufficiently explored by scholars. He collected classical texts on ethics under the title al-Fikr al-Akhlāqī al-ʿArabī (“Arab Ethical Thought”), published in two volumes. The first volume was subtitled al-Fuqahāʾ wa-l-Mutakallimūn (“Muslim Jurists and Theologians”), and the second al-Falāsifa al-Khuluqiyyūn (“Ethical Philosophers”) (Fakhrī 1978), thus going beyond what Drāz and Donaldson wrote about philosophical ethical writings. He broadened the meaning of ethical thought and merged some theological ethical discussions with individual ethical texts.
The texts of Muslim jurists and theologians that Fakhry selected included al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s (d. 110/728) treatise on qadar (fate), discussions from al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Muʿtazilī’s al-Mughnī fī Abwāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-ʿAdl (“The Sufficient Book on the Sections of Divine Unity and Justice”), Adab al-Dunyā wa-l-Dīn by al-Qāḍī Abū l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, al-Akhlāq wa-l-Siyar (“Morals and Behaviour”) by Abū Muḥammad Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī (d. 456/1064), and Kitāb al-Nafs wa-l-Rūḥ wa-Sharḥ Quwāhumā (“Book of the Psyche and the Soul and Their Faculties Explained”) by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). A detailed look at Fakhry’s classification reveals that some of these works explicitly belong to the field of Islamic theology, while others do not fit strictly within the Islamic jurisprudential field as conventionally understood, such as al-Māwardī’s and Ibn Ḥazm’s treatises as well as al-Rāzī’s book. Consequently, Fakhry’s labelling them “Muslim jurists and theologians” is not entirely accurate. While the label might apply to the authors, it does not do justice to the content of these sources. The fact that some Muslim jurists wrote ethical texts does not necessarily mean that what they wrote is jurisprudential in the conventional sense. Yet, al-Māwardī, Ibn Ḥazm, and al-Rāzī are encyclopaedic figures with contributions to various sciences. Hence describing them primarily as Muslim jurists in this specific context does not imply that their ethical content belongs to the field of jurisprudence. For instance, al-Rāzī’s book on the psyche and soul is fundamentally a work of ethical philosophy, even though it combines rational and scriptural arguments, it diverges from the methods typically followed by ethical philosophers who generally adhered to the Greek tradition.
The works of ethical philosophers, according to Fakhry, included al-Ḥīla li-Dafʿ al-Aḥzān (“The Art of Dispelling Sorrows”) by Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb Ibn Isḥāq al-Kindī, al-Ṭibb al-Rūḥānī by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Fuṣūl Muntazaʿa (“Selected Chapters”) by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq by Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī, Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq wa-Taṭhīr al-Aʿrāq by Miskawayh, and Risāla fī ʿIlm al-Akhlāq (“Treatise on the Science of Ethics”) by Abū ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā (d. 427/1037), along with Mīzān al-ʿAmal (“The Criterion for Action”) by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. Clearly, these texts are philosophical works that followed the Greek tradition in ethical philosophy, varying in their adherence to Greek methods and the depth of their integration of Islamic components.
It appears that these texts, which Fakhry gathered in his book al-Fikr al-Akhlāqī al-ʿArabī, laid the groundwork for his subsequent work published in the early 1990s titled Ethical Theories in Islam, which will be discussed shortly. In this later book, Fakhry followed-up on the texts he published in the first book, building on the conclusions he reached in his introduction, with some additional modifications evident in the structure of his second book. It seems that Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī did not recognise this when he critically reviewed Fakhry’s first book—a review not without its complexities regarding the idea of “stages” (marāḥil) of ethical history.10 Al-Jābirī overlooked Fakhry’s second book Ethical Theories in Islam, which was published in English a decade before al-Jābirī’s book al-ʿAql al-Akhlāqī al-ʿArabī. It might have been a language barrier that prevented him from accessing the work.
In the mid-1980s, Mohammed Arkoun observed that the Islamic intellectual output in the ethical field was rich and varied, thereby expanding the concept of ethics as is apparent from the preliminary bibliography he compiled, which included 51 books from “classical sources for the study of ethics and politics,” in Arkoun’s words. He stated, “It is impossible to review all the works written at that time representing various styles of ethical expression (al-taʿbīr al-akhlāqī) and manifestations” (Arkoun 2007, 83, 88). Arkoun’s list included books from various disciplines, such as adab (literature), al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya (the ordinances of government), ethical philosophy, Sufism, practical advice, history, ḥadīth, kalām, uṣūl al-fiqh, fatāwā (legal opinions), aqḍiya (judicial rulings), and biographies.
Clearly, Arkoun was interested in expanding the resources that aid the study of different moral values contained within Islamic tradition. Whether implicit or explicit, textual or lived. He included social, political, and cultural dimensions, thereby focusing on writings that “avoid technical analyses specific to a particular science” (Arkoun 2007, 83–126),11 thus significantly broadening the scope of ethical sources. Arkoun also called for the exploration of all written works in the field of worldly knowledge (commonly called adab) and all written works in the field of religious and rational sciences, to identify all moral values embedded in classical Islamic discourse (see Arkoun 2007, 88). It is curious that al-Jābirī overlooked Arkoun’s works, especially his latest book, despite sharing—at least partially—a focus on expanding ethical sources and incorporating literary sources, and discussing the reading of values and ethical discourse in Islamic tradition, as well as speaking of “ethical communities (jamāʿāt akhlāqiyya).” Arkoun published several studies on ethical sources and authors that al-Jābirī later addressed, notably Miskawayh, yet al-Jābirī did not mention them.12
In 1991, Majid Fakhry, in his previously mentioned book Ethical Theories in Islam, chose to reclassify ethical sources into four categories: scriptural morality, religious ethics, theological ethics, and philosophical ethics. In scriptural morality, Fakhry apparently found no individual sources to discuss, so he analysed certain Qurʾānic verses and ḥadīth texts addressing ethical issues. These issues include the deontological grounds of right and wrong, divine justice, and human capacity and responsibility. The theological ethics section discussed the ethical doctrines of the Muʿtazilīs and Ashʿarīs concerning the same three ethical issues mentioned under scriptural morality. In philosophical ethics, Fakhry began with a historical introduction to Greek ethics, its sources, and the method of their transmission to the Arabs. He then discussed the works of ethical philosophers al-Kindī, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd, the Brethren of Purity, Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī, Miskawayh, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī. In the religious ethics section, he revisited al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s treatise on fate mentioned earlier, briefly touched upon Ibn Abī l-Dunyā’s Makārim al-Akhlāq, discussed al-Māwardī’s Adab al-Dunyā wa-l-Dīn, Ibn Ḥazm’s al-Akhlāq wa-l-Siyar, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī’s al-Dharīʿa ilā Makārim al-Sharīʿa (“The Means to the Noble Qualities of the Sharīʿa”), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Kitāb al-Nafs wa-l-Rūḥ wa-Sharḥ Quwāhumā, and al-Ghazālī’s works, particularly focusing on Mīzān al-ʿAmal and Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn with emphasis on the former (Fakhry 1991). For this reason, Dimitri Gutas considered Fakhry’s book Ethical Theories in Islam essentially a series of summaries of ethical writings (Gutas 1997, 172–173).
In his second book, Fakhry addressed new sources not covered in the texts he selected for his first book, moving from discussing “stages” (marāḥil) of ethical thought mentioned in the introduction of his first book to discussing various ethical “theories” in his second book, which itself was not free from criticism as I will later explain. Fakhry’s perspective on ethics, as apparent in his second book, is narrower than Donaldson’s. Donaldson dedicated chapters to the ethics of early ascetics, important Persian writers, Persian Sufi poets, and contemporary ethical interpretations of Islam, which Fakhry omitted in his book. It appears he limited his book to texts he described in his first book as “ethical thought” (al-fikr al-khuluqī), distinguishing it from “ethical literature” (al-adab al-khuluqī). This distinction is not recognised by some who commented on his book, such as Dimitri Gutas who sharply criticised it, as I will clarify later. Fakhry, who grouped Muslim jurists with Muslim theologians in the first volume of Arab Ethical Thought, remarkably omitted them in his second book, as did Donaldson before him and al-Jābirī and others subsequently. This happened despite the fact that the works of Muslim jurists undeniably meet the criteria “ethical thought” as defined by Fakhry.
Moreover, studies prior to Fakhry’s second book by about a decade had already discussed the relationship between Islamic jurisprudence and ethics (Hovannisian 1985; Reinhart 1983). The last book Fakhry addressed chronologically was Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī’s, meaning he stopped at the turn of the tenth/sixteenth century. He neglected other works such as those by Abū ʿAmr al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868) and Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023), which mix both ethical thought and ethical literature. He also overlooked books on the advice to princes or mirrors for princes, the ordinances of government, and overall political ethics writings, areas partially explored by Mohammed Arkoun in a work published in French in 1986 and translated into Arabic in Beirut in 1990 (Arkoun 1986). Arkoun himself pointed out this oversight in his comments on Fakhry’s work (Arkoun 1993).
Overall, Fakhry’s work did not achieve theoretical coherence in understanding ethics, nor did he encompass all classical ethical sources, despite the existence of earlier works from which he could have benefitted to develop his own work.
In 2001, Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī published what he subtitled Dirāsa Naqdiyya Taḥlīliyya li-Nuẓum al-Qiyam fī al-Thaqāfa al-ʿArabiyya (“A Critical Analytical Study of Value Systems in Arab Culture”), in which he attempted to chronicle what he termed al-ʿAql al-Akhlāqī al-ʿArabī (“The Arab Ethical Mind”) by reviewing various ethical writings. This was to substantiate the framework he pre-established for this “mind,” positing that multiple value systems exist within the Arab and Islamic heritage that interact and influence each other. Each system revolves around a central value, which he identifies as saʿāda (happiness), ṭāʿa (obedience), murūʾa (manliness), and maṣlaḥa (interest or benefit). From these systems or sources reviewed by al-Jābirī, what he called “the Arab ethical mind” is formed. Al-Jābirī’s historical approach in his book should not obscure the fact that it provides summaries and analytical outlines of numerous sources from the Arab and Islamic ethical tradition, placing them within a historical context. Hence, al-Jābirī’s book relates to our discussion on the sources of Islamic ethics, as previously seen in Majid Fakhry’s works. Therefore, I will extract the list of sources al-Jābirī discussed in his book to examine the developments in the study of ethical sources as evidenced by his work.
Al-Jābirī begins his book with a methodological and historical introduction in which he addresses theological ethics centred around two main issues: freedom and responsibility, and classifying an action as good or bad (or reason and tradition). Here, he cites from limited theological sources, including some works of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Muʿtazilī, ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Ashʿarī. He then reviews the sources of ethics in the Arab and Islamic heritage, categorising them into groups that fall under one of the four ethical heritages he bases his book on: al-mawrūth al-Fārisī (Persian heritage), al-mawrūth al-Yūnānī (Greek heritage), al-mawrūth al-ʿArabī al-khāliṣ (pure Arabian heritage), and al-mawrūth al-Islāmī al-khāliṣ (pure Islamic heritage), in addition to a type he calls al-nazʿa al-tawfīqiyya (syncretic tendency) which is a category that falls in-between different heritages.
Under the category “Persian ethical heritage,” al-Jābirī broadly covers some works of ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, then goes into detail about the following books: ʿUyūn al-Akhbār by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Qutayba, al-ʿIqd al-Farīd (“The Unique Necklace”) by Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih (d. 246/860), al-Mustaṭraf fī Kull Fann Mustaẓraf (“The Delightful in Every Fine Art”) by Abū al-Fatḥ al-Abshīhī, Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā fī Ṣināʿat al-Inshā (“The Dawn of the Blind in the Craft of Composition”) by Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Qalqashandī (d. 821/1418), and Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk (“Advice for Kings”) by al-Māwardī, noting that his other works that fall under ethics and politics, and Mukhtār al-Ḥikam wa-Maḥāsin al-Kalim (“A Selection of Maxims and Excellent Sayings”) by al-Mubashshir Ibn Fātik (d. fifth/eleventh century).
Under the “Greek ethical heritage” category, after providing a historical background on Greek philosophy, al-Jābirī classifies the philosophical ethical heritage into two main tendencies: scientific and philosophical. Within the scientific tendency in ethics, he addresses the following sources: al-Ḥīla li-Dafʿ al-Aḥzān by Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī, al-Ṭibb al-Rūḥānī by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq (“Refinement of Character”) by Thābit Ibn Qurra (d. 283/896), and Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq by Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī. Al-Jābirī wrote extensively to prove that the author of the last book is Abū ʿAlī Ibn al-Haytham (d. ca. 430/1040) not Ibn ʿAdī, considering that attributing the book to the encyclopaedist Ibn al-Haytham would help classify it under “the scientific tendency in ethics.” Also, under “the scientific tendency in ethics,” he addresses al-Akhlāq wa-l-Siyar by Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī. As for the philosophical tendency in ethics, al-Jābirī includes the following sources: five works by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, which al-Jābirī sees as combining ethics (happiness) and politics (the virtuous city): al-Tanbīh ʿalā Sabīl al-Saʿāda13 (“Guidance to the Way of Happiness”), Tahṣīl al-Saʿāda (“Attainment of Happiness”), Ārāʾ Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila (“Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City”), Kitāb al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya (“The Book of Civil Politics”), and Kitāb al-Milla (“The Book of Religion”). He also discusses, Tadbīr al-Mutawaḥḥid (“Governance of the Solitary”) by Ibn Bājja al-Andalusī (d. 533/1138) and Kitāb al-Ḍarūrī fī al-Siyāsa (“The Necessary Book on Politics”) by Ibn Rushd, continuing the discussion on the relationship between ethics and politics according to the Greek conception.
Under the “syncretic tendency” category, al-Jābirī addresses the following sources: al-Saʿāda wa-l-Isʿād fī al-Sīra al-Insāniyya (“Happiness and Benefaction in Human Conduct”) by Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī (d. 381/992) and Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq by Abū ʿAlī Miskawayh, noting his other works as well.
Under the “Sufi heritage” category, al-Jābirī covers parts of the following sources, focusing on specific concepts or discussions: Kashf al-Maḥjūb (“Unveiling the Veiled”) by al-Hujwīrī (d. 465/1072), al-Risāla al-Qushayriyya (“The Qushayrī Epistle”) by Abū al-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072), al-Shaykh al-Akbar wa-l-Kibrīt al-Aḥmar (“The Greatest Master and the Red Sulphur”) by Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240), to illustrate some traits of the Sufis and their ethics related to the concepts of manners, companionship etiquette, and the relationship between the shaykh and disciple, wilāyā (sainthood), and maqāmāt (stations). Then he covers Qūt al-Qulūb fī Muʿāmalat al-Maḥbūb wa-Waṣf Ṭarīq al-Murīd ilā Maqām al-Tawḥīd (“The Nourishment of Hearts in Dealing with the Beloved and the Description of the Seeker’s Path to the Station of Divine Unity”) by Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 386/996) and al-Lumaʿ (“The Flashes”) by Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj al-Ṭūsī (d. 378/988). In passing he also quotes from other Sufi works.
Under the “pure Arabian heritage” category, he limits himself to quoting from the literature books he previously discussed, such as ʿUyūn al-Akhbār by Ibn Qutayba and al-ʿIqd al-Farīd by Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, then covers Adab al-Dunyā wa-l-Dīn.
Under the “pure Islamic heritage” category, he addresses the works of al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857), considered to be the earliest texts belonging to this category. Here, he discusses the book al-Waṣāyā aw al-Naṣāʾiḥ (“The Admonitions or the Advices”), al-Riʿāya li-Ḥuqūq Allāh (“Observance of the Rights of God”), Kitāb al-ʿIlm (“Book of Knowledge”), and the treatise Māʾiyyat al-ʿAql (“Essence of the Intellect”) among other books by al-Muḥāsibī, particularly expanding on al-Riʿāya li-Ḥuqūq Allāh. Then he returns to discuss Adab al-Dunyā wa-l-Dīn by al-Māwardī, then covers al-Dharīʿa ilā Makārim al-Sharīʿa by al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, Mīzān al-ʿAmal and Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, focusing primarily on the former. He also discusses Qawāʿid al-Aḥkām fī Maṣāliḥ al-Anām14 (“The Legal Maxims for the People’s Interests”) and Shajarat al-Maʿārif wa-l-Aḥwāl wa-Ṣāliḥ al-Aqwāl wa-l-Aʿmāl (“The Tree of Knowledge, States, Virtuous Sayings, and Deeds”) by ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), and al-Siyāsa al-Sharʿiyya fī Iṣlāḥ al-Rāʿī wa-l-Raʿiyya (“Sharīʿa-Based Governance in the Reform of the Ruler and the Subjects”) by Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328).
In my analysis of the list of sources al-Jābirī discussed in his book and his method of categorisation, I briefly focus on three aspects: the vision that governed his readings of these sources and the conclusions he reached, his concept of ethics, and the sources of ethics. His conception of ethics impacted the sources he selected.
Regarding the vision, al-Jābirī posits the existence of parallel value systems, each coherent and forming a structure in itself, revolving around a “central value.” These systems sometimes competed, were sometimes synthesised, and at other times Islamised. However, according to al-Jābirī, there remained purely Arabian and purely Islamic ethical heritages. Although al-Jābirī theoretically acknowledges the influence and intermingling between these heritages or systems in his introduction, he does not thoroughly and accurately historicise these values and is inconsistent in classifying ethical sources under a single heritage from among those he confines himself to. This led him to squeeze every group of ethical sources into a particular value system by seeking partial quotations that support his classification. For example, al-Jābirī sees the Persian ethical heritage as Persian in content and orientation, revolving around the ethics of obedience. Despite ʿUyūn al-Akhbār by Ibn Qutayba and al-ʿIqd al-Farīd by Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih being composed in eloquent Arabic and considered gems of “Arabic literature” due to their content and the quotations they gathered, al-Jābirī finds no issue in classifying them under the Persian heritage! Moreover, al-Jābirī applies this judgment to subsequent literature books. In his view, they remain dominated by these two books in terms of content, the method of their presentation, and the intended purpose of the literature, which addresses the ethics of the self and language. To maintain his idea of parallel ethical heritages, al-Jābirī considers al-Mustaṭraf by al-Abshīhī, for example, a move toward the Islamisation of the Persian heritage (al-Jābirī 2001, 217–218), though previous books could be read as intersecting ethical heritages that are not parallel and not entirely separate, or as an attempt to find common values. In the case of Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk by al-Māwardī, for instance, al-Jābirī classifies it under both the Persian and Greek heritages simultaneously: it is Persian in terms of its ethical content and Greek in structure (al-Jābirī 2001, 233). He distinguishes between the book’s content and structure, thus dividing the book itself and its author’s contribution between these two contending heritages in content and structure, leaving no trace of Arab influence except in the language it was written in. Similarly, al-Jābirī treats Mukhtār al-Ḥikam wa-Maḥāsin al-Kalim by al-Mubashshir Ibn Fātik as falling within “the framework of competition between the proponents of the Greek heritage and those of the Persian heritage” (al-Jābirī 2001, 244). As for Adab al-Dunyā wa-l-Dīn by al-Māwardī himself, the author of the previously mentioned Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk, al-Jābirī uses it in the context of discussing three ethical heritages: Persian, pure Arabian, and pure Islamic (see al-Jābirī 2001, 561), without hesitating to fragment the writings of one author who seems inclined to one ethical heritage in one book and to another in a different book. Al-Jābirī also does not hesitate to fragment a single book and subsume each part under a different heritage, merely so that his pre-established framework remains intact at the expense of the sources he discusses and their prominent authors who enjoyed an encyclopaedic culture and a coherent scientific structure, making some of them—at least—authorities in their fields.
This vision or framework that governed al-Jābirī’s perceptions and coloured his reading of ethical sources made him selective in choosing the sources themselves, and in his quotations that support only his idea, thus deviating from the method of historiography of the ethical heritage and its sources, and preventing a comprehensive understanding of ethical sources. His framework also came at the expense of the sources he discussed. He did not consider each book as a coherent structure but fragmented them to align with the parallel value systems he assumed, thus falling short in analysing the sources he addressed and not considering their reception by the scholarly community, particularly in the field of ethics, whether in classical times or in modern studies that addressed some of the previous books, resulting in a book that is a mixture of historiography and ideology.
Regarding the concept of ethics, while Fakhry confined his analysis solely to what is conventionally termed as ethical thought, al-Jābirī broadened the scope to include what Fakhry identified as ethical literature. In doing so, al-Jābirī incorporated three types of sources in his examination of ethics. The first type consists of books on tarassul (the art of prose composition), which relate to the ethics of language. The second type consists of literary books that explore the wisdom of the Persians, some narrated through the voices of animals and others in the form of collections of refined aphorisms or phrases attributed to kings, sages, and eloquent speakers. The third type is general literary books that merge the ethics of language with the ethics of the self, featuring an array of curiosities, proverbs, reports, tales, rarities, and eloquent phrases (see al-Jābirī 2001, 226–227). Although al-Jābirī incorporated these three types of sources, he categorised them under the Persian heritage, viewing them as proponents of a specific value system centred around the sultan and emphasising the value of obedience. From this perspective, he has previously analysed the works of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, Ibn Qutayba, and Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, which are recognised as part of ethical literature.
The value systems al-Jābirī explored through these sources treat ethical values as directives for community behaviour, i.e., as “ethical values for politics, politics in the sense of managing the community.” Arab society throughout its long history “formed ethical communities, if the term is appropriate, such as religious sects and Sufi groups” (al-Jābirī 2001, 24). Al-Jābirī focused on values that pertain to civic life, recalling the idea of linking politics and ethics as found in ancient thought, particularly Greek. However, values, in this sense, should not be sought solely in written texts without considering the lived and actual realities that appear through other types of historical sources, such as books on history, biographical works, and others (see al-Bishrī 2002).
Regarding sources, both Fakhry and al-Jābirī confined their discussions to sources of ethics in Arab and Islamic heritage. Fakhry did not go beyond the ninth/fifteenth century, while al-Jābirī stated in his book Al-ʿAql al-Akhlāqī al-ʿArabī that “we will continue to operate within our tradition as heritage” (al-Jābirī 2001, 28), but the period he covered was even shorter.
In theological ethics—which appears in a historical context—al-Jābirī did not offer anything notably new. He did not address individual sources nor does he benefit from previous studies that developed theological ethics and began to be systematically organised starting in the 1970s, although the inclusion of some theological discussions within the field of ethics dates back to the mid-twentieth century with Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh Drāz and Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā (Drāz 1998; Mūsā 1953, 162–163; 1945, 46–56). In the philosophical heritage, al-Jābirī does not discuss Fuṣūl Muntazaʿa fī al-Akhlāq by al-Fārābī and neglects to discuss Ibn Sīnā, justifying it by stating that “the Sīnāwian system is the same as the Farābian system with some modifications,” and that Ibn Sīnā “did not write on ethics and politics enough to warrant a specific place in this book” (al-Jābirī 2001, 365). Generally, al-Jābirī also overlooks the works of al-Jāḥiẓ, Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā, Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and others. However, he includes Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk by al-Māwardī and al-Siyāsa al-Sharʿiyya by Ibn Taymiyya but fails to encompass the literary genres to which these two books belong, namely the books on the advice of kings, the ordinances of government, and Sharīʿa politics. Regarding Sufi heritage, al-Jābirī does not maintain an organised presentation of sources as he does with other ethical heritages but limits his discussion to issues through specific Sufi sources, despite the existence of earlier studies specifically on Sufi ethics (Ṣubḥī 1983; ʿAwn 1983). He also overlooks Sharīʿa ethics books and Islamic jurisprudential ethics, even though he discusses some works by ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām but removes them from the jurisprudential context.
Al-Jābirī’s exaggerations in historicising ethics through its sources do not only concern evaluating sources or selective reading but also extend to his appreciation of these works. For instance, the inclusion of literary books in the field of ethics history has been undertaken by others before. Muhammad Yūsuf Mūsā had clarified the Persian influence in ʿUyūn al-Akhbār and al-ʿIqd al-Farīd more than half a century before al-Jābirī’s work (Mūsā 1953, 166–167). Al-Jābirī ignored earlier attempts that included Ibn Ḥazm’s al-Akhlāq wa-l-Siyar within the history of ethics, claiming that it was “previously in a state of neglect, and now—only now—does it enter the class to take its place in the history of Arabic ethical thought” (al-Jābirī 2001, 338). This is despite the fact that this text of Ibn Ḥazm had been one of the selected texts published by Fakhry in his al-Fikr al-Akhlāqī al-ʿArabī, and Fakhry had dedicated a full chapter to Ibn Ḥazm’s book in his second book published a decade before al-Jābirī’s publication.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have observed some of the historical developments in the study of ethics through its sources in the Arab and Islamic heritage. These developments have revealed clear complexities and gaps in our knowledge of the ethical heritage written in Arabic within the Islamic civilisation. Although our understanding has expanded compared to early studies on Islamic ethics, thanks to the transformation of Islamic ethics into an independent field still evolving, this has helped overcome the narrow perspective that confined ethics solely to philosophical or Greek ethics, moving towards a broader perspective that encompasses various fields and areas, including ethical discussions and individual books alike.
This transformation of ethics into an independent field has enabled overcoming the narrow goal that—for a time—dominated the academic output in English, which was to explore the Islamic ethical heritage from the angle of investigating the imprints of Greek legacy in Islamic civilisation through translation, transmission, and influence while analysing the Islamic ethical heritage itself was considered incidental collateral.
The previous discussions on the sources of ethics have led to the distinction between different forms and formulations of ethical discussions. At the methodological level, we can distinguish between ethical thought, which has an explicit theoretical framework, and ethical literature, which is closer to narrative and normative discourse and lacks an explicit or declared theoretical structure. At the structural level, there were two prominent formulations. On the one hand, there are scattered ethical discussions, which were part of other Islamic knowledge fields (such as Islamic theology and the principles of Islamic jurisprudence), and for this reason, they were subsumed under the field they belonged to, causing their ethical aspect to fade, considered to be only subordinate or auxiliary to that particular field. Examples of this are the issues of taḥsīn and taqbīḥ, divine justice, and human capacity and responsibility, which appeared—in books of Islamic theology—as purely theological discussions, but modern ethical studies have extracted them and made them into a subsidiary ethical field, namely theological ethics. On the other hand, there are the individual books, which were the focus of most studies discussed here and are further explored in this volume, which this chapter serves as an introduction to and part of. However, classifying these dense sources according to clear and coherent criteria remains something that merits an in-depth study of its own, which I hope to undertake at a later stage.
Still, there are two main challenges here. The first one is to study this rich ethical heritage rigorously for its own merit, away from ideological orientations or the obsession with searching for heritages and questioning authenticity and creativity, which tends to fragment the structure of classical ethical works in favour of an assumed purist thought fixating on sharply dividing ethical systems that are believed to be parallel and not intersecting. This does not mean we can do without the history of ideas, provided that the idea of historicising does not dominate ethical research, causing the ethical content itself to recede. Studying ethical content itself helps us build a coherent theoretical ethical thought or develop ethical theories, and, from another perspective, apply them in contemporary ethical discussions and create a field of applied ethics. Hence, we do not deal with the classical sources of ethics as “classical ethics” but rather integrate them into scholarly research where historical and philosophical, theoretical and practical aspects come together, and we distinguish between the absolute and the temporal linked to historical customs. This means that we use ethical sources in various directions so that they do not remain merely heritage or part of a historical study unrelated to the field of ethics as studied and taught today.
The second challenge relates to preserving the identity of ethics as an independent field, so that not all sources of Islamic heritage are transformed into sources of ethics. There are still traits that distinguish sources from various fields from what we call sources of ethics. If these boundaries disappear, the field of ethics loses its identity or we risk that all other sciences become part of ethics. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that ethical discussions are connected to various sciences because ethics is an interdisciplinary field, a dilemma we must address in the upcoming study on classifying the sources of ethics, God willing.
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I was unable to find biographical information about ʿAlwān, but his book was published in 1989.
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (d. 2002) regarded wisdom as a source of inspiration, motivation for commitment, guiding principles, stating that it will bear fruit only when it becomes dynamic and evolving. Nonetheless, he critiqued the genre of literature comprising proverbs, wisdom, and admonitions in his introduction to Miskawayh’s al-Ḥikma al-Khālida (“Eternal Wisdom”). He argued that the benefits of such literature are matched by its detriments. While it can promote virtue, offer moral guidance, and set behavioural standards, it simultaneously restricts the mind with artificial formulations, preconceived notions, and familiar meanings. He further observed that the prevalence of proverbs, wisdom, and admonitions in the East contributed to its weakness and decline, as verbal content often replaces active energy (Miskawayh 1952, 8–10). Conversely, Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān refuted these criticisms, asserting that this type of ethics (wisdom, admonition, and proverbs) is closely aligned with Arabic rhetoric. He maintained that it effectively conveys meanings concisely, refines concepts, and presents them in literary forms that resonate with the familiar context of the audience, thereby enhancing the impact of moral instruction (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, 397–400).
They are the preservation of dīn (worship), nafs (life), ʿaql (intellect), nasl (lineage), and māl (property).
To explore the beginnings and development of the concept of Greek-Arabic studies, refer to the introduction by Dimitri Gutas in his book Greek Thought, Arabic Culture (Gutas 2003).
Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān was preoccupied with refuting the claim that Islamic scholars and thinkers paid less attention to the study of ethics compared to other philosophical disciplines (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, 384 ff.).
The title of al-Māwardī’s book appears in manuscript copies and several classical biographical works as Adab al-Dīn wa-l-Dunyā, and it has been published under this title as well (see al-Māwardī 2013).
Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā, Majid Fakhry, and others have pointed out, for instance, that it is not possible to assert the existence of a theoretical ethical framework within the Qurʾānic text.
The study of theological ethics (or ethical discussions within Islamic theology) began with the works of Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh Drāz, Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā, and others, without being an independent field at the time. It then continued with Aḥmad Maḥmūd Ṣubḥī, and theological ethics became a distinct field with George Hourani and his successors (Ṣubḥī 1983; Hourani 1971; Frank 1983; Makdisi 1985).
Ṣubḥī dedicated his book to ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār (Ṣubḥī 1983, 7).
Al-Jābirī understood from Fakhry’s concept of the marāḥil al-fikr al-akhlāqī al-ʿArabī (stages of Arab ethical thought) that it referred to chronological stages. However, it is evident that Fakhry did not intend a chronological meaning, as he included figures from different time periods within a single stage.
Arkoun also mentioned in his other book, Nazʿat al-Ansana fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī (“Humanism in Islamic Thought”), a list of works under the title Nūṣūṣ ʿArabiyya wa-Dirāsāt Ḥadītha fī ʿIlm al-Islāmiyyāt (“Arabic Texts and Modern Studies in Islamic Studies”) (Arkoun 1997, 74–93). He referred to this list in al-Islām, al-Akhlāq wa-l-Siyāsa (“Islam, Ethics and Politics”) as “secular ethical literature” (Arkoun 2007, 125), although the list does not appear to be exclusively dedicated to ethical sources.
Arkoun also wrote articles on some ethical works such as “Ethics According to al-Māwardī,” “Ethics and History According to Miskawayh’s Tajārib al-Umam (Experiences of Nations),” and “Contribution to a Dictionary of Islamic Ethics.” He later compiled these articles into a book titled Essais sur la pensée islamique, published in 1984. He referred to this edition in his book Islam, Ethics, and Politics published in 1986. Some databases indicate the existence of an earlier edition of Essays in Islamic Thought dating back to 1973 (Arkoun 1984; 1986; 2007, 125).
Al-Jābirī (2001, 346) listed the title as al-Tanbīh ʿalā Sabīl Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda and referred to the edition by Saḥbān Khalīfāt. However, Khalīfāt’s edition does not include the word “Taḥṣīl” in the book’s title. For the different titles of the book, see Khalīfāt’s introduction to al-Fārābī’s book (al-Fārābī 1987, 11–14).
The book was published under the title Qawāʿid al-Aḥkām fī Iṣlāḥ al-Anām, and this title appears in several manuscript copies as well (Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām 2000).