1 Evolution of the African Governance Architecture and the Key Actors
The African Union’s (AU) regional governance architecture has its origins in the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA, Abuja, Nigeria, 8–9 May 2000). The CSSDCA instigated the development of common values and expressed the need for governance oversight of and an appraisal system for the AU. A slow building-block approach, with several significant developments, expanded this initiative, which followed changes informed by different AU organ processes that were tied to other events. The African Governance Architecture (AGA) institution eventually came into being through a series of disjointed activities that all had the same goal of achieving development in democratic, peaceful, and prosperous environments. The slow evolution of the AGA has not been a linear process because addressing Africa’s myriad governance challenges require a comprehensive collaborative approach at the national, subregional, and regional levels. Africa’s obligations to good governance have been taken up in the international conventions, treaties, and instruments developed and adopted by the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (see Kioko 2019; Wiebusch et al. 2019).
The prevalence of coup d’états in Africa since 1990 prompted the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to respond with the 1999 Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCGs), adopted in Algiers. This was followed by the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (hereinafter the Lomé Declaration, July 2000), which defined unconstitutional changes of government as military coup d’états, mercenary interventions to replace a democratically elected government, and the displacement of a democratically elected government by armed dissidents and rebel movements (Mehari Taddele Maru 2012). The 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) (African Union 2007) later added refusal to hand over power to the winning party after elections as well as the manipulation of constitutions to extend the hold on power by incumbents to the definition of unconstitutional power alternation. This ACDEG addition to the initial Lomé
By 2000, the AU member states had consecutively adopted a number of protocols to facilitate the adoption and implementation of democratic norms in Africa. These instruments are spread across AU institutions and are embedded in the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union (OAU 2000). The comprehensive ACDEG established standards of democratic governance for the region. It came into force in February 2012 after ratification by the requisite 15th member state. Ratification by member states of this charter has been a slow, long and arduous process (Engel 2019). By 2020, only 46 countries had ratified the ACDEG and deposited the legal instruments, indicating the need for continuous popularisation and advocacy to get all 54 countries to embrace the ACDEG. The implementation of the ACDEG requires a cohesive effort, a more robust and efficient sequencing of events, a commitment to combat corruption, effective and efficient public services and administration, the upholding of the rule of law, and respect for women’s and human rights (Kioko 2019).
2 The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
The primary African governance policy framework is the ACDEG, which incorporates elements from all other AU instruments, such as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1 June 1981), the African Charter on Rights and Welfare of the Child (1 July 1990), the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol, 1 July 2003), the African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (1 July 2003), the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Administration (31 January 2011), the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (16 February 1990), the Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa and the African Youth Charter (2 July 2006). The ACDEG supersedes all earlier AU protocols, norms, and standards, and the charter technically makes it easier to apply a holistic approach to governance. The rationale for the charter is rooted in the widespread concern about unconstitutional changes of
The ACDEG is designed to promote democracy and human rights in the African continent and is the first binding regional instrument adopted by member states that expansively addresses all fundamental elements for the establishment of liberal democracies. The charter is also the first legal instrument that condemns any amendments to the constitution or legal instruments of a member state without the people’s consent, considering that such actions infringe on the principles of democratic change of government. ACDEG provisions on civil and political rights safeguard individual freedoms and are laden with rules that regulate governance practices and competitive elections. As the various instruments present the amount of coordination required in the implementation of the ACDEG, a coherent architecture became essential to streamline efforts and minimise wastage caused by duplication. Implementation of the ACDEG is a painstaking process that constantly evolves in line with the dynamics within the AU and in the member states.
Since the initial development of the framework on UCGs, the AU has applied it on different occasions and in different countries, from Togo in 2005 to Mali in 2020 (see Aniekwe 2014; Wiebusch and Murray 2019). In all these cases, the AU responded differently in its efforts to restore constitutional order. The different approaches were determined by the concerned country’s responses to AU diplomatic and political interventions. Still, the AU continues to struggle in interpreting and classifying what constitutes unconstitutional power alternation and the process to restore order since this includes both sides, those pursuing power and those ousted in the contestation. The difficult case of the Arab Spring revolutions uncovered the fissures in the ACDEG’s definition and the AU’s interpretation and interventions (AU PSC 2014, 2019; see Mehari Taddele Maru 2012; Engel [2020], 39f.).
Monitoring compliance with the ACDEG has been a challenge for the AU Commission (AUC) for a long time. The ACDEG reporting parameters were only developed nine years after the charter came into force and were only adopted at the 28th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23–28 January 2016). Each country must produce an initial baseline report, which is then used to benchmark all other subsequent reports every two years. The report must provide general background information, implementation measures undertaken as prescribed by the ACDEG and the challenges encountered, and an indication of sectors needing technical support. Togo was the first country and is still the only one nine years after the ratification of the ACDEG, to submit the initial report on the implementation of the ACDEG.
In March 2009 at the Yaoundé consultative meeting, the AUC considered establishing the AGA to improve the coordination of the governance efforts on the continent. The meeting acknowledged the role of other institutional actors in developing the AGA. In 2010, the Yaoundé Working Session on the AGA approved the establishment of the new institution that would facilitate, coordinate and complement, and manage information flows on governance work in Africa. The AUC Department of Political Affairs (DPA) hosts the AGA Secretariat, which works with all AU organs such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), and the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC). The genesis of the AGA was sealed by the Executive Council decision on the theme ‘Shared Values of the AU’, with a special emphasis on inaugurating the AGA in the year 2011 (AU Council 2010).
The AGA’s key guiding principles clearly spell out its mandate: safeguarding citizen participation in democratisation processes in member states and regional affairs, advancing inclusionary mechanisms for gender equality and youth empowerment, protecting democratic principles, promoting human rights, upholding the rule of law, and pursuing good governance (see Matlosa 2014a). The RECs and AU organs are the bedrock of the AGA. There is consensus among key stakeholders that the AGA should be the regional framework for harmonising and bringing together AU organs and institutions mandated to ensure democracy and governance in order to minimise the transactional costs caused by the duplication of efforts. Emphasis is on improvement of complementarity among the different AU institutions.
The AGA operates through five clusters that all have mechanisms for inclusion of youth and women in the various areas of activities. The five intertwined clusters are: democracy (elections, parliaments, political parties, and democracy assessments), governance (public service and administration, local governance and decentralisation, anti-corruption and accountability, and natural resource governance), human rights and transitional justice, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and humanitarian affairs (AGA 2021).
Due to the divergent nature of AU organs’ activities, an operationalisation mechanism for the AGA – the African Governance Platform (AGP) – was devised to oversee, coordinate, and complement the already ongoing efforts by the different institutions on improving governance (African Union 2010).1
4 The African Peer Review Mechanism
The APRM was established as a voluntary governance assessment mechanism in 2003 and is an initiative that grew out of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (ASR Editorial 2010). NEPAD’s primary objectives are to alleviate poverty by promoting infrastructural development for sustainable growth, facilitating the integration of Africa into the world economy, and fast-tracking the empowerment of women. The APRM Secretariat coordinates the country governance assessments across all sectors of AU organs and works with diverse partners, including NEPAD, the AGA, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), select think thanks, and CSOs. The APRM assessment questionnaire covers all the governance sectors, and an Independent Panel of Eminent Persons leads the APRM country reviews, with the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) exerting peer pressure on the reviewed countries to implement the reforms. The APRM has accumulated experience from the numerous country reviews that have been undertaken to date in more than 20 countries. The APRM approach has clear mechanisms for linking the governance assessment platforms at the national level, being the focal points, to the APRM Secretariat and all steps and protocols are clearly outlined to ensure ownership of the review process by the country under assessment. The APRM goes beyond just assessments to ensure that action at the national level will be undertaken by overseeing the creation of the National Programme of Action (NPoA), which ties remedial action to resources and then to existing development plans and expenditure frameworks (see Matlosa 2014b). The processes eliminate duplication and ease the reporting of the APRM’s governance activities to the APRM Forum. The APRM’s 17 years of experience give it a vantage point of assessing countries’ compliance with the ACDEG. By 2016, 22 of the 36 countries that had acceded to the
The mandate of the APRM was extended to include tracking of the implementation and overseeing monitoring and evaluation of the continent’s key governance areas – that is to say, those listed in the ACDEG – by the 28th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30–31 January 2017). The APRM has steadfastly demonstrated readiness for future governance assessment roles and is always ahead in sequencing its activities. By March 2017, an APRM-AGA Joint Experts Methodology Workshop was convened by the APRM Secretariat in Johannesburg, South Africa, to unpack the implications and practicalities of the expanded mandate. The workshop produced a strategy and framework document on the new responsibilities and also established a multi-stakeholder Joint Task Force to design a road map. This additional mandate has paved the way for the AGA to work through the APRM for the monitoring of and reporting on the ACDEG through the well-established APRM processes.
The APRM is thus ready to be the lead agency for monitoring and evaluating the AU Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals Agenda 2030. This implies closer collaboration with NEPAD, which also has the mandate to coordinate the implementation of Agenda 2063 alongside the AUC and other strategic partners like the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and AGP members. On this task, the APRM will have to work closely with the RECs, which are key pillars of the AU, and some, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have demonstrated remarkable capacity in enhancing governance and resolving disputes in their subregion. The APRM has the capacity to provide the RECs with the experience it has acquired at the country and regional levels and can also use the RECs to obtain some useful information from countries that have not yet signed and implemented the APRM. Bridging the governance assessment gap between the AUC and the RECs requires a collaboration system between the APRM Secretariat and the RECs on the monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 2063 and Agenda 2030. The AU Assembly also decided that the Africa Governance Report shall be developed by the APRM, in collaboration with the AGA, and this will be presented every two years for consideration by the AU Assembly at its ordinary sessions starting in 2022 (AU Assembly 2019).
The 29th APR Forum of Heads of State and Government (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9–10 February 2020) also tasked the APRM with organising an African Migration Governance Conference in collaboration with the AUC and relevant stakeholders in order to share best practices. The intention is to strengthen
The APRM was integrated into the AU budget in 2018 and has more stable funding for its AGA-related work (AUC Chairperson 2021). In January 2018, the board of the African Development Bank (AfDB) confirmed the project plan and budget for the projects to be funded within the 2018–2021 funding cycle ($2.8 million confirmed). Other funders include the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which gave $60,000, and the European Union (EU), with $5 million.
5 AGA Operationalisation Challenges
Coordinating the work of the key stakeholders in a coherent manner that takes account of institutional sensitivities has slowed down the functioning of the AGA. The AGA policy and legal frameworks are now firmly in place, but a major problem remains since many AU institutions working on governance initiatives continue to operate in an uncoordinated and fragmented way. Each organ continues with its mandate as before and steps into the AGA realm when necessary. A good example of this is the continued segmented submission of reports on the different protocols that are now contained in the ACDEG. The APRM country reviews have reported that many of the signed commitments in the region have yet to come into force. And even when they get ratified, the probability and capacity to domesticate them and to adhere to the provisions remains low (Mangu 2014).
Providing AU member states with an implementation road map for the ACDEG remains essential, but there have been many setbacks to the process due to a high level of political disinterest by the member states. The AGA Secretariat database of key indicators to be used in the ACDEG as a baseline for assessing country reports struggled to get traction and in 2012 the DPA worked with technical support from the Centre for Human Rights in Pretoria in drafting the guidelines for reporting on the ACDEG. Furthermore, at a DPA meeting in Senegal in 2013, only three member states were represented at a junior administrative level to discuss the proposed implementation process. Other actors on the democracy landscape in the region contributed to the formulation of the implementation process, for instance, the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), was involved in a mapping study lasting from 2011 to 2013 of existing assessment frameworks in the African region. The Open Society Initiative also prepared a draft for the state reporting guidelines. None of these processes included input from the member states, hence their reluctance to even consider them as prototypes to work with. The benchmarking and indicators assessment processes eventually stalled in the latter part of 2013 due to internal administrative issues within some supporting institutions. Technical staff that had been seconded by IDEA to support AGA work in the Union did not get their contracts renewed. A new understaffed AGA Secretariat continues with the work, attempting to the content of the several draft documents in consultation with the AGP and member states. For now, the governance challenges faced by African countries necessitate that the AGA must prioritise a universal ratification of the ACDEG and work towards its domestication at the national level. However, more positive outcomes are likely if the work is led by the more established and experienced APRM.
In the case of the ACDEG, the Arab Spring revolutionary movements in the North African region required a platform for a thorough revisiting of the AU’s normative frameworks concerning constitutionalism and democracy (Solomon Ayele Dersso 2012; Mehari Taddele Maru 2012). There were glaring inconsistencies in the AU responses to the popular uprisings in North Africa (Solomon Ayele Dersso 2012). For instance, the Tunisian case was accepted as following the democratic process, but the Egyptian and Libyan cases were
6 Division of Labour Between the AU and the RECs on Governance
The foundation for broader African integration was laid out in the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action for the Development of Africa and in the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), which proposed that the RECs form the building blocks of continental integration. The eight RECs officially recognised by the AU (see this Yearbook, chapter 1, footnote 7) have all developed context-relevant roles and structures for facilitating regional economic integration between members of the individual regions and the wider African Economic Community (AEC). The RECs serve as the bridge between the AU and member states in areas of mutual interests – like peace and security, development, and governance.
All the RECs have acknowledged major AU protocols on democracy and governance and expect their member states to commit to them. Despite clear-cut duties of the RECs, many have not been able to perform their duties efficiently. The former SADC chairperson, President Hage Geingob of Namibia (since 2015), expressed dissatisfaction with the overlapping mandates and duplication of efforts among the RECs, as well as between the RECs and the AU (Geingob 2019). This was a hindrance to accelerating regional integration, and he therefore advocated the clarification of roles and responsibilities between the AU and the RECs, with the principle of subsidiarity providing the basis for an effective division of labour that would take into account the financial challenges faced by member states. Such an approach would allow member states to direct and take ownership of the policy and programme formulation at the subregional and regional levels in a way that ensures better value for the money spent.
The July 2019 Mid-Year Coordination Meeting (MYCM) addressed the division of labour between the AU, the RECs, and AU member states. It also scrutinised the second African Regional Integration Report (African Union, AfDB and UNECA 2019) and reviewed the draft protocol amending the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU, RECs, and Regional Mechanisms. The division of labour emphasised six specific areas: policy planning and formulation, policy adoption, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, partnerships, and joint resource mobilisation. All entities were tasked with developing a matrix for the division of labour based on the six areas. The matrix has to
ECOWAS has been very proactive in intervening in member states to restore constitutional order. This is a notable difference from traditional AU positions of unresponsiveness and seemingly tacit support it gave to some coups and undemocratic changes of government (ibid.). Recent examples of ECOWAS enforcement of the ACDEG include pressure that was placed on the military regimes to step down in Mali and Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS’s capacity to apply military force in cases of violation of the unconstitutional change of government has produced positive results in the countries in the region – including Sierra Leone, Togo, Mali, Guinea (Conakry), Niger, Guinea-Bissau, and Burkina Faso – which were all at one time threatened with sanctions and military intervention if they refused to revert to democratic order (ibid.). ECOWAS utilises mechanisms such as members of its Council of the Wise, the Mediation and Security Council, and regional police personnel to defuse political crises and monitor elections in the subregion. This has helped to fulfil commitment to the ACDEG in the region. ECOWAS actions imply that the division of labour between the AU and the RECs should be determined by the specific capacity of each REC.
In 2020, the AU embarked on reforms that are meant to be more effective and efficient. The division of labour between the AU, the RECs, member states, and other stakeholders will thus be performance oriented. The deputy chairperson of the AUC, Ghana’s Quartey Thomas Kwesi, announced acceptance of the proposed new structure along with the projected financing strategy at the 39th Session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) (Addis Ababa, 21–22 January 2020). In line with the Kagame reforms, it was decided to replace the AU Assembly held in summer with a Mid-Year Coordination Meeting between the RECs and the AUC. This MYCM is now the principal forum for the AU and the RECs to align their work and coordinate the implementation of the regional integration agenda according to the adopted and revised 2008 Protocol on Relations between the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). After the transformation of NEPAD into the resource mobilisation agency of the AUC, in February 2020 the AUC, the new African Union Development Agency (AUDA–NEPAD), the RECs and member states were tasked with finalising the gaps in the proposal on other facets of the division of labour that remain outstanding (Mangu 2017). The outstanding issues will be considered at the 35th AU Assembly scheduled for February
7 Post-2020 Linking Peace and Security with Governance
Under the AUC Strategic Plan (2014–2017) (AU Commission 2013), interventions concerning governance, democracy, and human rights were brought together to pursue the outcome, ‘[p]eace and stability, good governance, democracy and human rights as foundations for development and stable societies promoted’. Upon its establishment, the AGA complemented APSA, since both frameworks acknowledge the linkages between democratic governance, peace, and security (see Dawit Yohannes, this Yearbook, chapter 10). Both the AGA and APSA are intended to jointly address the structural root causes of conflict in Africa. The AGA’s overarching work extends to preventive diplomacy, mediation, negotiated settlement of conflicts, humanitarian assistance and durable solutions, reconciliation, and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). This mandate spills over into the work undertaken by the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD). The AGA and APSA are therefore found in the Annual High-Level Dialogues on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, an initiative began by the AGA in 2012. The high-level dialogues follow thematic lines and provide an engagement platform that produces reports for input into the AU policy processes. And in 2014, the AU High-Level Retreat of the AUC Chairperson’s Special Envoys and Special Representatives (Arusha, Tanzania, 21–22 October 2014) was held under the theme ‘Silencing the Guns: Improving Governance for Preventing, Managing and Resolving Conflicts in Africa by 2020’ (ACCORD 2014).
Opportunities for fortifying the links between the AGA and APSA are found in the AU-PCRD policy framework and the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI). The African Solidarity Initiative was launched by AU ministers of foreign affairs/external relations on 13 July 2012 to mobilise support from within Africa for PCRD in countries emerging from protracted violent conflict (Matlosa 2014a). Such collaboration between the AGA and APSA took place in the Central African Republic (CAR), where the DPA and the PSD both assisted in rebuilding CAR’s governance system by implementing a PCRD programme under the guidance of the AU- CRD policy framework (ibid.). Elections and human rights
By the end of 2020, the AU was prepared for a full-fledged merger between the AGA and APSA. The build-up had begun in an ad hoc manner through joint collaboration at select events. However, the upcoming merger of the DPA and the PSD into one Commission on Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) seems to be hanging at a policy and administrative level. The DPA has been left intact, with the director reporting to the new commissioner for PAPS. The AGA Secretariat remains in the old DPA offices, with the same set-up as before, and continues with its programmes. Unfortunately, the AGA Secretariat lost technical staff in 2019 when funding was cut by the main donors, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the EU. Reliance on one donor has cost the department dearly as two of its key staff members joined GIZ to pursue other AU-related projects.
8 Citizen Participation in Governance
The AGA acknowledges the role of civil society in governance dialogues and in monitoring the ACDEG and all other related protocols. As AGP members, the media and CSOs have actively participated in AGA dialogues and meetings, playing an important role in promoting the ratification, domestication, implementation, and dissemination of the protocols’ substance. Local media in Africa is affected by the declining quality of professionalism due to partisanship leanings in news coverage caused by political influence. The public broadcaster rarely reports on the implementation or publicisation of regional instruments and human rights violations. CSOs facilitate African citizen’s access to AU organs; monitoring adherence to the protocols; giving voice to citizen’s concerns for injustice and assisting in claiming compensation; and providing technical skills and expert knowledge and information to facilitate the protection of rights and to hold governments accountable. CSOs have organised networks and initiated their own platforms, such as the 7th AU–EU Civil Society Human Rights Seminar (Banjul, The Gambia, 28–29 October 2017), which took place just before the AU–EU Human Rights Dialogue (31 October 2017). The topic for the seminar was ‘Tackling Torture in Africa and Europe’ (EEAS 2017). Intolerance towards CSOs, especially those working on defending human rights, is increasing in many countries, and where the public space is
The AU Constitutive Act established two key organs that facilitate the participation of African citizens in the AU: the Pan-African Parliament, whose aim is ‘to ensure the full participation of the African peoples in the development and integration of the continent’ (OAU 2000, §17), and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), an ‘advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups’ (ibid., §22). The APRM has been outstanding in the inclusion of CSOs in the governance assessments at all levels of government. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has successfully institutionalised the participation of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and a broad array of CSOs in their dialogues (Bekker 2007). The Peace and Security Council (PSC) developed the Livingstone Formula in 2008 (AU PSC 2008) for greater citizen interaction in the promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa. This gave ECOSOCC an intermediary role between the PSC and civil society. Unfortunately, the formula restricted CSO participation due to the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act, the 2002 PSC Rules of Procedure (Rules 21 and 22), and the eligibility requirements of ECOSOCC. The Livingstone Formula was only operationalised in November 2016 in the quest to find inclusive solutions to Silencing the Guns by 2020.3 The AGA managed to overcome such hurdles by making CSOs part of the AGP, and the AGA Secretariat has been routinely supported by CSOs, such as the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD, Durban), the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA, Dakar), and the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), the Southern African Trust (Kyalami), and intergovernmental bodies such as IDEA.
9 Gender Dimension of the Governance Realm
Gender and youth participation in governance processes is stressed in all AGA processes, but progress in managing gender diversity has been slow (see Okech, this Yearbook, chapter 13). At the AGP institutional level, many countries struggle to comply with the AUC gender parity requirement. At the country level, efforts have been largely confined to the establishment of gender and
The AGA has addressed gender in the same way AUC institutions have. Gender sensitivity in the AU has been treated according to gender parity, and hence institutional policies have emphasised the inclusion of women. Achieving gender parity has been an uphill struggle, but the Kagame institutional reforms have set a timeframe (by 2025) for realising gender parity across all AU organs. The Maputo Protocol Scorecard and Index (MPSI) assesses performance and progress on gender across all AU institutions, and the recent AU Gender Online Reporting Platform provides a one-stop reporting facility for the various and complementary accountability tools including the Gender Scorecard, and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) reports.
Gender is mainstreamed across all the five AGA clusters, AGP structures, and AGA activities, with a clear emphasis on process-related gender issues such as integrating women’s roles across the governance arena. At the national level too, gender is mainstreamed across ministries and departments, but the substantive content of policy implications on gender remains elusive. A gender-responsiveness approach across all policy sectors can address this effectively since the AGA’s scope is broad, ranging from trade to criminal justice systems. For example, there is a need to answer questions such as ‘What does the the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA) need to put in place for women traders?’ and, ‘What do the criminal justice systems need to cater for women’s needs?’ Applying these important questions across all sectors makes it possible to move closer to gender equality in terms of the quality of policy outputs. Issues concerning gender parity are left to AGP institutions, including CSOs that have their own gender policies, but even then, in most institutions the gender gap remains vast. The gender policies in most institutions continue to target parity issues but not the substantive issues that equalise the service conduct between genders.
From 19 to 20 November 2020, the AGA Secretariat convened for the first time the Gender Pre-Forum, under the auspices of the AGA Women Engagement Strategy (AGA 2020). This brought together the Office of the Special Envoy on Women Peace and Security and the Women and Gender Development Directorate (WGDD) of the AUC as partners in the AGA pre-events of the then forthcoming 9th High-Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in Africa (online, 10–11 December 2020).
10 The Youth
The role of the youth as partners in sustainable development and stabilising Africa is well enunciated in the 2006 African Youth Charter (see Okech, this Yearbook, chapter 13). The charter urges member states to facilitate the creation of platforms for youth participation in decision-making at local, national, and regional levels (African Union 2006, §11[2]a). The AGA–Youth Engagement Strategy (AGA–YES) provides a framework for AU policy organs and the RECs to ensure sustainable engagement of youth in democratic governance processes (AU Commission 2018). AGA–YES evolved from the Youth Consultation event during the 2nd Annual High-Level Dialogue on Democracy, Governance and Human Rights (Dakar, Senegal, November 2013). AGA–YES was adopted by the technical and political heads of AGP members at their statutory meetings two years later, in December 2015.
Mainstreaming the youth across AGA work is seen as imperative because the presence of the youth is paramount for effective and relevant policy processes. Youth CSOs have been able to organise networks and set their own agenda on inclusion in governance processes. In 2017, the AU Demographic Dividend Roadmap was formulated to operationalise the theme of the year ‘Harnessing the Demographic Dividend through Investments in Youth’ (AU Commission 2017).
11 AGA Cooperation with International Partners
The AU has different kinds of strategic partnership that all add diverse value. Some partners provide direct grants to the AU, which are then parcelled out to the different organs/divisions, with others providing technical support, but most support is in the form of specific projects. This gives external partners the upper hand as they can cherry-pick what to support according to their domestic priorities (Pharathathle and Vanheukelom 2019). The high number of external partners distributing aid to the AU has overwhelmed its administrative capacity since funder servicing requirements are always high.
The EU’s support to the AUC was channelled through the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES) (Myandazi et al. 2018). The partnership pursued strong cooperation for ensuring effective, inclusive, and accountable governance, combating corruption, and recognising the role of civil society, the media, and democratic institutions (European Union n.d.). This support was managed through a direct grant to the AUC and operated under a Joint Programme Agreement (JPA) and Joint Financing Arrangement with Pool Funding Partners and Non-Pool Partners who did not harmonise their financial support but were committed to a coordinated approach (Miyandazi et al. 2018). The JPA utilised a coherent framework through which partners could support DPA activities in elections, governance, and humanitarian affairs. In 2014, the JPA supported the DPA with
Since 2012, the German government, through GIZ, has directly supported the implementation of programmes initiated by the AGA Secretariat. Initial GIZ support in the first phase was geared towards improving the institutional development and capacity of the AGP, and the later phase sought to support AGP members through technical aid for implementing the ACDEG at the member state level (GIZ 2021). This was under the GIZ–AGA Africa programme, which focused on supporting coordination and cooperation in the AGA. For this, €3 million was earmarked to support the four AGP organs – the AfCHPR, the DPA, the PAP, and the ACHPR – in the form of technical assistance from 2014 onwards. The new AGA Secretariat was supported from this budget, which also funded the elections programme, with support for capacity-building regarding the implementation of existing instruments. Plans for 2015 included a Human Capacity Development process for joint planning and monitoring of the ACDEG in a bid to reduce the burden on member states concerning the production of numerous reports. GIZ support has applied a systemic approach in strengthening the capacity of AGP members and AU member states to enhance their governance efforts.
Some specific projects like the AU–EU Human Rights Dialogue receive financial support from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (EEAS 2012). The Human Rights Dialogue is a long-standing framework for strategic discussion between Africa and the EU on issues related to human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law in Africa and in Europe.
A rather popular mechanism is the technical support given across AU institutions. For instance, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights funded a legal officer who was assigned to assist the special rapporteur on human rights; the government of Denmark funded another officer to assist the Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa. A Canadian CSO, Rights and Democracy, provided technical support fort the special rapporteur on women’s rights with a Canadian assistant who was based in Bamako in 2010 and with another assistant for the period 2011 to 2012 to help with report writing, conduct research for presentations, write press releases, and care for general administration.
Another partnership model of funding is the short-term proposals that are written for donors as specific ad hoc requests by directors or commissioners in AUC departments. These requests are usually for small amounts of funding to support projects, and the AGA has used this model a lot to support regional dialogues and consultative meetings. These AGA events were very often funded
12 Outlook
The year 2020 marked the end of all instruments of EU–Africa partnership, and the AUC chairperson appointed a high-level representative to lead the renegotiating of a new partnership with the EU based on principles of equality, mutual respect, and shared interests. A new directorate of partnership and resource mobilisation was created, AUDA–NEPAD, to harmonise the two processes that were initially separate. Separating partnerships from resource mobilisation resulted in the duplication of efforts and wastage. The last four years have seen partners increase their funding support in an ad hoc manner, directing their contributions to a wide number of projects, programmes, and pan-African organisations. This has fragmented governance enhancement efforts that the AGA is trying to pull together. For the AU, donor funding will continue coming in fragmented, unknown quantities, with strings attached, thereby worsening the managerial overload and constraining scarce administrative capabilities (see Pharatlhatlhe and Vanheukelom 2019).
Post-Brexit United Kingdom is working independently in fostering new relationships and partnerships. In 2019, the United Kingdom intended to inject up to £30 million of funding into prosperity and security projects across Africa as part of the partnership agreement.4 This funding will be spread over three years across different institutions and will be used to train peacekeepers in Kenya, assist free and fair elections, and support the next phase of negotiations for the AfCFTA. Although money for the AGA is very often contained within such big amounts given to the AUC, it does not trickle down to the actual activities of the AGA Secretariat. Given the demands placed on donors by Covid-19, future funding trends are likely to follow this British model and become even more targeted and fragmented.
References
Sources
ACCORD 2014. ‘Silencing the Guns, Owning the Future. Realising a conflict-free Africa. A report on the proceedings of the Fifth African Union High-Level Retreat on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa held from 21 to 23 October 2014 in Arusha, Tanzania’. Durban: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes.
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