8 Nicholas Trivet on the Univocity of Being
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This article considers the critique of Scotistic univocity by the Dominican Nicholas Trivet. He held at quodlibetal debate at Oxford in 1303, at which Scotus might have been present. It is clear, however, that Trivet’s criticism was directed against Scotus’ Ordinatio. Trivet focuses on the argument from the certain and doubtful concept; defeating this argument it seems, suffices for defeating the position. The focus on this argument then gives Trivet’s critique an emphasis on the psychological and epistemological aspects of the debate on univocity. Trivet denies that being has a concept proper itself. Rather, the concept of being is a disjunct, meaning ‘substance or accident’. Considering the matter from a logical point of view, Trivet holds that being is equivocal. But from the metaphysical view, in light of the attribution of accidents to substance, a doctrine of analogy emerges.