1 An Exposition on the Meanings of Nafs, Rūh, ʿAql, Qalb and What Is Intended by These Names. The Revival of the Religious Sciences (Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn) by Imam Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī (d. 505 AH/1111 CE)
1.1 Author’s Biography
Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Ghazālī al-Tūsī was born in Tus, Iran, in the year 450 AH/1059 CE and died in 505 AH/1111 CE. While the Imam was a young boy, his father passed away. But before his death, he had appointed a learned friend to take care of his two sons’ Islamic education. Under the direction of his father’s friend, the young Ghazālī studied in madrasas (Islamic seminaries) in Tus, Jurjan, and Nishapur (all cities within modern day Iran). When he arrived in Nishapur, Abu al-Maʿālī Abd al-Mālik al-Juwaynī, also known as Imam al-Haramayn took al-Ghazālī as his student. He managed to acquire various branches of knowledge during this time and remained in Juwaynī’s company, learning from him until his death. After his death, he went to Baghdad where he was appointed by the famous Seljukī wazīr Nizām al-Mulk who had established a chain of Islamic colleges or seminaries known famously as the madrasa Nizamiyya. Imam al-Ghazālī was tasked with penning the views and positions of the ahl al-sunna wa al-jamaʿa and to write several treatises refuting other deviant groups. This allowed for the Seljuk dynasty, under the intellectual leadership of Imam al-Ghazali to establish a standardized and unified creed and religious positions for the public that was sponsored by the state. Given al-Ghazālī’s genius and acumen, he was successfully able to write convincing treatises that demonstrated the supremacy of Sunni thought and its ability to address many modern and philosophical issues of the time. Through his relationship with Nizām al-Mulk and his work, he gained recognition and praise from the scholars. He preached to large crowds in the mosque, lecturing to over three hundred students, and giving legal opinions of great importance. Later in his life, Imam al-Ghazālī, took a long sabbatical from his teaching position in Baghdad to travel to other Muslim lands, spending years in spiritual solitude, reflection, prayer, and ascetic activities. He spent a large part of his time in the greater Sham region (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine). It is during this time that he wrote his most acclaimed work, Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn. He later returned to his teaching position after his long journey. In sum, Imam al Ghazālī is considered by many great scholars to be the reviver of the era he lived in and recognized as one of the most important figures in the Islamic scholastic and Sufi tradition. His works continue to shape the Islamic discourse in significant ways until today.
1.2 Text Overview and Significance
Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn (Revival of the Religious Sciences) is the most famous composition of Imam al-Ghazālī detailing Islamic beliefs and practices through the lens of Islamic spirituality or tasawwuf. The work originally spans 40 volumes, and it is divided into 4 sections, each one covering 10 subjects. The four sections are: (i) Acts of Worship (ʿibādāt), (ii) Social Aspects of Life (muʿāmalāt), (iii) Destructive actions (muhlikāt), and (iv) Actions that lead to ultimate Salvation (munjiyāt). One of the chapters contained within the third section is entitled, ‘The Wonders of the Heart’, which is followed by ‘Disciplining the Soul’. These two chapters deal with many psychological issues such as the early nature vs nurture debates, the nature of the psyche, human drives, character, well-being, relationship between the brain and psychological processes, emotions, thoughts and their sources and relationships to actions among others. The famous traditionist, Imam Nawawī is reported to have stated about the Ihyaʾ that: ‘were the books of Islam all to be lost, excepting only the Ihyaʾ, it would suffice to replace them all’. The psychological significance of the selected section in this book from the Iḥyaʾ addresses the ontological structure of the inner psyche or soul. In this section, Imam al-Ghazālī defines and presents the multiple meanings and usages for each of the following Islamic terms that point to aspects of the inner soul or psyche, i.e., qalb, rūḥ, nafs, and ʿaql.
1.3 Arabic Text
بيان معنى النفس والروح والقلب والعقل وما هو المراد بهذه الأسامي
اعلم أن هذه الأسماء الأربعة تستعمل في هذه الأبواب، ويقلُّ في فحول العلماء من يحيط بهذه الأسامي، واختلاف معانيها وحدودها ومسمياتها، وأكثر الأغاليط منشؤها الجهل بمعنى هذه الأسامي، وباشتراكها بين مسميات مختلفة، ونحن نشرح في معنى هذه الأسامي ما يتعلق بغرضنا.
اللفظ الأول: لفظ القلب.
وهو يطلق لمعنيين:
أحدهما: اللحم الصنوبري الشكل، المودع في الجانب الأيسر من الصدر، وهو لحم مخصوص، وفي باطنه تجويف، وفي ذلك التجويف دم أسود، وهو منبع الروح ومعدنه، ولسنا نقصد الآن شرح شكله وكيفيته؛ إذ لا تتعلق به الأغراض الدينية، وإنما يتعلق بذلك غرض الأطباء.
وهذا القلب موجود للبهائم، بل هو موجود للميت.
ونحن إذا أطلقنا لفظ القلب في هذا الكتاب.. لم نعن به ذلك؛ فإنه قطعة لحم لا قدر له، وهو من عالم المُلك والشهادة؛ إذ تدركه البهائم بحاسة البصر فضلاً عن الآدميين.
والمعنى الثاني: هو لطيفة ربانية روحانية، لها بهذا القلب الجسماني تعلق، وتلك اللطيفة هي حقيقة الإنسان، وهو المدرك العالم العارف من الإنسان، وهو المخاطب والمعاقب، والمعاتب والمطالب، ولها علاقة مع القلب الجسماني، وقد تحيرت عقول أكثر الخلق في إدراك وجه علاقته؛ فإن تعلقه به يضاهي تعلق الأعراض بالأجسام، والأوصاف بالموصوفات، أو تعلق المستعمل للآلة بالآلة، أو تعلق المتمكِّن بالمكان.
وشرح ذلك مما نتوقاه لمعنيين:
أحدهما: أنه متعلق بعلوم المكاشفة، وليس غرضنا من هذا الكتاب إلا علوم المعاملة.
والثاني: أن تحقيقه يستدعي إفشاء سر الروح، وذلك مما لم يتكلم فيه رسول اللّٰه صلى اللّٰه عليه وسلم؛ فليس لغيره أن يتكلم فيه.
والمقصود: أنا إذا أطلقنا لفظ القلب في هذا الكتاب.. أردنا به هذه اللطيفة، وغرضنا: ذكر أوصافها وأحوالها، لا ذكر حقيقتها في ذاتها، وعلم المعاملة يفتقر إلى معرفة صفاتها وأحوالها، ولا يفتقر إلى ذكر حقيقتها.
اللفظ الثاني: الروح.
وهو أيضاً يطلق فيما يتعلق بجنس غرضنا لمعنيين:
أحدهما: جسم لطيف، منبعه تجويف القلب الجمساني، وينتشر بواسطة العروق الضوارب إلى سائر أجزاء البدن، وجريانه في البدن وفيضان أنوار الحياة والحس والبصر والسمع والشم منه على أعضائه.. يضاهي فيضان النور من السراج الذي يدار في زوايا البيت؛ فإنه لا ينتهي إلى جزء من البيت إلا ويستنير به.
فالحياة مثالها النور الحاصل في الحيطان، والروح مثاله السراج، وسريان الروح وحركته في الباطن مثاله حركة السراج في جوانب البيت بتحريك محركه.
والأطباء إذا أطلقوا لفظ الروح أرادوا به هذا المعنى، وهو بخار لطيف أنضجته حرارة القلب، وليس شرحه من غرضنا؛ إذ المتعلق به غرض الأطباء الذين يعالجون الأبدان، فأما غرض أطباء الدين المعالجين للقلب حتى ينساق إلى جوار رب العالمين.. فليس يتعلق بشرح هذه الروح أصلاً.
المعنى الثاني: هو اللطيفة العالمة المدركة من الإنسان، وهو الذي شرحناه في أحد معنيي القلب، وهو الذي أراده اللّٰه تعالى بقوله: (قل الروح من أمر ربي)، وهو أمر عجيب رباني، تعجز أكثر العقول والأفهام عن درك كنه حقيقته.
اللفظ الثالث: النفس.
وهو أيضا مشترك بين معان، ويتعلق بغرضنا منه معنيان:
أحدهما: أنه يراد به المعنى الجامع لقوة الغضب والشهوة في الإنسان، على ما سيأتي شرحه، وهذا الاستعمال هو الغالب على أهل التصوف؛ لأنهم يريدون بالنفس الأصلَ الجامعَ للصفات المذمومة من الإنسان، فيقولون: (لا بد من مجاهدة النفس وكسرها)، وإليه الإشارة بقوله عليه الصلاة والسلام: ”أعدى عدوٍّ لك نفسك التي بين جنبيك“ (1).
المعنى الثاني: هو اللطيفة التي ذكرناها، التي هي الإنسان بالحقيقة، وهي نفس الإنسان وذاته، ولكنها توصف بأوصاف مختلفة بحسب اختلاف أحوالها، فإذا سكنت تحت الأمر، وزايلها الاضطراب بسبب معارضة الشهوات.. سميت النفس المطمئنة، قال اللّٰه تعالى في مثلها (يا أيتها النفس المطمئنة * ارجعي إلى ربك راضية مرضية)، والنفس بالمعنى الأول لا يتصور رجوعها إلى اللّٰه تعالى؛ فإنها مبعدةٌ عن اللّٰه، وهي من حزب الشيطان.
وإذا لم يتم سكونها، ولكنها صارت مدافعة للنفس الشهوانية ومعترضة عليها.. سميت النفس اللوامة؛ لأنها تلوم صاحبها عند تقصيره في عبادة مولاه، قال اللّٰه تعالى: (ولا أقسم بالنفس اللوامة).
وإن تركت الاعتراض، وأذعنت وأطاعت لمقتضى الشهوات ودواعي الشيطان.. سميت النفس الأمارة بالسوء، قال اللّٰه تعالى إخباراً عن يوسف عليه السلام أو امرأة العزيز: (وما أبرئ نفسي إن النفس لأمارة بالسوء)، وقد يجوز أن يقال: المراد بالأمارة بالسوء: هي النفس بالمعنى الأول.
فإذًا؛ النفس بالمعنى الأول مذمومة غاية الذم، وبالمعنى الثاني: محمودة؛ لأنها نفس الإنسان؛ أي: ذاته وحقيقته العالمة باللّٰه تعالى وسائر المعلومات.
اللفظ الرابع: العقل.
وهو أيضاً مشترك لمعان مختلفة ذكرناها في كتاب العلم، والمتعلق بغرضنا من جملتها معنيان:
أحدهما: أنه قد يطلق ويراد به العلم بحقائق الأمور، فيكون عبارة عن صفة العلم الذي محله القلب.
والثاني: أنه قد يطلق ويراد به المدرك للعلوم، فيكون هو القلب؛ أعني تلك اللطيفة.
ونحن نعلم أن كل عالم فله في نفسه وجود هو أصل قائم بنفسه، والعلم صفة حالة فيه، والصفة غير الموصوف، والعقل قد يطلق ويراد به صفة العالم، وقد يطلق ويراد به محل الإدراك؛ أعني المدرِك، وهو المراد بقوله صلى اللّٰه عليه وسلم: ”أول ما خلق اللّٰه العقل“ (1) ؛ فإن العلم عرض لا يتصور أن يكون أول مخلوق، بل لابد وأن يكون المحل مخلوقاً قبله أو معه، ولأنه لا يمكن الخطاب معه، وفي الخبر: ”أنه قال له تعالى: أقبل.. فأقبلَ، ثم قال له: أدبر.. فأدبرَ…“ الحديث (2).
فإذًا؛ قد انكشف لك أن معاني هذه الأسامي موجودة، وهي القلب الجسماني، والروح الجسماني، والنفس الشهوانية، والعلوم.
فهذه أربعة معانٍ يطلق عليها الألفاظ الأربعة، ومعنى خامس؛ وهي اللطيفة العالمة المدرِكة من الإنسان، والألفاظ الأربعة بجملتها تتوارد عليها، فالمعاني خمسة، والألفاظ أربعة، وكل لفظ أطلق لمعنيين، وأكثر العلماء قد التبس عليهم اختلاف هذه الألفاظ وتواردها، فتراهم يتكلمون في الخواطر، ويقولون: هذا خاطر العقل، وهذا خاطر الروح، وهذا خاطر القلب، وهذا خاطر النفس، وليس يدري الناظر اختلاف معاني هذه الأسماء، فلأجل كشف الغطاء عن ذلك.. قدمنا شرح هذه الأسامي.
وحيث ورد في القرآن والسنة لفظ القلب فالمراد به المعنى الذي يفقهُ من الإنسان ويعرف حقيقة الأشياء، وقد يكنى عنه بالقلب الذي في الصدر؛ لأن بين تلك اللطيفة وبين جسم القلب علاقة خاصة؛ فإنها وإن كانت متعلقة بسائر البدن ومستعملة له، ولكنها تتعلق به بواسطة القلب، فتعلقها الأول بالقلب، وكأنه محلها ومملكتها، وعالمها ومطيتها.
ولذلك شبه سهل التستري القلب بالعرش، والصدر بالكرسي، فقال: (القلب هو العرش، والصدر هو الكرسي)، ولا تظنُّ به أنه يرى أنه عرش اللّٰه وكرسيه؛ فإن ذلك محال، بل أراد به أنه مملكته، والمجرى الأول لتدبيره وتصرفه، فهما بالنسبة إليه كالعرش والكرسي بالنسبة إلى اللّٰه تعالى، ولا يستقيم هذا التشبيه أيضاً إلا من بعض الوجوه، وشرح ذلك أيضاً لا يليق بغرضنا فلنتجاوزه.
1.4 English Translation
An Exposition on the Meanings and Connotations of the Terms: Nafs, Rūḥ, ʿAql, Qalb
Know that these four terms will be used in these chapters.1 Few amongst even the elite scholars are those who have comprehensive knowledge of these terms, the nuances of their meanings, definitions, and denominations (i.e., the entities that are signified by them). Most misunderstandings arise out of ignorance of the meanings of these terms and their shared usages for different entities. [Here] we will [only] explain those meanings of these terms that are most relevant to our aims.
The First Term: The Word Qalb (Heart)
It is used for two meanings:
1) The first of them is: The piece of flesh whose shape [is like] the pinecone, situated in the left side of the chest. It is a special kind of flesh, with a cavity inside of it, and in that cavity is dark blood. It is the place of the origin (manbaʿ) and source (maʿdin) of the spirit (rūḥ) [of life]. At this moment, we do not intend to clarify its shape nor its mode [of functioning], since it is not relevant to religious objectives (aghrāḍ dīniyya), and relevant only to the objectives of the physicians.2
This [type of] heart is found in [all] animals; rather it is present [even] in the dead [carcass]. When we unrestrictedly mention the word qalb in this book, we do not intend that heart (i.e., physical heart) by it, for it is a piece of flesh with no [intrinsic] value. It [belongs to] the physical (mulk) and observable (shāhada) realm, since even animals, let alone human beings, can ocularly perceive it.
2) The second meaning [of the qalb] is: a metaphysical, divine, spiritual substance (laṭīfa rabbāniyya rūḥāniyya)3 that has a connection to this physical heart. This metaphysical substance is the essence of man. It is the part of man that perceives, knows, and experiences gnosis, and it is that which is addressed, punished, reprimanded, and commanded (by Allah). It has a relationship with the physical heart. In attempting to understand the nature of this relationship, the minds of most of creation are perplexed, for the relationship between the two is akin to the relationship between incidents (aʿrāḍ) and physical objects (ajsām),4 or the relationship between an attribute and the attributed, or the relationship of the user of an instrument and the instrument itself or the relationship between the occupant of a space and the space itself.
There are two reasons for our refraining from further explanation [of the metaphysical reality of this qalb]:
Firstly, because it is connected to the knowledge of mystical gnosis (mukāshafa) and our aim in this book is only the knowledge of social conduct (muʿāmala).
Secondly, its investigation leads to divulging the mysteries of the soul, and that is something that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, did not discuss and thus is not appropriate for anyone else to discuss.
The point is that when we unrestrictedly use the term qalb in this book, we mean by it this metaphysical substance (laṭīfa). Our objective is the discussion of its attributes and states, not the discussion of its inner reality in and of itself. Moreover, the science of social conduct requires recognition of its attributes and varying states but does not require the discussion of its [inner] reality.
The Second Term: The Rūh (Soul)
Regarding the genus of our objective, this too applies to two meanings.
1) The first of the two: is the imperceptible subtle physical substance.5 Its place of origin (manbaʿ) is the cavity of the physical heart, and it circulates through the medium of the veins to the rest of the parts of the body. Its flow in the body and the stream of the light of life, sensation, sight, hearing, and smell from it to the physical organs resembles the stream of light from a lantern which is taken around to the corners of a house, for it is not taken to any portion of a house except that it is enlightened by it.
So, [biological] life is like the light present within the walls, and the soul is like the lantern, and the circulation of the soul and its internal movement is akin to the movement of the lantern in the corners of the house by the mobilization of the one who moves it.
When physicians use the term “soul” unrestrictedly, this is what they intend. It is an imperceptible vapor warmed by the heart’s heat. Explaining it is not our aim [here], since it is related to the aims of the physicians who treat physical bodies. As for the purposes of physicians of religion who treat [the illnesses of] the heart so that it can be drawn towards the proximity of the Lord of the cosmos, the explanation of [this intended usage of] this rūḥ is not at all relevant.
2) The second meaning [of the term rūḥ]:6 is the knowing, perceiving, subtle faculty of man, which is what we explained as one of the meanings of the term qalb (i.e., the second meaning), and it is what Allah intends in His statement, And they ask you regarding the soul. Say: the soul is one of the affairs of my Lord (Sūrat al-Isrāʾ 17:85). It is a wonderous, divine matter that most minds and powers of comprehension are incapable of perceiving the essence of the reality of.
The Third Term: The Nafs
It is also a polysemic sharing several meanings, two of which are most relevant to our aims.
1) The first of them is: a signification encompassing the appetitive (shahwa) and aggressive (ghaḍab) human drives, which will be explained. This usage is most common among the Sufis because they mean by the nafs the root that combines all the reprehensible qualities in human beings. Hence, they state: “It is necessary to strive against the nafs and break it,” and there is an indication to this [usage] in the Prophetic statement: “Your greatest enemy is your nafs (ego) that is always with you7”.
2) The second meaning is the aforementioned metaphysical spiritual entity [under the second meaning of qalb and rūḥ] that is the human being in reality. It is man’s self and essence, but it is characterized by different attributes depending on its varying states.8 Thus, if it becomes subjugated under the command [of reason] and the [intrapsychic] tension is removed due to resisting the appetitive drives, it is known as al-nafs al-muṭmainna (the tranquil self). Allah the Exalted states concerning its like: “Oh you tranquil soul, return to your Lord, well-pleased and well-pleasing Him” (Sūrat al-Fajr 89:27). The first meaning of the nafs (the ego) cannot be conceived to be returned to Allah, the Exalted (in this way), for it makes [one] distant from Allah and is from the party of the devil.
If [the nafs] has not yet been fully pacified but it [nevertheless] attempts to repel and obstruct the appetitive [and predatory] drives, it is referred to as al-nafs al-lawāmma (the blaming self), because it blames the self when it is deficient in obeying its Lord. Allah the Exalted states: “And I swear by the blaming self” (Sūrat al-Qiyāma 75:2).
If the soul abandons obstruction [of the appetitive and aggressive drives] and accepts and obeys the demands of the base desires and invitations of the devil, it is known as al-nafs al-ammāra bi-l-sūʾ (the soul that commands to evil). Allah the Exalted says, informing about Yūsuf, upon him be peace, or the wife of the governor [of Egypt]: “I do not absolve myself for indeed the soul commands to evil” (Sūrat Yūsuf 12:53). It is possible to say that what is meant by the soul commanding to evil is the nafs of the first meaning (i.e., the ego). If so, the nafs of the first meaning is completely reprehensible, whereas with the second meaning it is praiseworthy because it is [but] the human being’s self, meaning: his essence and his reality that knows Allah the Exalted and all other knowable things.
The Fourth Term: The ʿAql (Intellect)
It too is polysemic, comprising multiple different meanings that we mentioned in the Book of Knowledge. Two meanings in particular are relevant to our aims.
1) The first of them is: [when] it is mentioned and what is meant by it is the knowledge of the reality of things, then [in such a case] it is an expression of the attribute of knowledge whose original locus is the qalb (or metaphysical heart).9
2) The second [meaning] is: [when] it is unrestrictedly mentioned, and what is meant by it is the faculty of conceiving knowledge. [In such a case] it is the heart, meaning that metaphysical essence (laṭīfa).
We know that every person of knowledge has within himself an entity (wujūd) that is foundational and exists independently [of other things]. [We also know that] knowledge is an attribute that exists within [the knower], and the attribute is different from the attributed. The ʿaql is sometimes unrestrictedly mentioned to indicate the attribute of the knower, and sometimes it is unrestrictedly mentioned to indicate the place of conception, meaning the conceiver. This [second meaning] is what is intended in the statement of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace: “The first thing that Allah created was the ʿaql”,10 for knowledge is an incident (ʿaraḍ) that cannot be conceived as the first creation; rather, the locus (maḥall) must be created before it or along with it. [Moreover,] it is not conceivable that the Divine address (khiṭāb) be directed to the [ʿaql alone], while [it is mentioned] in a [portion of the previous prophetic] report: “He the Exalted said to it: ‘Come’, so it came. Then He said to it: ‘Depart’, so it departed”.11
Thus, it has become evident to you that the meanings of these terms exist, and they are: the physical heart, the material rūḥ or soul, the animalistic nafs, and knowledge.
So, these are four meanings for which the four [aforementioned] terms are used for. [However,] there is a fifth meaning, and it is man’s knowing and perceiving metaphysical faculty in the human being, and all these four terms in their totality refer to it. Thus, there are five meanings and four terms, and every term is used for two meanings. Most scholars have been confused by the variance of these terms and how they are used. So, you see them discussing khawāṭir (thoughts) saying things like: “This is the thought of the ʿaql …” or “This is the thought of the rūḥ …” or “this is the thought of the qalb …” or “this is the thought of the nafs …”, while the examiner does not know the variance of the meanings of these terms. Therefore, to remove the confusion, we have begun with the explanation of these terms.
When the word qalb is used in the Qurʾan and Sunna, its connotation is the entity within man that comprehends and recognizes the reality of things, and sometimes “the heart that is in the chest” is used as an allusion for it, because there is a special relationship between the physical body of the heart and the metaphysical essence (laṭīfa). Even though [the metaphysical heart] is linked with the rest of the body and employs it, its connection is through the intermediation of the [physical] heart. So, its primary connection is to the [physical] heart as though it is its place and dominion.
For this reason, Sahl al-Tustarī12 likened the [physical] heart to the Throne (ʿarsh) and the chest to the Chair (kursī). He said, “the heart is the Throne, and the chest is the Chair”.13 It must not be assumed that he considered it Allah’s Throne and His chair, for this is impossible. Rather, what he meant is the heart is its dominion and primary means for its [metaphysical heart’s] activity and administration. Its [the physical heart and chest] relation to it [the metaphysical heart] is like the relation of the Throne and Chair to Allah the Exalted.14 This metaphor is also not suitable except in some respects. However, the discussion of it is not appropriate for our aims here, so we shall pass over it.
2 The Nature of the ʿAql and Its Types. Tuḥfat al-Murīd ʿalā Jawahart al-Tawḥid by Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Bājūrī (d. 1276/1860)
2.1 Author’s Biography
Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Bayjurī was a Shāfī scholar, author, and teacher who was appointed as the Shaykh of al-Azhar University from 1847 CE until he passed away in 1860 CE. al-Bayjuri was born in 1784 CE in the village of Bājur which is situated in the Manufiyya province in Egypt. He began studying the traditional Islamic sciences at the age of 14 after enrolling in Al-Azhar University. Prior to that, his father taught the Holy Quran and the art of its recitation (tajwīd). He authored over twenty works and commentaries in sacred law, tenets of faith, Islamic estate division, scholastic theology, logic, and Arabic. He was an Ashʿarī theologian, a logician based on the methods of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razi, and a Sufī belonging to the Naqshbandī order. Al-Bayjurī followed the scholarly tradition of giving importance to the three core sciences of law, theology, and mysticism.
2.2 Text Overview and Significance
Imam al-Bayjuri’s Tuḥfat al-Murīd ʿalā Jawahart al-Tawḥīd is a commentary of Jawharat al Tawhid, a poem detailing the Sunni Ashʿarī creed which was originally compiled by Imam Ibrāhīm al-Laqānī. It is a work in sciences of discursive theology (kalam). Amongst the many commentaries of the aforementioned poem, Imam Bayjurī’s is one of the most relied upon and accepted works among scholastic theologians.
Regarding its psychological relevance, Imam Bayjurī’s commentary upon line 95 of al-Laqānī’s original work has been selected due to his presentation of the nature of the intellect (ʿaql) and the various opinions related to it from Islamic scholars. He divides the ʿaql (intellect) into five types: (1) innate intelligence which is required to attain knowledge; (2) Acquired intelligence, which is acquired through interacting with intelligent people; (3) Divinely-endowed intelligence, which is the type of intelligence that Allah grants to the believers to be guided to faith; (4) the intelligence of the ascetics, through which indifference to the world is achieved; (5) Ennobled intelligence, which is in reference to the intelligence of the Prophet (May Allah bless him and grant him peace). Imam Bayjurī opines that the ʿaql is primarily responsible for cognitive processes and it can be subsumed under the broader metaphysical entity of man (latifa rabbaniyya) or metaphysical heart (qalb). Thereby establishing it separate from the brain, yet still related to it. This seems to be the position that he favors, while he mentions the position of other Islamic scholars who consider the intellect to be located within and part of the brain.
2.3 Arabic Text
قوله: (والعقل كالروح) مبتدأ وخبر، أي: والعقل مثل الروح من حيث الخوض في بيان الحقيقة والوقف عن ذلك. واختلف كلام المصنف في الترجيح: فرجح في ”هداية المريد“ طريق الخوض، ورجح في ”الكبير“ طريق الوقف، وهو المختار؛ لأنه من المغيبات، وكل ما هو كذلك فالأولى الكف عن الخوض فيه. وهو لغة: المنع، من عقل البعير إذا منعه بالعقال، وسمي بذلك لمنعه صاحبه من العدول عن سواء السبيل.
العقل: أنواعه
واعلم أن العقل على خمسة أنواع:
الأول: غريزي، وهو غريزة يتهيأ بها لدرك العلوم النظرية كما قاله شيخ الإسلام.
والثاني: کسبي، وهو ما يكتسبه الإنسان من معاشرة العقلاء.
والثالث: عطائي، وهو ما يعطيه اللّٰه للمؤمنين ليهتدوا به إلى الإيمان.
والرابع: عقل الزهاد، وهو الذي يكون به الزهد.
والخامس: شرفي، وهو عقل نبينا ﷺ؛ لأنه أشرف العقول.
وقد اختلف في تفضيل العقل على العلم أو العكس، والراجح تفضيل العلم على العقل؛ لأن العلم من صفاته تعالى، وما يروى في فضل العقل فهو موضوع لا أصل له كما صرح به الجلال السيوطي.
قوله: (ولكن قرروا فيه خلافا) أي لكن قرر العلماء في العقل خلافا، ولا محل لهذا الاستدراك؛ لأنهم قرروا في الروح خلافا أيضا، فلعل ”لكن“ لمجرد التأكيد، ثم رأيت المصنف في شرحه قال: ”ولكن … إلخ“ استدراك على طريقة الخائضين، فأشار إلى أنهم لم يتفقوا على حقيقة معينة، بل اختلفوا في بيانها. اهـ. فالاستدراك يشعر بانتشار الخلاف وكثرته.
العقل: تعريفه
وقول: (فانظرن ما فسروا) أي فانظر التفاسير التي ذكرها القوم في كتبهم لا في هذه المقدمة؛ لصغر حجمها. وأقوال أهل السنة متطابقة على عرضيته، فبعضهم قال: إنه من قبيل العلوم، وعرفه بأنه: العلم ببعض العلوم الضرورية، كالعلم بوجوب تحيز الجرم واستحالة عروه عن الحركة والسكون، وجواز إحراق النار وغير ذلك، وهذا القول لإمام الحرمين وجماعة، وبعضهم قال: إنه ليس قبيل العلوم، وعرفه بأنه: غريزة، أي طبيعة مغروزة، يتبعها العلم بالضروريات عند سلامة الآلات.
وعرفه الشيرازي بأنه: صفة يميز بها بين الحسن والقبيح.
وأحسن ما قيل فيه أنه: نور روحاني به تدرك النفس العلوم الضرورية والنظرية.
وقال بعضهم: إن هناك لطيفة ربانية لا يعلمها إلا اللّٰه تعالى، فمن حيث تفكرها تسمى عقلا، ومن حيث حياة الجسد بها تسمى روحا، ومن حيث شهوتها تسمي نفسا، فالثلاثة متحدة بالذات مختلفة بالاعتبار.
وقالت المعتزلة والخوارج والحكماء بجوهريته، وفسره بعضهم بأنه جوهر يدرك به الغائبات بالوسائط، والمحسوسات بالمشاهدة. ومنهم من فسره بغير ذلك. وفي كلام الغزالي أنه جوهر مجرد.
العقل: محله
واختلف في محله، والصحيح أنه محله القلب وله نور متصل بالدماغ كما ذهب إليه الإمام الشافعي والإمام مالك (رضي اللّٰه عنهما) وجمهور المتكلمين.
وقالت الحكماء وبعض الفقهاء بأن محله الدماغ لفساده بفساد الدماغ. وهذا لا يدل على ما ذكروه؛ لجواز أن تكون سلامة الدماغ شرطا لاستمراره وإن كان محله القلب.
2.4 English Translation
[From Imam al-Laqqānī’s (d. 1041/1632) poem on Islamic theology, Jawharat al-Tawḥīd (the Jewel of Monotheism):]
“The intellect (ʿaql) is like the soul (rūḥ), although [scholars] maintained * a contention in this regard, so investigate what they explained.”
Imam al-Bājūrī’s gloss on this line of al-Laqqānī’s poem in Tuḥfat al-Murīd:
In his (i.e., Imam al-Laqqānī) statement, “The intellect (ʿaql) is like the soul”, [grammatically,] ‘intellect’ is the subject and ‘soul’ is the predicate [in this nominal sentence construction], meaning that the intellect is like the soul from the perspective of [the ruling pertaining to] delving deeply into the exposition of its reality or abstaining from [such an endeavor]. The statements of the author (al-Laqqānī) are inconclusive regarding which he preferred [i.e., permission or abstention from exploring its reality]. In Hidāyat al-Murīd (Guidance for the Seeker)15 he prefers the course of exploration, while in [al-Sharḥ] al-Kabīr16 he prefers the course of abstention, and [the latter] is the favored position [by the scholars] because it is from the issues of the unseen (al-maghībāt), and it is best to abstain from delving into all such matters.
Linguistically, it (the ʿaql) [denotes] restraint (manʿ), as in: “he restrained the camel (ʿaqala al-baʿīr)” when one restrains it using a rope (ʿiqāl).17 The ʿaql is named so because it restrains its owner from straying from the straight path.
The Intellect (ʿAql) and its Types
Know that the intellect is of five types:18
Innate (gharīzī) (c.f. fluid intelligence): which is innate intelligence by which it is possible to attain investigative knowledge (ʿulūm naẓariyya), as Shaykh al-Islām19 stated.
Acquired (kasbī) (c.f. crystallized intelligence): which is what humans acquire through interactions with people of intelligence.
Divinely endowed (ʿāṭāʾī) (c.f. spiritual intelligence): which is what Allah gives to believers so that they are guided by it to faith.
The intellect of the ascetics (ʿaql al-zuhhād) (c.f. inspired intelligence): which is (the intelligence) by which asceticism (zuhd) is achieved.20
Ennobled (sharafī) intellect: which is the intellect of our Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), because he possessed the most ennobled intelligence.
There are differences of opinion regarding the superiority of the intellect over knowledge and vice versa. The preferred position is that of the superiority of knowledge over the intellect since knowledge is an attribute of Allah the Exalted. What has been reported regarding the virtue of the intellect21 is a baseless, fabricated report, just as Jalāl [al-Dīn] al-Suyūtī has elucidated.22
[As for Imam al-Laqqānī’s] statement: “although ‘lākin’ [scholars] maintained a contention in this regard”, it means scholars, however ‘lākin’, affirm that a contention exists regarding the intellect.
There is no place for this corrective conjunction [“although/however”] since scholars also affirm a contention regarding the soul. Perhaps [his usage of “although” is solely for emphasis. Moreover, I have seen the author in his commentary say: “although … etc.”, [this is] a corrective conjunctive [connected to] the method of those who delve [into such matters], thereby indicating that they did not all agree on a specific reality; rather, they differed in their explanations of it. Thus, the corrective conjunction [perhaps] indicates a widespread and abundant contention.
Defining the Intellect (ʿAql)
[As for] the statement: “so investigate what they explained”, it means, study the explanations that people have provided in their books, not in this introductory work [on creed], due to its small size. The statements of the Ahl al-Sunna all correspond to it being an accident (ʿaraḍ). [In light of this,] some of them state, “It is a type of knowledge”, defining it as “knowledge of some [aspects] of intuitive knowledge”, such as knowledge of the necessity of a substance occupying physical space and the impossibility of it being free of movement or rest [at any given time], and [the knowledge of] the possibility of fire to burn, and the like. This is the position of Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085)23 and a group [of scholars].24 Others state that it is not a type of knowledge and define it [instead] as “an innate faculty (gharīza), meaning, a natural predisposition that is followed by knowledge of [logical] necessities when all of [its] faculties are sound”.25 Imam al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083)26 defines it as “an attribute by which good and evil can be distinguished”. The best of what has been stated regarding it is that “it is a spiritual light by which the soul can grasp intuitive (darūrī) and investigative (naẓarī) knowledge”.
Some state that there exists a subtle metaphysical essence (latīfa rabbāniyya)27 that no one knows [the reality of] except Allah the Exalted. From the perspective of cognitive processes, it is referred to as ʿaql; from the perspective of the life force navigating the body, it is referred to as rūḥ (soul); from the perspective of its appetitive drives, it is referred to as nafs (self). All three terms are singular in essence but divergent in consideration.28
The Muʿtazilites, Khawārij, and philosophers opine that it is a [nonphysical] substance.29 Some of them elaborated that it is a non-physical entity by which unseen things are grasped through intermediaries, and sensory stimuli are perceived by way of observation. Others among them explain it differently. [The assertion that] it is an abstract non-physical essence (jawhar mujarrad) can be found in the statements of Imam al-Ghazālī.30
The Location of the ʿAql
The location [of the intellect] has been disputed. The correct position is that its locus is the heart, while it has a [metaphysical] light linked to the brain (dimāgh), just as Imam al-Shāfīʾī, Imam Mālik, and most discursive theologians propose.
[On the other hand,] the philosophers and some jurists state that its locus is the brain on account of it becoming dysfunctional because of brain dysfunction.31 However, this does not prove what they suggest, due to the possibility that the healthy functioning of the brain may be a condition for its sound operation, even if it were located in the heart.32
3 On Man’s Recognition of the Reality of His Soul and the Spiritual Disclosures of the Sufis regarding It. Knowledge of the Spiritually Learned (ʿAwārif al-Maʿārif) by Imam Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardī (d. 632 AH/1191 CE)
3.1 Author’s Biography
Shihab al-Din Abū Hafs ʿUmar Al-Suhrawardī was among the foremost spiritual mentors of Baghdad during his time. He was born in the year 539 AH/1098 CE and at the age of sixteen he traveled from his hometown of Suhraward (Sohrevard in modern day Iran) to Baghdad. His uncle, Abū al-Nājid ʿAbd Al-Qādir al-Suhrawardī, was the founder of the Suhrawardī spiritual order, and it is from him that Shibab al-Dīn learned Islamic law, oratory skills, hadith, and Islamic spirituality (tasawwuf). He became an influential personality in the spiritual sciences (tasawwuf) through the abundance of people making a pledge of allegiance to him and adopting him as their spiritual master. He is described as someone who was humble, honest, noble, and overall well-mannered. He was also known to have no value for money and that he died leaving behind nothing of material value. Imam Suhrawardī was recognized as a pragmatic person. A disciple of his once wrote to him, inquiring about the best course of action: ‘If I discontinue work I shall have no source of income, but if I continue to work, I will be filled with arrogance, so what is better [to do]?’ The imam replied, ‘Continue to work while you seek forgiveness for your arrogance’. And there were many examples of his pragmatic approaches to dealing with situations similar to this. He died in the year 632 AH.
3.2 Text Overview and Significance
His most famous work, Awārif al Maʿārif is a spiritual treatise and manual that outlines concepts related to Sufism in order for the seeker to understand and follow its teachings. While empirical knowledge is confined to perception via the senses, Suhrawardi purported that spiritual knowledge is perceived through the spiritual heart that is completely experiential. In this adopted excerpt from his work, Suhrawardī expounds on the differing opinions of the scholars regarding the nature of the soul. At the end, however, he concludes that there is nothing to conclusively indicate the nature of the soul and defers such conclusive knowledge to Allah alone.
However, after providing this disclaimer, he goes on to describe the nature of the soul according to his own understanding, drawing upon scriptural sources. He purports that the human being possesses two souls, a metaphysical soul (rūh samāwī ʿulwi) and an animal or life soul (rūḥ ḥayawānī). He offers that inherent in every individual is a tension between these two competing drives, with the animal soul wishing to live a life of hedonism, while the metaphysical soul desires connection with Allah and being freed of the shackles of materialism. He discusses the role of ʿaql or the intellectual as mediating between these two driving forces, attempting to service the rūh samāwī by helping distinguish between truth and falsehood and tame the animalistic drives.
3.3 Arabic Text
في معرفة الإنسان نفسه ومكاشفات الصوفية من ذلك
وحيث وجدت أقوال المشايخ تشير إلى الروح أقول: ما عندي في ذلك على معنى ما ذكرت من التأويل دون أن أقطع به؛ إذ ميلي في ذلك إلى السكوت والإمساك فأقول واللّٰه أعلم:
الروح الإنساني العلوي السماوي من عالم الأمر، والروح الحيواني البشري من عالم الخلق، والروح الحيواني البشري محل الروح العلوي ومورده، والروح الحيواني جسماني لطيف حامل لقوة الحس والحركة، ينبعث من القلب، أعني بالقلب هاهنا: المضغة اللحمية المعروفة الشكل، المودعة في الجانب الأيسر من الجسد، وينتشر في تجاويف العروق الضوارب، وهذه الأرواح لسائر الحيوانات، ومنه تفيض قوى الحواس، وهو الذى قوامه بإجراء سنة اللّٰه بالغذاء غالبا، ويتصرف بعلم الطب فيه باعتدال مزاج الأخلاط، ولورود الروح الإنساني العلوي على هذا الروح تجنس الروح الحيواني وما بين أرواح الحيوانات، واكتسب صفة أخرى فصار نفسا محلا للنطق والإلهام. قال اللّٰه تعالى: ﴿ونَفْسٍ وَمَا سَوَّاهَا. فَأَلْهَمَهَا فُجُورَهَا وَتَقْوَاهَا﴾ فتسويتها بورود الروح الإنساني عليها، وانقطاعها عن جنس أرواح الحيوانات، فتكونت النفس بتكوين اللّٰه تعالى من الروح العلوي وصار تكون النفس التي هي الروح الحيواني من الآدمي من الروح العلوي في عالم الأمر كتكون حواء من آدم في عالم الخلق.
وصار بينهما من التألف والتعاشق كما بين آدم وحواء، وصار كل واحد منهما يذوق الموت بمفارقة صاحبه. قال اللّٰه تعالى: ﴿وَجَعَلَ مِنْهَا زَوْجَهَا لِيَسْكُنَ إِلَيْهَا﴾ فسكن آدم إلى حواء، وسكن الروح الإنساني العلوي إلى الروح الحيواني وصيره نفسا، وتكون من سكون الروح إلى النفس القلب، وأعني بهذا القلب اللطيفة التي محلها المضغة اللحمية، فالمضغة اللحمية من عالم الخلق. وهذه اللطيفة من عالم الأمر.
وكان تكون القلب من الروح والنفس في عالم الأمر كتكون الذرية من آدم وحواء في عالم الخلق، ولولا المساكنة بين الزوجين اللذين أحدهما النفس ما تكوّن القلب، فمن القلوب قلب متطلع إلى الأب الذي هو الروح العلوي ميال إليه، وهو القلب المؤيد الذي ذكره رسول ﷺ فيما رواه حذيفة رضي اللّٰه عنه قال: «القلوب أربعة: قلب أجرد فيه سراج يزهر، فذلك قلب المؤمن، وقلب أسود منكوس فذلك قلب الكافر، وقلب مربوط على غلافه فذلك قلب المنافق، وقلب مصفح فيه إيمان ونفاق، فمثل الإيمان فيه مثل البقلة يمدها الماء الطيب، ومثل النفاق فيه كمثل القرحة يمدها القيح والصديد، فأي المادتين غلبت عليه حكم له بها».
والقلب المكنوس ميال إلى «الأم» التي هي النفس الأمارة بالسوء.
ومن القلوب قلب متردد في ميله إليها، وبحسب غلبة ميل القلب يكون حكمه من السعادة والشقاوة.
والعقل جوهر الروح العلوي ولسانه والدال عليه، وتدبيره للقلب المؤيد والنفس الزكية المطمئنة تدبير الوالد للولد البار، والزوج للزوجة الصالحة، وتدبيره للقلب المنكوس والنفس الأمارة بالسوء تدبير الوالد للولد العاق والزوج للزوجة السيئة، فمنكوس من وجه، ومنجذب إلى تدبيرهما من وجه؛ إذ لابد له منهما.
وقول القائلين واختلافهم في محل العقل؛ فمن قائل إن محله الدماغ، ومن قائل إن محله القلب، كلام القاصرين عن درك حقيقة ذلك، واختلافهم في ذلك لعدم استقرار العقل على نسق واحد، وانجذابه إلى البار تارة وإلى العاق أخرى، وللقلب والدماغ نسبة إلى البار والعاق، فإذا رؤي في تدبير العاق قيل مسكنه الدماغ وإذا رؤي في تدبير البار قبل مسكنه القلب.
فالروح العلوي يهم بالارتفاع إلى مولاه شوقا وحنوا وتنزها عن الأكوان، ومن الأكوان: القلب والنفس فإذا ارتقى الروح يحنو القلب إليه حنو الولد الحنين البار إلى الوالد، وتحن النفس إلى القلب الذي هو الولد حنين الوالدة الحنينة إلى ولدها، وإذا حنت النفس ارتقت من الأرض، وانزوت عروقها الضاربة في العالم السفلى، وانطوى هواها، وانحسمت مادته وزهدت في الدنيا، وتجافت عن دار الغرور، وأنابت إلى دار الخلود وقد تخلد النفس التي هي الأم إلى الأرض بوضعها الجبلي، لتكونها من الروح الحيواني المجنس ومستندها في ركونها إلى الطبائع التي هي أركان العالم السفلى. قال اللّٰه تعالى: ﴿وَلَوْ شِئْنَا لَرَفَعْنَاهُ بِهَا وَلٰكِنَّهُٓ أخْلَدَ إلَى الْأرْضِ وَاتَّـبَعَ هَوٰاهُۚ﴾.
فإذا سكنت النفس التي هي الأم إلى الأرض انجذب إليها القلب المنكوس انجذاب الولد الميال إلى الوالدة المعوجة الناقصة دون الوالد الكامل المستقيم.
وتنجذب الروح إلى الولد الذي هو القلب لما جبل عليه من انجذاب الوالد إلى ولده، فعند ذلك يتخلف عن حقيقة القيام بحق مولاه، وفي هذين الانجذابين يظهر حکم السعادة والشقاوة «ذلك تقدير العزيز العليم».
وقد ورد في أخبار داود عليه السلام أنه سأل ابنه سليمان: أين موضع العقل منك؟ قال: القلب؛ لأنه قالب الروح والروح قالب الحياة.
وقال أبو سعيد القرشي: الروح روحان: روح الحياة، وروح الممات؛ فإذا اجتمعا عقل الجسم وروح الممات هي التي إذا خرجت من الجسد يصير الحي ميتا، وروح الحياة ما به مجاري الأنفاس، وقوة الأكل والشرب وغيرهما.
وقال بعضهم: الروح نسيم طيب يكون به الحياة، والنفس ريح حارة تكون منها الحركات المذمومة والشهوات.
ويقال: فلان حار الرأس. وفي الفصل الذي ذكرناه يقع التنبيه بماهية النفس، وإشارة المشايخ بماهية النفس إلى ما يظهر من آثارها من الأفعال المذمومة والأخلاق المذمومة، وهي التي تعالج بحسن الرياضة إزالتها وتبديلها، والأفعال الرديئة تزال، والأخلاق الرديئة تبدل.
أخبرنا الشيخ العالم رضي الدين أحمد بن إسماعيل القزوينى، قال: أخبرنا إجازة أبو سعيد محمد بن أبي العباس الخليلي، قال أخبرنا القاضي محمد بن سعيد «الفرخزادى» قال أخبرنا أبو إسحق أحمد بن محمد بن إبراهيم قال: أخبرنا الحسين بن محمد بن عبد اللّٰه السفياني قال حدثنا محمد بن اليقطيني، قال حدثنا أحمد بن عبداللّٰه بن يزيد العقيلي، قال حدثنا صفوان بن صالح، قال: حدثنا الوليد بن مسلم، عن أبي لهيعة عن خالد بن يزيد، عن سعيد بن أبي هلال: أن رسول اللّٰه ﷺ كان إذا قرأ هذه الآية ﴿قَدْ أَفْلَحَ مَن زَكَّاهَا﴾ وقف، ثم قال: «اللّٰهم آت نفسي تقواها أنت وليها ومولاها، وزكها أنت خير من زكاها».
وقيل: النفس لطيفة مودعة في القالب، منها الأخلاق والصفات المحمودة، كما أن العين محل الرؤية، والأذن محل السمع، والأنف محل الشم، والفم محل الذوق، وهكذا النفس محل الأوصاف المذمومة، والروح محل الأوصاف المحمودة، وجميع أخلاق النفس وصفاتها من أصلين: أحدهما الطيش، والثاني الشره، وطيشها من جهلها، وشرها من حرصها. وشبهت النفس في طيشها بكرة مستديرة على مكان أملس مصوب، لا تزال متحركة بجبلتها ووضعها. وشبهت في حرصها بالفراش الذي يلقى نفسه على ضوء المصباح، ولا يقنع بالضوء اليسير دون الهجوم على جرم الضوء الذي فيه هلاكه.
فمن الطيش توجد العجلة، وقلة الصبر، والصبر جوهر العقل، والطيش صفة النفس، وهواها وروحها لا يغلبه إلا الصبر؛ إذ العقل يقمع الهوى.
ومن الشره يظهر الطمع والحرص، وهما اللذان ظهرا في آدم حيث طمع في الخلود، فحرص على أكل الشجرة.
وصفات النفس لها أصول من أصل تكونها، لأنها مخلوقة من تراب، ولها بحسبه وصف، وقيل وصف الضعف في الآدمي من التراب، ووصف البخل فيه من الطين، ووصف الشهوة فيه من الحمأ المسنون، ووصف الجهل فيه من الصلصال
وقيل: قوله )كالفخار( فهذا الوصف فيه شيء من الشيطنة لدخول النار في الفخار، فمن ذلك: الخداع، والحيل، والحسد.
فمن عرف أصول النفس وجبلاتها عرف أن لا قدرة له عليها إلا بالاستعانة ببارئها وفاطرها.
فلا يتحقق العبد بالإنسانية إلا بعد أن يدبر دواعي الحيوانية فيه بالعلم والعدل، وهو رعاية طرفي الإفراط والتفريط ثم بذلك تتقوى إنسانيته ومعناه، ويدرك صفات الشيطنة فيه والأخلاق المذمومة.
وكمال إنسانيته يتقاضاه أن لا يرضى لنفسه بذلك، ثم تنكشف له الأخلاق التي تنازع بها الربوبية، من: الكبر والعز، ورؤية النفس، والعجب.. وغير ذلك.
فيرى أن صرف العبودية في ترك المنازعة للربوبية.
واللّٰه تعالى ذكر «النفس» في كلامه القديم بثلاثة أوصاف:
بالطمأنينة، ﴿قال يأيَّتُهَا النَّفْسُ الْمُطْمَئِنَّة﴾.
وسماها لوامة، قال: ﴿لَا أُقْسِمُ بِيَوْمِ الْقِيَامَةِ وَلَا أُقْسِمُ بِالنَّفْسِ اللَّوَّامَةِ﴾.
وسماها أمارة، فقال: ﴿إِنَّ النَّفْسَ لأَمَّارَةٌ بِالسُّوءِ﴾.
وهي نفس واحدة.. ولها صفات متغايرة، فإذا امتلأ القلب سكينة خلع على النفس خِلع الطمأنينة، لأن السكينة مزيد الإيمان، وفيها ارتقاء القلب إلى مقام الروح لما منح من حظ اليقين.
وعند توجه القلب إلى محل الروح تتوجه النفس إلى محل القلب، وفي ذلك طمأنينتها. وإذا انزعجت من مقار جبلاتها ودواعي طبيعتها متطلعة إلى مقار الطمأنينة فهي لوامة، لأنها تعود باللائمة على نفسها لنظرها وعلمها بمحل الطمأنينة، ثم انجذابها إلى محلها التي كانت فيه أمارة بالسوء.
وإذا أقامت في محلها لا يغشاها نور العلم والمعرفة، فهي على ظلمتها أمارة بالسوء.
فالنفس والروح يتطاردان؛ فتارة يملك القلب دواعي الروح، وتارة يملکه دواعي النفس. وأما السر فقد أشار القوم إليه. ووجدت في كلام القوم أن منهم من جعله بعد القلب وقبل الروح ومنهم من جعله بعد الروح وأعلى منها وألطف.
وقالوا: السر محل المشاهدة، والروح محل المحبة، والقلب محل المعرفة.
والسر الذي وقعت إشارة القوم إليه غير مذكور في كتاب اللّٰه. وإنما المذكور في كلام اللّٰه الروح والنفس وتنوع صفاتها، والقلب، والفؤاد، والعقل.
وحيث لم نجد في كلام اللّٰه تعالى ذكر السر بالمعنى المشار إليه، ورأينا الاختلاف في القول فيه، وأشار قوم إلى أنه دون الروح، وقوم إلى أنه ألطف من الروح، فنقول -واللّٰه أعلم-: الذي أسموه سرا ليس هو بشيء مستقل بنفسه ، له وجود وذات كالروح والنفس..
3.4 English Translation
On Man’s Recognition of the Reality of his Soul and the Spiritual Disclosures of the Sufis Regarding It
Since I have found statements of the scholars that point to [the meanings of] the soul, I state: I do not have from the aforementioned interpretations33 any conclusive opinion on the topic, as my inclination on the subject is towards silence and abstention. I, therefore, say, and Allah knows best:
The heavenly celestial human soul (rūḥ samāwī ʿulwī) is from the realm of the divine command (ʿālam al-amr). The animalistic earthly soul (rūḥ ḥayawānī) is from the realm of creation.34 The animalistic earthly soul is the locus of the heavenly celestial soul and its place of provenance. The animalistic soul is bodily, subtle, carries the faculties of sense perception and movement, and emanates from the heart. I mean by heart here the piece of flesh that is well-known in shape that is lodged in the left side of the body and flows through the hollows of the arteries. These souls exist in all animals, and from it the perceptive faculties emanate. It is that which is maintained, by the habit of Allah, predominantly through nourishment, and is regulated through medical knowledge by [maintenance of] moderation in the temperaments of its humors. Due to the emergence of the celestial human soul upon this soul, the animalistic soul is made akin to the souls of animals, and it acquires another attribute upon which it becomes a nafs that is suitable for speech35 and [divine] inspiration. Allah the Exalted states: And [by] the soul (nafs) and Him who fashioned it – and informed it with [consciousness of] its wickedness and its righteousness (al-Shams 91:7–8). It is fashioned through the appearance of the human soul (rūḥ insānī) into it and its separation from the genus of the animal souls. The soul (nafs) is composed from the heavenly soul by Allah the Exalted’s creation, and the composition of the soul (nafs) – which is the animalistic soul of a human – from the heavenly soul (rūḥ ʿulwi) in the realm of divine command (ʿālam al-amr) is thus like the composition of Ḥawwāʾ (Eve) from Ādam (Adam) in the realm of creation (ʿālam al-khalq).36
Between the two (the nafs and the celestial soul), a union and mutual passion was formed just like between Adam and Eve, and it became so that each tastes death upon the separation of its companion. Allah the Exalted states: And from it He made its mate, to [find] repose with her (al-Aʿrāf 7:189). So, Adam found repose in Eve and the human celestial soul found repose in the animalistic soul and made it into a nafs. From the repose of the rūḥ with the nafs is the heart (qalb) composed. By this heart, I mean the subtle essence (laṭifa) whose locus is the piece of meaty flesh. The meaty piece of flesh is from the realm of creation, and this subtle essence is from the realm of the divine command.
The composition of the qalb from the rūḥ and the nafs took place in the realm of the divine command similar to the composition of [Adam’s] progeny from Adam and Eve in the realm of creation. If it was not for the mutual repose found amongst the two, one of which is the nafs, the qalb would not be formed.37
Amongst the hearts (qulūb) is the heart that is aware of the father that is the celestial soul and is inclined towards it. This is the reinforced heart that is mentioned by the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in the report narrated by Ḥudhayfa, may Allah be well-pleased with him, that he (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) said: “There are four hearts: (1) an open heart in which there is a radiant lamp; this is the heart of the believer, and (2) a black, inverted heart; this is the heart of the disbeliever, and (3) a heart that is wrapped around its cover; this is the heart of the hypocrite, and (4) a foliated heart containing [both] faith and hypocrisy. The example of faith in it is like a legume that expands with pure water. The example of hypocrisy in it is like a sore that expands with pus and matter. Whichever of the two components overcomes it, judgment is made based on it”.38
The inverted heart inclines heavily to “the mother” that is the nafs that commands to evil (al-nafs al-ammāra bi-l-sūʾ).39
Amongst the hearts is the heart that is reluctant in inclining towards any of the two, and in proportion to the dominance of the inclination of the heart will be the judgment of fortune or misfortune.
The intellect (ʿaql) is the essence, the tongue, and the indicator of the celestial soul. Its regulation of the reinforced heart and the purified, contented self (nafs) is [akin to] the regulation of the parent of the obedient child and the husband of the righteous wife. Its regulation of the inverted heart and the self that commands to evil is [akin to] the regulation of the parent of the disobedient child and the husband of the wicked wife. So, [it is] inverted from one aspect and attracted to the regulation of them both from another aspect, since it (the ʿaql) requires both as the presence of both is necessary.
The statements and contentions of those who hold positions on the location of the intellect: Some state that its locus is the brain, while some state that its locus is the heart. The discourses and contentions of those who are deficient in recognizing the reality of it is due to the inability of the intellect to settle upon one disposition, and [due to] its attraction to the obedient sometimes and to the disobedient at other times. The heart and the brain have an attachment to the obedient and the disobedient. Thus, when it (ʿaql) is seen to be in the service of the disobedient it is said that its residence is the brain, and when it is seen to be in the service of the obedient it is said that its residence is the heart.40
The celestial soul (rūḥ ʿulwī) thus seeks elevation to its Master due to an intense desire, loving affection, and attempt to detach from the universe (akwān), and the qalb and nafs are of this universe.41 When the soul ascends, the qalb develops an affection for it like a reverent, infant child does for its parent. The nafs feels an affection for the qalb – which is [like] the child – like the affection of a tender mother for her child. When the nafs feels such affection, it ascends from the earth, its participating roots (ʿurūq ḍāriba) withdraw into the lower realm (ʿālam), its caprice (hawā) disappears, its substance (mādda) terminates, and it becomes abstinent from the material world (dunyā). It shuns the Realm of Delusion (dār al-ghurūr, i.e., worldly life) and turns repentantly to the Realm of Permanence (dār al-khulūd, i.e., the hereafter).
Often the nafs – which is [likened to] the mother – clings to the earth by virtue of its natural appointment, because of its composition from the material animalistic soul, and [because] its basis is its dependence on natural dispositions that are the pillars of the lower realm.42 Allah the Exalted states: And if We so willed, we would have elevated him thereby; but He clung to the earth and followed his caprice (al-Aʿrāf 7:176).
When the nafs – which is the mother – settles upon the earth, the inverted qalb is attracted to it [like] the attraction of a child who is inclined to a twisted and defective mother as opposed to the upright and perfect father. [Moreover,] The rūḥ is attracted to the child – which is the qalb – due to the naturally created attraction in the father to his child, thereby falling behind in fulfilling the rights of his Master.
It is in these two sources of attraction that the judgment of felicity (saʿāda) or misfortune (shaqāwa) becomes manifest and “That is the determination of the All-Mighty, the All-Knowing” (Yasīn 36:38).
It has been mentioned in the reports about Dāwūd (upon him be peace) that he asked his son Sulaymān (upon him be peace): “Where is the location of the ʿaql in you?” He replied: “The qalb (lit. that which molds), since it is what molds (qālab) the rūḥ, and the rūḥ is what molds life.”43
Abū Saʿīd al-Qurashī states: “The rūḥ is of two types: the rūḥ of life, and the rūḥ of death.44 When they combine, the body achieves congitive faculties (ʿaqala al-jism). The rūḥ of death is that which, when it leaves [the body], a living person dies. The rūḥ of life is that by which the abilities to breathe, eat, drink, etc., are carried out.”45
Some state that the rūḥ is a pleasant, cool breeze by which life exists, while the [lower] nafs is a hot wind due to which blameworthy behaviors and desires occur.46 It is said, for example, that so and so is hot-headed.47
In the chapter we have mentioned, there is an explanation (tanbīḥ) about the essence of the nafs and the indications of the shaykhs about the nature of the nafs towards what manifests from its effects in terms of blameworthy actions and character that are treated, through excellent spiritual exercises, for their elimination and change. Vile actions are eliminated, while vile character is exchanged [for good character].
The shaykh and scholar, Raḍī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Qazwīnī, informed us, stating: Abū Saʿd48 Muḥammad ibn Abī al-ʿAbbās al-Khalīlī informed us through transmission-certification (ijāza), stating: al-Qāḍī Muḥammad ibn Saʿīd al-Farkhuzādī informed us, stating: Abū Isḥāq Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm informed us, stating: al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Sufyānī informed us, stating: Muḥammad ibn al-Yaqṭīnī narrated to us, stating: Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Yazīd al-ʿUqaylī narrated to us, stating: Ṣafwān ibn Ṣāliḥ narrated us, stating: al-Walīd ibn Muslim narrated to us, stating: from Ibn Lahīʿa, from Khālid ibn Yazīd, from Saʿīd ibn Abī Hilāl, that when the Messenger of Allah, (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) used to recite this verse: the one who purifies it (the nafs) succeeds (al-Shams 91:9), he would pause. Then he would say: “Allah! Grant my nafs its taqwā. You are its Protector and Master. Purify it! You are the best of those who purify it!”49
It is said that the nafs is a subtle substance consigned to the heart (qālib) from which praiseworthy character and attributes emanate. Just like the eyes are the locus of sight, the ears are the locus of hearing, the nose is the locus of smell, and the mouth is the locus of taste, the nafs50 is the locus of blameworthy attributes and the rūḥ is the locus of praiseworthy attributes.51
All character and attributes of the nafs originate in two sources; one is imprudence (ṭaysh) and the second is gluttony (sharah). While its imprudence comes from its ignorance (jahl), its gluttony comes from its covetousness (ḥirṣ). The nafs in its imprudence is likened to a sphere placed upon a smooth, leveled place. It will continue to move on its own by virtue of its nature and placement. It is likened in its covetousness to a moth that flings itself into the lamp’s light. It is not content with a dull light such that it springs toward the immensity of the light in which lies its destruction.
From imprudence, haste and lack of patience is found, and patience is the essence (jawhar) of the intellect. Rashness is an attribute of the nafs, whose desires and spirit cannot be overcome except by patience, as the intellect curbs desires.
From gluttony, greed (ṭamaʿ) and covetousness (ḥirṣ) appear, experienced by Ādam when he desired everlasting life (khulūd) and so coveted to eat (from) the tree.
The attributes of the nafs have foundational elements from the essence of its creation because it was created from dirt (turāb), and accordingly has its appropriate attribute. It is said that the attribute of frailty (ḍaʿf) in man comes from the dirt, and that the attribute of miserliness (bukhl) that is in him comes from the clay (ṭīn), and that the attribute of desire (shahwa) in him comes from dark foul-smelling mud (ḥamaʾ masnūn), and that the attribute of ignorance comes from ringing, dried clay (ṣalṣāl).
It is said about [Allah’s] statement: like pottery (ka al-fakhkhār) (al-Raḥmān 55:14)52 that this characteristic contains a satanic element due to the inclusion of fire in pottery. From it originates deceitfulness (khidāʿ), subterfuge (ḥiyal), and jealousy (ḥasad).
Hence, whosoever recognizes the foundations of the nafs and its nature also recognizes that he has no power over it except through seeking assistance from its Creator and Maker.
A slave (of Allah) is therefore not able to truly realize humanness (insāniyya) until he reflects – through knowledge and fairness – on the causes of animalistic tendencies (ḥayawāniyya) within him. This [fairness means] taking into consideration [and abstaining from] both extremes of excessiveness. By doing so his humanness and its essence are strengthened, and he can recognize satanic attributes and blameworthy character traits within himself.
The perfection of his humanness, however, demands that he not be satisfied with [just] this for himself. Rather, then the character traits that are at odds with godliness (rubūbiyya) become revealed to him, such as: arrogance (kibr), celebrity (ʿizz), self-absorption (ruʾyat al-nafs), vanity (ʿujb), among others.
He thus sees that unadulterated slavehood (ʿubūdiyya) is in abandoning any challenge to godliness.
Allah the Exalted mentions the nafs in his eternal speech with three attributes:
With “contentment” (ṭumaʾnīna). He states: O content nafs (al-Fajr 89:27).
And He called it “self-reproaching” (lawwāma), as He states: I swear by the Day of Resurrection, and I swear by the self-reproaching nafs (al-Qiyāma 75:1–2).
And He called it “inciting” (ammāra), as He states: Surely, man’s nafs is oft-inciting to evil (Yūsuf 12:53).
They are the same nafs, [albeit] with differing attributes. So, when the heart is filled with tranquility, it covers the nafs in the garb of contentment, because tranquility increases faith, and in it is the elevation of the qalb to the position of the rūḥ due to what it is apportioned of firm conviction.
When the qalb is directed to the place of the rūḥ, the nafs [in turn] becomes directed to the place of the qalb, and therein lies its contentment.
When it grows weary of the seat of its inherent nature and its natural attractions, [while being] aware of the seat of contentment, it is then self-reproaching (lawwāma), because it refers to itself with self-reproach because of its observation and knowledge of the place of contentment (maqārr al-ṭumaʾnīna), and then its attraction to its place in which it once incited to evil.
When it establishes itself in its place (the place of inciting evil), the light of knowledge and gnosis do not descend upon it. It becomes thus, in its darkness, inciting towards evil.
The nafs and the rūḥ are therefore mutually repelling: sometimes the qalb is possessed by the callers (dawāʿī) of the rūḥ, and sometimes it is possessed by the motives of the nafs.53
As for the inner secret (sirr), people have given subtle indications towards it[s reality]. What I have found in people’s discussions is that some have placed it following the qalb and preceding the rūḥ. Some have placed it as following the rūḥ and superior (aʿlā) to it and more subtle.
They say: the sirr is the locus of divine witnessing (mushāhada), and the rūḥ is the locus of divine love (maḥabba), and the qalb is the locus of divine gnosis (maʿrifa).
The sirr that people subtly indicate towards is not mentioned in the Book of Allah. What is mentioned in Allah’s speech is the rūḥ and the nafs – and its various attributes – as well as the qalb, the fuʾād (heart), and the ʿaql (intellect). Since we do not find the mention of the sirr in Allah’s speech with the meaning [previously] indicated towards , and we observe a difference in positions on it, and since some people indicate that it is inferior to the rūḥ and some indicate that it is more subtle than the rūḥ, we therefore state – and Allah is the Most-Knowing: What they have named the secret (sirr) is not something entirely independent that has a presence and essence like the rūḥ and nafs.
4 Inherent Faculties of Perception. Al-Qānūn fī al-Ṭibb (The Canon of Medicine) by Ibn Sīna (d. 428 AH/1037 CE)
4.1 Author’s Biography
Abū ʿAlī Ḥusayn ibn Sīna, also known as Avicenna, is considered to be amongst the greatest of Muslim philosophers and physicians. He is sometimes referred to as the “prince of physicians” or the “father of early medicine.” It is also said that he is “too famous to be mentioned, and his virtues are too innumerous to be recorded.” Ibn Sīna’s father was originally from Balkh (Afghanistan), but moved to the village of Afshana, Bukhāra (Uzbekistan) before the birth of his prodigious son in the year 370 Hijrī. Under the tutelage of his father, Ibn Sīna completed the memorization of the Quran before the age of ten. From an early age, he demonstrated advanced reasoning coupled with an exceptional memory, having memorized Aristotle’s works on metaphysics.
Throughout his life, Ibn Sīna wrote over 450 works, with many of such writings still intact today. He made significant contributions to the fields of psychology, medicine, geometry, chemistry, poetry, philosophy, and theology. Among his most famously known works are Al-Shifāʾ (The Healing), Risāla fī al-Nafs (Treatise on the Soul), and his magnum opus, al-Qānūn fī al-Ṭibb (The Canon of Medicine), which was used as the primary textbook in European medical schools until the sixteenth century.
Ibn Sīna’s devotion to knowledge acquisition is demonstrated by his division of desire into a two-level hierarchy: one of which is physical joy, and the other is psychological or intellectual. He stated that the greatest physical pleasures may appear to come from eating and sexual gratification, but if the human being suspends these base desires in lieu of a more meaningful intellectual pursuit, then the subsequent joy supersedes the fulfillment of physical and sensual desires.
4.2 Text Overview and Significance
The Canon of Medicine by Ibn Sīna is referred to as “the most famous medical textbook ever written in history.” Its enduring presence as a referential medical textbook in universities distinguishes it from other medical texts. In this translated excerpt, Ibn Sīna outlines and discusses the five inner cognitive faculties of the brain and their locations within the brain.
4.3 Arabic Text
الفصل الخامس: في القوى النفسانية المدركة
والقوة النفسانية تشتمل على قوتين هي كالجنس لهما: إحداهما قوة مدركة، والأخرى قوة محركة. وَالْقُوَّة المدركة كالجنس لقوتين: قُوَّة مدركة فِي الظَّاهِر وَقُوَّة مدركة فِي الْبَاطِن. وَالْقُوَّة المدركة فِي الظَّاهِر هِيَ الحسية، وَهِي كالجنس لقوى خمس عِنْد قوم وثمان عِنْد قوم. وَإِذا أخذت خَمْسَة كَانَت قُوَّة الإبصار وَقُوَّة السّمع وَقُوَّة الشم وَقُوَّة الذَّوْق وَقُوَّة اللَّمْس. وَأما إِذا أخذت ثَمَانِيَة فالسبب فِي ذَلِك أَن أَكثر المحصلين يرَوْنَ أَن اللَّمْس قوى كَثِيرَة، بل هُوَ قوى أَربع. ويخصون كل جنس من الملموسات الْأَرْبَع بِقُوَّة على حِدة، إِلَّا أَنَّهَا مُشْتَركَة فِي الْعُضْو الحساس كالذوق واللمس فِي اللِّسَان والإبصار، واللمس فِي الْعين، وَتَحْقِيق هَذَا إِلَى الفيلسوف. وَالْقُوَّة المدركة في الباطن أعني الحيوانية هي كالجنس لقوى خمس:
إِحْدَاهَا: الْقُوَّة الَّتِي تسمى الْحس الْمُشْتَرك والخيال: وَهِي عِنْد الْأَطِبَّاء قُوَّة وَاحِدَة، وَعند المحصلين من الْحُكَمَاء قوتان. فالحس الْمُشْتَرك هُوَ الَّذِي يتَأَدَّى إِلَيْهِ المحسوسات كلهَا وينفعل عَن صورها ويجتمع فِيهِ. والخيال هُوَ الَّذِي يحفظها بعد الِاجْتِمَاع، ويمسكها بعد الغيبوبة عَن الْحس، وَالْقُوَّة الْقَابِلَة مِنْهُمَا غير الحافظة. وَتَحْقِيق الْحق فِي هَذَا هُوَ أَيْضا على الفيلسوف. وَكَيف كَانَ فَإِن مسكنهما ومبدأ فعلهمَا هُوَ الْبَطن الْمُقدم من الدِّمَاغ.
وَالثَّانيَِة: الْقُوَّة الَّتِي تسميها الْأَطِبَّاء مفكرة: والمحققون تَارَة يسمونها متخيلة، وَتارَة مفكرة، فَإِن استعملتها الْقُوَّة الوهمية الحيوانية الَّتِي نذكرها بعد أَو نهضت هِيَ بِنَفسِهَا لفعلها سَموهَا متخيلة، وَإِن أَقبلت عَلَيْهَا الْقُوَّة النطقية وصرفتها على مَا ينْتَفع بِهِ سنّهَا سميت مفكرة. وَالْفرق بَين هَذِه الْقُوَّة وَبَين الأولى كَيفَ مَا كَانَت: أَن الأولى قَابِلَة أَو حافظة لما يتَأَدَّى إِلَيْهَا من الصُّور المحسوسة، وَأما هَذِه فَإِنَّهَا تتصرف على المستودعات فِي الخيال تصرفاتها من تركيب وتفصيل فتستحضر صوراً على نَحْو مَا تأدى من الْحس، وصوراً مُخَالفَة لَهَا كإنسان يطير وجبل من زمرد. وَأما الخيال فَلَا يحضرهُ إِلَّا للقبول من الْحس. ومسكن هَذِه الْقُوَّة هُوَ الْبَطن الْأَوْسَط من الدِّمَاغ. وَهَذِه الْقُوَّة هِيَ آلة لقُوَّة هِيَ بِالْحَقِيقَةِ المدركة الْبَاطِنَة فِي الْحَيَوَان وَهِي الْوَهم، وَهُوَ الْقُوَّة الَّتِي تحكم فِي الْحَيَوَان بِأَن الذِّئْب عَدو، وَالْولد حبيب، وَأَن المتعهد بالعلف صديق لَا ينفر عَنهُ على سَبِيل غير نطقي. والعداوة والمحبة غير محسوسين لَيْسَ يدركهما الْحس من الْحَيَوَان فَإِذن إِنَّمَا يحكم بهما ويدركهما قُوَّة أُخْرَى، وَإِن كَانَ لَيْسَ بالإدراك النطقي، إِلَّا أَنه لَا محَالة إِدْرَاك مَا غير النطقي. وَالْإِنْسَان أَيْضا قد يسْتَعْمل هَذِه الْقُوَّة فِي كثير من الْأَحْكَام وَيجْرِي فِي ذَلِك مجْرى الْحَيَوَان غَيْر النَّاطِق. وَهَذِه الْقُوَّة تفارق الخيال؛ لِأَن الخيال يستثبت المحسوسات وَهَذِه تحكم فِي المحسوسات بمعان غير محسوسة، وتفارق الَّتِي تسمّى مفكرة ومتخيلة بِأَن أَفعَال تِلْكَ لَا يتبعهَا حكم مَا، وأفعال هَذِه يتبعهَا حكم مَا، بل هِيَ أَحْكَام مَا وأفعال تِلْكَ تركبّت فِي المحسوسات، وَفعل هَذِه هُوَ حكم فِي المحسوس من معنى خَارج عَن المحسوس. وكما أَن الْحس فِي الْحَيَوَان حَاكم على صور المحسوسات كَذَلِك الْوَهم فِيهَا حَاكم على مَعَاني تِلْكَ الصُّور الَّتِي تتأدى إِلَى الْوَهم وَلَا تتأدى إِلَى الْحس، وَمن النَّاس من يتجوز ويسمي هَذِه الْقُوَّة تخيلاً، وَله ذَلِك إِذْ لَا مُنَازعَة فِي الْأَسْمَاء، بل يجب أَن يفهم الْمعَانِي والفروق، وَهَذِه الْقُوَّة لَا يتَعَرَّض الطَّبِيب لتعرفها؛ وَذَلِكَ أَن مضار أفعالها تَابِعَة لمضار أَفعَال قوى أُخْرَى قبلهَا مثل الخيال والتخيّل وَالذكر الَّذِي سنقوله بعد. والطبيب إِنَّمَا ينْتَظر فِي القوى الَّتِي إِذا لحقها مضرَّة فِي أفعالها كَانَ ذَلِك مَرضا فَإِن كَانَت المضرّة تلْحق فعل قُوَّة بِسَبَب مضرَّة لحقت فعل قبلهَا وَكَانَت تِلْكَ الْمضرَّة تتبع سوء مزاج أَو فَسَاد تركيب فِي عُضْو مَا فيكفيه أَن يعرف لُحُوق ذَلِك الضَّرَر بِسَبَب سوء مزاج ذَلِك الْعُضْو أَو فَسَاده حَتَّى يتداركه بالعلاج أَو يتحفظ عَنهُ. وَلَا عَلَيْهِ أَن يعرف حَال الْقُوَّة الَّتِي إِنَّمَا يلْحقهَا مَا يلْحقهَا كَمَا أَن الخيال خزانَة لما يتَأَدَّى إِلَى الْحس من الصُّورَة المحسوسة بِوَاسِطَة إِذْ كَانَ قد عرف حَال الَّتِي يلْحقهَا بِغَيْر وَاسِطَة.
وَالثَّالِثَة مِمَّا يذكر الْأَطِبَّاء -وَهِي الْخَامِسَة أَو الرَّابِعَة عِنْد التَّحْقِيق- وَهِي الْقُوَّة الحافظة والمذّكرة وَهِي خزانَة لما يتَأَدَّى إِلَى الْوَهم من معَان فِي المحسوسات غير صورها المحسوسة، وموضعها الْبَطن الْمُؤخر من بطُون الدِّمَاغ. وَهَهُنَا مَوضِع نظر حكمي فِي أَنه هَل الْقُوَّة الحافظة والمتذكرة المسترجعة لما غَابَ عَن الْحِفْظ من مخزونات الْوَهم قُوَّة وَاحِدَة أم قوتان؟ وَلَكِن لَيْسَ ذَلِك مِمَّا يلْزم الطَّبِيب إِذا كَانَت الْآفَات الَّتِي تعرض لأيهما كَانَ هِيَ الْآفَات الْعَارِضَة للبطن الْمُؤخر من الدِّمَاغ، إِمَّا من جنس المزاج وَإِمَّا من جنس التَّرْكِيب.
وَأما الْقُوَّة الْبَاقِيَة من قوى النَّفس المدركة فَهِيَ الإنسانية الناطقة. وَلما سقط نظر الْأَطِبَّاء عَن الْقُوَّة الوهمية لما شرحناه من الْعلَّة فَهُوَ أسقط عَن هَذِه الْقُوَّة بل نظرهم مَقْصُور على أَفعَال القوى الثَّلَاث لَا غير.
4.4 English Translation
Regarding the Inherent Faculties of Perception54
The basic innate faculties are comprised of two categorically distinct capabilities; the first is the faculty of perception, and the second is locomotion.
The faculty of perception is classified as having an external [component] as well as an internal [one]. Its external aspect includes the [physical] senses, which are divided into five [faculties] according to some,55 and eight according to others. Thus, according to the first view, the five faculties are: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.
However, regarding [the other view that] lists [the faculties] as eight, it is because most proponents of that view regard [the sense of] touch to include multiple faculties within itself; [in their view,] touch consists of four aspects, and they classify each one to be a distinct faculty given that [various] senses are jointly perceived through [more than one particular] body part. To elucidate, the tongue [experiences] both taste and touch. Likewise, the eye [perceives] sight and touch. This [view] is supported overall by the philosophers.
The innate internal faculty of perception consists of five composite faculties.
The first of them is termed the faculty of sensory integration (ḥiss mushtarak) and perceptual recall (khayāl). According to physicians, it is one singular faculty, but the erudite philosophers classify it as two faculties.
The faculty of sensory integration (ḥiss mushtarak) is defined as the section [of the brain] in which all sensations are processed; such are separated from their [external] forms and reconstructed therein. The perceptual recall faculty (khayāl) is that which retains everything after it is gathered [in the brain]; it stores the perception [of the stimuli] after the stimuli is separated from sensory awareness. In considering both faculties, that which receives the sensations is distinct from that which retains them. The final verdict on this matter [i.e., whether they are considered as one or two faculties] is determined by the philosophers.56 Regardless of how they [may] be [classified], both [faculties] are located and operate [in the] inner anterior of the brain.57
The second faculty is termed by doctors as [the] cogitative [faculty] (mufakkira). Some researchers occasionally refer to it as [the faculty of] imagination (mutakhayyala), although they [can also] refer to it as [the] cogitative faculty at times. If this faculty is employed by the sensorial intuitive faculties that we will discuss later, or if is activated involuntarily as per its function, then such is termed imaginative (mutakhayyala). However, if the faculty of intellect is further used to direct it advantageously, it is termed cogitative (mufakkira).
The [main] difference between this faculty and the aforementioned [faculty of integration] goes back to how each [of them] function. The initially [discussed] faculty [of integration] (ḥiss mushtarak) receives and retains the sensory input that is channeled to it. As for this faculty, it draws upon that [same] information stored in the perceptual recall faculty (khayāl), utilizing their composition and details to create mental images similar to that which may be perceived physically as well as that which defies reality, like a flying human or an emerald mountain. As for the perceptual recall faculty (khayāl), it is not capable of recalling other than that which it has [already] received through the senses.
This [imaginative] faculty is situated in the middle part of the brain.58 And this faculty is a tool for the intuitive faculty, which, in reality, is [part of] the inner perceptual capabilities [found] within all animals. And it is this instinctual faculty within an animal that adjudges a wolf to be a threat,59 a suckling to be precious, and the one committed to feeding [them] a trusted friend rather than someone to flee from.
Now, both hostility and affinity are [physically] imperceptible; basic sensory perception cannot detect them. As such, it must be that they are perceived and governed by another faculty altogether. If such is not perceivable through deductive faculties, then we can [at least] say definitively that it is a type of acuity that is [intuitive,] not logically deductive. Although human beings may also employ this faculty in various [cognitive] judgements, this functionality [in particular] is carried out instinctively by all animals.
This faculty is separate from the perceptual recall faculty (khayāl), as the perceptual recall faculty interprets physical stimuli, whereas this [faculty] infers qualities that are beyond the physical representation [of the stimuli]. It is also different from what is termed the cogitative faculty (mufakkira) and imagination (mutakhayyala), as their functions do not correspond to any [of the] inferences [of the inferential faculty]. Their abstractions are formulated on account of sensory inputs, whereas this [faculty] adjudges sensory stimuli using information [sourced] beyond sensory input. Moreover, just as sensory perception interprets the forms of physical sensory inputs, this inferential [faculty] (al-wahm) abstracts [additional] meanings associated with these [physical] forms, leading to inference as opposed to [mere] sensation.
Now, there are some people who conflate this faculty, [simply] referring to it as imagination (takhayyul); and this is tolerable, as there [should be] no disputation regarding semantic differences so long as the meanings [of each] and their distinct differences are [clearly] understood.
This faculty [in and of itself] is not something that a physician would monitor or diagnose, because the harms [that may arise from its] functions [typically] coalesce with the detriments of other prominent faculties, like the perceptual recall faculty (khayāl), imagination (takhayyul), and memory (dhikr), which we shall discuss later. Normally, a physician only examines the faculties that cause sickness when they are dysfunctional. If the functionality of any given faculty is negatively affected by an infirmity in a more prominent faculty that then results in temperamental disequilibrium or the impaired function of any given organ, then it is sufficient to diagnose the issue as an imbalance of humors afflicting or impeding that particular organ. Based on that, one may prescribe a remedy or monitor it [accordingly]. As such, it is not necessary for a physician to know the condition of the faculty that has merely been affected by that which would [typically] affect it. Afterall, the perceptual recall faculty (khayāl) is merely a perceptive repository that uses a medium to process sensory input through the senses. Thus, without intervention, a physician would commonly know what afflicts the perceptual recall faculty (khayāl).
The third faculty that physicians mention – which, in actuality is the fourth or fifth – is the capacity to retain (ḥāfiẓa) and recall (mudhakkira) [information]. It is a repository for the ideas interpreted by the inferential faculty (wahm) – not merely mental images. It is located in the innermost, lower back portion of the brain.60
Here, personal discretion [is to be used] regarding the question of whether [or not] the faculty of retention (ḥāfiẓa) and memory recall (mudhakkira) for that which is stored in the inferential faculty (wahm) is one [singular] faculty, or two [separate] faculties. Again, [determining] this is not necessary for the physician to ascertain, [especially] if the unhealthy conditions that affect either faculty are the same as those stemming from the lower back portion of the brain. Such are either viewed as related to [one’s] predisposition or [physical] composition.
As for the remaining faculty from amongst the [various] faculties of perception, such is [inherently] unique to human beings. Given that physicians have [largely] overlooked the inferential faculty (wahm) as per the reasons we have already explained, this [last] faculty is even further disregarded; their attention to it is restricted to the functionality of only three of the senses [in that category], and nothing more.
5 An Elucidation of the Malleability of Character Traits through Spiritual Exercises. Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn by Imam Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 AD)
5.1 Author’s Biography
See Author Biography under section 1.
5.2 Text Overview and Significance
In this section, Imam al-Ghazālī asserts that character can indeed be developed and acquired contrary to some of the views of some contemporary philosophers of his day. He contends that a person’s character is influenced by a combination of nature and nurture and that one’s behavior is not biologically predetermined. While biological temperamental predispositions influence character development, good character is something that can be acquired through the management and moderation of one’s biological drives. This finding is quite remarkable given that psychologists have only in the 20th century concluded upon the role of both environment and biology in influencing human psychological processes and behaviors.
Furthermore, Al-Ghazālī outlines that good character is a byproduct of the moderation of one’s primary drives of appetite (shahwa) and survival (ghaḍab). Thus, praiseworthy traits in Islam are those that are balanced and between the two polar extremes. For example, he says that generosity is praiseworthy because it is a trait that is between the extremes of extravagance and stinginess. He also draws attention to the important role of a shaykh or a mentor to help one achieve such moderation in one’s drives, and that such a mentor should make sure to point out disdainful behaviors when a seeker displays any extremes in their character traits. Such discussions regarding the role may be meaningful for psychologists to consider their role in bringing about equilibrium in any given problematic character trait in their patients.
5.3 Arabic Text
بيان قبول الأخلاق للتغيير بطريق الرياضة
فرد الغضب والشهوة إلى حد الاعتدال، بحيث لا يقهر واحد منهما العقل ولا يغلبه، بل يكون العقل هو الضابط لهما والغالب عليهما ممكن، وهو المراد بتغيير الخُلُق؛ فإنه ربما تستولي الشهوة على الإنسان بحيث لا يقوى عقله على دفعها عن الانبساط إلى الفواحش، وبالرياضة تعود إلى حد الاعتدال، فدل أنّ ذلك ممكن، والتجربة والمشاهدة تدل على ذلك دلالة لا شك فيها.
والذي يدل على أن المطلوب هو الوسط في الأخلاق دون الطرفين أنّ السخاء خلق محمود شرعاً، وهو وسط بين طرفي التبذير والتقتير، وقد أثنى اللّٰه تعالى عليه فقال: ”والذين إذا أنفقوا لم يسرفوا ولم يقتروا وكان بين ذلك قواما“، وقال تعالى: ”ولا تجعل يدك مغلولة إلى عنقك ولا تبسطها كل البسط“.
وكذلك المطلوب في شهوة الطعام الاعتدال دون الشره والخمود، قال اللّٰه تعالى: ”وكلوا واشربوا ولا تسرفوا إنه لا يحب المسرفين“.
وقال في الغضب:”أشداء على الكفار رحماء بينهم“.
وقال صلى اللّٰه عليه وسلم: ”خير الأمور أوساطها“.
وهذا له سر وتحقيق، وهو أن السعادة منوطة بسلامة القلب عن عوارض هذا العالم، قال اللّٰه تعالى: ”إلا من أتى اللّٰه بقلب سليم“، والبخل من عوارض الدنيا، والتبذير أيضاً من عوارض الدنيا، وشرط القلب أن يكون سليماً منهما؛ أي: لا يكون ملتفتاً إلى المال، ولا يكون حريصاً على إمساكه ولا على إنفاقه، فإن الحريص على الإنفاق مصروف القلب إلى الإنفاق، كما أن الحريص على الإمساك مصروف القلب إلى الإمساك، فكان كمال القلب أن يصفو عن الوصفين جميعاً، وإذا لم يكن ذلك في الدنيا طلبنا ما هو الأشبه بعدم الوصفين وأبعد عن الطرفين، وهو الوسط، فإن الفاتر لا حار ولا بارد، بل هو وسط بينهما، فكأنه خال عن الوصفين؛ فكذلك السخاء بين التبذير والتقتير، والشجاعة بين الجبن والتهور، والعفة بين الشره والخمود، وكذلك سائر الأخلاق، فكلا طرفي قصد الأمور ذميم، هذا هو المطلوب، وهو ممكن.
نعم، يجب على الشيخ المرشد للمريد أن يقبح عنده الغضب رأسا، ويذم إمساك المال رأساً، ولا يرخص له في شيء منه؛ لأنه لو رخص له في أدنى شيء اتخذ ذلك عذراً في استبقاء بخله وغضبه، وظنّ أنه القدر المرخص فيه، فإذا قصد قطع الأصل وبالغ فيه لم يتيسر له إلا كسر سورته، بحيث يعود إلى الاعتدال، فالصواب له أن يقصد قلع الأصل حتى يتيسّر له القدر المقصود، فلا يكشف هـذا السر للمريد؛ فإنه موضع غرور الحمقى، إذ يظنّ بنفسه أن غضبه بحق، وأنّ إمساكه بحق.
5.4 English Translation
An Elucidation of the Malleability of Character Traits Through Spiritual Exercises
It is possible to bring aggressive and appetitive drives to the point of moderation, such that neither one of them overpowers nor overcomes the mind, but rather the mind is the one that regulates and subdues them.61,62 This is what is intended by “modification of character”; for perhaps a person might be overcome by his lower appetitive ambitions such that his mind cannot repel the urges to engage in immorality, but through [spiritual] exercises it returns to the point of moderation, proving that [modification of character] is indeed possible. Both observation and experience provide indisputable proof that [it is possible].63
The evidence that what is required is moderation in character, and not the two extremes, is that generosity is a praiseworthy trait according to religion, and generosity is the middle point between the two polar extremes of extravagance (tabdhīr) and miserliness (taqtīr). Allah the Exalted has praised this trait where He said: They are those who are neither wasteful nor miserly when they spend but keep to a just balance (al-Furqān 25:67), And He the Exalted said: And do not keep your hand tied to your neck, nor spread it out fully (al-Isrā’ 17:29).
This is also what is required in [regard to] the craving for food: moderation without gluttony nor lethargy. Allah the Exalted said: and eat and drink [as We have permitted] but do not be extravagant: God does not like extravagant people (al-Aʿrāf 7:31).
And He said concerning anger: [Those who follow the Prophet] are harsh towards the disbelievers and compassionate towards each other (al-Fatḥ 48:29), and [The Prophet] may Allah bless him and grant him peace said: The best of affairs are the ones done in moderation.64
There is a truism and a subtle [reality] that [true] happiness is linked to the preservation of the heart from the defects of this world. Allah the Exalted said: Only those who come before Allah with a pure heart ˹will be saved (al-Shuʿarā’ 26:89). Stinginess is from the defects of the world. Extravagance is also from the defects of the world. The condition of [purification of] the heart is to be free from them, meaning one should not be attracted to money, neither too eager to collect it nor to spend it. For the heart of the one who fervently spends is inclined to spending limitlessly, just as the heart of the one who is adamant upon saving money is drawn toward withholding wealth. Therefore, the perfection of the heart is for it to be purified from both of these two [extreme] characteristics altogether. [However], since this state of complete purification is not achievable in the temporal world, then at the least we seek the closest thing to the absence of the two traits and the furthest thing from both extremes, which is the middle path. As an example, [something] lukewarm is neither hot nor cold, it is the middle in between; as if it is free of both characteristics [of the extremes]. So is generosity (sakhāʾ) between extravagance and miserliness, courage (shajāʿa) between cowardliness and recklessness, and chastity (ʿiffa) between gluttony and lethargy, and so on with all character traits. Thus, both extremes are despised. This is the goal, and it is possible [to attain].
Indeed, a shaykh (spiritual guide) who guides a disciple must wholly declare the repugnance of anger and miserliness altogether. He should not permit even for the existence of any amount [irrespective of how small it is], because if he allows even the slightest amount, [the disciple] will use that as an excuse to maintain his stinginess and anger and will consider it to be the permitted amount to possess.65 [As for] when [the disciple] intends to remove its roots and exaggerates in doing so, he [still] won’t be able to [eradicate it completely] except to decrease its intensity such that it remits back [to the path] of moderation. Therefore, the correct thing to do is to intend to uproot it completely so that the intended amount is made accessible.
This is a secret that [the shaykh] should not reveal to his disciple; as it is where fools are deceived by themselves, thinking that their anger and stinginess are justified.
6 Types of Insanity (Aqsām al-Junūn). Durar al-Ḥukkām Sharḥ Majallat al-Aḥkām by Imam Ali Haydar Efendi (d. 1380 AH/1960 CE)
6.1 Author’s Biography
Born on April 24, 1853, CE in Batumi, Imam ʿAlī Haydar Efendī was born into a family with a strong sense of traditional scholarship. His father, Dardaganzāde Mehmed Amīn Efendī, was a teacher in Istanbul for many years and was part of the committee that drafted the first Qānūn al-Asāsī, or foundational law of the Ottoman Empire. His father likewise served as a judge (qāḍī) in Mecca, regent (nāib) of Izmir, and Anatolian judge of the army (qāḍī ʿaskar).
Imam ʿAlī Haydar Efendī completed his primary education in Batumi. He then traveled to Istanbul and took lessons from Ḥāfız Rashīd Efendī, the Imam of Hünkār, receiving scholarly authorizations (ijāza) from him. He graduated from the School of Judges (Madrasa al-Quḍāt) in 1877 CE, thereafter, serving as the judge (qāḍī) of Burdur, Uşak and Denizli. During this time, he also served as a lecturer at the Islamic law school and held various legal posts. He taught the mejelle, aḥkām al-awqāf, and qawānīn for twelve years at the School of Civil Service (Mulkiya), five years at the Madrasa al-Quḍāt (School of Judges), and thirty years at the school of law. He became a consultant (amīn) for religious edicts (fatwā) in 1914 CE. It was Imam Alī Haydar Efendī who announced the religious edict for the Muslims to enter the first World War known as the al-jihād al-akbar, pronounced on November 14, 1914, CE, at the Fātiḥ Mosque. In 1916, he was appointed Rumeli judge of the army (qāḍī ʿaskar) and retired within the same year. Between November 11, 1918, and January 21, 1919, he briefly served as the minister of justice under the second leadership of Tevfik Pasha. After leaving this job, he busied himself with writing books at home until his death on September 14, 1935, CE. He was married twice and had four sons and three daughters. Two of his sons became jurists like him, including Ahmet Esat Arsebük, who became a faculty member at the Ankara Law School.
In addition to Durar al-Ḥukkām fī sharḥ Majallat al-Aḥkām, he wrote Mirqāt al-Majalla, Sharḥ al-Jadīd li-qānūn al-ʿarāḍī, Tertīb al-Ṣunūf fī aḥkām al-wuqūf, Tawḍīḥ al-mushkilāt fī aḥkām al-īntiqālāt and Tashīl al-farāiḍ.
6.2 Text Overview and Significance
This text delves into the types of insanity that are legally recognized within the framework of Islamic law. Furthermore, it illustrates the comprehensive nature of Islamic law, which has built-in mechanisms for considering the mental status of legal subjects in the adjudication of their legal cases. In modern practice, this intersection of Islamic law and psychology is referred to as forensic psychology. The translated text below, penned by Imam ʿAli Haydar Efendī, is part of a commentary of the famous Ottoman Mejelle, which is the codification and standardization of Ḥanafī-based Islamic law for application by the Ottoman courts. Accordingly, within the Ottoman legal system, those who fit into the various categories of legal insanity on account of mental illness would be given different disability accommodations and would not be held liable for their actions.
As per the text, Islamic law broadly categorizes the insane person into two types: the one whose insanity manifests at all times, and the one whose insanity is intermittent. Both of these broad categories have other more specific subcategories. In the work, Imam ʿAli Haydar Efendī also discusses the cases of those who do not meet the threshold of legal insanity but whose reasoning may still be deficient, resulting in disorders like impulsive spending. He also outlines the legal implications for such individuals who possess compromised mental faculties. In the bigger picture, this text serves as a primer for forensic psychology in Islamic law. It introduces readers to the legal issues that can be implicated due to mental illness and may pique the interest of those who may attempt to explore the further utility of such categories of insanity in Islamic law to contemporary clinical disorders.
6.3 Arabic Text
[(مَادَّةُ 944) الْمَجْنُونُ عَلَى قِسْمَيْنِ]
أَحَدُهُمَا: الْمَجْنُونُ الْمُطْبِقُ وَهُوَ الَّذِي يَسْتَوْعِبُ جُنُونُهُ جَمِيعَ أَوْقَاتِهِ، وَالثَّانِي: الْمَجْنُونُ غَيْرُ الْمُطْبِقِ وَهُوَ الَّذِي يَكُونُ فِي بَعْضِ الْأَوْقَاتِ مَجْنُونًا وَيُفِيقُ فِي بَعْضِهَا.
الْمَجْنُونُ قِسْمَانِ وَلِكُلٍّ تَعْرِيفٌ فِيمَا يَأْتِي وَلَيْسَ كَمَا يَقُولُ صَاحِبُ الدُّرَرُ فِي بَحْثِ سَجْدَةِ التِّلَاوَةِ: إنَّ الْمَجْنُونَ ثَلَاثَةُ أَقْسَامٍ: وَالْقِسْمَانِ الْمَذْكُورَانِ فِي التَّقْسِيمِ الْمُعْتَمَدِ آنِفًا هُمَا:
الْقِسْمُ الْأَوَّلُ: الْمَجْنُونُ الْمُطْبِقُ وَهُوَ الَّذِي يَسْتَوْعِبُ جُنُونُهُ جَمِيعَ أَوْقَاتِهِ.
وَالْجُنُونُ هُوَ زَوَالُ الْعَقْلِ وَاخْتِلَالُهُ وَيَمْنَعُ الْأَفْعَالَ وَالْأَقْوَالَ أَنْ تَجْرِيَ عَلَى نَهْجٍ مُسْتَقِيمٍ. (الْمَجَامِعُ) وَيَنْشَأُ الْجُنُونُ إمَّا عَنْ نَقْصٍ فِطْرِيٍّ فِي الْعَقْلِ أَوْ رَدَاءَةِ مِزَاجِ الدِّمَاغِ وَاسْتِيلَاءِ التَّخَيُّلِ الْفَاسِدِ (فُصُولُ الْبَدَائِعِ) وَلَا يُقْصَدُ فِي الْجُنُونِ هُنَا أَنْ يَكُونَ الْمَجْنُونُ مَجْنُونًا فِي جَمِيعِ الْأَوْقَاتِ كُلَّ عُمْرِهِ أَوْ فِي جَمِيعِ أَوْقَاتِهِ بَعْدَ طُرُوءِ الْجُنُونِ؛ لِأَنَّ الْمَجْنُونَ الْمُطْبِقَ إنَّمَا يَتَحَقَّقُ كَوْنُ جُنُونِهِ مُطْبِقًا بَعْدَ وَفَاتِهِ وَلَا يُقْطَعُ قَبْلَ الْمَوْتِ بِكَوْنِ جُنُونِهِ مُطْبِقًا أَوْ غَيْرَ مُطْبِقٍ.
وَعَلَيْهِ فَمَنْ يَقْضِي أَيَّامَ حَيَاتِهِ مَجْنُونًا لَا تَعْتَرِيهِ إفَاقَةٌ أَصْلًا وَيَأْتِيهِ الْمَوْتُ وَهُوَ عَلَى هَذِهِ الصُّورَةِ يُعَدُّ مَجْنُونًا مُطْبِقًا كَمَا أَنَّهُ يُعَدُّ مَجْنُونًا مُطْبِقًا بِالِاتِّفَاقِ مَنْ يَقْضِي سَنَةً وَهُوَ مَجْنُونٌ كَمَا سَيَأْتِي إيضَاحُهُ وَعَلَيْهِ فَلَوْ أُرِيدَ بِجَمِيعِ الْأَوْقَاتِ الْمَعْنَى الْمَذْكُورُ فَلَا يَكُونُ جَامِعًا لِأَفْرَادِهِ وَلِذَلِكَ فَلَفْظُ (جَمِيعِ أَوْقَاتِهِ) بِمَعْنَى جَمِيعِ أَوْقَاتِهِ فِي سَنَةٍ كَامِلَةٍ أَوْ شَهْرٍ كَامِلٍ وَبِذَلِكَ تَكُونُ خُلَاصَةُ التَّعْرِيفِ كَمَا يَأْتِي: الْمَجْنُونُ الْمُطْبِقُ عَلَى قَوْلٍ هُوَ مَنْ يَسْتَوْعِبُ جُنُونُهُ جَمِيعَ أَوْقَاتِهِ فِي سَنَةٍ وَعَلَى قَوْلٍ آخَرَ جَمِيعَ أَوْقَاتِهِ فِي شَهْرٍ.
وَالْآنَ فَلْنُدَقِّقْ الْوَقْتَ الَّذِي يَلْزَمُ لِيُعَدَّ الْجُنُونُ فِيهِ جُنُونًا مُطْبِقًا.
وَيَكُونُ لَفْظُ الْمُطْبِقِ إذَا جَاءَ صِفَةً لِلْجُنُونِ بِكَسْرِ الْبَاءِ وَإِذَا جَاءَ صِفَةً لِلْمَجْنُونِ يَكُونُ بِفَتْحِهَا.
فِي الْجُنُونِ الْمُطْبِقِ أَرْبَعَةُ أَقْوَالٍ:
الْقَوْلُ الْأَوَّلُ: الْجُنُونُ الْمُطْبِقُ هُوَ الَّذِي يَمْتَدُّ إلَى سَنَةٍ كَامِلَةٍ؛ لِأَنَّ الْمَجْنُونَ إذَا تَقَلَّبَتْ عَلَيْهِ الْفُصُولُ الْأَرْبَعَةُ وَلَمْ يُفِقْ مِنْ جُنُونِهِ عُلِمَ أَنَّ جُنُونَهُ مُسْتَحْكِمٌ، وَالْفَتْوَى فِي حَقِّ التَّصَرُّفَاتِ عَلَى تَقْدِيرِ الْجُنُونِ لِمُدَّةِ سَنَةٍ (حَاشِيَةٌ الْأَشْبَاهُ لِلْغَزِّيِّ) وَقِيلَ (حَقُّ التَّصَرُّفَاتِ) ؛ لِأَنَّ مُدَّةَ الْجُنُونِ فِي حَقِّ الْعِبَادَاتِ قَدْ حُدِّدَتْ بِصُورَةٍ أُخْرَى وَتُوجَدُ التَّفْصِيلَاتُ فِيهَا فِي أُصُولِ الْفِقْهِ.
الْقَوْلُ الثَّانِي، الْجُنُونُ الْمُطْبِقُ لِمُدَّةِ شَهْرٍ أَيْ: الْجُنُونُ الَّذِي يَمْتَدُّ شَهْرًا كَامِلًا وَقَدْ رُجِّحَ هَذَا الْقَوْلُ بِقَوْلِ (وَبِهِ يُفْتَى) وَأَشْعَرَ قَوْلُ الْخَانِيَّةِ (وَعَلَيْهِ الْفَتْوَى) رُجْحَانَ هَذَا الْقَوْلِ أَيْضًا (رَدُّ الْمُحْتَارِ).
الْقَوْلُ الثَّالِثُ: هُوَ كَالْجُنُونِ الَّذِي يَمْتَدُّ أَكْثَرَ مِنْ سَنَةٍ.
الْقَوْلُ الرَّابِعُ: هُوَ الْجُنُونُ الَّذِي يَسْتَوْعِبُ أَكْثَرَ مِنْ يَوْمٍ وَلَيْلَةٍ.
إلَّا أَنَّ هَذَا الْقَوْلَ الرَّابِعَ يُخَالِفُ ظَاهِرَ الرِّوَايَةِ كَمَا جَاءَ فِي الْخَانِيَّةِ وَيُقَالُ لِلْمَجْنُونِ الْمُطْبِقِ الْمَجْنُونُ الْمَغْلُوبُ أَيْضًا.
وَقَدْ ذُكِرَ حُكْمُ الْجُنُونِ الْمُطْبِقِ فِي الْمَادَّةِ (979).
الْقِسْمُ الثَّانِي هُوَ الْمَجْنُونُ غَيْرُ الْمُطْبِقِ وَهُوَ الَّذِي يَكُونُ فِي بَعْضِ الْأَوْقَاتِ مَجْنُونًا وَيُفِيقُ فِي بَعْضِهَا كَالْمَصْرُوعِ (التَّنْقِيحُ، وَالْهِنْدِيَّةُ فِي الْحَجْرِ).
وَيَصْدُقُ تَعْرِيفُ الْمَجْنُونِ غَيْرِ الْمُطْبِقِ هَذَا عَلَى الْمَجْنُونِ الْمُطْبِقِ أَيْضًا؛ لِأَنَّهُ إذَا بَقِيَ أَحَدٌ مَجْنُونًا سَنَةً كَامِلَةً أَوْ شَهْرًا كَامِلًا ثُمَّ بَعْدَ أَنْ رَجَعَ إلَى عَقْلِهِ عَادَ فَجُنَّ أَيْضًا مُدَّةَ سَنَةٍ كَامِلَةٍ أَوْ شَهْرٍ كَامِلٍ فَيُعَدُّ مَنْ كَانَ حَالُهُ كَذَلِكَ مَجْنُونًا غَيْرَ مُطْبِقٍ أَيْضًا.
وَعَلَيْهِ فَيَكُونُ الْمَجْنُونُ غَيْرَ الْمُطْبِقِ هُوَ الَّذِي يَكُونُ مَجْنُونًا أَقَلَّ مِنْ سَنَةٍ عَلَى قَوْلٍ أَوْ أَقَلَّ مِنْ شَهْرٍ عَلَى قَوْلٍ آخَرَ.
وَقَدْ ذُكِرَ فِي أُصُولِ الْفِقْهِ أَنَّ بَعْضَ الْأَحْكَامِ الشَّرْعِيَّةِ تَخْتَلِفُ بِاخْتِلَافِ مُدَّةِ الْجُنُونِ وَقَدْ يَتَّحِدُ الْمَجْنُونُ الْمُطْبِقُ وَغَيْرُ الْمُطْبِقِ فِي بَعْضِ الْأَحْكَامِ وَذَلِكَ كَتَصَرُّفَاتِ الْمَجْنُونِ الْمُطْبِقُ وَالْمَجْنُونِ غَيْرِ الْمُطْبِقِ الْقَوْلِيَّةِ فِي حَالِ جُنُونِهِمَا يَعْنِي: مَثَلًا بَيْعُهُمَا وَشِرَاؤُهُمَا وَإِيجَادُهُمَا وَاسْتِئْجَارُهُمْ وَصَيْرُورَتُهُمَا مَحَالًا لَهُمَا أَوْ عَلَيْهِمَا أَوْ كَفَالَتُهُمَا أَوْ رَهْنُهُمَا وَارْتِهَانُهُمَا وَإِيدَاعُهُمَا وَاسْتِيدَاعُهُمَا وَهِبَتُهُمَا وَاتِّهَابُهُمَا فَهَذِهِ التَّصَرُّفَاتُ كُلُّهَا بَاطِلَةٌ.
وَقَدْ مَرَّتْ التَّفْصِيلَاتُ الْمُتَعَلِّقَةُ بِهَذَا فِي شَرْح الْمَوَادّ الْمَخْصُوصَة وَإِذَا أَفَاقَ الْمَجْنُون الْمُطْبَق وَالْمَجْنُون غَيْر الْمُطْبَق وَعَادَ إلَيْهِمَا الْعَقْل تَامًّا تَصِحّ تَصَرُّفَاتهمَا الْقَوْلِيَّة الْمَذْكُورَة وَتَجُوز.
وَيَخْتَلِف الْمَجْنُون الْمُطْبَق وَغَيْر الْمُطْبَق فِي بَعْض الْأَحْكَام وَذَلِكَ أَوَّلًا إذَا جن الْوَكِيل أَوْ الْمُوَكَّل جُنُونًا مُطْبَقًا تَبْطُلُ الْوَكَالَة وَعَلَيْهِ فَلَا يَبْقَى حُكْم لِلْوَكَالَةِ وَلَوْ أَفَاقَ بَعْد ذَلِكَ يَلْزَم تَحْدِيدهَا اُنْظُرْ الْمَادَّة (1530) وَإِذَا جن جُنُونًا غَيْر مُطْبَق لَا تَبْطُلُ الْوَكَالَة فَلِلْوَكِيلِ أَنْ يُوفِي الْوَكَالَة إلَى أَنْ يُجَنَّ الْمُوَكَّل جُنُونًا مُطْبَقًا كَمَا أَنْ لَهُ الْقِيَام بِهَا لَوْ جن هُوَ نَفْسه جُنُونًا غَيْر مُطْبَق بِدُونِ حَاجَة إلَى تَجْدِيدهَا؛ لِأَنَّ الْجُنُون غَيْر الْمُطْبَق هُوَ بِمَثَابَةِ إغْمَاء فَكَمَا أَنْ الْوَكَالَة لَا تَبْطُلُ بِالْإِغْمَاءِ فَلَا تَبْطُلُ بِالْجُنُونِ الْقَلِيل.
ثَانِيًا: وَإِذَا جن أَحَد الشُّرَكَاء جُنُونًا مُطْبَقًا تَنْفَسِخ الشَّرِكَة كَمَا هُوَ مُبِين فِي الْمَادَّة (1352) بِخِلَافِ مَا لَوْ جن جُنُونًا غَيْر مُطْبَق فَلَا تَنْفَسِخُ.
وَفِي هَذِهِ الْحَالَة إذَا جن أَحَد الشُّرَكَاء تَبْقَى الشَّرِكَة إلَى أَنْ يُصْبِح الْجُنُون مُطْبَقًا وَمَتَى تَمَّ الْإِطْبَاق تَنْفَسِخ الشَّرِكَة فِي الْحَال (الْوَاقِعَات) وَقَدْ تَوَضَّحَ ذَلِكَ فِي شَرْح الْمَادَّة (1652) .
ثَالِثًا، تَنْفَسِخ الْمُضَارَبَة كَمَا هُوَ مُبِين فِي الْمَادَّة (1429) إذَا جن رَبّ الْمَال أَوْ الْمُضَارِب جُنُونًا مُطْبَقًا أَمَّا إذَا كَانَ جُنُونهمَا غَيْر مُطْبَق فَلَا تَنْفَسِخ.
رَابِعًا: إذَا جن الْمَأْذُون جُنُونًا مُطْبِقًا أصبح مَحْجُورًا.
أَمَّا إذَا جن جُنُونًا غَيْر مُطْبَق فَلَا (الْهِنْدِيَّة فِي الْبَاب الْخَامِس) .
وَسَيَأْتِي فِي الْمَادَّة (980) بَيَان حُكْم الْجُنُون غَيْر الْمُطْبَق.
[(مَادَّةُ 945) الْمَعْتُوهُ هُوَ الَّذِي اخْتَلَّ شُعُورُهُ]
(مَادَّةُ 945) الْمَعْتُوهُ هُوَ الَّذِي اخْتَلَّ شُعُورُهُ بِأَنْ كَانَ فَهْمُهُ قَلِيلًا وَكَلَامُهُ مُخْتَلِطًا وَتَدْبِيرُهُ فَاسِدًا.
الْمَعْتُوهُ لُغَةً نَاقِصُ الْعَقْلِ وَشَرْعًا هُوَ الَّذِي اخْتَلَّ شُعُورُهُ بِأَنْ كَانَ قَلِيلَ الْفَهْمِ مُخْتَلِطَ الْكَلَامِ فَاسِدَ التَّدْبِيرِ. وَلَكِنَّهُ لَا يَشْتُمُ وَلَا يَضْرِبُ كَالْمَجْنُونِ. بَلْ يَكُونُ كَلَامُهُ مُخْتَلِطًا فَبَعْضُهُ يُشْبِهُ كَلَامَ الْعُقَلَاءِ وَبَعْضُهُ يُشْبِهُ أَلْفَاظَ الْمَجَانِينِ.
وَإِنْ وَقَعَ اخْتِلَافٌ فِي تَفْسِيرِ الْمَعْتُوهِ فَالْمُخْتَارُ هَذَا التَّعْرِيفُ (رَدُّ الْمُحْتَارِ، التَّنْقِيحُ) وَعَلَيْهِ فَالْعَاقِلُ هُوَ الَّذِي تَكُونُ أَقْوَالُهُ وَأَفْعَالُهُ مُسْتَقِيمَةً (الْبَهْجَةُ)
[(مَادَّةُ 946) السَّفِيهُ هُوَ الَّذِي يَصْرِفُ مَالَهُ فِي غَيْرِ مَوْضِعِهِ]
(مَادَّةُ 946) السَّفِيهُ هُوَ الَّذِي يَصْرِفُ مَالَهُ فِي غَيْرِ مَوْضِعِهِ وَيُبَذِّرُ فِي مَصْرُوفَاتِهِ وَيُضِيعُ أَمْوَالَهُ وَيُتْلِفُهَا بِالْإِسْرَافِ وَاَلَّذِينَ لَا يَزَالُونَ يَغْفُلُونَ فِي أَخْذِهِمْ وَإِعْطَائِهِمْ وَلَمْ يَعْرِفُوا طَرِيقَ تِجَارَتِهِمْ وَتَمَتُّعِهِمْ بِحَسَبِ بَلَاهَتِهِمْ وَخُلُوِّ قُلُوبِهِمْ يُعَدُّونَ أَيْضًا مِنْ السُّفَهَاءِ. السَّفِيهُ مَأْخُوذٌ مِنْ السَّفَهِ، وَالسَّفَهُ لُغَةً خِفَّةُ الْعَقْلِ، وَالسَّفِيهُ هُوَ مَنْ كَانَ فِي عَقْلِهِ خِفَّةً، أَمَّا شَرْعًا فَهُوَ الَّذِي يَصْرِفُ مَالَهُ فِي غَيْرِ مَوْضِعِهِ يَعْنِي خِلَافًا لِمَا يَقْتَضِيهِ الشَّرْعُ وَالْعَقْلُ وَيُبَذِّرُ فِي مَصْرُوفَاتِهِ وَيُضِيعُ أَمْوَالَهُ وَيُتْلِفُهَا بِالْإِسْرَافِ.
وَالْفَرْقُ بَيْنَ الْإِسْرَافِ وَالتَّبْذِيرِ هُوَ أَنَّ التَّبْذِيرَ صَرْفُ الشَّيْءِ فِي غَيْرِ مَحَلِّهِ اللَّائِقِ أَمَّا الْإِسْرَافُ فَهُوَ صرفُ الشَّيْءِ فِي مَحَلِّهِ اللَّائِقِ زِيَادَةً عَنْ اللَّازِمِ (رَدُّ الْمُحْتَارِ فِي الْفَرَائِضِ) فَعَلَى ذَلِكَ التَّبْذِيرُ هُوَ تَجَاوُزُ مَوْضِعِ الْحَقِّ وَجَهْلٌ بِمَوَاضِعِ وَمَوَاقِعِ الْحُقُوقِ أَمَّا الْإِسْرَافُ فَهُوَ تَجَاوُزٌ فِي الْكَمِّيَّةِ وَجَهْلٌ فِي مَقَادِيرِ الْحُقُوقِ.
6.4 English Translation
Types of Insanity66
There are two types of insane67 persons (majnūn):
Non-remittent (majnūn muṭbaq): A person whose insanity manifests at all times.
Intermittent (majnūn ghayr muṭbaq): One who is insane at times, and sensible at other times.
The insane person is of two types, and each has a definition [that will be elucidated] in what is to follow. It is not what the author of al-Durar asserts in his discussion on the prostration of recital (sajdat al-tilāwa).68 [He purports] the one afflicted with insanity (majnūn) is of three types. The two types mentioned in the aforementioned categorization are [as follows]:
The first type, majnūn muṭbaq, is one whose insanity manifests at all times. Insanity (junūn) refers to the loss and disturbance of one’s mind; such inhibits one’s actions and speech from their proper manner of functioning (al-Majāmiʿ).69
Insanity can stem from a pre-disposed deficiency of the intellect, or a deterioration of the temperateness of the brain coupled with overwhelming delusions70 (Fuṣūl al-Badāʾiʿ).71
Here, “insanity” is not intended to imply that the afflicted person has been perpetually insane throughout his entire life, nor that he is permanently insane [and has been] from the onset of his intermittent insanity. This is because the insanity of one who is majnūn muṭbaq can only be verified as such after his death; before death it is not possible to determine with certainty whether his insanity is [categorized as] non-intermittent (muṭbiq) or intermittent (ghayr muṭbiq). Thus, [if] someone is afflicted with insanity throughout his entire life without regaining his sensibility at all, then in this scenario, it is [only] when death approaches that they would they be adjudged majnūn muṭbaq. Similarly, one who is afflicted with insanity for [only] a year, is also considered majnūn muṭbaq by consensus; further clarification regarding this is forthcoming.
On this basis, if “at all times” denoted the aforementioned, meaning [the duration of one’s life,] it would not be inclusive of all of its instances.72 Accordingly, the expression “at all times” [is taken to] mean at all times within a complete year or a complete month. By this [consideration], the summary definition of majnūn muṭbaq would be, “one whose insanity encompasses all moments for the duration of a [n entire] year.” Or, according to another opinion, “… for the duration of a [whole] month.”
We shall now examine the time period for insanity to be considered muṭbiq.
[It shall also be pointed out that] the word muṭbaq is used to describe the insane person, while muṭbiq is used to refer to [non-remittent] insanity itself.
There are four views regarding non-remittent insanity (junūn muṭbiq):
Non-remittent insanity is that which extends for an entire year. This is due to [the fact that] when a cycle of the four seasons passes without one having regained his sensibility, it is [clearly] known that his insanity is acute. The legal opinion (fatwā) in respect to the right of engaging in contracts (ḥaqq al-taṣarrufāt) is in accordance with the consideration of a measure of one year’s duration of insanity.73
As for responsibilities related to worship (ḥaqq al-ʿibādāt), the duration of insanity is defined differently; the particulars of which are discussed within the realm of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh).
Non-remittent insanity is for the duration of a month, meaning insanity that lasts an entire month. This position has been preferred as per the wording “and it is given as a verdict (fatwā)”. The statement of al-Khāniyya,74 “and upon it is the legal ruling,” also indicates its preference (Radd al-Muḥtār).75
It is when the insanity extends beyond a year.
It is when [one’s] insanity encompasses more than [a combined period of] one day and one night. However, this view contradicts the clearly transmitted opinions (ẓāhir al-riwāya),76 as is stated in al-Khāniyya.
The one afflicted with non-remittent insanity (majnūn muṭbaq) is also referred to as one who is overwhelmed [by his insanity] (majnūn maghlūb). The ruling of non-remittant insanity (junūn muṭbiq) has been mentioned under article 979.
The second type, majnūn ghayr muṭbaq, refers to a person who is insane at times, yet regains his senses at other times, much like an epileptic.77 Furthermore, it is conceivable to describe the one afflicted with non-remittent insanity (majnūn muṭbaq) as also being afflicted with intermittent insanity (majnūn ghayr muṭbaq). This would be so if a person is insane for an entire year, or an entire month, and thereafter regains his sensibility only to relapse back to being insane for [another] year or month; a person in such a state would also be classified as being afflicted with intermittent insanity (majnūn ghayr muṭbaq).78
In light of this [potential contradiction], one afflicted with intermittent insanity (majnūn ghayr muṭbaq) [should be defined as] a person who is insane for a period spanning less than a year, according to one opinion. Or, less than a month, according to another [view].79
It is mentioned in legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) that some legal rulings (aḥkām sharʿiyya) differ depending on the duration of insanity. However, the one afflicted with non-remittent insanity (majnūn muṭbaq) as well as the one with intermittent insanity (ghayr muṭbaq) may sometimes be undifferentiated in certain rulings, like the verbal transactions of both, whilst they are in a state of insanity. Such, for example, includes their buying, selling, and disposing of assets; their acquisition and renting; their guaranteeing, giving, or receiving collateral; their entrusting and deposits; their gift-giving and receiving; all such transactions are invalid [for both of them]. A detailed explanation of this subject has preceded under its specific articles. Notably, when either the one with non-remittent insanity (majnūn muṭbaq) or the one facing intermittent insanity (ghayr muṭbaq) regains lucidity, and their reason has been completely restored, then engaging in the aforementioned verbal transactions are deemed valid and permissible.
In various other rulings, however, the majnūn muṭbaq and the ghayr muṭbaq are distinctly different. These are [as follows]:
Firstly, if the agent (wakīl) or the commissioner (muwakkal) is afflicted with non-remittent insanity (junūn muṭbiq), his agency (wakāla) becomes invalid, and the ruling of agency no longer remains. If he regains his lucidity thereafter, there must be a renewal [of the contract]. Refer to article 1530.
However, if he is afflicted with insanity [that is] intermittent (ghayr muṭbiq), his agency (wakāla) is not voided. [In such a case,] the agent (wakīl) shall continue to fulfill his role up until the insanity of the commissioner (muwakkal) is deemed to be non-remittent (muṭbiq), just as he, [the agent,] is allowed to fulfill his agency if he himself were to be afflicted with intermittent insanity (ghayr muṭbaq), without a need to renew [the agency]. This is because insanity [that is] intermittent (ghayr muṭbiq) is comparable to fainting; just as fainting does not invalidate agency (wakāla), slight insanity does not invalidate it either.
Secondly, if the insanity of a partner in a business partnership is non-remittent (muṭbiq), the partnership is voided, as has been clarified in article 1352. [This is as opposed to] if the insanity of the partner is intermittent (ghayr muṭbiq), in which case the partnership is not voided. In such a case, when any one partner becomes insane, the partnership remains [valid] until the insanity is deemed non-remittent (muṭbiq). Once it is ascertained to be non-remittent (muṭbiq), the partnership is voided immediately. These details have been clarified in article 1652.
Thirdly, the profit-sharing partnership (muḍāraba) is voided when the insanity of either the financier (rabb al-māl) or the entrepreneur (muḍārib) is classified as non-remittent (muṭbiq). However, if their insanity is intermittent (ghayr muṭbiq), such is not voided.
Fourthly, if the insanity of an authorized transactor (maʾdhūn) is deemed as non-remittent (muṭbiq), he is interdicted (maḥjūr). However, such would not be interdicted if the insanity is intermittent (ghayr muṭbiq)80 (al-Hindiyya, Chapter 5).
Rulings related to non-remittent insanity (junūn ghayr muṭbiq) shall be clarified in article 980.
[Article 945]
The Mentally Impaired (Maʿtūh) is One Whose Sensibility is Marred:
The mentally impaired (maʿtūh) is someone whose cognitive faculties of conception are disturbed, in that his comprehension is inadequate, his expressions are confused, and his coordination is unsound. Lexically, the maʿtūh is someone who is deficient in their reasoning. Legally, such is someone whose perception is defective, in that they have inadequate comprehension, confused expressions, and unsound coordination.81 However, unlike the insane person (majnūn), he is neither vile nor violent. His speech varies; it is occasionally comparable to those who are reasonable, and at times [more] like those who are insane.
This is the description that shall be referenced if there is a disagreement concerning the definition of the maʿtūh (Radd al-Muḥtār; al-Tanqīḥ). Correspondingly, the sane (ʿāqil) is one whose speech and actions are sound (al-Bahja).
[Article 946]
The Spendthrift (safīḥ) is Someone Whose Spending is Misplaced
The spendthrift (safīh) is one who spends their wealth inappropriately; such are extravagant in their expenditures, squandering their wealth and wasting it.82 Furthermore, such are continuously heedless of their giving and taking. Those who are unaware of their business practices and consumption due to their fatuousness and inattention are likewise counted as spendthrifts.
The term safīh is derived from safah, which linguistically means feeble-mindedness. Thus, the safīh is one who has weakness in their intellect. Legally, however, the safīh is one who spends his wealth inappropriately; meaning, in a manner that is against Islamic Law (sharīʿa) and [basic] reason. Instead, they recklessly squander their wealth and waste it by being excessive.
The difference between excessiveness (isrāf) and squandering (tabdhīr) is that the former is spending excessively in what is permissible, whereas the latter relates to spending on that which is inappropriate (Radd al-Muḥtār). Thus, squandering (tabdhīr) is the trespassing of the rightful bounds to spend irresponsibly, and ignorance of the [correct] areas of [expenditure]. As for excessiveness (isrāf), it is exceeding the amount of rightful [spending],83 and ignorance of the [correct] amounts of [expenditure].
I.e., in the section on the ‘Marvels of the Heart’ of the “Revival of the Religious Sciences”.
The classical Muslim physicians who were also philosophers tended to discuss the nature of the spirit of life, as they viewed it as within the scope of their professions. Additionally, it is important to note that the physicians of that time were not pure empiricists as the science of medicine included a lot of inferences and assumptions that were not or could not be empirically validated. The physicians largely drew their foundations of medicine from Galen’s humoral medicine. It is also important to note that the physicians in general were also trained in theology and discussed metaphysics in their philosophical works and alluded to some of these discussions in their works on medicine.
This contrasts with the first meaning of heart. This heart that he is referring to is from the metaphysical realm. Al-Ghazālī asserts that the physical heart and the first meaning of rūh he describes are both physical substances, though the rūḥ is a very gas-like subtle substance. While the rūḥ of the first meaning cannot be observed, it is part of the physical realm of existence. Whereas the second meaning of heart and all the other second meanings of the remaining terms that are discussed below are from the metaphysical realm, also referred to as the malakūtī world or being from the ʿālam al-ʾamr or divine world. According to al-Ghazālī this is a completely non-physical created thing or jawhar mujarrad, which is a common term used to refer to this notion in contrast to the subtly physical substance or jism latīf.
It is also important to note that al-Ghazālī demonstrates in the subsequent explanations that the second meaning of all the four terms are indicators of the same essence. This may be referred to as latīfa rabbaniya as he and other scholars have referred to it (see al-Bāyjūrī section). They are one unitary metaphysical essence with different expressions and contextual usages as al-Ghazālī demonstrates.
This is a technical concept discussed by both scholastic theologians and philosophers. A physical substance is in reference to the essential properties that make up a physical object, while incidents are those things that cannot exist independently of the physical substance. These incidents are states that are associated with their physical objects. For example, a state of movement is not an essential quality of a moving object and thus known as an ‘incident’. However, physical substances too are not free from associated incidents since an object is always either in a state of rest or movement and either state is a non-essential incidental quality, subject to potential change that is affixed to the physical object (Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar al-Taftāzanī, Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2000).
See above footnote.
This is the primordial soul i.e., latīfa. All human beings were once souls that stood in the court of Allah and primordially bore witness to the Oneness and existence of Allah in the covenant of Alast, where Allah asked, “Am I not your Lord” and all responded, “Indeed, we bear witness to this” (7:171). Thus, each soul has an inherent longing to return to that state of being in the presence of Allah.
Literally: “the nafs that is between your two sides”, however the intended meaning is mentioned above given that translating it literally loses the connotations carried by the statement in the Arabic language.
This is narrated by Kharā’itī in “I‘tilāl al-Qulūb” (see Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Ja‘far Kharā’iṭī, I‘tilāl al-Qulūb Fī Akhbār al-‘ushshāq Wa al-Muḥibbīn, vol. 1 (Makkah: Maktabat Bilāl Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, 2000), 26.) related by Abū Mālik al-Ashʿarī from the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace). As well as by Bayḥaqī in “Zuhd” as a statement of ibn ʿAbbas (May Allah be pleased with him). (see Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Bayhaqī, al-Zuhd al-Kabīr (Beirut: Dār al-Jinān Mu’assasa al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyya, 1987), 343.). Ḥafiz Zabīdī in his commentary on this book (Iḥya), entitled “itḥāf” criticizes the narration of Bayḥaqī in citing ibn Ḥajar. He states that ibn Ḥajar stated that there are pathways/chains for this narration other than ibn ʿAbbas that is related as a statement of Anas ibn Mālik and statements of others as well for this narration (see al-Sharīf Muḥammad al-Zabīdī, Itḥāf al-Sāda al-Muttaqīn bi-Sharḥ Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn (Lebanon: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al- ‘Arabī, 1994), 206–7.).
This in essence refers to the ‘self’ and is an indication toward the aforementioned laṭīfa. However, the self or one’s laṭīfa can be at different stages based upon spiritual cleansing and purity. By graduating beyond living a completely sensual life one can eliminate the tension found within the self between the animalistic drives vs spiritual longing for connection to reach an eventual state of tranquility or reach the stage of al-nafs al-muṭmaʾinna.
Though al-Ghazālī seems to favor the second meaning, he mentions the usage of this term as it is a common usage of many great scholars such as his very own teacher Imam al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī (see al-Bayjūrī section).
See Abū al-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad Ṭabarānī, Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1994), 273–78.); Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Bayhaqī, Kitāb Shuʿab al-Īmān (Beirut: Maktaba Dār al-Rushd, 2003) hn. 4312.) Abū Nuʿaym al-Isfahānī, Ḥilyat al-Awliyāʾ wa Tabaqāt al-Aṣfiyāʾ (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2009), 317–18.).
This is a portion of the same hadith above. This is a weak hadith with many versions, Zabīdī, who offers a commentary on “The Revival of the Religious Sciences” discusses this hadith. (Al-Zabīdī, Itḥāf al-Sāda al-Muttaqīn bi-Sharḥ Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, 1:453.). Zabīdī also provides a more complete version of the hadith: “When Allah created the intellect He said to it, ‘Come close,’ and it drew near. Then He said, ‘Depart,’ and it left. Then He said, ‘I have created nothing that I love more than you; by you I take and by you I give’.”
Al-Ghazālī in his explanation is attempting to demonstrate that knowledge cannot have an independent existence of its own when the first term is intended, rather the first term must be understood considering the second term, i.e., that knowledge is an attribute of the intellect of an individual. Whereas intellect can have an independent existence that is situated within an individual, knowledge cannot and thus it needs to be an attribute or affixed to an intellect.
Salh al-Tustarī (or al-Tusturī) (286 AH/896 CE) was a Persian Islamic scholar and mystic. He founded the Sālimiya school of Muslim theologians named after his disciple Muḥammad ibn Sālim. He also authored a famous interpretation (tafsir) of the Quran named Tafsir al-Tustārī. He believed that mystical union (ittiḥād) with Allah, could be achieved through contemplation on oneself until complete consciousness was achieved.
See Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, Qūt al-Qulūb fī Muʿāmalat al-Maḥbūb, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al- ‘Ilmiyya, 2005), 885.
This does not mean Allah is on the Chair/Throne, rather it is the subject where Allah enacts.
This is one of three commentaries Imam Ibrāhīm al-Laqqānī wrote on his own poem: Jawharat al-Tawḥīd. The commentary referred to here, the Hidāyat al-Murīd, is the shortest of the three commentaries (Ibrāhīm al-Laqqānī, Hidāyat al-Murīd lī-Jawhar al-Tawḥīd (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2012).).
This is in reference to the larger commentary that the author, Ibrāhīm al-Laqqānī, composed on his original work (Jawharat al-Tawḥīd), entitled ʿUmdat al-Murīd li-Jawharat al-Tawḥīd (the Reliance of the Seeker for the Jewel of Monotheism), also commonly referred to as al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr, or the Large Commentary (Ibrāhīm al-Laqqānī, ‘Umdat al-Murīd li-Jawharat al-Tawḥīd (Beirut: Dār al-Nūr, 2016).).
An ʿiqāl is a rope with which a camel’s fore shank is bound to his arm, both being folded together and bound in the middle of the arm. See Lane’s Lexicon, sub ʿa-q-l.
This may be considered an alternative to Gardner’s multiple intelligence theory (Howard Gardner, Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences (New York: Basic Books, 1983) or Sternberg’s Intelligence Triarchy (Robert J. Sternberg, Beyond IQ: A Triarchic Theory of Intelligence (Cambridge University Press, 1985).).
By Shaykh al-Islām, the author likely intended Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1520).
Another conceptualization and translation of these four types of intellect could be: (1) fluid intelligence, (2) crystallized intelligence, (3) spiritual intelligence, and (4) inspired intelligence.
This is in reference to the hadith report, “A man has not been endowed with anything more virtuous after faith in Allah than the intellect”.
In the aforementioned commentary, ʿUmdat al-Murīd, al-Laqqānī quotes al-Suyūṭī as stating: “Al-Jalāl al-Suyūṭī states: ‘No hadith has been mentioned on the virtue of the intellect. Everything that has been transmitted on it is a forgery and a lie.’ This was transmitted by the shaykh of our shaykhs al-Shams al-ʿAlqamī in his gloss on [al-Suyūṭī’s] al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaghīr”. Al-Suyūṭī’s judgment is also relevant to Imam al-Ghazālī’s use of such a report in his chapter in the Iḥyā ʿUlūm al-Dīn: “An Exposition of the Meanings and Connotations of the Terms: Nafs, Rūḥ, ʿAql, and Qalb”.
Imam Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Mālik al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) is known popularly by his agnomen, Imām al-Ḥaramayn, meaning the leader of the two sanctified cities (Makkah and Medina). He was a Persian Shafiʿī jurist and scholastic theologian and is renowned for his contributions to both dialectic theology and legal theory, as was the case with his most celebrated and recognized student, Imam Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.
This position corresponds to the usage of the term ʿaql in the first meaning in al-Ghazāli’s discussion of ʿaql.
Imam ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Aḥmad al-Farhārawī al-Multānī (d. 1239/1823) in al-Nibrās (pg. 127), a gloss on al-Taftāzānī’s Sharḥ al-ʿAqīda al-Nasafiyya, gives the meaning of ʿaql as an innate disposition. He states therein: “It is an attribute placed in the attributed object from inception. The term gharīza connotes the recipient of the action of the root verb gharz, which denotes inserting a thing into another in a firmly embedded manner, such as: ‘I [firmly] planted (gharaztu) the spear into the earth’”. Imam al-Farhārawī attributes the usage of this term and its intended meaning to al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī and declares it to be the preferred position of Imam Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (al-Farhārawī al-Multānī, 2012).
Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī ibn Yūsuf, Abū Isḥāq, the shaykh of the jurists of his day. He died in 476/1083. He is the author of the acclaimed Shāfiʿī legal manual al-Muhadhdhab as well as al-Tabṣira and al-Lumaʿ (Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, Kitāb al-Aʿlām, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm al-Malāyīn, 2002), 51).
Imam al-Bājūrī outlines the notion of a unitary metaphysical soul, or psyche, called the latīfa rabbāniyya. This seems to indicate that the psyche is a metaphysical entity.
Here Imam al-Bājūrī further illustrates how there is a single unitary metaphysical entity with various manifestations and functions. He demonstrates the general dualistic approach of the discursive theologians dividing the individual into a body and soul, or physical and subtly physical essence. Just as the body is one whole entity with different parts that fulfill different functions, so too does the soul which contains the functions of cognition, human drives, and life.
The discursive theologians offer that all physical beings occupy space and have some form of physicality. All matter thus is either a physical thing, i.e., ʿayn, or a substance that contains incidental changing qualities (ʿarāḍ) attached to it. These “incidents” do not have an existence of their own. For example, in the case of a black ball, the ball occupies physical existence, while the blackness is an incidental quality that is affixed to the ball. Blackness does not have an existence in and of itself. All created things have some incidental qualities attached to them and can never be free of them. For example, a ball will either be in a state of rest or movement and cannot exist without one of these incidental states. Since incidents do not have any existence of their own, they require some existent thing to be affixed to. Thus, this item must itself have a location and physicality to it. Otherwise, a contingent thing would be dependent on another contingent thing to exist, and this is impossible. To the discursive theologians, all created things exist in space and have a beginning point in which Allah created them. This includes the soul, even though the soul is subtly physical. However, Muslim philosophers did not believe that all created things must have physicality. They offered that the ʿaql, mind, soul, and angels fall into this category. This is also typically associated with their belief in the eternality (qidam) of the existence of the souls and cosmos, despite their being created (al-Taftāzanī, Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya).
Imam al-Ghazālī offers a nuanced position. He divides the soul into two further categories (or two possible meanings/entities): (i) the animal soul or life force, which he describes as a jism laṭīf, or subtle body (like the discursive theologians). This soul is associated with the rest of the body and is contained within the physical heart. It simply provides the life force, and its associated survival drives of appetite and anger. The second category is what he refers to as the (ii) latīfa rabānniya. This is the unitary entity that is the essence of the human soul. It is completely non-physical or metaphysical and is the executive driver of a human being. Imam al-Suhrawārdī among other Sufis seems to provide a similar split between the animal soul and the heavenly soul and the need for the heavenly soul to reign supreme over the physical soul that resembles Imam al-Ghazālī’s discussion of the human soul (See the translation of al-Suhrawardī’s passage from ʿAwārif al-Maʿārif).
This is a demonstration of the richness of the Islamic intellectual heritage which considers multiple epistemic sources for dealing with the issue of the localization of the intellect. The question is: where is the source of cognitive functions in a human? While the Qurʾan alludes to cognitive processes being in the heart (22:46), Muslim scholars did not ignore clear empirical evidence that cognitive processes also exist in the brain.
The position that the scholarly majority adopted here demonstrates a sophisticated reconciliation between the two positions by considering the brain an essential condition for expressions of the metaphysical mind (ʿaql) located in the metaphysical heart. Imam al-Farhārawī elaborates on this in al-Nibrās (ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Aḥmad al-Farhārawī al-Multānī, Nibrās: Sharḥ Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya (Istanbul: Maktabat Yāsīn, 2012), 130.) stating: “The statements in revelation indicate that its location is the heart, such as His statement, exalted be He: Have they not traveled throughout the land so their hearts may reason (yaʿqilūna) (al-Ḥajj 22:46). The opinion that its location is the brain is attributed to Imam Abū Ḥanīfa (may Allah have mercy upon him) on account of the fact that if a hard strike meets the head, then one’s [faculty of] reasoning becomes impaired. However, it is possible to reconcile [between these two positions] by [stating] that the acquisition of knowledge is through the medium of the faculties of the brain while it’s place of settlement is the heart. The philosopher physicians posited that the place for the perception of pieces of [sensory] information is the external [five] senses and the internal senses (i.e., cognitive faculties of the brain) while the conception of universals [synthesis and analysis] is the [metaphysical] ʿaql that is established by the rational metaphysical soul (nafs nāṭiqa). The statements of Imam al-Ghazālī (known as the Proof of Islam), align with this. Amongst his positions is his proposal that the heart can generally be used [to refer to either] the ‘pinecone-shaped piece of flesh’ and/or the ‘rational soul’ (nafs nātiqa). This is the nafs that is intended by the [heart] in the statement of scripture (al-Farhārawī al-Multānī, 130.) (al-Ḥajj 22:46). Allah knows best.”
This excerpt is only a section of the entire chapter regarding this topic. Everything that preceded what is found in this translation was a summary of the various positions of the scholars on the nature of the rūḥ. That entire portion was omitted in the interest of focusing exclusively on the synthesis and position of Imam al-Suhrawardī given the diverse and complex positions regarding the reality of the soul. Imam al-Suhrawardī mentions something very important prior to beginning his explanation. He states that all that was mentioned previously by the scholars was interpretative (taʾwīl) and that he too does not have any conclusive proof for the position he is going to offer. This is an important epistemological point being referenced by him. The term taʾwīl indicates interpretations that carry possible meanings while tafsīr on the other hand is a much more rigorous hermeneutical process that attempts to ascertain conclusive evidence-based interpretations. In instances where there isn’t strong evidence for providing an explanation to an ambiguous issue, a scholar may provide his own possible interpretations. In the usage of the word taʾwīl, al-Suhrawardī is demonstrating that the objective for the discussions the soul is not to provide categorical interpretations. Rather, he intends to provide useful insights and possible explanations that are derived through his own inspirations and that of the ascetics. By restricting the discussion to this process, he can justify his reason for discussing this topic, while the prohibition to delve deep into the nature and reality of the soul remains (see al-Bajūri translation). Therefore, he precedes his discussion with a disclaimer that he generally prefers to remain silent on such issues.
Al-Suhrawardī gives a name to the two different souls that Imām al-Ghazālī discusses in his “Exposition on the Meanings and Connotations of the Terms: Nafs, Rūḥ, ʿAql, Qalb”. This corresponds to al-Ghazālī’s discussion of the life spirit being situated in the physical heart, while the soul of the second usage refers to the primordial celestial soul, or laṭīfa rabbāniyya.
Or possessing the faculty of reason.
Upon the descent of the human being from a celestial soul that existed primordially in the heavens into the physical world, the person becomes a nafs, possessing both animalistic instincts and celestial instincts to do good. The nafs is born out of the union of the animalistic soul and celestial soul in this world, just like Eve being created from the rib of Adam.
The qalb is necessary upon the existence of the human being in the world, given that it is inclined to either turn toward the celestial instincts or the beastly desires. Depending on which direction it turns, it harbors health or spiritual pathology.
Abū ’Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn Mubārak, al-Zuhd wa-l-Raqā’iq (Amman: Dār al-Fārūq, 2022) hadith 1439; Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (Lebanon: Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 1995), 3:7; Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn Abī Shayba, al-Musannaf fi-l-Aḥādīth wa-l-Āthār (Beirut: Dār al-Tāj, 1982) 31043; Abū al-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad Ṭabarānī, Mu‘jam al-Ṣaghīr (Madina: al-Maktabat al-Salafiyya, 1968) 1075; al-Isfahānī, Ḥilyat al-Awliyāʾ wa Tabaqāt al-Aṣfiyāʾ, 1:276 but attributed to Ḥudhayfa, may Allah be pleased with him, 4:385, with attribution to the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, through Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī, may Allah be pleased with him.
This is when the nafs is at a lower stage, i.e., the beastly level that seeks solely to satisfy its appetitive desires.
This is an interesting and unique perspective that diverges from the discussions of the location of the ʿaql discussed in al-Bajūrī’s summary where he summarized the two major position of the scholars asserting the ʿaql to be either in the brain or in the metaphysical heart.
al-Suhrawardī is discussing the affinity of the metaphysical celestial self to be inclined towards the Divine, while the body and animal soul is inclined to the earth and physical world.
Demonstrates the duality and intrapsychic conflicting drives between meeting its physical worldly needs that may be in conflict and weighing down its celestial instincts for elevation.
This is a very important in establishing a drive theory in Islam. There are opposing drives that exist within the human being that pull them toward realization of their celestial souls or pull them toward leaving a beastly and hedonistic life.
Transmitted by al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī in his Nawādir al-Uṣūl, hadith 868, as part of a lengthy report, except for the word “brain” (dimāgh) in place of “the heart” (qalb).
Another indication toward the dual drives between the affinity for temporal and eternal life.
See Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī, Ḥaqā’iq al-Tafsīr, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001), 397.
See Abū Bakr Kalābadhī, al-Ta‘arruf li-Madhhab Ahl al-Ṭaṣawwuf (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, nd), 68.
al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Nawādir al-Uṣūl fī Aḥādīth al-Rasūl, vol. 3 (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, nd), 217.
The various editions of the book give the name “Saʿīd” here. The correction to “Saʿd” has been made based on what has been mentioned in al-Taḥbīr fī al-Muʿjam al-Kabīr (see ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Sam‘ānī al-Marwazī, al-Taḥbīr fī al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr, vol. 2 (Baghdād: Riāsāt Dīwān al-Awqāf, 1975), 69.), and al-Muntakhab min Mu‘jam Shuyūkh al-Samʿānī (Abd al-Karīm al-Sam‘ānī al-Marwazī, al-Muntakhab min Mu‘jam Shuyūkh al-Sam‘ānī (Riyadh: Dār ‘Ālam al-Kutub, 1996), 1370.), and Muʿjam Shuyūkh (see Thiqat al-Dīn Ibn ‘Asākir, Mu‘jam al-Shuyūkh, vol. 2, (Dimashq: Dār al-Bashāir, 2000), 866.).
See Abū Isḥāq Tha‘labī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān ‘an Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, vol. 29 (Jidda: Dār al-Tafsīr, 2015), 426–27. The report is broken-chained. It is also narrated in al-Ṭabarānī’s al-Muʿjam al-Kabīr 11:106 from Ibn ʿAbbās (may Allah be pleased with them both) in the context of verses 7–8 in Sūrat al-Shams. Ibn Abī Ḥātim similarly transmits it in his Tafsīr hadith 19,339 through Abū Hurayrah, may Allah be pleased with him. Muslim transmits it in his Ṣaḥīḥ (hadith 2,722) from Zayd b. Arqam, may Allah be pleased with him, but not in the context of any particular verse.
I.e., the lower stage of the nafs.
See al-Qushayrī, al-Risāla al-Qushayriyya, 1: 204.
Referring to the 14th verse in Sūrat al-Raḥmān: “He created mankind out of ringing, dried clay (ṣalṣāl), like pottery”.
Here is a figure illustrating the relationship between the components discussed by al-Suhrawardī. In the middle of the diagram is the heart that is pulled either toward the bodily drives found in the rūḥ hayawānī or toward the celestial soul (rūḥ samāwī). The ʿaql serves as its aid. Depending on which element becomes dominant and wins over the self, it will reflect the state of the soul (nafs) accordingly. The jasad or body is from the physical realm, while the laṭīfa rabānniyya is of the metaphysical realm (malakūt/ʿālam al-ʾamr).
The branch of psychology that is concerned with the subject matter of sensation and its translation into perception is known as cognitive psychology. It delves into the complexities of human cognition, encompassing the processing of sensory information received from external stimuli, its internal translation into perceptions, and its subsequent storage and retrieval within the brain for various cognitive functions. Sensory information perceived by our senses is converted into neural signals in the brain, where it is encoded as mental representations. These representations are initially stored in our working memory, allowing us to manipulate and process them in our mental workspace or mind. If the information is practiced or associated with emotions, it may then be further encoded into long-term memory for retention (E. Bruce Goldstein Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research, and Everyday Experience (Cengage Learning, 2017), 4th ed.). Although the localization of the five faculties of human perception to specific parts of the brain, as described by Ibn Sīnā and other pre-modern physicians, has been proven largely inaccurate with the advent of modern brain imaging technologies, it is nonetheless remarkable how closely his description of the cognitive process aligns with the explanations of human perception in modern cognitive psychology.
It is important to note that ibn Sīnā among other physicians had adopted the notion of five internal faculties of perception from Aristotle and the ancient Greeks.
At face value, Ibn Sīna seems to suggest that classifying these faculties as one unit or as separate faculties is the realm of the philosophers and their discipline. Accordingly, the onus is upon the philosopher to determine the final verdict considering all that is known regarding these cognitive faculties and how they work together in various capacities. However, it is possible and perhaps even more likely that Ibn Sīna is referring to Aristotle, as it was his habit to refer to Aristotle as “the philosopher” in many of his writings.
According to modern cognitive neuroscience, the switchboard for all incoming sensory information that gets relayed to the other parts of the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain known as the thalamus, which is a paired gray matter structure located near the center of the brain. It is above the midbrain and contains neural pathways connecting to all the various parts of the cerebral cortex.
According to modern cognitive neuroscience, the imaginative faculties of humans are situated within the neocortex and the thalamus. The thalamus relays sensory information that is then manipulated by the neocortex to form imagination. The neocortex is the largest part of the cerebral cortex, and it is essentially the sheet of neural tissue that makes up the outer surface of the brain. It comprises all four major lobes of the cortex given the involvement of multiple areas of the brain in the forming of imagination. The limbic system is also activated during the imagination processes given the important role of memory and emotions in relation to imagination.
In cognitive psychology, previous learning as well as biological survival instincts like emotions interact with the nature of the perception of stimuli. For example, if an individual has been previously exposed to a threatening person or animal, then such learned information stored within the cerebral cortex would serve to inform or modulate the interpretation of new stimuli observed later on, consequently adjudging it to be either threatening or affable. Similarly, if an individual were to see an animal snarling, they may interpret this animal as threatening even in cases wherein there was no previous learning, on account of predisposed biological survival instincts, according to evolutionary and emotion theory. At this particular juncture, Ibn Sīna is suggesting that the qualities attributed to the stimuli are on account of an inferential faculty contained within the brain. It would be supposed that such a faculty, simply labeled ‘perception’ in cognitive psychology, would be the result of an interplay between the actual physical sensory input and previously learned reactions and emotions that come together to formulate the ultimate interpretation of sensory inputs.
According to modern cognitive neuroscience, the faculty of short-term or working memory lies within the hippocampus, which is part of the limbic system of the brain underneath the cerebral cortex. Once short-term information is retained within the hippocampus, it becomes transferred and stored within various parts of the cerebral cortex if practiced or deliberated upon.
Imam al-Ghazālī is answering the objections of those who assert that character cannot be developed and that human beings are ultimately driven by biological or predisposed drives. Though Imam al-Ghazālī acknowledges differences in the biological composition of individuals, he draws an important distinction between character development and inherent personality dispositions. He says for example in IḥyāʾʿUlūm al-Dīn (Revival of the Religious Sciences), “the causes of being overcome by appetitive or aggressive drives may be on account of: (i) inherent dispositions or (ii) habituation and social modeling. Sometimes an individual may be born with a preparedness for [releasing] anger such that their face naturally appears angry”. This demonstrates the sophisticated approach of al-Ghazālī in describing inherent dispositions toward some characteristics, while they are most certainly possible to bring within the path of moderation such that they do not become pathological nor pathways to immorality. While all individuals possess underlying aggressive and appetitive drives, the degree and specific inclinations vary from person to person based upon their inherent predispositions and personality compositions. In fact, Mulla Alī Qārī, a traditionist and Ḥanafī jurist cites the hadith, “If you hear of a mountain moving from its place, then certainly believe it, however, if you hear that a man has changed his character then do not believe it, for he will [behave] in correspondence to what he has been predisposed to do” in his commentary on the Mishkāt al-Maṣābīḥ, entitled Mirqāt al-mafātīḥ. Mulla Alī Qārī provides an explanation to this ḥadīth that seems to apparently contradict with other ahadith that instruct Muslims to perfect and develop their characters. However, he outlines that there is no real contradiction in that this hadith is simply demonstrating that changing one’s character especially for those whose predisposed tendencies contravene prosocial traits can be difficult. He goes as far as to say that the inherent dispositions that an individual experiences can never be fully eradicated even if they have been able to train their actions to act in accordance with moral injunctions. For example, if an individual possesses miserliness on account of an inherent risk aversive personality disposition, then generously spending or donating to charities may always serve as a challenge for him. However, through training and self-discipline he most certainly can develop the characteristic of generosity even if he may continually feel some inner pain or anxiety upon giving. Psychologists too highlight that habituation through practiced goal directed behavior overtime, can generate an ability to ingrain these habituated actions such that they emerge automatically later without conscious deliberation or exertion (Nancy E. Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory (New York: Routledge, 2010), 14; 39–62; Helen Y. Weng et al., “Compassion Training Alters Altruism and Neural Responses to Suffering” 24, no. 7 (2013): 1171–80.).
Al-Ghazālī also maintains that social modeling plays an important role in explaining human behaviors in his saying, “to mingle with a [social] group that prides themselves of releasing their anger and obeying their aggressive impulses. They consider this to be bravery and masculinity.” Thus, through a process of social modeling, individuals may adopt unhealthy aggression. This bears resemblance to the role of social modeling discussed by Albert Bandura (Albert Bandura, Social learning theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, (1977).).
In contrast, the nature versus nurture debate is still one of the most enduring in the field of psychology. While those who support nature in this debate attach all importance to heredity, those that favor nurture give all credit to the environment. Nativists take the position that all or most behaviors and characteristics are the results of inheritance, while humanistic psychologists tend to favor the environment or nurture (Abraham H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50, no. 4 (1943): 370–96; Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961).). Similarly, behaviorists believed that all behavior could be traced to environmental conditions as exemplified by the famous statement John Watson, “Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select – doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors” (John B. Watson, Behaviorism (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1930), echoing his predecessor John Locke, who asserted that human beings are born as a blank slate (tabula rasa).
This is a clear demonstration of the holistic epistemological approach of Islamic scholars. Prior to even citing revelation to substantiate his claims, he used both rational and empirical evidence to prove his argument.
Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr states in istidhkār, that this is from the statements of the philosopher physicians and not authentically transmitted from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace (see Abū ‘Umar Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Istidhkār, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2000), 524.). Hafidh al-ʿIrāqī stated in his investigation of the ahadith of Imam al-Ghazālī’s Revival of the Religious Sciences that this hadith has been transmitted by Bayḥaqī in the chapter “branches of faith” wherein it is a narration of Maṭraf bin ʿAbdullah that is consecutively missing two narrators within the chain (muʿḍal) (see Abū al-Faḍl ’Irāqī, Al-Mughnī ’an Ḥaml al-Asfār (Lubnān: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2005), 1064.).
This principle is consistent with the concept of reciprocal inhibition whereby one attempts to replace an undesired response to a situation with a more desirable one through counterconditioning. Thus, the alternative response needs to be trained and conditioned until it becomes internalized and automated (Wolpe Joseph, Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition (California: Stanford University Press, 1958).).
Forensic psychology is the discipline of psychology that explores the intersection between legal insanity and mental status. The American Board of Forensic Psychology defines it as, “the application of the science and profession of law to questions and issues relating to psychology and the legal system.” Islamic law, despite its comparatively distant origins, has long established that the legal status of an individual with regards to rights and responsibilities may change on account of their mental condition. This is exemplified by the tradition of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, “The pen has been lifted from three: (i) the insane one until he recovers …” (cf. Abū Dāwūd al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd (Lebanon: Dār al-Risāla al-’Ālamiyya, 2009), 4398). Thus, the determination of whether or not some clinical syndromes impact the legal obligations or rights of Muslims is instrumental to their societal, communal, familial, and personal lives. While forensic psychology, within a secular context, typically only covers criminal and civil issues, the scope of forensic psychology in an Islamic context is much wider. This is because even the personal religious obligations of Muslims may be impacted by their mental status, including issues of whether individuals are liable for performing their prayers, fasting, etc. For example, those with severe expressions of Obsessive Compulsive Disorders (OCD) may not be held liable even if the patient did not wash a particular limb properly, made a pronouncement of divorce incidentally (that typically nullifies his marriage), or missed an aspect of prayer, as they may be exempted on account of severe clinical dysfunction (Hooman Keshavarzi et al., eds., Applying Islamic Principles to Clinical Mental Health Care: Introducing Traditional Islamically Integrated Psychotherapy, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2020).). Thus, this section translated above provides a good overview of the major legal categories of insanity that have various implications on the rights and responsibilities of Muslims.
It is crucial to note that a prerequisite for accountability in Islamic law is mental competence (ahliyya). One who does not properly possess such, as indicated by, (i) conception (idrāk), (ii) willful intent (irāda), (iii) volition (ikhtiyār), (iv) appreciation of the consequences of one’s actions, (v) presence of mind (aql) or awareness of one’s actions, is effectively not liable (ghayr mukallaf) under Islamic law (Hooman Keshavarzi and Bilal Ali, “Forensic Psychology in Islamic Jurisprudence,” in Oxford Encyclopedia of Islamic Bioethics, 2016.).
It is also important to note that insanity is not a clinical term, but a legal one. The central interest of the courts and the legal system is to determine responsibilities, rights, and liabilities, whereas clinical categories are created in order to differentiate the type of mental dysfunction one is afflicted with in the interest of treatment and recovery. This is why there are a plethora of clinical categories, whereas in legal settings there are comparably only a few; such are primarily concerned with the question of whether or not an individual was of sound mind when engaging in a particular legal or illegal behavior irrespective of what that may be referred to as in clinical settings. In sum, it is to cast a judgement on someone, not to determine the course of treatment.
This is in reference to Muhammad ibn Farāmarz’s (d. 886/1454) renowned work Durar al-Hukkām Sharḥ Gharaz al-Aḥkām.
The author is referencing Muhammad al-Khadimi’s (d. 1176/1763) Majāmiʿ al-Ḥaqāʾiq, which is an authoritative work in the principles of jurisprudence according to the Ḥanafī school of Islamic law.
This may also simply include impaired reality testing, such as when one falsely perceives or interprets reality.
The author is referencing Mullā Shams al-Dīn al-Fenārī’s (d. 863/1431) work on Ḥanafī legal theory, Fuṣūl al-Badāʾiʿ fī Uṣūl al-Sharāʾiʿ. Mullā al-Fenārī was one of the most renowned early representatives of the Ottoman scholarly legacy.
Here, the author is providing an explanation of what is intended by the earlier statement, “a majnūn muṭbaq is one whose insanity remains at all times.” Since continuity cannot encompass an entire lifetime, as this would be exceedingly difficult to apply, and just saying “remains all the time” does not provide a specific time frame, the author is clarifying the potential legal thresholds required to qualify for this category as outlined by the authoritative legal manuals.
Meaning, if the insanity has extended beyond one year, then the individual can no longer independently initiate or fulfill legally binding contracts. If they were to do so, such would be considered null and void.
This is in reference to Fatāwā Khāniyya, which is a collection of the legal edicts of the renowned Ḥanafī jurist Fakhr al-Dīn Ḥasan al-Farghānī, more famously known as Qāḍī Khān (d. 592/1160).
Radd al-Muḥtār is one of the most commonly cited jurisprudential works of the Ḥanafī school, cataloguing the collection of responses to practical legal issues. It is authored by the Syrian scholar Muḥammad Amīn ibn ʿĀbidīn (d. 1268/1836).
Also called the Uṣūl or Masāaʾil al-Uṣūl, this collection of the rulings of the Ḥanafī school is contained in five books of Imam Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī. Ibn ʿĀbidīn lists them as:
al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr.
al-Jāmiʿ al-Saghīr.
al-Siyar al-Kabīr.
al-Siyar al-Ṣaghīr.
al-Mabsūṭ (also called al-Aṣl).
al-Ziyādāt.
Some Ḥanafī scholars did not include the two Siyar collections listed above amongst the books classed as ẓāhir al-riwāya, meaning that which is narrated from Imam Muḥammad through numerous reliable narrators and clearly established mass-transmitted or well-known chains. The ẓāhir al-riwāya primarily serve as a compendium of the legal opinions of the three preeminent imams of the Ḥanafī school (aṣḥāb al-madhhab), namely Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, and Muhammad. However, the books do not limit themselves to the rulings of these three; they include the legal opinions of other eminent scholars both within the framework of the Ḥanafī school, and beyond it as well.
This may include manic episodes of bipolar, temporary psychotic episodes, or features associated with other similar mental health conditions.
Given that non-remittent insanity is assumed to be lifelong, and it is difficult to definitively predict whether an individual will be insane for their entire lifetime, scholars have outlined specific thresholds of time that once met, allow for such an individual to be categorized as being afflicted with non-remittent insanity. This is in the interest of having clearly defined categories based on objective evaluations of time. However, if such an individual recovers from the seemingly “permanent” non-remittent insanity, they will find themselves in two categories at the same time; being ruled previously to be in the category of non-remittent insanity and then later impermanent or intermittent insanity on account of their unexpected recovery. All in all, the author is merely pointing out some of the potential problems of leaving intermittent insanity (junūn ghayr muṭbiq) undefined without a time frame.
In order to avoid this overlap, the author is stating that the definitions or thresholds that are adopted should be mutually exclusive of the other. For example, in contractual dealings, if more than one year is adopted as the threshold at which to categorize someone as suffering from non-remittent insanity, (junūn muṭbiq), then intermittent insanity (junūn ghayr mutbiq) should be defined to be less than one year.
This is particularly relevant to mental health settings, wherein all contractual arrangements pertaining to a patient suffering from non-remittent insanity will thus be handed over to a guardian who will assume responsibility for the patient’s transactions and dealings.
Clinically, this is most likely in reference to one who possesses intellectual deficiency (ID), or what used to be called mental retardation.
This can include those with mild intellectual deficiency, or, more generally, impulse control disorders.
Thus, his deficiency is in not knowing the appropriate amount to spend.