1 Sources of Knowledge. Al-Kifāya fī al-Hidāya1 by Imam Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580 AH/1184 AD)
1.1 Author’s Biography
Imam Abū Muḥammad Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd ibn Abī Bakr al-Bukhārī, also known as Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī, lived during the 6th century after the Hijra. He was a prominent Ḥanafī-Māturīdī scholar from Bukhāra (in modern day Uzbekistan) and is known to have held theological debates with famous scholars from other theological schools of thought, such as Fakhr al-Dīn Al-Rāzī who represents the Ashʿarī school of theology. Imam Fakhr al-Dīn reports in his book, “Munāẓarāt Jarāt fī Bilād ma Warā’ al-Nahr” that on his journey to Hajj at the end of his life, Imam al-Ṣābūni stopped and gave lectures at gatherings of knowledge in both Iraq and Khurasan. This is an indication toward the respect that was afforded to him for his scholarly contributions. He is most famously known for his text on the Māturīdī school of theology entitled, “Al-Bidāya fī Uṣūl al-Dīn2”. In fact, he is often simply referred to as “Ṣāḥib al-bidāya” (The author of al-bidāya). Imam al-Ṣābūnī died in 1184 CE in Bukhara.
1.2 Text Overview and Significance
Al-Bidāya fī Uṣūl al-Dīn is an expansive theological text that belongs to the genre of discursive theology (ʿilm al-kalām), and it is considered one of the central texts representing the Māturīdī school of Islamic theology. More specifically, the text deals with a wide range of theological principles and questions and it clarifies the Māturīdī opinions in contrast to other contemporaneous opinions and theological positions. This text, like many other texts of discursive theology, starts with epistemological foundations explicating the sources of knowledge, laying the foundation for the types of proofs and sources of knowledge that are considered admissible in proving the trueness of any reality or claim. This first section which deals with epistemology is the part selected for the purposes of this book. It is then followed by 5 major sections: the first section deals with questions related to Divinity (ilāhiyyāt), the second section deals with questions related to prophethood (nubuwwāt), the third section deals with questions of Imamate, the fourth section deals with questions of taʿdīl and tajwīr (imputation of justice and injustice), and the final section deals with issues pertaining to revealed and narrated traditions (samʿiyyāt).
The text establishes that rational, sacred, and empirical sources of knowledge can be congruous and not at odds with each other, demonstrating a multiplex epistemological framework in providing a holistic approach to understanding reality and levels of knowing that reality. This is among the most critical conversations that can be brought into the field of an Islamic psychology, providing us a foundation for understanding which sources of knowledge can be used to construct an understanding of human psychology.
1.3 Arabic Text
القول في مدارك العلوم
اعلم أن العلم الحادث نوعان: ضروري واكتسابي. فالضروري هو ما يُحدثه اللّٰه تعالى في نفس العالم من غير کسبه واختياره، کالعلم بوجود نفسه وتغير أحواله من الجوع والعطش واللذة والألم. واختصاصه أن لا يتمكن العالِم من دفع هذا العلم من نفسه ولا يقدر على تشكيك نفسه فيه، ويشترك في هذا النوع من العلم جميع الحيوانات. وأما الاكتسابي فهو ما يُحدثه اللّٰه تعالى بواسطة کسب العبد، وهو مباشرة أسبابه. وله أسباب ثلاثة: الحواس السليمة، والخبر الصادق، ونظر العقل.
أما الحواس السليمة فهي خمسة: السمع والبصر والشّم والذوق واللمس، وكل حاسة تختص بنوع من الـمُدرَكات إذا استُعمِلت فيها تفيد العلم. وأما الخبر الصادق فنوعان. أحدهما الخبر المتواتر، وهو ما يُسمَع من أشخاص مختلفة في أحوال مختلفة بحيث لا يُتوهم أنهم توافقوا على
الكَذِب فيه؛ وهو موجب للعلم الضروري، کالعلم بوجود الملوك الماضية والبلدان القاصية. والثاني الخبر الـمُؤيَّد بالمعجزة من الأنبياء، وهو موجب للعلم القطعي ولكن بطريق الاستدلال. وأما نظر العقل فهو سبب للعلم أيضًا، و الحاصل منه نوعان: ضروري ويُسمى بديهيًّا، وهو ما يحصل بأول النظر من غير تفکر، کالعلم بأن كل شيء أعظم من جزئه؛ واستدلالي، وهو ما يُحتاج فيه إلى ضرب تفكر ونوع تأمل، كالعلم بوجود النار عند رؤية الدخان. وحصول العلم بهذه الأسباب مُشاهَد لمن أنصف ولم يعاند.
وأنكرت السمنية والبراهمة كون الخبر من أسباب العلم، وقالت: الخبر يتنوع إلى صدق وكذب، وما يتردد بين الصدق والكذب لا يفيد العلم. قلنا: هذا الكلام خبر منكم أيضًا فلا يفيد العلم على زعمكم. ثم هذا لا يُلزِمنا فإنا عَنَيْنا الخبر الصادق وأنه لا يتنوع، ولأن الخبر لو لم يكن سببًا للعلم كيف يعرف الإنسان والده وأخاه وعمه وخاله وسائر أقربائه، إذ لا طريق لمعرفة هؤلاء إلا بالخبر.
وأنكرت الملحدة والرافضة والمشبهة كون العقل من أسباب العلم وقالت: قضايا العقل متناقضة بدليل أن العقلاء اختلفوا فيما بينهم. وكل واحد منهم يثبت قوله بالعقل، وما تناقضت قضاياه لا يصلح أن يكون سببًا للعلم.
قلنا: بِمَ عرفتم أن العقل ليس من أسباب العلم، والأسباب محصورة في العقل والخبر والحس؟ إن قلتم: {{بالعقل}}، فقد ناقضتم حيث قلتم: علمنا بالعقل أن العقل ليس من أسباب العلم. وإن قلتم: {{بالخبر}}، فمن أخبركم أن العقل ليس من أسباب العلم وبِمَ عرفتم أن ذلك الخبر صدق أم كذب؟ وإن قلتم : {{بالحس}}، فبأي حاسة علمتم ذلك والحواس محصورة؟ ولأن العقل لو لم يكن من أسباب العلم بطل أن يكون الخبر من أسباب العلم، إذ لا يمكن التمييز بين الصادق والكاذب إلا بالعقل، وبدون التمييز لا يحصل العلم بالخبر، وقولكم: {{تناقضت قضاياه فلا يكون سببًا للعلم}}، قلنا: هذا نظر منكم بالعقل، فكيف تنفون النظر بالنظر؟ فإن قالوا: نعارض الفاسد بالفاسد، قلنا: معارضة الفاسد بالفاسد معارضة الشيء بمثله وإنه من باب العقل أيضا؛ فكيف ما كان ففيه إثبات العقل والنظر.
ثم نقول: لا تتناقض قضايا العقول ولا يجوز فيها التناقض وإن كان أقوال العقلاء متناقضة، لأن العقل حجة اللّٰه على عباده، والتناقض عن حجج اللّٰه تعالى منفيّ. وإنما وقع الاختلاف بين العقلاء إما لتقصيرهم في مراعاة شرائط النظر أو لقصورهم عن بلوغ درجة النظر، فإن للنظر شرائط تجب رعايتها ليفيد العلم. وكذا العقول متفاوتة في أنفسها، فربما قَصُرَ عقله عن معرفة ذلك فحكم بالطبع والهوى وظنّ أنه من قضيات العقل. فأما أن تختلف قضايا العقول فلأمثال ذلك إذا قيل لك: کم اثنين في اثنين؟، قلت: أربعة، وهذا من قضيات العقل لا يحتمل غير ذلك ولا يختلف فيه العقلاء كثير اختلاف. فإن قيل لك: کم ستة عشر في ستة عشر؟ قلت: مائتان وست وخمسون، ولكن يُحتاج فيه إلى زيادة تأمل واجتهاد ورعاية شروط النظر حتي يخرج ما هو المبلغ من عدد الضرب. وربما يقع الاختلاف بين العقلاء في جواب هذا السؤال. وما هو حقيقة المبلغ في قضية العقل لا يحتمل الاختلاف وإن اختلف جواب العقلاء في ذلك؛ ولكن لو راعى كل واحد من العقلاء ما هو شرط النظر لعرف أن مبلغه ما قلنا. ولو وقع الاختلاف كان الاختلاف راجعًا إلى التقصير في رعاية شرائط النظر لا إلى اختلاف قضية العقل. واعتَبِر هذا بنظر العين فإن المرئيات متنوعة، منها ما هو بديهي يحصل العلم به بأول نظرة كالنظر إلى السماء والقمر ليلة البدر لا تختلف فيه النُّظَّار، ومنها ما لا يحصل العلم إلا بنوع جهد وكلفة كالنظر إلى القطب في السماء والهلال في أول الشهر، وربما يقع الاختلاف فيه. وهذا الاختلاف راجع إلي أحد الأمرين: إما إلى التقصير من جهة الناظر أو إلى قصور آلة النظر. واللّٰه الموفق.
1.4 English Translation
On the Sources of Knowledge
Know that temporal knowledge3 is of two types: intuitive knowledge (ḍarūrị̄) and acquired knowledge (iktisābī). Intuitive knowledge is that which Allah the Exalted effectuates in the knower’s self without their acquisition or choice, such as knowledge of one’s own existence, and the [distinctive awareness] of one’s varying states like hunger, thirst, pleasure, and pain. Its distinguishing attribute is that a person is incapable of repelling such knowledge from one’s own self; they are furthermore unable to harbor any skepticism regarding it. All animals share this particular type of knowledge. As for acquired knowledge, it is what Allah Exalted confers via a person’s undertaking [and choice], which is interaction with its occasions (asbāb). [This type of knowledge] has three sources: sound senses, true reports, and intellectual reasoning.4
As for the sound senses, there are five: hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch. Each sense corresponds to a specific type of perception. When each sense is utilized for [the corresponding type of perception], they will provide knowledge.5
As for true reports, it is of two types. The first of the two is the massively and congruently transmitted report (khabar mutawātir), namely that which is heard from (a multitude of) separate individuals in different states such that it is unimaginable for them to have agreed upon a falsehood within it.6 [Such a report] establishes intuitive knowledge (ʿilm ḍarūrī), like the knowledge of past kings and distant lands. The second is the report7 that is accompanied by a miracle from the prophets.8 [Such a report] establishes certain (qaṭʿī) knowledge, however by way of inference9 (istidlāl).10
As for intellectual reasoning, it is also a source of knowledge. In sum, it is of two types: the intuitive (ḍarūrī),11 also called the self-evident (badīhī)12 – which is what is obtained by preliminary reflection without [need for] any deliberation, such as knowledge that any sum is greater than its parts. [The other is] inferential (istidlalī) knowledge, which requires some type of deliberation and contemplation, such as knowledge of the existence of fire upon seeing smoke.
The acquisition of knowledge from these sources is an [obviously] observable affair to one who is fair and does not obstinately resist. The Śramaṇa13 (al-sumaniyya) and Brahmins14 (al-barāhima) deny15 that reports are from the sources of knowledge.16 They say: reports are categorizable into either truth or falsehood, and that which can vacillate between truth and falsehood cannot provide knowledge. We say [in response]: this statement itself is a report and as such should not establish knowledge according to your own claim. Moreover, this argument does not corner us, for our intent is a true report which does not vacillate. Furthermore, if reports are not sources of knowledge, how would mankind have knowledge of their fathers, brothers, paternal uncles, maternal uncles, and all other relatives, as there is no way of knowing them except through reports?
The heretics (al-mulḥida),17 extreme Shīʿa (al-rawāfiḍ), and the anthropomorphists (al-mushabbiha) deny reason as a [certain] source of knowledge. They say: rational propositions are contradictory, evidenced by the fact that rational people differ with one another (in their conclusions), and yet each of them establishes their claim through reason.18 Thus, that which has contradictory propositions cannot be fit to be a source of knowledge.
We say: How do you know that reason is not a [certain] source of knowledge, given that the sources [of knowledge] are limited to reason, reports, and sensory perception? If you say: “[We know this] through reason”, then you have contradicted yourself, since you have [essentially] stated that “we know through reason that reason is not a source of knowledge”. If you state: “[We know this] through reports”, then who reported to you that reason is not from the sources of knowledge, and how do you know whether that report is true or false? If you say: “[We know this] through sensory perception”, then by which sense do you know that, given that the senses are limited?
Furthermore, if reason is not a source of knowledge, reports will also not be a valid source of knowledge, as discernment between a true [report] and a false [report] is not possible without reason, and without discernment, knowledge of a report is not attainable. [As for] your statement: “Its propositions are contradictory, therefore it cannot be a source of knowledge”, we respond: “This is [in fact] investigation (naẓar) through reason! How can you deny rational investigation using rational investigation?!” If they say, “We are contradicting the invalid with the invalid”, we respond: “Contradicting the invalid with the invalid is a contradiction of something with its like, which is from the category of reason as well”. So however, the matter may be, in all of this is justification for [the epistemic value] reason and investigation.
Further, we say: rational prepositions are not contradictory. Contradiction is not possible in them even if the statements of people of reason are contradictory, because reason is a proof of Allah against His slaves, and there can be no contradiction in Allah the Exalted’s proofs. Differences between people of reason only occur due to either their inadequate observance of the conditions of rational investigation or due to their inability to reach the level of [sound] rational investigation, as certain conditions must be observed to establish [certain] knowledge through rational investigation. Similarly, intellects are diverse in themselves. Perhaps one’s intellect is deficient in recognizing that [knowledge] and thus judges based on their temperament and caprice, thinking it to be a proposition of reason. As for the [idea of] differences in rational propositions, then for examples of that [difference], [consider] if you are asked: “What is two multiplied by two?” you would say: “four”. This is a rational proposition that does not carry any other possibility in which people of reason do not much differ. Then, if you are asked: “What is sixteen multiplied by sixteen?” you say: “two hundred and fifty-six”. This, however, requires more deliberation, effort, and observance of the conditions of rational investigation in order for the product of the multiplication to be reached. It is perhaps in the answer to this question that a difference between the people of reason may occur. [As for] the true product according to the proposition of reason, it does not carry the possibility of a difference, even if the answers of people of reason may differ in that regard. However, if every rational person observed the conditions of rational investigation, they would realize that its total is what we stated. Even if differences were to occur the disparity therein would go back to the inadequate observance of the conditions of sound rational investigation and not to the propositions of reason. Consider this [in comparison to] ocular vision, for what is ocularly perceived (i.e., things observable with the eye) is [also] diverse, some of which is self-evident, knowledge of it being acquired upon first glance, such as seeing the sky and the moon on the night of a full moon over which viewers do not differ. Some of [those perceived things] are [such that] knowledge of them is not acquired except with some effort and difficulty, such as seeing the polestar in the sky or the new crescent moon at the beginning of the month; [in these] perhaps disparities may occur. This disparity originates in one of two things: either a deficiency from the perspective of one’s ocular vision, or a deficiency in the instrument of one’s vision. And Allah is the one who grants success.
2 All That the Prophet (May Allah Bless Him and Grant Him Peace) Brought from Allah Is Self-Evident (Badīhī). The Letters of Imam Rabānnī (Al-Maktūbāt al-Rabbāniyya) by Mujaddid al-Alf al-Thānī al-Imam al-Rabbanī, Aḥmad al-Sirhindī (d. 1033 AH/1624 CE)
2.1 Author’s Biography
Shaykh Aḥmad al-Sirhindī was born on May 24 in the year 972 AH/1564 CE and is considered to be one of the most important figures of the Naqshbandī Sufī order. He is also often simply referred to as al-Imam al-Rabbānī. He was also a Hanafī scholar who hailed from the town of Sirhind in India and traced his paternal lineage to the second caliph of Islam, ʿUmar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him). He was given the honorific title of Mujaddid al-alf al-Thani (the reviver of the second Millennium) by his disciples. In fact, the disciples that follow him in the lineage of the Naqshabanī Sufi order are referred to as belonging to the mujaddidī arm of the order. He was known for his opposition to the mughal ruler of India, Akbar’s innovation of a new religion known as Din-ilahi which was a synthesis of Islam and Hinduism. The period of Akbar was a time of mass confusion among the Muslim orthodoxy in the Indian subcontinent, and he is said to have made a concerted effort to contend with and single handedly reversed such trends back to the traditional understanding of Islam that was re-established under the rulership of succeeding Mughal ruler Aurangzeb. According to many contemporary historians, Sirhindī is a major figure in effecting major changes to Islam’s progression in the Indian context. He died on December 10 in the year 1033 AH/1624 CE and is buried in his birthplace of Sirhind. His tomb is also referred to as the Rawza Sharīf.
2.2 Text Overview and Significance
His Maktubat (“Letters”) is the most famous of his compilations, and it consists of letters written to his friends in India and the region north of the Amu Darya (river). It was through these letters that Shaykh Ahmad’s major contribution to Islamic thought can be traced, and teachings continue. The compilation consists of 534 letters to nearly 200 people. These letters deal with a variety of subjects connected with Sufī thought, and it is through these letters that his metaphysical and mystical teachings are preserved.
The psychological significance of the selected letter in this work is due to its dealing with the notion of fitra in the Islamic tradition. The prophet Muḥammad (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) is reported to have said ‘No child is born but that he is upon the fitra ….’ The fitra is understood to mean the primordial inclination for spiritually connecting with God and intrinsic awareness of morality without the need for external proof. Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī purports that belief in God, the prophethood of the Messenger of God (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), and everything that was conveyed by him revealed to him from God are all self-evident truths (badīhī). Thus, purporting that human beings are in essence capable of deducing morality and acting in accordance with it. However, he stipulates that understanding morality is only self-evident to those whose inner comprehension is free of [spiritual illnesses]. To substantiate his claim, he draws upon a medical analogy of the one who is unable to taste the sweetness of honey on account of a sickness by saying: ‘don’t you see that a person with ageusia (safrāwī), for instance, so long as he suffers from ageusia (safrāʾ), the sweetness of sugar and honey for him needs to be established by [external] evidence? However, after he is cured from that illness, he no longer needs any [external] evidence. Thus, there is no contradiction between his need for proof on account of the presence of a sickness and its [i.e., the reality that honey is sweet] being self-evident in its nature.’ He offers that one needs to focus on curing the disease itself, not on attempting to convince the individual intellectually while his sensory perception says otherwise. Thus, Sirhindī presents a bottom-up approach to understanding reality and maintaining realistic and cognitive health. This entails the behavioral and spiritual cleansing of one’s unhealthy habits and environments that serves to influence or distort one’s cognitive faculties. Due to habituated habits, individuals may rationalize these unhealthy behaviors, losing their ability to see their problematic nature. Thus, instead of proposing cognitive restructuring by intellectually debating, challenging their evidence or psychoeducation, he proposes that behavioral interventions focus on removing the behavioral and environmental conditions causing these cognitive distortions of reality in the first place.
2.3 Arabic Text
جميع ما جاء به النبي صلى اللّٰه عليه وسلم من عند اللّٰه عز وجل بديهي:
قال رضي اللّٰه عنه أيضًا في مكتوبه إلى الشيخ فريد البخاري في بيان أن جميع ما جاء به صلى اللّٰه عليه وسلم من عند اللّٰه بديهي ما يلي:
”اعلم أن وجود الباري تعالى وتقدّس وكذلك وحدانيته سبحانه، بل نبوة محمد رسول اللّٰه ﷺ، بل جميع ما جاء به من عند اللّٰه بديهي لا يحتاج إلى فکر ودليل، على تقدير سلامة القوة المدرِكة من الآفات الرديّة والأمراض المعنوية.
والنظر والفكر فيها مقصور على زمن وجود العلة وثبوت الآفة، وأما بعد النجاة من المرض القلبي وزوال الغشاوة البصرية فلا شيء سوى البداهة، ألا ترى أن الصفراوي مثلا ما دام مبتلى بعلة الصفراء يحتاج إثبات حلاوة السكر والعسل عنده إلى الدليل، ولكن إذا تخلّص من تلك العلة لا يحتاج إلى دليل أصلا، ولا منافاة بين احتياجه إلى الدليل الناشئ عن وجود الآفة وبين بداهته يعني في ذاته، ألا ترى أن الأحول يرى الواحد اثنين ويحكم بعدم وحدته، فهو معذور في هذا الحكم، ولا يخرج حکمه هذا الناشئ من الآفة فيه وحدة ذلك الواحد من البداهة ولا يدخلها في النظرية.
ومن المحقَّق أن ميدان الاستدلال ضيق جدا وحصول اليقين من طريق الدليل والنظر والفكر متعذر، فكان فكر إزالة المرض القلبي لتحصيل الإيمان اليقيني ضروريا، كما أن إزالة علّة الصفراء في تحصيل اليقين بحلاوة السكر أشد ضرورة من إقامة الدليل على حلاوة السكر، وكيف يحصل اليقين به بإقامة الدليل عليه مع حكم وجدانه بمرارته بسبب علة الصفراء القائم به، وهكذا الحكم فيما نحن فيه، فإن النفس الأمارة منكِرة للأحكام الشرعية بالذات وحاكمة بتناقضها بالطبع، فتحصيل اليقين بحقّية هذه الأحكام الصادقة من طريق الدليل مع وجود إنکار وجدان المستدل عليه عسير جدا، فكانت تزكية النفس ضرورية لتعسر حصول اليقين اللازم الحصول بدونها (قد أفلح من زكاها. وقد خاب من دساها) (الشمس: ۹-١٠)، فتقرر أن منكِر هذه الشريعة الباهرة والملة الطاهرة الظاهرة معلول بعلة مثل منکر حلاوة السكر، ولكن:
فالمقصود من السير والسلوك وتزكية النفس وتصفية القلب هو إزالة الآفات المعنوية والأمراض القلبية المشار إليها بقوله تعالى: (في قلوبهم مرض) (البقرة: ١۰)، لتحقق حقيقة الإيمان، فإن وجد الإيمان مع وجود هذه الآفات فإنما هو بحسب الظاهر فقط؛ لأن وجدان النفس الأمارة حاكم بخلافه، وهي مصرّة على كفرها، ومَثَلُ هذا الإيمان الصوري مثل إيمان الصفراوي بحلاوة السكر في كون وجدانه حاكما وشاهدا بخلافه، فكما أن اليقين الحقيقي بحلاوة السكر إنما يحصل بعد زوال مرض الصفراء كذلك حقيقة الإيمان -يعني بحقيّة الأحكام الشرعية وصدقها- إنما تحصل بعد تزكية النفس واطمئنانها، وحينئذ يصير الإيمان وجدانيا.
وهذا القسم من أقسام الإيمان محفوظ من الزوال لقوله تعالى: (ألَآ إن أولياء اللّٰه لا خوف عليهم ولا هم يحزنون) (يونس: ٦٢) صادق في شأن صاحبه، شرفنا اللّٰه سبحانه بشرف هذا الإيمان الكامل الحقيقي بحرمة النبي الأمي القرشي عليه وعلى آله من الصلوات أفضلها ومن التسليات أكملها“.
2.4 English Translation
All that the Prophet (May Allah bless him & grant him peace) brought from Allah is Self-Evident (Badīhī)19
[Al-Imam al-Rabbānī Mujaddid al-Alf al-Thānī Shaykh Aḥmad al-Sirhindī] (may Allah be pleased with him), in his letter to Shaykh Farīd al-Bukhārī, explains that everything that Allah revealed to the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) is self-evident (badīhī),20 as follows:
Know that the existence and oneness of the Creator – Exalted, Sanctified, and Glorified be He – as well as the prophethood of the Messenger of Allah Muḥammad (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), and even more so, everything that he conveyed from Allah is self-evident (badīhī) and does not require deliberation or establishment by proofs, – assuming that [a person’s] faculty of comprehension (quwwa mudrika) is free of cognitive impairments and spiritual illnesses.21
The need for investigation and deliberation over [matters of revelation] is restricted to the duration of the presence of disease and determination of disorder.22 However, after the heart is relieved of any illnesses and the curtain of the inner eye is removed, then nothing remains except self-evidence. Do you not see that a person with ageusia23 (ṣafrāwī), for instance, if he suffers from ageusia (safrāʾ) the sweetness of sugar and honey needs to be established by [external] evidence. However, after he is free from such an illness, he no longer needs any [external] evidence. There is no incompatibility between his need for proof on account of the presence of a sickness and its self-evidence in its nature (i.e., that the honey and sugar are inherently sweet in and of themselves). Do you not see that a person with diplopia24 (aḥwal) sees one thing as two and judges that it is not singular? He is exempted in [making such a] judgment. This [faulty] judgment of his, arising out of the sickness in his eyes, does not remove the self-evident nature of the oneness of that singular object, nor does it place it into [the realm of] investigative (naẓarī) knowledge.25
It is clear that the domain of investigation of proofs is especially limited, and achieving true certainty (yaqīn) through evidence, theorization, and deliberation is near impossible. Thus, deliberating over the eradication of spiritual illnesses in order to attain conviction (yaqīn) is imperative, just as the elimination of the ageusia disorder in order to acquire certainty of the sugar’s sweetness is more essential than providing evidence for the sugar’s sweetness.26
How can (one) achieve certainty through the establishment of evidence for the sugar’s sweetness while his sensory experiences render it bitter on account of his enduring ageusia disorder?27 This similarly holds true for our topic of discussion, for the nafs ammāra inherently denies religious legal injunctions by its very being and makes judgements of contradiction in it by its very nature.
Thus, acquiring any certainty of the truthfulness of these true religious injunctions by way of intellectual proof is incredibly difficult while one’s internal experience is attempting to prove otherwise. Hence, purification of the nafs is necessary, because reaching that certainty which is imperative to attain is impossible without it. Successful indeed is the one who purifies their soul, and doomed is the one who corrupts it! (Sūrat al-Shams 91:9–10). Thus, it has been established that those who deny this brilliant law and the pure, manifest religion suffer from an illness akin to the one who denies the sweetness of sugar.
The ultimate objective of traversing the spiritual path, cleansing the soul, and purification of the heart is the removal of spiritual disorders and the heart’s sicknesses indicated by the Quran: There is sickness in their hearts (Sūrat al-Baqara 2:10), so that the reality of faith can be realized.28 If faith is found to exist concurrently with these illnesses, then [know that] this is [only] with respect to what is apparent, since the disposition of the nafs29 ammāra (the nafs that commands toward evil) is to judge in contradiction to faith while it is insistent upon disbelief. The example of this superficial faith is like the faith of the person with ageusia in the sweetness of sugar while his inner experience testifies and judges contrary to it. Just as true certainty regarding the sweetness of sugar can only occur after the elimination of ageusia, the reality of faith, that is, in the truthfulness of the rulings of divine law, is only attainable after the purification (tazkiya) of the self and its achieving tranquility (iṭmiʾnān). At that point, faith becomes inherent (wijdānī).
This type of faith is protected from elimination, for Allah mentions: There will certainly be no fear for the close servants of Allah, nor will they grieve (Sūrat Yūnus 10:62) and is true for the one who holds it (type of unwavering faith). May Allah the Glorified honor us with this type of perfect, true faith through the sanctity of the unlettered Qurashyī prophet and may the best of salutations and highest degree of peace be upon him and his family.
Al-Sābūnī, Nūr al-Dīn. Al-Kifāya fi-l-Hidaya. Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazam, 2014.
Al-Sābūnī, Nūr al-Dīn. Al-Bidāya min al-Kifāya fī Uṣūl al-Dīn. Cairo: Dār al-Mā’rif, 1969.
Al-Ṣābūnī begins his concise work on discursive theology, al-Bidāya fi Uṣūl al-Dīn, with the following critical preface to this discussion: “Knowledge consists of two types: the eternal (qadīm) and the temporal (ḥādith). The eternal is that which is ascribed to the essence of the Creator and does not resemble the knowledge of that which is temporal. Temporal knowledge is then of two types: intuitive (ḍarūrī) and acquired (iktisābī) …” (al-Ṣābūnī, al-Bidāya min al-Kifāya fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, 29).
In the above classification, al-Ṣābūnī includes true reports that are corroborated by miracles (i.e., revelation) under temporal knowledge. This is not contradictory to the belief that the Quran is in fact eternal (qadīm). This is because the temporal knowledge being referred to here is the knowledge of revelation which is heard through recitation or read from its written form by the believer. Although both are created forms of speech, the actuality of that knowledge is eternal in and of itself as it is the speech of Allah.
This establishes a very important Islamic epistemology that creates a framework for the appropriation and acceptance of both scientific knowledge and divine revelation, effectively breaking the false dichotomy that is commonly held between science and sacred traditions.
It is also important to note that all three sources of knowledge are equal in terms of their providing new knowledge, while they may not be equal in terms of sacredness. Each source is judged in accordance with the strength of its evidence, whether they are certain (qatʿī) or probabilistic (ẓannī). If two objective facts were to seem contradictory to one another, then there is a reconciliation process that is undertaken. The first step in this process is an attempt to reconcile both sources (tawfīq) so that a holistic understanding can be achieved that resolves the apparent tension between the sources. This can be seen in the section of al-Bayjūrī’s discussion on the location of the ‘mind’ (ʿaql). If however a reconciliation process is unachievable, then one source may be given preference (tarjīḥ) over another depending on the strength of its source transmission and/or the consistency and correspondence of its meaning to the principles of religion. Finally, if none of these are possible such as in the case of a verse of the Qurʾan apparently conflicting with established empirical evidence then, the verse may be understood by considering another possible meaning (taʾwīl) for the scriptural source considering the certain (qatiʿ) rational or empirical evidence at hand.
This demonstrates that empirical data can establish certain facts. This is corroborated by al-Nasafī in his Tabṣirat al-Adillah (Nasafī, Tabṣirat al-adillah fī uṣūl al-dīn: ‘alá ṭarīqat al-imām Abī manṣūr al-Māturīdī, ed. Muhammad al- Anwar Hamid Issa (Cairo: The Library of al Azhar, 2011), 125.). This can be extended to include the scientific method within the hard sciences, while ‘soft facts’ built upon qualitative, correlational, or subjective self-reports as is commonplace in the field of psychology may similarly establish only ‘soft’ facts.
A falsehood includes both an intentional lie and fabrication as well as an unintentional error.
What is intended here is reports of revelation being transmitted to a prophet from Allah.
In other words, the proof that the prophets’ reports are undoubtedly true is that Allah granted them inimitable miracles that certify them as bearers of the truth and only the truth. Once Allah has certified them through miracles, to consider the reports of His messengers to be false is essentially akin to stating that Allah lies, which is a logical impossibility.
What is inferred here is that the individual (i.e., prophet) that is reporting revelation from Allah is in fact a truthful individual. This is done through investigation of their character, history, reputation, conduct, etc. Such an investigation provides evidence for the truthfulness of the individual. On top of this, when miracles are bestowed upon such an individual, their claim to prophethood is corroborated by it, leaving no doubt in the mind of the person that they are indeed transmitting revelation.
Reports do not need to establish certain knowledge to inform legal or scientific enquiry. In theological enquiry, however, reports need to be categorical and certain for them to establish Islamic creed, or what is necessary to believe to be considered a believer. In scientific enquiry, such as discussions of mental health principles and practices, the content of probabilistic reports is very valuable even if not categorical.
This contrasts with information that demands thorough investigation and careful deliberation. Badīhī knowledge is such that upon first presentation to an individual it ‘clicks’ and makes sense.
This demonstrates that according to Islamic belief, individuals are born with basic a priori knowledge which is referred to as self-evident (“badīhī”) knowledge. Maturīdī theologians even extend this to include knowledge of some basic universal morals. That is, that individuals are born with an ability to differentiate right from wrong inherently, understand their world and surroundings and have an inborn tendency to believe in a Creator. This perspective differs from the widely accepted notion, advocated by behaviorist psychologists like Pinker, that humans are born as a ‘blank slate.’ (Steven Pinker, “The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature,” Choice Reviews Online 40, no. 07 (March 1, 2003): 40–4305.).
The Sramana is an ancient religious movement in India that began as an offshoot of the Vedic religion but diverged from Vedic Hindu ritualism and the hierarchical authority of the Hindu Brahmin priesthood. Sramanas adopted the path of asceticism and self-denial and largely led monastic lives in the pursuit of spiritual liberation. The Sramana tradition gave rise to Jainism and Buddhism.
The Brahmins represented the priestly class of Vedic Hinduism. They were an exclusive caste of priests and teachers who were believed to be intermediaries between the supposed gods of Vedic Hinduism and common men. Brahmins guarded their exclusive access to the learning found in the Vedas.
This can be likened to post-modernist and social constructivist views in asserting that reports are mere beliefs and notions that individuals differ on cross culturally.
Another interesting note is that the field of psychology has evolved from the old behaviorist notion of dismissing all true reports to accepting the subjective self-report, which has led psychology to become a ‘soft’ science. However, a contradiction remains in doing so in that the science of psychology, despite being willing to accept these subjective self-reports that are not built upon observable realities through the senses, maintains a rejection of scripture that is massively and congruently transmitted through objective self-reports. If psychology is willing to entertain and accept self-reports, then why have they limited them only to intrapsychic experiences such as one’s emotions or attitudes to make conclusions about the reality of human nature while dismissing a rigorous tradition of transmission for revelation contained within the Islamic tradition.
To clarify, the Sramana and the Brahmins did not deny the epistemic value of reports altogether. Rather, they believed that reports can at most establish speculative or probabilistic knowledge and cannot establish knowledge with certainty.
The author is referring to the Bāṭīnī sect of Shī’as.
This same contradiction can also be observed by social constructivists and post-modernists who dismiss objective truth and state that they are all relative or social constructions. The idea that morality, or knowledge is relative or socially constructed is established by them as a ‘universal’ truth, which violates its own premises of the lack of objectivity. Alternatively, an objection could be levied in that social constructivism itself can be alleged to be socially constructed.
Taken from the Arabic translation of the letters of Imam Aḥmad al-Sirhindī al-Fārūqī’s celebrated collection of correspondences on spiritual and theological topics, entitled al-Maktūbāt (Al-Sirhindi Al-Mirani & Senturk, 2016, 96–97). The original text is in Persian and was translated into Arabic.
Badīhī: self-evident, axiomatic; a priori; that which does not need any proof or reflection, as opposed to theoretical (a posteriori; nazarī) knowledge. Here, we see that Imam al-Sirhindī offers a taṣawwufī bottom-up epistemological approach. He suggests that all of revelation (including the rules of sharīʿa) are self-evident to an unbiased mind that is free of ideological preconceptions and materialistic attachments. On the other hand, discursive theologians (mutakallimūn) offer a top-down approach to epistemology, stating that knowledge requires ithbāt (proof). This means that rational, empirical, and scriptural proofs are used to prove Islamic belief and law. Maturidi Sunni scholars go as far as to suggest that the intellect can inherently decipher the difference between universal good and evil, independent of revelation. On the other hand, they do acknowledge that the ability to realize that an action, which is not inherently evil but is evil due to external considerations (qabīḥ lī ghayrihi), is not possible through intellectual judgment alone (e.g., drinking a little bit of wine). In such cases revelation is required to establish its immorality (al-Taftazānī, 2000). Whereas Imam al-Sirhindī seems to indicate that if an individual has a sound mind that is free of materialistic attachments and spiritual ailments, all of revelation would intuitively make sense to them even upon its initial presentation. It seems that a reconciliation between the two approaches may be to consider that it is important for individuals to use the intellect and proofs at the outset to accept Islam. Afterwards, however, everything else would be accepted without objection if they are free of materialistic attachments. This may be likened to the faith of Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq. When people, in astonishing disbelief, informed him that the Prophet (may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) was reported to have been transported to Jerusalem and came back in one night during what is called the Isrāʾ and Miʿrāj (the Night Journey and Ascension), Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq responded contrary to their expectations by exclaiming: “If Muḥammad said it, then he is speaking the truth. I have believed him regarding something even more far-fetched than that: that he receives revelation from the heavens (i.e., that an angel descends from the heavens to him). How can I not believe that he went to Jerusalem and back in a short time while these relate to occurrences on the earth.” (al-Hākim, 1990, 3:81; 4407). In such an instance, he did not find the details of scripture objectionable after he had already committed and accepted the Prophet (may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) as the true prophet of Allah.
This part suggests that revelation is in accordance with what is natural and intuitive to any individual who is free of rational or spiritual ailments. For example, a person who drinks alcohol and considers its consumption normal can claim that drinking alcohol should not be forbidden unless it impairs someone’s ability to avoid hurting others, questioning the dictates of the religion by way of using reason. According to this view, this person questions this prohibition as a rationalization for their spiritual sickness and habit of drinking alcohol rather than accepting it as a prohibition of Allah.
This demonstrates that after one has become Muslim, the continuous need for intellectual proofs and rationale is only needed for the cognitively challenged or spiritually diseased.
The inability to taste, particularly the loss of ability to detect sweetness. The name of this disease in Arabic is etymologically linked to the word yellow, related to the pre-modern Galenic conceptualization of this disease originating in excessive or deficient amounts of yellow bile that disturbs the balance of the four humors. Here we can see that Muslim scholars did not hesitate to utilize the medicinal theories of the time even if they originated in the ancient Greeks so long as they did not conflict with the Sharīʿa. Today, this sickness is referred to as ageusia (Rathee & Jain, 2023).
Double vision, also called diplopia, causes a person to perceive two objects as a single object (Najem & Margolin, 2023).
This is akin to demonstrating evidence for the binding duty of salat or prohibition of alcohol. Just as generating evidence for the sweetness of honey does not indicate that it may not be sweet in actual reality, likewise, establishing evidence by way of proof for the mandates of religion or tenants of Islamic belief does not reduce their truth value.
The solution cannot be providing evidence when there is a sickness which should be treated. Instead of trying to prove that sugar is sweet, one should try to cure the disease.
Even if he is convinced with the evidence, he cannot reach certainty by accepting it, since he internally experiences the opposite.
Here we may highlight an important difference between modern schools of psychology and what is being offered here. According to Imam al-Sirhindī, cognitive distortions must also include distortions of ultimate reality as offered by scripture. This includes matters of faith. Furthermore, he is not suggesting that one merely challenges the evidence of the distortions by appealing to reason alone, since cognition can be used as a rationalizing tool by the lower ego. Since the source of the problem is the ego, and then it must be targeted and cleansed of its sickness to clear one’s cognitive interpretative lens.
This is the lower ego that commands toward evil and that possesses excessive appetitive and aggressive drives. See the al-Ghazālī section on “An Exposition on the Meanings and Connotations of the Terms: Nafs, Rūḥ, ʿAql, and Qalb”.