The Erasmian designation of Christianity as philosophia Christi is well known. If one assumes that it to be understood not as a metaphorical expression, but quite literally, then the question arises whether there is also an Erasmian understanding of “philosophy as a whole” (philosophy tout court, philosophy without an adjective) as a correlate of philosophia Christi. The author of this book, first published in 1973, set himself the task of identifying, analysing, and more closely defining this concept of philosophy from the texts of Erasmus. To be sure, Erasmus wrote no treatise, no independent, separate text on his own understanding of philosophy, nor did he formulate an exact, complete, and independent definition of philosophy. However, he often, albeit occasionally, made use of ancient definitions or other kinds of ancient descriptions of its essence, its goal, and its task, as well as various statements concerning the ancient philosophers – sayings, apophthegmata, anecdotes. To this ancient material he added his own significant remarks, stamped with his own personality. Consequently, it was advisable and possible to try to construct, out of all these quotations and allusions, and Erasmus’ own remarks on them, the relatively coherent notion he had of philosophy, without, of course, having to go into the question of whether and to what extent he himself had a philosophical or a non-philosophical mentality.
In the first part of the book, entitled “Philosophy as a Way of Life,” an analysis of such statements, selected from various works by Erasmus and ordered according to a specific principle, brings to light the following characteristics of “philosophy in general,” which is always to be referred to the philosophia Christi, agrees with it, and is therefore evaluated positively by Erasmus.
Such a philosophy has as its proper subject mankind (in accordance with Socrates’ saying
The philosophical life is distinguished by certain traits, at the same time stereotypical and personal, of a genuine philosopher, that are of a more characterological than intellectual kind. The most important of these traits is the philosopher’s “Silenic” nature, obviously taken from the Platonic Symposium, in which it serves as an emblematic characteristic of Socrates. Closely connected with it is the fact that the genuine philosopher almost always opposes the thought and behavior of most people (hominum vulgus). Since, however, almost all those who do not lead a philosophical life belong to the vulgus, Erasmus considered both false philosophers and most leaders and people in positions of power as members of the vulgus, since they pay no attention to the Platonic postulate and are not at all concerned to be philosopher-rulers. If it comes down to a conflict between such a ruler and a genuine philosopher, the genuine philosopher is aware that he [or she] is fully within his [or her] rights not to obey the laws if they are unjust, whereas the ruler shall follow them. Erasmus considers Socrates, Antisthenes, Diogenes the Cynic, and Epictetus as particularly complete representatives of philosophy so conceived, as much because of their Silenic nature and because they were happy to renounce the investigation of external, non-human reality and saw the focal point of their philosophizing in the philosophical life. Sometimes, however, other ancient philosophers (for instance Epicurus) can also play such an exemplary role. Erasmus also sees a special kinship between the Silenic nature of these philosophers and the same nature of many Christian saints and of Christ himself. The imitation of the “Sileni” forms just as important a component of the Erasmian conception of philosophy as the imitation of Christ forms the most important component of Christianity, conceived as the philosophia Christi. These components of Erasmus’ conception of philosophy are designated as “ethical exemplarism” in this book.
Yet how can this conception of philosophy, which thus diminished not only the role of all ontological speculation, but also the role of erudition and even the best education, be harmonized with Erasmus’ beloved bonae litterae, that focal point, so peculiarly named by Erasmus, of the intellectual and literary culture of learned Renaissance humanism? Is it not the case that on the one hand, the Erasmian notion of philosophy, in which erudition scarcely plays any role, and, on the other, the humanistic ideal of bonae litterae must be considered as two completely disparate domains of Erasmian thought, especially since this thought is not distinguished, in other respects as well, by any systematic tendency? Answering this question is the task of Part 2 of the book, entitled “Philosophy and the Bonae Litterae.”
This second part begins by focusing on the analysis of the Ratio seu methodus verae theologiae (1519), an introduction to the New Testament that can be considered as an attempt to determine the relations between the bonae litterae and the philosophia Christi found in the Gospels. Erasmus understands the Bible, whose central and focal point is for him the Gospels, not so much as the transmission of a theoretically formulated doctrine, nor as the transmission of similarly theoretically formulated prescriptions (praecepta), but rather as the presentation of dramatically staged events, which he describes in the Ratio with such highly peculiar denominations as Christi circulus et orbis [course and circle of Christ’s life] and fabula quam Christus pro nostra salute peregit [a drama acted out for our sake by Christ]. As emerges from the analyses of the Gospels, Erasmus carries out what is understood as an inseparable unity by such designations: on the one hand, the primarily moral teachings, on the other the acts, behavior, and even the ethical-characterologically determined personality of Christ. An equivalence is thereby established between philosophy (“philosophy simpliciter,” which can practically refer only to ancient philosophy) and the philosophia Christi. Christianity and genuine philosophy are determined by ethical practicism in the same way, for both consist in a primarily ethical doctrine that relies on prescriptions: it is realized in the life of those who preach it, who act as model personalities.
It is a generalized humanistic conviction that this can be made present both to a wider circle of contemporaries and also to future generations only through the intermediary of a written text. In Erasmus, we have to do with a singular variant of this generalized conviction, expressed as the presence of Christ in the Holy Scriptures, first in the Enchiridion militis Christiani (1503), and further in the Paraclesis ad saluberrimum Christianae philosophiae studium (1516) as well (one may name this presence in Latin, by means of a slight paraphrase, as praesentia Christi in sacris litteris). In contrast, from the Ratio (and even earlier from the Methodus, produced at the same time as the Paraclesis), one can tell that such an exemplary presence, available for imitation, need not necessarily take place in the form of a narration, a relatio, or a description. It is just as real, or perhaps even more so, when it is expressed in literary texts, and especially as the words pronounced by the person presented, written down by his audience, particularly in the form of admonitions, sayings, and apophthegms. In other words, the Gospels, which contain the nucleus of the philosophia Christi, are not merely narrative or descriptive literature, but contribute both the facta as well as the verba or dicta Christi, usually in dialogue form. In this there is a particular analogy between both philosophies. The relation between the “metaphilosophical” and the “literary,” that is, between the concept of philosophy and the concept of bonae litterae in Erasmus can thus be determined. Erasmus remarks directly only on the kinship, both intellectual and in terms of content, that connects many ancient adages with the Bible; however, it can be shown that he was also aware of a particular kinship between the Gospels and the apophthegms of the philosophers, relating not merely to content, but also to the existential situation. For it was clear to him that the dialogue-style and dramatically influenced apophthegm, consisting in the interwoven “words” and “deeds” of the interlocutors (for instance, from very brief dialogues and behavior, positions, and so on), belongs to the same literary genre which philosophy, conceived as ethically practicist and exemplary, and the Silenic personality of the philosopher can express most adequately.
The third part of the book under the title “The Old and New in the Erasmian Conception of Philosophy,” attempts to present the historical background of the ideas described in the three preceding parts, as briefly and synthetically as possible.
It can be shown that a conception of philosophy almost identical with that of Erasmus was already predominant in Antiquity since the time of Plato, and that Erasmus’ statements in this regard make clear for us that he picked up on this conception quite deliberately. In this context, it is Plato, Seneca, and Plutarch whom he cites most often. In contrast, he deals critically with many of Aristotle’s metaphilosophical ideas that seem to deviate from this predominant tendency: for instance, the ideal of philosophy as
However, the position of ancient Christianity was already at the basis of such a limitation of the notion of philosophy to the merely theoretical. Indeed, like most ancient philosophers, most Christian thinkers of the Patristic period were of the opinion that a true philosophy could not be conceived without its ethical-practical component: those who proclaimed it had to realize it as a life wisdom in their own lives. For them, only Christianity was worthy of the name of such a philosophy. To be sure, thanks to the Logos of God that was active within them, the heathen philosophers had also discovered many truths concerning both God and human beings that were in agreement with those of the Christians, or even identical. Yet since they had not been supported by the cooperating Grace of God, earned by Christ, it had not been granted even to the best of them to live in accordance with those truths.
This negative evaluation of “heathen” philosophers, which can be traced from Justin Martyr to John Chrysostom and beyond, was predominant in Christian Antiquity. However, one can also find a quite positive evaluation of ancient philosophers among the Church Fathers, as for instance in the famous Oratio ad iuvenes de legendis gentilium libris (the common title in Greek
Erasmus, who considered the Patristic period as an authoritative model not only of the Christian faith and the genuinely Christian life, but also of a genuinely Christian culture, was strongly influenced by the ancient Christian idea of grasping Christianity as a genuine, ethico-pragmatically determined philosophia Christi. He even owes to ancient Christian authors the designation philosophia Christi, which had been abandoned since the 13th century but had been used in the Patristic period and also later, albeit sporadically, down to the 12th century as a synonym of Christianity. At the same time, however, he went beyond the mistrust they had harbored against the ethico-exemplary value of ancient heathen philosophers. For Erasmus, between the philosophia Christi as handed down in the Gospels and the genuine philosophy of heathen Antiquity, and even between Christ, along with the other Christian sileni, on the one hand, and the ancient philosophers on the other, there was only a difference of degree: that is, in the sense that the ethico-pragmatically oriented philosophy of heathen Antiquity found its completion and perfection in the philosophia Christi.
Translated by Michael Chase