Pride without the Fall: Hobbesian Pride and the Augustinian Tradition

Alexandra Chadwick

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Chapter 5 Pride without the Fall: Hobbesian Pride and the Augustinian Tradition

于Vice, Sin, and Sociability in Early Modern Philosophy

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Alexandra Chadwick

Alexandra Chadwick
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类型:: 章节

Page Range:: 111–133

DOI:: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004424036-007

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Abstract

This chapter situates Thomas Hobbes’s idea of the nature and origins of pride in the context of Augustinian accounts of his close contemporaries, and considers the similarities and differences between them. It draws on the writings of William Greenhill (1591-1671), William Jenkyn (1613-1685), and Edward Leigh (1602-1671) to establish an Augustinian definition of pride and associated terms, relevant to Hobbes’s time and place. All are in agreement that pride involves an unmerited assertion of superiority, but whereas Augustinian accounts revolve around man’s relationship to God, Hobbes shifts the focus of pride to claims of superiority to, and independence from, other human beings. The prideful desires for honour and for dominion, which Augustinians identify as causes of conflict in political societies, are foregrounded in Hobbes’s political theory. However, there are fundamental differences in the origins and nature of these desires which reveal the distinctiveness of Hobbes’s position. Indeed, Hobbes moves further away from Augustinian accounts of the effects of the Fall on human nature in his later work, in accordance with the requirements of his materialist psychology. A desire for dominion is presented as a universal and fundamental motive of human beings in The Elements of Law (1640), at odds with Hobbes’s claims about the variety and variability of human motives, suggesting a remnant of Augustinianism in Hobbes’s thinking, which is removed in Leviathan (1651). A desire for honour, on the other hand, while remaining an important motivator for all human beings across Hobbes’s work, is not inherently vicious: a Hobbesian desire for honour may take on a vicious – that is, for Hobbes, a socially destructive form – but Hobbes also allows for a rational form of the desire for honour, born out of human awareness of the need for others’ assistance to achieve their goals.

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Vice, Sin, and Sociability in Early Modern Philosophy

丛编： Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, 卷： 366

ISBN:: 9789004424036

出版社:: Brill

印刷出版日期:: 31 Mar 2026

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Part 1 The Nature and Origins of Vice

Part 2 The Social Utility of Vice

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Chapter 5 Pride without the Fall: Hobbesian Pride and the Augustinian Tradition

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Vice, Sin, and Sociability in Early Modern Philosophy

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