On the eve of Voitinsky’s arrival, the situation in China was complex to say the least with shifting spheres of influence controlled by feuding warlords and a small but extremely powerful foreign presence. Weaving his way through this environment, Voitinsky provided the stimulus for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Most works by CCP historians still stress the party’s indigenous roots. “Chen in the South and Li in the North” is the common refrain; the notion that Chen Duxiu through his contacts was influential in the South and Li Dazhao was instrumental for the development of the small groups in Northern China. In his path-breaking work van de Ven (1991) concludes that the CCP would have come to life irrespective of Soviet involvement. The atmosphere did encourage radical intellectuals to look for alternatives such as those provided by a Bolshevik party. However, as we have seen, Soviet agents were actively courting Chinese activists and promoting their views and ideology. We review the question of the origins by examining the communist small groups that formed before the First Party Congress.
“Chen in the South and Li in the North” is a myth created by a later justification that has entered the canon of official CCP accounts of the party’s founding. The origins lie with the speech by Gao Yihan at Li Dazhao’s memorial service in 1927 (Gao Yihan, 1927, Ishikawa, 2013, pp. 101–03). No original sources confirm the thesis but the debate has continued in China, with those such as Xiao Chaoren still supporting the traditional view, whereas others such as Ren Wuxiong (a head of the Museum for the First Party Congress) adopting a more critical view. This chapter covers the strong role that Soviet Russia played, mainly through the work of Voitinsky, to create the basis for the CCP. Perhaps a CCP might have developed independently but it would have taken far longer and would not have thrived without Russian material and organizational support. The united front tactic was vital to the CCP’s expansion through the 1920s.
1 China on the Eve of and after Voitinsky’s Arrival
While the Comintern was developing policies for China and the Far East, the nation was in a state of flux. The revolution had ended dynastic rule but had created a set of questions to be answered about what kind of government was suitable for China and what the relationship of the people should be to the state. Different groups explored rival solutions and advocates of communism had to struggle to find a place on the intellectual and political agendas. Important for work in Shanghai were the actions of the foreign powers, the growth of a new bourgeoisie and the stirrings of a small proletariat. The young and radical intellectuals were profoundly influenced by the nationalist, anti-imperialist sentiment developed during the May Fourth Period (1915–1919). It made for a heady mix and a world full of intrigue, suspicion and betrayal.
Nominally, the 1911–12 Revolution had ushered in a Republican Government based in Beijing but, in reality, the country was divided internally. Outside of Beijing, real power often rested with an array of warlords. Around the time of the Comintern’s Second Congress and during Voitinsky’s initial visit, two important events were taking place that had an important bearing on Voitinsky’s and Sneevliet’s activities. First, a power shift took place in Beijing, when the Zhili and Fengtian Cliques defeated the Anhui Cique. Second, in November 1920 Sun Yat-sen returned to Guangzhou. With these events taking place on the ground and with the Comintern developing its policies, Voitinsky tried to understand the situation, while helping lay the foundations for the CCP.
The end of the empire ushered in an incompetent republic with Yuan Shikai as president. Revolutionaries and monarchists agreed that Yuan was the most suitable candidate as he had been an influential figure in the waning years of the Qing dynasty and in the abdication of the boy Emperor. The revolutionaries were severely disappointed as Yuan accumulated more power, leading Sun Yat-sen to flee to Tokyo (November 1913). On December 12, 1915, Yuan declared himself to be the Hongxian Emperor, causing disruption and opposition in several provinces. Before conflict and confusion became worse, Yuan died on June 6, 1916. Not only was parliamentary rule not consolidated but also warlordism became the norm for much of the country. For many, political survival meant aligning with a military power, which was unreliable at best and life threatening at worst. The nationalists and the communists had to find a path through the shifting sands of warlord alliances and betrayals.
Militarism was dominant, with feuding warlords fighting to control territory and resources (van de Ven, 2003). It left the country vulnerable and many citizens prey to exploitation and banditry (Sheridan, 1977). For political movements such as the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD), it meant that without an independent military force, it had to seek shelter from “friendly” warlords. These alliances were fragile, prone to sudden shifts, often exposing the nationalists to unexpected dangers. For the Soviets, it led to the search for the good “nationalist” or even better a “socialist” warlord. Frequently, they were disappointed. In the case of Sun Yat-sen, he was convinced that a military solution had to precede any political solution and a firm commitment to an alliance with the Soviet Union. While money moderated and shaped Sun’s view, Sneevliet remained critical of his preference for military work over propaganda and for developing a strong, organized political party.
Three major “cliques” dominated life in North China during the period under consideration: one based around Duan Qirui, the Zhili Clique and the Fengtian clique.1 While the Comintern’s Second Congress was holding forth and while Voitinsky was still in China, a decisive shift in factional power took place. From 1917 until July 1920, Beijing politics was dominated by Duan Qirui and the Anhui clique.2 Duan served as Premier presiding over a parliament amenable to his wishes, managed by his supporters in the Anfu Club. Internationally, Duan received complete support from the Japanese to whom he was financially indebted (Sheridan, 1983, p. 304). The relationship was problematic for Duan, especially once the May Fourth demonstrations erupted to protest the Versailles agreement, which ceded the German concession of Shandong to Japan. Duan’s embarrassment was even greater when it was revealed that the Versailles decision was based, in part, on agreements signed between his government and the Japanese. Opposition to Duan resulted in his rivals solidifying into a rival group—the Zhili clique. Further, Duan’s activities disturbed Zhang Zuolin and his Fengtian Clique that controlled the Northeast and Inner Mongolia. The perceived threat to their position caused them to ally with the Zhili clique to ouster the Anhui clique.
The defeat of the Anhui Clique led to further uncertainty in Beijing with power shifting between the Zhili and Fengtian Cliques. Both cliques sought to run the government to serve their own interests and conflict was inevitable. In any case, the “alternative government” based in Guangzhou never accepted either one as legitimate. Initially, the Zhili clique had the upper hand in Beijing but it consisted of two main factions: one under Cao Kun and the other under Wu Peifu.3 Having played the key role in ousting Duan Qirui in 1920, Cao was the nominal leader but Wu was increasingly acknowledged as the “real military leader of the Zhili clique” (Sheridan, 1983, p. 313). Under Wu’s military leadership, the Zhili Clique began to expand its power causing Zhang Zuolin to ally with Sun Yat-sen, based in Guangzhou, who was equally worried about Wu Peifu’s expansion of power. Initially, the alliance did not do either man any good. Zhang was criticized for his pro-Japanese sympathies and the CCP was hyper-critical of Sun because of his association with Zhang. These shifting relationships complicated Soviet attempts to find allies and produced significant wishful thinking about the true intent of the different warlords.
Choice in the North was simplified in spring 1922 when the Zhili Clique defeated Fengtian, leaving Wu Peifu as the clear champion from 1922 to 1924. Zhang and the Fengtian Clique were not completely defeated and withdrew to their Manchurian heartland to lick their wounds, regain strength before returning to defeat the Zhili Clique in 1924.
Wu Peifu and his supporters curried favor with the British and Americans. The British Government was favorably disposed toward Wu but tried to exhibit a degree of neutrality and it did not funnel financial and other aid to his government (Wou, 1978, pp. 151–97; Sheridan, 1983, p. 307). The same cannot be said for British companies operating in China that plied Wu with large sums in return for protecting their interests, especially by prohibiting boycotts against companies in the areas under his control.4 Once the CCP stepped up its labor activities in areas under Wu’s control, a road to disaster was opened as it undermined the case of those in Moscow who supported Wu as a potential ally.
Zhang Zuolin’s retreat was important for Soviet Russia and Japan (McCormack, 1977). Crucially for the Soviets, the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) ran through his territory. As Zhang rose to prominence in the 1920s, the Japanese decided to support him. While they were willing to ensure he remained in control in Manchuria and were even willing to help him develop the area, they did not support his expansionist aspirations to control the Beijing Government. The Japanese were primarily interested in maintaining a stable warlord who would ensure that their interests in Manchuria were well protected (Sheridan, 1983, p. 305; McCormack, 1977, pp. 56–59).
These persistent conflicts among the various warlord cliques created a highly unstable situation, which rendered long-term planning impossible. Most warlords never even attempted to develop enduring political structures, preferring to concentrate on the more immediately gratifying prospect of grasping and expanding personal power and prestige. This situation left China vulnerable to foreign penetration and pressure. Yet such disorder and fragmentation was a double-edged sword for the foreign powers. On the one hand, it permitted a high degree of foreign influence but, on the other, the “widespread disorder limited foreign activities and interfered with the economic exploitation of the country by foreign enterprises” (Sheridan, 1983, p. 303). For Soviet agents, it gave them freedom to move around, especially in the foreign concessions, to establish contacts with radical Chinese. However, they were also drawn into the game of playing off the warlords and seeking alliances with the shifting factions. On different occasions, the Soviets attempted to establish contacts with both Wu and Zhang.5 The issue of whether to support Wu Peifu in the North or Sun Yat-sen in the South was hotly debated within Comintern and Narkomindel circles. Sneevliet had strong opinions on this question and he had a significant impact on the outcome of the debates.
The situation in the South was equally complex. In 1920, Sun Yat-sen pulled together various nationalist voices to form the Zhongguo GMD, followed a few months later, in November 1920, by the formation of Sun’s second administration in Guangzhou. His first administration ended with Sun’s disillusionment, resignation and departure for Shanghai in April 1918 (Wilbur, 1976, pp. 29–30). In reality, despite his impressive title of “Grand Marshall,” real power was in the hands of Li Rongting, head of the Guangxi clique. In Shanghai, Sun had plenty of time for reflection and he put some of that time to good use. He breathed life back into the GMD and plotted his return to Guangzhou.6
While in Shanghai, Sun enjoyed his first physical contacts with Soviet Russia (see also, Wilbur, 1976, pp. 112–18). Already in the Summer of 1918, Sun had telegraphed Lenin to congratulate him on the Russian party’s success and to express his hope that Russian and Chinese forces might come together in a joint struggle. Given the unstable situation, it is not surprising that contacts were sporadic, consisting of letters and telegrams gone astray or arriving late. The most important meeting was with Voitinsky, either at the end of October 1920 or, more likely before November 25 when Sun left Shanghai to return to Guangzhou.
In October 1920, the wheel of fortune swung back Sun’s way. Warlord, Chen Jiongming with his allies were driving the Guangxi Clique out of Guangdong and on October 26, 1920, with Sun’s political help, they captured the city of Guangzhou. This facilitated Sun’s return in late-November and once again he took over the military government.
Again, after returning to Guangzhou, things did not go as smoothly as hoped because Sun and Chen Jiongming had different views about future strategy. In theory, Chen was subordinate to Sun but his military position as the most powerful army commander and his political position as provincial governor placed him in a strong position. It is no surprise that Soviet advisors viewed him favorably and a strong bet for an alliance. Sun’s gaze was always fixed on the national stage and he longed for national reunification. The Guangzhou base was the starting-point for a Northern military push to promote a revolutionary movement in Central and Northern China. In contrast, Chen viewed this as a costly expense and he favored concentrating on the development of Guangdong province. His desire was to turn Guangdong into a model province for others to follow. Despite Chen’s opposition, on May 5, 1921 Sun was inaugurated as president, having been elected earlier by the “Extraordinary Parliament.”
In the summer of 1921, the Guangxi Clique suffered a further defeat as the Guangdong armies marched into Guangxi province. Sun set off for Guilin to organize his Northern military campaign to reunify China, remaining there from mid-October until his return to Guangzhou in April 1922. Sun was frustrated in Guilin, sitting through the winter while a disinterested Chen Jiongming made clear his opposition to the whole idea.7
2 Voitinsky’s Mission in China
Grigori Voitinsky was Soviet Russia’s first formal envoy, traveling with his wife and two assistants, Titov (a graduate of the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok) and Serebryakov (a social activist in Korea), in April 1920. Formally, they had been sent by the Foreign Section of the Vladivostok Branch of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Russian Bolshevik Party and on the personal authority of Vilensky-Sibiriakov. Although the mission had the approval of the Comintern, given its lack of resources and expertise on the Far East, it was billed as a delegation of Bolshevik Party members. Voitinsky went to China under the cover of a journalist of the Dalta News Agency for the Far Eastern Republic. This allowed him to move around and meet with many of the key figures on the political left in China. His front as a journalist, while working clandestinely on behalf of the Bolshevik Party, would become a normal pattern of operations for Soviet intelligence officers working overseas. The clear mandate for the mission was to establish contact with revolutionary groups working out of Shanghai, understand the local environment and explore possibilities for the development of a more formal organization. Serebryakov’s inclusion was important as they were also to investigate the situation in Japan and Korea. In addition to memoir literature, three reports in the Comintern Archives help us understand the mission’s work and its early progress in establishing a communist movement.8
Voitinsky’s arrival certainly provided impetus for the creation of a formal CCP organization but it does not seem that initially he set out to establish a more traditional, disciplined party. In his June 1920 report (Doc. 1), he mentioned meeting with the “leaders of the Chinese revolutionary movement” and that the next step would be to bring together the “socialists and anarchists” in a representative meeting in North China. Chen Duxiu was charged with working out both the details and the timing of the meeting. The two differed on the nature of the initial organization for the revolutionary movement (on the debate among Chinese scholars see Fang Ning, 2011). While Chen favored a “pure” party, Voitinsky was willing to include in the mix the anarchists and others to push forward the revolutionary momentum.9 Tensions were inevitable but the Comintern’s Second Congress (July–August 1920) resolved the debate in Chen’s favor. Policy was to exclude reformists and other groupings from the communist parties, causing Voitinsky to modify his position and for the CCP to push ahead with plans for a more orthodox party.
Some Chinese youths radicalized by the May Fourth Movement and impressed by developments in Russia began to organize and participate in study groups. These study groups, such as the New People’s Study Society, the Awakening Society, the Social Welfare Society and later the Society for the Study of Socialism, provided the training ground for a number of China’s communist leaders.10 The existence of these groups support the view of official Chinese historians regarding the indigenous origins of the CCP, underpinned by the claim that the suggestion to form a party was raised by Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu when Chen was leaving Beijing. This would place the discussion in early 1920, thus preceding Voitinsky’s arrival (see Yu Chongsheng, 1986; for an official view Zhonggong zhongyang, 1991). No clear contemporary documentation supports this assertion and instead derives from various memoirs and the writing of Gao Yihan, a friend of Li Dazhao. Gao mentions the discussion at a memorial service held for Li in 1927 but its reliability is questionable (Ishikawa, 2013, pp. 101–02).
Voitinsky had three objectives for his work. As noted, the first was to acquaint himself with the key figures in the Chinese political landscape and report back on his findings. The second was organizational work to plant the seeds for the idea of establishing a CCP. The third was propagating materials on Bolshevism and the Chinese Revolution. Posing as a journalist, Voitinsky met with a wide range of people. The recent publication of the Karakhan Declaration meant that Voitinsky was well-received in Beijing and elsewhere. The enthusiasm was short-lived, however, as the “petit-bourgeois and bourgeois intellectuals became estranged” (Li Da, 1955, pp. 6–7). Two Russians teaching at Peking University, Ivanov and Polevoy, were instrumental in helping with introductions to radicals in the city and most probably one or both facilitated the meeting with Li Dazhao, a professor at the university. Li Dazhao was one of the earliest converts to Marxism. While Voitinsky’s two reports (Docs. 1 and 2) do not mention Li by name, it seems certain that the two did meet and that the conversation was wide-ranging but general in nature and did not specifically cover the topic of a communist party.11 More important were his interactions with Chen Duxiu, having been introduced through a letter from Li Dazhao.
In addition, to these two future CCP luminaries, Voitinsky met with influential theorists, Li Hanjun and Dai Jitao and important political figures, Chen Jiongming and Sun Yat-sen and with Bai Jianwu, a key member on the staff of the Northern warlord, Wu Peifu. Chen, Sun and Wu were all considered to be potential allies by different Russian actors. Voitinsky did not express strong support for any of them and seemed ambivalent about both Chen and Sun. Li Dazhao arranged an introduction for Voitinsky and Polovoy to meet with Bai (October 9, 1920). They enjoyed a general discussion about the current situation in China while Voitinsky introduced conditions in revolutionary Russia (Bai Jianwu, 1992, p. 277). In Guangzhou, Chen Duxiu accompanied Voitinsky to meet with Chen Jiongming, about whom he was ambivalent. Later, Voitinsky noted that Chen Jiongming was a man of “great will power and self-control” but he found him rather puritanical. He noted the friction between Chen and Sun Yat-sen and although Chen expressed great respect for Sun he “considered him an impractical idealist.”12 His contemporary assessment of Chen (June 1920, Doc. 1) was less positive than that of other Russian visitors: “According to the local revolutionaries, the revolutionary activities of General Chen (in Zhangzhou) were somewhat exaggerated.”
In his 1925 memorial for Sun, Voitinsky (March 15, 1925 [1957]) wrote that their meeting in Shanghai had been held in November at Chen Duxiu’s prompting.13 The conversation ranged from Sun’s interest in hearing about the revolution in Russia, a discussion of the 1911–12 Chinese Revolution and finally back again to the problems in Soviet Russia. Voitinsky noted that Sun was “greatly interested in the question of how the struggle in South China, which has just been liberated from counterrevolutionary … troops in Guangzhou, could be joined with the struggle of faraway Russia” and he complained that geography rendered establishing contact with Russia unfeasible.14 Finally, Sun asked repeatedly whether it would be possible to place a very powerful radio station in Vladivostok or in Manchuria to facilitate communications. As Voitinsky prepared to leave China, he had not expressed a clear preference for a specific ally in China and later he clashed with Sneevliet about the value of cooperation with Sun.
Voitinsky was very positive about organizational progress. Subsequent developments following his departure suggest he was overly optimistic. However, there was noticeable progress and the foundations were laid for future advance. Four sets of organizational activities were important to guide Voitinsky’s activities but their impact and effectiveness varied. First, in May 1920, a Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern was set up in Shanghai (Report by Vilensky-Sibiriakov, Doc. 8) but mystery surrounds the organization as it is not mentioned anywhere else and it is debatable whether or not it really functioned.15 The Secretariat was described as a temporary organization to coordinate information about revolutionary activities and potential with a China Department and a Korea Department and, a to be set up, Japan Department in line with the original remit.16 The China Department was to establish basic grass-roots organizations in the coastal industrial areas with party work promoted through worker and student organizations. Labor unions and the military were important for this work and communist propaganda was to be encouraged within them. Last but not least, publication work was promoted.
Second, and importantly, building blocks were assembled for the establishment of the CCP. Voitinsky (June 1920, Doc. 1) reported that he had contacted the most important revolutionary activists and even though there were no representatives operating in cities such as Hankou, Guangzhou and Nanjing, things were moving ahead.17 From the beginning, the intention was to create an organization that could coordinate and centralize these actions. The dispersed nature of the activities drew complaints leading Voitinsky (June 1920, Doc. 1) to suggest soon convening a gathering of North China socialists and anarchists. Chen Duxiu was tasked with writing to revolutionaries in each city to encourage their participation. Voitinsky hoped the meeting would take place in July as he intended to participate and help with the preparations. In fact, on July 19, a meeting of the “Most Activist Chinese Comrades” was held in Shanghai, which helped lay the groundwork for the establishment of the CCP (Ishikawa, 2013, p. 112). Voitinsky suggested that the Qunyi Bookstore could play a coordinating role.18
July was a busy month. On July 4, Vilensky, together with several assistants, arrived in Beijing. Having sent out information in advance, from July 5 to 7, they convened the first meeting of the representatives of the members of the Russian Communist Party working in China. Among other issues, they discussed the soon-to-be-held meeting of Chinese communist organizations and the establishment of a CCP. Probably, the meeting referred to is that of July 19.
The Shanghai Revolutionary Bureau featured prominently in Voitinsky’s August 1920 report (Doc. 2).19 It comprised five members including himself and four Chinese revolutionaries: Chen Duxiu, certainly, and Li Hanjun, Yang Mingzhai and Yu Xiusong (Ren Wuxiong, 2002). The bureau had three departments: publication, information and agitation, and organization. Voitinsky noted that a similar bureau was established in Beijing and Stoyanovich was dispatched from Tianjin to Guangzhou to set up another bureau there (with departments for propaganda and for organization), while one was also planned for Hankou. The Bureau must be the Shanghai communist small group, which formed the core of the nascent CCP (Ishikawa, 2013, p. 113). However, there are different opinions among Chinese scholars as to the nature of this organization and neither Chinese memoirs nor documents refer to it. The range of views include the idea that the Revolutionary Bureau was an organization set up by the Bolshevik Party, and led by its members and it did not represent at all the early party organization (Xie Yiming, 2002) or that it was a united front body for socialists and anarchists (Tian Ziyu, 2001). Others suggest it was a provisional body of the Comintern set up under the Far Eastern Secretariat to oversee the Chinese revolutionary movement (Li Danyang and Liu Jianyi, 2001) or that the Revolutionary Bureau, under Voitinsky’s direct leadership and the Shanghai group that founded the party were two independent organizations (Ren Wuxiong, 2002, pp. 337–50).20
It is no surprise that organization and propaganda work focused on students, who were viewed as sympathetic to the Russian cause. In turn, Voitinsky and his colleagues used the students to conduct propaganda and organizational work among the workers and soldiers (June and August 1920, Docs. 1 and 2). The Bureau’s Organization Department oversaw this work but was not especially successful, although the Bureau did claim that some organizations were under its control.
In August, hoping to push ahead with work, the Organization Department intended to convene a meeting for ten local unions and trade associations, with each sending two delegates. The objective was to establish a Central Labor Secretariat, which would send a representative to participate in the Shanghai Revolutionary Bureau. Voitinsky was the driving force behind this, drafting a resolution passed by the Bureau that was included in the propaganda materials for the proposed meeting.
Voitinsky reported that in early August, the communists had helped with student meetings in Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin to discuss the question of unifying the various groups. As a result, Voitinsky hoped that the revolutionary student groups would band together to establish the Socialist Youth Corps (SYC) and indeed, on August 22, 1920 the Shanghai SYC was formed. To increase influence among the student movement, Voitinsky suggested sending delegates to participate in the Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin Revolutionary Bureaus.
Voitinsky’s expectation was that by integrating the revolutionary students into the Bureaus, they would grasp the clear distinction between communist ideology and that of “the capitalist groups, the intellectuals and business groups, because these groups rely on the democratic US to oppose Japan.” Voitinsky wanted students to prepare for social revolution and oppose Japanese militarism and the division of China into spheres controlled by different foreign powers. The students were to rely on the workers and to take control of their own lives as the only way to ensure China’s liberation. Voitinsky dismissed the “fantasy” harbored by some students that it was possible to rely on “non-aggressive capital (American)” to help Chinese capital develop the productive forces, in turn improving people’s living standards. This view was especially prevalent among those with an American education. In the current struggles, student support for the convocation of a National Assembly made them sympathetic toward Wu Peifu (August 1920, Doc. 2).
The last set of work was publication and the promotion of pro-Russian materials. Work began by translating materials about socialism and the Russian Revolution but this quickly moved on to establishing publications that would come under the influence of the emerging communist movement. On June 1, the Shanghai “Dalu bao” (Voitinsky wrote China Press) published an article based on materials that he had provided. This was followed by other pieces. Yang Mingzhai helped with materials about Soviet Russia, including those for Chinese students.
After the Vilensky visit in early July and the stated intent to form a communist party, publication work was stepped up. Certainly, Vilensky viewed publication as a key component of the work of the “Far Eastern Secretariat.”21 There were to be three publishing centers: Vladivostok for Russian materials, Harbin for republication of “agitation literature” in English, Chinese and Japanese, and Beijing and Shanghai as the focal points in China. The work in Beijing was pushed forward by students and the publications included “Xin chao” (New Wave) and the Beijing University Students’ Weekly.22 On May 1, a special issue of the journal was dedicated to the international workers’ movement.
Publication work was strongest in Shanghai and it was linked most closely to the development of the communist movement. The publication department under the Shanghai Revolutionary Bureau had its own printing capability and was already churning out pamphlets (15 in all, as well as some flyers) in addition to translating and printing materials sent from Vladivostok. The Russo-Chinese Information Bureau, with a branch in Beijing, was set up under the Information and Agitation Bureau and contributed information to thirty-one Chinese newspapers. The Bureau drew materials from papers in the Russian Far East and other left-wing publications, such as The Manchester Guardian, the New York Call and Soviet Russia. Yang Mingzhai was a key figure promoting this work (Voitinsky report, August 1920, Doc. 2).
In retrospect, the most important development occurred in fall 1920 when the influential magazine Xin qingnian (New Youth), under Chen Duxiu, effectively became a publication of the Shanghai Communist movement.23 The use of left-wing American publications indicated the clear influence of Voitinsky who had joined the Socialist Party of America in 1915. Chen Duxiu and his colleagues at Xin qingnian even put the logo of the Socialist Party of America on the magazine’s cover.24 At the same time as Xin Qingnian became the external face of the communist group, the decision was taken to launch Gongchandang (literally The Communist Party but more commonly referred to as “The Communist”) as a monthly underground journal for the party. Under the editorship of Li Da, it was launched on November 7, 1920; after publishing seven issues, it ceased publication in July 1921 (Zhonggongdangshi shijian renwulu, 1983, p. 84). The journal contained mainly explanatory theoretical articles and pieces on Soviet Russia.
On August 22, the publishing department put out a paper for Chinese workers, Laodong jie (Workers’ World).25 To increase influence among workers, in Beijing on November 7, the group launched the weekly Laodong yin (The Voice of Labor). The publication department also published the Communist Manifesto that had been translated by Chen Wangdao and revised by Chen Duxiu and Li Hanjun.
Finally, to increase access to Russia, in Shanghai, the Foreign Languages School was established under Yang Mingzhai’s leadership to provide language training for those members of the recently formed SYC who were going to study in Russia. In spring 1921, it enrolled its largest cohort, including the future President of the People’s Republic of China and CCP leader, Liu Shaoqi.
3 The Party Falls Apart
On leaving China in January 1921, Voitinsky could be pleased with the progress. A foundation for the communist movement had been laid, the suggestion of a national congress had been raised, propaganda work was progressing and it seemed that a strong core was being developed in Shanghai. However, following Voitinsky’s departure, the central party organization collapsed, only to be revived following the arrival of Sneevliet and Nikolsky.26 Internal differences resurfaced but some momentum was maintained to activate Voitinsky’s suggestion to convene a national congress. In March 1921, the Far Eastern Secretariat, which sent Nikolsky to China, had already decided that the time was ripe to convene a congress. In fact, writing in late April or early May, Shumiatsky was under the impression that the Congress might already be under way, creating a Chinese branch of the Third International.27
However, the congress was not in session and neither Nikolsky, who was to oversee it, nor Sneevliet, who was sent by the Comintern, arrived in China until early June (Saich, 1991, vol. 1, p. 54). Reflecting on the collapse of momentum, on arrival in Shanghai Sneevliet found that he had to start from the very beginning (Isaacs, 1971, p. 103) and had to begin his work under “highly unfavorable conditions” (Bericht des Genossen H. Maring, July 1922). The Russian representatives in Beijing and those from the Irkutsk Bureau informed him of the weak connections between the communists and the working-class and that very little real organizational work had been accomplished (Isaacs, 1971, p. 103). Aside from Guangdong province, where the GMD and anarchist influence was strongest, only the railway workers at Changxindian (near Beijing) had formed modern organizations.28
Others noted the problems with the young workers’ movement. Lidin, who was sent to China in October 1921, traced the lack of success to the “intellectual group of the CCP” being isolated from the workers, with the Labor Secretariat “divorced from the masses.” The real workers’ movement had passed the communist small groups by!29 Earlier, Zhang Tailei had complained that the labor landscape was populated by one form of traditional organization or another. For the most part, the only real unions were the Shanghai Machinists’ Union, the Five Metals’ Union, the Printers’ Union and those in Hong Kong. The reason was that the Chinese economy was built on the peasantry, while contemporary capitalism, despite imperialism, had not had an impact on Chinese life. Foreign goods were plentiful but there were no large factories.30 How to operate under these circumstances, without a modern proletariat and with a large peasantry was a crucial question that Sneevliet and early CCP members wrestled with.
Five reasons explain the problems with party work under the Shanghai Revolutionary Bureau. First, following Voitinsky’s departure, the party found itself in financial difficulties. Second, with Chen Duxiu’s move to Guangzhou, Shanghai lost a driving force. Third, Li Hanjun, who took over from Chen Duxiu, was not too keen on practical work, preferring a more academic approach. Fourth, not surprisingly, strong disagreements existed between Chen and Li over the party’s future development. Finally, there was the insular nature of the different party groups and their isolation from social forces.
Sneevliet noted that after Voitinsky’s departure, the Shanghai group found itself without financial means, leading to the abandonment of activities in the workers’ schools. It is unclear which schools he is referring to here as the Foreign Languages School and the workers’ school that had been established in Changxindian did continue to function after Voitinsky’s departure. Perhaps, they continued but with reduced CCP engagement.
Li Da (1955 [1980], p. 9) also mentioned the funding problems. When Voitinsky left for Russia, the monthly expenses for party work amounted to around 200 dollars, most probably Mexican dollars. At the time, none of the Shanghai members were employed and thus they had no income and therefore the organization could not meet its financial obligations. Clearly, a workers’ movement without any money could not do very much. Writing to Chen Duxiu, Li Hanjun suggested that the New Youth Book Company could provide a monthly subsidy to cover party expenses. At the time, the recently opened book company was enjoying a brisk trade. Li never heard back from Chen, not surprising given that just before Chen left for Guangzhou, they had fallen out over the question of production costs for Xin qingnian. The dispute was the source of the enmity between the two men. The only source to fund party activities was contributions from articles that members had managed to sell. These financial problems also led to the discontinuation of The Communist.
In December 1920, Chen Duxiu left for Guangzhou to take up his post as Commissioner of Education in Guangdong province, leaving Li Hanjun to deputize together with Chen Wangdao, to take editorship of Xin qingnian (Li Da, 1955 [1980], p. 5). Yet, even before Chen’s departure, party members had been hard-pressed to handle the work. Toward the end of the year, Bao Huiseng arrived in Shanghai with a group of Wuhan SYC members. They intended to travel on to Moscow for study but the trip could not be realized and Bao was asked to stay on in Shanghai to help with party work. The provisional party center set up an education committee with Bao and Yang Mingzhai in charge. The most important tasks were to select students to be sent to Moscow, arrange Russian classes—presumably through the Foreign Languages School—and engage in propaganda work in Shanghai (Bao Huiseng, 1953 [1980], p. 304).
Chen and his deputy Li differed about the type of party to be built. Li called for the party to operate openly and legally as the time was only ripe for educational work, research and to spread Marxist influence in intellectual circles. In particular, Chen and Li disagreed about the power relationships within the party. In February 1921, Chen drafted a party document that he sent to Shanghai advocating that the party adopt a system of centralized power.31 Clearly, Chen had learned something about Bolshevik organization from Voitinsky! Li disagreed completely, feeling that Chen simply wanted members to support his autocratic and dictatorial rule. In response, Li Hanjun drafted a document advocating the division of power among the localities (ditu fenquan) instead of Chen’s advocacy of centralized power (zhongyang jiquanzhi). The center comprised an office but was to have no authority to dictate to the branches. Chen was furious with Li’s draft and sent a letter to Shanghai, reproaching Li Hanjun and claiming that other party members were also opposed to Li’s views.
The rift between Chen and Li grew increasingly wider. Li Hanjun was sufficiently incensed that he wished to resign as acting secretary and also from the editorship of Xin qingnian. He handed over the party register and a few articles to Li Da and asked him to take over as party secretary, which Li Da did to maintain party unity (Li Da, 1955 [1980], pp. 9–10; Wang Laidi, 1981, p. 18, states Chen handed over the items on March 7, 1921). Whether Li Hanjun really did resign as secretary is unclear as he continued to play an important role in organizing the First Party Congress and at the Congress, he vigorously defended his views. Zhang Guotao (1971, vol.1, p. 136) wrote that teaching commitments meant that Li Da, Li Hanjun and others had not been able to perform their duties as they had when Chen Duxiu was present.32
Finally, Sneevliet and others felt that the party was isolated from society. There was initial engagement with the railway workers in the North and with the students. However, in May 1921, engagement with younger Chinese suffered a blow when the SYL was disbanded; it was not restored until November when Zhang Tailei returned from Russia (Smith, 2000, p. 26). In addition to Sneevliet’s negative views of the party, Lidin (May 20, 1922, Doc. 21) complained that there was no unified, single party but merely a few local communist groups. In his view, they operated as independent blocs rendering them incapable of practical revolutionary work. They were inclined to “content themselves with a kind of greenhouse culture of communism.”33
Clearly, when Sneevliet arrived in June 1921, the party as an organization was not in a very healthy state. However, there was an organization into which life could be breathed and the Chinese comrades together with Sneevliet and Nikolsky’s help, began to resuscitate it and bring it back to life.
4 The Development of Communist Small Groups across China
The small groups that formed the building blocks of the national party were an eclectic bunch—some came together through promptings by Soviet activists, whereas others had little or no contact at all. Without the drive of the Soviet emissaries, a national congress clearly would not have convened so soon. Newly available materials allow us to clarify some but not all of the outstanding puzzles. Not surprisingly, Soviet writers and Chinese official historians persisted in stressing respectively the role of the Comintern in the party’s formation or the indigenous nature of the local groups. Both approaches contain elements of truth and the party was born during a period not only of domestic but also global turmoil, with people adjusting to the end of the war and coming to terms with the rise of Bolshevism. Chinese historians covered the local developments that were responding to the interest in Marxism among intellectuals as they searched for a suitable political system to replace the old imperial system. Soviet accounts dwelt on the various Soviet agents and the range of meetings with local progressive intellectuals to detect fertile ground to grow socialist and communist roots. Confusing the picture on the ground, the Marxist research groups, anarchist associations, study societies, and communist small groups enjoyed a profusion of names, with some interchangeable and individuals enjoying multiple memberships. It is not surprising that many years or even decades later memories were faulty or confused. So what does reliance primarily on contemporary documents reveal?
For a communist party to take root among radicalized intellectuals four transitions had to occur. First, Marxism had to be viewed as an intellectually viable belief system and displace other radical ideas such as anarchism and more moderate forms of socialism. Second, the intellectual inquiry and publishing ethos had to be replaced by action. Third and related, the dominance of interpersonal relations as the basis of group formation had to be replaced by a commitment based on ideology and subservience to the organization. Fourth, there had to be a shift to Leninism as an instrument for action and the necessity to form a Bolshevik-type organization.
Perhaps downplaying the Soviet role in the genesis of the CCP, Chinese memoir literature makes no mention of the Revolutionary Bureau that Voitinsky claims he established. Most probably, they mean the Revolutionary Bureau when referring to the Shanghai communist small group and they may even have used the names of the Revolutionary Bureau and the Marxist Study Group interchangeably. Clearly, the Bureau was the focal point of later CCP development. A December 1920 report from Bronstein (deputy president) and Abramson (head of the China Division) refers to Voitinsky’s August report, noting that a five-person Revolutionary Bureau had been established.
Apart from Voitinsky’s, the most extensive report was by Zhang Tailei to the Comintern’s Third Congress (1921 [2013], pp. 6–31). He identified Shanghai and Beijing as the places where the earliest communist small groups were set up in May 1920, “followed by a few others.” Before March 1921, no unified communist organization existed, in part because of the strength of the anarchists within the radical movement. As a result, communist sympathizers tried to infiltrate their organizations to turn them toward communism. Certainly, this was the case in Guangzhou. To counter the anarchists effectively, the necessity to clarify communist principles and objectives became obvious. Consequently, a March 1921 meeting decided that a congress should be convened to pass provisional guiding principles (although a manifesto had been published in November 1920), a work plan and to clarify attitudes with respect to the SYC, union and trade associations and other organizations such as the military.
Interestingly, Zhang stated that by May 1921, the CCP had seven provincial organizations, listing six of them: Beijing, Tianjin, Hankou, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Nanjing, which was the most recent organization.34 The delegates who attended the First Congress representing domestic organizations came from Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, Hunan, Guangzhou, and Jinan (Shandong). This attests to the fortuitous nature of who attended. We do not know who was invited and the attendees were a mixture of those who could make it and those who happened to be around at the time. The absence of any delegates from Tianjin is interesting, given that not only Zhang Tailei but also other accounts attest to the vibrancy of the work there but organizationally, it fell under the Beijing region, which explains why there were no separate delegates. Zhang noted that the Tianjin group devoted special attention to the Tangshan area as it was China’s first great industrial center. Members were drawn from workers at the railway repair shop at the largest station on the Tianjin-Pukou Railway.
The deposition of Shi Cuntong when he was arrested in Japan (late-1921) concurs with Zhang Tailei on May 1920 regarding the establishment of a group to promote a communist party (Ishikawa, 2013, pp. 157–59). Further a July 10, 1920 entry in Yu Xiusong’s diary noted that a Socialist-Communist Party (Voitinsky’s Revolutionary Bureau)35 had been organized probably before June 17 when the diary entries began (for a discussion see Ishikawa, 2013, pp. 152–56). This suggests this is the Revolutionary Bureau set up at Voitinsky’s instigation. Again, the precise origins are confused by the use of different names in later memoirs that may or may not refer to the same organization. For example, historian Yang Kuisong concludes that the Socialist League, the Revolutionary Bureau and the Shanghai Communist small group were one and the same thing. By contrast, Jin Li claims that the Socialist League and the Revolutionary Bureau are one and the same but the small group was separate (Ishikawa, 2013, p. 164). Jin Li’s view supports the idea of the strong indigenous nature of the CCP’s origins. However, contemporary documents do not support this.
The contemporary accounts by Zhang and Shi give May 1920 as the date for the formation of a group promoting a communist party, confirming Voitinsky’s claim about the establishment of a Revolutionary Bureau in Shanghai. Certainly, by mid-June, a communist nucleus had formed in Shanghai around Chen Duxiu, Li Hanjun, Shi Cuntong and Yu Xiusong. The group drew up party rules before Shi departed for Japan on June 20 (Shi Cuntong’s deposition in Ishikawa, 2013, p. 161). Contemporary accounts make it clear that the group in Shanghai was the first one to be established and it functioned as the central organization of the future communist party.
Voitinsky and Sneevliet came into this environment with very different ideas about what a communist party should be than those members in the original communist small groups. This included Chen Duxiu. The early ideas about the nature of the CCP developed from two very different traditions (Ishikawa, 2013, p. 162). Chen was a product of the New Culture Movement and a tradition based on interpersonal relationships to draw people to the organization, especially those who were associated with Xin qingnian. He was not convinced about the viability of the nascent labor movement and was negative about the potential of working with the anarchists. Marxism-Leninism fit the agenda of the early Chinese communists but conflicted with their prior norms of behavior and the type of cooperation to which they had been accustomed (van de Ven, 1991, p. 6). Certainly, Li Hanjun saw Chen’s initial program as developing a party that revolved around the crucial presence of his own persona, which Li denounced as autocratic.
Voitinsky and Sneevliet came from a very different tradition within which organization and discipline were important. Voitinsky wanted to work with the student and labor groups at the core and with the Revolutionary Bureau operating as the coordinating agency. Voitinsky was instrumental in pushing the small group of radical intellectuals into action. Sneevliet brought with him the experience of working in the Dutch labor movement and the national railway movement in the Dutch Indies. Discipline was important to him and, when necessary, he would invoke it to get his way, much to the annoyance of some Chinese comrades.
In September 1920, Chen Duxiu signaled publicly, in the article “Talking Politics,” that he was beginning to break from his tradition. This followed the formation of the Revolutionary Bureau and the discussions about outlining a platform for a communist organization. He was moving away from his roots in the anti-Qing networks and those of the May Fourth Movement to a perspective that was more sympathetic to the Bolshevik message that Voitinsky had brought to China and that Sneevliet would reinforce. He wrote “In my belief, revolutionary means must be employed to establish a working-class state” (Chen Duxiu, September 1920), a sentiment echoed by others who became influential in the early communist movement. In December 1920, Mao Zedong wrote to his colleagues in the New Study Movement in France that when all other means had failed, revolution was the last resort and was “simply the natural course of events.” In response to Cai Hesen’s letter of August 13, 1920, Mao agreed that a proletarian dictatorship along the lines of Soviet Russia was the only solution for China’s woes (Mao Zedong, December 1, 1920, pp. 9, 11). This was shortly after the party had drafted the November 1920 declaration but there is no evidence to suggest that Mao had seen it.
It is well known that as early as 1918 Li Dazhao had been attracted to the Bolshevik world view (Meisner, 1967, especially p. 24 and the discussion in Chapter Two). In 1926, Cai Hesen recollected that while the study societies formed the organizational antecedents of the communist party, they were not completely communist and they lacked an organizational umbrella (Cai Hesen, 1926 [1980], p. 8). However, they did form the building blocks for the CCP. In fact, in January 1921, at Mao’s prompting, the majority of the New Citizen Study Society decided that they should adopt a Leninist strategy. Of the 15 voting, 12 favored Bolshevism (Zhang Yunhou et al, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 592, 594). The Chinese soil was becoming more fertile to sow the seeds of a communist party. Bolshevism and the Leninist idea of the party were gaining traction so quickly that the party was Bolshevik before its members understood what that entailed. This led to clashes between Sneevliet and his Chinese colleagues and as a result many of the First Party Congress attendees drifted away.
In 1985, I wrote that the common wisdom was that six communist “small groups” had been established inside China before the First Party Congress convened (July 1921): Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan (or Hankou or Hubei), Guangzhou (or Guangdong), Changsha (or Hunan), Shandong (or Jinan) (Saich, 1985). Yet, even this was a simplification. In both contemporary documents and in the memoir literature there is confusion about what they were called, as there is confusion with the founding of the Shanghai Small Group. Most Chinese writers refer to them as xiaozu (small groups) but others disagree. Liu Renjing (1978 [1980], p. 207) remembered that before the First Party Congress, Shanghai, Beijing, Changsha, Jinan, Wuhan, Qingdao, Guangzhou and so forth all had organizations propagating communism but there was no standard, formal name. Luo Zhanglong (1979 [1980], p. 195; interview September 1987) explained that the appellation Beijing communist “small group,” of which he was a member, was appended by later writers, as the group never used this name in internal or external dealings. Zhu Wushan (1956 [1980], p. 91) goes so far as to say that in early 1921 there was no formal party organization in Beijing, while In Hunan, there was no communist “small group” independent of the New Citizens Study Society (van de Ven, 1991, p. 66).
A fast-moving and confusing situation combined with simultaneous developments that were often poorly coordinated. Some reports refer to active groups such as Tianjin/Tangshan that did not send delegates to the First Party Congress. Even if one made it as a delegate to the Congress, there was little continuity as few attended subsequent meetings. Further, the two key figures who had spearheaded Marxism within leftist circles, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, did not even attend the Congress.
The different traditions and influences were reflected in the origins of the cells scattered around the country. Some were formed with considerable help from Russians and the Comintern (Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou), others through local forces, personal connections and the radicalization of those who had gone to France (Hunan), such as Cai Hesen while some areas had communist groups that did not send any delegates at all (Tianjin, Nanjing and Chongqing). This variation created a distinct organizational trajectory for the early CCP with no clear core leaders and central organization (van de Ven, 1991, pp. 55–56). The CCP emerged from these disparate local organizations. The group in Shanghai operated more as a facilitating agency than as a leadership group and when Chen Duxiu sought to assert his authority, this conflicted with the personal bonds and regional loyalties that could not be easily supplanted. Sneevliet encountered similar resistance when seeking to enforce his authority. Van de Ven’s argument is persuasive but documents released subsequently reveal how hard the Comintern worked to instill the idea of organization and to bring discipline through a more powerful Revolutionary Bureau in Shanghai.
Clearly, before the First Party Congress, groups that considered themselves communist did exist but even contemporary documents present a confused picture. Once one includes the memoirs, the situation becomes even murkier. Some originated as Marxist Study Societies, others from youth league activities and in Hunan, for example, from the New Citizen Study Society. Later CCP historiography imposed an order on this varied picture by naming the diverse entities “small groups.”
The first communist group—The Revolutionary Bureau—that could be taken seriously was set up in Shanghai with Voitinsky’s strong prompting. However, as noted, the time of its establishment has been subject to debate. Earlier writings suggested May or August 1920, with most preferring the earlier date.36 If the Revolutionary Bureau had been set up in May 1920, surely Voitinsky would have mentioned this important fact in his June report. He mentioned it in his August report and the “Report on the First Party Congress” provides corroboration claiming that the Chinese communist organization was established in mid-1920 (translated in Saich, 1991, vol. 1, p. 203). It had five members, including Chen Duxiu. Thus, the Bureau was established after Voitinsky filed his June report but before July 10 (when we have the first of Yu’s diary entries), hence most probably in the mid-June (Ishikawa, 2013, p. 154).37 The key figures in the organization were Chen Duxiu, Li Hanjun, Shi Cuntong, and Yu Xiusong. Sokolov-Strachov, reporting in April 1921 (Doc. 9), suggested that real leadership of the party lay with the editorial group of Xin qingnian, under Chen Duxiu (the “Chinese Lunacharsky).”38 At the time of his writing, Chen had already left Shanghai for Guangzhou. Thus, the Shanghai core group combined the attributes of a group founded both through personal relations and the promptings of the Comintern.
This was swiftly followed by other groups that broadened the base for a “national” communist organization. Generally, they evolved from the extant radical study groups and other similar organizations. The first two localities to follow Shanghai’s lead were Beijing and Wuhan (Hankou). The date of the establishment of the Beijing group is easily determined as its report to the First Party Congress states clearly it was October 1920. Work to date had not been very fruitful and the group hoped that the Congress would spur future momentum.39 Earlier in March 1920, a Marxist Study Society had been set up at Peking University, which some claim formed the genesis for the “small group” (Jindaishi ziliao, 1955, pp. 161–73). Again, it may only have been an informal grouping that came together at the university to cater to growing interest in radical ideas. The genuine origin was the branch of the Revolutionary Bureau that was setup on Voitinsky’s instructions and was working with “Comrades Minor (Stoyanovich) and Polevoy.”40 Voitinsky visited Beijing in October and one can presume that that marked the formal beginning of the Beijing group.
The third major group set up with Soviet influence was in Guangzhou. Contemporary reports permit a more precise timeline to be determined. In his August report, Voitinsky mentioned that he had sent Stoyanovich to Guangzhou to set up a Revolutionary Bureau. Reporting to the First Party Congress, the Guangzhou group noted that in 1920, there was no organization and nobody could be found to carry out such work.41 At the end of 1920, Voitinsky and Perlin visited Guangzhou and set up a branch of the Russian News Agency, set about organizing labor unions and began carrying out propaganda work. In late December 1920, Chen Duxiu arrived. In his work, Stoyanovich did not seem to distinguish between the anarchists and the communists and it is not surprising that the report complained that the anarchists dominated the original organization. Of the nine members, only the Russians, Stoyanovich and Perlin were communists. Only following Voitinsky’s visit and Chen Duxiu’s were the anarchists expelled and the group reformed as a “communist” organization.
The anarchist influence resulted in three self-proclaimed communists, Chen Gongbo, Tan Pingshan and Tan Zhitang refusing to join. The three had been publishing the leftist periodical Guangdong qunbao (Guangdong Masses). Reporting to the Party Congress, Chen Gongbo noted that the party was better thought of as an “anarcho-communist party.” Between February and March 1921, the anarchist influence was overcome as on March 15 the anarchist publication, Minsheng (The People’s Voice), started up again. The majority of its editorials critiqued Marxism and Bolshevism. The Russian supported Laodongzhe (The Laborer, the paper of the anarcho-communist party, ceased publication in January). The Guangzhou Bureau was rated as good in publication and propaganda work but not very active in the labor movement where the anarchists were stronger.
There is no original documentation about the remaining three localities that sent delegates to the Congress. The key figures in Wuhan (Dong Biwu) and Changsha (Mao Zedong) had been in contact with Li Hanjun and Chen Duxiu respectively in Shanghai. Memoirs credit Dong Biwu and Liu Bochui with working to establish the “small group” in Wuhan (or Hankou or Hubei). After the establishment of the Shanghai group, Li Hanjun wrote to Dong Biwu suggesting that a similar organization be set up in Hubei. Dong replied that he would begin work and shortly thereafter, Li Hanjun made a special trip to Wuhan for consultations with Dong Biwu, Zhang Guoen and others. At about the same time, Liu Bochui was in Shanghai on his way back to Wuhan from Guangzhou, where he had been involved in editing Weimin Zhoukan (Weekly for the People). In Shanghai, he consulted a number of times with Chen Duxiu, who persuaded him to join the Shanghai group. Shortly thereafter Chen sent him to Wuhan to help Dong set up the party.
Memoir literature suggests that one day in September a meeting was convened to set up the Wuhan Communist Research “Small Group” (Gongchanzhuyi yanjiu xiaozu).42 Six people attended the meeting: Dong Biwu, Liu Bochui, Chen Tanqiu, Bao Huiseng, Zhang Guoen and Deng Kaiqing.43 The meeting discussed the draft of the party program that Liu had brought from Shanghai and listened to Liu’s report on the Shanghai group.44 Bao Huiseng was placed in charge of work for the “small group,” Chen Tanqiu and Zhang Guoen were to take charge of organizational and financial work, respectively. The account of the meeting might be correct but the date is incorrect. In one memoir, Bao Huiseng (1961 [1980], p. 435) although holding to the September-October date, remembered that “perhaps the Beijing group was set up a little earlier than the Wuhan group,” the Beijing group having been set up in October. In 1921, Shumiatsky reported that the Wuhan SYC was established on November 7, with the initial objective of studying socialism and realizing its ideals.45 The group was at the core of communist actions in Wuchang and the broader Wuhan area. Its main activities in Wuhan operated through the private secondary school that had been set up by Dong Biwu and Zhang Guoen, with Chen Tanqiu playing a very active role. The school opened on April 10, 1920. Early activists often set up schools to push revolutionary propaganda and to identify recruits. Dong, Zhang and Chen were three of the seven original members of the small group and subsequently five of the nine members came from the school (Wang Qian, 2001, pp. 46–47).
In Changsha, it is quite probable that a formal communist small group did not exist before the First Party Congress. In Changsha, the activities revolved around Mao Zedong and some of his close associates. The most important organization was the New Citizen’s Study Society (van de Ven, 1991, pp. 66–69). Even though Mao and He Shuheng attended the Party Congress as Hunan delegates, it was not until October 10, 1921 that Mao participated in the establishment of a Hunan branch of the CCP (Pang Xianzhi, ed., vol. 1, 1993, pp. 85, 89). Peng Shuzhi was one dissenting voice about Mao’s centrality (Cadart and Cheng, 1983, especially pp. 154–56), who given his Trotskyite views was hostile to Mao. Peng Shuzhi identifies He Minfan, director of the Chuanshan Secondary School as the main driving force in Hunan. He was introduced to Chen Duxiu by his former pupils in Shanghai who called on He Shuheng to form a communist group. The work began in July 1920 and by September the group consisted of five people: He Minfan, Liu Hun, one of the teachers in He’s school, He Shuheng, Mao Zedong and Li Yirong. This informal group was actually the Marxist study society. Mao’s early official biographer agrees on the timing of July–August but makes no mention of He Minfan and attributes the work to Mao as well as the founding of the Cultural Book Society (Li Rui, 1991, pp. 366–81).
What existed before the Congress in addition to the New Citizens Study Society with its leftist leanings was the SYC. Yi Yirong (1979a [1980], p. 283), one of those personally involved in the events, states quite clearly that before the First Party Congress there was only a SYC organization and no party organization. Peng Shuzhi agrees that it was following the Party Congress that the Hunan branch was formally set up, with Mao Zedong as secretary (Cadart and Cheng, 1983, p. 158).
The final group to send delegates to the First Party Congress was established in Jinan, Shandong province and again no contemporary sources exist. Li Da (1955 [1980]), based in Shanghai, provides the only source suggesting contacts between Shanghai and those in Shandong. He remembered that Chen Duxiu had asked Wang Leping to help organize a group but Wang deferred to three students at the Number Five Middle School. The delegates to the Congress attended more because of their relationship to Chen and Shanghai rather than because they represented an actual local organization. Other memoirs and accounts stress the primary role of Beijing and of Chen Weiren in particular, in organizing the group.46
There were also self-proclaimed communist groups that did not send delegates to the Congress such as Tianjin and Nanjing and even Sichuan, where there was no connection with Shanghai. The communists active in Tianjin fell under the jurisdiction of Beijing and thus did not send representatives and in Nanjing, according to Chen Tanqiu there were a few communists but not an actual organization.47
Especially interesting is the case of Chongqing, where a very lively communist organization is reported to have thrived.48 The report described the activities of a group that was established on March 12, 1920, formed by students and workers who had been involved in strikes. The group set itself the task of linking with other communist groups in China and establishing contact with Soviet Russia to develop a better understanding of communism. For a long time, neither later Soviet nor Chinese sources referred to this organization: clearly it did not fit the dominant narrative of either set of official historians.
This raises questions about the provenance of the document and why, if it is genuine, no one was invited to attend the First Party Congress. The report was delivered to the Comintern by four group members who had traveled to Moscow via Shanghai, intending to attend the Comintern’s Third Congress (Liao Huaping, Du Xiaoma, Xu Dunrang and Qin Huiseng). The official delegates to the Congress, Zhang Tailei and Yu Xiusong, objected to their credentials and had them expelled as they were not legal representatives from China. Most of those who planned to go to Moscow from Sichuan were anarchists and indeed the organization they had founded, the “Appropriate Society” (shishe), was an anarchist organization. In turn, this was a “secret society” based on the Chongqing Socialist Party Branch that had been established in March 1912 (Yang Shiyuan, 1996, pp. 3–8 and pp. 22–26). The report was written by Liao Huaping, an influential member of the group who had studied at the Shanghai Foreign Languages School. Liao was an anarchist with no affection for Chen Duxiu and the Bolsheviks. On March 9, 1921, he wrote “Now in Guangzhou, the Bolsheviks are very active, for example, Chen Duxiu is very active in Guangzhou, he often howls in the press ‘advocating that the anarchists are a few hundred years too early,’ is he a scoundrel or not?” This would explain why the preparatory group in Shanghai would not want to invite such a critical group to attend the Congress.49
A range of organizations had developed under the broad umbrella of the communist organization and although the precise names and structure differed from place to place, by the time of the First Party Congress a threefold structure had evolved. Operating, in many cases illegally at the core, were the “small groups,” and operating semi-openly were the SYCs, providing a recruitment pool for the party, and, presenting a public face, the Marxist Study Societies were trying to reach the widest audience possible. Just as the organization varied from place to place, so too did the type and intensity of work. However, with varying degrees of success, the nascent groups became involved in the labor movement, propaganda and youth work.
The relationships among the various cliques are described well in Ch’i, 1976, pp. 36–76. For a further concise but very useful account of these cliques (apart from Fengtian) and others see Nathan, 1976, pp. 225–61.
Nathan warns against lumping these two together. He writes that one should think of Duan’s personal faction, the Anhui Clique comprising the group of militarists who fought for Duan or who publicly supported him in the 1920 war and the Anfu Club, the parliamentary group created by Duan and his associates, Wang Yitang and Xi Shuzheng, to protect Duan’s power in government. Nathan, 1976, p. 226.
For an account of the structure of the Zhili clique, see Wou, 1968, pp. 255–71. For an assessment of the relationship between Cao Kun and Wu Peifu, see Nathan, 1976, pp. 233–39.
This was especially true of the British American Tobacco Co. and the Asiatic Petroleum Co. Sheridan, 1983, p. 307.
In late 1924 and 1925, the Russians favored Feng Yuxiang, whose defection from Wu Peifu brought the Zhili-Fengtian War to an abrupt end. In Feng, they saw a potential ally for the GMD in light of his perceived revolutionary and reformist posture. He was known as the Christian General, Sheridan, 1966.
For overseas branches, the Zhongguo GMD was launched officially on October 10, 1919, with establishment as a political party following one year later. It adopted its Constitution on November 9, 1920, Wilbur, 1976, p. 30.
While in Guilin, Sun met Sneevliet for the first time.
Two reports were from Voitinsky himself (June and August 1920, Docs 1 and 2) and one was from Vilensky-Sibiriakov (September 1920, Doc.8). Earlier accounts claimed that Voitinsky’s delegation included Mamaev and Yang Mingzhai. However, Mamaev was not part of the delegation and Yang, while crucial for Voitinsky’s work, was already in China when the delegation arrived. Clearly, earlier Soviet writings on the mission were based on the then unpublished reports in the Comintern archives. See, for example, Kartunova, 1973 and Shevelyov, 1981.
The main proponent of this view was Jin Liren, 1998; 2010. According to Jin, Chen Duxiu was the first person in China to draw a clear distinction between Marxism and anarchism.
Mao Zedong was the motivating force behind the New People’s Study Society, Zhou Enlai was involved in the Awakening Society, while the Society for the Study of Socialism was organized under Li Dazhao’s guidance and was the successor to the Marxist Research Society (late 1916).
However, Luo Zhanglong (1978 [1980], pp. 197–99; interview September 1987) remembers that while in Beijing, Voitinsky commented that China needed a Russian-style party. Luo maintained that it was only during Voitinsky’s visit (April–May 1920) that they considered establishing an organization. Voitinsky felt that although a party had not been formally established and did not have the approval of the Comintern, it was evolving spontaneously. If the Chinese wished to set up an organization, he was willing to pass on their ideas to the Comintern.
The article was written on the occasion of Sun Yat-sen’s death and was published in Pravda (Truth), no. 61, March 15, 1925, p. 2, translated in Eudin and North, 1957, p. 218.
He refers to Comrade Ch, who must be Chen Duxiu. The mention also gives us a clue about the dating as Sun left Shanghai to return to Guangzhou on November 25. Voitinsky, 1925, in Eudin and North, 1957, pp. 218–19.
Sun raised the same problem in his correspondence with Chicherin.
Only in January 1921 was the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) Far Eastern Secretariat set up but it was in Irkutsk not Shanghai.
Again, it is important to note that work in Shanghai was to pursue revolution throughout the region and it was not limited to China.
Vilensky-Sibiriakov (Doc. 8) wrote that these activities provided the basis for developing communist organizations in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Hankou, Nanjing and other cities.
Voitinsky’s report refers to a United Publications Bureau but the editors of the Chinese translation of the report refer to this as the Qunyi shushe, the publisher of the influential New Youth (Xin qingnian) journal.
The report was sent to the section of the Eastern People of the Siberia Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), August 17, 1920.
For a review of the different perspectives see Zhang Yuhan, 2002. Ishikawa engaged with Yang Kuisong and Jin Liren who had originally debated the provenance of the Bureau. See, for example, Yang Kuisong, 1996, and Jin Liren, 1998.
It is unclear whether he was referring to the Shanghai Revolutionary Bureau.
Xin chao was a monthly that ran from 1919 to 1922. The student publication was short-lived, running from January 4, 1920 to May 23 1920.
This was from vol. 8, no. 1 onwards (Li Da, 1955 [1980], p. 8). See also Zhonggongdangshi shijian renwulu, 1983, p. 73.
Relying on the diary of Yu Xiusong, Zhang writes that the Shanghai organization formed in June 1920 was originally named the “Socialist Party” but was changed to the CCP in August 1920, Ishikawa, 2013, p. 116; Zhang Xudong, 2011, pp. 113–15.
Voitinsky calls it “Workers’ Speech.” The publication ran from August 1920 to January 1921. The first copy had a print run of 2,000 and was sold for one cent. It was a weekly that published nineteen issues, although issue no. 13 did not appear. The last issue appeared on December 29, 1920, He Shouyi, 1981, pp. 78–79.
Voitinsky did not return to China until 1924 but he remained influential in the policy debates.
Ishikawa, 2013, p. 228. This is based on his essay “Kommunisticheskii Internatsional na Dal’nem Vostoke” (The Communist International in the Far East) Narody Dal’nego Vostoka, 1, no. 1, May 1921.
Bericht des Genossen, H. Maring, July 1922. Sneevliet actually refers to “railway workers near Beijing” but clearly he is referring to Changxindian.
He sent his report on work in China to the Far Eastern Department of the ECCI on May 20, 1922, Doc. 21.
Zhang Tailei’s 1921 [2013].
Most probably, Li Da (1955 [1980]) was referring to an original draft of “The First Program of the Chinese Communist Party.” This called for the loyalty of members to the party and gave a provisional Central Executive Committee the power to supervise and direct finances, publications and the policies of any local soviet.
Bao Huiseng (1953 [1980], p. 304) provides a different account for the decline in the work of the Party Center in Shanghai. Following a May Day mass meeting, Chinese and French police raided the Party Center offices and the Language School. Li Hanjun convened a meeting to discuss the matter and suggested that party activities be suspended and that either party headquarters be moved to Guangzhou or that Chen Duxiu be asked to return to Shanghai. Bao was then sent to Guangzhou to discuss these matters with Chen Duxiu.
Lidin’s report was one of two in addition to Sneevliet’s that reported positively on the relative strength of the GMD within the labor movement as compared with that of the CCP.
Presumably the seventh was Shanghai but it was not listed as it was the Party Center. In his June 7–9, 1921 letter to the Far East Secretariat of the ECCI, Sneevliet mentions some fifty members who were spread across six small groups: Beijing, Shandong, Hankou, Guangzhou and Shanghai. One place name is indecipherable. This suggests either a rather fluid situation or poor information flows.
Shi notes that Voitinsky attended the meeting, indicating that the two names are for one organization, Shi Fuliang, 1956 [1980].
The May 1920 date stems from the date given in the 1939 official publication Zhongguo xiandai geming yundongshi (History of the Contemporary Chinese Revolutionary Movement), 1939, p. 127. Ishikawa, 2013, has provided a great service by bringing clarity to the timing.
This is concluded by Ishikawa following remarkable detective work, 2013, p. 161. Yang Kuisong disputes this conclusion, dating the founding to sometime between the establishment the Socialist League (July 19) and Voitinsky’s August report to the Comintern. According to Yang Kuisong (1996), Yu’s entries are incorrect. Jin Liren (1997, 1998) dates the founding as June 1920 after the Marxist Study Group was set up in May 1920 and he views it as independent of the Revolutionary Bureau.
The report covered the Guangzhou Government and was marked top secret.
“Beijing gongchan zhuyi xiaozu de baogao,” (Report of the Beijing Communist Small Group) Yida qianhou, vol. 3, 1986, pp. 1–9, presented by Zhang Guotao. An English translation is in Saich, 1996, pp. 19–25. In his June 7–9, 1921 letter, Sneevliet gives the date of October, which suggests either he had seen the report in advance of the Congress or at least had been informed about it. He wrote that the group comprised eight members after some anarchists had withdrawn once the group had passed a communist party program.
Voitinsky’s August report sheds some light on why Tianjin did not have a delegate at the First Congress. Voitinsky was sending Stoyanovich from Tianjin to Guangzhou, implying that the work in Tianjin was in some way incorporated under the Beijing Revolutionary Bureau. The December 21, 1920 report on the work of the Siberian Bureau also notes its work, Doc. 8.
“Guangzhou gongchandang de baogao” (Report of the Guangzhou Communist Party), Yida qianhou, vol. 3, 1986, pp. 10–14, delivered by Chen Gongbo. An English translation can be found in Saich, 1996, pp. 25–27.
Also referred to as the Hubei Party branch (Hubei dangzhibu) or the party “small group” (Hubei dang xiaozu).
Liao Xinchu, 1980, p. 26. This article is a summary of several reminiscences by Bao Huiseng. Bao refers to the role played by Lin Bochui in setting up the group and provides the date of September 1920 as the date of its establishment. Bao was chosen as Deputy Secretary and Zhang Guoen was placed in charge of financial work. After the “small group” was set up, some time in the fall, Mamaev arrived in Wuhan to investigate the situation and to select students to go to Russia. Bao’s memoirs refer to Mamaev as one of Voitinsky’s entourage but although they must have been in contact, he was not a formal member of the delegation. See Bao Huiseng, 1961 [1980], p. 373; 1953 [1980], pp. 312–13.
Li Hanjun had written to his associate Dong Biwu in June or July 1920, asking him to set up a communist organization to which Dong replied positively, a request presumably reinforced by Mamaev. Bao, 1953 [1980].
This is feasible as the October meeting strongly emphasized the youth movement and its organization.
On Chen’s role see Wang Weiquan and Li Zhaonian, 1981, p. 97. Zhang Guotao did not mention Chen but writes that Beijing organized the communist “small group” and the SYC in Shandong. Chang Kuo-t’ao, 1971, vol. 1, p. 138. Ma Baosen’s memoirs (1951 [1980], p. 393) noted that Chen went to Shandong to set up a party branch but this was after the Party Congress.
On Tianjin see Zhonggong Tianjin shiwei dangshi yanjiushe (2005, especially p. 65). On the question of Nanjing, Chengdu and Hangzhou having communists but no organization and thus not invited to the First Party Congress see Chen Tanqiu, 1936.
“Sichuansheng Chongqing gongchan zhuyi zuzhi de baogao” (Report of the Chongqing, Sichuan Province, communist organization), in Zhongyang dang’anguan (1984), pp. 27–32; van de Ven, 1991, pp. 73–75.
Li Rong, 2011, pp. 38–48. Li Rong suggests that because the group had no direct contact with the Shanghai group or because it had lost contact are the most likely explanations for its members not attending.