Forgiving Without Forgetting
In: Forgiveness: An Interdisciplinary DialogueSearch for other papers by Yotam Benziman in
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Forgiveness is possible only when real harm has been done. But when there is real harm, there is no reason to forgive. Forgiveness is therefore a paradoxical concept. I will discuss and reject two possible ways of resolving this paradox. The first treats the repenting wrongdoer as profoundly ‘other’ than the person who caused the harm. The second condemns the wrong while seeing the person who committed it as separable from his act. I will show that the philosophical discussion of forgiveness mostly revolves around these two options, which both assume that forgiveness requires forgetting. My analysis of the concept of forgiveness, on the other hand, argues for the value of the paradox in revealing that forgiveness is possible only if the memory of the harm done is preserved by both parties. I will claim that this notion is captured by the Biblical Hebrew root describing interpersonal forgiveness: the root nasa. The Old Testament differentiates between two kinds of forgiveness. One is ascribed to God, and is described by the root salakh. This root is connected in Semitic languages, as well as in the Bible itself, to the act of ‘throwing water,’ i.e. of cleansing thoroughly and starting afresh, perhaps forgetting. The root nasa, however, means ‘to bear.’ Human forgiveness is thus constituted upon bearing the consequences of the wrong committed. This is what the person seeking forgiveness is asking for, and what the forgiver is willing to give. Thus, far from being connected to forgetting, forgiveness becomes the act of incorporating the wounds into the fabric of one’s life, providing them with a new meaning.