1 Introduction
New space exploration missions aim to create a sustainable human presence on the Moon.1 A growing number of countries are joining the space and lunar exploration market, notably in the context of the Artemis programme,2 which is the NASAâs project to return astronauts to the Moon3 and to establish a long-term lunar base. Russia and China have also announced plans for a joint International Lunar Research Station.4 In addition, private entities5 are developing lunar missions as for instance iSpace and Astrobotic. The prospect of new space activities on the Moon, in particular those related to extraction, poses technical and logistical challenges in light of the likely geographical concentration of
One tool that has been advanced to help with these challenges is that of safety zones, a type of area-based management tool (ABMT) which is meant to restrict or even prohibit use in a zone around an ongoing operation. Safety zones have been included in some recent soft-law instruments, but they are not yet part of the space law legal system. There are in fact challenges in determining how they would fit therein. Indeed, the establishment of safety zones could be considered a breach of this legal system, which principally consists of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST).8 In particular, these ABMTâs might appear difficult to reconcile with certain principles, such as the free access to outer space, the freedom of exploration and use of outer space, as well as the fact that outer space shall not be subject to national appropriation. However, the OST also contains other overarching obligations and principles, in particular of due regard and cooperation, that could support some form of safety zone. This contribution does not delve into the 1979 Moon Agreement9 as it received a limited number of ratifications so far.10 While it remains a valid international law treaty binding its 17 State Parties (as of January 2025), it is not generally considered the âapplicableâ legal framework.
This contribution explores the potential development of restrictions to use â and even of non-use measures â in a regime that emphasises the freedom
2 The Concept of Safety Zones
In light of the planned increase in missions to the Moon, safety zones are needed because of the geographical concentration of resources and the issue of rock and dust causing damage to equipment (2.1). The concept of safety zones, while not formally codified in international law, has been delineated in soft law instruments, which provide clarifications as to what these ABMTs would consist of (2.2).
2.1 Why Safety Zones Are Needed
More than 250 missions to the Moon11 are planned in the next few years.12 Many of these programmes foresee permanent lunar bases and aim to explore, exploit and use the Moonâs natural resources in situ or bring them back to Earth.13 In the short term, space resources would be used to sustain projects on the lunar surface, but in the long term, the Moon and its resources would represent an essential component in far-flung missions in the solar system. Indeed, lunar and cis-lunar activities constitute a first step towards future Mars missions.
Lunar missions of exploration, including mining activities, intend to identify what resources are really available on the Moon and on other celestial
Ongoing research indicates that there are only a few small areas of the Moon that are rich in both water and rare materials.19 This concentration of resources could raise potential tensions between actors conducting activities on its surface, as many of the missions are likely to explore and to prospect the same parts of the Moon depending on where resources will be found.
Moreover, when talking about lunar activities, it is necessary to consider the fine dust and small rock fragment (also known as âregolithâ) present on its surface.20 Since there is no atmosphere on the Moon, the dust is easily raised when spacecraft land or drive on the lunar surface.21 These dust particles can have a very negative impact on machinery and human activities,22 and might also alter historic lunar sites. In addition, lunar activities and infrastructures
Hence, in this context where more and more activities are being planned on the Moon and taking into account the risks of damage24 and harmful interferences,25 there is a need for some restricted-use or non-use âspace measuresâ on the Moon. These measures would overall aim at ensuring that activities conducted by States and private entities are pursued in a safe manner26 with the aim to preclude risks and protect space systems during normal operation.27
2.2 What Safety Zones Could Consist Of
Safety zones would be a type of ABMT for managing different forms of space use.28 It is to be noted that the current understanding of safety zones would characterise them primarily as a form of restricted use. In order to enable the safety of specific operations, such as mining, rules would be put in place by the State âactiveâ (or the State responsible for a private entity) in an area or an international organisation, for a certain period of time and towards determined actors, to regulate who can be active in a given area, and how. Safety
At the moment, there is a lack of practice with no safety zone in place on the Moon. The conditions for establishing safety zone have not yet been clarified, and there is no clear definition of the concept of safety zone in the space legal framework.29 Nevertheless, the concept has been introduced in soft-law instruments, in particular the Building Blocks for the Development of an international Framework on Space Resource Activities (Building Blocks or BB) adopted in 2019 and in the Artemis Accords (Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Mars, Comets and Asteroids for Peaceful Purposes) adopted in 2020. Hence, even if the concept of safety zone is not present in a binding treaty, it has been introduced in soft-law instruments at the international level and progress is being made towards a common approach. The characteristics of safety zone developed in these recent soft law instruments are presented here below.
2.1.1 The Building Blocks for the Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities
The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group (the Working Group) was established in 2016 and consists of stakeholders of space resource activities, coming from academia, government agencies, international organisations, the industry, and non-governmental organisations.30 It was created with the purpose to assess whether a governance framework for space resource activities was needed, and, if so, to start working on it. The outputs of this Working Group were intended to be provided to States and international organisations for their consideration if and when they came to developing an international governance framework.
In November 2019, the Working Group adopted a governance framework, entitled the Building Blocks for the Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities.31 The BB were presented at the United
11.3 Taking into account the principle of non-appropriation under Article II OST, the international framework should permit States and international organizations responsible for space resource activities to establish a safety zone, or other area-based safety measure, around an area identified for a space resource activity as necessary to assure safety and to avoid any harmful interference with that space resource activity. Such safety measure shall not impede the free access, in accordance with international law, to any area of outer space by personnel, vehicles and equipment of another operator. In accordance with the area-based safety measure, a State or international organization may restrict access for a limited period of time, provided that timely public notice has been given setting out the reasons for such restriction.
11.4 The international framework should provide that appropriate international consultations are undertaken in case of possible overlap of safety zones or conflicts involving the freedom of access recognized by international law.
Safety zones have to be established in a manner that it is consistent with the United Nations Space Treaties, and in particular the OST. They should be established, operated and terminated in a way that safeguard personnels, equipment, vehicles and operations from harmful interferences36 in order to ensure the safety and security of lunar activities. In addition, in case of international disagreement in relation to different aspects of safety zones, international consultations could be held between interested parties (eg space agencies, private companies),37 through for instance the Permanent Court of Arbitration âOptional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activitiesâ.38 Nevertheless, this consultation procedure would need to be clarified in a future legal framework.
2.1.2 An Overview of the Artemis Accords
The Artemis Accords, also known as the Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Mars, Comets, and Asteroids for Peaceful Purposes, were signed in 2020 by 8 founding States. This non-binding set of principles aimed at guiding cooperative activities in civil space exploration
11.7. In order to implement their obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, the Signatories intend to provide notification of their activities and commit to coordinating with any relevant actor to avoid harmful interference. The area wherein this notification and coordination will be implemented to avoid harmful interference is referred to as a âsafety zoneâ. A safety zone should be the area in which nominal operations of a relevant activity or an anomalous event could reasonably cause harmful interference. The Signatories intend to observe the following principles related to safety zones:
The size and scope of the safety zone, as well as the notice and coordination, should reflect the nature of the operations being conducted and the environment that such operations are conducted in;
The size and scope of the safety zone should be determined in a reasonable manner leveraging commonly accepted scientific and engineering principles;
The nature and existence of safety zones is expected to change over time reflecting the status of the relevant operation. If the nature of an operation changes, the operating Signatory should alter the size and scope of the corresponding safety zone as appropriate. Safety zones will ultimately be temporary, ending when the relevant operation ceases; and
The Signatories should promptly notify each other as well as the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the establishment, alteration, or end of any safety zone, consistent with Article XI of the Outer Space Treaty.
Hence, in order to avoid harmful interference with each otherâs activities, the Signatories can establish safety zones in the area of operations of an activity, or where a special event occurs. Safety zones are intended to be temporary, until the end of the operation. At the heart of how safety zones will function in practice are notification and coordination between the Signatories: it is thus that they will communicate the size and scope of these ABMTs, as well as the changes in the conditions applicable to safety zones. Notification is also due to the United Nations Secretary General. As much as possible, information about safety zones is to be made available to the public.41
The Artemis Accords then recalls that the Signatories will respect the principle of free access as well as the other provisions of the OST.42 The complex relationship between this principle and safety zones is not fully clarified, as, on the one hand, States are required to respect safety zones in order to avoid harmful interference among operations but, on the other hand, the possibility of conducting operations in another Stateâs safety zone remains open, as long as notification and coordination have taken place.43
The Artemis Accords finally recognises that further efforts will be necessary to âdevelop international practices, criteria, and rules applicable to the definition and determination of safety zones and harmful interferenceâ.44
2.1.3 Key Elements of Safety Zones as Restricted-use/Non-use Measures
The soft law instruments described here above provide guidance concerning the elements that could compose a safety zone but do not give a comprehensive definition of it, how it should be implemented, or the process to be followed by actors involved in space missions.
Under the BB, both States and international organisations are considered as entities able to establish safety zones, whereas the Artemis Accords only refers to its Signatories, which are States. In both sets of soft law instruments, it is clear that the aims of these ABMTs would be to ensure safety in operations
With that in mind and recalling that safety zones are still under development in international law, it seems possible to say that these ABMTs might constitute a restricted use or, in certain cases, a non-use measure for certain actors and for a limited period of time. Safety zones as non-use measures are, by nature, temporary since they are meant to evolve when the operation changes or ceases. Their aim is primarily to avoid safety concerns during extractive operations or harmful interference: they are consequently intended to enable use by the actor that establishes the safety zone, by placing restrictions on other actors. At a later stage, such ABMTs could be related to conservation or management of natural resources, as many other non-use measures are.
3 Can âSafety Zonesâ Fit within the Outer Space Treaty Principles?
Notwithstanding the frequent references to the existing space law legal regime in the BB and the Artemis Accords, some questions of consistency between safety zones and key principles of the OST merit examination.45 Indeed, the creation of safety zone raises concerns about their conformity with the space legal framework and in particular with the principles of freedom of use, free access (Article I of the OST), non-appropriation (Article II of the OST), and the obligation to open installations (Article XII of the OST) (3.1). Nonetheless, safety zones can be buttressed by the obligation of due regard and the concept of cooperation in the conduct of space activities (Article IX of the OST) (3.2).
The issue with the concept of safety zone is that it could be viewed as a breach of the freedom of use expressed in Article I of the OST. According to this article, âOuter space [â¦] shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kindâ.46 This provision means that the use of outer space, for non-economic and economic reasons, is open to all States and non-governmental entities under their jurisdiction, which States have to authorise and continuously supervise in accordance with Article VI of the OST.47 This freedom of use encompasses exploitation of outer space and celestial bodies, and is granted to States, private entities, international intergovernmental organisations as well as non-governmental organisations.48 Consequently, a State deciding to put restrictions to activities by other actors in a certain area might appear to contradict the concept of freedom of use set in Article I.
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States
Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.
Finally, Article II of the OST stresses that no area of space is subject to ânational appropriationâ by âclaim of sovereigntyâ, by âmeans of use or occupationâ, or by âany other meansâ.51 Creating a safety zone around a landing or mining site might be considered an occupation, and hence contrary to the principle of non-appropriation.52
If at first sight, a safety zone might be seen as at risk of breaching Articles I, II and XII of the OST, the creation of such areas might however be in line with the principles and obligations of the OST. First of all, the freedom of use, while broad in scope, can be limited by conditions set under the provision of the space treaties or under customary international law.53 Hence, should States create a legal framework for safety zones and acknowledge these measures as adequate in their activities in outer space, safety zones could be considered lawful restrictions to the freedom of use.
Moreover, safety zones could be established in such a manner that respects the freedom of access and the obligation to keep stations, installations, equipment and vehicle open to other States. Indeed, a condition could be that the installations located where the safety zone applies would have to remain, as much as possible, open to States others than the one which established it, in the limit that these States do not interfere with the operations underway.
Finally, safety zones do not necessarily come into conflict with the prohibition of national appropriation and their establishment does not automatically imply any claims of sovereignty or territorial rights by States. There is indeed a difference between appropriation and the creation of temporary and specific measures to restrict access to and use of an area in order to avoid interferences between various activities for instance.
As acknowledged in the BB and the Artemis Accords, a safety zone should, as much as possible, remain free of access to other parties without causing
In that sense, it is fundamental that States have agreed in the BB and the Artemis Accords â and hopefully soon formalise this agreement in a binding instrument â that safety zones are acceptable management measures for space activities. While the international community continues to examine this topic to identify a common approach, an example of an acceptable management measure for safety concerns in space is the International Space Stationâs (ISS) âKeep-Out Sphereâ which is an âapproach zoneâ to the Station. The ISS uses this area, delimited with an imaginary boundary of 200 metres from the centre of gravity of the ISS54 as a type of safety zone to ensure the safety and protection of the ISS during docking operations.55 Hence, during such operations, there are many requirements for cargo and module approach in order to reduce the overall risk to the ISS and its crew.
3.2 Obligation of âDue Regardâ and Principle of Cooperation
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their
activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.
The obligation of due regard implies that States, as well as private entities authorised by their respective State, should carry on space activities with a certain standard of care and attention to others.58 Similarly, the principle of cooperation, meant to enable peaceful co-existence, includes an expectation that States will work together through, for example notification, consultation, and negotiation. From a space law perspective, safety zones can therefore be seen as âoperationalisingâ the obligation of due regard and the principle of cooperation. Indeed, these ABMTs will allow space exploration and use to be conducted in a safe and secure manner, taking into account the interest of all other States, mainly by avoiding the risk of harmful interference between activities of actors involved.
In practice, the principle of cooperation59 will play a significant role in establishing common definitions of key concepts relating to space exploration, such as safety zones, in order to ensure that space activities are conducted in a peaceful manner.60 It will also be central in the actual establishment of these ABMTs, through consultation, information exchange, and notification.
Article IX requires State Parties to consult with each other when their respective activities might interfere, an obligation which is highly relevant to the question of safety zones. International consultations between parties must take place in two specific situations: first, when a State Party âhas reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer spaceâ and, second, when a State Party âhas reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer spaceâ. Consultations must happen before the activities in question take place. The creation of a safety zone would necessitate coordination
Even after the international consultation phase, information exchange will continue to be at the heart of successful safety zones. Such information exchange might need to be centralised through an international body or, at least, a clearing house mechanism. Information such as the identity of the State establishing a safety zone, the reasons therefore, the types of restrictions in place and the period of applicability thereof would all constitute relevant data. The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) could provide such services, maintaining a registry of safety zones. It could also put together a centralised map of lunar activities and the safety zones established in relation to on-going operations. Ideally, it would also have a mandate to verify that the existing rules are respected, maybe through reports by States âactiveâ on the Moon.
States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as public and the international scientific community [â¦] of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities [â¦].
Hence, the Secretary General of the United Nations would receive and centralise crucial information related to operations in outer space. This might include data related to specific management measures, such as safety zones, which could then be shared with UNOOSA.
In summary, while safety zones have not been established yet, there are arguments and discussions in favour of creating them given the anticipated rise of space activities on the Moon in the next years. The international space community is aware of the challenges that numerous lunar activities represent for the safety of space activities. Safety zones are a practical application of the due regard and cooperation principles, two core elements of Article IX of the OST. Hence, the creation of safety zone could be seen as an application of the Outer Space Treaty. Moreover, several provisions of this treaty focusing on consultation and notification could contribute to the establishment and success of safety zones.
Safety zones, as restricted-use measures, could also be a stepping stone for stricter non-use measures in lunar exploration. In particular, one could envision heritage zones for the protection of historical artifacts on the Moon.
Considering the development of lunar exploration activities, the international community is becoming aware of the necessity to protect cultural sites on the Moon.61 In addition to the Apollo missions landing sites,62 it is estimated that there are more than 110 potential human heritage sites on the Moon.63 The question hence arises about the need to create âheritage zonesâ to safeguard, protect and preserve such cultural and heritage sites on the Moon and other celestial bodies as the traces of humanity in outer space. A heritage zone could deal with the non-use of an area where a cultural site is located in order to protect artifacts. Hence, to avoid that a lander, a robot, an astronaut, or an installation damage cultural heritage, a âforbidden perimeterâ would be established, creating a heritage zone.
The Signatories intend to preserve outer space heritage, which they consider to comprise historically significant human or robotic landing sites, artifacts, spacecraft and other evidence of activity on celestial bodies in accordance with mutually developed standards and practices. The Signatories intend to use their experience under the Accords to contribute to multilateral efforts to further develop international practices and rules applicable to preserving outer space heritage.
In March 2023, the Legal Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS also acknowledged the need to recognise and to promote the adoption of measures to protect certain sites that embody historic firsts in the history of space exploration.66
At the national level, the United States, a pioneer in the field, is engaged in developing standards and norms for the protection of historic sites on the Moon. For instance, NASA adopted in 2011 a set of recommendations to all space-faring entities, considering also the destructive potential of lunar dust. The goal was to protect Apollo and other US objects on the lunar surface that are of historical and scientific value. The recommendations implement âexclusion zonesâ, defined by NASA as âboundary areas into which visiting spacecraft should not enterâ.67 In addition, the United States recently passed the âOne Small Step to Protect Human Heritage in Space Actâ which directs NASA to ensure that its contractors do not interfere with heritage sites on the Moon.68 Such instruments are not enforceable against any entity or nation unless they are contracting directly with NASA.
In addition to these important domestic initiatives, it remains to be seen whether an international framework can be put in place to grant spatial protection to lunar heritage sites. Even more than for safety zones, international recognition seems necessary, as safeguarding space exploration tracks ought to be of interest to the international community as a whole.
As examined here, due to the increase in interest and planned activities on the Moon, new ABMTs might be necessary to ensure safety during extractive operations and to avoid harmful interference. Safety zones are under discussion on the international scene, as evidenced by their inclusion in the Building Blocks and the Artemis Accords. According to these instruments, safety zones might be established by States, space agencies and/or private entities authorised by the appropriate State pursuant to Article VI of the OST, to limit, in a temporary manner, the activities and/or access of other entities into a given area that corresponds to the location of operations.
In addition to these soft-law initiatives, it is worth noting that, in June 2022, the UNCOPUOS formed the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities. This groupâs mandate is to review the existing legal framework for the exploration, exploitation and utilisation of space resources, to develop and prepare a draft set of recommended principles for such activities under a five-year workplan.69 It is likely that the topic of safety zone will be addressed. One could imagine that, based on the model of the Hague Working Group that drafted the BB, another working group could be set up, focusing this time on safety zones. It could contribute an expert opinion towards the definition of a legal framework for these ABMT sâ establishment, with the participation of representatives of governments, space agencies, industry and civil society. Such framework could then be presented at UNCOPUOS to serve as a basis for intergovernmental negotiations for an instrument on safety zones.
Safety zones illustrate the emergence and early development of restricted-use or non-use measures, in response to a new need. Still under development, they have to fit within the existing legal framework, here the OST. Key principles of freedom of use, freedom of access, and non-appropriation provide limitations to the potential scope of safety zones, but these spatial tools also find roots in the OST, in particular in the obligation of due regard and the principle of cooperation. When fully operationalised, safety zones will represent a practical illustration of restricted-use or non-use measures intended to enable use. These measures indeed mainly aim at making sure that operations can be conducted safely and without damage to infrastructures; they limit the use and/or access by other actors, in order to enable one actor to extract resources. However, safety zones on the Moon could also serve as a stepping stone for
Safety zones represent real challenges for international space law in terms of conditions and modalities for their adoption â and, at a later stage, their implementation, and compliance. Even if safety zones are quite special in that they are not conservation oriented, they are not unique in international law. For example, safety zones can indeed be established under the law of the sea around artificial islands, installations and structures,70 to ensure the safety of both navigation and of the installations.71 While safety zones on the Moon will probably be determined unilaterally by the State planning the extractive activity, heritage zones would be likely be adopted internationally. There, inspiration could potentially be drawn from the Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs) envisioned under the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty.72 These areas have been set aside to preserve their unique natural systems or to reduce the risk of interference to areas with exceptional environmental, scientific, historic, aesthetic, or wilderness value. In both case of safety or heritage zones, information will need to be centralised and then publicised, to enable proper implementation and compliance. As the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat does in relation to ASPAs, UNOOSA might have a role to play in maintaining an updated catalogue of safety and heritage zones on the Moon and later on other celestial bodies.
NASA, âNASAâs Moon to Mars Strategy and Objectives Development, A blueprint for sustained human presence and exploration throughout the Solar Systemâ (2023), available at <https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/m2m_strategy_and_objectives_development.pdf> accessed 2 August 2023; Euroconsult, âProspects for Space Explorationâ (2022), available at <www.euroconsult-ec.com/press-release/global-governmental-space-exploration-investments-to-reach-31b-by-2031-as-public-and-private-players-reach-for-the-moon/> accessed 2 August 2023.
NASA, âArtemis Programâ, available at <www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis/> accessed 2 August 2023.
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R. Boyle, âA New Private Moon Race Kicks Off Soonâ (Scientific American, 2022), available at <www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-new-private-moon-race-kicks-off-soon/> accessed 2 August 2023.
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NASA, âApollo 17 Technical Crew Debriefingâ (4 January 1973), available at <https://an.rsl.wustl.edu/apollo/data/A17/resources/a17-techdebrief.pdf> accessed 2 August 2023; NASA Technical Reports Server, âResults of Examination of the Returned Surveyor 3 Samples for Particulate Impactsâ (1972), available at <www.lpi.usra.edu/lunar/strategies/Cour-PalaisEtAl_NASA-SP-284E_Surveyor_3_Particulate_Impacts.pdf> accessed 2 August 2023; M. Hanlon and B. Cunningham, âThe Legal Imperative to Mitigate the Plume Effect: An âAggravation and Frustrationâ That Imperils Our History and Our Futureâ (2019) 43 Journal of Space Law 309.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967) 610 UNTS 205. 115 States Parties as of January 2025.
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3, 18 ILM 1434.
S.-M. Wedening and J. W. Nelson, âThe Moon Agreement: Hanging by a Thread?â (Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University, January 2023), available at <www.mcgill.ca/iasl/article/moon-agreement-hanging-thread> accessed 17 April 2025.
NSR, âDeveloping Moon Market Propelled by 2050+ Missions and $105 Billion in Revenueâ (10 April 2023), available at <www.nsr.com/nsr-developing-moon-market-propelled-by-250-missions-and-105-billion-in-revenue-through-decade/> accessed 2 August 2023.
M. Hanlon, âLunar mining and Moon land claims fall into a gray area of international law, but negotiations are underway to avoid conflict and damage to spacecraftâ (The Conversation, 23 August 2022), available at <https://theconversation.com/lunar-mining-and-moon-land-claims-fall-into-a-gray-area-of-international-law-but-negotiations-are-underway-to-avoid-conflict-and-damage-to-spacecraft-188426> accessed 2 August 2023.
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ibid.
European Space Agency, âHelium-3 mining on the lunar surfaceâ, available at <www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Preparing_for_the_Future/Space_for_Earth/Energy/Helium-3_mining_on_the_lunar_surface> accessed 2 August 2023.
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Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics (n 6).
A. Gilbert, âSafety Zones for Lunar Activities under the Artemis Accordsâ (Open Lunar Foundation Report, January 2022) 11, available at <https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5e4b7985a58df89b6c254001/61de2458e7af966b631a7f67_Copy%20of%20Pre-Print%20Safety%20Zones%20for%20Lunar%20Activities%20AQG%20Open%20Lunar%20Foundation.pdf> accessed 2 August 2023.
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NASA (n 7); NASA Technical Reports Server (n 7); Hanlon and Cunningham (n 7).
T. Lewton, âSpace Is an Ecosystem like any Other. And Itâs in Perilâ (Undark, December 2022), available at <https://undark.org/2022/05/12/space-is-an-ecosystem-like-any-other-and-its-in-peril/?> accessed 2 August 2023.
See eg damage could be understood as âloss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizationsâ as per Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (adopted 29 November 1971, entered into force 1 September 1972) 961 UNTS 187, art I(a).
See eg harmful interference could be understood as âinterference which endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance with Radio Regulationsâ, as per both International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Radio Regulations (2016 edition), No. 1.169; and Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (adopted 22 December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994) 1825 UNTS 1, No. 1003.
J. K. Schinger, âImagining Safety Zones: Implications and Open Questionsâ (The Space Review, 8 June 2020), available at <www.thespacereview.com/article/3962/1> accessed 2 August 2023.
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E. Gissi et al, âContributions of marine area-based management tools to the UN sustainable development goalsâ (2022) 330 Journal of Cleaner Production 129910.
Gilbert (n 20) 2.
International Institute of Air and Space Law, âThe Hague International Space resources Governance Working Groupâ (Leiden University), available at <www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/law/institute-of-public-law/institute-of-air-space-law/the-hague-space-resources-governance-working-group> accessed 2 August 2023.
The Hague International Space resources Governance Working Group, âBuilding Blocks for the Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activitiesâ (Leiden University, November 2019), available at <www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-publiekrecht/lucht--en-ruimterecht/space-resources/bb-thissrwg--cover.pdf> accessed 2 August 2023; T. Masson-Zwaan and M. Hofmann, Introduction to Space Law (Wolters Kluwer 2019) 105â106.
UNCOPUOS, âBuilding blocks for the development of an international framework on space resource activitiesâ (2020) A/AC.105/C.2/L.315.
International Institute of Air and Space Law (n 30).
The Hague International Space resources Governance Working Group (n 31).
O. Bittencourt et al (eds), Building Blocks for the Development of an International Framework for the Governance of Space Resource Activities (Eleven International Publishing 2020) 65.
ibid 66â67.
ibid 66.
Permanent Court of Arbitration, âOptional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activitiesâ (Effective 6 December 2011) available at <https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/Permanent-Court-of-Arbitration-Optional-Rules-for-Arbitration-of-Disputes-Relating-to-Outer-Space-Activities.pdf > accessed 7 March 2024.
NASA, âThe Artemis Accordsâ (8 April 2025) available at <www.nasa.gov/artemis-accords/> accessed 20 April 2025; UN Doc A/AC.105/C.1/2025/CRP.16/Rev.1 (10 February 2025).
Artemis Accords, 11.1.
ibid 11.9.
ibid 11.11.
ibid 11.10.
ibid 11.6, see also 11.11.
M. Stubbs, âThe Legality of Keep-Out, Operational, and Safety Zones in Outer Spaceâ in C. Steer and M. Hersch (eds), War and Peace in Outer Space â Law, Policy and Ethics (OUP 2021) 201â206 and 224â226.
S. Hobe, âArticle Iâ, in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd, K.-U. Schrogl and G. Meishan Goh (eds), Cologne Commentary on Space Law, Vol. 1, Outer Space Treaty (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2009) 25â43.
M. Gerhard, âArticle VIâ, in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd, K.-U. Schrogl and G. Meishan Goh (eds), Cologne Commentary on Space Law, Vol. 1 (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2009) 103â125; also see eg Outer Space Treaty, art VI, which provides that âStates Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space [â¦] shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. [â¦]â; 1979 Moon Agreement, art 14.
Hobe (n 46) 35.
ibid 36.
L. J. Smith, âArticle XIIâ in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd, K.-U. Schrogl and G. Meishan Goh (eds), Cologne Commentary on Space Law, Vol. 1 (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2009) 207â214; 1979 Moon Agreement, art 9.
S. Freeland and R. Jakhu, âArticle IIâ in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd, K.-U. Schrogl and G. Meishan Goh (eds), Cologne Commentary on Space Law, Vol. 1 (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2009) 44â63.
S. Hobe and K. Chen, âLegal Status of Outer Space and Celestial Bodiesâ in R. S. Jakhu and P. S. Dempsey, Routledge Handbook of Space Law (Routledge 2017) 30â34.
Freeland and Jakhu (n 51) 53.
D. S. Koons, C. Schreiber and F. Acevedo, âRisk Mitigation Approach to Commercial Resupply to the International Space Stationâ (2010) ESA Special Publication 1; A. Lemole, âSpaceX Crew-4 returns to Earth with Atlantic Splashdownâ (NSF 14, October 2022), available at <www.nasaspaceflight.com/2022/10/crew-4-return/> accessed 2 August.
See eg ISS Safety Requirements Document (SSP 52721) (2019), available at <https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20210009936/downloads/SSP%2051721-Baseline.pdf> accessed 2 August 2023.
C. Johnson, âThe Space Law Context of the Artemis Accordsâ (SpaceWatchGL, May 2020) available at <https://spacewatch.global/2020/05/spacewatchgl-feature-the-space-law-context-of-the-artemis-accords-part-2/> accessed 2 August 2023.
S. Marchisio, âArticle IXâ in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd, K.-U. Schrogl and G. Meishan Goh (eds), CoCoSL, Vol. 1 (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2009) 169â182.
ibid 175.
See eg UNGA Res 51/122 (1996) GAOR 51th Session.
A. A. Ortega, âArtemis Accords: A Step Toward International Cooperation or Further Competition?â (Lawfare, 15 December 2020), available at <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/artemis-accords-step-toward-international-cooperation-or-further-competition> accessed 24 January 2024.
See eg the website of For All Moonkind, which is a US not-for-profit organisation aimed at developing norms to protect lunar heritage sites, including with a possible convention, or recognition by UNESCO, available at <www.forallmoonkind.org/> accessed 2 August 2023.
See eg For All Moonkind, âCrewed Landing Sitesâ, available at <www.forallmoonkind.org/moonkind-mission/apollo-landing-sites/> accessed 2 August 2023; see also NASA History Program Office, âCatalogue of Manmade Material on the Moonâ (July 2012), available at <https://history.nasa.gov/FINAL%20Catalogue%20of%20Manmade%20Material%20on%20the%20Moon.pdf> accessed 2 August 2023; For All Moonkind, âMoon Registryâ, available at <https://moonregistry.forallmoonkind.org/> accessed 2 August 2023.
For All Moonkind, âOther Landing Sitesâ, available at <www.forallmoonkind.org/moonkind-mission/other-landing-sites/> accessed 2 August 2023.
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (adopted 16 November 1972, entered into force 17 December 1975) 1037 UNTS 151.
A. S. Martin, âThe âOutstanding Universal Valueâ Concept of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention: Food for Thought to Preserve Lunar Artifactsâ in A. Froehlich (ed), Protection of Cultural Heritage Sites on the Moon (Springer 2020) 53â64.
UNCOPUOS, âStatement by the Delegation For All Moonkindâ (Legal Subcommittee, 28 March 2023), available at <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/lsc/2023/index.html> accessed 2 August 2023.
NASA, âNASAâs Recommendations to Space-Faring Entities: How to Protect and Preserve the Historic and Scientific Value of U.S. Government Lunar Artifactsâ (20 July 2011) available at <www.nasa.gov/pdf/617743main_NASA-USG_LUNAR_HISTORIC_SITES_RevA-508.pdf> accessed 2 August 2023.
Congress of the United States, One Small Step to Protect Human Heritage in Space Act (2020) Public Law No 116â275, S. 1694, available at <https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ275/PLAW-116publ275.pdf> accessed 2 August 2023.
UNCOPUOS, âReport of the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activitiesâ (2023) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2023/SRA/L.1; UN General Assembly, âAnnex IIâ (2022) UN Doc A/AC.105/1260.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3, arts 60(4), 60(5), 60(6), 60(7).
ibid art 147 (c).
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (adopted 4 October 1991, entered into force 14 January 1998) 30 ILM 1461, art 12(g).