Kangâs dueling legacies were fixed between 1909 and 1911. He was attacked by his contemporaries and criticized by historians as a failed political leader corrupted by power and money who drove his organization into the ground, losing tens of thousands of idealistic followers to the revolutionaries led by Sun Yatsen. In contrast, the culmination of the constitutional movement highlights Kangâs role as a seminal political organizer and thinker who roused hundreds of thousands of his compatriots to seek a modern constitutional system for China. During these three years, Kang largely withdrew from direct involvement in the Xianzhenghui except to communicate multiple orders and vent his frustrations to key disciples. There is no positive evidence that Kang made a quick trip to North America in 1909 as mentioned in the sequel to his autobiography. He also failed to gain entry to Australia, where he hoped to revive his movement. Instead, Kang traveled the world and stayed for extended periods in Singapore, Penang, Hong Kong, and Japan, where he watched the rapidly radicalizing political situation in China, the downward spiral of his own political organization, and, finally, with Liang Qichao, Xu Qin, and military and political allies in China, made a dramatic last attempt to forestall the 1911 victory by the revolutionaries.
Plagued by the messy breakdown of the Commercial Corporation and torn by internal disputes and scandals, the Xianzhenghui began to lose the political loyalty of Chinese overseas. However, a strong contingent of members and leaders in North America and the newspapers and schools they sponsored remained loyal to Kang and the constitutional movement for decades into the future. They closely followed news in China between 1909 and 1911, watching the constitutional petition movement grow quickly in mass and energy. The petition movement gained gravitas when the new provincial assemblies (ziyiju) convened October 14, 1909, following the Qing courtâs nine-year plan for implementation of a constitutional government. The rump parliament or national Political Consultative Council (Zizhengyuan) elected in 1910 further accelerated popular demand by Chinaâs urban gentry and merchants for full political participation. The new institutions, meant only to be advisory in nature, instead became a vehicle for constitutionalists to organize under official auspices. That reformers were well-prepared to take advantage of these new political bodies stemmed directly from organizational skills and knowledge gained during the decade-long movement begun by Kang and Liang in 1898.
Throughout most of 1909, Kang not only left behind his nuclear family but abandoned any sustainable effort to stem the mounting troubles of his organization. Instead he pursued the personal pleasures of world travel and reunions with family members studying abroad. Having produced two sons born in December 1908 and January 1909 to his second and third wives, Kang left Penang for Europe in February 1909. On the way, he toured Egypt and Palestine, visiting Cairo, Luxor, and Aswan, saw the moon rise over the Red Sea, visited Jerusalem and the Dead Sea, lingered at the Wailing Wall, and wrote a poem about Christâs sacrifices to save others.
In April, Kang proceeded to Switzerland and the Alps, before traveling in England, Wales, and Ireland in May and June. He was accompanied in London by Mai Zhonghua, husband of eldest daughter Kang Tongwei and at the time an Oxford University student. Kang Tongbi completed her studies at Barnard College on June 2 and sailed from New York on June 6, landing at Plymouth, England on June 11.1 After a seaside stopover with her father, they left for Ireland.2 Together with Tongbiâs fiancé, Luo Chang, who had just received a masterâs degree from Oxford, they spent a week in Dublin at the home of Sir Henry Blake, the supportive governor of Hong Kong during Kangâs early exile who became his friend and had previously hosted him when Blake was governor of Ceylon. Kang took a side trip from England through The Hague, Netherlands, to Kassel, Germany where he toured Wilhelmshöhe landscape park, before returning to England. Sometime in July, Kang, Tongbi, and Luo Chang boarded a luxury liner in Southampton and after passing through the Suez Canal, sailed back to Penang, arriving on August 16 to a welcoming crowd of several hundred. En route, Kang wrote a poem about finishing his utopian classic, Datong Shu, musing, âI wait for the day when the whole world will be unified.â3 Kang spent
I have long heard of the best constitution of Australia and am very anxious to visit it [sic]. I have been around the world many a time to study their constitution and Government except never have been to Australia â¦
I am a reformer of China therefore there were many people jealous me and often create all sorts of false accusations to block my way wherever I go.6
Kangâs letter was accompanied by a character reference from Charles Beresford in London, who asked Lord Dudley to host this âpersonal friend of mineâ whose life Beresford had saved when Kang fled China in 1898. Yet again, Australia refused Kangâs entry, this time for the added reason that Kang alludes to in his letterâa report from the Japanese envoy in Stockholm to the British consulate there that Kang had seduced a young Englishwoman (among others) at his home on the island of Korsholmen, Sweden and was thus of immoral character.7
Missing from Kangâs documented travels is a possible June 1909 visit to North America. There is only one reference to this trip, in Jung-pang Loâs sequel to Kangâs autobiography, which is based on Kang Tongbiâs 1958 draft chronology: âIn the fifth month [June 18 to July 19, 1909] he revisited Victoria, British Columbia, staying again at his former retreat on Coal Island.â8 Kang Tongbiâs memoirs, written with fresher memories in the 1930s or 1940s, makes no mention of this improbable trip.9 Nor do Kangâs travel poems, which include several poems about his first visit to Ireland during this period.10 Moreover, for Kang to travel to the west coast of Canada in between visits to England and Germany would require a roundtrip journey across the Atlantic to Montreal and train trip to Victoria, or an even more circuitous ocean voyage around Cape Horn to the western coast of North America.11 However, based on the authority of Jung-pang Lo and his primary informant, his mother, Kang Tongbi, historians have generally taken this 1909 North American journey as fact.
It has been suggested that Kang might have had a strong political motivation to disrupt his European sojourn to travel to Coal Island at this time, distracted
Kang Tongbi wrote both versions of Kangâs chronology, but her own memoirs were written earlier and include important markers in her life. Her entries for June 1909, during the time when her fatherâs Coal Island sojourn was to have taken place, include completing college in New York and meeting Kang and Luo Chang in England. Tongbiâs fleeting mention of Kangâs 1909 trip to Coal Island in Kangâs autobiographical sequel may always remain a mystery. If indeed Kang made his last stand in Canada in 1909, he failed to repair the splits
This is a promising move toward constitutionalism. The 1898 coup dâétat inspired people and officials to start thinking seriously about reforms. President Kang and our party have been loudly appealing to the public for more than a decade ⦠we almost have reached our goal.17
Our president is a great scholar who has lectured for decades and read extensively. Now every Chinese intellectual should regard him as a teacher. Since the coup, he has traveled for more than a decade in Europe and the Americas. He became friends with aristocrats and high-ranking officials, examined Western politics, customs, and arts and compared them to those of China, and only adopted those he deemed proper for China. How can students who just spend several years abroad compare to him in terms of experience?18
More difficult for Wu to dispute were the serious allegations about Kangâs character and personal style, which were being blamed for the financial and organizational turmoil: embezzlement of public funds for his own and familyâs use, a wasteful and extravagant lifestyle as Xianzhenghui president, appropriating Commercial Corporation property in Mexico for himself, and allowing his daughters and son-in-law to manipulate Xianzhenghui businesses for their own profits. Wu could only call the attacks irrational and groundless and did not directly address specific criticisms. At most, Wu could point to his own observations of Kangâs personal behavior: âIn his daily life he sticks to the principle of austerity. When I was in Penang, I saw him wearing patched old cotton clothes. If he lived an immoderate life, he wouldnât be doing this.â And only in the postscript did Wu deny that Kang and Liang had anything to do with the assassination of Liu Shiji, cautioning members not to believe the âvirulent attacks from our enemies.â
To stem the tide of discontent and resolve the failing Commercial Corporation businesses and the divisive fight over control of the Zhenhua Gongsi, Kang
A darker shadow hung over Xuâs campaign to restore member confidence in the Xianzhenghuiâthe accusations that Kang, Liang Qichao, and Xu himself were implicated in Liu Shijiâs May 1909 murder. The man rumored to be behind the assassination plot was Xuâs colleague, He Qiwu.21 While the case was never solved, Kang historian Zhang Ronghua points out that before the murder, Kangâs letters to the brothers Liang Qixun and Liang Qichao articulated his ferocious hatred of Liu, whom he saw as betraying the Xianzhenghui by promoting Zhenhua shares to members and then disassociating the company from the party when it was to his advantage: âNow even if I could go easy on [Liu], people will follow him in his treachery. What he has done is an example for everyone. Therefore, even if I kill him, justice would not be done unless he were put to death many times.â22 Kangâs violent turn of phrase was a standard curse, yet his vehemence was real. Zhang contrasts these earlier private letters with Kangâs public statements after the murder, which praised Liu and accused Ye En, Ou Jujia, and others of plotting Liuâs murder to take Zhenhua profits for themselves. Not only was there an irreparable break between Kang and some of his closest followers, but stoked by the revolutionary press, the unresolved suspicions about Liuâs assassination further alienated many Xianzhenghui members from Kang.23 Contemporary American newspaper
Kangâs most steadfast ally in Canada, Li Fuji, published a booklet in late 1909 after his return from supervising Commercial Corporation businesses in Mexico. Li wrote from his vantage point as a Baohuanghui founding member and a businessman speaking plainly to his Canadian compatriots and other members dissatisfied with the sorry state of Xianzhenghui businesses.25 He first detailed the storied Canadian origins of the Baohuanghui dating from Kangâs arrival in Victoria in 1899 before responding to membersâ unhappiness with the businesses. It was Liang Qichao who âfirst suggested that our association start our own businesses in 1901,â linking the Commercial Corporation to Kangâs more popular disciple. He acknowledged that the business ventures had been poorly managed by inexperienced persons and in the end the meager earnings could not meet investorsâ expectations. He promised that eventually âthe tides would flow back inâ and asked that the shareholders âbe magnanimous and excuse us. They donât have to mention it all the time.â Moreover, Li continued, âeven if the commercial projects fail, our association will succeed. We should avoid trying to save a little only to lose a lot. We still need to exert our willpower and from beginning to end keep united, so as not to waste our ten yearsâ achievements in a night. We do not want to be ridiculed by outsiders.â Taking a side in the Zhenhua dispute, Li simply stated, âI disapprove of Ye En and Ou Yunqiao [Ou Jujia] despite my long-time personal connections to them. I support Xu Qin and think the charges against him as well as Kang and Liang are ridiculous.â Li Fuji was not alone among Victoria Chinese Empire Reform Association leaders who backed Kang against Ye En and his supportersâin 1910, Lin Lihuang assumed the presidency of the Canadian reform association and moved the headquarters from Vancouver to Victoria.26
In addition to the newspaper wars, mass-distribution letters and booklets proliferated in 1909 causing confusion and disenchantment among Xianzhenghui members. Kangâs public letters and Wu, Xu, and Liâs publications that were intended to restore trust in Kang and the Xianzhenghui were countered by the circulars written by dissidents, including Tom Leungâs Zhengxinlu and Ye Enâs denunciations of Xu Qin and Kang. Writing to Kang from Hong Kong, Chen Wenhui attributed the organizational disarray to the spate of accusatory public letters, especially the jointly signed leaflets criticizing Kang and Liang, causing âlengthy arguments which provoked innumerable complications.â30 It was not surprising that many patriotic Chinese overseas had come to see the Xianzhenghui and its leaders as âorganizationally and morally bankrupt,â in the words of historian Cai Huiyao.31
Kang submitted a memorial in late 1909 to the Xuantong Emperor asking that parliament be convened in the autumn of 1910, rather than 1917 as decreed in the nine-year plan.33 Given the desperate national crisis and external threats, Kang believed there was no alternative to bypassing the Qing court and bureaucracy and allowing an elected national assembly or parliament to draft a constitution. He suggested the parliament convene one year from the opening of the provincial assemblies, on the first day of the ninth month of the second year of Xuantong, or October 3, 1910, allowing the prince regent to make a fresh start and preside over a grand ceremony to pass power to the new body, a move that would please the people and strengthen Chinaâs place in the world. This was the date that the Qing planned to convene the Zizhengyuan, the national consultative council described in the nine-year plan, a much less representative body than a parliament. Kang asserted that no more than a few months was necessary to prepare for an election of parliamentary legislators since there were already rules for electing provincial assemblies. Once parliament was convened, the legislators could design a constitution modeled after those of foreign countries: âWriting of a constitution is the internal affair of parliament, not the duty of court officials.â The results might not be perfect, Kang added, but âone should start by driving a cart in ragged clothes to blaze a new trail. In the end, one will ride in a carriage made of jade and a litter made of gold.â He envisioned that each prefecture, department, and county (fu, zhou, xian) would elect parliamentary representatives, and that if one followed the
Much had changed since Kangâs twelve-point constitutional petition kicked off a serious debate in 1908 about Chinaâs path to a constitutional system. In that first petition, Kangâs primary demand was âConvene a parliament to realize constitutional government,â yet he gave no details beyond this general principle and only asked that the court set a specific date for parliament to convene. By the end of 1909, constitutionalism had emerged as a practiced if messy reality in China, and Kang, Liang, and a new cohort of empowered constitutionalists inside China now focused on convening a parliament, a goal they would not realize until the dawn of the soon-to-be new Republic and then only briefly. They had come to understand the truth of Kangâs assertion in his 1907 petition, âSetting up a constitutional government is meaningless without a parliament to defend it.â34
2 1910â11: âIt Is Difficult to Build a House But Easy to Burn It Downâ35
With the Xianzhenghui stumbling into political and financial ruin, Kang relocated closer to China, eventually joining Liang Qichao in Japan in June 1911. Together, they contributed to the political debate as constitutionalists struggled to reform the monarchy. Kang was bitterly aware of all that he and the Xianzhenghui had lost. On March 23, 1910, he wrote to Liang Qichao: âWeâve gone to our doom. I lost all my standing and reputation for nothing ⦠Now I am ill; the only thing that awaits me is death.â36 Yet, the constitutionalist cause would still gain political power and visibility in 1910 and 1911, the Qing arrest orders for Kang would be lifted in October 1911 as a last gesture of commitment to reform, and, even to this day, Kangâs reputation rises and falls with the political winds, his character faults and business failures notwithstanding. The revolution that began in Wuchang on October 10, 1911, brought an end to the old regime in China, and two years later Kang returned to his homeland to stay.
Kang spent most of 1910 in the Straits Settlements, both Penang and Singapore, but not without incident. Whether those after Kangâs head were
âThe root of all the absurdities is that I was not able to go back to Hong Kong. As a result, the revolutionary party attacked us. It is difficult to build a house but easy to burn it down.â Thus, Kang concluded a letter to Liang Qichao in January 1911 after discovering on his 1910 visit to Hong Kong that the three interconnected Huayi banks in Hong Kong, New York, and Torreón had lost $2 million.40 This had been Kangâs first return to Hong Kong, headquarters of the Commercial Corporation, since 1904 when he was banned from the colony by the British government because his presence inflamed antiforeign sentiments among his followers and displeased China.41 Kang now felt that had he been able to supervise Commercial Corporation management in Hong Kong, he could have prevented attacks by revolutionary opponents who were gaining ground as business scandals demoralized Xianzhenghui members. Kangâs premonition that the Xianzhenghui house was on fire proved correct in 1911, the battles playing out in fervid ânewspaper warsâ in North America, and, after Wuchang, in physical attacks on Xianzhenghui members and buildings. Xianzhenghui members defected, sometimes a whole chapter en masse overnight, while others remained loyal to the constitutionalist cause for decades into the future. A different political dynamic propelled the constitutionalists
3 Culmination of the Constitutional Petition Movement
Arguably, the most important legacy of Kang and the Baohuanghui (and Xianzhenghui) was the brief but transformative period between 1910 and 1911 when constitutionalists practiced legislative politics in the provincial assemblies and the Political Consultative Council. When the legislative process failed to yield the progress they desired, they formed national associations to submit constitutional petitions to demand representation through a parliament. Since 1899, the constitutionalistsâ boycotts, petitions, newspapers, schools, and politicized membership abroad had fostered the organizational capacity and political knowledge of reform-minded people inside China, equipping the assembly members to rapidly advance the constitutional cause once they held power. In 1902 Kang began to popularize the ideal of âlocal self-governmentâ for the purpose of âmobilization, in which localism and private energies were stimulated and then disciplined in the service of economic development and national vigor,â wrote historian Philip Kuhn.42
The Qing constitutional reforms unintentionally catalyzed political activism at the grassroots level, which Kang and the Xianzhenghui continued to encourage from abroad. There was limited coordination between overseas activists and constitutionalists in China. They were allies with the same goals, grounded in years of reform ideology. The most influential exile was not Kang but Liang Qichao, who expounded on constitutional questions and commented on the current political situation through two China-based Xianzhenghui-affiliated newspapers, Guofeng Bao (Shanghai, 1910â12) and Guomin Gongbao (Beijing, 1910â19). Liang maintained close contacts with former Zhengwenshe leaders, particularly Xu Fosu, who was effective at rallying the many provincial constitutionalists associated with banned Zhengwenshe chapters, some now elected assembly members.43 Xu was a key organizer of the influential coalition of provincial legislators, elected Political Consultative Council
Constitutionalism was broadly popular by 1910. âMany powerful men had clearly been reading the proscribed writings of Liang Qichao carefully, and they were prepared to push the Qing toward constitutional government,â writes historian Peter Zarrow of the radicalizing effect of the official constitutional preparations.45 Zarrow notes âhow quickly what had once been heresy became orthodoxyâ among Qing officials who after 1905 had come to accept constitutionalism as a necessary and obtainable goal for China.46 On the other hand, the revolutionaries opposed constitutional reform as half measures that would prolong Qing rule; they did not foresee the explosive consequence when ardent constitutionalists increasingly asserted themselves in national politics, any more than did the Qing court. And, likewise, with each dramatic revolutionary act of attempted or successful assassination or uprising, the Qing became more amenable to constitutional reform.47 Provincial assemblies opened for fifty-day sessions simultaneously throughout China on October 14, 1909.48 Historian John Fincher observed that the energized provincial assemblymen âshowed a marked tendency to put off local and provincial problems until they had expressed their views on national or even international problems.â49 This cosmopolitan focus was reflected in the backgrounds of the assembly members, who represented a population far more Westernized and youthful than those previously involved in provincial officialdom. Although the men qualified to run for election were largely from the gentry and most had official degrees, there were many who had bought or earned lower degrees,
Even the most organized constitutionalists running for the assembly had to do so as individuals, because political parties were not allowed. Campaigning was considered vulgar and corruptible (through bribery), and blank ballots required voters to write in their favored candidates. The long-standing Qing ban on political parties as dangerous factionalism was compounded by the Qing view of elections as a means to consensus rather than contestation, a more participative and âdemocraticâ way of selecting the âtalented and worthyâ than the old civil service examination.53 Those eligible to vote (and hold office) were the fewer than one-half percent of the population who were male and could meet the high educational or wealth requirements.54 The daunting and complex indirect election process meant that few eligible voters participated. Although overseas Chinese were seen as a wealthy constituency to be tapped for investment in economic development projects, they did not meet the residency requirement for voters or candidates. There was also a fear that by registering to vote, one would be audited for taxes. Thus, it is remarkable that this highly imperfect system resulted in a predominance of serious, proactive legislators.
Likely reckoning that this might be their only chance for legislative participation, the assemblies debated unwieldy numbers of proposals, requiring six-day work weeks and long hours, and even extending the sessions beyond the official fifty-day limit for which legislators were paid. Standing committees of legislatorsâsome of whom had been associated with Kang and Liang as students in Japanâmet between the 1909 and 1910 assembly sessions and
With suppleness and persistence, the petition movement grew exponentially between January and October 1910 under the leadership of provincial assembly members stirred to take action beyond their formal governmental roles. The first petition for a parliament was organized by provincial assembly delegates from sixteen provinces who gathered in Shanghai in November 1909, convened by Zhang Jian, chair of the Jiangsu Provincial Assembly and elder statesman of the constitutionalists.61 They formed the Association of Comrades Petitioning for a National Congress (Guohui Qingyuan Tongzhihui) and submitted a petition to the Qing Censorate (Jianchashu) on January 26, 1910. Association of Comrades chair Sun Hongyi presented the two hundred thousand-signature petition in Beijing, and remained the dedicated heart of the petition movement throughout 1910. He declared: âSince we have assumed responsibility on behalf of our countrymen, we are trusted by the whole nation. Until we realize our aim, I shall not leave the capital, even if every one of our representatives has left.â62
After the Qing courtâs quick rejection of the petition, the Association of Comrades prepared a second petition and widened its signature campaign to a broad span of organizations, from chambers of commerce to industrial and education associations, as well as to overseas Chinese. It garnered three hundred thousand signatures and was submitted on June 22, 1910. Kang sent some of his overseas deputies to Beijing, including newspaper editor and Kang confidant Wu Xianzi to represent Chinese in the Americas.63 Wu became a frequent
Sometime between the second petition in June and the third in October 1910, Kang Youwei wrote a memorial to the emperor and prince regent on behalf of the Xianzhenghui in the United States. Throughout, Kang invoked the need to honor Guangxuâs true intent: constitutional government. The memorial forthrightly declared that the concept of constitutionalism was adopted from Europe and the United States, including three branches of government with distinct responsibilities for legislation, judicature, and administration. The citizenry alone was empowered to legislate. While acknowledging that âour country does not have the tradition of a constitutional government,â Kang claimed that Guangxu believed that China should belong to its people, and ânow we urge the realization of his will.â It was fine for officials to carry out a census and other administrative functions in preparation for a constitution, but only parliament could legitimately draft a constitution. âOur emperor and regent should fix this process to be faithful to the dying decree of the late emperor and the wishes of our citizens ⦠The nine-year preparatory period should be disregarded ⦠Please issue an edict and set the third year of Xuantong, 1911, for the inauguration of parliament.â66
On September 27, 1910, the Canadian Xianzhenghui (Yingshu Jiaânada Qisheng Xianzheng Zonghui) representing chapters in seven provinces, submitted a constitutional petition under the names of the national president Lin
Xianzhenghui leaders in the United States personally handed their petitions to visiting Qing royalty. Prince Zaitao, half-brother of both Guangxu and Prince Regent Zaifeng, had been selected to form a Palace Guard (Jinweijun) in 1908 and make a mission to Japan, the United States, and Europe to investigate Western army modernization in 1910.68 Twenty-three-year-old Zaitao was sympathetic to reform and later secretly allied with Liang Qichao in a plot to effect a military takeover of the Qing government.69 Zaitao was handed two petitions on his brief trip in spring 1910 to San Francisco, Chicago, Washington, DC, and New York City. During his one-day stop in Chicago on April 26, the local chapter welcomed the long-awaited visit of a relative of Guangxu to whom they could pass on their petition: âWe are sick to heart about the state of the country. Quickly save the nation from extinction when you return, and weâll eagerly look to the east.â70 The petition repeated many familiar themes, appealing for unity in the face of foreign threats and demanded that parliament should âbe opened as soon as possible.â A second petition, in the name of the Xianzhenghui in the Americas, was nearly identical to Kangâs late 1909 memorial and called for convening parliament on October 4, 1910.71 This one might
In the five months following Zaitaoâs American mission, the revolutionary movement inside and outside China grew more brazen. This reinforced the constitutionalistsâ admonitions against delaying political reforms before it was too late. Zaitaoâs brother, the new navy minister, Prince Zaixun, experienced firsthand the dangers of revolutionary zeal. He was targeted by assassins on three occasions as he traveled on study missions to Europe and the United States in 1910.73 Police arrested George Fong, a member of the revolutionary Young China Association, just as he was aiming his gun at Zaixun, who was exiting the train in Oakland before boarding a ship to return to China on October 6, 1910.74 Fong told police that he considered the prince âan enemy of my people.â Earlier in Zaixunâs journey, he encountered insistent Xianzhenghui members in New York City and Chicago bearing petitions exhorting him to persuade the prince regent not only to convene parliament but also to lift the ban on their loyal, patriotic âparty of 1898â and ârejuvenate the reforms.â75 The petitions described anti-Manchu revolutionaries ready âto seize the opportunity to carry out their venomous schemesâ and take advantage of the âpeopleâs accumulated rancor.â Worse still, if domestic troubles coincided with foreign
After they returned to China, Zaixun and Zaitao both continued to support the reform cause, but their political power paled next to Prince Pulun, the Grand Council-appointed president of the Political Consultative Council. Pulun had much earlier shown sympathies with the reformersâincluding meeting with Baohuanghui members when he visited the United States in 1904âand came to be âknown as a spokesman for âthe progressivesââ for his open approval of the petition movement.77 On October 3, 1910, the same day Pulun convened the 200-member council, Sun Hongyi of the Association of Comrades Petitioning for a National Congress submitted the third petition to the censorate, âallegedly with 25 million signatures.â78 This time, three key groups joined in the petitionâprovincial assembly representatives (who were gathering for the second session of the provincial assemblies on October 3), civic organizations, and some governors and governors general.79 The desperation of the signers rang out in rhetoric of harangue and ridicule, warning Prince Regent Zaifeng to heed their âbold but honest wordsâ instead of continuing to â[sit] idle until he is placed under the guillotine, when he will be laughed at by the people.â Only a true parliament, not the advisory Political Consultative Council, would satisfy public opinion. Having had their first two petitions rejected without a word, the petitioners massed in front of Zaifengâs palace and threatened to remain until their petition was accepted in person, and a few, âfollowing the classical tradition, cut off joints of their fingers and wrote
The Political Consultative Council was composed of one hundred court-appointed representatives and one hundred elected by the provincial assemblies; many of the elected members had signed the two earlier constitutional petitions.81 Although it was the Qing courtâs clear intent that the court-appointed majority of the council (including the court-appointed president) would protect imperial power against the demands of elected reformers, most of the three-month session was spent debating the petitions and the appointment of a âresponsibleâ cabinet whose authority would be granted by a legislative body. However, not only the presiding officer, Pulun, but other court-appointed representatives âwere inclined to the peopleâs side,â although they remained silent and unwilling to openly oppose the court.
In a spectacle of democracy in action, on October 22 the Political Consultative Council endorsed by acclamation the third petition demanding an elected parliament in 1911. In the words of Pulun, who presided over the session, âThe entire assemblage was swept by a storm of joy ⦠Princes, nobles, scholars and ordinary subjects all gathered together in one room and, giving expression to the same emotion, afforded a spectacle unseen in China for thousands of years.â82 Pulunâs October 28 memorial to Prince Regent Zaifeng exposed deep rifts within the court: âThe specious character of recent constitutional reforms has been patent to everyone in the Empire,â and thus âthe question of a parliament admits of no delay.â Following the councilâs vote, governors general, governors, and military commanders from almost every province had telegraphed their own demands for the immediate establishment of parliament and a cabinet. âThe most significant event in the history of China for the last half century,â wrote U.S. Minister to China William J. Calhoun, and âit is proper that this new development be taken into consideration by the [State] Department and the American group.â83
The Qing court had to respond and, on November 4, 1910, issued an edict that parliament would convene in 1913, rather than in 1917 as originally planned. At
While the reformers might have celebrated their success in moving the parliamentary timeline ahead by four years, the Political Consultative Council responded to the edict in fiery sessions on November 7 and 9. They boldly telephoned a summons to the Grand Council, including its head, Prince Qing, to come answer questions from the members. On the grounds that the court was making âa farce of constitutional government,â they threatened to dissolve unless they were given greater powers.85 Receiving no response from the Grand Council to its summons, the Political Consultative Council became ever more assertive, attempting to impeach the grand councilors, demanding that the Grand Council be responsible to it as a representative body, and criticizing Prince Regent Zaifeng, who overruled the impeachment memorial.86
The constitutional petition movement was further radicalized by the Political Consultative Council sessions in November when, âSpeaker after speaker declared that three years was too long to waitââWho will save Manchuria during that time?â demanded one ardent patriotâand the only member who attempted to defend the decision of the Government was shouted down by his colleagues.â87 Indeed, Japan had annexed Korea that July. In a move endorsed by Manchurian Governor General Xiliang, in December Fengtian Province activists, joined by students in Tianjin, presented the final petition for a 1911 parliament.88 Numbering in the thousands, they marched to Beijing to make their demands in person. On December 25, Zaifeng issued a scathing edict calling the petitioners âignorant and stupidâ to âhave recklessly persisted in their demand, often collecting crowds of people and seeking to force the
On the day the petition representatives were ordered to leave the capital, they had a secret meeting. They would proclaim provincial independence in demanding a constitution. That Tang [Hualong] and Pu Dianjun, and many others [including Sun Hongyi] who had been petition leaders and had attended the secret meeting seized the opportunity [to proclaim their provincesâ independence] is no trivial matter.92
We here decide that we shall lead revolution secretly. All the comrades of the assemblies will form the body of the organization. If there is any
event in the future which could lead to an uprising, comrades in each province will respond by proclaiming independence immediately.93
In late 1910, Xu and his comradesâall presidents of provincial assembliesâSun Hongyi (Zhili), Tang Hualong (Hubei), Tan Yankai (Hunan), and Pu Dianjun (Sichuan) began drafting a platform for what became Chinaâs first officially registered political party, initially named Diguo Tongyidang (Imperial Unification Party) by Liang Qichao, and renamed Xianyouhui (Friends of the Constitution) before a plenum held on June 4, 1911.94 Its leaders were among the radical constitutionalists and increasingly undertook anti-Qing actions, while pursuing political power.
By spring 1911, the dynastyâs demise may have been inevitable. It was a mistake to clamp down on the very elites who, because of their moderate views and strategic positions, had been recruited by the Qing to participate in the early constitutional reforms. Both Chinese and Western historians attribute the end of Chinaâs monarchy to the disillusionment of the constitutionalists, who saw no way to achieve their ends under Qing rule. Historians Zhou Jiming and Hu Xi conclude that that âthe party that broke the stalemate in the competition between constitutional monarchy and anti-Manchu revolution and gave the historical advantage to the revolutionaries was the Qing government itselfâtruly a great irony of history.â95 William T. Rowe writes in Chinaâs Last Empire: âBoth radical students and professional revolutionaries had played important roles in creating a climate favorable to republican revolution. But the influence of both groups had faded after 1908, and neither group was the direct agent of the revolution. The key role fell to a class of persons who had never been overtly revolutionary but who in practice might have been the most revolutionary of all: the reformist elite.â96
Constitutional petitioners like Sun Hongyi and Xu Fosu no doubt believed that they would prevail after a revolution by using their political power to enact a constitutional system that evolved from the Qing-era provincial assemblies and Political Consultative Council and would transition quickly to an elected
4 House on Fire: The Xianzhenghui Meets Revolutionary Fervor
The sudden radicalization of Chinaâs constitutionalists after their petitions failed to bring about an immediate parliamentary transition coincided with the weakening of the overextended and internally divided Xianzhenghui abroad as it faced off against the Tongmenghui (Revolutionary Alliance). Led by Sun Yatsen, the organizationally challenged Tongmenghui was slow to attract its rivalâs defectors.98 The Xianzhenghui maintained its dominance over the revolutionaries until the end of 1911, with more than two hundred chapters on all continents, well-established schools and businesses, twelve years of mass actions from boycotts to petitions, and, most critical, a widespread network of newspapers to spread reform news and ideology. Sunâs ten uprisings from 1895 until the April 27, 1911 Guangzhou Uprising did little to inspire new followers or retain his funders, because each successive uprising failed, often at great cost to Tongmenghui morale and financial coffers.99 Competing revolutionary organizations kept emerging, and neither Sun nor the Tongmenghui were
Students, Christians, and secret society members were the most devoted base supporters of revolutionary action, but not necessarily loyal to Sun or the Tongmenghui, described by historian Marie-Claire Bergère as âan extremely loose federation of revolutionary groups, some of which became openly hostile to the Cantonese leader.â101 Luckily for the Xianzhenghui, at the very time when it was fracturing in 1908 and 1909, Sun and the Tongmenghui were also under attack, with challengers âprinting leaflets which attacked Sun, accusing him of megalomania, of misusing funds, and of causing revolutionary failures through mismanagement and poor organization,â a campaign boosted by the reformers and coinciding with Sunâs 1909â10 trip to the United States.102
In North America, the revolutionariesâ most convincing line of attack was exposing the corruption and self-aggrandizement within the Xianzhenghui and vilifying Kang himself. Such attacks fed into the reformersâ internal disputes and underscored Sunâs integrity and dedication. The revolutionaries dismissed as inconsequential the rapid momentum of constitutional reform inside Chinaâand its genesis with Kang and the Baohuanghuiâor labeled it a clever Manchu ploy to retain control over the Han. In response to the reformersâ comprehensive political program, the revolutionaries spread a populist message of racially based anti-Manchu revolution, with little consideration of how they would construct a Chinese republic when the dynasty was toppled and incorporate non-Han minorities and territories. A major difference between the reformers and the revolutionaries was how they depicted the outcome of a revolution: chaos, disunity, and the loss of China to imperialist powers, or a sovereign Chinese state that would rapidly evolve and be embraced by friendly democratic nations.
Both the Xianzhenghui and Tongmenghui suffered from internal dissension directed against their respective leaders. But it was the conflicts among Kangâs associates that ultimately caused the institutional breakdown of the Xianzhenghui in North America, when many dissident members dropped out or defected to the revolutionist camp. Reports of Tongmenghui discord in reform newspapers did not inhibit Sun Yatsen from recruiting Tongmenghui members and raising funds in Canada and the United States. Sunâs positive reception in 1911 was underpinned by the political and propaganda base built over many years by a few staunch men, including early Baohuanghui defectors, and by their alliance with the powerful Zhigongtang, also known as Hongmen or in English as Chinese Triads or Freemasons. Ultimately, the greatest boost to the Tongmenghui and Sun came from disenchanted Xianzhenghui leaders, exemplified by Vancouverâs Ye En (Charles Yip Yen), who led their followers to rebel against Kang. Ye himself never rejected reform for revolution, but his diatribes against Kang had a radicalizing effect on many others.
The gravitation of reformers to the Tongmenghui in two key cities, Vancouver and San Francisco, illustrates the importance of individuals doggedly dedicated to the revolutionary cause, who overcame the dysfunctional organization
As one of the rare Tongmenghui intellectuals equipped to wage editorial battles with the likes of Liang Qichao, Feng was made editor of the Hong Kong newspaper Zhongguo Ribao (China News). He wrote theoretical articles for Min Bao (Peopleâs News) to attack the Baohuanghui and define Tongmenghui ideology.108 When Feng brought Li Bohai from Victoria, British Columbia, to the Hong Kong Tongmenghui chapter in 1905, it was a stinging rebuke to Liâs father, Li Fuji, the first president of the inaugural Baohuanghui chapter. Li and Feng worked to expand the Tongmenghui presence in North America.
The Tongmenghuiâs lack of visible presence in most North American Chinatowns meant that it was the well-established, zealously anti-Qing brotherhoodâthe Zhigongtangâwhich swung thousands of its members and tens of thousands of its dollars to support Sun Yatsen in 1911. Feng Ziyou astutely put himself in a position to forge this partnership, after years of uneven and temporary alliances between Sun and his Zhigongtang supporters.
Cooperation between the revolutionaries and Zhigongtang began in April 1904 when Sun Yatsen was detained by the U.S. immigration authorities in San Francisco after attempting to enter the United States using a forged birth certificate from HawaiÊ»i.111 He was freed by the joint efforts of Wong Sam Duck (Huang Sande), grand master of the Zhigongtangâs American headquarters, and his colleague, Tang Qiongchang (once a militant Baohuanghui activist in San Francisco, see Chapters 3 and 4), along with Reverend Ng Poon Chew, chief editor of the Christian newspaper in San Francisco, Chung Sai Yat Po (Zhongxi Ribao), who also once supported the reformers. Ng and the Zhigongtang then assisted Sun by printing Zou Rongâs anti-Manchu, pro-Han booklet, Gemingjun (Revolutionary Army), and distributed 11,000 copies in the Americas and Southeast Asia. After freeing Sun, the Zhigongtang also accepted Sunâs proposal to reorganize its headquarters and lodges into a centralized political party and to replace Ou Jujia, the editor of the Zhigongtang newspaper Datong Ribao, with a revolutionary partisan recommended by Sun.112 In May 1904, Sun and Wong Sam Duck began a tour across the United States to deliver anti-Qing
Revolutionary fortunes in North America began to change after the Xianzhenghui was shaken by the Zhenhua scandal and Liu Shijiâs assassination. When Sun Yatsen returned to the United States in November 1909, he was greeted in New York City by Huang Xi, whom he had met in 1904. Huang, a merchant, and his wife, a former first vice president of the Baohuangnühui (Chinese Empire Ladies Reform Association), helped Sun establish the first American chapter of the Tongmenghui at the end of 1909. The family shop inside their house became the chapterâs headquarters with Huang as president.116
It was Feng Ziyou who realized that Canada had the greatest potential for expansion of the revolutionary cause in North America. Former Xianzhenghui leaders in Vancouver, led by Ye En and Ye Chuntian, were loudly airing their grievances against Kang and the Commercial Corporation. As these men also were influential Zhigongtang members, Feng saw a way to gain a Tongmenghui foothold in Canada. In 1910 he left Hong Kong for Vancouver to edit the Zhigongtang newspaper, Da-Han Ribao (Tai-Hon Yat-Bo, Chinese Daily News).117
Fengâs propaganda campaign in Canada created such a receptive climate among Zhigongtang members that when Sun visited between February and April 1911, the lodges donated generously to support Sunâs planned Guangzhou Uprising. While thousands attended Sunâs lectures on his first stop in Vancouver, Fengâs cultivation of the Zhigongtang came to fruition in Victoria.119 On February 22, Sun and Feng were welcomed by Lin Lihuang, treasurer (sikuyuan) for the Canadian Zhigongtang headquarters in Victoria and concurrently national president of the Canadian Xianzhenghui, also headquartered in that city. Sunâs stirring speeches gave Feng an opening to persuade Lin and other Zhigongtang leaders to mortgage their building for HK$30,000 so that Sunâs imminent uprising would not fail for lack of funds.120 Leaving Victoria, Sun traveled with Zhigongtang escorts to smaller towns in British Columbia, and then east to Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, and Montreal, raising funds from donations and mortgages on lodge buildings.121 Canadian donations yielded at least HK$63,000, more than 40 percent of the total donated by overseas Chinese for the Guangzhou Uprising. Although the uprising failed, Sunâs fundraising success in Victoria spurred successful collaboration between the Tongmenghui and the Zhigongtang in both Canada and the United States. Nonetheless, Lin Lihuang and other Xianzhenghui leaders who gladly helped Sun raise funds through the Zhigongtang in 1911 remained loyal to the reform organization up to and beyond the revolution and never joined the Tongmenghui.122 Even for revolutionists, loyalty to the Zhigongtang sometimes outweighed devotion to
After Sun left Canada in late April 1911 to return to the United States, Feng Ziyou founded the first Canadian Tongmenghui chapters in Vancouver and Victoria. One of the inaugural members was Ye Qiumao, whose father was the former Baohuanghui and Xianzhenghui leader, Ye Chuntian. Here, as with Li Bohai and Feng Ziyou, the Tongmenghui won over the radicalized progeny of powerful pro-Baohuanghui clans, such as Ye in Vancouver, Li in Victoria, and Feng in Yokohama. They became some of the Tongmenghuiâs most skillful and well-connected leaders.124
While the Vancouver Xianzhenghui chapter sustained its heaviest blow from the internal conflict led by Ye En and his relatives in 1909, it remained strong.125 The Xianzhenghui was able to claim a short-lived victory in the newspaper war between Liang Wenqingâs Rixin Bao and Feng Ziyouâs Da-Han Ribao. Liang Wenqing wrote to Liang Qichao in Japan near the end of 1910, declaring success not only in quieting Feng Ziyouâs âimpetuous remarksâ (fuyan) but also in blunting the attacks of the Ye clan on the Canadian Xianzhenghui.126 He also reported that a number of leaders in Vancouver, Victoria, and other cities remained loyal to the Xianzhenghui and raised 29,000 Japanese yen during a trying time when the business ventures were failing in Mexico, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia. After fruitlessly requesting Liang Qichao to thank these members personally, Liang Wenqing became irritated. He wrote, âIn the past few years, you have not written a word to our [North American] comrades, yet you want us to raise money and seek talent.â Nevertheless, he remitted 25,000 yen to Liang Qichao in Japan to fund Liangâs futile attempt to bribe Manchu princes and Empress Dowager Longyu to extract pardons for himself and Kang and end the ban on the party.127
Perhaps around the time that Da-Han Ribao closed, Feng Ziyou moved to San Francisco. With Sun, Li Shinan, and others, Feng established a formal institutional and fund-raising alliance between the national Tongmenghui headquarters and the Zhigongtang, which was achieved just before the 1911 revolution erupted.131 Equally important in building the Tongmenghui was Shaonian Zhongguo Chenbao (Young China), the daily newspaper begun by Li Shinan in 1909 that had been radicalizing its readers throughout North and South America.132 Many of the most zealous Tongmenghui members were young, some still in high school, and, Eve Ma notes, âalmost all were people who could not expect their voices to be heard in the major Chinatown social organizations,â in contrast to the establishment figures who dominated the Xianzhenghui. Shaonian Zhongguo Chenbao led the propaganda campaign against the Xianzhenghui in 1911, winning a series of newspaper battles with Shijie Ribao (Chinese World) edited by Kang disciple Liang Chaojie in San Francisco. Shaonian Zhongguo Chenbao exposed the reform organizationâs national and local scandals and portrayed the reformers as corrupt, effete, and bound by outdated Confucian ideals of hierarchy and filial piety. In simple terms, Shaonian Zhongguo Chenbao said the reformers were âfathers ⦠afraid of their sons â¦
From the time Sun Yatsen arrived in Canada in February 1911, Kangâs deputy, Xu Qin, found himself in the painful position of being the most authoritative face of the Xianzhenghui as it struggled against the revolutionaries in North America, both in newspaper wars and Chinatowns. âThe situation is precarious,â Xu wrote Liang Qichao, because members were losing hope and Xu himself was disheartened and felt powerless.134 In April, Xu confronted business failures in Mexico and Chicago and difficulties raising donations.135 Further damaging Xianzhenghui credibility, the Victoria chapter had mortgaged its building to donate 10,000 yuan for the effort to lift the party ban. But Liang had kept 9,000 yuan in Japan and now the chapter demanded its money be returned. Xu no longer wanted to face members, who had lost trust in Kang and Liang and, unless the Qing allowed the party to act inside China, there was no point in going from chapter to chapter begging for a few thousand dollars. Members hurled abuse and insults at Xu, dissatisfied by what they perceived was the reformersâ passivity and lack of progress inside China. A more aggressive response to both Qing and revolutionary forces was needed to boost member morale. Xu seemed convinced that if the Qing lifted the ban against the Xianzhenghui and its leaders, it could be âthe medicine to snatch the patient from the jaws of death.â136
There was a ray of hope with the formation in China in early 1911 of the new constitutionalist political party. In February, Xu wrote Wu Xianzi in Beijing that as soon as the Diguo Tongyidang was officially registered by the Qing
Shortly after the October 10, 1911 Wuchang Uprising, the Tongmenghui, Zhigongtang, and local revolutionary newspapers organized celebrations in Chinatowns throughout North America. They pulled down Qing dragon
It is striking that Sun Yatsen never appeared publicly or joined the celebrating throngs in American Chinatowns. Instead, he kept his movements as secret as possible, sheltered by Tongmenghui chapters in Denver, Kansas City, Chicago, Washington, DC, and New York City, perhaps with a premonition of his tenuous hold on power or fear of assassination by âroyalists.â144 A New York Sun reporter, tipped off by a member of the Xianzhenghui, confronted Sun in the hallway of New York Cityâs Young China Association at 12 Mott Street in late October; âDr. Sun refused to admit his identityâ and dashed into a waiting car, saying âDonât talk to me. I have nothing to say.â145
Plotting his next moves, Sun continued to raise funds, and attempted through his âdiplomatic envoyâ Homer Lea to win diplomatic and financial
The Red Dragon plan failed when American businessmen could not be persuaded to invest in such a risky scheme. But Lea and Sun forged a close and lasting bond that was not broken until Leaâs death in 1912. Thus it was on November 11, 1911, that Sun met Lea in London and, reminiscent of their Red Dragon concessions, they approached the British government for its âfriendship and support,â offering in return âa [British] Political Officer on his [Sunâs] staffâ and to âplace the new Navy under the command of British Officers,â as well as âin regard to any agreement China may make with Japan they would act under advice of the British Government.â148 Just as the U.S. government had already concluded after hearing Leaâs similar appeals, the British government
After Sun Yatsen left North America, his followers violently attacked Xianzhenghui members and the visual symbols of their organization. Tongmenghui members and sympathizers overlooked the similar goals of the reformers and revolutionaries, and, stirred by anti-Manchu fervor, vowed to âeraseâ âall vestige of the Empire Reform Association.â151
At the turn of 1912 and the inauguration of the Republic, Rixin Bao in Vancouver received a harrowing firsthand report dated January 10 from Huntington, Oregon, a railroad town on the Snake River, whose Baohuanghui/Xianzhenghui chapter had existed for more than a decade.152 It was now down to about a dozen members, having lost its followers with the Commercial Corporation troubles and the revolution. This letter describes the escalating demands and âtyrannicalâ behavior the members had endured since Sun Yatsen came to town a few months earlier (probably in spring 1911) to raise funds and denounce the Xianzhenghui. First, they were asked to display the new Republican flag and adopt the solar calendar. âAfter we compromised and did as they demanded, they said that the sign of our association [Diguo Xianzhenghui] has the two characters, diguo (imperial) that are not proper since Sun Yatsen as president has expelled the Manchu government.â The sign then was removed, but âSun Wenâs party tore apart our association office,â removed the inscribed tablets at the entrance, and tossed everything in the street, chasing those in the office out of the building where they were beaten. The remaining members in the chapter âwonât desert us even if threatened with death.â
From Canada, most likely Vancouver, several members wrote to Kang and Liang on January 20, 1912: âThe pawns of the rat party (shudang)âthe so-called
The word âhumiliationâ (chi) frequently appears in the Canadian and Huntington, Oregon, letters to express not just what the writers personally suffered but humiliation because two prominent Xianzhenghui newspapers, Hong Kong Shang Bao and Guangzhouâs Guoshi Bao, had been attacked by mobs and now were closed.154 Yet, only a few weeks later during Chinese New Year in February, the Vancouver leaders displayed a flag on their headquarters building echoing Kangâs globalist perspectiveââa âflag bearing a huge picture of the worldââa daring move in a âChinatown ⦠all ablaze with revolutionary flags.â155 Perhaps they were inspired by their Portland comrades, whom they informed Kang and Liang, ârefused to obey a twenty-four-hour ultimatum to change the flag and banner, and negotiations are still going on.â
Li Meijin (Lee Maginn, Lee Mee Ginn), the Portland Xianzhenghui secretary and 1899 founder of the leading Northwest Pacific chapter, had brought a court injunction against the Young China Association after he was âseverely beaten in the effort to protect the property of the [Chinese Empire Reform] association.â156 Young China members entered the building and attempted to tear
The fate of the Manchus is now set. If we continue our propaganda in defiance of public opinion and advocate preserving the status of the imperial family, we will become the enemies of the whole nation. In the Americas, popular opinion is even more with the republic, so be sure not to advocate preserving the imperial line or we will lose popular support, and the association will be done. Our party has never been prepared, and others with more nimble feet have outstripped us.
Xu Qin countered his despair after Wuchang by rallying loyal members and raising funds for a multipronged political and military campaign that Kang and Liang Qichao had initiated in Japan in October 1911. They hoped to subvert
5 1911: Final Move
Since 1898, I had advocated constitutional monarchy; since 1911 I have been advocating republicanism under a titular monarch.
KANG YOUWEI, telegram to Republic of China Provisional President Feng Guozhang, 1917160
After the Wuchang Uprising, Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei, together in KÅbe since June 1911, began to execute a plan to usurp the rapidly moving revolutionary victory and stage their own âpolitical revolution.â161 According to Ernest Young, this plan had been âset in motionâ as early as March 1911 under the assumption that it would not be executed until sometime in 1912, and they were not fully prepared.162 Nevertheless, they swiveled quickly from advocating a constitutional monarchy (junzhu xianzheng) to supporting what Kang awkwardly called a âtitular monarchical republicâ (xujun gonghe). Emulating the British system, the government would be led by a parliament, which would draft a constitution and select a cabinet. The monarch would be purely âtitular,â bearing a symbolic title but wielding no political power, which would be granted exclusively to the elected parliament.163
To introduce such a system in the midst of a republican revolution required quick and forceful action, in effect, a coup. As Xu Qin wrote Kang from Seattle in November 1911, âToday, only military power has any impact, and only when you have this power can you take the floor.â164 Liang Qichao had been plotting
Liang telegraphed Xu in late October with a terse description of their plan: âUse the Northern Army [Bei Jun] to overthrow the government, immediately set up parliament (guohui), use parliament as an expedient tool to pacify the revolutionary party, and the country can be saved. Otherwise, it will perish. The opportunity has arrived. Wire relief. I am in deep distress.â Liang told Xu that they were mortgaging association office buildings to pay for the military action and for bribes to the Imperial Guards. Xu did wire funds, which Liang had requested be sent via his daughter Liang Lingxian (Liang Sishun) in KÅbe so as not to alert people to their plans, and, âdonât use Nanfoâs [Kang Youwei] or my name.â166
Key to the Kang-Liang scheme were three Beiyang Army commanders, graduates of the Japanese Army Officers School in 1902 and 1904âWu Luzhen of the Beiyang Armyâs Sixth Division in Baoding, Zhili; his classmate Zhang Shaozeng of the Twentieth Division in Mukden (Shenyang), Fengtian; and Lan Tianwei of the Second Mixed Brigade in Mukden.167 Whether or not they all met Liang while studying in Japan, each had displayed political activism before 1911. For example, Wu left Japan briefly in 1900 to participate with Tang Caichang in Qinwang, and after graduation returned to China in 1903, when the reformers were protesting the Russian occupation of Manchuria. Lan organized the Resist Russia Volunteer Corps (Ju E Yiyongdui) with his fellow Chinese students in Japan.168 Wu corresponded with Liang from China, and it was through him and his advisor, Kang disciple Pan Ruohai, that plans hatched with Zhang, Lan and Prince Zaitao were communicated.169 Zhang, Lan and
In addition to Prince Zaitao in the court and the pro-constitutionalist Political Consultative Council, Kang and Liang believed they had important political allies in the newly formed revolutionary military government in Hubei. One was Li Yuanhong, âforced at gunpoint to be the military governor.â Another was Tang Hualong, civilian chief executive of the Hubei provincial government and former Hubei provincial assembly president and constitutional petition leader who commanded the respect of his fellow provincial assembly leaders.171 Kangâs October 26 letter to Xu Qin laid out their basic scheme, asked for an immediate donation of $50,000 to $60,000, and cautioned Xu, âOur arrangements are secret, so be sure not to leak them.â172 Kang referred to Li and Tang, to whom he would soon make a personal appeal to enact a titular monarchical republic.
Fortunately, the Wuhan [government] is led by General Li Yuanhong (and has nothing to do with Xingzhe [Sun Yatsen]). And, Tang Hualong
is taking part. Both are scholar-officials (and they enlisted many others of their rank). This possibly can turn into a political revolution [zhengzhi geming]. It so happens that we have an opportunity in north China with military men in charge who are our friends. There are close relatives of the emperor [such as Prince Zaitao] who want to use force to change the government so that the Political Consultative Council can become a parliament, and the representatives of the eighteen provincial assemblies [ziyiju] will become legislators.
Scroll written by former Republic of China president Li Yuanhong for Kang Youweiâs sixtieth birthday in 1917: âYou look like a celestial being.â
Kang revealed that âfor the time being, we are blocking the military order for a punitive expedition,â the action that became known as the Luanzhou Mutiny. This refers to General Zhang Shaozeng, who had defied the October 14 order of Qing Second Army Commander Feng Guozhang to move his Twentieth Division troops to Wuhan in a âpunitive expeditionâ against the rebels. Zhang not only kept his troops in the northern city of Luanzhou on the Beijing-Mukden rail line in Zhili province, but recruited other Second Army generals to hold their troops in Luanzhou and refuse to move south.173 Their combined numbers were about 30,000, a major portion of the Second Army. âWeâve already sent several important people to move up north,â wrote Kang. Here, Kang may have been referring to Wu Luzhen, the Sixth Division commander, then in Beijing, who telegraphed Zhang Shaozeng on October 28 to inform Zhang that he was coming to Luanzhou âto discuss matters.â174 The plan was for Wuâs troops to join with Zhangâs combined troops and march west to the capital in a show of force against the Qing court.175 There, it was hoped that the sympathetic Prince Zaitao, who commanded the Third Army and the Imperial Guards, would be in a good position to expel Princes Qing and Zaize, the key Qing leaders obstructing reforms.176 This would allow Zaitao to begin implementing
Liang Qichao wrote Xu Qin a few days later with details on their desired political outcome.178 After the palace coup, said Liang, Zaitao would become prime minister and immediately convene parliament with Zizhengyuan and Ziyiju representatives as legislators, who would serve until there was an election. With the dominant power in the hands of the parliament, punitive expeditions against the revolutionaries would end and negotiations with the rebels would begin. The emperor would issue a penitent rescript blaming himself for the strife, the Eight Banners would be abolished, and the emperor and all Manchus would take Han names. He anticipated that both the Manchus and the revolutionaries would lose power, the parliament would wield the true authority, and âa full constitutional government will result.â Liang told Xu he hoped that this would all take place within a monthâs time.
There was no palace coup, but Zhang Shaozeng and his allied commanders in Luanzhou attained most of what Kang and Liang sought. Between October 27 and 29, Zhang dispatched a series of telegrams to Prince Qing, Yuan Shikai, Prince Zaitao, the Political Consultative Council, governors, generals, and all the provincial assemblies, demanding the acceptance of his twelve-point memorial to the emperor, which in essence and in details echoed the political program proposed by Kang and Liang.179
âThe goals of reform do not conflict with the glorious status of the emperor. Rather, reform benefits our country by solidifying its foundations. The only groups who oppose it are the revolutionaries and the conservative elites.â180
In four stunning edicts issued on October 30, the Qing court backed down from its previous refusal to accelerate political reform.183 The first imperial edict apologized for past mistakes, abolished the distinction between Manchu and Han, and commenced reforms. Another asked the Political Consultative Council to draft a constitution. The third disbanded the âcabinet with princes and dukes as minister of stateâ and established a responsible cabinet in keeping with constitutional governments. The fourth edict granted amnesty to all political offenders from 1898, including exiles.184
We now stand before Our People (confessing that) We have accomplished no good, but have caused disaster and have humbled the greatness of Our Ancestors by Our maladministration; and it is now of no use to regret. We have no alternative but to rely upon Our People and Our soldiery that
they may help Us to secure the welfare and happiness of Our People, to strengthen Our Imperial Dynasty in an unbroken perpetual line and to establish constitutional government.185
In memorials on November 1 and 3, Commander Zhang demanded the court move faster, recognizing that Prince Regent Zaifeng was still clinging to power by appointing Yuan Shikai as prime minister with authority to select a cabinet and delaying the establishment of a parliament, among other prevarications.186 Even as Zhang disparaged the Political Consultative Council as âan organ of the old government, incapable of representing the entire country,â he was lobbying the members of this body, who were largely supportive constitutionalists.187 An exchange of telegrams with the council included an alert to Zhang on October 31 of the imminent Political Consultative Council announcement âto adopt British constitutionalism based on written statutes and moreover to consult and follow the points listed in your political program,â expressing the legislatorsâ âdeep sympathy with [your great voices and deeds].â188 On November 3, the Political Consultative Council adopted a nineteen-article draft constitution codifying the principle of a titular monarch whose primarily ceremonial powers were subordinate to the parliament and limited by the constitution.189 The next day, the council telegraphed Zhang and his allied commanders, assuring them that they had drawn up the Nineteen Articles (Shijiu Xintiao), âbased on your memorial to implement the political program,â and added, âIf your division has opinions about the constitution, legislative law and electoral law, please hastily inform us by telegram so that we may abide by your views.â190
With the Political Consultative Councilâs prompt cooperation that followed Zaifengâs shocking compliance with most of the reformersâ demands, Kang and Liang seemed to have achieved their goals by November 3. Their long-cultivated network appeared to have bested both the Qing and the disorganized
On November 3, impelled by the âunexpected success of political revolution,â Liang Qichao informed Xu Qin that he would âgo to the battlefrontâ in China.192 He explained that with the ban against him lifted and their scheme half accomplished, he had to attempt to âbring order out of chaosâ and complete their mission in Beijing. Liang believed that the Political Consultative Council would be a crucial partner, as it âalready holds the countryâs real power and more than half the legislators are our comrades.â Liang surely imagined a scenario in which the mutinous commanders in the north would enter Beijing, and with the cooperation of Zaitaoâs Imperial Guard, force Zaifeng and his government to step aside and make way for Liang to negotiate with Yuan Shikai in the quest for political leadership.193
Yang Weixin, a reformer in Japan close to Liang, accompanied him on his journey from Japan. Yang later recalled that âprior to departure [from Japan on November 6], we conferred secretly with Nanhai [Kang Youwei]â and drafted final plans aboard the ship to present to the trusted Sixth Division Commander Wu Luzhen.194 Just before his arrival in Dalian on November 9, Liang wrote his daughter that after a stay in Dalian and Mukden, he would go to Luanzhou (where Zhang Shaozeng had been stationed), and, perhaps in the company of more than one hundred troops, proceed to Beijing.195
Ignorant of the fate that had befallen their military allies during the previous three days of travel, Liang and Yang discovered that the Qing court had punished the uncooperative commanders who had proven so politically powerful.196 On November 6, Zhang Shaozeng lost his Twentieth Division command and was assigned to go to the front as a pacification commissioner (xuanfu dachen). Second Mixed Brigade commander Lan Tianwei stationed in Mukden
On the political front, Kang, in Japan, wrote to members of the provisional military government in Hubei while they were drafting a constitution and proposed they adopt a titular monarchical republic as the most appropriate political system. Kangâs November 9 letter was addressed to his two allies in the new government, General Li Yuanhong and Hubei constitutionalist Tang Hualong, and to Tongmenghui commander Huang Xing, whom the revolutionaries had recently sent to Hubei as commander in chief.200 Quite the opposite of calling the Wuchang Uprising âtragicâ as he had described it a few days earlier to Xu Qin, Kang acclaimed the remarkably rapid revolutionary victory over imperial forces as earning âthe mandate of heavenâ and the support of the people. But, he warned, âThe success of this great undertaking will be sealed in a short time. At a distance I hear rumors of the new country seeking to adopt a [presidential] republican system.â Kang contended that he too strove for popular
Kangâs letter to Li, Tang, and Huang would have arrived in Hubei after Tang Hualong and revolutionary leader Song Jiaoren had drafted a constitution for the new civil government, one which did not preserve the monarchy and was modeled after the federalism of the United Statesâ constitution.201 Tangâs moderating influence on the revolutionary transition quickly receded, as his revolutionary partners suspected that he and the many constitutionalists working in the new provisional governments would attempt to subvert the revolution and reinstate a monarchical system such as proposed by Kang.202 By the end of November, Tang was demoted, and he decamped to Shanghai.
Kang also had to explain to Xianzhenghui members why he now favored a titular monarchical republic. In a November 1911 public letter, Kang argued that the presidential republic promoted by the ârevolutionary party of Wuhanâ was a grievous mistake.203 âOur party has always taken the constitutional system as its goal, and in any case, political reform is our partyâs aim, whether the monarch is a true or titular one.â He pictured the monarch, whom he now said should be the eldest descendant of Confucius, as virtually powerless over the parliament, which would elect the prime minister, who in turn would select the high officials, explaining in simple terms that âalthough in name he is a monarch, in
Although it had been thirteen years since Kang fled China, he felt turmoil, disquiet and even grief upon learning of the October 30 Qing amnesty promising freedom from arrest upon his return to China. The edict was unequivocal: âall political offenders since 1898, whether purely political offenders or revolutionists, who have taken refuge outside the Empire, and all connected with the present troubles who will come forward and be loyal to Us, are hereby granted pardon of their crimes.â204 The Qing court admitted that since ancient times, the suppression of political opinion âprevents the development of men of ability and of the national energy; and moreover, views that are not appropriate at the time at which they are expressed may prove fruitful later.â
In October or November 1911, Kang wrote two short poems expressing anguish at both his and his countryâs tragic fate. The passage of time and his long years away from China as a wanted man, had aged him.205
Above all, the poems betray the bitter irony that Kang was granted amnesty thanks to the revolution, when his exile was spent fighting for a different political ideal.
It may be that Kang wrote these poems after Liang Qichaoâs brief trip to China had ended their best chance for the constitutionalists to assert power. Despite these despondent verses, Kang had not given up. Yet, he did not return to China for two more years.
In November and December 1911, Kang developed his arguments for a hybrid political system in two essays, as did Liang Qichao upon his return to Japan.211
Liang Qichao, at the urging of Xu Qin, had not abandoned military force to block the revolutionary advance. In late 1911, he was working with a new cast of conspirators, now focused on Guangdong.213 They were discussing how to set up a military base on Hainan Island, overthrow the new revolutionary provincial government, and from this power center in the south, âforge on to the central plains.â Xianzhenghui member support for military action against the Guangdong government is unmistakable in the two January 1912 letters from chapters in North America quoted above. The Vancouver members urged Xu Qin to return to Guangdong immediately to force the rich gentry to turn against the revolutionaries for a âthoroughgoing revolutionâ to âcleanse the landâ and allow their party to regain power.214 The Huntington, Oregon, chapter recounted a rumor that the Sacramento chapter president had gone back to Guangdong with munitions purchased for the Qing troops with the sad result that âmore than ten of our people have been murdered by revolutionaries.â The South China Morning Post described in great detail several confrontations of Xianzhenghui members or sympathizers and Republican troops between December 10 and December 17 in Guangzhou. âDetectives of the New Government have lately discovered that large numbers of the members of the Emperor Protecting Society are hiding in the City of Canton with intent to stir up disturbances so as to upset the Republican Government.â215 Firearms were discovered (along with dragon flags) and confiscated; an eighteen-year-old woman was arrested when she was found with documents linking her to the reformers; and Kangâs house in Guangzhou was searched for Xianzhenghui members believed
Liangâs schemes in the south fizzled quickly, no match against the strength and numbers of New Army troops in Guangdong who had defected to support the Republic.217 In any case, it was too late to salvage either the monarchy or a constitutionalist alternative, as Sun Yatsen was sailing to China to claim the provisional presidency of the new Republic on January 1, 1912. Liang quickly discarded the notion of restoring a monarchical system; he returned to China in November, greeted with more fanfare than Sun Yatsen had received a year earlier, but with considerably less political influence.218
A century later, in 2012, the prominent Peking University Law School constitutional scholar and liberal political critic Zhang Qianfan declared that if the Nineteen Articles had been enacted, âChina would have embarked on the gradualist British approach and avoided a century of revolutionary tumult.â He concluded that Chinaâs contemporary authoritarian system âwith a constitution without constitutionalismâ is more resistant to political participation in policymaking than was China under Empress Dowager Cixi.219
â¦
Complicated indeed is Kang Youweiâs legacy, complicated not only for twenty-first-century historians, but also for early twentieth-century observers, including Kang himself. The Hundred Days had failed, forcing Kang and his closest disciples to flee abroad. Qinwang, assassination plots, and the Commercial Corporation all failed. The young emperor that the reformers hoped to restore to power died prematurely, presumably killed on the orders of his aunt. But Kang survived, traveled extensively around the world meeting presidents,
Ship manifest, S.S. Deutschland, New York to Plymouth, England, âMiss Kang Tung Pihâ departing June 6 and arriving June 11, 1909.
Chi Jeng Chang reconstructed Kangâs European travel itinerary from June 11 to July 16, from Kangâs writings and his daughter Tongbiâs memoirs. The page in Tongbiâs memoir covering 1909 describes meeting Kang when she arrived in England, after he had spent a month touring the surroundings. Another month of travel followed, with Ireland as a highlight, before boarding the âWhite Stare [sic] lineâ steamer.
Kang Youwei, poem, âJiyou liuyue zi Ou guiâ å·±é å æèªææ¸ [Returning from Europe in the 6th month of 1909], in Kang Youwei Quanji 康æçºå ¨é [Collected Works of Kang Youwei], ed. Jiang Yihua and Zhang Ronghua å§ç¾©è¯, å¼µæ¦®è¯ (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2007), vol. 12, 308.
Chi Jeng Chang and Zhang Qizhen å¼µå礽, å¼µåç¦ ed., Kang Youwei zai Haiwai, Meizhou ji: Bu Nanhai Kang Xiansheng Nianpu 康æçºå¨æµ·å¤ç¾æ´²è¼¯: è£å海康å çå¹´è [Compilation of Kang Youwei Abroad: Supplement to Kang Nanhaiâs Biographical Chronology] (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2018), 132â33; the editorsâ source is the unpublished âKang Tongbi Huiyiluâ 康åå£åæ¶é [Kang Tongbi Memoirs], compiled by Zhang Cangjiang å¼µæ»æ±, Kang Tongbiâs private secretary 1955â68, in Chi Jeng Changâs private collection. Chang found two poems by Kang referring to the trip from Europe to Asia, with the departure date from Europe between July 17 and August 15, 1909 in a poem written on the ship, âJiyou liuyue zi Ou gui,â and the arrival date in Penang on August 16, 1909 in âJiyou Qiyue yueshuo you Binglangyuâ å·±é ä¸ææé游æ§æ¦å±¿ [Traveling to Penang on the first day of the seventh month of 1909], both in Kang Youwei Quanji, vol. 12, 308.
Mei-fen Kuo, Making Chinese Australia: Urban Elites, Newspapers and the Formation of Chinese-Australian Identity, 1892â1912 (Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash University Publishing, 2013), 96, 225. In 1910, the Sydney Baohuanghui continued to request that Kang visit Australia for up to six months, and the Australian External Affairs department continued to insist that Kang make his request through the Chinese consul general. Miscellaneous Letters, May 4 to July 12, 1910, NAA: A1, 1910/3933, Department of External Affairs, 17â22.
Kang Yu Wei to Earl of Dudley, Governor General of Australia, August 26, 1909, NAA: A1, 1910/3933, Department of External Affairs. The 125-page file of External Affairs papers pertaining to Kangâs immigration attempts between 1904 and 1910 are online at https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Gallery151/dist/JGalleryViewer.aspx?B=6155&S=2&N=125&R=0#/SearchNRetrieve/NAAMedia/ShowImage.aspx?B=6155&T=P&S=1, accessed January 3, 2020.
Li Hairong ææµ·è, âYingguo Zhengfu dui Kang Youwei Liuwang Taidu zhi KaoshiâJian lun Baohuanghuide Moluoâ è±åæ¿åºå°åº·æçºæµäº¡æ 度ä¹èéâå ¼è«ä¿çæçæ²è½ [Textual Analysis of the English Governmentâs Attitude toward Kang Youwei in Exileâand the Rise and Fall of the Baohuanghui], Shi Lin no. 1 (2019): 98â100.
Jung-pang Lo, âSequel to the Chronological Autobiography,â Kâang Yu-wei: A Biography and Symposium (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1967), 214. Zhongping Chen has examined all three handwritten drafts for the sequel at University of California at Davis; two of the three drafts mention the trip to Coal Island. Email from Zhongping Chen to Jane Larson, September 21, 2013.
âKang Tongbi Huiyilu,â compiled by Zhang Cangjiang. Coincidently, or not, Kang Youwei was in British Columbia exactly ten years earlier, in June and July 1899 and on Coal Island from July to Ocober 1899.
Zhang Qireng å¼µå礽 and Kang Xuepei 康éªå¹, Kang Youwei Haiwai Shiji (Kang Youweiâs Overseas Poetry Collection) 康æçºæµ·å¤è©©é (Beijing: Zhongyi Chubanshe, 2025). Email to author from Chi Jeng Chang, May 6, 2024.
Thank you to Scott Seligman for his extensive search of ship manifests in summer 1909 for clues of travel by Kang to Canada from Europe and back.
Zhongping Chen, Transpacific Reform and Revolution: The Chinese in North America, 1898â1918 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2023), 115â16.
Gao Weinong é«åæ¿, Ershi Shiji chu Kang Youwei Baohuanghui zai Meiguo Huaqiao Shehui zhong de Huodong äºåä¸ç´å康æçºä¿çæå¨ç¾åè¯å社æä¸çæ´»å [Activities of Kang Youwei and the Baohuanghui among the Chinese in the United States in the First Part of the twentieth Century] (Beijing: Xueyuan Chubanshe, 2009), 348â77. See Chapter 9 for details on Zhenhua Gongsi.
Zhongping Chen, âKang Youweiâs Activities in Canada and the Reformist Movement Among the Global Chinese Diaspora, 1899â1909,â Twentieth-Century China 39, no. 1 (January 2014), 21â22.
Hu Yinghan è¡ææ¼¢, Wu Xianzi Zhuanji ä¼æ²åå çå³è¨ [Biography of Wu Xianzi] (Hong Kong, 1953), 10.
Public letter from Wu Xianzi ä¼æ²å and other members of the Hong Kong Xianzhenghui to all chapters, November 2, 1909, in Kang Youwei yu Baohuanghui 康æçºèä¿çæ [Kang Youwei and the Baohuanghui], ed. Shanghai Shi Wenwu Baoguan Weiyuanhui ä¸æµ·å¸æç©ä¿ç®¡å§å¡æ (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1982), 451â54.
Public letter from Wu Xianzi, 451.
Public letter from Wu Xianzi, 453.
Xu Qin to Kang Youwei, October 13, 1909, in Kang Youwei yu Baohuanghui, 438.
Gao, Ershi Shiji chu Kang Youwei Baohuanghui, 361.
Kang Youwei to Liang Qixun æ¢åå³, April 12, 1909, in Zhang Ronghua 張榮è¯, ed., Kang Youwei Juan 康æçºå· [Kang Youwei Documents] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2015), 19â21. Zhang lists Kangâs 1909â10 public statements made after Liuâs murder: âA Letter to Zhenhua Gongsi Shareholders,â âA Rebuttal to Ye Huiboâs Zhenhua Gongsi Announcement,â âA Proposal to Arrest Ou Jujia, the Bandit Chief,â and âZhang Mingqi Takes Bribe and Shields Ou Jujia who Plots a Revolt and the Murder of Liu Shiji, as well as Frames Us.â
The fact that Liuâs murderers were never brought to trial continued to animate the descendants of Liu Shiji and Guangdong scholars into the twenty-first century. See Zhao Liren and Liu Renyi èµµç«äºº, åä»æ¯ , Liu Shiji zhi Si: Kang Youwei Yituan Cehua de Yizhuang Xueâan å士驥ä¹æ»: 康æçºéåçåçä¸æ¨è¡æ¡ [The Death of Liu Shiji: the Murder Plot of Kang Youweiâs Clique] (Guangzhou: Zhongguo Yingshi Wenyi Chubanshe, 2006).
âLocal Chinese Avenged by Tragedy in China,â New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 25, 1909. Other articles in May and June 1909 report the murder and attribute it to revenge by the âBow Wung Weiâ because Liu had peddled âworthless mining stock.â
Li Fuji æç¦åº, âXianzhenghui Jishi Shilüeâ æ²æ¿æç´å§äºç¥ [A Sketch of the Origins of the Constitutional Association], 1909, 1â11, Ethnic Studies Library, University of California Berkeley, Chinese Empire Reform Association, AR-22, AAS ARC 2000/78, hereafter AAS ARC 2000/78.
Zhongping Chen, Transpacific Reform and Revolution, 157.
Chen Zhongping é³å¿ å¹³, âWeiduoliya, Wenâgehua yu Haiwai Huarende Gailiang he Geming (1899â1911)â ç¶å¤å©äº, 溫å¥è¯èæµ·å §å¤è¯äººçæ¹è¯åé©å½(1899â1911) [Victoria and Vancouver in Chinese Reform and Revolution at Home and Abroad, 1899â1911], Shehui Kexue Zhanxian 269, no. 11 (2017): 90. Luo Yuehu 駱ææ¹ to Kang Youwei, June 19, 1909, in Kang Youwei yu Baohuanghui, 419.
L. Eve Armentrout Ma, Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution (Honolulu: University of Hawaiâi Press, 1990), 130, 193 n12.
Chen, âWeiduoliya, Wenâgehua yu Haiwai Huarende Gailiang,â 90, which describes the three-year series of Baohuanghui ten lawsuits in Vancouver against the Christian- and Zhigongtang-affiliated Hua Ying Ribao è¯è±æ¥å ±, edited by former Kang disciple Cui Tongyue å´éç´, which bankrupted the newspaper in late 1909. Cui moved to San Francisco to edit Chung Sai Yat Po ä¸è¥¿æ¥å ±. Chen, Transpacific Reform and Revolution, 139â40, highlights Cuiâs Christian, anti-opium stance reflected in his newspaper and at odds with the opium businesses of several Canadian Baohuanghui leaders.
Chen Wenhui é³ææ to Kang Youwei, October 10, 1909, in Kang Youwei yu Baohuanghui, 437.
Cai Huiyao è¡æ å ¯, âShilun Baohuanghui Shibai de Neibu Yuanyinâ 試è«ä¿çæ失æçå §é¨åå [On the Internal Reasons for the Failure of the Baohuanghui], Jindai Shi Yanjiu no. 2 (1998): 116.
Chen Wenhui to Kang Youwei, October 10, 1909, in Kang Youwei yu Baohuanghui, 437.
Kung-châüan Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World: Kâang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858â1927 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), 245. This is reprinted as âWei Guoshi Pinruo Kong Niang Fenluan Qing Ding Xuantong ernian jiuyue yiri Kai Guohui zheâ çºåå¢è²§å¼±æéåäºè«å®å®£çµ±äºå¹´ä¹æä¸æ¥éåææ [A Memorial to Set the Opening of Parliament for the 1st day of the 9th month of second year of Xuantong (October 3, 1910) to keep the weakened nation from splitting and chaos] in Kang Youwei Quanji 康æçºå ¨é [Collected Works of Kang Youwei], ed. Jiang Yihua and Zhang Ronghua å§ç¾©è¯, å¼µæ¦®è¯ (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2007), vol. 9, 173â75; it is dated by the editors as 1910 but its text reveals it was written in 1909 as it refers to âthis first year of Xuantongâ and to the opening of the provincial assemblies on October 14, 1909.
âErbai bu qiaomin qingyuan shuâ äºç¾å åæ°è«é¡æ¸ [Petition from two hundred overseas Chinese cities], Zhongguo Weixin Bao (New York), July 28, 1908, 5, AR-6, AAS ARC 2000/78.
Kang Youwei to Liang Qichao æ¢åè¶ , January 11, 1911, in Ding Wenjiang ä¸ææ± and Zhao Fengtian è¶è±ç°, ed., Liang Qichao Nianpu Changbian æ¢åè¶ å¹´èé·ç·¨ [Uncut Version of Liang Qichao Life Chronicle] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 534â35.
Kang Youwei to Liang Qichao, March 23, 1910, in Ding and Zhao, Liang Qichao Nianpu Changbian, 532.
Marie-Claire Bergère, Sun Yat-sen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 192â94.
This was Lao Lianzhiâs åé£æ eightieth birthday following Chinese custom, as she was born in 1831.
Lo, âSequel to Autobiography,â 217â18, 226.
Kang Youwei to Liang Qichao, January 11, 1911, in Ding and Zhao, Liang Qichao Nianpu Changbian, 534â35.
Li, âYingguo Zhengfu dui Kang Youwei,â 97.
Philip A. Kuhn, âLocal Self-Government Under the Republic,â in Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, ed. Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Carolyn Grant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 275.
Zhang Pengyuan å¼µæå, Liang Qichao yu Qingji Geming æ¢åè¶ èæ¸ å£é©å½ [Liang Qichao and the Late Qing revolution] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1964), 194â95.
Zhang, Liang Qichao yu Qingji Geming, 197â98.
Peter Zarrow, After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885â1924 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 145.
Peter Zarrow, âConstitutionalism and the Imagination of the State: Official Views of Political Reform in the Late Qingâ in Peter Gue Zarrow, ed., Creating Chinese Modernity: Knowledge and Everyday Life, 1900â1940 (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 78.
Zhou Jiming and Hu Xi, âConflict and Competition: A New Perspective on Late Qing Politics,â in China: How the Empire Fell, ed. Joseph W. Esherick and C. X. George Wei (New York: Routledge, 2014), 67â71, gives several examples of Qing policies promoting constitutionalism in response to a revolutionary act.
Pâeng-yüan Chang, âThe Constitutionalists,â in Mary C. Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900â1913 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 145.
John H. Fincher, Chinese Democracy: The Self-Government Movement in Local, Provincial and National Politics, 1905â1914 (New York: St. Martinâs Press, 1981), 130. The authorsâ analysis of the impact of the constitutional movement owes much to this book.
Chang Pâeng-yuan, âProvincial Assemblies: The Emergence of Political Participation, 1909â1914,â Chinese Studies in History 44, no. 3 (1984): 15â18.
Ma Mingde, âTang Hualong in the 1911 Revolution,â in Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell, 136â38.
Min Tuki, National Polity and Local Power: The Transformation of Late Imperial Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 164â65.
Joshua Hill, Voting as a Rite: A History of Elections in Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019), 63â71, describes the July 22, 1908, provincial assembly election regulations as designed to be âan opportunity for men of good moral character to anonymously nominate their neighbors for public officeâ who eschewed competition and factionalism.
Chang, âThe Constitutionalists,â 146â49; the proportion of qualified voters in the 21 provinces was .42 percent.
âChina: The Provincial Assemblies,â The Times (London), January 20, 1910, 5.
âSelf-Government in China,â The Times (London), November 23, 1909, 11.
Fincher, Chinese Democracy, 132â34.
Xiaowei Zheng, The Politics of Rights and the 1911 Revolution in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 156â62, describes the Sichuan Railway Association rhetoric, which âemphasized the dual aim of preserving constitutionalism and the rights of the nation.â The Railway Protection Movement is often seen as the spark that led to the 1911 revolution but was led by constitutionalists.
Fincher, Chinese Democracy, 138â40.
Fincher, Chinese Democracy, 147.
Fincher, Chinese Democracy, 148â49.
Chang, âThe Constitutionalists,â 162.
Hu, Wu Xianzi Zhuanji, 10. Australia and Southeast Asia were represented by Lu Nai-xiang and Japan by Tang Juedun 湯覺é ; Chang Pâeng-yuan å¼µæå, Lixian pai yu Xinhai Geming ç«æ²æ´¾èè¾äº¥é©å½ [Constitutionalists and the Revolution of 1911 in China] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica, 1969), 6.
âGuohui Wenti: Wu Xianzi zhi Xianzhenghui Tongzhi shuâ åæåé¡: ä¼æ²è´æ²æ¿æåå¿æ¸ [The Issue of Parliament: Wu Xianzi writes to Xianzhenghui Comrades], letter dated July 30, 1910, Tung Wah Times, September 17, 1910, 8; Chang, âThe Constitutionalists,â 170â71.
Fincher, Chinese Democracy, 149.
Kang Youwei, âQing Likai Guohui yi Jiuwang Ju Zhe dai Meiguo Xianzhenghui Zuoâ æ¸ ç«éåæ以æ亡å±æ代ç¾åæ²æ¿æä½ [A Memorial on Behalf of the Constitutional Association in the United States to Establish a Parliament to Save the Nation from Extinction], written between June and October 1910, in Kang Youwei Quanji, vol. 9, 171â72.
âYingshu Jiaânada Qisheng Xianzheng Zonghui Bingâ è±å±¬å æ¿å¤§ä¸çæ²æ¿ç¸½æç¨ [Petition of the Constitutional Association in the Seven Provinces of the British Dominion of Canada], AR-8, AAS ARC 2000/78. Zhongping Chen in an email to authors dated January 12, 2022, stated he strongly suspects that Kang wrote the petition.
Edward J. M. Rhoads, Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861â1928 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 145â49 passim.
The plot will be described later in this chapter. Ernest P. Young, âThe Reformer as a Conspirator: Liang Châi-châao and the 1911 Revolution,â in Approaches to Modern Chinese History, ed. Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphy, and Mary C. Wright (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 244â46.
âYao Zhe: Lü Meiguo Zhicheng Zhonghua Diguo Xianzhenghui Chengqing Tao Junwang dai Zouzheâ è¦æº: æ ç¾åèåä¸è¯å¸åæ²æ¿æåè«æ¿¤é¡ç代å¥æ [Urgent Memorial: a Memorial to the Throne Submitted by the Chinese of the Chicago (United States) Xianzhenghui to Prince [Zai]tao], Tung Wah Times, July 30, 1910, 8; âChicago Receives Chinese Prince,â San Francisco Call, April 27, 1910; âChinese Prince Guest of Grant,â Chicago Tribune, April 27, 1910, 3.
âDailun: Lü Meizhou Diguo Xianzhenghui cheng Tao Junwang Dai Zou Su Kai Guohui Qingyuan Shuâ 代è«: æ ç¾æ´²å¸åæ²æ¿æå濤é¡ç代å¥ééåæè«é¡æ¸ [Petition to the Emperor Submitted by the Imperial Constitutional Association in the Americas via Prince [Zai]tao to Speedily Open Parliament], in two parts, Tung Wah Times, June 11, 1910, 2, and June 18, 1910, 2.
âChinatown Misses Tsai,â The Sun (Baltimore), May 5, 1910, 2.
Rhoads, Manchus and Han, 153â57.
âTries to Slay Chinese Prince,â Chicago Tribune, October 7, 1910, 5.
âDailun: Bulu Zhijiagao bu Diguo Xianzhenghui shang Xun Junwang Qing Kai Guohui Jie Dangjin Zheâ 代è«: è£éèå é«å å¸åæ²æ¿æä¸æ´µé¡çè«éåæ解黨ç¦æº [Copy of a Memorial from the Chicago Imperial Constitutional Association Chapter to Prince [Zai]xun asking to Open Parliament and End the Ban on Parties], Tung Wah Times, December 17, 1910, 2; âDailun: Bulu Meidong Gebu lianhe Jia Mo Zhong Nan Meizhou Gebu Diguo Xianzhenghui Su Kai Guohui Qingyuan Shu (zai Niuyue shang Xun Junwang)â 代è«: è£éç¾æ± åå è¯åå 墨ä¸åç¾æ´²åå å¸åæ²æ¿æééåæè«é¡æ¸ (å¨ç´ç´ä¸æ´µé¡ç) [A Petition from all the Chapters in the Eastern United States jointly with all the Chapters in Canada, Mexico, Central and South America of the Imperial Constitutional Association to Speedily Open Parliament (presented to Prince Xun in New York)], Tung Wah Times, December 31, 1910, 2 (this petition has an updated addendum from the same group of chapters, angry about the November 1910 edict [see below] to convene parliament in 1913 claiming it was too dangerous to delay three more years). âChinese Prince Arrives,â New-York Tribune, September 30, 1910, 9: âFong Ken Chun [possibly Feng Jingquan 馮é¡æ³], president of the Chinese Reform Association, presented the prince with ⦠a memorial for the Prince Regent asking that he appoint a Chinese parliament.â
The Qing courtâs ambivalence and increasing internal conflict over lifting party bans and pardoning Kang and Liang are described in An Dongqiang å®æ±å¼·, âXinhai Geming Qianhou Kang Liang zai Guonei de Mouhua Huodong,â è¾äº¥é©å½åå¾åº·æ¢å¨åå §çè¬åæ´»å [Schemes and Actions of Kang and Liang inside China Before and After the 1911 Revolution], Journal of Sun Yat-Sen University (Social Science Edition) 6, no. 61 (2021): 56â59.
Fincher, Chinese Democracy, 173.
Chang, âThe Constitutionalists,â 162â65.
Fincher, Chinese Democracy, 168, notes that the second session of the provincial assemblies coincided in time with the first session of the Political Consultative Council, October 3, 1910âJanuary 11, 1911.
âThe Chinese Demand for a Parliament,â The Times (London), November 2, 1910, 7.
Chang, âThe Constitutionalists,â 165â67.
Memorial submitted by Prince Pulun and Shen Jiaben, October 28, 1910, translation, enclosure no. 1 in Calhoun to Knox, November 21, 1910, State Department Numerical Files, no. 893.00/482, Entry A1 205A, vol. 1422, RG 59, NA-College Park.
William J. Calhoun, Beijing, to Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State, October 25, 1910, State Department Numerical Files, no. 893.00/449, Entry A1 205A, vol. 1422, RG 59, NA-College Park.
Zhou and Hu, âConflict and Competition,â 74.
Detailed accounts of these two sessions were recorded by the U.S. Delegation Chinese Secretary, Charles D. Tenney, who attended: âThe Constitutional Assembly,â memorandum, November 15, 1910, enclosure no. 5; âThe Constitutional Assembly,â report of the 12th meeting, held November 7, 1910, enclosure no. 6; and âThe Constitutional Assembly,â report of the 13th meeting, held November 9, 1910, enclosure no. 8, all in Calhoun to Knox, November 21, 1910, State Department Numerical Files, no. 893.00/482, Entry A1 205A, vol. 1422, RG 59, NA-College Park.
Fincher, Chinese Democracy, 173â74.
âThe Reform Movement in China,â The Times (London), December 17, 1910, 5.
Rhoads, Manchus and Han, 159â60.
âImperial Decrees,â North China Herald, December 30, 1910, 785.
âNiuyue Gongdianâ ç´ç´å ¬é» [New York Public Telegram, sent first month, 25th day], Shi Bao (Shanghai), February 24, 1911, 2.
Sun Hongyi å«æ´ªä¼, âYao Jian: Beijing Tongzhihui tonggao shuâ è¦ä»¶: å京åå¿æéåæ¸ [Important Document: Beijing Society of Comrades written announcement], Tung Wah Times, January 7, 1911, 6. The same document, without attribution to Sun, was published in âJizai di-yi: Zhongguo Da Shijiâ è¨è¼ç¬¬ä¸: ä¸å大äºè¨ [Report no. 1: Important Current Events in China], Dongfang Zazhi (Shanghai) 7, no. 11 (November 1910): 18696â97.
Wuâs description of the meeting is quoted in Chang, âThe Constitutionalists,â 168â69. Also see Ma, âTang Hualong in the 1911 Revolution,â in Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell, 138.
Chang, âThe Constitutionalists,â 168â69.
Chang, âThe Constitutionalists,â 173â74; Hou Yijie 侯å®å, Ershi Shiji chu Zhongguo Zhengzhi Gaige Fengchao: Qingmo Lixian Yundong Shi äºåä¸ç´åä¸åæ¿æ²»æ¹é©é¢¨æ½®: æ¸ æ«ç«æ²éåå² [Agitation for Political Reform in Early Twentieth Century China: History of the Late Qing Constitutionalist Movement] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2009), 341.
Zhou and Hu, âConflict and Competition,â 77.
William T. Rowe, Chinaâs Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 273, 277.
Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 129â36. Sunâs five-power division of government included a control branch meant to âprevent the legislative branch from dominating the executive.â
This summary as it relates to Sun Yatsen and the revolutionary movement reflects the analysis of Bergère, Sun Yat-sen; Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911; Shelley Hsien Cheng, âTâung-meng-hui: Its Organization, Leadership and Finances, 1905â1912,â Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1962; Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell; Tjio Kayloe, The Unfinished Revolution: Sun Yat-sen and the Struggle for Modern China (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2017). Zhongping Chen contributed much of the detail from primary sources in this section and shaped the analysis.
âShort of funds and manpower, forced to rely upon unpredictable allies such as the secret societies and âroving bravesâ or bandits, plagued by inadequate planning, uncoordinated efforts, spies and security leaks, Tâung-meng-hui plots were a series of fiascos.â Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911, 57; Kayloe, The Unfinished Revolution, 183, 200â204.
Kayloe, The Unfinished Revolution, 212â16. However, Sun was involved to the extent that his primary collaborator Huang Xing had telegraphed him seeking money for Wuchang before October 10. Sun was not able to decipher the telegram while in transit in the United States because he lacked the code key. By the time he read the telegram, the uprising had begun. Rather than return to China immediately, Sun continued his travels in the United States and Europe, both to raise funds as well as to seek diplomatic support from governments. Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, 207; Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell, 107â108. On October 13, 1911, many American newspapers began reporting that Sun would likely be elected president of the new republic.
Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, 153.
Ma, Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns, 131â35.
Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, 190.
Eric C. Han, âNarrating Community in Yokohama Chinatown: 1894â1972,â Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2009, 50, 60â66.
Cheng, âTâung-meng-hui,â 65â66.
Sang Bing æ¡å µ, Gengzi Qinwang yu Wan-Qing Zhengju, Di-Er Ban åºåå¤çèææ¸ æ¿å± (第äºç) [The 1900 Movement to âRush Troops in to Save the Throneâ and the Late Qing Political Situation, 2nd ed.] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2015), 192â99, 356â61, 366â81; Chen Min é³æ°, âFeng Ziyouâ 馮èªç±, in Xiong Shanghou çå°å and Yan Ruping å´å¦å¹³, ed., Minguo Renwu Zhuan æ°åèå人ç©å³ [Biographies of Historical Figures in Republican China] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2002), vol. 11, 83â84.
Chen, âFeng Ziyou,â vol. 11, 83â85.
Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, 145, 155, 170.
Feng Ziyou, Geming Yishi é©å½é¸å² [An Unofficial History of Chinese Revolution] (Beijing: Xinxing Chubanshe, 2009), vol. 1, 70, 356â57; Chen Xiqi é³é«ç¥º ed, Sun Zhongshan Nianpu Changbian å«ä¸å±±å¹´èé·ç·¨ [A Comprehensive Chronological Biography of Sun Yatsen] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1991), vol. 1, 465, 490.
Wen Xiongfei, ed. Him Mark Lai, âFounding of the Chinese Revolutionary League in America,â Chinese America: History and Perspectives 19 (2005): 24â26.
Chen, Sun Zhongshan Nianpu Changbian, vol. 1, 308â10.
Ma, Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns, 88â98; Chen, Sun Zhongshan Nianpu Changbian, vol. 1, 310â13.
See Chapter 4 for details on Sunâs 1904 tour with Wong Sam Duck and widespread alarm in the Baohuanghui about Sunâs appeal to its members as well as Kangâs fear that he was an assassination target.
Ou Jujia ææ¦ç² to Kang Tongbi 康åç§, July 29, 1904, no. S-C33; Tang Mingsan 湯éä¸ to Kang Tongbi, December 5, 1904, no. B-21; Huang Rongye é»æ¦®æ¥ in Hartford to Kang Tongbi, December 7, 1904, no. S-C32, all in Kang Tongbi South Windsor Collection. For Huangâs relations with the New York Zhigongtang, see Feng, Geming Yishi, vol. 2, 747.
Ma, Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns, 96; Chen, Sun Zhongshan Nianpu Changbian, vol. 1, 313â23.
Zhongping Chen, âKang Tongbiâs Pioneering Feminism and the First Transnational Organization of Chinese Feminist Politics, 1903â1905,â Twentieth-Century China 44, no. 1 (2019): 23â24, 31; Chen, Sun Zhongshan Nianpu Changbian, vol. 1, 479, 483.
Chen, âWeiduoliya, Wenâgehua yu Haiwai Huarende Gailiang,â 84, 90â91.
Feng Ziyou, Geming Yishi, vol. 1, 170; Fengâs account uses the newspaperâs former name Xin Bao æ°å ±, which was renamed Rixin Bao æ¥æ°å ± in 1911 after the Xianzhenghui took over the paper from the now-antagonistic Ye clan. See Chen, Transpacific Reform and Revolution, 141â53.
Chen, âWeiduoliya, Wenâgehua yu Haineiwai Huaren de Gailiang,â 92â93.
âAdvocates Armed Revolt in China,â Province (Vancouver), February 22, 1911, 10; Feng, Geming Yishi, vol. 1, 171 and vol. 2, 603; Jian Jianping, Zhongguo Hongmen zai Jiaânada [The Chinese Freemasons in Canada] (Vancouver: Zhongguo Hongmen Minzhidang zhu Jiaânada zongzhibu, 1989), 24â25.
Chen, âWeiduoliya, Wenâgehua yu Haiwai Huarende Gailiang,â 93â94.
Email from Zhongping Chen to authors, December 28, 2021.
Chen, âWeiduoliya, Wenâgehua yu Haiwai Huarende Gailiang,â 90â94; Chen, Transpacific Reform and Revolution, 154.
âMemorandum of Association of the Chinese Daily Reform Gazette Sun Bo Limited,â Reference no. BC 284, Reel no. B05120, British Columbia Archives, Victoria.
Liang Wenqing to Liang Qichao, November 30, 1910, in Zhang Ziwen å¼µåæ, ed., Liang Qichao Zhijiao Shouzha æ¢åè¶ ç¥äº¤ææ [Letters of Liang Qichao and His Confidants] (Beijing: Guojia Tushuguan, 1995), 329.
Liang Wenqing to Liang Qichao, December 20, 1910, in Zhang, Liang Qichao Zhijiao Shouzha, 329â31. Young, âThe Reformer as a Conspirator,â 244â46.
Email from Chi Jeng Chang, January 3, 2022, notes that no issues of either newspaper exist from the period of the newspaper wars, and the main source is Feng Ziyouâs history, Geming Yishi, which is not always reliable.
âWenâgehua Rixin Bao Da Shengli Kaixuan Wenâ 溫å¥è¯æ¥æ°å ±å¤§åå©å±ææ [Vancouverâs Rixin Bao Returns Triumphant from Big Victory of the Pen], Tung Wah Times, October 14, 1911, 8. Tung Wah Times (Sydney) typically reported North American events several months after they occurred.
Te-Ping Chen, Liangâs great-granddaughter, a journalist herself, has documented his career in China; see âChina Could Have Been a Very Different Country: A Search for Family Reveals a Lost Moment,â Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2019.
Chen, âWeiduoliya, Wenâgehua yu Haiwai Huarende Gailiang,â 90â94.
Ma, Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns, 133â34.
Ma, Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns, 143â53.
Xu Qin to Liang Qichao, February 1, 1911, in Liang Rengong Xiansheng Nianpu Changbian Gaoben æ¢ä»»å ¬å çå¹´èé·ç·¨ç¨¿æ¬ [Uncut Manuscript of Liang Qichaoâs Nianpu], ed. Qinghua Daxue Guoxue Yanjiuyuan and Zhonghua Shuju Bianjibu æ¸ è¯å¤§å¸åå¸ç 究é¢, ä¸è¯æ¸å±ç·¨è¼¯é¨ (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2015): vol. 9, 4399â402.
Xu Qin to Liang Qichao, April 3, 1911, in Liang Rengong Xiansheng Nianpu Changbian Gaoben, vol. 9, 4430â36.
Xu Qin to Wu Xianzi, February 1, 1911, in Liang Rengong Xiansheng Nianpu Changbian Gaoben, vol. 9, 4403â5.
Kang Youwei, âMinzhengbu Zhun Diguo Tongyidang Zhuce lunâ æ°æ¿é¨åå¸åçµ±ä¸é»¨è¨»åè« [On the Registration of the Imperial Unification Party by the Ministry of Civic Affairs], April 1911, in Kang Youwei Quanji, vol. 9, 192.
Hou Yijie, Ershi Shiji chu Zhongguo Zhengzhi Gaige Fengchao, 340â45.
Joseph W. Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 97â98. The Xianyouhui disbanded soon after the revolution, and its members joined other parties formed at the beginning of the Republic; Philip C. Huang, Liang Châi-châao and Modern Chinese Liberalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 118.
Xu Qin to Liang Qichao, [September 15, 1911; the editors date this letter to August 27, 1910 but Xu writes of the Xianyouhui, which did not exist in 1910], in Ding and Zhao, Liang Qichao Nianpu, 515. Chen Xuezhang verifies this correction.
Note that Prince Qing and Prince Zaize were considered potential reform allies up to the banning of Zhengwenshe in 1908.
âChinese of Portland Express Hope Rebels will Triumph,â Oregonian, October 23, 1911, 4; âParade Shows Local Spiritâ; âNew York Chinese Meet,â San Francisco Call, October 16, 1911, 5.
âChinese Republic Opens its Treasury Here,â San Francisco Chronicle, October 16, 1911, 14.
âAssassins Trail Sen in Chicago,â Chicago Tribune, October 15, 1911, 6.
âDr. Sun Yat Sen is in Town,â New York Sun, October 28, 1911, 6. At least until 1907, 12 Mott Street was a Baohuanghui location, housing Huayi Bank and the Western Military Academy armory; see Chapter 10.
âFuture Ruler of China Pays Denver a Visit,â Rocky Mountain News (Denver), October 14, 1911, 2. Patrick Anderson, Appendix 14: âA re-investigation of Sun Yatsenâs fifth arrival in England, late 1911,â The Lost Book of Sun Yatsen and Edwin Collins (London: Routledge, 2017), 253â55, documents Sunâs U.S. travels from local news articles, communications with Homer Lea, and other sources to conclude that Sun Yatsen left New York on November 2 on the Adriatic and arrived in Liverpool November 10, and London on November 11.
Two books present the convoluted story of Red Dragon, primarily based on the correspondence saved by one of its principals, Charles Beach Boothe: Charles Beach Boothe Papers, 1850â1976, Collection Number 65006, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University. The most comprehensive and thoughtful account is Eugene Anschel, Homer Lea, Sun Yat-sen, and the Chinese Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1984), 115â50. Lawrence M. Kaplan, Homer Lea: American Soldier of Fortune (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2010), 145â167, describes the conspiracy and provides considerable detail about Leaâs personal and authorial life during the Red Dragon years, 1908 to 1911.
Anschel, Homer Lea, 160â61.
Anschel, Homer Lea, 164â73; Kaplan, Homer Lea, 174â82.
Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, 210, 212, 216. Lea suffered a stroke on February 11, 1912 and returned to Ocean Park, California, where he died on November 1, 1912. In 1969 his ashes and those of his wife Ethel were interred at Yangmingshan No. 1 Public Cemetery, Taipei, Taiwan, with the intention they would be reinterred next to the Sun Yatsen Mausoleum in Nanjing; Kaplan, Homer Lea, 6, and Find a Grave, https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/44063706/homer-lea, accessed August 19, 2024.
âImperial Society Yields to Rebels,â Portland Oregonian, January 12, 1912, 12.
Huntington, Oregon, chapter to comrades at Rixin Bao, January 10, 1912, in Ding and Zhao, Liang Qichao Nianpu Changbian, 602â4. Rixin Bao was likely in the process of closing its office when it received this letter.
Liao Zhao å»ç §, Jiang Nai è£å¥, Lin Henian æ鶴年, Liu Tingyang å天é, and Lin Renzhi æä»»ä¹ to Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei, January 20, 1912, Ding and Zhao, Liang Qichao Nianpu Changbian, 604. Email from Zhongping Chen, August 19, 2022, identified Jiang Nai as a Vancouver-area leader, mentioned as among other local stalwarts that Rixin Bao editor Liang Wenqing asked Liang Qichao to write; November 22, 1910, in Zhang, Liang Qichao Zhijiao Shouzha, 328.
The Shang Bao åå ± attack in November 1911 is described in Jung-fang Tsai, Hong Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842â1913 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 243â45.
âChinatown is all Ablaze with Flags,â Province (Vancouver), February 19, 1912, 14. The article reports that the reform association announced publicly that they would hang the revolutionary flag for one hour and then replace it with the world flag. This is the only known instance of a world flag displayed by a Xianzhenghui chapter.
âChinese Fight Anti-Rebel,â Portland Oregonian, January 9, 1912, 18. Li Meijin was a staunch reformer, who had been given a personal loan of $5,000 at Kangâs request from the initial King Joy Lo investment in 1905. See Chapter 9.
âImperial Society Yields to Rebels,â Portland Oregonian, January 12, 1912, 12.
âChinese Pens Defi,â Portland Oregonian, January 19, 1912, 12.
Xu Qin to Kang Youwei, November 14, 1911, in Ding and Zhao, Liang Qichao Nianpu Changbian, 592â93. More on this letter below.
Kang Youwei to Provisional President of China Feng Guozhang, Telegram, sent after the failure of the 1917 restoration of the Xuantong Emperor (Puyi) by Zhang Xun; cited in Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World, 248.
The main secondary sources used were: Young, âThe Reformer as a Conspirator,â 239â67; Edmund S. K. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980), 216â22; Lo, âSequel to Autobiography,â 217â21; and Huang, Liang Châi-châao and Modern Chinese Liberalism, 109â10.
Young, âThe Reformer as a Conspirator,â 254â55.
As Zhaoyuan Wan notes, Kang had earlier described the British political system as a constitutional monarchy, not a republic; Zhaoyuan Wan, Science and the Confucian Religion of Kang Youwei (1858â1927): China Before the Conflict Thesis (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2021), 149.
Xu Qin to Kang Youwei, November 14, 1911, Liang Qichao Nianpu Changbian, 592â93.
Fung, The Military Dimension, 219.
Liang Qichao to Xu Qin, October 29, 1911 and November 3, 1911, Liang Qichao Nianpu, 552, 556, 558.
Fung, The Military Dimension, 190â92, 263.
Fung, The Military Dimension, 119â20.
Fung, The Military Dimension, 191; Young, âThe Reformer as a Conspirator,â252â53. Lo, âSequel to Autobiography,â 217, 220, describes how Kang and Liang communicated with the commanders through Wanmucaotang alumnus Pan Ruohai æ½è¥æµ·. Pan had done the bidding of Kang in the past, making contact with members of the Qing court. Also see Liang Qichao to Wu Shouqing [Luzhen] å³å£½å¿, ç¥¿è² to be delivered by Pan Ruohai, 1911, Liang Qichao Nianpu, 562.
Fung, The Military Dimension, 191â92; for example, Wu Luzhen and Liang Qichao worked together to demote Yuan Shikai in 1908 after the death of the Guangxu Emperor.
Fung, 209; Ma, âTang Hualong in the 1911 Revolution,â in Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell, 140â45.
Kang Youwei to Xu Qin, October 26, 1911, in Kang Youwei Quanji, vol. 9, 200.
Zhang Huateng, âThe Qingâs Three Armies after the Wuchang Uprising,â in Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell, 219â21, 229. New Army troops who took part in the Luanzhou mutiny were Zhang Shaozengâs Twentieth Division, Lu Yongxiangâs Third Division, and Lan Tianweiâs Second Mixed Brigade. Luanzhou is now in Hebei province.
Wu Luzhen å³ç¥¿è² to Zhang Shaozeng 張紹æ¾, October 28, 1911, telegram informing Zhang he was headed for Luanzhou, in Du Chunhe ææ¥å, âXinhai Luanzhou Bingjian Handian Xuanâ è¾äº¥ç¤å·å µè««å½é»é¸ [Selected Letters and Telegrams from the 1911 Luanzhou Mutiny], Jindaishi Ziliao no. 91 (1997): 54.
Young, âThe Reformer as a Conspirator,â 255â56.
Liang Qichao feared that â[Zai] Tao è¼æ¿¤ could be swept away in one stroke,â and told Xu Qin that the loyalty of the Imperial Guards was being reinforced by the attempt by âour party peopleâ to infiltrate the Guards over the past few months, consuming all the funds Liang had been able to raise; Liang Qichao to Xu Qin, October 29, 1911, Liang Qichao Nianpu, 554.
Kang Youwei to Xu Qin, October 26, 1911, in Kang Youwei Quanji, vol. 9, 200.
Liang Qichao to Xu Qin, October 29, 1911, Liang Qichao Nianpu, 554â56.
Du, âXinhai Luanzhou Bingjian Handian Xuan,â 51â55, 67â69. This article compiles telegrams and correspondence to and from Zhang Shaozeng from October 13 to November 9, 1911, and shows the twelve-point remonstrance was first issued on October 27, rather than October 29, the date commonly used in earlier secondary sources. Signatories to the Twelve Demands were: Zhang Shaozeng; Lan Tianwei è天è; Lu Yongxiang ç§æ°¸ç¥¥, commander, Fifth Brigade; Wu Xiangzhen ä¼ç¥¥æ¥¨, commander, Thirty-Ninth Brigade; and Pan Juying æ½æ¦æ¥¹, commander, Fortieth Brigade; Fung, The Military Dimension, 218.
Appendix 1: âZhang Shaozeng deng Zouqing Lixian Zhe ji Niding Zhenggang Shiâer tiaoâ 張紹æ¾çå¥è«ç«æ²æåæ¬å®æ¿ç¶±åäºæ¢ [Zhang Shaozeng, et al., âMemorial Requesting the Establishment of a Constitution and Twelve-Point Political Programâ] in Du, âXinhai Luanzhou Bingjian Handian Xuan,â 67â69.
Fung, The Military Dimension, 218.
Zhang, âThe Qingâs Three Armies after the Wuchang Uprising,â in Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell, 229.
Rhoads, Manchus and Han, 179â81, notes that until threatened by Zhangâs Luanzhou mutiny, Zaifeng had ignored all calls for political reforms, even from the Zizhengyuan è³æ¿é¢.
Appendix C. âDocuments of the Revolution: I. An Imperial Apology; A Constitution; A Responsible Cabinet; An Amnesty; Imperial Edicts Issued the 30th October, 1911,â The China Mission Year Book (Shanghai: Christian Literature Society for China, 1912), 5â9.
âDocuments of the Revolution: I. An Imperial Apology,â 5â7.
Zhang Shaozeng to Junzifu è»è«®åº [Army General Staff], memorial telegrams, November 1 and 3, 1911, in Du, âXinhai Luanzhou Bingjian Handian Xuan,â 59, 62.
Four telegrams to and from Zhang Shaozeng and the Zizhengyuan from October 29 to November 3, 1911, indicate the close contact; Du, âXinhai Luanzhou Bingjian Handian Xuan,â 55â56, 59, 61â62.
Zizhengyuan to Luanzhou Commander Zhang, October 31, 1911, in Du, âXinhai Luanzhou Bingjian Handian Xuan,â 56.
âDemands of the National Assembly Submitted in a Memorial to the Throne on the 3rd November,â in âDocuments of the Revolution,â 10â11.
Zizhengyuan to Commanders Zhang Shaozeng, Lu Yongxiang, Lan Tianwei, Wu Xiangzhen, and Pan Juying, telegram, November 4, 1911, in Du, âXinhai Luanzhou Bingjian Handian Xuan,â 64.
Zhang Huateng, âThe Qingâs Three Armies after the Wuchang Uprising,â in Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell, 228â30.
Liang Qichao to Xu Qin, November 3, 1911, Liang Qichao Nianpu, 558.
Some hints of this are in Liangâs two letters to his daughter Liang Lingxian æ¢ä»¤å«», written from Dalian, November 9, 1911, Liang Qichao Nianpu, 558â59.
Yang Weixin æ¥ç¶æ° to Ding Wenjiang [nianpu editor], no date, Liang Qichao Nianpu, 561â62.
Liang Qichao to Liang Lingxian, November 9, 1911, Liang Qichao Nianpu, 558.
Zhang, âThe Qingâs Three Armies after the Wuchang Uprising,â in Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell, 220â21.
Young, âThe Reformer as a Conspirator,â 257; Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell, XXI.
Liang Qichao to Liang Lingxian, three letters dated November 11â12, 1911, Liang Qichao Nianpu, 560â61.
Young, âThe Reformer as a Conspirator,â 258â59.
Kang Youwei to Li Yuanhong, Huang Xing, and Tang Hualong é»å æ´ª, é»è, 湯åé¾, November 9, 1911, in Kang Youwei Quanji, vol. 9, 202â17. This is the second of three versions of this letter published in the Quanji; we use the version quoted by Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World, 246â47.
Ma, âTang Hualong in the 1911 Revolution,â in Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell, 146â47. The Hubei constitution became the basis of the first Republic of China constitution.
Ma, âTang Hualong in the 1911 Revolution,â 148â50.
Kang Youwei public letter to internal party members, November 1911, in Kang Youwei Quanji, vol. 9, 218â19.
Appendix C, âDocuments of the Revolution: IV, An Amnesty,â 9.
Kang Youwei, two poems, 1911, in Wu Tianren å³å¤©ä»», Kang Youwei Nianpu 康æçºå¹´è [Chronological Biography of Kang Youwei] (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 2018), 487. Thank you to Chen Xuezhang, Yang Zheng, Evans Chan, and Connie Kang for translation.
Ma Hong é¦¬å® and Su Wu èæ¦ were Western Han envoys to the Xiongnu tribal confederation, but were captured and imprisoned; the Xiongnu leader Huandi Chanyu pardoned them both in 80 BCE by as a goodwill gesture, and they came back to Changâan together.
This is a reference to Tao Yuanmingâs é¶æ·µæ (365â427) poem âGuiqulaixi ci æ¸å»ä¾å ®è¾ [Iâm homeward bound].
Kang is using traditional Chinese counting of years, or inclusive counting, thus including both his first year of exile (1898) and the current year (1911) as a full year, totaling fourteen, instead of calculating a span of years by subtracting the beginning year from the ending year.
In the poem, Zi Qin åå¿ refers to Su Wu èæ¦.
In the poem, Po Lao å¡è refers to Su Dongpo èæ±å¡ or Su Shi è軾, one of Chinaâs most famous poets and scholars who was also an important government official during the Song dynasty (960â1279). He figured prominently in the political controversies of his times and repeatedly suffered hardships. This refers to Suâs verse, âç¡å¯å¥ä½æ°ç½é«®, ä¸å¦æ¸å»èéå±±â from the poem âHuan xi shaâ æµ£æºªæ² [Silk Washing Stream]. Su died shortly after he was pardoned.
Kangâs two essays on the titular monarchical republic were: Jiuwang Lun æäº¡è« [On Saving China from Collapse] drafted OctoberâNovember 1911 and published in August 1913 in Kangâs journal Buren ä¸å¿ in Kang Youwei Quanji, vol. 9, 222â39, and Gonghe Zhengti Lun å ±åæ¿é«è« [On the Republican Political System], December 1911, in Kang Youwei Quanji, vol. 9, 241â50.
Liang Qichao, âXin Zhongguo Jianshe Wentiâ æ°ä¸å建è¨åé¡ [On the Reconstruction of New China], 1911, in Liang Qichao Quanji æ¢åè¶ å ¨é [Collected Works of Liang Qichao], ed. Yang Gang and Wang Xiangyi æ¥é¼, çç¸å® (Beijing: Beijing Chubanshe, 1999), vol. 4, 2437, 2442.
Young, âThe Reformer as a Conspirator,â 259â65. Xu Qin to Kang Youwei, November 14, 1911, Liang Qichao Nianpu Changbian, 593.
Liao Zhao, Jiang Nai, Lin Henian, Liu Tingyang, and Lin Renzhi to Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei, January 20, 1912, in Ding and Zhao, Liang Qichao Nianpu Changbian, 604.
âCanton News: Fight Between Republicans and Imperialists,â South China Morning Post, December 20, 1911, 8.
âCanton News: Brutal Treatment,â South China Morning Post, December 25, 1911, 8. Also see Edward J. M. Rhoads, Chinaâs Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung, 1895â1913 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 241â42; Young, âThe Reformer as a Conspirator,â 259â65.
âEditorsâ Introductionâ to Zhang, âThe Qingâs Three Armies after the Wuchang Uprising,â in Esherick and Wei, China: How the Empire Fell, 214.
Huang, Liang Châi-châao, 120â21; Liang Qichao Nianpu Changbian, 650.
Qianfan Zhang, The Constitution of China: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2012), 14, 259, 261.