1 The Gorgias and Platoâs Anti-Populism
The Gorgias is one of Platoâs most extensive and richest dialogues. Its ancient subtitle â âOn Rhetoricâ1 â suggests that rhetoric is its main topic. But it becomes evident that questions like what the correct use of rhetoric is and what constitutes good politics might be answered only if the question of what it means to live a life properly is answered. The ancient commentator Olympiodoros
Two concepts of life are up for discussion: that of the traditional politician and orator, who is focusing on increasing his or her own power and influence, and the life of the philosopher or â to put it in modern terms â the life of the intellectual, who in the late fifth century B.C. was regarded as antisocial, a-political and too weak to defend him or herself against injustice, and therefore becomes the subject of mockery, for instance in comedy.3
Platoâs Gorgias reacts to such attacks by showing that traditional politicians or even the tyrant are in reality not strong, but weak, because they do not have the knowledge which is necessary to distinguish between good and bad. They therefore fail to achieve what really is good for them. So, they do not get what they really want. According to Platoâs Socrates, the traditional politicians and orators â and not the philosophers or intellectuals â are unable to care for themselves.
This is a famous and much discussed argument in the Gorgias.4 In my paper, however, I would rather like to concentrate on yet another argument, which is proposed by Socrates in a later part of the dialogue. Here Socrates discusses Calliclesâ understanding of the relationship between politicians or orators and their audiences (Grg. 508câ522e). According to Callicles, this relationship is characterized by mimesis. For according to him orators as well as politicians are obliged to assimilate or adapt to their audiences or addressees in order to influence them successfully. Socrates, however, argues that this approach leads to populism and self-contradiction, and therefore causes weakness of the politician or the rhetorician.
Socrates suggests a new understanding of what he calls âtrue rhetoric and true politics,â5 which according to him must be based on mimesis,6 but also on norms and should focus on the benefits for the addressees and audiences, not
Socratesâ approach might seem paradoxical to us as it did to Platoâs contemporaries. But â as I shall argue â Socratesâ argument from assimilation, as Malcolm Schofield once labelled it,7 reacts to developments in the political and cultural life of his time: growing populism and what has been called the âtheatrical mentalityâ of the Athenians, who were more interested in the performances of the politicians in the assembly rather than in what they were saying. This âtheatrical mentalityâ8 and the populism of politicians which responded to this development might seem familiar to us today in many parts of the western world. Thus, I recommend reading the last part of Gorgias as a kind of anti-populist manifesto, whose analysis and arguments might be of interest even today.
2 Strong Politics â Weak Intellectuals
So, let us first remind ourselves of the context of this anti-populist argument. The Gorgias is made up of three conversations Socrates has with Gorgias, Polos and Callicles.9 The conversation with Gorgias concerns the definition of rhetoric. Gorgias â like most of his contemporaries â regards rhetoric as a practical art of influencing menâs wills through the spoken word, an important road to power and the guarantee of personal security.
The conversation with Polos brings up the moral aspect of how to handle rhetoric and the question of power, which is exercised by the rhetoricians. Power â it turns out â is not secured just by calculation of means, but also by the discovery of the good ends. Since real advantage for us is the just
For you see that our debate is upon a question which has the highest conceivable claims to the serious interest even of a person who has but little intelligence â namely, what course of life is best; whether it should be that to which you invite me, with all those manly pursuits of speaking in Assembly and practicing rhetoric and going in for politics after the fashion of you modern politicians, or this life of philosophy; and what makes the difference between these two. (500bâc, trans. Lamb)
Callicles obviously regards this to be an excluding alternative. He is convinced that only traditional self-interested politics or rhetoric enable people to achieve power, to defend themselves against injustice and harm and to provide happiness. Now, it should be noted that Calliclesâ reticence toward intellectuals was quite popular in Athens at the end of the fifth century as we learn from public speeches, from the historians and most of all from drama and comedy. Aristophanes, for instance presents, intellectuals on stage as people who are always making up arguments for absurd problems, who do not know what real life is about, who are not familiar with politics and its institutions, and who
Calliclesâ claim that philosophers are social outsiders and too weak to care for themselves, as well as Socratesâ opposition to that understanding, are to be understood and interpreted against this background.
But there is even more to it if we remind ourselves that the dialogue Gorgias itself was written well after 399 BC, the very year when the philosopher Socrates was accused, convicted and put to death.13 The reader of the Gorgias will understand Calliclesâ claim that philosophers like Socrates are not strong enough to defend themselves against injustice as a kind of vaticinium ex eventu: Because he knew that Socrates indeed suffered injustice and that he apparently was unable to defend himself in court. So, he might regard Platoâs Apology as a testimony to Socratesâ weakness and as a proof that Callicles was right. He even might wonder, whether it was a good idea by Plato to choose Socrates to defend the thesis that only the philosophers are strong and able to defend themselves. Seen against this background it becomes clear that in the Gorgias Socrates not only fights against Calliclesâ thesis and a popular prejudice and resentment against intellectuals, but also defends himself and his way of life as a philosopher. If he prevailed in this fight it would prove that he not only had better arguments on his side, but it also would illustrate that he as an intellectual or philosopher in fact was not weak, but able to defend himself when facing injustice. In addition to this, Socratesâ arguments in the Gorgias would gain hermeneutical power. For they would help to better understand why Platoâs Apology by no means testifies to Socratesâ failure to defend himself
3 Socratesâ Reaction
But let us see first how Socrates defends the life of the philosopher and refutes the populist assertion of Callicles that intellectuals are useless for society. Socrates starts by claiming â and Callicles agrees â that traditional rhetoric and politics aim at pleasing their audiences in order to achieve power and security (501dâ503c).14 To prove this, Socrates interestingly refers to music and to drama, and especially to tragedy. He asserts that dramatists do not fight by arguments in their plays nor do they aim at making the audience better, but rather wish to win them over by pleasing them. They do so because theatre performances are competitions, which tragic poets want to win. They therefore have to persuade the judge, i.e. the audience, to vote for them and therefore they try to please the audience. Now, or so Socrates argues, the same is true with respect to rhetoric. If one takes away rhythm, melody and verse in drama, Socrates argues, only the words remain and that is why a tragedy can be regarded as a form of traditional rhetoric, which also tries to win over the audience by pleasing it (502e). All this is done out of self-interest and not for the betterment of the audience.
In fact â or so Socrates claims â no politician ever existed in Athens who really cared for the people of Athens and not for himself only (503bâc).
Now, modern commentators have wondered why Socrates refers to drama in this context.15 They call this passage a digression. I would like to remind us, though, that in Socratesâ and Platoâs time rhetoric had acquired an important influence in politics and in the cultural life in Athens outside
It therefore makes sense that Socrates refers to drama in order to illustrate and to prove, that rhetoric always is trying to adapt and to imitate the audience in order to please it and to win the contest. For, Socrates is convinced that traditional politicians try to make people happy or feel good by using words that correspond to the way they already are.18 Again, Socratesâ arguments get profile, when seen in the cultural context of the late 5th century in Athens.
Socrates criticises Calliclesâ thesis by applying what Malcolm Schofield19 has called the assimilation thesis. Let us remind ourselves that according to Callicles an orator or politician should adapt to or imitate â or even identify with â the audiences in the assembly or in the theatre to win the vote or the competition (510câ511c). Socrates compares this relationship between orator or politician and addressee or people with the relationship of a lover with the beloved and reminds us that Callicles and he himself both have a pair of loves. The beloved of Callicles is the Athenian people or demos; the beloved of Socrates is lady philosophia (481d).
Callicles therefore has to adapt to the demos in order to please his love and to gain power over it. But this â or so Socrates argues â will create problems for Callicles, because his beloved demos is always changing its mind and
This changing of positions and beliefs causes, of course, disharmony within the âloverâ Callicles â or as Socrates puts it: There will be a Callicles in Callicles, who contradicts himself (482b)20 â and discord will exist in his life. And this disharmony creates weakness in every lover of the people like politicians and orators. Populist politicians who claim to be the mouthpiece of the people do not really achieve power â although they might believe otherwise â but are weak because their power is only borrowed and dependent on the favour of the demos and the demos changes its mind every moment. The lover therefore never can be sure to what position he should adapt. The loverâpolitician is rather enslaved by the demos. The imitation of the unsteady demos causes a breakdown of communication between the lover and the beloved,21 because the fluctuation of the positions of the demos induces arbitrariness of the statements. Populist politicians might believe themselves to be âmasters of truthâ, who command what is true and what not, and think they are powerful.
In reality, however, their wish to adapt to people who change their mind every other moment leads them to say that things are so and then to say that those same things are not so, which prevents a communication that strives for truth. It is not by chance that Callicles falls into silence right after this exchange of arguments with Socrates (505câ509a). By this Plato shows that populist politicians like Callicles may feel like masters of truth, but in reality they are the slaves of the people and their volatile opinions. The imitation-argument therefore proves that Callicles is wrong: Imitation of the demos does not create power and security, as Callicles believes, but is responsible for the weakness of politicians and orators.
4 Strong Philosophers as âTrue Politiciansâ
The assimilation-argument not only proves that Callicles is wrong, but also â as Socrates now hastens to show â that Socrates is right in claiming that the philosopher is not weak but strong.
If Calliclesâ imitation-argument â namely that the lover always has to imitate the beloved â applies here as well, as Socrates rightly claims, it follows that, as a lover and imitator of stable and unchangeable philosophia, Socrates himself and his opinions become stable and unchangeable as well â as he in fact demonstrates in the Gorgias and in other dialogues time and again (509a). The imitation of his beloved â lady philosophia â therefore prevents him from ever changing his mind, contradicting himself and therefore from weakness.
And yet another important difference follows. For sure, lady philosophia is the beloved of Socrates whom he imitates; but she is not the addressee of his speeches or the partner of his conversations as demos is for Callicles â and every traditional orator. Lady philosophia rather represents norms or rules that are separated from both the philosopher and his partners.
That is to say: The traditional bipolar relationship between orator or politician and addressee or audience is replaced by a triangular relationship: Orator-addressee-norm.23 This is an important innovation, because this triangular relationship enables Socrates to remain stable in his own opinions even while he addresses people who often are changing their minds. The triangular relationship (speaker â norm â addressee) enables Socrates to remain independent of any influence by the addressee. For he does not imitate the addressee, as it might seem to some interpreters, but philosophia. One therefore might say that the traditional adaption to the people, which is practised by traditional politicians and which creates all the problems Socrates is reminding us of, is replaced and turned into an imitation of stable principles or to an adjustment to a fixed norm.24
That is to say: Socrates develops the concept of a new kind of âstrong rhetoricâ, politics and philosophy which aim at supporting the partners, addressees or audiences to recognize what really is good for them.25
I think I am one of few, not to say the only one, in Athens who attempts the true art of statesmanship, and the only man of the present time who manages affairs of state. (521d, trans. H. N. Fowler)
True politics, as Socrates understands it, means to care for the souls of his fellow citizens in order to enable them to recognise what is wrong and what is not, and to help them to deal with other people and the institutions in a correct manner â an approach which might be called philosophia medicans since it tries to free people from misconceptions by refuting them. Socrates, then, is presented by Plato as the model of the true politician in the Gorgias and in other dialogues, a politician who acts out of love for lady philosophia and the rules and norms which she represents and which help him to also love the people and deal with them properly. His love for philosophia inspires and forces him to urge his partners to reconsider their positions and to perhaps modify them. When he irritates his partners and causes helplessness he is just trying to help them to become better and happier citizens. By doing this Socrates proves
5 Socrates in the Apology
But what to say about the Apology? The Apology is perhaps Platoâs most famous text, but it also has irritated the commentators of all times â at first sight the Apology testifies to the weakness of the philosopher Socrates rather than to his power and strength.26 It seems to confirm Calliclesâ claim that philosophers are weak, because they are unable to defend themselves when suffering injustice and harm. Certainly, a closer look and analysis of what is really going on in the Apology might point to another direction and interpretation.
Although quite obviously written by Plato to set a monument of the steadfastness of Socrates and to defend him against the accusation of godlessness and the seduction of youth, the performance of Socrates as described by Plato has upset his contemporaries and many readers.27 Socratesâ behaviour has often been regarded as unusual under the circumstances and even arrogant. Indeed, Socratesâ defence speech seems more like a prosecution of his accusers than a defence of himself. Instead of defending himself Socrates rather seems to refute his judges. One might think of the elenctic questioning of the judges Socrates practices in court28 or of Socratesâ reference to his successors who will continue to ask agonizing questions. Socratesâ claim that his philosophical Pragma should be acclaimed as a service to the gods and he himself as a gift of God29 has been perceived as a provocation by the judges and many readers. The same is true when Socrates denies the relevance of the death penalty and when he demands to be honoured by being offered free meals in the Prytaneion (36d, 37a).
Socratesâ behaviour before the court as it is described by Plato must have seemed embarrassing to the judges and the reader of Platoâs Apology at his
I am therefore, you men of Athens, now far from defending me for my sake, as many may believe, but I defend myself in your interest, so that you may not perish from the gift which God has given you by my condemnation (Ap. 30b, trans. Lamb)
And so, men of Athens I am now making my defense not for my own sake, as one might imagine, but far more for yours, that you may not by condemning me err in your treatment of the gift the God gave you. (Grg. 522c, trans. Fowler)
Seen against this background, Socratesâ behaviour in the Apology becomes a prime example for Platonic therapeutic rhetoric and politics, which includes purifying the souls of the judges from ignorance. Socratesâ behaviour in the Apology illustrates and confirms what he is arguing for in the Gorgias. Socrates argues in the Gorgias and illustrates in the Apology what is meant by being in love with lady philosophia: He sticks to his convictions and tries to help others to get rid of misconceptions. That is why Socrates does not behave like a defendant, but rather accuses the judges before court. This is why he practices a new kind of rhetoric in philosophical conversation, this is why he irritates his partners and does not even try to please them â and he does so â or it seems â to his own disadvantage. But his disadvantage only concerns his bodily
The Apology therefore illustrates the anti-populist stance which Socrates defended in the Gorgias, i.e. that it is not important to just survive at any cost when in danger, but to live a good life and to save oneâs own soul and the souls of others.
6 Aristotle and âTrue Politicsâ
Socrates as the true politician and orator who cares for the souls of his fellow citizens: this concept might seem bizarre to modern interpreters. However, one should not forget that to the ancients the word polis does not necessarily entail the aspect of territory or institution like the modern concept of state. Polis rather means community of people as individuals.31 This is why Socrates calls his philosophical pragma â his caring for the souls of his fellow citizens â true politics.32 This is why Socrates in Platoâs Republic has much to say about the human soul but much less so about laws and political institutions.
One also should keep in mind that Plato developed his concept of true politics and rhetoric in reaction to a growing populist movement and the theatrical mentality at his time which he refused to imitate or to adapt to. This is why Platoâs Socrates proposes to replace the traditional binary relation of speaker and addressee by his triangular model of speaker or politician, norm and addressee. When stable norms and rules are to be imitated, traditional rhetoric is transformed into a sort of pedagogical tool, which aims at improving the souls of the addressee. Platoâs Socratic true politics as developed in the Gorgias and illustrated in the Apology and other dialogues indeed established a kind of educational tradition,33 whose traces can be observed for instance in Aristotle and can be followed until late antiquity. In the Nicomachean Ethics,34 for example, Aristotle argues that two types of politics exist: traditional politics
The true statesman seems to be one, who has made a special study of the nature of goodness, since his aim is to make citizens good and law-abiding men. (Eth. Nic. I 1102a7â10, trans. Rackham)
It seems plausible to argue that Aristotleâs differentiation between traditional and true politics, which intends to educate and improve the souls of the citizen, refers to what Socrates has to say about âtrue politicians and true politicsâ in the Gorgias.35 When Socrates surmises in the Gorgias that the educational purpose of true politics can only be put into practice in a small circle of students, this as well might have inspired Aristotle, who says similar things in the Nicomachean Ethics.36
7 Conclusion
In this paper I wanted to remind readers that Plato creates a concept of âtrue politicsâ as an activity which tries to obey unchangeable principles in an effort to serve fellow citizens and his partners in conversation. I tried to bring attention to the fact that Platoâs philosophy indeed is political â which often has been denied â but it is political in a new and transformed sense of the word, which does not aim at oneâs own advantage but wishes to help others to become better humans or citizens. I also wanted to remind us of the fact that Plato is developing his idea not the least in reaction to self-orientated populism, which was growing at his time, and opposing a theatrical mentality as it were which declares self-interest as the natural basis of politics and superficial performance as a means to impress people and thereby to achieve power. I suggest that this might not seem very unfamiliar to us today and for this reason the last part of the dialogue still should be heard as Platoâs anti-populist voice.
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Dover, Kenneth. Aristophanes: Clouds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.
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Erler, Michael. âHilfe der Götter und Erkenntnis des Selbst. Sokrates als Göttergeschenk bei Platon und den Platonikern.â In Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des Spätantiken Denkens, edited by Theo Kobusch and Michael Erler. Berlin â Boston: B.G. Teubner, 2002.
Erler, Michael. âPlaton und seine Rhetorik.â In Handbuch Antike Rhetorik, edited by Michael Erler and Christian Tornau, 315â337. Berlin â Boston: De Gruyter, 2019.
Erler, Michael, Tornau Christian, eds. Handbuch Antike Rhetorik. Berlin â Boston: De Gruyter, 2019.
Erler, Michael. Sokrates in der Höhle, Aspekte praktischer Ethik im Platonismus der Kaiserzeit. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2020.
Halliwell, Stephen. âBetween Public and Private: Tragedy and Athenian Experience of Rhetoric.â In Greek Tragedy and the Historian, edited by Christian Pelling, 121â141. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
Heitsch, Ernst. Apologie des Sokrates. Ãbersetzung und Kommentar, 2. Auflage. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004.
Jermann, Christoph. Philosophie und Politik. Stuttgart â Bad Cannstatt: FrommannâHolzboog, 1986.
Jordovic, Igor. âBios Praktikos and Bios Theoretikos in Platoâs Gorgias.â In Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue, edited by Alessandro Stavrou and Christopher Moore, 369â385. Leiden â Boston: Brill, 2018.
Kamtekar, Rachana. âThe Profession of Friendship: Callicles Democratic Politics and Rhetorical Education in Platoâs Gorgias.â Ancient Philosophy 25 (2005): 319â339.
Kobusch, Theo. âNachwort.â In Plato: Gorgias, übersetzt von Michael Erler, kommentiert und mit einem Nachwort versehen von Theo Kobusch, 127â247. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2014.
Maffi, Emanuel. âThe Theatetus Digression. An Ethical Interlude in an Epistemological Dialogue?â In Thinking, Knowing, Acting. Epistemology and Ethics in Plato and Ancient Platonism, edited by Mauro Bonazzi, Filippos Forcignanò and Angela Ulacco, 138â160. Boston: Brill, 2019.
Moss, Jessica. âThe Doctor and the Pastry Chef: Pleasure and Persuasion in Platoâs Gorgias.â Ancient Philosophy 27,2 (2007): 229â249.
Ober, Josiah, and Barry Strauss. âDrama, Political Rhetoric, and the Discourse of Athenian Democracy.â In Nothing to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context, edited by John J. Winkler and Froma I. Zeitlin, 237â270. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Pollitt, Jerome Jordan. Art in the Hellenistic Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Renaud, François. La justice du dialogue et ses limites : Ãtude du Gorgias de Platon. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2022.
Rowe, Christopher. Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Schofield, Michael. âCalliclesâ Return: Gorgias 509â522 Reconsidered.â Philosophie Antique 17, 2017: 7â30.
Schütrumpf, Eckart. Aristoteles: Politik. Buch I. Berlin â Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991.
Sedley, David. ââBecoming like Godâ in the Timaeus and Aristotle.â In Interpreting the TimaeusâCritias, edited by Thomas Calvo and Luc Brisson, 327â339. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1997.
Zimmermann, Bernhard. âAristophanes und die Intellektuellen.â In Entretiens sur lâantiquité classique, Bd. 38: Aristophane, edited by J. M. Bremer and E. Degani, 255â286. Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1993.
Diogenes Laertius III 59. Michael Erler, Platon (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2007), 132â141. François Renaud, La justice du dialogue et ses limites. Ãtude du Gorgias de Platon (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2022), 7â27.
Olympiodorus, In Plat. Gorg. 3,1â14 Westerink. See Damian Caluori, âOlympiodoros,â in Philosophie der Kaiserzeit und der Spätantike (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2018), 2051â2059, esp. 2055.
See Bernhard Zimmermann, âAristophanes und die Intellektuellen,â in Aristophane. Entretiens sur lâantiquité classique 38, eds. J. M. Bremer and E. W. Handley (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1993).
See Christopher Rowe, Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
See Michael Erler, Sokrates in der Höhle, Aspekte praktischer Ethik im Platonismus der Kaiserzeit (Tübingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020), 16â22. Renaud, La justice, 167â188.
See Malcolm Schofield, âCalliclesâ Return: Gorgias 509â522 Reconsidered,â Philosophie Antique 17 (2017). Renaud, La justice, 142â148.
Schofield, âCalliclesâ Return,â 22â25.
See Jerome J. Politt, Art in the Hellenistic Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 4; Josiah Ober and Barry Strauss, âDrama, Political Rhetoric, and the Discourse of Athenian Democracy,â in Nothing to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context, ed. J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 237â70; Angelikos Chaniotis, âTheatrically Beyond the Theater. Staging Public life in the Hellenistic World,â in De La Scène aux Gradins. Théâtre et représentations dramatique aprés Alexandre le Grand dans les cites hellénistiques, ed. B. Le Guen (Toulouse: Pallas, 1997), 224â232.
See Erler, Platon, 132â141.
See Grg. 484câ486d, 500câd, 521dâ522c. See also Igor Jordovic, âBios Praktikos and Bios Theoretikos in Platoâs Gorgias,â in Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue, ed. A. Stavrou and Ch. Moore (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 373â377. Joachim Dalfen, Gorgias. Ãbersetzung und Kommentar (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 336â342.
See Thucydides II 34â46. See also Christine Abbt and Nahyan Niazi, eds., Der Vieltuer und die Demokratie. Politische und philosophische Aspekte von Allotrio- und Polypragmosyne (Basel: Colmena, 2017).
See Aristophanes, Nubes 228, 333, 360, 1284; see Kenneth Dover, Aristophanes: Clouds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), XXXIV.
Plat., Ap. 19bâc, 26dâe. See Ernst Heitsch, Apologie des Sokrates. Ãbersetzung und Kommentar, 2. Auflage (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 63â66.
See Jessica Moss, âThe Doctor and the Pastry Chef: Pleasure and Persuasion in Platoâs Gorgias,â Ancient Philosophy 27,2 (2007): 229â49.
E. R. Dodds, Plato: Gorgias. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 320f. Plato often explains important aspects in digressions, see Erler, âEpisode und Exkurs in Drama und Dialog. Anmerkung zu einer poetologischen Diskussion bei Platon und Aristoteles,â in Orchestra. Festschrift für H. Flashar, ed. A. Bierl and P. von Möllendorff (StuttgartâLeipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1994).
For this topic, see Jordan J. Pollitt, Art in the Hellenistic Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 4; Chaniotis, âTheatrically Beyond the Theater,â 221â259, esp. 248.
Thucydides III 38; Stephen Halliwell, âBetween Public and Private: Tragedy and Athenian Experience of Rhetoric,â in Greek Tragedy and the Historian, ed. Ch. Pelling (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 121â2.
See Grg. 513c.
Schofield, âCalliclesâ return,â 22â25. Rachana Kamtekar, âThe profession of friendship: Callicles democratic politics and rhetorical education in Platoâs Gorgias,â Ancient Philosophy 25 (2005).
See Michael Erler, âSocrates in the Cave. Argumentations as Therapy for Passions in Gorgias and Phaedo,â in Plato Ethicus. Philosophy is Life, ed. M. Migliori (St. Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2004).
See Theo Kobusch, âNachwort,â in Plato: Gorgias (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2014), 241.
See Plat. Tht. 172câ177c; see also Emanuel Maffi, âThe Theatetus Digression. An Ethical Interlude in an Epistemological Dialogue?â in Thinking, Knowing, Acting. Epistemology and Ethics in Plato and Ancient Platonism, ed. M. Bonazzi et al. (Leiden: Brill 2019).
As it is discussed in the Phdr. 269dâ274b.
See Michael Erler, âEpicurus as deus mortalis. Homoiosis theoi and Epicurean self,â in Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath [Philosophia Antiqua 89], eds. D. Frede and A. Laks (Leiden: Brill, 2002). For Aristotle see also David Sedley, âBecoming like God in the Timaeus and Aristotle,â in Interpreting the TimaeusâCritias, eds. T. Calvo and L. Brisson (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1997), 327â339.
See Michael Erler, âPlaton und seine Rhetorik,â in Handbuch Antike Rhetorik, eds. M. Erler and C. Tornau (BerlinâBoston: De Gruyter, 2019).
For rhetoric in the Apology see Heitsch, Apologie des Sokrates, 41â44.
See Myles Burnyeat, âThe Impiety of Socrates,â in Platoâs Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Critical essays, ed. Rachana Kamtekar (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 150â62.
Cf. Joachim Dalfen, Platon: Gorgias. Ãbersetzung und Kommentar (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 277 f.
Ap. 23c. See Michael Erler, âHilfe der Götter und Erkenntnis des Selbst. Sokrates als Göttergeschenk bei Platon und den Platonikern,â in Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des Spätantiken Denkens, eds. T. Kobusch and M. Erler (BerlinâBoston: B.G. Teubner, 2002), 402.
See Heitsch, Apologie des Sokrates, 41â44.
See Thucydides VII 77,7; see Norbert Blössner, Dialogform und Argument, Studien zu Platons Politeia (Stuttgart: SteinerâFranz Verlag, 1997), 189.
Grg. 521d6â522a7. See Erler, Sokrates in der Höhle, 16â21.
See Michael Erler, âVom admirativen zum irritierten Staunen. Philosophie, Rhetorik und Verunsicherung in Platons Dialogen,â in Irritationen. Rhetorische und poetische Verfahren der Verunsicherung, eds. R. Früh et al. (Berlin â New York: De Gruyter), 2015.
Arist., Eth. Nic. I 1095b22 ff.
See Eckart Schütrumpf, Aristoteles: Politik. Buch I (Berlin â Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991), 78â9.
See Plat., Grg. 521d6 ff., Arist., Eth. Nic. I 1102a8â1103a10. See also Schütrumpf, Aristoteles: Politik. Buch I, 82.