1 Introduction
Like the captain of a sailboat forced to change course with the varying winds, the interpreter of the Gorgias is called upon to continuously change perspective with respect to both the object and the method of investigation. This feature of the dialogue has led scholars to speak of a lack of cohesion, which in turn creates uncertainty about Platoâs main purpose in writing the Gorgias.1 In addition, readers must take into account modern interpretersâ views on the effectiveness of Socratesâ arguments, the coherence of his statements in relation to
The Gorgias is articulated into three distinct logoi, arranged in sequence, in order to develop a coherent argument.3 This sequence starts with the discussion with Gorgias about the definition of rhetoric as the art of persuasion, that has acquittal in lawcourts and success in politics as its main purpose; it then moves, with the shift of interlocutor to Polus, to a reflection on the supposed happiness deriving from the unethical use of rhetoric; and it concludes with an investigation into the best way of life in discussion with Callicles. Each of the ethical issues raised in the conversations with Gorgias and Polus â which are all developed in Socratesâ confrontation with Callicles â is to be understood with reference to the set of values stemming from Calliclesâ hedonistic stance, which represents the contemporary backdrop for both Gorgiasâ utilitarian view of rhetoric and Polusâ defence of injustice. The wide range of uses made of the dialogue form â the âDelphicâ interview with the rhetorician Gorgias about his craft, the elenchos of Polusâ theorisation of injustice, the agon with Callicles on human excellence and the right way of life, the mimetic monologue through which Socrates imitates the actual dialogue after Calliclesâ withdrawal, and then, after Calliclesâ return, what can be considered on the whole a continuous speech (makrologia), culminating in Socratesâ account of the destiny of souls in the afterlife â all closely follow variations in the argumentative structure of the work. In this labyrinthine architecture, the reader proceeds as if wandering through a dark wood, encountering along the way matters of intense debate among scholars, mainly concerning Platoâs complex treatment of the Socratic paradoxes and his supposed departure from the historical Socratesâ views â assuming that those views can be identified. Yet the wide-ranging route of Socratesâ vessel, driven by the changing winds of his interlocutorsâ arguments, should not distract us from the deeper meaning of the simile of sailing: despite the numerous adjustments to the course of the dialogue, Socratesâ destination always remains the same, the consistent and safe (albeit temporary, until
In light of this, I will address here the issue that Socrates himself claims to be the most beautiful of all and to which he strongly commits in the Gorgias: namely, what a man ought to be like, and what he ought to practice and for how long in both youth and old age. Following Socrates in the finest of all possible inquiries he undertakes with Callicles about the life most worth living, I will focus on Socratesâ portrayal of the completely good man, which results from an understanding of excellence as kosmos. On account of both the pivotal role attributed to sophrosune as the primary virtue and the striking absence of phronesis in Socratesâ account of the virtuous individual, scholars â from William Thompson4 to David Sedley5 â have pointed to a shift in Platoâs characterization of Socrates, from the standard claim that virtue is knowledge to a definition of excellence as psychic orderliness. Yet a close reading of the craft analogy argument that Socrates uses to refute Calliclesâ definition of excellence as âintemperanceâ (akolasia) shows that Socratesâ understanding of excellence as kosmos is consistent with the Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge.
I will start my analysis (section 2) from Socratesâ exchange with Callicles, just after the latterâs Great Speech, where Callicles â pressed by Socratesâ questioning â expresses his stance that justice is the natural right of superior men to rule and have a greater share â with superiority understood to refer to intelligence and courage alone â and that the best way of life is a life involving the limitless fulfilment of desires, upon which Calliclesâ definition of excellence as luxury, intemperance and freedom depends. I will then (section 3) focus on the interlude after Calliclesâ withdrawal, during which Socrates, recapitulating on his own the conclusions of the preceding cross-examination, defines his understanding of excellence as relating to the order in an individualâs soul, which is then followed by a portrayal of the virtuous individual in which all of the so-called cardinal virtues appear except intelligence. I will argue against the possibility of a non-intellectualistic reading of Socratesâ account of virtues by framing it in its wider argumentative context, where it appears both as the outcome and the completion of Socratesâ craft analogy argument as applied to the craft of ruling: the craft analogy narrows the scope of the politicianâs task in producing virtuous citizens by restricting it to only those virtues which can be produced by the craft of ruling, from which intelligence qua innate virtue is
The claim that the order-based portrayal of the virtuous individual in the interlude should be framed within Socratesâ knowledge-based conception of virtue is supported by the immediately following reference to the knowledge of geometry as a metaphor for the knowledge of the good and bad (section 5). Set against Calliclesâ praise of intemperance and championship of having a disproportionate share of things, the notion of geometric equality is here put forward as the universal principle that enables the understanding of the correct proportion between conflicting elements: the universal common ratio â which establishes orderliness between heaven and earth, gods and men, as well as among men themselves â sheds light on knowledge of the correct proportion between the body and the soul implied in Socratesâ reference to the soma-sema theory. The implications of the body-as-grave simile â which Socrates only hints at in his first set of arguments, due to Calliclesâ reluctance to challenge his hedonistic point of view â are fully developed in the Phaedo (section 6), where the philosophical disposition of Socratesâ interlocutors makes it possible to address the body-soul dualism in full, by considering the body, with its needs, affections and desires, as an obstacle to â and even an evil for â the cognitive life of the soul.
In closing (section 7), I will underline how the results which Socrates achieves through his question-and-answer method, whether aporetic or positive, vary in relation to the argumentâs premises, which, in turn, depend on both dialogical contexts and disposition of interlocutors.
2 Socratesâ Reply to Calliclesâ Great Speech: The Finest of All Possible Inquiries
In answer to Calliclesâ Great Speech, Socrates makes two preliminary observations, both of which serve as keys to interpreting the remainder of the dialogue. The first remark relates to the uniqueness of his interlocutor as a âgodsendâ (hermaion): a touchstone that tests Socratesâ soul (Grg. 486d1âe3)
The right of Calliclesâ superior men to a greater share gains Socratesâ full attention. On account of this supposed right to have more, Socrates raises the question of whether a ruler should rule himself or only others (491d4âe1).9 Callicles rejects the idea that his âintelligentâ (phronimos) and âcourageousâ (andreios) ruler also ought to be âtemperateâ (sophron), âmaster of himselfâ (enkrates)10 and able to rule the desires within him (á¼ÏιθÏ
μιῶν á¼ÏÏÏν Ïῶν á¼Î½ á¼Î±Ï
Ïá¿·), for â he claims â there is no happiness in being a slave to anyone, not even to oneself (491e2â6).11 In contrast to the need for self-control envisaged by Socrates, the correct way of life according to nature consists, for Callicles, not in restraining desires, but in letting them grow as large as possible and being able to âserveâ (huperetein) them by means of âcourageâ (andreia) and âintelligenceâ (phronesis), satisfying whatever particular desire we may have (491e5â492a3): this way of life, argues Callicles, is not in the power of the many, whose praise of âtemperanceâ (sophrosune) and âjusticeâ (dikaiosune) is a sign of their âlack of manlinessâ (anandria) when it comes to fulfilling their own desires (492a3âb1). Callicles thus provides a striking definition of both âexcellence and happinessâ (arete te kai eudaimonia), as corresponding to âluxuryâ (truphe), âintemperanceâ (akolasia), and âfreedomâ (eleutheria) (492c3â8). Just as was the case with his earlier claim, according to which âlawâ (nomos) is inferior to ânatureâ (phusis), Calliclesâ point shows a subversive intent with regard to the traditional conception of virtue: in dismissing justice and temperance
3 âWhat a Man Ought to Be Likeâ: The Craft Analogy Argument
At the pinnacle of Socratesâ refutation of Callicles â with his interlocutor refusing to play the role of respondent any longer â Socrates is forced to complete the discussion on his own, thus taking on the role of both questioner and respondent (505c1âd9). In the form of a recapitulatio,12 he first briefly summarizes the findings of the discussion about the pleasant and the good, followed by the outcome of the application of the craft analogy to the case of the politician-orator in relation to the soul of the citizens as subject of his craft,13 upon which the ensuing portrayal of the completely good man depends (506c5â507c7).
Contrary to Calliclesâ initial admission (494e9â495a6) and formal declaration (495d2â5), âthe pleasantâ (to hedu) is not the same as âthe goodâ (to agathon), since the pleasant is what makes people experience pleasure, while the good is that by virtue of which individuals are âgoodâ (agathoi) (506c6âd2). Socrates associates the state of being good, in the case of both individuals and all other things, with some âexcellenceâ which comes to be present by virtue of
Consistent with this line of reasoning, Socrates counters Calliclesâ model of superior individuals with his portrayal of the man who is âcompletelyâ (teleos) âgoodâ (agathos) based on temperance as the underlying virtue from which all the others follow: the temperate individual must be âjustâ (dikaios) and âpiousâ (hosios), for he would act appropriately regarding both men and gods, and also âcourageousâ (andreios), in that he would pursue or flee what it is appropriate to pursue or flee, whether actions, people or pleasures and pains (507a5âb8). Socrates then infers that it is the temperate individual who will be happy, since the good individual does whatever he does âwell and rightlyâ (eu te kai kalos), and whoever does well is âblessed and happyâ (makarios te kai eudaimon), whereas the âbaseâ (poneros) individual who does badly, is âwretchedâ (athlios). Socrates identifies the latter with the intemperate man praised by Callicles, as representing the opposite of the individual who is temperate (507b8âc7).
The absence of phronesis in Socratesâ account of virtues,15 together with the emphasis on kosmos and sophrosune, led earlier scholarship to see evidence here of Plato distancing himself from the Socratic notion that virtue
Now, by juxtaposing the craft analogy section with the corresponding summary in the recapitulatio, we can spot a significant difference in Socratesâ focus. In the discussion with Callicles, the focus is on the âcraftsmanâ (demiourgos) at the centre of the analogy, namely the good politician-orator speaking with a view to the best and committed to making the citizens as good as possible (503d7). Socrates outlines his profile in intellectualistic terms: the politician-orator is said to be âgood and proficient in his craftâ (504d5â6); he masters and practices a craft bearing on âtrue excellenceâ (arete alethes) (503c4âd3); this craft does not consist in satisfying our own and othersâ desires (503c5â6) â which is what the âpracticesâ (paraskeuai) which only have pleasure as their goal do, lacking any knowledge of what is better and what is worse,23 and this is because they are mere knacks, like cookery (500a7âb5), but rather it consists in satisfying only those desires whose satisfaction makes a person better (503c7âd1) â which is what the practices which ârecognise what is good and what is badâ do (αἱ δὲ γιγνÏÏκοÏ
Ïαι á½
Ïι Ïε á¼Î³Î±Î¸á½¸Î½ καὶ á½
Ïι κακÏν), and these are crafts concerned with the good, like medicine (500a7âb5).24 By contrast, Socratesâ focus in the recapitulatio is not on the craftsman in the analogy â the good politician-orator who knows what true excellence in his craft is, but on the âobjectâ of his âworkâ: the soul he made âorderlyâ (kosmia), and thus âgoodâ (agathe), through the exercise of the fine kind of rhetoric grounded in knowledge of what is good and bad for the soul. On account of this shift in focus, the portrayal of the completely good man should be taken to refer only to the good citizen ruled by a good politician, who, according to the concept of orderliness borrowed from the craft analogy, fosters in the soul what corresponds to its proper structure and order, that is justice and temperance and all of the other ethical virtues. It is from the point of view of those who are ruled, as subjects of the healing political craft of the soul, that Socrates has sketched the profile of the man who is completely good in the recapitulatio: it is from the perspective of the subject of the craft of ruling that the absence of any reference to phronesis in the account of the temperate man should be interpreted,25 since
4 The Perils of phronesis: The Case of Evil, but Skilled Individuals in the Republic
In order to shed light on the absence of phronesis in the profile of the virtuous individual of the Gorgias, it will be useful to consider Socratesâ account of the virtues of the soul in Republic VII. According to his own interpretation of the allegory of the cave as referring to the soulâs necessary ascent to the good (Resp. VII 517a8âc4), Socrates distinguishes between the incorrect model of paideia, corresponding to the Sophistsâ implanting of knowledge into souls which lack it, and the true paideia, understood as the craft of âturningâ (periagoge) the faculty with which one learns towards the good (VII 518b7âd7). Socrates identifies this faculty with the virtue of the soul entrusted to reasoning, and gives an account of virtues in which phronesis has a different status with respect to the others (VII 518d9â519a5).26 Unlike the other so-called virtues of the soul acquired by habit and practice,27 âthe virtue of reasoningâ (he de tou phronesai) happens to be made up above all of something more divine, which never loses its inborn âfacultyâ (dunamis) and whether it is useful and beneficial or useless and harmful depends on the way in which it is turned (VII 518d9â519a1). Socrates distinguishes the virtue of reasoning from all of the other virtues on
Socratesâ understanding of phronesis as the innate virtue of reasoning â whose neutral âfacultyâ (dunamis) can be either beneficial or harmful, depending on its orientation â sheds light on his use of the term phronimoteroi, âmore intelligentâ, to identify Calliclesâ superior men. At some point during the inquiry into what Callicles claims to be the just by nature (488b2â490a8), Socrates figures out that the excellent men Callicles has in mind â namely, those who are allowed to seize inferior menâs belongings, as well as who are entrusted to rule over them and to have more than them (488b2â6) â could be âthe more intelligentâ (489e6â490a8). The term phronimoteroi proposed by Socrates necessarily takes on a negative connotation, since it is meant to sum up Calliclesâ stance on justice and human excellence, through which phronesis is associated with expropriation, tyrannical power, and the right to a âgreater shareâ (pleon echein). The same negative connotation is attributed to the virtue of reasoning in the passage from Republic VII under consideration (519a1â5): Socrates explains the negative potential of phronesis by pointing to the case of âevil, but skilled individualsâ (poneroi-sophoi), whose âpetty, inferior soulâ (psucharion) nonetheless possess sharp, keen vision; for such a soulâs sense of
Furthermore, Socrates not only presents the same perspective on phronesisâ negative sense and subservience to evil ends in both dialogues, but his treatment of phronesis is also framed by the same hedonistic background, at least if we take into account the fact that, in the passage of Republic VII immediately following the account of the virtues, Socrates ascribes the corruption of the soul to pleasure (519a7âb5). Referring to the petty soul of the evil, but skilled individuals, burdened with âleaden weightsâ (molubdides) â that is, the heavy psychic deformities resulting from a life devoted to the world of Becoming â Socrates points to the adverse effects of pleasures, in the sense that they are the cause of those weights which bend the vision of the soul downwards, thus forcing phronesis to serve evil. Socratesâ claims about the role of pleasures in damaging the soul are set forth within the framework of the relationship of the soulâs innate virtue to correct education: this encompasses both an early stage,28 which involves âgetting rid of psychic weightâ (molubdidas ⦠hon ⦠apallagen), resulting from pleasure-oriented ways of life,29 and a later stage, which involves orienting phronesis towards the things that are true30 â as opposed to those related to Becoming. These two stages in Socratesâ understanding of education involve the previous distinction between the ethical virtues â that is those acquired by habit and practices aimed at getting rid of the soulâs deformities â and the intellectual virtue of phronesis, which is not acquired, but which is oriented towards the good. The craft analogy argument in the Gorgias closely recalls Socratesâ stance in Republic VII on ethical virtues as being produced later in the soul and the paideutic commitment to eliminating evils, at least, if one considers that in sketching the figure of the good politician-orator at 504d5â4 Socrates describes his task in similar terms, namely as consisting of bringing justice and moderation into existence (gignetai; eggignetai)
Socratesâ views on paideia in Republic VII are mainly concerned with the supplementary education envisioned for selected guardians â in addition to the early education in gymnastics and music (521d13â522b4) described in Book II and III, which aimed to provide them with ethical virtues. This longer educational path (makrotera periodos, Resp. VI 504bâd9) is intended to select and train the future philosopher-kings of the city which is âwiseâ and âsound in judgmentâ (sophe kai euboulos, Resp. IV 428b12â13), whose philosophical paideia will enable them to attain the megiston mathema (Resp. VII 519c4âd2) by means of that periagoge of the soul which corresponds to true philosophy (521c1â8). It is worth noting that, in the Gorgias, Socrates is not talking about a Kallipolis ruled by philosophers, but rather about the real polis of Athens, a sick, swollen city, suffering from festering sores caused by generations of politicians who set up feasts for the Athenians and indulged all of their desires, with no moderation and justice (518e1â519b2). It is the sick city of Athens that Plato portrays through the character Callicles, who embodies and champions those âevil and skilledâ (poneroi-sophoi) individuals whose divine, innate virtue of phronesis is enslaved to limitless desires, and thus bound to serve evil ends. It is in opposition to Calliclesâ perilous paradigm of intelligent and brave leaders who lack in justice and moderation that Plato has Socrates resort to the craft analogy: its application to the case of the politician-orator in relation to the soul of the citizens draws our attention back to the ethical virtues rejected by Callicles, whilst avoiding conflict with a knowledge-based account of virtue, as evidenced not only by Socratesâ intellectualistic portrayal of the politician-orator, but also by a cognitive understanding of the concept of kosmos of the soul as relating to knowledge of geometrical equality â as emerges from Socratesâ remarks on his own recapitulatio, which I shall now discuss.
5 The Knowledge of Geometric Equality and the Relation of the Body with the Soul
Outside the narrow boundaries of the craft analogy argument, in which the wide spectrum of meanings of the term kosmos is narrowed down to âorderâ, intended as the correct arrangement of parts, both as a result of the comparison itself with houses, boats and bodies (Grg. 504a8âb3), and under the influence of its being paired with the term âstructureâ (taxis), Socrates sheds light on his understanding of kosmos as relating to the knowledge of geometric equality. In his closing remarks immediately following the depiction of the
Commenting on the results of his debate with Callicles, Socrates maintains that a life devoted to satisfying limitless, overgrown desires not only impedes individual happiness, in that it is an âevil without endâ (anenuton kakon), but is also the greatest obstacle to the âcommunionâ (koinonia), and therefore âfriendshipâ (philia), upon which individual happiness depends (507câe6).32 In order to support his claims about communion and friendship among citizens, Socrates resorts to the authority of âthe wiseâ (hoi sophoi):33 the wise
It is worth noting that the references to the evil without end of satisfying limitless desires, the misinterpretation of intemperance as the governing principle, the cognitive failure involved in championing a greater share, together with Socratesâ argument based on the authority of the wise men, take the reader back to Socratesâ first counter-attack to Calliclesâ hedonism, which starts with the limpid concision of the maxim âblessed are those who need nothingâ (οἱ Î¼Î·Î´ÎµÎ½á½¸Ï Î´ÎµÏμενοι εá½Î´Î±Î¯Î¼Î¿Î½ÎµÏ) and, through Euripidesâ verses âWho knows if being alive is really being dead, and being dead aliveâ (ÏÎ¯Ï Î´â οἶδεν εἰ Ïὸ ζá¿Î½ μÎν á¼ÏÏι καÏθανεá¿Î½, Ïὸ καÏθανεá¿Î½ δὲ ζá¿Î½, fr. 638 Kannicht = fr. 8 JouanâVan Looy â from
6 Different Accounts for Different Addressees: the Phaedo
Socratesâ perspective on Calliclesâ cognitive failure in the Gorgias should be considered in the light of the formerâs soul-oriented understanding of phronesis in the Phaedo. Here Socrates is called to account for his way of life, this time not in the political dimension of the polis, as in the Gorgias and the Apology, but within the circle of his companions. The motif of the body as a fatal obstacle to the cognitive life of the soul and its relationship to an intellectualistic conception of virtue (to which the application of geometrical proportion to ethical issues refers) is a topic that Socrates can only hint at in the Gorgias, due to his interlocutorâs reluctance to engage in philosophical dialogue. This idea is fully developed in the Phaedo instead, where, by contrast, it is the key argument upon which Socrates bases his defence of the philosophical life. In the Phaedo, Socrates fully develops the content of truth that he gleans from the simile of the âgraveâ (sema), in support of both the philosopherâs practice of death as a purification from the body and of his own stance on true virtue. The simile of the body as a grave in the Gorgias closely recalls Socratesâ viewpoint on the relationship between the body and the soul in the Phaedo, where the body is said to be an obstacle (empodios koinonos, lit. âa companion [standing] in the wayâ) for the soul in acquiring phronesis (65a10). This is because it perturbs the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom, whenever it is associated with it (Phd. 66a5â6). This perspective is confirmed by the discussion among the true philosophers, in which the body is said to be an âevilâ (kakon) which prevents them from acquiring âthe truthâ (to alethes): in fact, the needs, affections and desires of the body prevent them from thinking (phronein) â and thus prevent them from doing philosophy (Phd. 66b1âd3).39 On the basis
Only hinted at and left undeveloped in the agon with Callicles in the Gorgias, it is within the framework of the sunousia with Socratesâ companions in the Phaedo that Plato has Socrates fully assert the pre-eminence of the soul over the body, a stance from which the relationship of both soulâs proper life with the practice of dying and the relationship of phronesis to the true virtues is derived. From this point of view, what Sedley misinterprets as a âradical recasting of the intellectualistic modelâ of the unity of virtues in the Phaedo, after the alleged âtemporary abandonment of the intellectualistic accountâ in the Gorgias,43 only depends on the dialogical context of the Phaedo, where, on the basis of his interlocutorâs agreement to consider the body as an obstacle for the cognitive life of the soul, Socrates is able to develop a line of reasoning leading to an account of the virtues based on phronesis as the proper excellence of the soul, which must be set against any hedonistic-based understanding of virtue. Such an outright cognitive account of the virtues is possible only thanks to Simmiasâ initial assent to the premise that the body is an obstacle for the cognitive life of the soul, a stance which Socrates only indirectly hints at in the Gorgias, mainly through the example of foolish and uninitiated people in the leaky jars passage (493a5â494a5) and through the reference to the essential knowledge of geometric equality (507e6â508a8).
7 Closing Remarks
As I have tried to show, the absence of phronesis in Socratesâ account of the virtuous individual in the Gorgias is due to the dialogical context of the confrontation with Callicles, the Platonic Socratesâ sole encounter with a politician of the next generation in the whole corpus.44 As scholars increasingly tend to underline, the results that Platoâs Socrates achieves through his question-and-answer method depend on the dramatic and dialogical context, on his interlocutorâs intellectual development and ethical depth, and on the openness to discussion necessary for the Socratic method to achieve its full potential. The nature of Socratesâ investigations, whether aporetic or positive, thus varies in relation to the contexts and dispositions of the interlocutors. In the Gorgias, the joint enquiry which was possible in collaboration with the two Sicilian rhetoricians is broken off as the result of the entrance of Callicles, who expresses his strong beliefs according to the mode of the unphilosophical epideixis. Calliclesâ significant lack of openness to discussion during the following
Staging the failure of Socratesâ confrontation with the evil but skilled politicians of contemporary Athens, the Gorgias plays a key role in Platoâs literary and philosophical project built around the character of Socrates, representing the foil against which Plato conceives the Republic-Timaeus-Critias trilogy. For Socratesâ finest of all inquiries on the best way of life is only possible outside the physical and metaphorical city walls of Athensâ struggles.
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Tulli, Mauro. âIl Gorgia e la lira di Anfione.â In Gorgias â Menon: Selected Papers from the Seventh Symposium Platonicum, edited by Michael Erler and Luc Brisson, 72â77. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2007.
Vlastos, Gregory. Platonic Studies, 2nd print., with corrections. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
Woolf, Raphael. âCallicles and Socrates: Psychic (Dis)harmony in the Gorgias.â Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 18 (2000): 1â40.
As noted by Devin Stauffer, The Unity of Platoâs Gorgias: Rhetoric, Justice and the Philosophic Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3â6 and n. 8.
See the harsh criticism of Terence Irwin, which has exercised considerable influence: âThe Gorgias is a puzzling and unsatisfactory dialogue, because it attempts ambitious tasks with the inadequate resources of the Socratic theory [â¦] Plato eventually decides that these problems are too severe, and that the theory itself needs radical revision.â T. Irwin, Platoâs Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 131.
Erwin Sonderegger, âZur Funktion der Personenwechsels im Gorgias,â Museum Helveticum 69,2 (2012), shows how the four themes at the heart of the dialogue (rhetoric, the relationship between power and justice, the best conduct of life, the attitude toward death) traverse the dialogue well beyond the boundaries of the sections with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.
William H. Thompson, The Gorgias of Plato (London: Whittaker, 1871), IXâX.
David Sedley, âThe Unity of Virtue after the Protagoras,â in Unité et origine des vertus dans la philosophie ancienne, eds. Bernard Collette-DuÄiÄ and Sylvain Delcomminette (Bruxelles: Editions Ousia, 2014), 72â77.
For Callicles as an âespecially suitable interlocutorâ to pursue the truth on account of his âanti-conventional positionâ see Terence Irwin, Platoâs Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 102. See also Alex G. Long, Conversation and Self-Sufficiency in Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 42â45. On Callicles as a speaker in relation to Socratesâ reference to á¼ÏιÏÏήμη, εá½Î½Î¿Î¹Î±, and ÏαÏÏηÏία see Marina McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 103â106.
For Euripidesâ Antiope as a model for the Gorgias as Platoâs good-oriented tragedy see Mauro Tulli, âIl Gorgia e la lira di Anfione,â in Gorgias â Menon: Selected Papers from the Seventh Symposium Platonicum, eds. Michael Erler and Luc Brisson (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2007); Fritz-Gregor Herrmann, âPoetry in Platoâs Gorgias,â in Plato and the Poets, eds. Pierre Destrée and Fritz-Gregor Herrmann (Leiden: Brill, 2011), as well as Marie-Pierre Noël in this volume.
On Callicles being unable to define âthe betterâ see Jyl Gentzler, âThe Sophistic Cross-Examination of Callicles in the Gorgias,â Ancient Philosophy 15,1 (1995), and Stauffer, Unity, 99 and n. 17.
Charles H. Kahn, âDrama and Dialectic in Platoâs Gorgias,â Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983): 102, highlights a sudden shift in topic, from Calliclesâ stance on natural justice to the question of politiciansâ self-mastery. Yet the question raised here by Socrates is consistent with his interest in the finest of all possible inquiries concerning what a man ought to be like.
For the relationship between sophrosune and enkrateia see Louis-André Dorion, âEnkrateia and the Partition of the Soul in the Gorgias,â in Plato and the Divided Self, eds. Rachel Barney, Tad Brennan, and Charles Brittain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 38â52.
For self-control in relation to Socratic intellectualism in the Gorgias see John M. Cooper, âThe Gorgias and Irwinâs Socrates,â The Review of Metaphysics 35,3 (1982); John M. Cooper, âSocrates and Plato in Platoâs Gorgias,â in Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory, ed. John M. Cooper (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Christopher Rowe, âThe Moral Psychology of the Gorgias,â in Gorgias â Menon: Selected papers from the Seventh Symposium Platonicum, eds. Michael Erler and Luc Brisson (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2007).
For this section interpreted as a recapitulatio see Heinrich Lausberg, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft (München: M. Hueber, 1960), 434â437, 442, 671.
Terence Irwin sees politicians and citizens here to be related as shepherd and sheep or carpenter and wood, a relationship which, in his view, makes it âno longer obvious why a virtuous man with moral knowledge should teach the citizens the same knowledgeâ. T. Irwin, Plato: Gorgias, Translated with Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 214. On the craft analogy in relation to the craft of ruling see Richard Parry, Platoâs Craft of Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 11â73.
On which see the contribution by Frisbee Sheffield in this volume.
The absence of phronesis is foreshadowed by Socratesâ asymmetrical use of adjectives to describe the soul (507a5â7): the adjectives á¼ÏÏÏν and á¼ÎºÏλαÏÏÎ¿Ï used to describe the ÏÏ Ïá½´ κακή are not mirrored in the description of the ÏÏ Ïá½´ á¼Î³Î±Î¸Î®, where we only find ÏÏÏÏÏν, which should be understood as corresponding both to á¼ÎºÏλαÏÏÎ¿Ï and to the antonym of á¼ÏÏÏν, that is ÏÏÏνιμοÏ. The same opposition should be also identified in the water carriers myth, where κÏÏμιοι is opposed to both á¼Î½ÏηÏοι and á¼ÎºÏλαÏÏοι (493a5âd3); see David Blank, âThe Fate of the Ignorant in Platoâs âGorgiasâ,â Hermes 119,1 (1991). With regard to these asymmetric oppositions, Cooper, âSocrates and Plato,â 68, n. 59, notes that âthroughout Socratesâ discussion of the two lives wisdom (phronesis) is plainly implied as the origin of sophrosune in any soul.â
Thompson, Gorgias, IX.
Sedley, âUnity,â 72â77.
Sedley, âUnity,â 76, speaks of a âtemporary abandonment of intellectualist account of virtueâ, opposed to the intellectualistic model of virtue sketched in the Protagoras and the Phaedo.
On Socratesâ dogmatic tone after Calliclesâ withdrawal and its connection to the unusual context see Christopher Gill, âForm and Outcome of Argument in Platoâs Gorgias,â in Gorgias â Menon: Selected Papers from the Seventh Symposium Platonicum, eds. Michael Erler and Luc Brisson (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2007), 62â65.
The first argument, as Cooper correctly notes, is the jars analogy section. âIrwinâs Socrates,â 584.
For a fully intellectualistic reading of the reference to psychic order see Rowe, âPsychology,â 90â101.
For a similar use of the term see Empedocles B 135 D-K (= 121 Wright), and Sophocles, Antigone 450â455.
αἱ μὲν μÎÏÏι ἡδονá¿Ï, αá½Ïὸ ÏοῦÏο μÏνον ÏαÏαÏÎºÎµÏ Î¬Î¶Î¿Ï Ïαι, á¼Î³Î½Î¿Î¿á¿¦Ïαι δὲ Ïὸ βÎλÏιον καὶ Ïὸ Ïεá¿Ïον (Grg. 500b2â3).
Thomas Brickhouse and Nicolas Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 191â192, interpret this ÏÎÏνη as a âcraft of measurementâ.
With respect to the absence of phronesis from the list of virtues, Charles H. Kahn interprets virtue as the telos of the âmoral-political technÄâ, that is âthe good condition of the souls of those on whom the art is practicedâ: on this assumption he concludes that âit would obscure the teleological structure of this art if virtue, its product, was identified with knowledge or technÄ, the art itselfâ. Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 133.
On this section see Kenneth Dorter, The Transformation of Platoâs Republic (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 206â208.
James Adam notes that âPlato does not mean to deny that they are virtues, but they do not belong to soul essentially and from the first,â for Plato âis merely contrasting these and other virtues or excellencies with νÏηÏιÏ.â The Republic of Plato, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902), 99. On the account of phronesis in this passage in relation to Platoâs tripartite psychology see Rachana Kamtekar, âThe Powers of Platoâs Tripartite Psychology,â in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2009): 131â133; David Sedley, âSocratic Intellectualism in the Republicâs Central Digression,â in The Platonic Art of Philosophy, eds. George Boys-Stones, Dimitri El Murr, and Christopher Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 80â89; and Ivana Costa, âPlatonic Souls in the Cave: Are They Only Rational?â in Soul and Mind in Greek Thought: Psychological Issues in Plato and Aristotle, eds. Marcelo D. Boeri, Yasuhira Y. Kanayama, and Jorge Mittelmann (Cham: Springer, 2018), 142â150.
ÏοῦÏο μÎνÏοι, ἦν δâ á¼Î³Ï, Ïὸ Ïá¿Ï ÏοιαÏÏÎ·Ï ÏÏÏεÏÏ Îµá¼° á¼Îº ÏÎ±Î¹Î´á½¸Ï Îµá½Î¸á½ºÏ κοÏÏÏμενον ÏεÏιεκÏÏη Ïá½°Ï Ïá¿Ï γενÎÏεÏÏ ÏÏ Î³Î³ÎµÎ½Îµá¿Ï á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ Î¼Î¿Î»Ï Î²Î´Î¯Î´Î±Ï (Resp. VII 519a7âb1)
αἳ δὴ á¼Î´Ïδαá¿Ï Ïε καὶ ÏοιοÏÏÏν ἡδοναá¿Ï Ïε καὶ λιÏÎ½ÎµÎ¯Î±Î¹Ï ÏÏοÏÏÏ Îµá¿Ï γιγνÏμεναι ÏεÏικάÏÏ ÏÏÏÎÏÎ¿Ï Ïι Ïὴν Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï á½Ïιν (Resp. VII 519b1â3)
Ïὴν Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï á½Ïιν [â¦] εἰ [â¦] ÏεÏιεÏÏÏÎÏεÏο Îµá¼°Ï Ïá½° á¼Î»Î·Î¸á¿ (Resp. VII 519b3â4)
Louis-André Dorion claims that âalthough in the Gorgias Plato never explicitly asserts a bipartition of the soul into reason and desire, one can conclude nonetheless (in the light of 491d and 493aâb) that Plato envisages a bipartition of this sortâ. Dorion, âEnkrateia,â 41. See also Irwin, Ethics, 109 and 114. David Sedley, maintains, on the basis of 493a1âb3 and 496e6â8, that, in the Gorgias, Socrates introduces âan importantly new idea, that of psychic complexity: the soul is a complex entity which includes a distinct part containing potentially unruly desiresâ. Sedley, âUnity,â 72â73. Daniel Lopes believes that âthe discussion of temperance and intemperance between Socrates and Callicles contains features that evoke the treatment of the âpartâ of the soul in books IV, VIII and IX of the Republicâ. D. Lopes, âMoral Psychology in Platoâs Gorgias,â Journal of Ancient Philosophy 11,1 (2017): 30. See also George Klosko, âPersuasion and Moral Reform in Plato and Aristotle,â Revue Internationale de Philosophie vol. 47, no. 184,1 (1993): 34, and Raphael Woolf, âCallicles and Socrates: Psychic (Dis)harmony in the Gorgias,â Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 18 (2000), 30â31. Dodds contends, against Alfred Taylor, Plato, the Man and his Work (New York: L. MacVeagh, Dial Press, 1929), 120 n. 1, that the wise manâs formulation reported by Socrates Ïá¿Ï δὲ ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï ÏοῦÏο á¼Î½ ᾧ á¼ÏÎ¹Î¸Ï Î¼Î¯Î±Î¹ εἰÏὶ (493a3â4) implies no partition of the soul: âall that need be assumed is the popular distinction between reason and impulse [â¦] The tripartition first appears in the Republic, and the manner of its introduction at IV 435bâc strongly suggests that Plato devises it as a counterpart of the three classes in society.â Dodds, Gorgias, 300. See also Yuji Kurihara, âPlatoâs Conception of Unhappiness in the Gorgias,â Skepsis 13â14 (2002): 115.
For the role of friendship in Socratesâ conversation with Callicles see Woolf, âPsychic (Dis)harmony,â 9â17, and Tushar Irani, Plato on the Value of Philosophy: The Art of Argument in the Gorgias and Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 82â87.
On the Pythagorean milieu of the wise men see the discussion in Philip Sidney Horky, âWhen did Kosmos become the Kosmos?â in Cosmos in the Ancient World, ed. P. S. Horky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). The anonymity of the reference could be intentional: Plato may have merged together in a coherent new articulation heterogeneous elements of Presocratic origin, in order to point to the relation of cosmology and geometry to ethics â hence the difficulty in identifying a certain reference: see Walter Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism. Transl. Edwin L. Minar, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 78â79.
This is the geometrical progression as opposed to both numerical equality and arithmetical progression: see Dodds, Gorgias, 399â40; Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 195, n. 119; and Irwin, Gorgias, 226.
Burkert notes that Socratesâ reference to geometric proportion is not equivalent to the equality that distributes more to the greater and less to the lesser, to which the Athenian Stranger refers in the Laws (VI 757b7âc6), which âwould be scarcely appropriate to refute the pleonexia of Calliclesâ: in his opinion, the reference to geometrical equality âshould be understood in a more general sense, as ἡ Ïοῦ á¼´ÏÎ¿Ï á¼Î½Î±Î»Î¿Î³Î¯Î± in Archytas A23a â the power of mathematics that governs the worldâ. Pythagoreanism, 78, n. 156.
See Laura Carrara, Lâindovino Poliido. Eschilo, Le cretesi, Sofocle, Manteis, Euripide, Poliido (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2014), 326â33.
On the relation of á¼ÎºÎ¿Î»Î±Ïία with ignorance, and of ignorance with misery according to the wise manâs interpretation of the water carriersâ myth see Blank, âFate,â 22â36.
According to Olympiodorusâ understanding of the term: á¼ÏιÏÏίαν μὲν Ïá¿· μηδὲ ὠλÏÏ ÏαÏαδÎÏεÏθαι, λήθην δὲ Ïá¿· ÏαÏαδÎÏεÏθαι μὲν á¼ÏιλανθάνεÏθαι δΠ(In Plat. Gorg. 30,6 = p. 157, 18â20 Westerink). See Harold Tarrant, âLiteral and Deeper Meanings in Platonic Myths,â in Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths, eds. Catherine Collobert, Pierre Destrée, and Francisco J. Gonzales (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 55â56. For á¼ÏιÏÏία as âunreliabilityâ see Irwin, Gorgias, 492; Dodds, Gorgias, 303; and Cooper, âSocrates and Plato,â 60â61.
For Socratesâ treatment of desires in the Phaedo as only related to the body see George Boys-Stones, âPhaedo of Elis and Plato on the Soul,â Phronesis 49,1 (2004): 4â7.
Virtues are true virtues if and only if âtheir proper valueâ (Ïὸ νÏμιÏμα á½ÏθÏν) is defined by phronesis, μεÏá½° ÏÏονήÏεÏÏ, that is by the soulâs cognitive process in ζήÏηÏιÏ, without the body as an á¼Î¼ÏÏÎ´Î¹Î¿Ï ÎºÎ¿Î¹Î½ÏνÏÏ (Phd. 65a9âb1).
According to Christopher Rowe, Socrates âis here ascribing an unconscious hedonism to the many, as in Prot. (351bâ360e): they may think of themselves as employing other criteria of choice (the good, the fine), but in reality they measure everything by the single yardstick of what will maximise pleasure and minimise painâ. Plato: Phaedo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993), 149.
For the á¼ÏÏοÏÏνη of the body as cause of cognitive error see Chad Jorgenson, The Embodied Soul in Platoâs Later Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 42â47.
Sedley, âUnity,â 72 and 76.
It is no coincidence that Callicles is a young man whose identity has no definite grounding in historical reality. On the puzzle of Calliclesâ historicity see Debra Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 75â77.