In most cases of people actually talking to one another, human communication cannot be reduced to information. The message not only involves, it is, a relationship between speaker and hearer.1
Near the start of Platoâs Gorgias, Gorgias argues that rhetoric is an ethically neutral tool, which can be used justly or unjustly; those who teach the skill of persuasion are not to be blamed for the ends its serves (456dâ457c).2 As the dialogue proceeds, the relationship between persuasion and value becomes more intimate than this suggests and ethical concerns take centre stage.3 How value enters the account, though, is not entirely clear. A plausible thought is that speech is used to convey information, which has ethical content. Rhetoric in the law courts and the assembly (454b), or Socratic discussion about ethical terms, enables the sharing of insights and assists judgment about things such as justice (455a). Since the speech under consideration aims to persuade (453e), or to teach (453a5, 455a, 460a3â4), it communicates information in such a way that leads people to act on it, e.g. by building the walls of Athens, or its dockyards (456a); hence it produces great power for the speaker.4 This thought gives speech epistemic value and ethical value in virtue of its ability to inform behaviour; it does nothing to thwart the possibility that rhetoric is an ethically neutral tool, however. Here is a thought that might: as a relational practice, speech establishes relationships of various kinds â between the participants, within the souls of those who participate, and within a logos itself; those relationships exemplify value and are not, or not solely, an instrumental means to its acquisition. This paper explores that contention.
Gorgiasâ claim that rhetoric seeks âfreedom for oneself and control over othersâ, for example, exposes rhetoric as a relationship in which other persons are âenslavedâ to the speaker (452e1â8); as Dodds suggested, this conception of speech comes to fruition in Calliclesâ account of the strong man
2 Value in the World
One might wonder whether Socrates has a substantial normative framework in the Gorgias, which is exemplified in dialogue, as I propose; the refutational format makes it difficult to extract positive views.6 And yet, towards the end, Socrates presents a world-view.
T1: What the wise say is that heaven and earth and gods and men are bound together by community, friendship, orderliness, self-control and justice (κοινÏνία Ïιλία καὶ κοÏμιÏÏÎ·Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏÏÏοÏÏνη καὶ δικαιÏÏηÏ), and this is why my friend, they call the whole a world order, not a disorder or indiscipline. In your wisdom you pay no attention to these things, as far as I can see. You havenât realised that geometrical equality has great power
among gods and among men, and so you think you have to practise grabbing as much as you can. You should do more geometry. (507eâ508a)7
What is under consideration here is a âwholeâ, comprising many parts â heaven and earth, men and gods â âboundâ by five values into an orderly system (kosmos). This is presented as a model for emulation, looking towards which human beings can discern the value of order, and appreciation of which is gleaned from geometry.
Before exploring how these five values are both theorised and exemplified in the account of the ideal speaker, this framework needs to be clarified.8 No
To appreciate the sense in which the five values (koinonia, philia, kosmiotes, sophrosune, dikaiotes) are structural properties which bind the item in question into an organised whole, consider each in turn.13 Just before T1, Socrates applies this framework to an individual agent and to a community, as part of a larger argument against akolasia. Socrates argues that only if a soul is ordered can it be lawful (504d), of which the names are sophrosune and dikaiosune, and only if it is lawful can it enter into koinonia and philia (507e).14
T2: âSuch a person [who is disorderly] could be friend neither to any other human nor to god. He would be incapable of feeling any sense of community, and there can be no friendship (philia) for someone who has no sense of community (koinonia). (507dâe)
Here, then, the five values are, again, doing âbindingâ work, now in a community. The Protagoras deploys a similar idea, arguing that men were first âscattered in unitsâ, but formed communities, with shame and justice âas the principles of organisation of cities and the bonds of friendshipâ (322c). The Protagoras speaks of âshameâ, where the Gorgias has sophrosune, but the point is that men and gods will be no more than âscattered unitsâ or distinct parts, unless relationships are established between them to bring them into organisation and unity by these structural values.15
This view of koinonia as a structural property of a whole conceived of parts can also be seen in the Republic, which conceives of the city as a single subject composed of distinct parts whose relationship to one another is conceived in terms of their relationship to other parts, and to the larger whole they comprise together. Unity is achieved by fostering koinonia between elements in the city, something which requires the correct relationship between parts and whole. Just as a single person is composed of different elements â body and soul â ordered into a single system (eis mian suntaxin), so the city needs to be brought together as a suntaxis and a koinonia, where ruler and ruled stand in their proper relationships (V 462c9). Given the hierarchical relationship between citizens in the Republic, any equality between these parts must involve specifically proportional equality, which Plato explores in the Laws: âit [i.e. proportional equality] distributes more to the greater and less to the lesser, apportioning its gifts to the nature of each, greater privileges to those of more
Philia is also a structural relationship between distinct persons, or parts, which expresses equality. The Gorgias argues that there can be no friendship between those who are âmuch betterâ or âgreatly inferiorâ (510bâd), i.e. that there cannot be too much difference in status between friends, a thought retained in the Laws (VIII 837b).17 Philia obtains between citizens in a polis bound together by bonds of friendship (Resp. IV 424a2, V 449c5, IX 590c8âd6 and Laws I 639bâe, V 743c5â6), such that they can be brought in harmonious relationships, and within the soul itself (Resp. IV 442câ443d). A more abstract expression of the binding work of philia occurs in the Timaeus, where it structures relationships between different elements; the organisation of these parts by geometric proportion so that they cohere into kosmos is to the fore (32b8âc4). Both koinonia and philia are seen, then, and in a variety of contexts, to express structural relationships between distinct parts of some whole, brought into organisation and unity and governed by equality of a kind.
Orderliness (kosmiotes), the third value from T1, is also conceived as a relationship between parts organised into a unity. Socrates argues that various items are made better when they have a certain organization (taxis, Grg.
Of the five values from T1, sophrosune and dikaiosune, closely associated with orderliness (504d), remain. How sophrosune expresses orderliness is first explored on the level of soul: being oneâs own master, âruling the pleasures and desires within oneselfâ (491d). Since it is that state where distinct elements of the soul (ârulerâ, âpleasuresâ, âdesiresâ) are placed in their proper relationships to one another, which is determined by âwhich of the pleasures are better and worseâ (501b7, 503c), i.e. in a way that gives each their due, how these parts are âfitted together so that they âharmonise (harmottein) with each otherâ, may also instantiate proportionality (see Laws VI 757b on the relationship between proportional equality and âtrue justiceâ). Dikaiosune is likewise described in terms of a harmonious ordering of soul (Grg. 504d), and its application to the community again suggests that proportionality governs its operation: when distributing shares at a feast, justice does not obtain, as Callicles supposes, when the ruler takes more than their share, but when they have more than some and less than others and shares are distributed in accordance with what is best (490c6).18 In other words, the Gorgias suggests the view, developed in more detail in the Republic, that sophrosune and dikaiosune are structural properties, associated with order and harmony, and governed by proportionality.19
The omission of wisdom from this value system is puzzling.21 If the five values are structural properties, though, perhaps wisdom is absent because it is not so conceived (see Resp. IV 430e where sophrosune is said to be more like a sort of concord and attunement than wisdom and courage; see IV 431e). Structural values are to the fore because of Socratesâ pervasive concern here with the nature of wholes, which are replete with internal relationships that function better when their elements are âbound togetherâ into kosmos, or harmony.22 âIt is some order (kosmos tis) â the proper order for each of the things that are â which makes things good by coming to be present in itâ (Grg. 506e2â4). Why this concern is pertinent in a dialogue about speech becomes clear once we appreciate that crafting a logos involves composing âthe whole into a thing of order and systemâ (504a), and this crafting is directed towards persons, each of whom are subjects composed of distinct elements which may be in a state of order and harmony or not (504b5, 482bâc). Further, in order for the ideal speaker to achieve this aim (504dâe), appropriate relationships must also obtain between speakers, as we shall see. Given the various relationships involved in legein, I submit, priority is given to structural values that govern those relationships.
Given that appreciation of the binding work of these five structural values is placed under the single practice of geometry, it is not clear how the five values are distinct; this is the âstructuralâ equivalent of the question regarding the unity of the virtues in light of their relation to knowledge (where âstructureâ here takes the place of âknowledgeâ). While there is no obvious reason why two agents or items cannot simultaneously stand to each other in the relation of, say, justice and friendship, it seems impossible for them to stand simultaneously in two distinct geometrical relations. Socrates also mentions courage (507b) and claims that it, too, is dependent on structure: the same kosmos in the soul which is responsible for temperance is also manifested in Calliclesâ prized courage. This suggests that all the virtues (even piety, 507b) manifest the same geometrical relation; for if all Socrates means to say is that both temperance and courage are structural relations in the soul, without insisting that they are the same structure, then it would be possible to claim that they are two
Though some ideas compressed in T1 find fruition in the Timaeus, the passage is part of a dialectical encounter with Callicles, whose patience with such theorizing one suspects to be minimal.27 The beauty of this passage is that despite looking forward to ideas that find fuller expression in other Platonic works, it reworks ideas that Callicles put on the agenda. The dialectical force of the addition of koinonia and philia (507e) to the other values that have loomed large thus far is that these are values to which Callicles has shown the most affinity: he is part of a koinonia with a group of friends with whom he discusses philosophy (487c2). The laws and conventions of the city (484d) and affairs of human beings more broadly (d5â6) matter to Callicles, as does helping friends (philoi, 483b4, 486b); part of his defence of lawlessness is that the strong man can give gifts to friends (492c2â3).28 Socrates already appealed to Calliclesâ commitment to friendship and community in their first exchange, where instead of a private (idion) experience, he makes reference to a shared pathos (481c); the parallel with the community (koinonia) of pleasures and pains in
T3: I think it is better that my instrument should be discordant and out of tune, along with any chorus I may be responsible for putting on the stage â and that the greatest part of mankind should disagree with me and contradict me, than that I being one (hena onta), should be out of harmony with myself and contradict myself. (Grg. 482bâc)
Socrates claims that he is one (hena onta), and yet also a plural subject composed of distinct elements, like a lyre or a chorus, which may harmonise or not.32 From this consideration a normative claim is generated: since these diverse elements exist in one whole, they ought to be brought into harmony. This is an a fortiori argument; being out of tune with oneâs fellow chorus members or playing an out of tune instrument are obviously bad. It is surely worse to be out-of-tune with oneself. If you are completely out of tune with yourself, it might even become a question whether you are one; there might be a point when a chorus stops functioning as a chorus if each individual is singing a different song, or in a different key.
Why this is better is explained by the thought that in anything, its distinctive virtue comes to be present by some structure (taxis) and order (kosmos), which âmakes thing good by coming to be present in itâ (506e2â4). Though the context for T3 emphasizes harmony, or consistency of distinct beliefs (Calliclesâ inconsistent beliefs prompted this reflection), a richer account of psychic harmony is suggested by the relationship between psychic harmony and sophrosune at 504a ff., with the account of sophrosune as the ordering of pleasures and desires (491d10âe1, âruling over oneselfâ, heautou archonta). By this point, the account of harmony includes the symphonic work of three values of T1 (âorderlinessâ, âmoderationâ and âjusticeâ), and governs pleasures and desires,
4 Kosmos in Dialogue
The application of this framework to speech shows that it is not a value-neutral practice. Speech composed at random is contrasted with the skill of a craftsman who works with a view to the purpose of his craft (503dâ504a), ensuring that each part of what he makes is appropriate (prepon) and fitting (harmottein) to every other part, to establish order (taxis) and arrangement (kosmos). Consider, for example, where Socrates puts a head on the argument (505d1), without which the argument will be incomplete (μὴ Î³Î¬Ï Ïοι á¼Ïελῠγε Ïὸν λÏγον καÏαλίÏÏμεν, 505d6). By referring to a part of the logos as âa headâ in the Gorgias, Socrates shows his focus on the larger whole â the âbodyâ â of which this head is a part, which he desires, like other craftsmen, to bring to completion by fitting its parts together.34 This image of a logos as a living body composed of parts resurfaces in the Phaedrus, which shows a similar concern with compositional unity.35
T4: Every logos must be organised like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole. (Phdr. 264c) 36
The different elements of a logos constitute a unity if they are organised in relation to each other and to the larger whole of which they are parts. Conceived as such, legein is a relational practice, and it is the relationships involved in the operations of logos that are governed by the structural values of T1. These relationships take a variety of related forms: the logos you legein itself needs to be appropriately structured, where this is a matter of its internal content or form: âEach [craftsman] looks to his own particular job ⦠with the intention that the object he is making shall have a certain form ⦠Each one positions each thing he positions in some structure, until he has composed the whole into a thing of order and systemâ (503eâ504a), where this âobjectâ naturally refers to the structure of a logos. But then Socrates turns to those experts such as doctors, to argue that they order and attune the body (504a), just as the ideal speaker orders the soul (504dâe). So, the structuring involved in legein is both an internal matter (of the relationship between âhandsâ, âheadâ and âfeetâ in oneâs logos) and also concerns the intrapersonal, or internal, relationships within an interlocutorâs soul, towards which the ideal speaker aims (504dâe). Further, in order to foster harmony in an interlocutorâs soul (an ideal speakerâs aim, 504dâe), a speaker must also foster appropriate relationships between speakers, as we shall see. There is something intuitively plausible about this: for if harmony of soul requires consistent beliefs (482bâc, T3), then a logos must be structured in such a way that consistency in an interlocutorâs doxastic set can be appropriately tested, and for this to obtain the participants must be appropriately related to each other such that they are capable of participating in this enterprise; they must be capable of engaging in the shared, reciprocal, task of question and answer (hence the importance of koinonia and philia), following the proper âorderâ of discussion, and proceeding âjustlyâ and âmoderatelyâ in argument.
Consider how the five values from T1 are exemplified in discussion. This takes a distinctive form; dialegesthai is contrasted with epideixis (447c1â3), conceived
This communal enterprise is constituted by sharing, as each takes turns âasking and answering questionsâ (449bâc, 461a2). This requires equality in the distribution of discursive shares: no-one should take more than their share in discussion, as Polus is inclined to do (461d8â9); hence the fondness for brachulogia, attention to which is drawn repeatedly (449a1, 449b8, 449c1, 449c5, 449c7, 461d6, 462a4â5, 505e4â6). Though the distribution of the logos involves the division of equal shares, this is not governed by strict arithmetical equality; sometimes it is not just permitted, but required, to extend oneself into a makros logos, as Gorgias first suggests (449b9âc3) and Socrates endorses and demonstrates (465e1â6). If one of the parties does not understand and cannot make âuseâ of the answer (465e5), then a further share of the logos may be taken to explain; answers must be given their discursive due which is determined by the degree of use that can be made of them. This distribution of logos manifests proportional equality, elsewhere characterised as âtrue justiceâ
The importance of sharing, equality â and reciprocity both in the back and forth of question and answer and in taking turns as questioner and answerer (462a3â5) â explains a second characteristic of Socratic discussion, indicated by the prevalence of philein and cognate terms in discussion; for these are its key characteristics. Socrates professes friendship with all three interlocutors and frequently addresses them as friends (Polus: 465d, 466c7, 466d, 471a3, 473a3, 479d7; Gorgias: 487b1; Callicles: 500b6, 507a3, 519e3; see also 485e, 486a where Callicles professes friendship for Socrates). Dialogical relations, unlike Gorgianic rhetoric, are relations without domination, and friendship is the recognition each gives to the other as an equal, such that one will engage in reciprocal sharing.39 The dialogical relationship manifests the equality characteristic of friendship insofar as each takes their turn âasking and answering questionsâ, each is heard equally, and no less important, the worth and value of each participant, along with their proposals, is acknowledged.40 To treat someone as an inferior is to refuse to take them seriously, which inhibits philia (510c), no less than dialogue. Consider how friendship is invoked to establish equality when this is threatened. Polus sniggers at Socratesâ proposals, claiming that even a child could prove him wrong (470c5â6); Socrates resists by invoking friendship: âI should be most grateful to the child and equally to you, if you prove me wrong and rid me of some piece of nonsense. You are doing a favour to a friend (philon), so stick at it â prove me wrong.â (470c7â8). Callicles accuses Socrates of joking (481b6â7, 482c4) and treats him like a child; he does not take the argument seriously and shifts his ground, attempting to deceive him (499c2). This is something that Socrates did not expect, because he thought he was a friend (499c3â4). Further, when Socrates urges Callicles âin the name
Acknowledging the other as an equal is required to see them as worthy of reciprocation, which in this context means making a discursive return. When Socrates urges Callicles, for the second time to answer âin the name of friendshipâ this seems to refer to discharging the reciprocal obligations characteristic of friendship (519e3). Such reciprocity is how one shows the care and active support and assistance characteristic of friendship, something to which both Callicles (483b, 486b) and Socrates (487aâb, 508c, 509b) appeal.41 Socrates associates this care with telling each other the truth (487aâb), which will sometimes be shown by asking questions to test the proposal, as Socrates puts it to Polus (and later to Callicles, 506c1â3): you are doing a favour to a friend, âprove me wrong, and rid me of some piece of nonsenseâ.42 The goodwill (eunoia) of the discussants towards one another (487aâb) is what disposes them to receive it as such.43 Whether a speaker is acknowledged as an equal partner, towards whom one will reciprocate, relies on some degree of similarity and agreement between discussants, another hallmark of philia (510bâd).44 If there is not at least a similar orientation in the discussion, and agreement about the fundamental terms of their co-operation, then where there is disagreement, or refutation, the parties will âlose their tempers, and think the other is speaking out of malice, trying to win an argument rather than investigating the subject put forward for discussionâ (457câe). This dissolves communication, the opposite of that binding work of philia.
The third value from T1, âorderlinessâ (kosmiotes), is clear throughout. Remarks on method punctuate exchanges with all three speakers (Gorgias: 457c4â458e2; Polus: 471d3â472d1; Callicles: 486d2â488b). From the start, Socrates is emphatic that the argument must be completed âin an orderly wayâ (454c1â2 with Gorgias), and questions are put âin the right orderâ (463c3â6
Here, too, proportionality is in operation. When Socrates addresses the ti esti question first, he says he will not embark on a makros logos, but speak as the geometers do (hoi geometroi, 465bâc), introducing the following proportionalities: âas fashion is to training, so the skill of the sophist is to the science of the legislator, and as cookery is to medicine, so rhetoric is to justiceâ (465c1â3). These proportionalities introduce a structure of classifications which establish relationships between relevant âskillsâ to assist the definitional task.45 In a concluding remark, Socrates claims that the language of geometrical proportion is phusei (465c4), but orators and sophists get mixed up and fail to make relevant distinctions: everything becomes like Anaxagorasâs description of the original state of things before the world was created where âall things were togetherâ
This ordering of logos reveals its âuseâ (chreia). Just as a shoemaker works with materials and imposes form so that the function of a shoe is realised, so the speaker imposes form on the discussion so that its use or function can be realised.47 This is specified as follows: âThe good man who speaks with a view to the best (to beltiston), surely he wonât speak at random, but will look to something (pros ti). He will be like all other craftsmenâ (Grg. 503dâe). âAs he applies to souls the words he speaksâ, the good speaker will âalways have his mind on this (pros touto); to see that the souls of the citizens acquire justice and get rid of injustice, and that they acquire temperance and get rid of intemperance and that they acquire the rest of virtue and get rid of viceâ (504e, 503bâd, 515aâc, 516eâ517a). If the form of a logos is its shape and structure (given by the definitional enterprise), the pros ti is the establishment of structural relations (e.g. justice and moderation) within the listenerâs soul. The speaker has in mind both healthy relationships between different parts of the logos to maintain dialogical structure, and healthy internal relationships in the interlocutorâs soul (to establish the pros ti). The aim for the craftsman of logos is ultimately the crafting of souls in accordance with the model in T3.48
Like the model craftsman, Socrates brings about order by â[compelling] one thing to be appropriate and harmonise with anotherâ, one expression of which in logos is agreement, or consistency, between ideas.49 Socrates is attuned to whether things said by the speakers harmonise (sumphonein) with what was said previously (457e2, 461a2, with Gorgias; 480b4 with Polus; 482bâc with
Notice that Socrates is concerned not only to bring about order and harmony by ensuring that interlocutors stand in their appropriate relationships with one another; he is also concerned with how participants are related to their own selves, i.e. to their own desires and interests. This becomes important when appreciating how this craftsman of logos fosters not only harmonic logoi (482bâc), but also orderly desiderative states, that is, ruling over pleasures and desires (491d). To appreciate this, consider how the two remaining values from T1, dikaiosune and sophrosune, which the speaker aims to establish in soul, are exemplified discursively. When Socrates attends to Gorgiasâ account of rhetoric, for example, he checks that he has understood before checking whether it âharmonizesâ with things said before; Gorgias confirms: âYour belief is correct and your supposition justâ (dikaios, 451a). Socratesâ work as questioner is to scrutinise proposals; Gorgiasâ work is to answer, but each cannot do the work assigned to them if they â[snatch] at one anotherâs meaning on the basis of guessworkâ (454c1â5). The questioner must attend to âwhat they really meanâ when they offer a proposal (450c3â4, 451d9âe1, 453b5â7 with Gorgias; 462câ466a with Polus; 488b2âd3, 489d1â4, 508c3â5, 515b6â8 with Callicles), because it may be the case that âyour answer is correct and I donât understand your meaningâ (458e3â6). This underpins the importance of brachulogia (449a1, b8, c1, c5, c7, 461d6, 462a4â5, 505e4â6), which allows the questioner to âscrutinize more clearlyâ and enables a âjust reckoningâ (dikaion logon, 504e).50 Consider a third invocation of justice, after the refutation of Gorgias. When the argument has been made explicit and a contradiction exposed, Polus objects and is invited to âput them straightâ, which means âif anything has been agreed which was wrongly agreed, [he should] take back whatever [he] want[s] to
T5: Do not be unjust in your questions. It is the height of unreasonableness that a person who professes to care for moral goodness should be consistently unjust in discussion. I mean by injustice, in this connection, the behaviour of a man who does not take care to keep controversy (diatribas poiein) distinct from discussion (dialegesthai); a man who forgets that in controversy he may play about and trip up his opponents as often as he can, but that in discussion he must be serious, he must keep on helping his opponent to his feet again, and point out to him only those slips which are due to himself or to the intellectual society which he has previously frequented. If you observe this distinction, those who associate with you will blame themselves for their confusion and difficulties, not you. They will seek your company and think of you as their friend; but they will loathe themselves, and seek refuge from themselves in philosophy, in the hope that they might thereby become different people and be rid for ever of the men that they once were. (Tht. 167e1â168a6)51
If discussion aims at virtue, it must enable the interlocutor to realise errors as their own, rather than blaming the questioner. Hence the value of explicit argumentation, which determines whether the participants agree to each step, and allows them to retract statements, so that when a contradiction is exposed they take responsibility for it, rather than seeing themselves as âtied upâ and âmuzzledâ (as Polus does, Grg. 482e1â2) by the âbullyingâ questioner (505d4â5: Callicles). This âjustâ procedure also generates discursive norms for the interlocutor, too: each must say what they really think and not just what most people
This refutational activity is cast as a form of beneficial punishment (508b5â7, 480aâd); just as one must âpay the penaltyâ to a physical doctor for faults in the body, so one must pay the penalty to the elenctic doctor for faults in the soul when these are identified (478d6â7, 479a6âb1).52 This expression of justice is intimately related to sophrosune; an interlocutor may refuse to show moderation by conceding to the logos when required to do so. Socrates chastises Callicles, for example, for being unable to undergo the very thing the argument is about, namely the discipline that instils moderation (505c3â5). Desires can interfere when a speaker is âbattling it through, regardless of whether this makes it more pleasing or unpleasing to those listening to themâ (503a). As Socrates explained earlier: if such discussants disagree âthey lose their tempers, and think the other is speaking out of malice, trying to win an argument rather than investigating the subject put forward for discussion. Some of them end up parting in a way they should be thoroughly ashamed of, hurling abuse at one another, and exchanging the kind of remarks which make the bystanders annoyed as wellâ (457câe). Socrates considers it a greater good to be refuted than to refute (458a) and welcomes giving way to argumentative challenges (506a; see also Crito 48d8âe1), unlike Polus, who hurls abuse (461c4), calls Socrates âmonstrousâ and âshockingâ (467b), or Callicles, who loses his temper (506c1â2; see also 487d7 and 503d where Socrates urges Callicles to examine gently). This is a failure to keep within bounds in the discussion, by failing to restrain the impulse to speak and taking more than their discursive share to satisfy their desire for victory at all costs.53 When discussants participate as required, they are sometimes unwilling to concede to the superior logos, which thwarts the establishment of symphonic relationships in the logos, and gives their desires (for esteem or victory) undue expression, thus jeopardizing
All five values from T1, then, are exemplified discursively and perform âbindingâ work within the dialogue. This enables us to appreciate how the very practice of dialogue can foster the orderly states of soul which are its expressed aim. For when participants embark on the communal endeavour of dialogue, position themselves as equals and friends, share the logos in brachulogia, do their proper work and reciprocate, they are creating a structural arrangement between equals and exemplify koinonia and philia in so doing.58 When they follow the proper order of discussion, complete the argument âin an orderly wayâ (454c1â2 with Gorgias), and follow Socratesâ insistence that questions are put âin the right orderâ (463c3â6 with Polus; 494e3 with Callicles), on the
Though it might seem as if koinonia and philia govern interpersonal relationships between participants, kosmiotes governs internal relationship within the logos (as the craftsman applies shape and structure), and sophrosune and dikaiosune govern the intrapersonal relationships within the soul (the pros ti for the craftsman), there is in fact no neat division between the application of these values; they are operative at times in the giving and receiving of logos, and govern relations both between and within persons involved in the logos. Justice, for example, is ascribed to the logos where there is a âjust reckoningâ (dikaion logon) and to the behaviour of persons towards each other when they give and receive logos and make fair suppositions in so doing, and to relationships in their souls when they âpay the penaltyâ for error. Orderliness can be seen in the logos, and exemplified in the behaviour of the participants whenever they are capable of following an orderly argument, make concessions when required to do so, and pay the penalty for error; for sophrosune and dikaiosune are the names for orderly states of soul (504d). This slippage emphasizes that isomorphism between these seemingly distinct domains, each of which are subject to the same analysis, insofar as they involve disparate parts which are brought into taxis and kosmos by the operation of the five values. Since the values which govern the binding of wholes are conceived at a high level of generality and abstraction (as the reference to geometry at 508a suggests), this enables them to be expressed in several different kinds of entities wherever there is a differentiated âwholeâ bound by these values into unity. Relationality is operative in many domains, and one of these is speech.60
Sections 2â4 have argued that seemingly distinct domains (world, community, soul, logos) receive the same analysis. Speech is placed within this framework, because the various items involved function better when relationships between them are brought into taxis and kosmos. Appreciating how values are exemplified in the binding work of dialogue helps to explain why Socrates is so emphatic about the regulation of dialogue form: when adhered to properly, this fosters relationships of various kinds and expresses harmony and kosmos, in accordance with the model in T1. Further, if there are values exemplified in the very practice of dialogue, then this suggests that dialogue provides a model, by exemplification, of the values that form its end. This should lead to a reassessment of how this activity is related to its end, and where the value of communication resides.
Now, insofar as legein is a craft one would expect it to have a good product distinct from the activity. The other craftsmen Socrates mentions within his account of the ideal speaker â painters, builders and shipwrights, for example, make a painting, a house, a ship, where in each case the product is distinct from the activity. Just as the end of medicine is health, kosmos tis in the body, so the end of speaking is kosmos tis in soul (justice and sophrosune, 504d). This suggests that qua craft, legein (including dialogue), is instrumentally valuable for the sake of some product (a good soul) distinct from its exercise.61 Was Gorgias, then, right to suggest that legein is an ethically neutral tool (456dâ457c)? The analysis thus far has suggested that the relationship between the end product and the activity of crafting may be differently construed in the case of speech; for the exercise of the craft of legein not only causes a good end product (the removal of folly and the production of psychic health), it also exemplifies the values that it produces. In this respect it differs from the production of a house,
To support a broader conclusion, we need to pay equal attention to Gorgiasâ claim that rhetoric is a manifestation of power which enslaves (452dâe), and substantiate Doddsâ insight that âGorgiasâ teaching is the seed of which the Calliclean way of life is the poisonous fruit.â62 Rhetoric is based on a conception of the self as independent and self-interested, just like Calliclesâ superior man (483aâ484c). When one teaches students to engage in monological display (makrologia), one is teaching them to ignore the claims of the other party to an equal share, as Callicles urges (483bâd). When one overreaches in argument, or âsnatches at one anotherâs meaning on the basis of guessworkâ, one learns to treat others as inferiors whose contribution is beneath proper attention. When one refuses to make and respond to arguments, one is demonstrating that one sees no need to account for oneself to oneâs inferiors, which, again, comes to fruition in Calliclesâ disdain for the many.63 When one imposes oneâs view on others, one fails to consider oneâs own fallibility, and is giving oneâs own desires (for victory) free reign, as Callicles exhorts (491e8â9, 492a5, 492c4â5). Dominating others in speech is a way of gaining âfreedom for oneself and rule over othersâ (452d5â8, 452e4â8), the very model adopted by Calliclesâ superior person, who shows himself to be a ruler rather than the slave the many make him (484a2âb1).64 Gorgianic speech is seen as a competition (agonizein,
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Ursula K. E. Le Guin, âTelling is Listening,â in The Wave in the Mind: Talk and Essays on the Writer, the Reader, and the Imagination (Boston: Shambala, 2004), 187. I thank Seunghyun Angela Yeo for this reference.
See VladimÃr MikeÅ¡âs paper in this volume, especially pages 7â9.
Given the centrality of ethical concerns to this work (472c, 487e, 500c, 527c), the unity of the dialogue has been contested. On this issue, see Eric R. Dodds, Plato: Gorgias, Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 53.
This holds for Socratic speech, too; see 488a6âb1 where Socrates says that if one has agreed to something in argument, then one should be found acting in accordance with what has been agreed.
Dodds, Gorgias, 15: âGorgiasâ teaching is the seed of which the Calliclean way of life is the poisonous fruitâ.
Note that Socrates takes the role of both questioner and answerer in this work (e.g. 462b1â3), and the elenchus is deployed more constructively (on which, see Gregory Vlastos, âWas Polus Refuted?â, The American Journal of Philology 88,4 (1967): 454â60. The scholar who does most to articulate Socratesâ normative framework in the Gorgias is Raphael Woolf, âCallicles and Socrates: Psychic (Dis)harmony in Platoâs Gorgias,â Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 18 (2000).
Unless otherwise indicated all translations are from Tom Griffith and Malcolm Schofield, Plato: Gorgias, Menexenus, Protagoras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Identifying âthe wiseâ would help here. A natural referent is the Pythagoreans, who called the universe a kosmos and believed it was underpinned by mathematical laws (Aristoteles, Met. 986a2; Diogenes Laertius VIII 48 on Pythagoras). See Dodds, Gorgias, 337; William. K. C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 300; Malcolm Schofield, âPlato in his Time and Place,â in The Oxford Handbook of Plato, ed. G. Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 47; Sarah Ahbel-Rappe, âCross Examining Happiness in Platoâs Socratic Dialogues,â in Ancient Models of Mind: Studies in Divine and Human Rationality, ed. A. Nightingale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 41. Philip Sidney Horky, âWhen Did Kosmos Become the Kosmos?â in Cosmos in the Ancient World, ed. P. S. Horky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 32, identifies Philolaus as a likely candidate. See also Laura Rosella Schluderer, âThe World as Harmony: Philolausâ Metaphysics of Harmonic Structure and the Hierarchy of Living Beings,â Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 56 (2019). Another popular candidate has been Archytas. Carl Huffman, Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher and Mathematician King (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 208 compares Archytas Fragment 3: âOnce calculation (logismos) was discovered, it stopped discord and increased concord (homonoia). For people do not want more than their share (pleonexia) and equality (isotas) exists, once this has come into beingâ. But Huffman argues that âthe specific emphasis on the geometric mean in the [Gorgias] passage does not make much sense as a reference to Archytas fragment 3, where the geometric mean is not singled out.â The mention of logismos in Fragment 3, though, may relate this fragment to Archytasâ concern with the study of ratio and proportion, which he called logistike, a study concerned with the quantity of number and with what quantity numbers have in relation to one another; i.e. with the application of proportion (compare logistike at Gorgias 451c, which is concerned with âwhat amount the odd and the even have both in themselves and in respect to one anotherâ). âThe wiseâ could also include many Presocratics who saw equality as preserving the order of nature and securing cosmic justice, on which see Gregory Vlastos, âEquality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies,â in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, ed. D. Furley and R. E. Allen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 56â91. For philia as a cosmic power, Empedocles (B35) seems a precursor, with B26 which talks of things coming together by love (philia) into kosmos. Heraclitus B30 talks of kosmos (though whether this refers to âorderâ or to an âorderly worldâ is not clear; on which see Gregory Vlastos, Platoâs Universe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 6.
See Terence Irwin, Plato: Gorgias, Translated with Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1979), 226: âThe mere reference to geometrical equality leaves many unanswered questionsâ.
So, âgeometryâ here cannot be restricted to the plane geometry of Republic VII.
On which, see Dodds, Gorgias, 339â340. Compare Huffman who argues that the term âgeometrical equalityâ is probably not being used by Plato as a technical term; rather, it means âthe sort of equality that is studied by geometersâ but also the sort of equality that appears in politics in proportional distribution of goods and power. Huffman, Archytas, 209.
See Euclidâs account of equality in koinai ennoiai, Elements I: âThings fitting to one another (epharmozonta) are equal to one anotherâ.
I opt for âvalueâ rather than âvirtueâ in the absence of evidence that koinonia, philia or kosmiotes are virtues, strictly speaking, for Plato, though they are evidently conducive to them, as we shall see.
Compare Xenophonâs Memorabilia II 6: those subject to pleonexia and overpowered by appetites are incapable of friendship. See Republic I 351c: a group of thieves committing unjust actions cannot accomplish anything if they wrong one another, because âfactions [â¦] are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings agreement and friendship (homonoian kai philian)â. Compare the claim that tyrants cannot have friends, because their companions hate them (VIII 567bâ568a, 567d3). Lysis (214 ff.) suggests that wrongdoers are unsteady and unbalanced, and when a thing is unlike itself and variable (anomoion kai diaphoron) it cannot become like or friend to anything else; inconsistency doesnât lend itself to the favourable attitude.
As Christopher Taylor argues, shame is âvirtually synonymous with sophrosune, when the latter term is used in the sense of that soundness of mind which makes a man accept his proper role in society and pay due regard to the rights of othersâ. Plato: Protagoras (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 85. See also Charmides 160e and note the role that shame plays a role in community building in the Laws; on which, see Dan Lyons, âPlatoâs Attempt to Moralize Shame,â Philosophy 86, 337 (2011): 353â374.
As David Sedley argues: âHow Plato might envisage proportional equality at work in his ideal city can be glimpsed, albeit without the mathematics, by comparing the randomly equal distributions characteristic of a democracy, at VIII 558c, with the proportionate principles of distribution assumed at IV 433eâ434b.â D. Sedley, âPhilosophy, the Forms and the Art of Rulingâ, in Cambridge Companion to Platoâs Republic, ed. G. E. F. Ferrari (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 271, n. 24. Compare Isocrates, Areopagiticus 21ff who recognises two kinds of equality and commends that which does not treat all alike, but gives to each according to his deserts; see also Aristotle, Pol. V 1, 1302a6. Thanassis Samaras argues that âPlato there [in the Republic] employs geometrical equality in the sense that everyone receives from the state what is appropriate for him or her in correlation with his or her social role and contributionâ, though he concedes that âthe idea of this type of equality exists at the core of the dialogue. Despite this fact, it is [â¦] left underdevelopedâ. Samaras, Plato on Democracy (New York: Peter Lang, Oxford, 2002), 64. The mathematical disciplines also form a koinonia at Republic VII 531d. Since appreciation of the âcommunity and kinshipâ between these subjects contributes to âthe desired endâ, i.e. a grasp of the good, it has been argued by David Sedley that it is specifically grasping âthe mathematical principles of proportionalityâ that emphasizes this community, and contributes to the âdesired endâ, on the understanding that the Good itself is an ideal of proportionality. Sedley, âPhilosophy,â 270. The Gorgias (508a) is taken as a precursor to this idea (Sedley, âPhilosophy,â 270â1). For the metaphysical significance of koinonia, see Sophist on the âgreatest kindsâ (254b, 250b, 256b, 257a).
Ïίλον μÎν ÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±Î»Î¿á¿¦Î¼ÎµÎ½ ὠμοιον á½Î¼Î¿Î¯á¿³ καÏá¾½ á¼ÏεÏὴν καὶ á¼´Ïον á¼´Ïῳ. (âWe use the term friend, I take it, to indicate a relationship of a virtuous kind, between like and like, or of an equal with an equalâ, trans. T. Griffith)
Distributing shares at a âfeastâ was an image for koinonia, on which see Plutarchâs Quaestiones Convivales 2,10 with James Warren: âthe communal dinner is no mere analogue for the desired harmonious koinonia of the cityâ. J. Warren, âCommunity and Solidarity in Platoâs Republic and Stoicismâ (unpublished): 3. Warren also argues that: âPlutarch may also have been thinking of Plato Gorgias 490b1âd1 where Socrates begins to interrogate Calliclesâ preference for pleonexia by wondering whether food and drink ought to be distributed among a group of people âen koinoiâ so that the wiser and stronger people have more and the more foolish and weaker have less. But the verbal reminiscences point more strongly towards the Republic.â Ibid. 5, n. 5.
See Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, 300: âWhen kosmos is here related to crafts which produce their results by âmaking one part fit and harmonize with anotherâ, and to taxis, whose meaning is more closely restricted to orderly arrangement, it does seem here that we have an earlier adumbration of the doctrine, developed at length in the Republic, that the soul is a complex, and righteousness consists in a harmonious order and working together of its partsâ. For sophrosune and dikaiosune as kinds of attunement, see sophrosune at III 412a; see also IV 441eâ442a; dikaiosune at IV 443dâe, VII 522a.
Since the individual body-soul compound was likened to a koinonia, âorganised by the soulâ in Resp. V 462câd, perhaps the fifth value from T1 is suggested.
David Sedley argues that wisdom âforms no part of the value system that Socrates constructs in the Gorgiasâ. Sedley, âMyth, Punishment and Politics in the Gorgias,â in Platoâs Myths, ed. C. Partenie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 5. John M. Cooper notes this omission, but argues that âwisdom is plainly implied as the origin of sophrosune in any soulâ. Cooper, âSocrates and Plato in Platoâs Gorgias,â in Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory, ed. J. M. Cooper (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 68, n. 59.
Verity Harte, Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) argues that this structural view of composition is central to Platoâs view of wholes. Compare Raphael Woolf who argues that âwe have here a quite general theory of what it is for something to be good, and that is for that thing to have a harmonious and well-ordered structureâ, though he does not make much of T1. Woolf, âCallicles and Socrates,â 12.
Compare the account of intelligence, or nous as âthe truly good and bindingâ responsible for order in Socratesâ autobiography in the Phaedo; see also Philebus 28d5â29a4.
This may specify wisdom too narrowly for some, but see David Sedley on the importance of grasping âthe mathematical principles of proportionalityâ in the educational program of the Republic and its exercise by the craftsman in the Timaeus. Sedley, âPhilosophy,â 270 and 270, n. 24.
Compare Justin Gosling on the Republic: âthe whole trend is to assimilate value concepts to mathematical ones of measure and proportionâ. Gosling, Plato: The Arguments of the Philosophers (LondonâNew York: Routledge, 1973), 103. See Myles Burnyeat: âThe content of mathematics is a constitutive part of ethical understandingâ. Burnyeat, âPlato on Why Mathematics is Good for the Soul,â Proceedings of the British Academy 103 (2000): 6. Sedley argues that goodness is ideal proportionality and this is expressible in mathematical terms. âPhilosophy,â 270.
The psychology of the Republic provides support here insofar as it seems that there is only one proper structural relation between the soulâs parts, and yet all the virtues are in place. I thank Naly Thaler for comments on this paragraph.
Note the following parallels with the Timaeus. First, the study of the natural world provides objective grounds for ethical values. As Thomas Kjeller Johansen argues: âIt is a tenet of Platoâs thought that man is not alone in the universe with his moral concerns. Goodness is represented in the universe. We can therefore learn something about goodness by studying the cosmos. Cosmology teaches us how to lead our livesâ. Johansen, Platoâs Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1. In the Timaeus, the world is an object of worship (Tim. 27câd), which human beings strive to emulate; on which, see Sarah Broadie, Nature and Divinity in Platoâs Timaeus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 173â174. Second, one of the ways in which we appreciate the order of the world is by appreciating the proportionality that brings the different elements of the universe into friendship: â⦠these four particular constituents [i.e. earth, water, air, and fire] were used to beget the body of the world, coming into agreement through proportion (diâanalogias homologesan). They bestowed friendship (philia) upon it, so that, having come together into a unity with itself, it could not be undone by anyone but the one who had bound it togetherâ (Tim. 32b8âc4). There is a geometrical bond in the body of the universe, which establishes an equal and harmonious relation between the elements such that they will âall of necessity turn out to have the same relationship to each otherâ and will âall be unified (hen)â despite their difference. Third, the Demiurge was able to fulfil his plan of intelligent ordering (apotelei, Tim. 56c6) and bestow the order, which the Gorgias describes as characteristic of craftsmanship (504 ff.), by introducing âas much proportionality into them and in as many waysâ (Tim. 69b2â5).
Noted by Roger Duncan, âPhilia in the Gorgias,â Apeiron 8, 1 (1974): 23 and Woolf, âCallicles and Socrates,â 6, 10.
As Duncan argues: âIn going on to assign a cosmic role for philia, Socrates relates the spectacle of the divided Callicles to the nature/convention dichotomy, so crucial to Calliclesâ world picture. Philia, Socrates tells us, is naturalâ. âPhilia,â 23â4.
W. K. C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 300.
That Socrates does engage Callicles successfully is clear from their most productive exchange that follows (509c ff.); on which, see Malcolm Schofield, âCalliclesâ return: Gorgias 509â522 reconsidered,â Philosophie Antique 17 (2017): 7â30.
The notion of the soul as a lyre in harmony may recall Pythagorean themes explored earlier (n.8), particularly those of Philolaus, as well as the intertwining of soul-harmonia-lyre in Simmiasâ objection in the Phaedo. I thank Gábor Betegh for this point.
This need not require the view that there is an explicit division of the soul into parts in the Gorgias (though for suggestive references to psychic complexity, see 493a1âb3 and 496e6â8); all it requires is, at least, the thought that there are distinct beliefs in an agentâs soul which need to be âharmonisedâ (481bâ482c), and âpleasuresâ and âdesiresâ which require governance by âreasonâ (491d10âe1). How these pleasures and desires are conceived, and what relationship they have to reason is a further question, on which see Gabriella Roxanne Carone, âCalculating Machines or Leaky Jars: The Moral Psychology of Platoâs Gorgias,â Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26 (2004).
Compare the concern that the argument will be unfinished with the workings of that master craftsman from the Timaeus who was able to fulfil his plan of intelligent ordering (apotelei, 56c6). See Republic VII 530e where philosophers must guard against any study that lacks purpose or completion (ateles).
Richard Hunter calls Plato âthe first surviving theorist of literary unityâ: âPlatoâs analogy of a written work to a living creature, composed of individual parts of which each has its own function, but which also contribute to a single whole, may go back to sophistic discussion in the 5th century BCE (see Gorgias, Helen 18), and it develops Presocratic and medical ideas about the relation between health and a balanced mixture of diverse elements. It is this analogy that helps to explain the important links between ordering, appropriateness, and âunityâ, links which give the pursuit of unity an ethical function, as well as a simply artistic one.â Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd edition, under âPoetic Unityâ, eds. S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
ÏάνÏα λÏγον á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ Î¶á¿·Î¿Î½ ÏÏ Î½ÎµÏÏάναι Ïῶμά Ïι á¼ÏονÏα αá½Ïὸν αá½Ïοῦ, á½¥ÏÏε μήÏε á¼ÎºÎÏαλον εἶναι μήÏε á¼ÏÎ¿Ï Î½, á¼Î»Î»á½° μÎÏα Ïε á¼Ïειν καὶ á¼ÎºÏα, ÏÏÎÏονÏα á¼Î»Î»Î®Î»Î¿Î¹Ï καὶ Ïá¿· ὠλῳ γεγÏαμμÎνα.
Compare the statue image in the Republic IV 420câd where there is a similar emphasis on the painterâs ability to perceive overall unity, i.e. how the parts of his creation are arranged within a whole.
I take the phrase from Michael Frede who argues that the public character of dialogue enables a degree of rationality âwhich is not guaranteed when the soul is left to discourse with itselfâ. M. Frede, âPlatoâs Arguments and the Dialogue Form,â Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume (1992): 218.
This helps to deal with the objection that Socrates himself sometimes delivers long speeches (e.g. the pastry-baking analogy at 464bâ465d, the critique of Themistocles and Pericles at 517bâ519d, and the myth at the end of the dialogue at 523aâ527c); insofar as a long speech promotes understanding, it is permissible (465e4â466a2). See Tushar Iraniâs paper in this volume, especially pages 90â91.
That equality is a factor in the Gorgiasâ conception of friendship can be seen at 510c ff. The maxim âEquality is friendshipâ is referred to in the Laws VI 757a6; Aristotle reports the saying that âfriendship is equalityâ in Nicomachean Ethics VIII 8, 1168b8.
Socrates encourages interlocutors to refute him (Polus: 467a8âb2, 469c8, 473b7; Callicles 482b2, 506c1â3, 508a8âb3 and 505e4â506a7); he does not subject others to anything he is not prepared to undergo himself.
Callicles associates philia with care (kedesthai) at 483b4 and 487a6âb1; Socrates associates philia with care (kedesthai) for that of which one is philon at 487aâb. See Resp. III 412d2â7.
Compare the Apology where Socrates acts towards citizens as philoi (31b4) and confers upon each citizen individually what he regards as the greatest benefit (36c3â4), being a refutational gadfly.
Compare Laws IV 722eâ723a: âIt seems clear to me that the reason why the legislator gave that entire persuasive speech was to make the person to whom he promulgates his law accept his command in a well-disposed frame of mind (eumenos) and with a corresponding readiness to learn (eumathesteron)â.
Equality implies similarity and belongs to the same semantic field, see Laws VIII 836e5â837d8 (isos te kai homoios). Aristotle argues that friendship is a type of equality and likeness, and philoi need to be alike because this enables reciprocity between them (Eth. Nic. VIII 13, 1162bâ1163a).
Aristotle comments on the use of proportion in developing definitions (Top. I 17, 108a7), where the ability to recognize likeness in things of different genera is central. âWind-lessnessâ and âcalm-on-the-oceanâ are recognized as alike, and this likeness is expressed in the following proportion: as nenemia is to the air so galene is to the sea. The use of proportionality in definitions is something with possible Archytean precedent, on which see Huffman, Archytas, who argues that this would explain a reference to Archytas at Rhetoric III 11, 1412a9â17, where Archytas is praised for his ability to see similarity in things which differ. The definitions of an altar and an arbitrator appeal to their common functions as a refuge, while recognizing the different context and way in which this function is carried out. For doubts about this reconstruction of Archytasâ theory, see Malcolm Schofield, âArchytas,â in A History of Pythagoreanism, ed. C. A. Huffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 80.
See T. K. Johansen on how proportionality operates in the logos of the Timaeus, to imitate cosmic proportionality: âA proportionate account of the cosmos itself instantiates the order and relative importance of the parts of the cosmosâ. More specifically, âproportionality of speech is expressed both in the relative size of the parts of the speech and in the order in which they comeâ. Johansen, Platoâs Natural Philosophy, 190â192.
Since form is that principle which organises parts into a functioning whole, so that its distinctive good can be realised (506dâe), this suggests that the imposition of form is associated with that arrangement that allows it to be a good object of its kind. This is not a conception of eidos in the sense of how something looks, then, but is concerned with functionality; to work out somethingâs form one needs to know what it is for. One need not be a philosopher to do this; see the ideal âuserâ in Republic X.
For Socratesâ aim as the improvement of souls, see 475d5âe1, 522b2âc2.
The logical relationship suggested by âharmonyâ is debated, on which see Dominic Bailey, âLogic and Music in Platoâs Phaedo,â Phronesis 50, 2 (2005). Compare Philebus 23câ27b on the harmonic nature of dialectical inquiry.
See Prot. 329aâb, 334câ338e, esp. 335b on brachulogia as âδιαλÎγεÏθαι ÏÌÏ ÎµÌγÏÌ Î´Ïναμαι á¼ÌÏεÏθαιâ with âin order to scrutinize more clearlyâ (352a); see Charm. 166d; Hip. Min. 364bâc; Resp. I 348aâb; Soph. 217câ218a.
Translation by M. J. Levett (revised by Myles Burnyeat).
Compare Jessica Moss, âThe Doctor and the Pastry Chef: Pleasure and Persuasion in Platoâs Gorgias,â Ancient Philosophy 27,2 (2007): 234, who argues that âdialectic is the craft of justiceâ.
Though Gorgias and Polus want to be able to say as much as they like (461d8â9), Socrates urges both men to watch over/guard their condition (phulattein, 461d4), which recalls the notion of âruling over oneselfâ as a characterisation of sophrosune (491d).
Compare the Theaetetus: after Theaetetus has acknowledged the inferiority of all three proposals, the result is that Theaetetus in turn will become more moderate and gentle in argument (ἡμεÏÏÏεÏÎ¿Ï ÏÏÏÏÏνÏÏ Î¿á½Îº οἰÏÎ¼ÎµÎ½Î¿Ï Îµá¼°Î´Îναι ἠμὴ οἶÏθα, 210c). See also Soph. 230b4âe3.
Charm. 160e: âtemperance makes men ashamed or bashful, and temperance is the same as modestyâ.
Where it is a breach of social norms, this can foster koinonia; as Aristotle puts it, âshame dwells in the eyes of othersâ (Rh. II 6, 1384a18). In experiencing this one sees oneself to be embedded in a community (koinonia), however individualistic one supposes oneself, like Callicles, to be. On shame as a social emotion, see Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 102.
Jessica Moss, âShame, Pleasure and the Divided Soul,â Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 29 (2005): 152. Compare Richard McKim, âShame and Truth in Platoâs Gorgias,â in Platonic Writing, Platonic Readings, ed. C. Griswold (New York: Routledge, 1998), 34â48, and Christina Tarnopolsky, âShame and Rhetoric in Platoâs Gorgias,â in Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: Platoâs Gorgias and the Politics of Shame, ed. C. Tarnapolsky (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 29â55.
The relationship between justice and equality was strong in Greek thought. In Platoâs Republic, Glaucon relates popular justice to equality and juxtaposes this with injustice and pleonexia (II 359c3â6). In Aristotleâs discussion of distributive justice in Eth. Nic. V 3, 1131a13â4 he writes âif, then the unjust is unequal, the just is equal, as all men suppose it to be, even apart from argumentâ (see also Pol. III 9). As Gregory Vlastos argues, âthe linguistic bond of justice with equality was even closer for the Greeks than it is for us: Ïὸ á¼´Ïον, á¼°ÏÏÏηÏ, would be the very words to which they would turn for a natural, unstrained, one-word variant for Ïὸ δίκαιον, δικαιοÏÏνηâ. Vlastos, âPlatoâs Theory of Social Justice,â 18â19.
Compare Ahbel-Rappe, who argues that âthere is an ethical dimension to the practice of the elenchusâ. âHappiness,â 43. And Mary Margaret McCabe: âDialegesthai has normative force ⦠it is a matter of moral character, tooâ. âIs Dialectic as Dialectic does? The virtue of philosophical conversation,â in The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics, ed. B. Reis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 72, n. 6.
As Burnyeat argues: âPlato finds concord and attunement in many different media. Not only in music, but also in the social order of the ideal city, in the psychic structure of a virtuous individual, and more broadly still, when he is doing physics in the Timaeus, throughout the cosmos.â (âMathematics,â 56). Compare Cratylus 404eâ406a where Socrates claims that Apollo, the god of harmony, makes all things move together by a harmonious power, whether in the harmony of a song or the poles of heaven (music, prophecy, medicine and archery are brought under his remit); see also Symposium 186aâ188e for the medical expression of harmony. See Edward A. Lippman, âHellenic Conceptions of Harmony,â Journal of the American Musicological Society 16,1 (1963). Since the five values of T1 enable harmony and kosmos, it is crucial to note that though values such as koinonia and philia seem most properly to have interpersonal expression, these need not do so, for Plato. Consider the Sophist (253d5âe2) where the stranger lists four kinds of relations (koinonia) of forms (ideai). For philia compare the Timaeus (32c), where the elements of the universe are bound together in philia, just as elements of the soul in the Republic (IV 430e6â12) manifest philia, as well as justice and sophrosune in their orderly arrangement.
See Irwin, Gorgias, 223: âa craft is instrumentally valuable for the sake of some product distinct from its exerciseâ.
Dodds, Gorgias, 15. Compare J. Doyle on the relationship between extended speechmaking and an outlook focused on power and self-interest. Doyle, âThe Fundamental Conflict in Platoâs Gorgias,â Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 30 (2006): 92.
Gorgiasâ use of ochlos to refer to gatherings in law court, assembly and boule (454eâ459b) suggests such disdain, since as Joshua Ober has argued, ancient sources describe the citizen gatherings as the mass (to plethos) or the many (hoi polloi); the mob (ho ochlos) was insulting. See Joshua Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 11.
Translation of 452d5â8 is adapted from Irwin, Gorgias, but some translations take it that rhetoric is a cause of âfreedom for human beings themselvesâ, where this refers to citizens generally. Given the coupling of this freedom with rule over others, and the mention of enslaving other craft practitioners (452e4â8, 456a7âc7), it becomes clear that the individual rhetorician seeks to dominate.
As J. Austin argued in How to Do Things with Words (1965), speech is also performative, not just descriptive, which enables speakers to do things in the world â here, to foster a way of life between participants. I am not using âperformativeâ in the precise Austinian sense, however.
The full quote is from Dodds, Gorgias, 10: âPlato never doubted that the spoken word could âchange the souls of manââ. Warm thanks to the participants of the 2019 Plato conference on the Gorgias in Prague and to Gábor Betegh, Naly Thaler, James Warren and VladimÃr MikeÅ¡ for written comments on this paper.