1 Africa’s Regional Governance Initiative: The African Governance Architecture
Since 2000, Africa’s regional governance architecture has been evolving, with a more coherent picture only emerging after 2010 when the African Union (AU) resolved to establish the African Governance Architecture (AGA) as the pan-African platform to promote good governance, democracy, and respect for human rights (see Yearbook on the African Union 2000, 85f.). The AGA draws inspiration from the Constitutive Act of the African Union (OAU 2000), which expresses the organisation’s determination to ‘promote and protect human and people’s rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture and ensure good governance and the rule of law’ (ibid., §3[h]). The AGA is aligned with the AU’s continental development blueprint – Agenda 2063 – specifically with Aspiration 3, which identifies the region as ‘An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law’ (African Union 2015, 5).
The AGA brings together all the stakeholders with a mandate to promote good governance and strengthen democracy in Africa – member states, AU bureaus, civil society organisations (CSO s), development partners – by coordinating the implementation of the AU’s shared values agenda and tracking compliance with the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG, African Union 2007). The ACDEG is the major legal framework specifying the normative commitments to democratic governance and integrity of the AU member states. Through supportive joint engagement in strategic interventions, the coordination of interdepartmental efforts towards preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa, the AGA is slowly and painstakingly becoming the driving agent for democratic change on the continent (see Yearbook on the African Union 2000, 86f.).
The AGA’s activities and objectives are operationalised through the African Governance Platform (AGP) members who meet annually and agree on joint flagship initiatives as outlined in the AGA road map. The AGP is composed of the AU Commission (AUC), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Pan-African
2 Dominant Actors in the Governance Realm
In 2021, the APRM, a voluntary instrument for self-monitoring by participating member governments, rose to prominence in steering regional governance work (of note, however, is the fact that not all AU member states are members of the APRM). The background for this meteoric rise was set in 2017 when the 28th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30–31 January) tasked that the institution with being the lead agency for tracking member states’ implementation of the ACDEG (see Yearbook on the African Union 2000, 89–91). The expanded mandate also included monitoring progress on Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG s) as well as producing the Africa Governance Report (AGR).
Under the leadership of Prof Edward ‘Eddi’ Maloka, the APRM Continental Secretariat (Midrand, South Africa) has been turned around within a short period. In the last five years, a reactivation of the organ has been successful, and the expanded mandates of the APRM by the AU Assembly show the confidence in his steering. The amount of work covered by the organ is unprecedented as the unit now shoulders the production of most continental reports, including the Agenda 2063 Continental Report, the AGR, country review reports, and periodic update reports of Africa’s credit rating. The new emphasis on knowledge production by the APRM points to a shift in the use of empirical evidence in the designing of governance strategies and programmes.
3 Key Developments
The APRM led the production of the biennial publication of the AGR in 2021 and the national governance reports of reviewed states. There were broad consultations across the AGP for the second report to be produced by an AU organ in 2021.1 The AGR report, titled ‘African Governance Futures for the Africa We Want’ (APRM 2021), was finalised at the end of 2021 and raised red flags of where Africa is headed should it continue to neglect needed governance reforms. The AGR assessment of the state of governance in APRM member states is produced through cooperation and collaboration between the APRM and AGP members. The report emphasised four scenarios for Africa in 2063: the Baseline Scenario refers to a more integrated continent, including diaspora communities, and greater connectivity among the citizens who are supported by efficient governance; the Utopian Scenario – Africa Thriving is a continuation of current governance and socioeconomic systems, including some technological developments and enhanced regional unification; the Dystopian
The APRM soldiered on with plans for the country peer reviews and successfully concluded four reviews in Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, and South Africa during the course of the year in spite of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. Among these four countries, Nigeria and South Africa conducted the second country reviews, while Niger and Namibia had their first reviews. The APRM also conducted targeted reviews in 2021 of Uganda and Kenya. The Uganda Targeted Review Mission took place in October 2021 and focused on three thematic clusters, namely underdevelopment of agriculture, unresponsive civil service, and underdevelopment of infrastructure (APRM 2022, 3). The Kenya Targeted Review Mission took place in November and December 2021 and focused on the ‘Big 4 Agenda’ – covering key issues in four broad sectors: affordable housing, expansion of manufacturing, food security and nutrition, and affordable healthcare – as well as salient cross-cutting issues, including corruption, gender inequality, youth unemployment, and diversity management. The targeted reviews were in response to requests by the two member states.
For South Africa, the APRM National Governing Council (NGC) and the Country Review Mission conducted provincial consultations for the second country review process of the country between 6 and 22 December. These consultations led to the production of the Country’s Self-Assessment Report (CSAR) at the end of December 2021.2
The South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA) was very proactive in supporting CSO s in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region (South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe) to contribute to the
The Botswana Council for Non-Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO) partnered with a regional organisation and arranged for local civil society organisations to make submissions regarding 12 priority key governance issues in Botswana.3 Supported by SAIIA, the Botswana APRM Popular Sensitisation Project created public awareness on the APRM in the country and launched its own report in April 2021.
The APRM seems to be gaining more traction with CSO s in many countries as there is more enthusiasm to join the country review process. The process is very complex and requires expertise across the themes targeted for review. Governments continue to lag behind in mobilising this capacity and remain rather reluctant to rely on CSO s. Such collaboration, however, would hasten the quick turnaround in conducting the country reviews. Up until now, 23 countries have undergone the APRM country review process. Of the 41 countries that are now APRM members, the following are yet to undertake the very first country reviews: Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Malawi, Mauritania, Seychelles, Togo, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe.
In line with the Kagame reforms (see Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 3), the integrative approach to security and governance was finally achieved when the AU positioned itself as a key governance actor in the region through the newly established Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The PAPS merger of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the AGA is now under a new administrative structure in the AUC that is led by a new cohort of commissioners appointed in February 2021. The merger is supposed to result in a more coordinated management under one PAPS commissioner, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye. The new unit has two directors: one for conflict management, and another one for governance and conflict prevention. The rest of the administrative structures and other logistical arrangements is still falling into place; PAPS now has a total headcount of 111 positions (56 staff
Due to the nature of the merged governance and security tasks, the institutional development of PAPS dominated the rest of 2021, and cultivating a new organisational culture centred on governance will take years to develop. However, some system integration has been faster in some areas of work. For instance, a noticeable change is the integration of early warning and governance monitoring into different regional desks, which could increase the potential for quick collaboration and information-sharing (but also see Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 3). Challenges around structuring will dominate management issues for the foreseeable future as there are concerns regarding the new location of some units. For example, the location of the desks for early warning and governance monitoring in the Directorate for Conflict Management rather than the Directorate for Governance and Conflict Prevention4 signals a subtle continuation of previous operational modalities in silos, yet these desks should inform the conflict prevention efforts of both directorates.
At the REC level, in May and June 2021, the Pan-African Parliament – the legislative body of the AU that was formed in response to the calls of the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the 1999 Sirte Declaration for a body that would ensure the inclusion of Africa’s citizens in the development of the continent – spent time quibbling over the procedures for the nomination of a parliamentary president for the next five years.5 Disagreements on the election modalities have plagued the organ for some years, and the AU Executive Council noted in October that the election of the PAP president and four vice presidents should follow the AU’s regional rotation principle. These problems took place against a background of deep-rooted corruption practices, impartiality, and maladministration. The AU established a commission to conduct a PAP fact-finding mission in September, and the team also flagged similar challenges that had been picked up by an earlier audit report.6 The PAP has struggled to comply with the 2001 protocol that established it, which stated that each of the five regions must have a chance to lead the institution. The PAP was thus instructed to restrict presidential election candidates to regions that have not held the position, leaving Southern and North Africa as the only legitimate contestants. A loss of autonomy was noted when the AU Executive Council ordered in October 2021 that the forthcoming elections be run by the AU’s Office of the
The PAP is clearly aggrieved by its failure to get the legal recognition emanating from the 2014 Malabo Protocol, which gives the PAP greater legislative powers (see African Union 2014). Eight years later, only 12 of the 28 needed AU member states have ratified the protocol. It is proving difficult to get the 16 needed for enforcement of the protocol. Many of PAP’s 235 parliamentarians did not win their seats in free and fair elections, which further complicates relations among members of diverse political backgrounds and the quest for the body’s legitimacy. Tendencies towards inward servicing of the PAP divert attention away from the key business of the institution.
The 10th High-Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance was held on 2–9 December 2021 (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) as part of the annual AGP projects. The high-level dialogues are an open space where state and non-state actors meet to discuss regional policies and progress on democratic governance, human rights, and peace within the AU frameworks.7 In 2021, the themes covered developments in the state of governance, democracy, and peace in the region. A new emphasis was on reshaping the African renaissance concept to acknowledge the region’s historical context, the contemporary democratic governance landscape, and the normative and legal frameworks on democratisation and governance. The dialogue attempts to give insights into road maps and opportunities for both state and non-state actors to design requisite national level interventions.
In line with the AGA’s inclusion policies, regional-wide youth consultations and a gender pre-forum deliberated on the enhancement of their incorporation into the policy and implementation levels before the 10th High-Level Dialogue. All the discussions were held under the AU’s theme of the year, ‘Arts, Culture and Heritage: Levers for Building the African We Want’. This theme opened up opportunities for embracing diversity and the repositioning of women in politics and society while increasing their presence and roles in leadership and decision-making. Member states, the REC s, the AGP, and pan-African cultural institutions were urged to work together to utilise these spaces for collaboration and dialogue. The AU used this space to acknowledge youth agency in the region and encouraged intergenerational
Due to the slow pace of ratification, AU member states were called on to ratify the 2006 Charter for African Cultural Renaissance and the Statute of the African Audio-Visual and Cinema Commission to ensure its entry into force and implementation. Member states were urged to allocate 1 per cent of the national budget to arts, culture, and heritage and the development of the creative economy to contribute to the inclusion of women as part of the African Women Decade on Economic and Financial Inclusion agenda.
4 Covid-19 Setbacks
4.1 Postponement of Elections
The effects of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated the governance crisis in the region in 2021. The shifts on the democracy landscape to combat the disease and the deepening health and socioeconomic crisis all tested the resilience of governance systems and political institutions. Government weaknesses in organising mass health delivery and designing responsive social support systems remained glaring across all levels – exposing Africa’s primary challenges due to weak institutional environments, poor structures, and deficient leadership. Service delivery was delayed across all sectors in most countries as services were disrupted in the attempts to contain the disease, together with some elections that were postponed at the beginning of the pandemic from 2020 to 2021.
The postponement of elections was contested by many defenders of democracy. For instance, in South Africa, the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), supported the postponement, whereas its main rival, the Democratic Alliance (DA), strongly opposed it.8 South Africa’s Constitutional Court finally rejected the appeal, ordering the elections to be held between 27 October and 1 November 2021. An argument presented by some CSO s that were demanding that these democratic procedures be adhered to was that the ACDEG was accepted as a treaty falling under the purview of the AfCHPR since 2016 hence the debates that elections during Covid-19 should be within the framework of Article 25(b) of the International Covenant on
Elections postponed in Africa due to the Covid-19 pandemic
| Country | Election | Place | Originally scheduled | Rescheduled |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Botswana | local by-elections | Metsimotlhabe and Boseja South wards | May 2020 | 18 December 2021 |
| Chad | legislative elections | 13 December 2020 | 24 October 2021, then postponed indefinitely | |
| Ethiopia | parliamentary elections | 29 August 2020 | 21 June 2021 | |
| Gabon | partial legislative elections | Lékoni-Lékori (Akiéni) | 4 and 18 April 2020 | 31 January 2021 |
| The Gambia | National Assembly by-election | Niamina West constituency | 16 April 2020 | 7 November 2020 |
| Kenya | County Assembly and National Assembly by-elections | April, June–July 2020 | 15 December 2020 | |
| Liberia | midterm senatorial elections and national referendum | 13 October 2020 | 8 December 2020 | |
| Libya | municipal elections | 18 April 2020 | June 2020 | |
| presidential elections | 24 December 2021 | (not directly related to Covid-19) | ||
| Niger | local elections | 1 November 2021 | 13 December 2021 (not directly related to Covid-19) | |
| Nigeria | senatorial by-elections | Bayelsa, Imo, and Plateau districts | March 2020 | 5 December 2020 |
| Rwanda | local elections | Kigali city | 30 December 2021 | |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | second round presidential elections | 8 August 2021 | 5 September 2021 (not directly related to Covid-19) | |
| Somalia | parliamentary elections | 27 November 2020 | ||
| presidential elections | before 8 February 2021 | first moved to 25 July–10 October 2021 | ||
| South Africa | municipal by-elections and voter registration activities | March–May 2020 | 11 November 2020 | |
| Tunisia | municipal elections | Hassi El Ferid and Jbeniana | 28–29 March 2020 | 5 July 2020 |
| Uganda | special interest groups elections | April–May 2020 | 11, 13, 17 August 2020 | |
| Zimbabwe | rural district council by-election | Chiredzi ward 16 | 4 April 2020 | |
| legislative and council by-elections | 5 December 2020 | 2021 |
SOURCE: IDEA (2022)
In January 2021, the AU PSC agreed on AU Guidelines on Elections in Africa in the Context of the Novel Coronavirus (Covid-19) Pandemic and Other Public
The continuing menace of the Covid-19 pandemic forced many policy-makers and civil society leaders to recognise the importance of technology to political and economic participation. The shift towards engaging through digital technologies, such as video conferencing, allowed many actors to participate. The connectivity challenges experienced by many participants in AGA activities pointed to the need for hastened technology infrastructure development in the region. Crippling power outages pushed many CSO s to begin physical meetings much earlier on in 2021, drawing attention to the gaps between the AU structures and its potential to keep working remotely. At the national level, the impact of constant power outages, high data costs, and lack of options pushed local actors to organise themselves differently.
4.2 Linking Governance with Security
The APRM Continental Secretariat was mandated to link the region’s governance work with the African Peace and Security Architecture’s tasks in building regional stability. In December 2021, the First Joint Retreat of the PSC and the APRM was held in Durban, South Africa.9 The retreat was supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Durban-based African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).
The Durban Joint Retreat was aimed at enhancing early warning systems by revisiting previous APRM reports and identifying problematic issues that could feed into the new PAPS early warning strategies. The development of a systematic framework for feeding what the APRM pointed out as conflict markers was essential for cementing the ties between governance and conflict in the region. The Joint Retreat also aligned its actions and aims with the realisation of two aspirations of AU Agenda 2063: Aspiration 3 ‘An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law’ and Aspiration 4 ‘A peaceful and secure Africa as guided by the AU Master Roadmap on Practical Steps in Silencing the Guns by the Year 2020’ (African Union 2016).10
5 AU/REC s Division of Labour in Governance
Nascent participatory innovations under the AGA reflect ongoing contestation over the form and function of African regional governance initiatives. The REC s, through the principle of subsidiarity, aid the AU’s response to governance challenges, but this contestation complicates the governance institutional landscape, hence the need for better continental and regional coordination mechanisms. The REC s tend to insist on their autonomy and work with other Regional Mechanisms (RM s), which hold more power in certain respects; nevertheless, power tussles remain notable around positioning the dominance of the AU in steering the peace and security agenda (see Yearbook on the African Union 2000, 93–95). The AGA Secretariat sits within the merged PAPS and
The REC s form the pillars of the AU and take the responsibility of distilling and conveying continental policies to the subregions. All of the REC s had been established prior to the launch of the AU in July 2002, having all evolved in response to regional dynamics and set up differing structures for tackling political and development challenges in the quest for regional integration. The REC s facilitate regional economic integration between members of the individual regions and through the wider African Economic Community, which was established under the 1991 Abuja Treaty (see also Bruce Byiers, this Yearbook, chapter 10). Due to the varying nature of demands across regions, the REC s carried out different AGA-related activities in 2021 and these were always designed to bring the AU and CSO s closer.
After the AU Assembly had identified the underlying need for a clear division of labour and effective collaboration between the REC s, RM s, and AU organs to achieve the aspirations of Agenda 2063, annual coordinating meetings, which derive their mandate from the 28th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly were scheduled (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30–31 January 2017). The 3rd Mid-Year Coordination Meeting (MYCM; virtual, 16 October 2021) deliberated on the following governance issues: the Report on the Status of the Regional Integration in Africa and the Progress Report on the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Continent.12 After the PAPS commissioner’s statement on the state of AU–REC s/RM s relationship, the rest of the REC s and RM s provided their own reports on the status of the relationship. Though major points emphasised cordial relations and collaboration with the AU, the REC s clearly had more initiatives that connected them with citizens in their member states. A major challenge that will continue to complicate relations is the principle of subsidiarity, which allows the REC s to intervene in their member states without active participation and engagement of the PSC regarding conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict resolution (see Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 3).
A five-day high-level ministerial conference on the role of the REC s in promoting the youth, peace, and security agenda in the east and the Horn of Africa took place in Nairobi, Kenya (1–5 November 2021). The conference aimed to promote the youth, peace, and security agenda by advocating more inclusive policies and meaningful engagement of young people in peacebuilding and conflict prevention mechanisms. The combination of governance and security
6 Gender and Governance
The AU has a few protocols in place to address gender equality and development – but translating the blueprint into action remains slow (see Yearbook on the African Union 2000, 97–99). Progress is hampered due to the dominant toxic patriarchal tendencies in the region that are manifested in both domestic and political violence that is experienced by many women. Agenda 2063 locates gender equality at the forefront of the continent’s vision, particularly in Aspiration 6 and Goal 17, with the focus on achieving full gender equality to enable people-driven development for Africa (African Union 2015). The priority areas of women’s and girls’ empowerment and an end to violence and discrimination against women and girls are thus central to the achievement of Agenda 2063. The REC s have been operationalising the several AU protocols meant to tackle the marginalisation of women and the violence that creates distance. These are: the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004), a reporting framework on gender equality and women’s empowerment that reaffirms the member states’ commitment to gender equality as enshrined in Article 4(1) of the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union; the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol); and the AU Strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (2018–2028) (see Awino Okech, this Yearbook, chapter 12).
Violence remains a big deterrent to women’s inclusion into political affairs. Coupled with the defective criminal justice systems across all the countries, most women shy away from stepping into the public realm, and many do not enjoy their rights. In a bid to make law enforcement more gender responsive, SADC developed tools to curb regional gender-based violence (GBV) in the region. The tools are designed to operationalise and guide the implementation
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Gender Development Centre brought together gender experts from member states in October 2021 to review their response to the announcement by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government on January 2021 regarding a ‘Declaration on Zero Tolerance for Sexual and Gender-based Violence and the Elimination of all forms of Violence against Women and the Girl child at all times and under all circumstances in the ECOWAS region’.14 The gender experts reviewed the draft regional strategies on the prevention of and response to GBV as well as sexual harassment in the workplace and educational institutions in West Africa. The documents were submitted to the ECOWAS ministers in charge of women’s affairs and gender for official adoption.
The East African Community (EAC) continued to blend youth and women issues when ministers met at the 5th Sectoral Council on Gender, Youth, Children, Social Protection and Community (Arusha, Tanzania, 7–11 June 2021). Among the items on the agenda was the consideration of a training manual for female cross-border traders and service providers, the progress report of the 50 Million African Women Speak networking platform project, progress in implementing the Action Plan of the EAC Youth Policy, the impact of Covid-19
7 Youth and Governance
Agenda 2063 singles out young people as an instrumental driving force behind the continent’s political, social, cultural, and economic transformation (see Yearbook on the African Union 2000, 99f.). To harness the energy of the youth, the AGA has been fundamental for AU policy organs and the REC s to ensure sustainable engagement of youth in democratic governance processes within the AGA framework. YES creates channels for youth participation in policy-forming and democratic governance through institutionalised annual consultations on democratic governance, peace, and security.
Youth participation is enshrined in the ACDEG (African Union 2007, §§31[1] and [2]). It calls on member states to promote the participation of social groups with special needs, including youth and persons with disabilities, in governance processes. The 2006 African Youth Charter (AYC) is a blueprint for youth empowerment and development at continental, regional, and national levels. Among others, it states that every young person shall have the right to participate in all spheres of society and commits member states to promote active youth participation and create platforms for youth involvement in decision-making processes (African Union 2006, §§ 11[1] and 11[2]b). Aspiration 6 of Agenda 2063 envisions a continent ‘whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children’ (African Union 2015, 8). Though there is convergence with the AU protocols on youth and participation, all of the REC s have devised their own strategies, reflecting their areas of concern. Some strategies, however, are vague and do not specify the strategic action areas.16
At the REC level, the national youth councils of COMESA member states elected in September 2021 the first COMESA Youth Advisory Panel.18 The 11-member advisory panel has a three-year tenure and is responsible for strengthening the engagement of youth within the region in democracy, governance, and socioeconomic development issues and to promote and advocate productive and meaningful participation of young people in decision-making processes. The panel reports to the COMESA Council of Ministers and the COMESA Secretariat through periodic reports and contributes to the reports of the various thematic groups. The institutionalisation of the Youth Advisory Panel in the COMESA structure is an outcome of the joint project on ‘Youth Engagement in Democratic Governance and Socio-Economic Development processes in Africa’ with the AU through the AGA. The COMESA Secretariat was supported by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).
With SDC support, the AGA and COMESA again developed a guide to facilitate ‘Youth Participation in Political and Electoral Processes in Africa.’ The guide and manuals will be useful for the REC s and member states to mainstream youth participation across the electoral cycle. This youth inclusion guide is a response to allowing youth voices to be part of the electoral processes as a contribution to the Silencing the Guns initiative.
European Union (EU) cooperation on governance and human rights in the AGA continues to flounder and is unlikely to ever match the scale of APSA in terms of support (see Yearbook on the African Union 2000, 100–102). Globally, cooperation is being impaired, with multilateralism facing many challenges (Bellmann et al. 2012). This has left bilateral relations with the upper hand, being the preferred option for engagement since it continues to prove to be a more successful cooperation approach for all development partners. In terms of supporting the AGA, there is a clear failure to replicate the existing cooperation within the APSA. Reasons for this vary from the indifference of heads of state and government to all interventions into governance areas which are deemed to be sensitive domestic affairs to the absence of effective AU enforcement mechanisms. Another reason is the emphasis on financial support over increased internal institutional collaboration and rationalisation of resources.
As in previous engagements, external partners continued to pick AGA work they want to support. A good example is the EU Technical Assistance to the AGA Support Project (AGA–SP) that focused on the strengthening of the following AGA members: the ACHPR, the PAP, the APRM, and the ACERWC. In doing so, the AGA–SP seeks to improve coordination, maximise synergies between AGA members and other institutions, and nuture formal/informal linkages with national governance institutions.
The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit’s (GIZ) governance strengthening programme continued with its systemic focus on capacity-building of AGA platform members and on AU member states fulfilling their commitments to the regional governance protocols as laid out in several shared value instruments (SVI s).19 The cooperation agreement targets AU institutions that overlap in four bureaus with the EU TA: the AU Commission’s former Department of Political Affairs, as the host of the AGA Secretariat; the ACERWC, the ACHPR, the APRM, and the AUABC. The GIZ programme cooperates with 6 of the 19 AGA platform members, meeting annually and formulating joint flagship initiatives in line with the AGA road map.
The APRM appears to be drawing more attention due to its elaborate mandate and capacity to deliver. The organ has also forged more partnerships around its different work areas. Accordingly, it is likely to gain more attention from development partners in the future.
The year 2022 is set to be dominated by consolidating the functions and collaboration mechanisms across the new PAPS structures. PAPS institutional challenges, the hesitancy towards interference in governance, the need to safeguard sovereignty, the relatively indifferent AU leadership, and the presence of international partners and their ideologies all risk having the governance agenda play second fiddle to the AU’s peace and security activities. PAPS will struggle to strike a balance between the unified though diverse member states, as well as their constantly competing interests. The merger therefore raises questions about the implications for the AU’s role in governance, and questions remain on whether the merger will boost or undermine its governance role and if it can move Africa closer to peace and prosperity. The marker of success will be if the AU can intervene in the domestic politics and governance of its member states and if the member states’ interests comply with AU expectations.
Governance remains a sensitive area for member states, who are unlikely to buy into AUC leadership of what they deem domestic matters. Despite the PAPS merger, these sensitivities will continue to shape the AU’s work, which was intended to be streamlined by merging the AGA and APSA. The complementary nature of the fragmented AGA and AGP responsibilities appear to add value by allowing for multi-layered scrutiny and addressing of governance issues. Notwithstanding, the reality of high coordination costs and the possibility for inefficiencies and overlaps between actors with similar roles may slow down progress. For this is the nature of bureaucratic procedures in intergovernmental bodies.
For instance, conflict alerts by national level institutions can get bogged down by inertia at the REC level. With the APRM country assessments, these take time and early warning risks the chance of coming too late, and the AGA Secretariat itself does not have the capacity to connect with national level actors, thereby prolonging the time for essential interventions to be undertaken. A positive note is that the AU managed to develop a number of essential governance-enhancing tools, leaving the challenge for 2022 of translating these blueprints into action.
References
Sources
African Union 2006. African Youth Charter. African Union: Banjul.
African Union 2007. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Addis Ababa: African Union.
African Union 2014. Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the African Union Relating to the Pan-African Parliament. Malabo: African Union.
African Union 2015. Agenda 2063 – The Africa We Want. Popular Version. Addis Ababa: AU Commission.
African Union 2016. African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020 (Lusaka Master Roadmap 2016). Addis Ababa: African Union.
African Union/AGA 2021. Guide to Youth Participation in Political and Electoral Processes in Africa. Addis Ababa. African Governance Architecture.
African Union et al.2021. ‘Joint Ministerial Conference on Youth in Regional Peace and Security’. Lusaka, Zambia, 31 October. URL: <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-release-joint-high-level-ministerial-meeting-on-youth-peace-and-security-final.pdf> (accessed: 30 June 2022).
APRM 2021. The Africa Governance Report 2021. African Governance Futures for the Africa We Want. Midrand: African Peer Review Mechanism.
APRM 2022. Governance Link. Newsletter, May, no. 10.
AU Council 2021. ‘Decision on the Report on the Incident on the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)’. Adopted at the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 14–15 October (virtual). EX.CL/Dec.1128 (XXXIX).
AU PSC 2020a. ‘Communiqué of the 914th PSC meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 5 March’. PSC/PR/COMM. (CMXIV).
AU PSC 2020b. ‘Communiqué of the 962nd PSC meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 5 November’. PSC/PR/COMM. (CMLXII).
AU PSC 2021. ‘Communiqué of the 976th PSC meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 29 January’. PSC/PR/COMM. (CMLXXVI).
OAU 2000. Constitutive Act of the African Union. Lomé: Organisation of African Unity.
OAU 2002. ‘The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance’. Adopted at the 38th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly held in Durban, South Africa, on 8 July. AHG/235, Annex I (XXXVIII).
Literature
Christophe Bellmann, Jonathan Hepburn, and Marie Wilke 2012. ‘The Challenges Facing the Multilateral Trading System in Addressing Global Public Policy Objectives’, International Development Policy (43), https://doi.org/10.4000/poldev.1012.
IDEA 2022. ‘Global overview of Covid-19: Impact on elections’. Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. URL: <https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections> (accessed: 30 June 2022).
Open Society Justice Initiative 2022. ‘2020 Elections in Africa during the COVID-19 Pandemic’. Johannesburg: Open Society South Africa. URL: <https://www.justiceinitiative.org/litigation/elections-in-africa-during-the-covid-19-pandemic> (accessed: 30 June 2022).
Ronceray, Martin, Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw, and Ueli Staeger 2021. ‘Merging peace and politics: Drivers, dilemmas, and options for the AU’s new governance setup.’ Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management (= ECDPM Discussion Paper 303).
Websites
African Peer Review Mechanism. ULR: <https://www.aprm-au.org>.
AUC Democracy, Law & Human Rights. ULR: <https://au.int/en/democracy-law-human-rights>.
AUC Judicial, Human Rights & Legal Organs. URL: <https://au.int/en/legal-organs>.
UN Economic Commission for Africa. ‘Governance’. ULR: <https://archive.uneca.org/our-work/governance>.
Previously, five governance reports were produced by the United Nations Economic Community for Africa (UNECA) between 2005 and 2018. The first APRM governance report was published in 2019.
South African Government. Department of Public Service and Administration Press Statement [Pretoria], 13 December 2021. URL: <https://www.gov.za/speeches/african-peer-review-mechanism%C2%A0review-mission-engages-provincial-consultations-14-22-dec-13> (accessed: 30 June 2022).
ISS PSC Insights [Pretoria], 5 May 2021.
ISS PSC Insights [Pretoria], 3 November 2021.
Ibid.
AU News [Addis Ababa], 2 December 2021.
The Conversation [Melbourne], 31 August 2021.
The retreat was an arrangement pursuant to a PSC decision (see AU PSC 2020a, 2020b).
On 6 December 2020, the AU Assembly decided to postpone the deadline for Silencing the Guns by 10 years to 2030 (see Yearbook on the African Union 2020, 150f.).
AU Press Release [Addis Ababa], 2 December 2021.
AU Press Release [Addis Ababa], 19 October 2021.
SADC News [Gaborone], 9 December 2021. URL: <https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-develops-tools-curb-gbv-across-region/> (accessed: 30 June 2022).
ECOWAS Post [Abuja], 12 October 2021. URL: <https://ecowas.int/?p=50946> (accessed: 30 June 2022).
EAC Post [Arusha], 9 June 2021. URL: <https://www.eac.int/press-releases/146-gender-community-development-civil-society/2095-5th-sectoral-council-of-ministers-on-gender,-youth,-childen,-social-protection-and-community-development-underway-in-arusha> (accessed: 30 June 2022).
ECOWAS has made youth empowerment a priority in its conflict prevention framework; the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has mainstreamed youth in its main regional strategy; the EAC has instituted a youth ambassadors programme to promote youth engagement; COMESA has mainstreamed youth participation in policy, democracy, and socioeconomic development in its programming; the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has adopted a regional programme to strengthen the capacities of young people in the management of association, crisis, and conflict prevention; the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) has rolled out a regional strategy for engagement, participation, and advocacy to amplify youth voices to promote peace, security, and sustainable development; and SADC has developed a programme focusing on mitigating youth participation in violence, youth empowerment, and employment (see African Union/AGA 2021).
AU Press Release [Addis Ababa], 23 December 2021.
AU Press Release [Addis Ababa], 14 September 2021.
GIZ 2022. ‘Support to the African Governance Architecture (AGA)’. URL: <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/27933.html> (accessed: 30 June 2022).