1 Introduction
The security situation of the continent today is deeply marked by the metastasis of terrorism and the dangerous resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government. Furthermore, the two phenomena establish causal links known to all. One finds its pretexts in the significance and expansion of the former, and the necessary fight against the latter produces the illusion that the second is the answer to proven failures in the fight against the first. (AUC Chairperson 2022b)
The year 2021 is an opportune moment to reflect on the vistas of possibilities, capabilities, and limitations that the establishment of the African Union (AU) has opened up over the last nearly two decades. Its creation was driven primarily by the dire necessity to effectively respond to the continent’s multiple peace, security, and governance challenges at the turn of the century. To their credit, the AU, the Regional Ecnomic Communities (REC s)/Regional Mechanisms (RM s) and their international efforts have since embarked on a serious experiment of developing norms, institutions, and structures for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, broadly known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). They have also made significant attempts at mobilising the political resolve of their member states and allocating modest resources for the noble cause of sustainable peace on the continent. Such efforts have led to the deployment and utilisation of different response mechanisms, including AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs), political missions, and stabilisation strategies, albeit with varying levels of outcome and impact. However, as the AU inches closer to celebrating its 20th anniversary in 2022, the different forms of instability and crises that once bedeviled the continent have resurfaced in various shapes and intensity (see Döring et al. 2021).
Taking these trends as a starting point, this chapter offers a tour d’horizon of the state of peace and security on the continent, focusing on the AU’s response to conflict trends and dynamics in 2021. Once again, the AU was confronted with the nearly impossible task of dealing with various conflicts and issues
The threat of violent extremism persisted, sparing none of the continent’s regions. Different violent extremist groups continued to be a major source of instability in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), Libya, Somalia, and Mozambique. The threat made worrying inroads into areas that were traditionally less affected. Countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, and Togo experienced terrorist attacks. Sustaining political transitions proved difficult, be it from a repressive to democratic order (The Gambia), restoring state presence in the middle of armed conflict (Libya, Somalia, and the Central African Republic [CAR], Mali), or consolidating political stability (Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan, and Sudan). Leadership tussle among key political actors and electoral contestation exacerbated the fragile political and security situations in Libya and Somalia.
Long-standing governance deficits and the related implications became more acute in different parts of Africa. In some cases, dissatisfaction and pressure that had built up over decades fuelled popular resentment against ruling regimes, particularly over the failure to provide ‘good enough’ security and livelihoods. This trend has consequentially enabled the resurgence of coups d’état as in the case of Mali and Guinea. Similarly, Chad and Sudan witnessed the military takeover of power, with each of the incidents driven by their own unique political and security trajectories (see Powell et al. 2021).
The violent conflict in northern Ethiopia, which started in November 2020, took a more violent turn. It evolved into a major headline-grabbing series of events with dire humanitarian consequences, large-scale human rights abuses, and precarious regional reverberations. Although interstate disputes were not the primary source of conflict across the continent, there were tensions in some cases. The relations of Burundi and the DRC with their respective neighbours – Uganda and Rwanda – improved. Kenya and Somalia, which severed their relationship in December 2020, restored diplomatic relations in October 2021. However, the ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the maritime dispute between the two nations, immensely tested their bilateral relations.1
In response to these challenges, the AU sought to fulfil its primary role as a facilitator of timely and efficient responses by rolling out an array of response strategies and mechanisms through the varied engagement of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The AU also engaged in various conflict situations
On balance, 2021 was a year in which only few conflicts showed signs of abating, but many intensified and even saw the emergence of new crises through the resurgence of coups d’état. The net effect of crises continues to test the AU’s capacity and resolve in shouldering the continent’s peace and security responsibilities. Many factors were at play in limiting the AU’s bandwidth to troubleshoot the continent’s multiple crises – not all of them being placed at the AU’s doorstep. The AU identified the narrow reading of the ideal of subsidiarity and the question of sovereignty as the foremost challenges to the AU’s decision-making role in responding to Africa’s security challenges (AUC Chairperson 2022b).
Constraints persisted, emanating from the inconsistent commitment of member states to interpret, uphold, and implement the norms, policies, and decisions related to peace, security, and governance and to avail themselves of the requisite resources. The PSC’s stance on Chad was considered an anomaly to the AU’s prior effort to enforce its norms related to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG s). However, the PSC defended its decision citing the peculiar situation of the country (AU PSC 2021h). It traded very carefully, sometimes too cautiously, to deal with some of the protracted issues and emerging hot conflicts in a more timely manner (for example, in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Western Sahara). The PSC faced limitations to keep simmering tenuous situations on its radar and act on its conflict-prevention mandate (Guinea). The AU’s existing engagement was overshadowed by more kinetic and dynamic developments in particular regions. For example, while the AU is a guarantor of South Sudan’s peace agreement, its involvement in the country appeared to have been overshadowed by two high-profile and rapidly evolving situations in the region, notably the conflict in northern Ethiopia and the
The following section offers a broad analytical overview of these complex trends structured around region- and country-specific discussions. Alongside responding to these crises, the AU kept developing its policies and strategies, enhancing its capacity, deepening its strategic partnerships, etc. But these critical activities will not be covered in this chapter.
2 Regional Overview of the AU’s Peace and Security Engagement
2.1 The Horn and East Africa
2.1.1 Ethiopia
Unlike the previous years that saw a spike in a patchwork of turbulences, communal and ethnic clashes subsided transiently in different parts of the country in 2021. At the same time, the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia inarguably stood out as one of the most tumultuous and violent set of events on the continent. The conflict passed through different phases, and it became the locus of a plethora of peacemaking efforts, including by the AU.
Peacemaking efforts by the AU and others ebbed and flowed to the tune of the conflict dynamics within the different phases of the conflict. The conflict passed through four major phases. In the first six months of 2021, government forces gained the upper hand in the war and controlled Tigray’s capital, Mekelle. The second phase saw a reversal of the government’s military gains in the region. Except for the contested western part, the insurgents managed to control most of the Tigray region and advanced into the neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions. Together with the government’s massive mobilisation effort, the third phase saw a southward advance of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) forces, threatening to march on the capital. In the fourth phase, government forces and their regional allies reversed the rebels’ advance in November and December.2
In contrast to 2020, the AU had engaged in quantitatively more ways, with a questionable qualitative impact in changing the course of the conflict arguably due to the AU’s lack of robust action in the lead-up to the conflict and the early days of the war in 2020. The AU engaged with the crisis by convening PSC
The PSC discussed the conflict only twice, on 7 March and 8 November 2021. In the March meeting of the PSC, held at the level of African Heads of State and Government, the situation was discussed under ‘Any Other Business’ (AOB). During the meeting, the Ethiopian government delivered a statement defending its track record in various ways. It downplayed accusations of human rights abuses by its forces, outlined efforts to redress the humanitarian crisis, and expressed its readiness to work with continental institutions to investigate rights abuses.3 This particular PSC meeting did not discuss the situation itself, and hence the PSC was not expected to pass a formal decision or action (Amani Africa 2021). The crisis was substantively discussed at the PSC only at an emergency session on 8 November 2021, apparently triggered by the Tigrayan forces southward advance and speculations around the imminent fall of Addis Ababa. Arguably, this meeting’s only significance was the assurance of the AU’s support for the preservation of Ethiopia’s sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity, as well as expression of the AU’s strong anti-war stance and advocacy for a negotiated political end to the conflict (AU PSC 2021z).
On 26 August, former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo was appointed as AU high representative for the Horn of Africa. He made several trips to the region to engage with Ethiopian government officials, the Tigray Regional Administration leadership, regional leaders in the Horn of Africa, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN). Throughout 2021, the good offices of the high representative remained the only avenue for a preliminary exploration of the needs, interests, and perhaps positions of the warring parties that is acceptable to both sides. His engagement unveiled the complexity and intricacies of future mediation efforts and the imperative for ‘baby steps and many steps’ than aiming for an immediate and comprehensive resolution of the conflict.4 He also helped to create an understanding among the warring parties (though individually) on the political nature of their differences and the necessity to find a political solution through dialogue (UNSC 2021a). Nonetheless, the high representative’s role remained constrained for a significant part of 2021 as the conflict was not ‘ripe for resolution’, and the warring parties continued to aspire to achieve a military victory as a way out of the conflict.
The AU’s efforts unfolded side by side the efforts of other actors, albeit with limited coordination and sometimes in apparent competition and overlap among the various actors. The Tigray conflict embodied a typical case of a dysfunctional international peacemaking arena marked by a proliferation of initiatives and tension between the self-interest of certain actors and their drive for collective action in resolving the crisis.
Whereas largely absent from peacemaking efforts in 2020, the US increasingly assumed a prominent and vocal role in 2021. President Joe Biden’s administration imposed sanctions to persuade the warring parties to resolve the crisis peacefully. The US also threatened to delist Ethiopia from preferential trade access provided under the 2000 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The US also appointed former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman as special envoy for the Horn of Africa. However, these efforts appeared to have limited impact in forcing the warring parties to commit to a negotiated end to the conflict. Likewise, the EU levied a budget freeze on Ethiopia, contingent on fulfilling specific conditions. It also supported the initiative by the AU’s high representative for the Horn of Africa, mainly by reinforcing its messaging in support of the latter’s effort.
Arguably, the UN was heavily involved in efforts to resolve the conflict through the political role of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and its various agencies. The UN humanitarian agencies expanded their operations to deal with the humanitarian crises, including famine, hunger, and supporting internally displaced persons (IDP s). Ethiopia featured in a number of the UNSC meetings, with the humanitarian situation in northern Ethiopia taking centre stage in these discussions. The UNSC discussed the situation in Ethiopia ten times: ‘five times under AOB, four times in a public meeting and once in an informal interactive dialogue meeting’.5
The conflict revealed the AU’s continued inability to intervene in major crises in a timely manner, owing mainly to limits imposed by strict interpretation of the principle of national sovereignty, the lack of political will to deal with thorny issues on the continent, and the lack of concerted regional action from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The PSC’s engagement in the war in Tigray remained minimal (only one substantive discussion), bespeaking the continued challenge of discussing troublesome issues in this central AU platform.
The warring parties’ contrasting political strategies and conflicting end state also left little room for the AU to manoeuvre. The Ethiopian government mainly framed the war as a ‘law enforcement campaign’ to ensure the sustenance of the Ethiopian state. On the other hand, the Tigrayan forces, though they explicitly expressed their desire to topple the regime in Addis Ababa, remained ambivalent in terms of their position for the continuation of the Ethiopian state. Also, there is little indication that the conflict had reached a ‘hurting stalemate’ throughout 2021, which could have induced a desire among the warring parties to negotiate.
2.1.2 Somalia
A raft of internal and external factors significantly shaped Somalia’s political and security environment. These factors mainly include contention around elections, uncertainty about the future of AMISOM, constant threat from al-Shabaab, Somalia’s maritime dispute with Kenya and spillover effect of the strained relations between the two countries, and continued political rivalry among the country’s political elites. As a net effect of the country’s multiple
The modalities and conditions of a general election remained contested. When the Somali’s government mandate expired in February, the country entered into a political limbo, pitting the president against his political opponents and some of the Federal Member States (FMS). The PSC issued two communiqués concerning the resultant dangerous stand-off. On 9 February, following the conclusion of the Dhusamareeb consultation (1–6 February) – ending without an agreement – the PSC called on all relevant stakeholders ‘to refrain from undertaking any unilateral or non-consensual measures that might further complicate the situation and deepen the current political impasse’ (AU PSC 2021c, §4).
In the aftermath of a controversial decision by Somalia’s House of the People to extend the sitting president’s mandate by two years, the PSC issued a strong statement on 22 April. It condemned the decision, claiming that it would effectively delay the elections and undermine Somalia’s unity, stability, and nascent democracy. The PSC also requested the AUC chairperson ‘to immediately appoint a High Representative as Special Envoy for Somalia’ (AU PSC 2021h, 9). The AUC acted upon this request and on 8 May appointed the former president of Ghana, John Mahama, as the high representative for Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) received this decision negatively in general, and later rejected the appointment, accusing Mahama of having close ties with Kenya’s top leadership. The PSC’s condemnation of the extension put the AU–FGS relations on difficult grounds, contributing to the rejection of the high representative’s appointment thereafter. This contestation notwithstanding, the AU claims to have contributed, through AMISOM, to mediation efforts that led to the electoral agreements of 17 September 2020 and 27 May 2021 between the FGS and the FMS (AU Assembly 2022a, §14).
The fate of AMISOM also hung in the balance for a significant part of the year owing to inconclusive negotiations on the post-2021 AU involvement in Somalia and the nature of the mission replacing AMISOM (AU PSC 2021y). AMISOM’s transition became one of the sticking points between the prominent security actors, including Somali authorities, the AU, the UN, and the EU. With the looming planned exit of the mission in March 2021, the FGS adopted a stance pushing for quick but not necessarily immediate transfer of security responsibilities to local security forces. The year notably witnessed diverging positions on AMISOM’s future among Somalia’s government, the AU, the UN, and the EU, the mission’s major financier. Respective assessments conducted by the UN (in 2020) and the AU (in 2021) and statements by the Somalia governments on the outcome of these assessments reflect the differing positions of these critical stakeholders.
To resolve these differences and other related matters, the AU, through the AUC, engaged with the FGS. The Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) undertook a technical mission to Somalia in December 2021, which culminated in an agreement that outlined the principles and modalities for a follow-up mission in Somalia (AU Assembly 2022a, §14). In addition, the PSC renewed the AMISOM mandate until 31 December 2021, and the UNSC approved a technical rollover of the mission’s mandate for three months, effective from January 2022 (AU PSC 2021j).
On top of these internal security dynamics, Somalia’s external relations with Kenya also reached a new low in 2021. After severing their diplomatic ties in 2020, they re-established their relations, although not fully resolving the underlying issues of their dispute.7 One significant development in the Kenya–Somalia relations in 2021 was the ICJ ruling on 21 October 2021 on their disputed maritime boundary. The ruling largely considered as favouring Somalia, which led to Kenya rejecting the decision in its totality and accusing the ICJ of being biased. Even though the AU was engaged with the matter in 2020 in various ways (see Yearbook on the African Union 2020, 160f.), no pronouncement came from it on the ruling in 2021, neither a statement from the AU chairperson nor the PSC. A regional analyst opined that the latter was expected as Kenya was a member of the PSC. The council had a track record of not discussing issues involving some sitting PSC members.8
Overall, the AU’s involvement in Somalia in 2021 remained mixed. Inarguably, the AU, through AMISOM, continued to contribute to creating a modicum of stability and some level of political governance. The AU’s interaction with the FGS reached a low point, leading to far-reaching consequences. Disagreement between the two entities tainted their relations and spilt over into other
2.1.3 Sudan
Sudan witnessed an intensification of existing political instability and crisis of governance. The AU characterised Sudan as a fluid situation, attributing the major fault lines to the fractures between the military and the civilian components of the transitional government occasioned by the military takeover of October 2021 (AU Assembly 2022a, §16).
Up until October 2021, Sudan’s Sovereign Council, composed of military and civilian leaders, presided over a fragile political and security environment. Occasional popular protests and tensions marked the political landscape. Sudan’s political elites were wrangling over implementing the transitional arrangement that came in the wake of the removal of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019. During this period, a critical defining feature of Sudanese politics was a flawed joint military-civilian governing body marked by inherent cleavages and competing interests.10 Besides the contestation between the military and civilian members of the Sovereign Council, infighting, factionalism, and disagreement prevailed within the respective camps.11
As a reflection of the military’s long-standing dominant role in the country’s politics, the military staged a coup on 25 October 2021, detaining Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, his officials, and other political leaders. In addition, the military declared a state of emergency and suspended articles 12, 15, 16, 24 (3), 71, and 72 of the Constitutional Document, in effect dissolving the Sovereign Council and the Council of Ministers (UNSC 2021b). To justify its action, the military cited the failure of the civilian administration to drive forward the reform agenda. However, the reluctance of the military to hand over the rotating leadership of the Sovereign Council in November may have been a critical factor behind the military’s power grab.12 Nonetheless, the coup effectively ended Sudan’s turbulent transition. It also primed the country for further instability, primarily arising out of anti-democracy protests across the country and the risk of returning it to a pariah status among the international
The year had also witnessed continued unmet demands for justice and accountability for various forms of crimes and atrocities, including those perpetrated against pro-democracy protestors and other victims of state abuse during the Bashir regime.13 Regionally, Sudan’s external relations with Ethiopia piqued over two main issues. Disagreement over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) remained unresolved due to a stalemate in the AU-led negotiations. Dispute over the al-Fashaga border also remained volatile due to the regional ramifications for the war in Tigray.
The AU responded to Sudan’s unfolding peace and security dynamics in different ways. Sudan featured in four of the PSC’s discussions, including the session in March, which did not result in any public document. On 13 April, the PSC discussed the report of the council’s field mission to Sudan from 30 March to 1 April 2021 (AU PSC 2021f). Noting some of Sudan’s concerning situations, the PSC initially signaled a largely favourable assessment of the political and security developments on various fronts. It commended the progress made in terms of the implementation of the 2019 Constitutional Declaration, particularly the signing of the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement; the formation of the new transitional government; and the recent signing of the Declaration of Principles with the chairperson of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N), Abdel Aziz El Hilu. The PSC also welcomed the collaboration between the Sovereign Council and the transitional government (AU PSC 2021f).
The tone of the PSC’s subsequent session and its outcome contrasted with the above-mentioned seemingly favourable assessment. The PSC session on 26 October took place under the shadow of the military takeover of power and dissolution of the transitional government. Framing the unfolding situation as a UCG, the PSC suspended Sudan from all AU activities until the effective restoration of the military-civilian partnership (AU PSC 2021x). The PSC also decided to undertake a mission to Sudan to engage with all stakeholders to find an amicable solution to the current political stalemate. However, the latter did not take effect as Sudan rejected to receive the AU’s emissary (Amani Africa 2022). Prior to this meeting, on 25 Ocotber the AU chairperson had issued a statement that underscored the vitality of dialogue and consensus as a way out of Sudan’s current woes.
Some members were of the view that a fact-finding mission should be dispatched first to assess the situation on the ground [as the PSC did in the case of Chad] … while others stood by the established norms and practices of AU and argued for the immediate suspension of Sudan.
The AU was also engaged in broader efforts to resolve the political impasse, including supporting the dialogue efforts by the UN.
The subsequent session on Sudan on 24 November 2021 looked at the military government’s reinstatement of the prime minister, based on the 12 November 2021 agreement. The PSC welcomed this development and underscored the importance of dialogue, an inclusive transitional government, etc. (AU PSC 2021a1). Nonetheless, the PSC stopped short of lifting the sanction despite the expectation of some PSC members (Amani Africa 2022).
Many had expected the AU to play a more prominent role in Sudan, given its crucial contribution to shepherding the country’s transition in 2019 and the mediation process that culminated in the transitional arrangement. The AU’s decision to suspend Sudan can be considered swift as it did not equivocate to denounce the military power grab as it did in the case of Chad. Among others, the PSC’s stance on Sudan appears to be driven by the limited likelihood of a concerted regional response from the REC in question – in contrast to Mali from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In this case, IGAD was unlikely to take any decisive action, as Sudan was the current chair of IGAD, and the latter’s responses were traditionally muted in relation to emerging governance-related dynamics in the region. At the same time, some consider the AU’s response was limited to providing a decisive course correction mainly to challenges emanating from the military’s power grab. The AU’s call to return the status quo ante was considered one that ‘legitimises’ the military role, which pro-democracy protestors rejected under the slogan ‘No negotiation, No partnership, No compromise’.14 In addition, questions could be raised as to the impact of the AU’s decision and the weight it carries in comparison to the action of other actors, including the US and the World Bank, that responded more swiftly and decisively at the time and arguably had greater impact in shaping the military’s position.15
South Sudan remained on the Union’s radar in 2021, albeit with limited attention being paid to the country compared to the previous years. For the major part, the key issue had been uncertainties around the slow pace of implementing the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R–ARCSS). Despite all its flaws to fully addressing the deep causes of the crises, the R–ARCSS remains a critical political mechanism that warrants attention, not least for its contribution to ‘halting most fighting between the main parties in the country’s civil war’.16
The agreement saw some progress, such as forming national and state executive and legislative bodies.17 The government made some progress in the inclusion of opposition MP s in the new parliament and the final drafting of the nation’s constitution. Nevertheless, the agreement’s full implementation was lagging, especially with regard to transitional security arrangements, the enactment of key legislation by the Transitional National Legislative Assembly, and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms.18
While there may be many factors explaining the slow pace of implementing the agreement, fractures within political and armed opposition was the most cogent one. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM–IO) was rocked by defections of its high-level officials, sometimes joining the government camp. Such challenges within the major opposition may further slowdown the agreement’s implementation, with clear implications for security sector reform (SSR)/disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) processes and greater political stability in the country. The surge in communal violence was another major trend in South Sudan in 2021, not least driven by the faltering power-sharing arrangement and slow implementation of the armed forces’ unification.
The AU’s most notable involvement in South Sudan in 2021 was the PSC’s field mission (24–26 March) and a council meeting on 13 April 2021 to consider the report findings of the mission. Reflecting on the limited progress of the peace agreement, the PSC called for the enhanced implementation of different aspects of the R–ARCSS, such as transitional security arrangements; a DDR programme; human rights and transitional justice; and timeous preparations for credible, transparent, and democratic elections at the end of the current transition (AU PSC 2021g). Although the AU is the guarantor of the R–ARCSS, its engagement in the country appears to have been overshadowed by two
2.1.5 The Comoros
The ramifications of the contested 2018 referendum and the 2019 elections continued to have ripple effects on the political stability of Comoros. The opposition persisted in their rejection of President Azali Assoumani’s authority, who won the election boycotted by the opposition camp (AU Assembly 2022a, §17). The PSC convened two sessions on the Comoros, which had a history of coups and prior attempts to declare unilateral independence by some of the islands. On 1 June, the PSC requested the AUC to deploy a technical early response mission (TERM) to establish facts and report back to the council. And on 19 October 2021, the PSC considered the TERM report that was undertaken from 12 to 15 September 2021. It called for several requirements, including various mechanisms for institutional and justice reforms, as well as mediation and dialogue, especially national dialogue and preparations for elections in 2024. The PSC also authorised the deployment of a follow-up AU multidimensional mission (AU PSC 2021w).
2.2 Southern Africa
As in the previous years, Southern Africa remained comparatively more stable than the other regions in 2021, especially when it comes to armed conflicts. To a lesser extent, the violent extremist insurgency in Mozambique, the pro-democracy protests in Eswatini, and the mass riots in South Africa were notable exceptions within this broad characterisation. On the positive side, the presidential election in Zambia, which led to the transfer of power from an incumbent to an opposition candidate, was also a major step forward. This is noteworthy in a region where ruling regimes have stayed in power for decades, sometimes holding out against contested electoral processes.19
In March 2021, the insurgents in Mozambique launched their biggest attack since the start of the conflict in 2017, targeting economic infrastructure in the Palma region. This attack precipitated the decision by Total, one of the leading developers of Mozambique’s liquefied natural gas reserves, to suspend its operations – a major setback for the country’s economy.20 In addition, by the end of 2021the violence, which was initially associated with the Cabo Delgado province, expanded into neighbouring Niassa.21
The two missions initially were unsynchronised and raised questions about the various aspects of the deployments. Some media reports indicated that SADC was ‘concerned about a non-member country deploying soldiers in the region without its approval and ahead of the bloc’s troops’.23 In addition, the timing of Rwanda’s deployment – being ahead of SADC’s arrival – has been described initially as ‘regrettable’ by Dr Stergomena Tax, SADC’s outgoing executive secretary.24 The level of coordination between the two military interventions in their areas of operations also seems limited. These initial perceptions notwithstanding, the deployments achieved some gains in countering the threat of the insurgents. Considering these achievements, SADC extended the SAMIM mandate until April 2022 (AU Assembly 2022a, §19). Likewise, Rwandan forces supported efforts to dislodge insurgents from the harbour town of Mocímboa da Praia, which had been occupied since August 2020. They also helped in restoring security in Palma, where services resumed, and some displaced people could return to their homes.25 Despite these gains, the insurgency continued throughout 2021.
As in the previous year, the AU’s response to the growing insurgency in Mozambique was a mixed bag. The AUC chairperson issued a statement on 31 March 2021 condemning the most prominent terrorist act, pledging its solidarity with Mozambique, and calling on its member states to support efforts to curb terrorism in the country. The AU provided its political backing to both external deployments by Rwanda and SADC and broader peacemaking efforts. On 10 July 2021, the AUC chairperson applauded the deployment in his tweet ‘as a strong and concrete act of African solidarity to support a fellow Member
The crisis raised important questions regarding the commitment of the AU and its member states to utilise APSA instruments such as the ASF. Statements by the AU endorsed the deployment of the SAMIM while underlining the mission’s deployment within the framework of the ASF. Likewise, a letter by the SADC executive secretary to UN secretary-general states that the deployment to Mozambique of the SAMIM was ‘under scenario six’ of the African Standby Force (Svicevic 2021). Nonetheless, it was evident that SADC deployed the mission without any PSC authorisation, and the PSC did not discuss Mozambique until the end of 2021. Mozambique featured on the PSC’s initial monthly agenda for May 2021 but was later removed from the agenda as Mozambique had insisted that this was a ‘SADC matter’. It seems that SADC had not informed the AU of its deployment, though it was not legally obliged to do so.28 As such, the conflict in Mozambique continued to typify three ongoing and emerging challenges around the policy discourse on African peace and security. First, it refers to contested notions in operationalising the principle of subsidiarity that underpins AU–REC relations. Second, it highlights the emerging questions concerning the viability of APSA to address violent extremism-induced threats across the continent. And third, it also showcases the imperative for a continental-level discussion on ad hoc deployments as crisis response and management tools.
2.3 North Africa
Libya was one of the main countries that the AU engaged in 2021 in the Northern African region. The AU characterised the situation in Libya as ‘relatively stable’ in 2021 (AU Assembly 2022b, §[x]87). This comparative stability resulted from several milestones met in the preceding year and 2021. These milestones include the signing of the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement on 23 October 2020, the UN-facilitated Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), the establishment of an interim Government of National Unity (GNU), and the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) (see Yearbook on the African Union 2020, 151–153).
The first issue was the ongoing challenge of returning foreign forces and mercenaries. Towards the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the JMC remained the central framework for coordinating the removal of foreign forces from Libya (UNSG 2021a). Reflecting the continental stance on this critical issue, the PSC on 18 May 2021 called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign fighters and mercenaries within the three-month timeframe stipulated in the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement (AU PSC 2021l). However, save the departure of about 350 Syrian fighters, progress in removing foreign security entities remained limited.29 On 8 October 2021, the JMC agreed and signed a comprehensive Action Plan for the Withdrawal of Mercenaries, Foreign Fighters, and Foreign Force, which envisages to be ‘the cornerstone for the gradual, balanced, and sequenced process of the withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces’.30 The AU took part in the various meetings to implement the action plan, notably in the ministerial meeting of the neighbouring countries of Libya, held on 30 August 2021 in Algiers (AU PSC 2021u; AU Assembly 2022a).
The second major challenge was the difficulty in convening presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 December 2021. Libyans were supposed to go to the polls in line with the provisions of the road map established within the framework of the inter-LPDF, held in Tunis in November 2020. Depite the establishment of the GNU being a major highlight of the year, the elections could not take place due to disagreements over candidates and a disputed legal framework (ibid.).
This discord broadly underpinned the High National Elections Commission’s announcement that it could not hold the presidential election on 24 December 2021 and its suggestion to postpone the election until 24 January.31 To support the electoral processes, the AU initially planned for a multidimensional needs assessment mission and, on that basis, to deploy a short-term
Apart from the contestation over the election date and modality and the presence of foreign fighters, some worrying security concerns persisted throughout the year. Tripoli and north-western towns were affected by rivalry and renewed competition between armed groups over territorial control (UNSG 2021a). Criminal activities, including killings, kidnappings for ransom, and trafficking in illegal substances and fuel continued in the eastern region. Southern Libya was also affected by growing tensions and confrontations among armed groups in southern Libya and Da’esh’s increased violent activity (ibid.).
Overall, the AU strived to keep its hand in Libya’s complex and multiparty peacemaking landscape. In comparison to the previous year, the AU’s visibility was reduced in terms of the frequency of the meetings of the High-Level Committee on Libya, summit-level and PSC decisions and deliberations, and the engagement of the AU Contact Group for Libya. This seems understandable as 2020 was a monumental year that witnessed many critical political developments, including signing the comprehensive peace agreement and developing a political road map. In addition, conflict resolution remained dominated by many global and regional actors that continue to exert more influence and deploy more political and financial resources than the AU. As such, Libya continues to typify a multiparty mediation environment led by actors that have a direct interest in the outcome, and their involvement has made it difficult to resolve the conflict.32
As in the previous year, the absence of a meaningful and coordinated subregional platform that could complement the AU’s effort also continued. Whereas the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) mainly lacked meaningful involvement, visibility of the North African Regional Capability (NARC) remained under the radar regarding conflict prevention, management, and resolution.
Besides Libya, the PSC considered Western Sahara to be a part of the council’s agenda (AU PSC 2021e). To be sure, Western Shahara’s demand for independence and international recognition has been prolonged, with no significant progress in the intervening years. However, confrontations between Algeria and Morocco in 2021 accounted for the AU’s renewed focus on Western Sahara. Tensions between the two countries rose in 2021, among others, due to their divergent positions, Morocco claiming sovereignty over Western Sahara and Algeria backing the latter’s independence.
2.4 West Africa
2.4.1 The Gambia and Guinea
In 2021, the most salient issue in The Gambia has been sustaining the political transition that commenced with the removal of Yahya Jammeh’s regime. The presidential elections and transitional justice processes were arguably crucial markers of the country’s political transition, which was facing critical challenges. There were warning signs of a looming crisis, such as political factionalism, delayed institutional and constitutional reforms, ethnic polarisation, and constant socioeconomic challenges.33
The elections became all the more critical mainly because of an unexpected political manoeuvre in the form of an agreement between the current president Adama Barrow’s National People’s Party and Jammeh’s Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction. The alliance led to dual concerns that former President Jammeh would interfere in the election and the current president’s intention to win the election in any way possible.34 In addition, the possible re-entry of Jammeh into politics was deemed detrimental to the fight against impunity for crimes committed during his reign, jeopardising national cohesion and stability.35
Unlike the previous years, the PSC did not have a dedicated session on The Gambia, but the AU had engaged in the country in other ways. The AU deployed
Beyond the deployment of the EOM, the AU highlighted The Gambia as one of the cases where it extended substantial electoral assistance. These interventions sought to foster electoral integrity and overall democratic consolidation, peace, stability, and effective governance. In addition, the AU claimed to have supported The Gambia through other mechanisms. These include the deployment of a consultative mission in support of the Constitutionalism and Rule of Law initiative, a preventive diplomacy-based measure in December 2021, a multidimensional needs assessment mission, and the implementation of quick impact and peace-strengthening projects, as well as needs assessment and deployment of SSR experts (AU Assembly 2022a). The AU terminated the AU Technical Support Team to The Gambia (AUTSTG) in 2020 for funding reasons (see AU PSC 2020). However, the AUTSTG indicated that the small, agile, and embedded AU deployment teams that are built around national ownership, institutional development, and a comparatively light footprint are valuable.38 In light of the various achievements, experts recommended that the PSC mandate a follow-up support mission to phase one of the AUTSTG. However, the AU did not authorise or deploy the mission throughout 2021.39
The coup that led to the removal of President Alpha Condé in Guinea and the military’s assumption of power on 5 September was another significant political situation in the region in 2021. Although Guinea had been confronted with ongoing structural challenges, the coup was particularly precipitated by the extension of the term limit and the president’s running for a controversial third term in the face of stiff resistance in October 2020. Popular protests persisted before, during, and after the election, paving the way for the military’s takeover of power on 5 September 2021. On the very day of the military takeover, the DRC’s president, acting as the AU chairperson, and the AUC chairperson issued a joint statement. They condemned any seizure of power by force, demanded the immediate release of Condé, and invited the PSC to
Successive PSC meetings followed the joint statement and culminated in a decision that contrasted with the AU’s stance on a similar situation of the military takeover of power in Chad earlier in April. On 6 September, the AU held an emergency session, which did not culminate in any outcome document (Amani Africa 2022). Four days later, and calling the situation a UCG, the AU suspended Guinea (AU PSC 2021t). The AU’s decision mirrors ECOWAS’ decision to suspend Guinea on 9 September.
The AU’s subsequent engagement came in the wake of an ECOWAS meeting that took place on 16 September. This meeting appraised positively the commitment of the coup leaders to the swift restoration of constitutional order, including their decision to hold consultations with the relevant stakeholders. Yet, ECOWAS decided to uphold Guinea’s suspension, sanction the coup leaders and their families, and call for elections within six months (ECOWAS 2021b). It seems the Guinean coup leaders ‘failed to rollout a timetable for the return of constitutional order four months after the coup’, thus raising the question of whether the PSC and/or ECOWAS are going to impose more sanctions or extend the duration of the transition (Amani Africa 2022, 11).
In general, two main observations can be made regarding the AU’s involvement in the situation in Guinea. The first refers to the PSC’s failure to have Guinea on its radar before the outbreak of the crisis, acting on its conflict prevention mandate. Despite continuing instability, the PSC did not discuss Guinea in 2020 and for the major part of 2021, except after the coup. The AU did not equivocate in calling the situation in Guinea by its name, that is to say, a coup d’état. In comparison to the situation in Chad, this also raises questions regarding the AU’s commitment to consistently uphold its norms, the importance of a ‘strong sub-regional actor’, and finally calls for a discussion of the military’s role in politics on the continent.
2.4.2 The LCB Region and the Threat of Boko Haram
As in the previous years, the Boko Haram insurgency continued as a key threat to the countries in the LCB, along with other overlapping sources of instability. The battle-related death of Abubaker Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram on 19 May 2021 is one major event that affected the course of the insurgency. His demise set in motion a range of interrelated dynamics representing a major
The threat of violent extremism persisted together with other security challenges. While not entirely new in 2021, countries in the region continued to grapple with intercommunal clashes, leading to fatalities and displacement of peoples in the region. Some countries in the region, such as Nigeria, also saw a rise in banditry and abduction. Just between January and June 2021, there were 2,944 cases of kidnapping, as compared to 2,860 for the whole of 2020.43
As in the previous year, the response by the AU, regional actors and their partners to the Boko Haram threat, especially to violent extremist elements, assumed two major dimensions. Throughout the year, national armies in the region intensified the military pressure on the violent extremist groups, including aerial attacks on the different factions. In addition to operations by national armies, notably by Nigeria, the MNJTF maintained its operations. The PSC renewed the MNJTF’s mandate for an additional twelve months, starting on 31 January 2021 (AU PSC 2021a). The AU also continued to provide support to the MNJTF through its technical section at the force’s headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad. Another major response was the continued implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region (RSS). On 19 July 2021, the PSC reviewed the strategy’s implementation (AU PSC 2021p).
2.4.3 The Sahel: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
The security situation in the Sahel remained ‘highly volatile’ due to increased terrorist attacks, local conflicts, non-state armed groups, and transnational organised crimes (AU Assembly 2022b). According to ACLED (2021), fatalities from clashes between the state forces and armed groups linked to Islamic State, al-Qaida, and criminal gangs across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger showed an increase of 18 per cent against 2020. On 14 November 2021, Burkina Faso notably witnessed the worst violent extremist attack on a gendarmerie outpost in
The existing trend of violent extremism witnessed some qualitative changes. According to ACLED (2022), violent extremist groups shifted their activities to geographic areas beyond the immediate reach of external forces due to military pressure in the Liptako-Gourma region. This was accompanied by renewed engagement in local conflicts, allowing jihadist militant groups to enlarge their scope of action, reassert their influence, remobilise, and gain resources to rebuild (ibid.). In addition, the expansion of attacks to the coastal states of Western Africa became more pronounced. This was evidenced, for example, by attacks on Côte d’Ivoire in October and northern Togo in November 2021. Civilians bear the brunt of insecurity in the Sahel, not just from attacks by jihadists but also due to the actions of the security forces. The region also witnessed increased friction between the Malian transitional authorities and some of their international partners in the fight against violent extremists. Key milestones were France’s decision to draw down its forces and the growing involvement of the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group.
The region also saw an increase in local conflicts, mostly between farmers and herder communities – compounding the current instability in the region. Furthermore, the spike in political unrest in the Sahel added another layer to the complex security situation of the region. The region witnessed a coup in Mali, an attempted coup in Niger, and calls for Burkina Faso’s president to resign.45 Such instances of political instability were primarily driven by citizens’ dissatisfaction over governments’ failures to address the security challenges and were underpinned by long-standing governance deficits. Violent extremist groups continued to exploit these local grievances effectively.
The PSC discussed the situation in Mali at the ministerial level on 24 May 2021, coincidentally a few hours before the coup (Amani Africa 2022). The military took power by arresting the transition president of Mali, Bah N’Daw, and the prime minister, Moctar Ouane. This incident interrupted Mali’s fragile transition to civilian rule emerging from an earlier military takeover in 2020. On 25 May, the PSC convened its 1,000th session to consider the situation in Mali.46 The PSC condemned the arrest of the leaders of the civilian-led transitional government and called for their release (AU PSC 2021m). In addition, it called for a return to the civilian-led transition and indicated possible sanctions
In its subsequent meeting held on 1 June, the PSC suspended Mali from all its activities until the restoration of constitutional order in that country (AU PSC 2021n). The PSC’s stance endorsed ECOWAS’ decision, which included Mali’s suspension from the regional bloc, the call for a new civilian government, and the nomination of a new civilian prime minister (ECOWAS 2021a). Meanwhile, the National Transition Council (NTC) adopted an ambitious Government Action Plan (GAP) for 2021–2022, aspiring to prepare for presidential and legislative elections in February and March 2022. The PSC also deployed an evaluation mission to Mali (14–17 July 2021). On 2 September, the PSC received the mission’s report and appraised progress made in the implementation of the GAP. The PSC particularly called on the Malian authorities to establish ‘a clear, precise and realistic chronogram, delineating the period and implementation of reforms and the elections within the collectively agreed 18 months transition period’ (AU PSC 2021s, §3).
The AU also took part in various other initiatives to resolve the governance crises in Mali, shepherding the transition process and ultimately organising free, fair, and credible democratic elections. The AU Mission for Mali and Sahel (MISAHEL) was part of the Local Transition Monitoring Committee (LTMC), composed of the special representative of the UN secretary-general for Mali and head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the representatives of ECOWAS, and the AU itself. This initiative is primarily aimed at fostering dialogue with the Malian transitional authorities and ensuring the implementation of preceding recommendations and decisions of the PSC and ECOWAS. The committee had various meetings with transition authorities and national interlocutors, aiming to prioritise reforms and publish an updated timeline for the elections planned in February 2022 (UNSG 2021b). MISAHEL took part in the LTMC’s dialogue efforts to broker the release of leaders of the former transition president and the prime minister, who were under house arrest.47 The AU supported Mali’s transition by mobilising resources and initiating the recruitment of technical experts to help the government implement its transition road map (AU Assembly 2022a, §§9–11).
As in the previous year, the AU attempted to be part of the broad international effort to respond to the region’s persisting security threats. The AU’s responses came through various interventions centred around MISAHEL
The mission provided operational and technical support, such as supporting a radio programme on the peace and reconciliation process in Mali, continued monitoring and compliance of the human rights situation in Mali, and supporting training on human rights and implementation of a project on the prevention of sexual violence. MISAHEL also organised awareness-raising workshops regarding the various AU instruments in governance, gender, and the promotion of human rights; facilitated the organisation of training workshops on decentralisation and local conflict resolution techniques; and provided technical assistance to the various structures responsible for electoral operations and reforms.48
MISAHEL continued its participation in the Peace Agreement Monitoring Committee (Comité de suivi de l’accord, CSA) of the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Mali. The last session of the CSA took place on 5 October 2021. However, relations between the signatory parties have continued to deteriorate, despite the international mediation efforts. Making real progress towards its full implementation was limited, mainly owing to the parties’ lingering differences underscoring the need for the renewed commitment of all stakeholders (UNSG 2021b). In spite of MISAHEL supporting the implementation of this agreement and other endeavours in the broader region, it remained understaffed and inadequately resourced. Bolstering the mission remained a critical consideration, especially as the AU expanded the mission’s mandate to assist Guinea’s transition.49
The AU also made limited efforts to create momentum around the Nouakchott process (see Yearbook on the African Union 2020, 154–155). The AU established this platform for information and intelligence-sharing and a tool for combatting terrorism and extremism in 2013. The process was credited with creating a culture of exchange and cooperation among security actors.50 However, political
The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel maintained its deployment as a crucial instrument in the fight against terrorist groups in the region. Though not an AU mission in the strictu sensu, as a mandating authority, the PSC on 6 July 2021 renewed the mandate of the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel for another year, starting on 13 July 2021 (AU PSC 2021o). The renewal was made in consideration nof the mission’s effort to restore durable peace and stability in the region. Nonetheless, the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel operated in the face of critical challenges that risk losing the gains made in the preceding years. The report of the UN secretary-general on the joint force underscored that the mission needed a more predictable funding through assessed contribution-instead of relying on unpredictable partner financing, better regional ownership, and a more complementary approach between military, political and development endeavours (UNSG 2021d, 23).
In 2020, the AU Assembly authorised the deployment of a MNJTF comprising 3,000 troops in order to further impair terrorist groups in the Sahel (see Yearbook on the African Union 2020, 154–155). However, limited progress was made in 2021 in implementing this decision despite the finalisation of the development of the concept of operations (CONOP s) for the deployment of the troops. When the AU took the deployment decision, key states in the region, Nigeria and Ghana, had criticised the AU for insufficient consultation with ECOWAS on the deployment of the MNJTF.52 Apparently to address this criticism and create momentum around the force, the PSC, on 6 July 2021, requested the AUC chairperson ‘to continue consultations with the concerned stakeholders on the deployment of the 3000 troops in the Sahel region’ (AU PSC 2021o, §11).
Similarly, the review of the AU Strategy for the Sahel Region did not observe much progress in 2021. The strategy was developed in 2014 to ‘identify synergies, avoid unnecessary duplication and promote an action-oriented approach of the various initiatives for this region’ (AU PSC 2014, §16). The need for better coherence and coordination has become more pronounced throughout the years in light of the proliferation of actors, response mechanisms, and strategies in the region. The PSC requested the ‘AUC to finalise the Stabilization
2.5 Central Africa
2.5.1 Central African Republic
The CAR’s political and security dynamics continued to evolve in 2021. Although deeply steeped in the history of instability in the country, the CAR’s contemporary challenges originated primarily in the contestation around the 2020 election and the military offensive launched by the rebels in the preceding years.
On the political front, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra was declared the winner of the election. In the previous year, the credibility of the election was fiercely contested by the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), a loose alliance of armed opposition groups that was established in the first place to stop the electoral process (see Yearbook on the African Union 2020, 167). The CAR’s political turmoil showed some signs of relative stability as contestation around the presidential election took a back seat, albeit temporarily, following the president’s inauguration on 30 March and the establishment of a new government on 23 June. Howeverime, the resignation of the prime pinister on 10 June was taken at the same time as signs of continued political fragility within the current government.
Security-wise, the government was able to check the advances of the rebel forces that were looming to capture the capital of Bangui in January 2021 and even reverse the rebels’ territorial gains. UN peacekeepers, Russian paramilitaries, advisors, and mercenaries, and the Rwandese military contributed to the government’s efforts to counter the rebel’s offensive. The offensive liberated around 80 per cent of the national territory from the grip of armed groups.54 A fragile status quo had ensued where the territorial control and the power balance appeared to favour the government, at least for a significant part of 2021. However, the situation remained precarious as violence continued in different parts of the country, particularly in the west and centre (UNSG 2021c). The offensives by government forces and its foreign allies as well as reprisal attacks
The quest for lasting solutions to the CAR’s peace and security woes took different forms, constituting a loosely interlinked peace architecture. Launching a republican dialogue with all the nation’s active forces and the setting up of the Preparatory Committee on 1 September was one significant political instrument announced in 2021 (AU Assembly 2022a, §5). However, disagreement was not avoided as it was not clear who would participate in the planned dialogue, that is to say, mainly if the government would allow the CPC, which it accuses of major atrocities, to participate.55 The political opposition also criticised the composition of the Preparatory Committee for its ‘large representation of public authorities and those affiliated with the ruling party’ (UNSG 2021c, §4).
The announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by the president on 16 October was another critical development. The announcement came on the back of a flurry of diplomatic efforts, including high-level engagement of envoys and the adoption of a Joint Road Map for Peace for the CAR. The road map, among others, called for the government to declare a ceasefire of its operations to combat armed groups in the country and called for an inclusive dialogue supporting the AU-brokered 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (PAPR–CAR), which urged the government to declare a ceasefire.56 Despite its limited implementation, the agreement remained the only viable framework for sustainable peace. According to the UN secretary-general’s quarterly report on the CAR, the political agreement was sidetracked owing to ‘attention focused on preparations for the republican dialogue and the ICGLR initiative’ (UNSG 2021c, §8).
As in the previous year, the AU’s role has been to ensure the sustenance and support of the various peace initiatives, notably the PAPR–CAR, through two PSC sessions, a PSC field visit, a high-level engagement of the AU chairperson, and initiatives by the commissioner for PAPS, such as a joint AU, UN, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and EU high-level mission; video conferences with the CAR president and the CAR’s partners; and deployment of the AU’s military advisors (AU Assembly 2022a, §5).
On 16 February 2021, the PSC offered its political backing for the CAR’s election and ongoing efforts for peacemaking, especially its support for the PAPR–CAR. The PSC welcomed the election result while condemning the CPC’s attempted coup on 13 January 2021. The PSC issued a stern warning against spoilers and violators of the PAPR–CAR, including requesting the AU
The PSC also undertook a field mission to the CAR (27 June–1 July 2021). The mission was intended to show solidarity with the people and the government of the CAR (AU PSC 2021d). Based on the field mission report, the PSC convened another meeting on 21 July. It stressed the PAPR–CAR as the ‘only viable approach for holistically addressing CAR’s multifaceted challenges’ and urged the signatories to recommit to the peace process and prioritise dialogue in their quest for lasting solutions (AU PSC 2021q, §5).
Another key instrument of the AU’s involvement has been the deployment of the Military Observer Mission to the Central African Republic (MOUACA). In spite of its delayed deployment, which was indicative of one of the critical gaps in the implementation of the PAPR–CAR, the military observers remained deployed throughout 2021.57 However, the PSC had not received a briefing on the MOUACA, as indicated by its 936th and 979th sessions (Amani Africa 2022).
In a nutshell, the CAR shows some emerging trends and policy imperatives regarding the AU’s engagement in the continent’s peace and security landscape. First, it indicates the limitation of the AU to articulate a common African position towards external intervention in conflict settings where the Union has been involved historically as well as how to contend with some of the shifts related to these intervenions. Second, the involvement of Russian mercenaries and Rwandan forces in the CAR helps to showcase two major emerging trends in Africa’s peace and security. At one level, it illustrates the ascendance of Russia (for example, in Mali and the CAR) and Rwanda (Mozambique and the CAR) as external interveners in some of the conflict hotspots on the continent. The CAR also became a battleground for growing superpower rivalry on the continent, in this case between France and Russia, as the latter dislodges the former’s influence, including from areas considered France’s traditional mainstay and historical partners.58 Third, the situation in the CAR also signifies the AU’s persisting constraints regarding implementation capabilities and the political will to maintain its involvement. Finally, on the positive side, the CAR also demonstrates how the AU has collaborated with regional actors – such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and ECCAS – and global players – notably the UN and the EU – without insisting on taking a lead role in the quest towards sustainable peace in the country.
The year 2021 was a tumultuous one for Chad as unfolding internal political and security dynamics triggered regional and continental ripple effects. On 19 April, presidential elections were held in the face of rebel offensives and in a political environment force marked by little challenge from the opponents of incumbent President Idriss Déby. The election culminated in an unsurprising victory but was followed by a major turn of events. The country’s military announced that the president died of wounds sustained in the battlefield; one day before, provisional results had indicated his re-election for a sixth term. Déby’s death set in motion complex consequences for Chad, the region, and even for the AU. In Chad, the question over succession to power immediately came to the fore. The constitution provides for the speaker of the parliament to take charge of the country in case the president dies. In an apparent departure from this provision, the military announced the establishment of a Transitional Military Council led by Déby’s son, General Mahamat Déby. Across the region, uncertainties emerged about whether or not Chad could maintain its crucial role in the fight against violent extremism in the LCB and Sahel regions. For the AU, it was a critical test for its handling of the military’s takeover of power.
The AU followed a more circuitous and contested route in handling the transition. In short, it did not proceed to sanction Chad as it did earlier in the case of the coup in Mali in 2020 or in other subsequent cases of military takeover of power in 2021 in Mali (for a second time in May), Guinea (September), and Sudan (October). In a clear policy departure from these cases, rather than sanctioning Chad, the PSC authorised the deployment of a PSC fact-finding mission to engage with Chadian authorities on all issues of the transition, including an investigation into the killing of the president and restoration of constitutionalism (AU PSC 2021h).
The fact-finding mission took place from 29 April to 5 May 2021. Its report highlighted Chad’s precarious security standing, including external aggression, the threat of mercenaries, and terrorist attacks by Boko Haram, the ISWAP, and other armed groups operating in the LCB (AU PSC 2021k). The PSC spared Chad from any immediate sanctions – justifying its decision on Chad’s unique role and contributions to the fighting terrorism in the LCB and the Sahel regions, as well as the country’s complex political and security predicament. At the same time, it called for a civilian-led, inclusive and consensual transitional process within an 18-month review of the Transitional Military Council’s transitional charter. Following the PSC’s call, on 24 May the AU also appointed Ambassador Basile Ikouébé as the AU special representative of the AUC chairperson and head of the AU Office in Ndjamena. Prior to Ambassador Ikouébé’s appointment, Chad refused the decision to have Ibrahima Fall fill the same post owing
The PSC’S subsequent engagement with Chad was its 1016th session on 3 August 2022. The PSC appeared to have a relatively positive appraisal of the progress made, notably the establishment of a civilian transition government and the process for establishing the NTC. In addition, it called for an all-inclusive dialogue, insisted on the completion of the transition in 18 months, and strongly indicated that the members of the Military Transition Council should not stand as candidates for the elections at the end of the transition (AU PSC 2021r).
Notwithstanding Chad’s political and security situation remaining volatile, the country did not follow a chaotic path as initially predicted. There were concerns that Déby’s death may lead to the deterioration of Chad’s role in the fight against terrorism in the region; nonetheless, it continued to fulfil its regional commitments within the G5 Sahel arrangements and the MNJTF. The AU’s attempt to perform a balancing act by not sanctioning Chad in the wake of the military takeover of power was to set a disturbing precedent.60 The AU appeared to have nearly averted such precedent by making a course correction in the succeding cases of Mali, Guinea, and Sudan. Nonetheless, it remains one indication of the ambivalence of the AU and its member states in dealing with UCG s as stipulated in the relevant norms laid out in the 2007 African Chater on Democracy, Elections and Gvernance and the 2000 Lomé Declaration (see also the op ed by the first AU commissioner for peace and security, Djinnit 2021).
2.5.3 Burundi
In 2021, the AU characterised Burundi as one of the country situations that has made progress (PSC 2021i; AU Assembly 2022a, §9). The AU highlighted improvements in Burundi’s political and security situation that ‘culminated in the successful organization of the election in 2020, the formation of a new government, and the betterment of its relations with its neighbours’ (AU PSC 2021i, §1). Considering the overall improvement of the political and security conditions indicated above, the PSC decided to end the mandate of the AU Human Rights Observers and Military Experts Mission in Burundi on 31 May 2021 and to remove Burundi from the agenda of the council (ibid.). This follows a similar decision by the UN in December 2020. However, concerns over
2.5.4 Cameroon
The situation in Cameroon showed signs of intensification by different measures. The situation in parts of Cameroon was unfolding owing to several factors: confrontations between the Cameroon army and armed separatist groups from the two Anglophone regions, incursions by armed groups affiliated with Boko Haram in the Far North region as well as local conflicts between farmers and herders (AU Assembly 2022a). According to the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, the crises over autonomy or secession, which it characterised as ‘limited war’ in 2020, escalated into war in 2021 and the violent number of causalities saw a sharp rise since 2020 (HIIK 2021, 69). Even though the separatist groups did not exert much territorial control, they resorted to the use of improvised explosive devices (IED s) and launching sporadic attacks on the military, the police, and other state representatives.62
For the major part, the government maintained a militarised approach in responding to the conflict, framing it as an internal security matter to be addressed through the full range of the state’s law and order mechanisms and therefore not warranting external intervention.63 However, the government also took some non-kinetic measures to respond to the crises, even though the real impact of these measures has yet to be seen. The government was also preparing to host the African Cup of Nations, including in stadiums located in the anglophone region.
As in the previous year, Cameroon did not see much AU engagement in 2021. Despite the evolution of the conflict and its likelihood of continuing in the future, regional and continental actors, including the AU, did not give it the attention it deserved.64 The conflict did not feature in the PSC’s or the AU Assembly’s discussions in 2021. As Cameroon is a member of the PSC, it could have exerted diplomatic pressure so that the PSC would not discuss the conflict in its anglophone regions. In this sense, Cameroon typifies the AU’s challenge to deal with the question of the sovereignty of states while it strives to foster collective response to peace and security issues on the continent. Despite the lack of the PSC-level engagement, the AU acknowledged Cameroon as one of
2.5.5 Democratic Republic of Congo
The AU framed the DRC as one of the country situations that is showing improvements despite ongoing violence in parts of the eastern DRC, principally due to the activities of local and foreign armed groups as well as intercommunal tension (AU Assembly 2022a, §10). However, this assessment may not sufficiently reflect the state of affairs in the country, including the multiple sources of instability. For instance, the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer designated the DRC, along with Ethiopia, as a country with the highest number of full-scale wars in 2021 (HIIK 2022, 65). Major security woes emanated from the militant activity in the eastern provinces and North Kivu, usually in close proximity to depots of mineral resource exploration; the large-scale, violent attacks by the Islamist Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in different parts of the country; as well as clashes between Burundian opposition groups, on the one hand, and the governments of Burundi and the DRC and the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), on the other (ibid.). In an unprecedented move to contain and possibly eradicate the activities of the armed groups, DRC president Félix Tshisekedi launched l’Etat de siege on 6 May 2021 in North Kivu and Ituri to deal with what he called ‘negative forces’. The military and judicial operation was initially planned to last three months but remained in place throughout 2021 to ensure stability for the population, according to the administration.
In addition, political tension mounted over the National Independent Electoral Commission and the shifting of alliances among the country’s key political actors to form a new ruling coalition, which took an entire year. As the newly elected president, Tshisekedi started to assert his power after emerging from the shadows of former President Joseph Kabila, testing old coalitions and unveiling new alliances. The new president started to engage more actively in the region and with its neighbours as it relates to the security situation in the eastern DRC. In fact, the DRC’s relations with Rwanda and Uganda showed signs of improvement owing to regular high-level meetings among their leaders (see Hans Hoebeke and Onesphore Sematumba, this Yearbook, chapter 4.)
Like the previous year, the PSC did not have a session dedicated to the situation in the DRC; however, it was part of its discussion of the Great Lakes region on 21 January. The PSC welcomed UNSC Resolution 2556 (2020), which extended
3 Outlook
The worrying peace and security trends that prevailed for a significant part of 2021 leave little room for an optimistic outlook on 2022. The ‘hodgepodge of negative factors’ that beleaguered Africa in 2021 is likely to spill over into 2022, including the scourge of violent extremism, a resurgence of UCG s, and intrastate conflict (AUC Chairperson 2022a). Such bleak assessment is underpinned by the deep roots of the multiple crises, notably governance deficits and socioeconomic malaise, that will continue in the coming years. A range of factors is also at play in compounding Africa’s peace and security predicament. Growing confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine and other forms of big power rivalry are likely to escalate, with clear implications for the global economic and political situation and likewise for Africa. Coupled with the Covid-19’s lingering impact on African economies and harsh climate change across the continent, such disputes will worsen the social and economic drivers of conflicts on the continent. It is worth highlighting some of the most salient conflict trends and troubling situations that will continue to test the AU in 2022.
Addressing governance deficits and making political transitions work: A few more UCG s are expected as militaries in beleaguered states position themselves as providers of solutions to the entrenched challenges highlighted above. In addition, complex political transitions ushered in by the military usurpation of power in 2021 will enter a difficult implementation phase in Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan. The resolve of the AU and the REC s, which have already sanctioned coup leaders in some of these contexts, will be critically tested if military juntas decide to extend their sojourn in such transitions.
For instance, Sudan will embark on a complex dialogue process to conclude the transition process. The dialogue will be challenging owing to the gradual hardening of the positions of the various actors involved.65 The primary fault line will be between those who wish to see a civilian-led democratic rule and those seeking the status quo that allows the military to remain in power.
Dealing with violent extremism: Violent extremism will continue to be the primary source of instability across the continent. In the Sahel, the threat of violent extremism continues to interlace with communal conflicts, socioeconomic deficits, and the influence of global terrorist groups. Violent extremist groups in West Africa will likely threaten to further spread towards the coast, targeting countries such as Ghana, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire. Moving from the prevailing securitised approach to dealing with crises to a more comprehensive approach that considers politics and a development-centred approach will remain a lacking imperative. Cracks within the international coalition against violent extremism will likely widen with growing tension, especially between France and Russia. In the LCB region, the Boko Haram threat and the group’s territorial control may see further reduction due to the military offensives of the MNJTF and countries in the region. However, possible leadership contest within the ISWAP will likely occur, together with potential repercussions for counterterrorism operations. In addition, countries in the area will be confronted with the complex tasks of effectively dealing with former combatants leaving the various terror groups.
In Southern Africa, major operations by the Mozambican government, Rwandan forces, and the SAMIM will continue throughout the year and contribute to restricting the capacity of the insurgents to control territories and launch attacks on major economic infrastructure. This might entail a change in the nature of warfare or how Islamic militants may decide to continue their insurgency. Insurgents may embrace possible strategies and tactics such as spreading violence to northern Malawi and southern Tanzania instead of concentrating their operations in the coastal areas and holding the harbour town of Mocimboa da Praia in the previous year, as they did in 2021.
Ending protracted conflicts and full-scale wars: Some protracted conflicts are unlikely to be resolved; rather, they will be compounded by unfolding political and security dynamics. Somalia will continue to struggle with political contestation between the current president and his political opponents, and the road to the planned election will be a bumpy one. Such political dispute will have direct consequences for the mission that will replace AMISOM, undermining the solid political foundation that needs to accompany the mission’s operations. In the DRC, contestation over electoral processes will exacerbate the country’s security predicament. Even with the election being set for 2023, 2022 will be a crucial year in which uncertainties over the electoral process will
The stalemate around Western Sahara will most likely continue. Rivalry among the region’s major powers, Algeria and Morocco, may de-escalate; however, their competition will continue to frustrate global and continental efforts to resolve the Western Sahara issue. The AU may succeed in revitalising the engagement of the troika, but the latter’s contribution hinges on the composition of its members.
While the war in northern Ethiopia has temporarily subsided, a lasting resolution will not be in sight in 2022. A number of interrelated political processes must be watched keenly to comprehensively address the country’s multiple sources of instability, namely the onset and progress of a national dialogue, possible mediation efforts with Tigray’s insurgents, and discussions of how prominent international actors engage with the resolution of the crises constructively. In Cameroon, the government is likely to intensify its offensive campaigns against the separatist groups. Despite there being a broad recognition that the government’s current militarised approach is insufficient, a continuation of a similar course is expected in 2022.
In conclusion, the combined effect of the above-mentioned trends and other crises will continue to weigh heavily on the AU’s ability and commitment to ensure stability in the continent. To avert a looming crisis of legitimacy and relevance, the AU is increasingly called upon to revisit the vitality of its peace, security, and governance architectures. The AU may initiate new processes and reinvigorate existing ones to scrutinise its role in responding to UCG s and addressing the governance deficits; find better ways of dealing with violent extremism, reigning in the security sectors in effective governance frameworks; and enhance its relations with the REC s/RM s.
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Somalia alleges Kenya interferes in its internal affairs by supporting rival politicians in some of its regions.
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Interview with a researcher, 30 March 2021 (virtual).
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ICG Briefing (166) [Brussels], 3 February 2021.
ISS Today [Pretoria], 25 June 2018.
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ICG Briefing (166) [Brussels], 3 February 2021.
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ISS PSC Report (136) [Pretoria], June 2021, 2–3.
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ISS PSC Report (142) [Addis Ababa], December 2021/January 2022, 12.
Interview with a researcher, 30 March 2021 (virtual).
PSC Insights [Pretoria], 17 December 2021.