1 Introduction
The psychological theory underlying Platoâs Gorgias has been notoriously difficult to come to grips with. The trouble stems from the fact that at different stages of the dialogue Socrates expresses what appear to be incompatible views about the nature of human motivation. Thus, while the conversations with Gorgias and Polus contain strong evidence for a strictly âintellectualistâ theory of desire, according to which all desires are manifestations of the agentâs conception of the good, the conversation with Callicles is replete with claims that seem to attest to a psychological theory that takes non-rational desires and,
Scholars have suggested various ways to deal with this apparent inconsistency. One familiar solution is to take the Gorgias as a transitional dialogue, one whose earlier part reflects Socratesâ (or Platoâs early) fully intellectualist theory of motivation, according to which all human desires are manifestations of the agentâs prudential judgment about what the best course of action for them is, yet whose later part shows traces of Platoâs own (or his later) tripartite theory of the soul which famously acknowledges that some desires arise from non-rational loci in the psyche.2 Others have argued for a unifying reading, claiming that Socratesâ apparently conflicting claims about motivation are in fact fully compatible with each other. This, it is claimed, is because, unlike what is presupposed by more traditional interpretations of Socratic intellectualism, Socratesâ (or Platoâs âearlierâ) view of human motivation does not preclude
In what follows I shall suggest a new way of dealing with Socratesâ disparate claims about motivation in the Gorgias. As we saw, the current âunifyingâ interpretation of these claims holds that Socratesâ acceptance of the possibility of psychic struggle and disharmony in the second part of the dialogue is indicative of his basic view of the human psyche, according to which the psyche contains non-rational loci of motivation which are liable to produce desires that conflict with the agentâs beliefs about the good. In contrast to this, I shall argue that Socratesâ claims about the need to practice self-control and his acceptance of the possibility of mental conflict are completely consistent with a fully rationalistic theory of desire, one which takes all the agentâs desires to be reflections of his considered, and hence revisable, conception of the good. Yet, as I shall proceed to show, recognizing the congruity between a fully rationalistic psychology and the phenomenon of mental conflict requires us to alter our conception of the âgoodâ which is definitive of the idea of a rational desire. In contrast to the underlying presupposition shared by both the traditional view of the tenets of Socratic intellectualism and the revisionist unifying reading, I shall argue that the relevant notion of the good is not that which features in an agentâs prudential judgment concerning which course of action is all-things-considered most beneficial for her, but rather that which is embodied in her basic scheme of values.
My point of departure for attempting to question the popular ânon-rationalistâ construal of the desire for pleasure in the later part of the Gorgias (a construal which is common to both competing current interpretations) is Socratesâ exchange with Callicles in 499bâ500a. Let us begin by reminding ourselves of the context of the exchange: Socrates here presents an argument in response to Calliclesâ apparent change of heart regarding the status of pleasure: Calliclesâ original claim was that the attainment of pleasure is the sole human goal, and that the desire for it must remain unhindered by any external or internal constraints. Callicles was able to maintain this position throughout Socratesâ various attacks on it, until the argument at 497eâ499b which I shall refer to as the âArgument from Pleased Cowardsâ (henceforth APC). In the course of that argument, Socrates showed that it is inconsistent to claim that pleasure is the sole human good and to also hold, as Callicles seems to do, that some people are better than others in virtue of being wiser and braver.5 If pleasure is the good then, assuming people become good by virtue of coming to have the good in them (491e1â3), it follows that cowardly soldiers become better than their courageous companions each time they come to feel (cowardly) pleasure at seeing the enemy flee from battle (499a7âb3). Following this argument Callicles retracts his original position and brazenly claims that all along his considered view had been that only some pleasures constitute the human good, and that others are in fact bad (499b6â8).
(1) âgoodâ pleasures are beneficial ones, i.e. those that are conducive to certain desired states such as health or strength, whereas âbadâ pleasures are harmful ones, i.e. those that are conducive to the opposite states, namely, sickness and infirmity (499d1âe1).
(2) beneficial pleasures and pains are to be pursued, whereas harmful pleasures and pains should be avoided (499e3â5).6
(3) All items or actions that are not categorically and invariably good must be pursued for the sake of the good (499e6â500a2).
(4) Pleasant actions are to be pursued for the sake of the good and not for the sake of pleasure (500a2â3).
On the face of it, APC and AIV together form the following sequence: APC refutes Calliclesâ original position that pleasure is the sole human good, and leads him to acknowledge that while pleasure is in fact intrinsically good, there are other considerations one must take into account when pursuing a good life, considerations which place some limit on the pursuit of pleasure. AIV takes up this revised position and argues for the conclusion that pleasure does not, in fact, belong to the category of goods at all, since it is desirable only as a means to the promotion of items that, unlike it, are invariably and intrinsically desirable.7
But now, consider the following oddity about AIV. Premise (3) of AIV refers back to the argument with Polus which relied on an analysis of human motivation. According to the basic principles revealed in that analysis, the objects of our desires fall into two distinct kinds. The first kind consists of objects such as taking medicine, running or sailing which, in themselves, are conceived of as neither good nor bad. The value of these objects, and hence their ability to become objects of desire, is strictly dependent on whether or not we take them to be conducive to favorable results. Such actions, referred to as âintermediatesâ
Notice also that the psychology in question has an important concomitant which is quite clearly presupposed by Socratesâ subsequent remarks to Polus. As we saw, Polus identified health, wealth and wisdom as items that belong to the category of intrinsic goods and which therefore function as consistent and invariable objects of desire. But, should Polus realize that one of these items, say wealth, has mere instrumental value, his desire for it should thereby also undergo a change and become strictly conditional upon his assessment of its conduciveness to whatever now remains in the category of intrinsic goods. This means that unconditional desires are not brute facts about the human psyche, but are themselves dependent on the agentâs presently held conception of the intrinsic goodness of their objects. While such desires may not be as fickle as conditional ones â since an agentâs conception of his basic values does not typically alter according to varying circumstances â Socrates nevertheless assumes that they too are open to revision, consequent on some thorough process of intellectual progress (or, perhaps also intellectual decline). That such change in oneâs conception of the objects of intrinsic value is possible should appear obvious when we reflect on the fact that the desire for wealth cannot be a brute fact about our psyche but is derivative on the contingent fact that we grow up in societies where its accumulation is possible. And, in fact, it seems clear that Socrates relies precisely on the possibility of such a change in our values when he urges on Polus that justice is the sole criterion for happiness (470e4â11). Since Polus did not formerly include justice in his list of intrinsic goods (in fact, Polus holds that it is not even instrumentally valuable), it follows that Socrates presupposes that oneâs conception of value is open to reconsideration.
These facts about the principles introduced in the argument with Polus must now make AIV appear odd for the following reason: While premise (3) of AIV explicitly relies on these principles, both it and the argumentâs conclusion in (4) are framed in the prescriptive mode, i.e. that all things must be done for the sake of the good (á¼Î½ÎµÎºÎ± Î³Î¬Ï ÏοÏ
Ïῶν á¼Î³Î±Î¸á¿¶Î½ á¼
ÏανÏα ⦠ÏÏακÏÎον εἶναι, 499e6â7), and hence that pleasant activities too must be performed for that reason (Ïῶν á¼Î³Î±Î¸á¿¶Î½ á¼Ïα á¼Î½ÎµÎºÎ± δεῠκαὶ Ïá¼Î»Î»Î± καὶ Ïá½° ἡδÎα ÏÏάÏÏειν, 500a2â3), and not for their own sake, i.e. not for the pleasure they provide. But this must surely appear strange since the argument with Polus leaves no room for any normative claims regarding our pursuit of intermediates. A prescriptive
I would like to suggest that rather than making us doubt Platoâs merits as a philosophical author, the difficulty before us should be taken as an incentive to rethink the entailments of a fully intellectualistic theory of the soul. The underlying assumption of current readings of the Gorgias is that Socratesâ talk of mental conflict and his advice to curb and chastise recalcitrant desires presuppose his acknowledgement of non-rational desires. This, as we have seen, leads either to a reading which finds two distinct psychological theories in the Gorgias, or to one which denies that Socrates ever held that all desires are necessarily good-oriented. In what follows I shall attempt to take a different route and argue that there is no incompatibility between a fully rationalistic psychology and the phenomenon of mental conflict. But, as we shall see, this will require us to alter our conception of what is meant by the idea that all desires are oriented towards the good. The popular construal of the idea that all desires are good-oriented is that a desire to perform a given action is necessarily the manifestation of the agentâs judgment that this action constitutes the all-things-considered best practical alternative for him or her to take. Since, presumably, two distinct practical alternatives cannot both be judged as âbestâ or maximally prudent, it follows that the agent cannot experience conflicting desires for distinct actions. In contrast to this reading of what the good relevant to an intellectualist psychology is, I shall suggest that when Socrates claims that desires are aimed at the good he is not thinking of the agentâs particular prudential judgments, but rather of what I shall term the agentâs general âvaluesâ. These values, we shall see, are precisely the items that fall under the category of intrinsic goods discussed in the argument with Polus.
A prescription to curb and chastise a desire for pleasure presupposes that an agent can judge that it is best for him not to pursue a pleasant action and yet, at the same time, experience an intense desire for that action based on the recognition that it will cause him pleasure. How can this fact be accommodated by a psychological theory that assumes all desires are manifestations of judgments concerning the good? In order to answer this question, it will be profitable to reexamine Polusâ list of intrinsic goods. Polus had agreed that wealth, health and wisdom are all desired for their own sake. Accordingly, and in contrast to desires for intermediates such as killing and exiling, he must take the agentâs desire for these goods to be unconditional, i.e. to be consistent and unmitigated by considerations of any possible contingencies. But now, consider the following scenario: Polus has come upon the opportunity to conduct a highly lucrative business transaction with several battle-hardened yet quite un-business-savvy Spartans. In fact, the lucrativeness of the transaction involves cheating the Spartans of what should be their rightful share in the profits. Polus has a burning desire to conduct the transaction, yet is held back by his fear of physical retribution that is likely to follow once the Spartans recognize they have been conned. Ultimately Polus, who reasonably values his physical integrity more highly than his financial flourishing, decides to refrain from acting on the desire to conduct the unjust and lucrative yet physically injurious business transaction. Does Polus experience genuine mental struggle in this case, or does his judgment that it is better to refrain from unjust action lead to the dissipation of the desire to cheat? It seems to me that the principles of the psychological theory he and Socrates agreed on dictate that the former is the case.12 Since (what are taken by the agent as) intrinsic goods are objects of invariable and consistent desires, the theory should lead us to expect that in this case Polus will be plagued by two conflicting desires at the same time: one which is aimed at the most lucrative course of action and one which is aimed at the action most conducive to health, which Polus also takes to be the most prudent.
I suggest then that the theory of motivation presented in the conversation with Polus places certain constraints on the occurrence of desires. These constraints reflect a demand for coherence among simultaneously held values. This entails that conflicting desires can stem from a single, purely rational, source of motivation, as long as these desires are aimed at goods which are, in principle, compatible with each other.14 The fact that it may not be possible to
And now, in light of these suggestions, let us return to our initial difficulty about AIV. Consider Calliclesâ attitude to pleasure, and the change it undergoes in the course of his conversation with Socrates. Calliclesâ initial position, which he upheld until faced with the conclusion of APC was that pleasure is the sole human good. According to the analysis of desire presented in the conversation with Polus, this means that Calliclesâ desire for pleasure should be persistent, i.e. unconditional and unhindered by any recognition of mitigating circumstances. Calliclesâ revised position, adopted as a result of APC, entails that there are in fact goods other than pleasure, and that these goods place some limit on the desirability of pleasant actions, thus leading to his recognition of the distinction between âgoodâ and âbadâ pleasures. But what, precisely, is the relation between these newly recognized goods and pleasure? Specifically, are these goods compatible in principle with the idea that pleasure is an intrinsic good (in the same way that Polusâ health and wealth are compatible), or are they such that recognizing their status as intrinsic goods will necessarily lead to a revision in Calliclesâ conception of the value of pleasure?
Why are there no rational constraints on taking both pleasure and health to be intrinsic goods? One might initially suppose that there are in fact such constraints since the indiscriminate pursuit of pleasure is inevitably conducive to ill health. Thus, unlike the conflict between health and wealth which requires an imaginative scenario (Polus and the Spartans) in order to be brought out, one can point to a familiar and systematic adverse relation between the pursuit of some paradigmatic pleasures, such as luxurious food and excessive drink, and the attainment of health.16 Yet it is important to recognize that this systematic relation is nevertheless contingent, in that it depends on empirical facts about nutrition and the constitution of the human body. There is no conceptual constraint on imagining a world where the constant consumption of sweets or fat17 has no adverse effect on oneâs physique. Consequently, there is no noticeable incoherence in wishing both to be able to consume a limitless quantity of sweets and to remain in perfect health. This, I suggest, is a general fact about the relation between the notion of pleasure and the notion of âbenefitâ which Socrates unexpectedly invokes in premises (1) and (2) of AIV. Conceiving of the items that are traditionally associated with the notion of benefit, such as health and wealth as ends is fully consistent with treating pleasure in
In contrast to this, I wish to suggest that there is a basic (if perhaps veiled) incoherence in treating both virtue and pleasure as intrinsic goods. To see this, consider the following.18 Human beings, like all other animals, find it pleasant to consume food and drink when they stand in physical need of them. Since this feeling of pleasure increases or subsides in proportion to the degree of the bodyâs need of sustenance, there is a straightforward way in which, at least in the case of those endowed with a healthy physical constitution,19 the sensation of pleasure serves as an indication for when it is proper to consume nourishment and when it is proper to desist from its consumption. When thought of under this function, pleasure is conceived of merely as a means to an end, where the end in question is the attainment of vigor and health.20 Yet unlike other animals, human beings also have the technological capacity to embellish food so as to make it pleasing to the taste in ways that allow it to be enjoyed even after the bodyâs needs have been satisfied. Thus, human beings are unique among animals in having the capacity and (clearly) the tendency to seek out food and drink in a manner that is independent of their basic bodily needs and is detrimental to the attainment of vigor and health. This pervasive human attitude to food, drink and sex necessarily involves a different attitude towards pleasure than the one outlined earlier. In such behavior the value of the experience of pleasure ceases from being thought of as strictly subservient to the needs of the body and instead comes to be conceived as a goal whose value is unmitigated by and unconditional upon other circumstances.
And now, consider the additional fact that the persistent desire to pursue food, drink and sex in varieties and quantities that deviate from and exceed the bodyâs needs is definitive of the vice of intemperance. This connection between an excessive, luxurious and unhealthy diet, and the vice of intemperance is made explicit in many Platonic passages and, in fact, accords with the prevalent notion of his contemporaries about the nature of this vice. To give only a few examples, in Republic IV 425eâ426b Socrates claims that chronic
Exposing the connection between the vice of intemperance and the belief that pleasure is intrinsically valuable should now allow us to see why it is incoherent to conceive of both temperance and pleasure as intrinsic goods. In order for this incoherence to become apparent, what needs to be emphasized is that it is possible to refrain from acting intemperately due to two distinct motivations, and while being under two correspondingly distinct psychological states. On the one hand, one can refrain from intemperate activity for the sake of preserving oneâs health. If we accept the idea that pleasure and health are compatible values, and bear in mind the theory of desire introduced in the conversation with Polus, we can see that an agent so motivated will continue to experience desires for intemperate activities even when she chooses to refrain from them. What needs to be emphasized is that agents of this kind do not feel aversion to intemperate activities as such, but merely to their physical consequences (whose negative value, they believe, outweighs the pleasure they afford). According to these psychological principles, agents who succeed in acting temperately merely for the sake of health will do so through the exercise of self-control.
Yet one can also refrain from intemperate action due to the belief that intemperance is intrinsically bad. What would be the consequent psychological and cognitive ramifications of taking temperance as an end, i.e. of acting temperately for the sake of temperance? Acting temperately in this manner should involve an aversion not towards the consequences of an intemperate diet but
If this is along the right lines, I would like to suggest the following story about the relation of APC and AIV, and the corresponding explanation for why in the course of AIV and even after its conclusion has been accepted Socrates continues to speak to Callicles as if the desire for pleasure is an ineliminable feature of our psyche. APC, which brought to the fore the tension between the idea that both pleasure and virtue are goods, is an argument whose proper conclusion is that pleasure is not an intrinsic good at all. Yet Callicles is not in a position to recognize this conclusion. The reason for this is that the incongruence between the idea that the pleasant and the fine are both goods is most manifest in the case of a particular species of the fine, namely, temperance. But it is part and parcel of Calliclesâ position that temperance is not, in fact, a virtue on par with wisdom and courage and is not a genuine species of the fine at all. Unlike Socrates, who holds that courage, wisdom, justice and temperance are all manifestations of one and the same intellectual and psychological state (506câ507c), Calliclesâ position is that unlike courage and wisdom, justice and temperance are fine merely by convention yet base by nature (483a, 491eâ492c). As a consequence of his detachment of temperance from courage and wisdom, Callicles cannot see the principled incongruity between these
It is for this reason that, in presenting the premises of AIV immediately following Calliclesâ acceptance of the conclusions of APC, Socrates describes the additional goods Callicles has been forced to acknowledge in terms of health and âthe beneficialâ rather than virtue and âthe fineâ. What prompts this substitution of the beneficial for the fine is the fact that, unlike temperance and the fine, health and the beneficial can be treated as values alongside pleasure with no apparent contradiction.21 In light of this, and assuming that Socrates really is committed to the moral and intellectual improvement of his interlocutor (rather than merely winning the argument), I would like to suggest the following: pointing to âthe beneficialâ as a constraint on the pursuit of pleasure is, as it were, a necessary first stage in the dialectical cure for the perverted intellectual state of someone who, like Callicles, starts out holding the view that pleasure is the sole good and refuses to acknowledge even the instrumental value of temperance. Rather than vainly forcing him to admit that temperance is not merely useful but also intrinsically valuable and that pleasure is not a good at all, Socrates chooses to begin by alerting Callicles to the fact that he too would accept some constraints on the pursuit of pleasure, even if he does hold pleasure to be intrinsically valuable. These constraints, which are presented as the requirements of health and strength, i.e. goods that pertain to the body, turn out to be coincidentally those of temperance, in that the strategy that best promotes them corresponds to the dictates of temperance. Socratesâ first step then is to induce Callicles to accept the instrumental value of temperance by having him admit that he too can recognize the intrinsic value of health or the beneficial.
This now allows us to resolve the problem of the prescriptive mode used in AIV and to see that Socratesâ subsequent claims about the need to chastise
And the very same rationale explains Socratesâ subsequent injunction that Callicles practice temperance in the form of self-control. This prescription is relevant for anyone who has not yet attained an understanding of the true value of virtue and who, consequently, treats it as mere means to an end. Since taking, e.g. temperance to be valuable merely as an instrument (in the form of a dietary strategy) for securing health leaves one with recalcitrant desires for pleasure, attempting to live temperately will require one to chastise and control their desire for the latter. Yet â and this is the crux of the matter â both motivations are fully rational in that they both reflect the agentâs conception of what is non-derivatively good in a human life. Thus, the need to chastise
Bibliography
Barney, Rachel. âPlato on the Desire for the Good.â In Desire, Practical Reason and the Good, edited by Sergio Tenenbaum, 34â64. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Brickhouse, Thomas and Nicholas Smith. Socratic Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Cooper, John M. âThe Gorgias and Irwinâs Socrates.â The Review of Metaphysics 35,3 (1982): 577â587.
Devereux, Daniel. âSocratesâ Kantian Conception of Virtue.â Journal of the History of Philosophy 33,3 (1995): 381â408.
Irwin, Terence. Plato: Gorgias, Translated with Notes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
Irwin, Terence. Platoâs Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Moss, Jessica. âHedonism and the Divided Soul in Platoâs Protagoras.â Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96,3 (2014): 285â319.
Penner, Terry. âDesire and Power in Socrates: The Argument of âGorgiasâ 466A-468E that Orators and Tyrants Have No Power in the City.â Apeiron 24,3 (1991): 146â202.
Reshotko, Naomi. Socratic Virtue: Making the Best of the Neither-Good-nor-Bad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Vlastos, Gregory. âIntroduction: The Paradox of Socrates.â In Gregory Vlastos, The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Gregory Vlastos, 1â21. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971.
Vlastos, Gregory. Socrates Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
For the purpose of the discussion to follow, the idea of a ânon-rationalâ motivation will be that of a desire that is independent of the agentâs considered notion of the good, i.e. one which is not amenable to revision or reorientation following any sort of reconsideration by the agent of the identity of the good. Thus, the possible question of whether non-rational parts of the soul, such as those introduced in the Republic, actually conceive of their objects under the notion of the âgoodâ is irrelevant for my purposes, since even if this were the case, this notion would still be rigid and unsusceptible to revision. While this is not the place to argue the point, it seems to me that the idea of a fully rigid conception of the good, one which is not based on any process of deliberation and is hence in principle immune to revision, is a contradiction in (Platonic) terms.
For this solution, see Terence Irwin, Plato: Gorgias, Translated with Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 218.
For the âtraditionalâ view see Terence Irwin, Platoâs Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 83â4; Terry Penner, âDesire and Power in Socrates: The Argument of âGorgiasâ 466A-468E that Orators and Tyrants Have No Power in the City,â Apeiron 24,3 (1991): 147; Gregory Vlastos, âIntroduction: The Paradox of Socrates,â in The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 15â16.
This view of Socratesâ psychology in the Gorgias was originally articulated by Daniel Devereux, âSocratesâ Kantian conception of virtue,â Journal of the History of Philosophy 33,3 (1995): 381â408. He is followed, with some important revisions, by Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), ch. 2 and 3, as well as by Naomi Reshotko, Socratic Virtue: Making the Best of the Neither-Good-nor-Bad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch. 4.
I take it that Calliclesâ admiration for courage and wisdom does not stem merely from their potential conduciveness to maximizing pleasure. Had that been the case, it would have been open to him to object to APC by claiming that the isolated case of pleased cowardly soldiers does not alter the general fact that courageous action is the best overall strategy for maximizing pleasure. In order for APC to have any force, Callicles must take courage and wisdom to be intrinsically better than their opposites. Yet, as I shall attempt to show in what follows, since Callicles does not properly understand the nature of these virtues, there is a sense in which he cannot be said to genuinely consider virtue or the general category of âthe fineâ to have intrinsic value.
While it is not stated explicitly, the inference from (1) to (2) must rely on the tacit assumption that the negative value of these harmful states outweighs the positive value of the pleasure that is secured in the actions leading to them, and that the positive value of the beneficial states outweighs the negative value of the pain involved in attaining them.
Socrates does not explain what he has in mind here in the claim that pleasure is merely instrumentally good. I shall deal with this issue directly at a later stage in the paper.
It is important not to read the passage as making the blanket denial that intermediates are ever objects of desire. While Socrates does introduce the notion of intermediates in 467câd by claiming that we do not desire actions such as sailing or taking medicine but only those things for the sake of which we perform them, such as health and wealth (οὠÏοῦÏÏ á¼ÏÏιν ὠβοÏλονÏαι, á½ ÏοιοῦÏιν á¼ÎºÎ¬ÏÏοÏε ⦠á¼Î»Î»á¾½ á¼ÎºÎµá¿Î½Î¿ οἶμαι οὠá¼Î½ÎµÎºÎ± ÏλÎÎ¿Ï Ïιν, ÏÎ»Î¿Ï Ïεá¿Î½), at 468c he claims that we do in fact desire intermediates whenever we take them to be conducive to the attainment of ends (á¼á½°Î½ μὲν á½ ÏÎλιμα á¾ ÏαῦÏα, Î²Î¿Ï Î»Ïμεθα ÏÏάÏÏειν αá½Ïά, βλαβεÏá½° δὲ á½Î½Ïα Î¿á½ Î²Î¿Ï Î»Ïμεθα). The apparent contradiction between these two claims is relieved by Socratesâ immediately preceding remark, that we do not desire intermediates âjust like thatâ (á¼ÏÎ»á¿¶Ï Î¿á½ÏÏÏ 468c3). It seems clear that the purpose of this phrase is to qualify the earlier blanket claim that we do not desire intermediates, and to explain precisely in what way we do in fact desire them. The point is not to deny that agents ever form desires to perform or attain intermediates, but merely to emphasize that such desires are strictly conditional upon certain clearly defined circumstances (here, I am in agreement with Penner, âDesire and Power,â 178â9).
It is common for commentators to talk of these goods as if our desire for them is in fact dependent on our conception of them as instrumental for the attainment of an ultimate good, namely, happiness; see for example Gregory Vlastos, Socrates Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 224â232; and Penner âDesire and Power,â 181. Yet Socrates here says nothing to hint that he conceives of happiness as the only genuine intrinsic good and of these other goods as subordinate to it in some sense.
In giving this account of the theory of motivation introduced in the argument with Polus I am setting aside a basic issue which is central to the treatment of these passages, namely, whether Socrates takes desire to be aimed at the agentâs own notion of the (intrinsic) good, or at the genuine good â even if that good happens to be at odds with the agentâs conception of it. While I cannot treat this issue adequately here, the following remarks will help situate my view in regard to it: while it is evident that Socrates does hold some objectivist conception of the good, I am assuming (as will become clear in what follows) that this does not conflict with his commitment to the idea that different characters are distinguished from each other by the distinct values, i.e. distinct conceptions of intrinsic goods, to which they subscribe. The attachment to such values is paramount for explaining their actions and general orientation of their practical exertions. Thus, as will become clearer in what follows, I take it that the notion of the âapparent goodâ must play a central role in Socratesâ explanation of human motivation. For a highly lucid account of the issues concerning the relation between the apparent and the real good as objects of desire, along with what seems to me a very good suggestion for how they should best be addressed, see Rachel Barney, âPlato on the Desire for the Good,â in Desire, Practical Reason and the Good, ed. S. Tenenbaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
This should be enough to dispel any idea that the distinction is meant to apply only to rational desires and that Socrates means to leave open the possibility of our being attracted to intermediates in some non-rational, i.e. good-independent manner, e.g. for fun. Such a suggestion might attempt to appeal to the fact that in presenting the distinction, Socrates uses only the verb βοÏλομαι and never á¼ÏÎ¹Î¸Ï Î¼ÎÏ. Accordingly, it might be claimed that Socratesâ view is that while no one would ever âwishâ an intermediate á¼ÏÎ»á¿¶Ï Î¿á½ÏÏÏ, one might still âdesireâ it in this immediate, non-derivative way (for a suggestion of this kind, see Devereux, âVirtue,â 403â4). But, first, as I have said, the assimilation of intermediates such as running to the act of taking medicine rules out this alternative desiderative attitude to intermediates. Second, Socrates does in fact pick out a motivation for performing intermediates which is distinct from wishing, namely, âdoing what one likesâ (Ïοιεῠἠδοκεῠαá½Ïá¿·, 468d4). Yet this phrase is identified with the notion of doing âwhat seems bestâ (οἰÏÎ¼ÎµÎ½Î¿Ï á¼Î¼ÎµÎ¹Î½Î¿Î½ εἶναι αá½Ïá¿·, 468d3). So, even when tyrants perform intermediates which (it turns out in retrospect) they had no wish for, they nevertheless act in accordance with their conception of the good.
While Socrates does claim that we pursue intermediates such as running âif we think it is betterâ (οἰÏμενοι βÎλÏιον εἶναι, 468b2), there is no need to take this claim as a commitment that desires always follow prudential judgments. The context is simply a general explanation of why we bother to perform intermediate actions which we would otherwise have no motivation to perform. Socrates is not speaking here of the resolution of complex deliberations involving incompatible desirable courses of action, such as the one I am describing.
It seems to me that the value whose adoption as an intrinsic good would lead to this shift in Polusâ scheme of values and to a corresponding change in his desiderative orientation in relation to wealth is justice. Though I will not argue for this specific claim, my reasons for thinking that justice and, in general, the fine, are incompatible with taking wealth to be intrinsically valuable will become clearer in what follows (see especially note 22 below).
Thus, my position contrasts with those who, like Jessica Moss, hold that a plurality of values entails a corresponding plurality of loci of motivation in the soul. There seems to be no principled reason why one could not rationally subscribe to a plurality of values, as long as these are not mutually exclusive. While it may turn out that a proper understanding of what is valuable in a human life will ultimately result in the adoption of a single value to the exclusion of others, this in itself is not the result of any logical constraints on the number of values one can rationally subscribe to, but an entailment of the identity of the particular good which happens to be the true one for human beings to hold. J. Moss, âHedonism and the Divided Soul in Platoâs Protagoras,â Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96,3 (2014).
To clarify: I do not mean to suggest that prudential judgments do not lead to the formation of desires for action. My point is merely that under Socratesâ rationalistic conception of the soul, one need not conceive of an action as all-things-considered best in order to desire it. The fact that prudential judgments do lead to the formation of desires is precisely what allows for the occurrence of mental conflict between the agentâs practical orientation or âchoiceâ and her recalcitrant desire for a course of action that conflicts with this choice.
For a clear statement of Platoâs acknowledgment of this fact see Grg. 518câe, and also Resp. IV 425eâ426b.
Or, if one prefers the ancient parallels to these modern dietary trends â meat (Resp. II 373câd); excessively seasoned food (Hippocrates, Ancient Medicine 14); eels and gray mullets (Hippocrates Internal Affections 6).
The following account of the repercussions of treating pleasure as intrinsically valuable will at best appear coherent yet speculative. It forms part of a broader project in which I am currently engaged which has yet to see the light of print.
Note Platoâs emphasis on this requirement in Grg. 505a.
I do not mean to imply that animals take pleasure as an instrumental good. Clearly, the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value requires a capacity for abstraction that is unavailable to animals. Rather, my point is that animals naturally seek pleasure in a way that corresponds to their basic bodily needs, and that this would correspond to a rational animalâs recognition that pleasure is merely an instrumental good.
As further confirmation for the claim that pleasure is compatible with the beneficial but not with the fine, note that in the argument Socrates presents to Polus at 474câ475e, whose purpose is to prove that committing injustice is worse than suffering it, Socrates introduces a premise which reduces the value of âthe fineâ to that of pleasure and benefit (474dâ475a). I would like to suggest that, far from reflecting Socratesâ own view of the value of the fine, this premise is tailored to Polusâ intellectual state which does not acknowledge the intrinsic value of the fine (in his case the relevant species of the fine is justice rather than temperance). For our purposes, it is important to see that the premise in question entails that it is possible to treat pleasure and benefit together as values. It also shows that we should not expect anyone who subscribes to these values to treat the fine as intrinsically valuable.
Note that the use of the prescriptive mode here suggests that the practical judgment about a given pleasant action being damaging to health is, in itself, insufficient to overcome the desire to pursue it. If such practical judgment did inherently control action, there would not be a need for the normative claim that we should stick by it. Thus, the kind of rationalist psychology underlying AIV seems to be congruent not merely with mental conflict but with the possibility of akrasia. This seems to me an innocuous repercussion (even in light of the argument in Protagoras 351bâ358a) once we remember that, according to the reading I propose of Socratesâ psychology, the agent who possesses knowledge of the good will experience neither akrasia nor mental conflict. Thus, mental conflict and akrasia are both dependent on ignorance of the good.
I wish to thank VladimÃr MikeÅ¡, David Machek, and Michael Russo for substantial comments on earlier versions of this paper which helped me clarify my view.