1 Introduction
The capacity of the doer to give purpose and meaning to the deed, or intentionality, is a major theoretical and practical concern of Islamic ethics. This chapter illuminates this concern by recourse to a study of the Prophetic report often called the ḥadÄ«th of intention: âActions are indeed [evaluated] according to intentions.â I approach this report as an entry point into broader debates on human agency in Islamic ethics. To that end, this chapter pursues the following questions: What is the relationship between intention and action? Does the former cause the latter, or does action construct inner life? How do commonly shared motivations create community and how are such motivations cultivated? Where have Muslim jurists and Sufis converged and diverged in their approaches to intentionality? Are intentions performative (embedded in devotional practices and social transactions) or a matter of the heart (presupposing a self that stands behind bodily actions)?
I grapple with these questions in three conceptual frameworks, which is to say that I relate the ḥadÄ«th of intention to (1) the dialectic of inside (bÄá¹in) and outside (áºÄhir), (2) communal formation, and (3) the distinction between the transcendental and empirical aspects of juridical-moral norms. My argument, simply put, is that studying the ḥadÄ«th of intention in relation to these conceptual frameworks reveals the resourcefulness of ḥadÄ«th discourse for thinking about ethical agency, since the commentarial literature on this report elaborates a complex view of intention as a psychosomatic orientation that conjoins the self to the Other, the individual to the community, and morality to legality.
At the outset, I find it apropos to mention my personal motivation for pursuing the question of intentionality and ḥadÄ«th discourse. I suspect that this chapter is an attempt on my part to grapple with the challenges posed to intentionality by psychoanalysis, especially the writings of Sigmund Freud (d. 1939) and Jacques Lacan (d. 1981). I have especially struggled to come to terms with two challenges stemming from my study of their writings. First, they hold that the subject of consciousness is not fully self-transparent and one often acts without total knowledge of oneâs latent motivations. Second, they contend that it might be impossible to constantly orient oneself towards a transcendental signifier, that is, to constantly focus on God, when most of oneâs actions are embedded in social networks of recognition.
The commentarial literature on the ḥadīth of intention allows us to think creatively about both challenges posed by psychoanalysis. This is so because Muslim ethicists have elaborated nuanced views of interiority that approach inner life as a theatre of struggle between instinct and reason. They have also acknowledged the social nature of action as well as the communal, even political, import of intentionality. Thus, I read the Islamic ethical insistence on the necessity of introspection, the struggle to purify motivation, as an attempt to constantly destabilise the moral certitude practitioners of piety might enjoy about their actions. In other words, by linking intention to self-probing ethical reasoning, the Islamic ethical tradition posits moral action as a site of self-transcendence.
Now, a note on what follows. I commence with a brief discussion of the ḥadÄ«th of intention that locates my inquiry in the turn to practice on the part of religious studies scholars. This section also illuminates how thinking about intention through the lens of religious practice involves attention to its historical scene of emergence, its meaning in concrete social contexts, and the âdiscursive formationsâ (or what I have called conceptual frameworks) in which it has been historically understood. To that end, the following sections consider the biography of the ḥadÄ«th scholar who popularised this report in the middle of the second/eighth century (section 3); how this report has been linked to political action and communal formation (section 4); the textuality of its citation in its locus classicus, namely, al-BukhÄrÄ«âs (d. 256/870) á¹¢aḥīḥ (âAuthenticâ) (section 5); the reception of this report, and intentionality more broadly, in classical-era Sufi writings (section 6); the necessity of approaching intention in Islamic ethics as simultaneously empirical and transcendental (section 7); finally, the conclusion considers the methodological salience of using ḥadÄ«th texts to think about key concepts in the study of Islamic ethics.
2 Intention and the Turn to Practice
The three conceptual frameworks I mentioned above are alluded to in the âthe ḥadÄ«th of intention,â which I cite below:
Actions are indeed [evaluated] according to intentions, and in fact what belongs to a man is what he intends. So, whosoever migrates towards God and His Messenger, let it be known that his migration is for God and His Messenger. So, whosoever migrates to pursue the world or to marry a woman, let it be known that his migration is for what he migrates towards.
al-BukhÄrÄ« 2011, 1:180â1811
The reportâs ethical significance was clear to classical-era Muslim religious scholars. For instance, the famed jurist Muḥammad b. IdrÄ«s al-ShÄfiÊ¿Ä« (d. 204/820) allegedly said: âThis ḥadÄ«th contains seventy portals into âreligious understandingâ (fiqh) ⦠and encompasses one-third of âreligious knowledgeâ (Ê¿ilm).â2 This Prophetic report has thus been cited copiously and continuously in Muslim religious discourses to underscore the ethical principle that the doerâs motive is an important source for determining the moral status of the deed. The ḥadÄ«th fleshes out this principle by recourse to an example, what I call âethnographic illustration,â that is, an example considering how people might practice the principle at hand.
The ḥadÄ«th of intention places motive at the heart of action, a move that has wide-ranging purchase in both legal and Sufi ideas about human agency (that is, the capacity to transform oneself and oneâs social world through action). Yet the Islamic ethical principle concerning intention (niyya) is not only about being conscious of oneâs motivations; it also involves truthfulness and sincerity: âintention signifies sincerity; it is a unitary act for the sake of God, the One without peersâ (Ibn Ḥajar 1969, 1:12). This is what we might call the pietistic understanding of intention, which has often been elaborated in Sufi texts. At the same time, the idea that Sufi theologians are concerned solely with the transcendental aspects of intentionality is also problematic. As the foremost Sufi theologian and Muslim mystical author of the seventh/thirteenth century Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ« (d. 638/1240) writes: âWhile intention is unitary with respect to its essence, it changes with respect to its object, and so the consequence of an intention, too, depends on its objectâ (Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ« 1997, 1:256). Niyya thus concerns how one desires in the heart but also what one desires in the world. Muslim jurists, in turn, consider the moral status of devotional rituals, social transactions, and criminal behaviour. The key question here is: How does empirical action mirror inner motive? Jurists answer this question on a case-by-case basis, complicating our understanding of the inside-outside relationship.
The broader ethical principle underlined by this ḥadīth thus becomes: because bodily action can reveal, conceal, and displace inner motive, we must approach niyya in contextual, concrete terms. This is another way of underscoring the centrality of practice and contingency in ethical theory. The fact that Sufis and jurists have accentuated different aspects of this ethical principle does not necessarily imply that we are talking about two different religious practices. Rather, we can take the Sufi insistence on the inside and the juristic emphasis on the outside as reflecting the two sides of religious practice: the transcendental and the empirical. I address the latter conceptual dichotomy below. Here, let me say more on the advantages of approaching intentionality through the lens of religious practice.
Several scholars of religion have argued for nuanced approaches to religious practice. In her influential ethnography of Egyptian Muslim womenâs participation in the so-called Islamic Revival of the 1990s, anthropologist Saba Mahmood underscores âthe morphology of moral actionsâ (Mahmood 2005, 25, 119). She argues that when examined as micropolitical strategies, Muslim womenâs practices of piety can no longer be depoliticised as docile submission to authority, as is often done within secular liberal feminist frameworks. In her focus on practice as a site for understanding ethical life, historian of religion and social ethicist Anna Peterson posits practices of âmorality as a living, collective, and active undertakingâ (Peterson 2020, 6). The sociologist of religion Robert Wuthnow argues that intention cannot be ignored in any examination of religious practice, since practitioners use rituals to âarticulate and enact their intentionsâ (Wuthnow 2020, 104). He further argues that we must attend to the macrostructures in which religious practices are situated and in which intentions are âreinforced, aligned, and favorably [or unfavorably] assessedâ (Wuthnow 2020, 104). These macrostructures include âpower dynamics, social interactions, and discursive formationsâ (Wuthnow 2020, 13). The turn to practice in religious studies, therefore, allows us to place intentionality in Islamic ethics in multiple historiographical, political, and conceptual frameworks. In what follows, I have especially attempted to situate the ḥadÄ«th of intention in relation to its salient âdiscursive formations,â namely, the dialogue of the inside and outside, political action and communal formation, and the transcendental and empirical aspects of juridical-moral norms.
3 The Popularisation of the Ḥadīth of Intention
To appreciate how this report underscores the dialogue between the inside and outside (as well as the implications of this dialogue for the practice of Islamic ethics), it is important to first study its historical scene of emergence. It was the traditionist YaḥyÄ b. SaÊ¿Ä«d al-Aná¹£ÄrÄ« (d. 143/760 or 144/761) who first brought this report into wide circulation in the middle of the eighth century. A student of the so-called âseven jurists of Medina,â YaḥyÄ b. SaÊ¿Ä«d was a famed scholar of Prophetic traditions and a master-jurist in his own right. His pre-eminent status as a man of piety â according to some observers he was an urbane ascetic â made him attractive to the administrators of law and order in the Islamic imperium. The Umayyads appointed him judge (qÄá¸Ä«) of Medina around the year 743 (Judd 2014, 158). The Ê¿AbbÄsids followed suit and appointed him qÄá¸Ä« when they established rule in the Iraqi city of HÄshimiyya. The prosopographical literature remembers YaḥyÄ for emphasising sincere intentions and pious actions. The Damascene historian and ḥadÄ«th scholar Shams al-DÄ«n al-DhahabÄ« (d. 748/1348) informs us that âYaḥyÄ is the [chief] narrator of the Prophetic report about actions and intentions, and it is from him that this ḥadÄ«th became popular. It is said that around 200 people narrated this report from himâ (al-DhahabÄ« 1996, 5:476â481).
YaḥyÄ is therefore the âcommon linkâ between narrators of this report before his time period and the succeeding generations of narrators. The term, âcommon link,â was coined by the Orientalist Joseph Schacht (d. 1969) to refer to the narrator who popularised a tradition: âthe existence of a significant common link (N.N.) in all or most isnÄds of a given tradition would be a strong indication in favour of its having originated in the time of N.N.â (Schacht 1979, 172). The Dutch historian of ḥadÄ«th G.H.A. Juynboll (d. 2010) brought a more nuanced view to this phenomenon and joined Schacht in using âthe common linkâ to âestablish the date and place of origin of individual ḥadÄ«thsâ (Motzki 2004, xxxviii). Yet both Schacht and Juynboll associated the common link phenomenon with forged reports. Harald Motzki (d. 2019) challenged their view by insisting that the common link is not necessarily the forger of a tradition, but in many instances a narrator who might be âcharacterised as an early systematic collector who professionally passed his material on to students in a teaching circleâ (Motzki 2004, xl). This view is more sympathetic to the approach of Muslim traditionists, since for them the common link phenomenon did not automatically imply forgery or invention; rather, it only signalled one of the many defects of transmission that must be considered in evaluating a reportâs authenticity and normative evidentiary status (Aghaei 2020, 114â115).
The point to underscore here is that it was YaḥyÄ who popularised the ḥadÄ«th of intention, as is brought out in Juynbollâs âchain of narrationâ (isnÄd) for this report:
IsnÄd chart of the ḥadÄ«th of intention (Juynboll 2007)
We can only speculate why YaḥyÄ might have frequently engaged in the teaching of this ḥadÄ«th, since âthe early historical literature on ḥadÄ«th and rijÄl does not contain a single clue as to the reason why ⦠YaḥyÄ â¦ may have brought the tradition into circulationâ (Juynboll 2007, 677). At the same time, Juynboll does insinuate that YaḥyÄâs âjudicial activities may have dictated the need for such a niyya maximâ (Juynboll 2007, 677). This is a valid interpretation because intention is an important aspect to consider when judging human actions in juridical settings. Let me suggest two additional interpretations.
First, the time period in which YaḥyÄ was a qÄá¸Ä« coincided with the tumultuous decades that witnessed the transition from the Umayyads to the Ê¿AbbÄsids. While recent scholarship has emphasised a continuity between the two empires instead of the âruptureâ presumed by earlier scholars, the two decades of the 740s and the 750s nonetheless saw significant transition in power and patronage. The era was therefore ripe, one might argue, for proliferating a Prophetic teaching that used intention to emphasise loyalty to religion, including in acts of migration. In fact, YaḥyÄ himself migrated from Medina to Iraq. This contextualisation allows us to appreciate how ethical ideas accrue value, and how moral practices become normative, in relation to particular social and political dynamics.
Second, the biographical literature on YaḥyÄ portrays him to be incredibly learned in ḥadÄ«th and jurisprudence and also exceptionally committed to devotional religion (al-BukhÄrÄ« 1941â1964, 4.2:275â276; al-MizzÄ« 1983, 31:346â359; al-DhahabÄ« 1996, 5:468â481; Juynboll 2007, 668). I would like to suggest that he might have popularised this ḥadÄ«th for the sake of exhorting his co-religionists to monitor their motives and to cultivate sincerity. Thus, his profuse transmission of this ḥadÄ«th might be seen as an antidote to the habituated, dry practice of devotional religion.
4 Community and Political Action
The attention to YaḥyÄ b. SaÊ¿Ä«d enables us to identify the possible social and political contexts in which early Muslims might have cited this report. Yet it is important to underscore that this ḥadÄ«thâs linking of intention to political action resonates generally with how intentionality figures in the broader ḥadÄ«th discourse. This section first mentions those reports that maintain this link and then discusses the political implications of intention. To begin with, let me mention a report mentioned in ShÄ«Ê¿Ä« sources:
Actions are indeed according to intentions, and in fact what belongs to a man is what he intends. So, whosoever fights for the sake of what is with God the Loftiest, he will surely find his reward with God the Loftiest. And whosoever fights desiring something of this world, then there is nothing for him except what he intends.
al-Majlisī 1983, 67:2123
Consider also the tradition, âThere is no migration after the Conquest of Mecca, but in terms of armed struggle and intention and if you are called to go forth, then go forth [in armed struggle]â (al-BukhÄrÄ« 2011, 6:7â8).
In his discussion of intention, the famed Muslim moral theologian AbÅ« ḤÄmid al-GhazÄlÄ« (d. 505/1111) mentions the following reports that further link intention to political acts such as warfare and migration:
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Anas b. MÄlik (d. 93/712) reports: âThe Prophet said during the TabÅ«k campaign: âThere are many in Medina who, while still in the city, are joined with us in every valley we have crossed, every path we trod that vexed the unbelievers, every provision spent or hunger felt.â The Companions asked, âHow could it be, O Messenger of God, if they were not with us?â He replied: âThey were excusably detained and partook by way of good intentionââ (al-GhazÄlÄ« 2010, 6:132; al-GhazÄlÄ« 2013, 6; al-BukhÄrÄ« 2011, 8:619â620).
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âHe who fights with the intention only to have his share [of the booty] shall have only what he intendsâ (al-GhazÄlÄ« 2010, 6:133; al-GhazÄlÄ« 2013, 6).
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âFighters fight according to intentionsâ (al-GhazÄlÄ« 2010, 6:134; al-GhazÄlÄ« 2013, 7).
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âWhen the two rows meet, the angels descend to record men their rank: so-and-so fought for the world (dunyÄ); so-and-so fought zealously (ḥamiyya); so-and-so fought for clan (Ê¿aá¹£abiyya). Therefore, say not that this person fell in the path of God, for only he who fights to make Godâs word supreme is on Godâs pathâ (al-GhazÄlÄ« 2010, 6:135; al-GhazÄlÄ« 2013, 7).
While scholars have questioned the authenticity of some of these reports, these reports do enable us a glimpse of how later authors such as al-GhazÄlÄ« underscored the political context in which intention mattered as a concept in early Islam. These reports suggest that communal belonging and political action were especially relevant to early Muslimsâ ethical thought and practice. Thus, Kevin Reinhart identifies âmembership in/leadership of the communityâ as one of the two primary concerns of formative âIslamic theological ethics,â the other being âpredestination/moral responsibilityâ (Reinhart 2005, 250). He insightfully explains that these two issues were âinextricably bound togetherâ and posed a major question for those who aspired to the âmoral rigorism of early Islam:â Does âmoral failure mean expulsion from the community?â (Reinhart 2005, 250).4 The moral failure that was linked to political belonging included failures in both devotional rituals and pious intentions.
How do intentions become political? The ḥadÄ«th of intention uses the example of migration, namely, the migration of the early believers from Mecca to Medina. We know that according to the standard biographical tradition, the Prophet Muḥammad migrated to Medina after thirteen years of preaching in his hometown of Mecca. For a believer to migrate with Muḥammad implied leaving behind home and family ties. Migration was thus an act of fidelity, which demonstrated oneâs commitment to an ideological community (instead of a tribal community). However, what if a believer had migrated for a reason other than pleasing God and joining Muḥammadâs community? What if one had migrated for the sake of a prospective marriage partner or to sell oneâs merchandise in a new market? Is this migration also an act of fidelity and does it also secure political belonging? The ḥadÄ«th of intention questions this type of migration. ḤadÄ«th commentators state that this report is about a person who had allegedly migrated from Mecca to Medina for the sake of marrying a woman named Umm Qays (Ibn Ḥajar 1969, 1:10; al-SuyÅ«á¹Ä« 1986, 37â38). Consequently, the man became known as âthe migrant of Umm Qaysâ (muhÄjir Umm Qays). While the story is hard to verify, it does furnish us with the context needed to understand the practical, and in fact political, implications of intention. The strong connection we see between the ḥadÄ«th of niyya and community-forming political actions, such as migration and warfare, suggests that the idea of pure intentions served to consolidate loyalty in believersâ hearts, so that the onset of adversity and adversaries would not weaken believersâ attachment to the faith community. The particular example of âthe migrant of Umm Qaysâ gives an incredibly political charge to intention, signifying intentions as personal and political.
5 Al-BukhÄrÄ«âs Creative Citation
The above explanations underscore the point that the ḥadÄ«th of intention is deeply connected to the dialectic of inside and outside and that intentionality is at once a matter of private devotion and political belonging. I now turn to the locus classicus of this ḥadÄ«th, namely al-BukhÄrÄ«âs á¹¢aḥīḥ, to examine some further aspects. This famed collection of Prophetic speech commences with this report, and it is significant that al-BukhÄrÄ« placed it at the beginning of a chapter concerning the lofty theme of divine revelation (waḥy), suggesting, albeit implicitly, that the Prophetâs sincere search for truth was rewarded in the form of QurʾÄnic revelation, for God gifts one according to oneâs intentions. Recall the Prophetâs foundational migration, one that took him from commercial engagements to contemplative experiences on the Mount of Light. By taking up solitude in a cave outside Mecca, the Prophet Muḥammad intended to find transcendental meaning and message. Because what God gifts people corresponds to their intentions, the Prophet received divine revelation as the reward of his foundational quest/intention to find God. Here, at least two questions must be addressed. First: Why does al-BukhÄrÄ« include the ḥadÄ«th of intention at the beginning of âThe Book of Revelation?â Second: What is the significance of starting with ârevelation?â5 The ḥadÄ«th commentator, Ibn Ḥajar al-Ê¿AsqalÄnÄ« (d. 852/1449), addresses both questions.
Ibn Ḥajar speculates about al-BukhÄrÄ«âs possible intent behind the textual decision to commence with this ḥadÄ«th. Imagine, the commentator asks his readers, the following words on al-BukhÄrÄ«âs lips: âI intended to collect the revealed Sunna transmitted from the Prophet Muḥammad â who is the best of all created beings â so that my [sincere] intention would ensure the goodness of my action [of compiling ḥadÄ«ths]â (Ibn Ḥajar 1969, 1:8; see also al-Qasá¹allÄnÄ« 1996, 1:67). Note how these words posit the Sunna a revealed text, hearkening back to al-ShÄfiÊ¿Ä«âs point that the Prophetâs speech was âcast into his heartâ by God.6 This is also the reason that al-BukhÄrÄ« begins a collection of ḥadÄ«th with ârevelation,â accentuating the revealed or scriptural nature of Prophetic speech. Thus, the reader is encouraged both to think of ḥadÄ«th as revelation and to engage in an act of purifying his or her intention for engaging in the study of ḥadÄ«th. In other words, the reader is indirectly being directed to contemplate this question: What motivates my engagement with divine revelation? In this way, al-BukhÄrÄ«âs textual decision to commence his collection by coupling revelation and intention performs the communicative work that is usually reserved for exhortative prefaces.
Ibn Ḥajar mentions that some commentators have suggested that al-BukhÄrÄ« cites this report in lieu of an opening âsermonâ or khuá¹ba (âexhortative prefaceâ in this textual context). This is so because in some traditions it is reported that the Prophetâs companion Ê¿Umar b. al-Khaá¹á¹Äb (d. 23/644) recited this ḥadÄ«th âon the pulpit,â and in another narration, the ḥadÄ«th begins with the Prophet saying, âO people! Actions are indeed according to intentions.â These textual cues lend support to the idea that this ḥadÄ«th is exhortative in substance, an ideal Prophetic aphorism befitting the sermon genre. We must also mention that by opening with this ḥadÄ«th, al-BukhÄrÄ« might be merely following tradition, an established custom of his righteous predecessors. In this regard, the following textual fragment from another Mamluk-era commentator, namely, Badr al-DÄ«n al-Ê¿AynÄ« (d. 855/1451), sheds some light: âThe predecessors [of the community] have preferred starting their discourse with the ḥadÄ«th of intention for the sake of indicating their sincerityâ (al-Ê¿AynÄ« 1970, 1:13). Note that Ê¿Abd al-RaḥmÄn b. MahdÄ« (d. 198/814) is reported to have said, âhe who wants to write a book, let him start with the tradition: works are to be judged by their intentions (man arÄda an yuá¹£annifa kitÄban fa-l-yabdaʾ bi-ḥadÄ«th al-aÊ¿mÄl bi-l-niyyÄt)â (Juynboll 2007, 676).7 These explanations attest to al-BukhÄrÄ«âs success in compiling a text that invites such rich observations on the part of commentators and readers. Let us now examine how other Muslim scholars approached the theme of intentionality.
6 Intention in Sufi Writings
The interplay between inside and outside as being a major feature of the Islamic ethical traditionâs understanding of intentionality is especially brought out in Sufi writings.8 In his al-RiÊ¿Äya li-ḤuqÅ«q AllÄh (âObserving Godâs Dueâ), a text that was âcomposed in the form of counsels given to a disciple in response to questions on his partâ (Smith 1935, 44), the mystical theologian al-ḤÄrith al-MuḥÄsibÄ« (d. 243/857) defines niyya as âthe resolution on the part of the believer to align his action to an idea from among ideas. Hence, when he determines that he will perform this particular action for this particular idea, then such a resolution is called niyya, be it for Godâs sake or for anotherâsâ (al-MuḥÄsibÄ« n.d., 246). Furthermore, al-MuḥÄsibÄ« says, âintention thus covers two meanings: the resolution to do a particular action and doing something while desiring a particular meaning [object of thought]â (al-MuḥÄsibÄ« n.d., 246). It is in this sense that I term niyya a psychosomatic orientation; it is an inner movement that is expressed by and embodied in physical action.
In his QÅ«t al-QulÅ«b (âNourishment of the Heartsâ) AbÅ« ṬÄlib al-MakkÄ« (d. 386/996) adopts a holistic approach to the centrality of niyya in everyday ethics: intention pervades not only the formal practices of piety but, also,
eating, drinking, attire, sleeping, and marital relations, since these are all actions for which one shall be questioned [by God]. If one performs these actions for Godâs pleasure, then they increase his tally of good works. However, if one undertakes these actions in pursuit of lust or for the sake of anotherâs pleasure, then they end up amplifying the tally of evil deeds. This is [the meaning of the Prophetâs words] for every man is what he intends.
al-Makkī 2001, 3:1342
Al-MakkÄ« additionally says that niyya is a gift of God and that a single action can contain multiple motivations. In this way, a single action becomes a source of plentiful merit. Such merit, however, is contingent on not only the doerâs knowledge of and assent to the revealed norms but also the grace of God (al-MakkÄ« 2001, 3:1343).
In al-GhazÄlÄ«âs thinking we find a finessed account of niyya. He retains the link between action and what al-MuḥÄsibÄ« calls idea (that is, between Ê¿amal and maÊ¿nÄ) and also al-MakkÄ«âs idea of âmultiple intentions.â However, instead of âideaâ or âmeaningâ (maÊ¿nÄ), al-GhazÄlÄ« opts for a more psychologically-laden word, namely, gharaḠ(aim or purpose). To that end, he cites the ḥadÄ«th under study in this chapter in a refined discussion of intention as well as sincerity (ikhlÄá¹£) and truthfulness (á¹£idq).9 For al-GhazÄlÄ« intention becomes especially relevant for highlighting the dialogue between the inside and outside, since he defines niyya as an âintermediate attributeâ (of the soul). He writes, âintention is the soulâs springing forth, direction, and inclination towards what it perceives as its purpose [intended object], in this life or in the hereafterâ (al-GhazÄlÄ« 2010, 6:155). âThe springing forth of the soulâ â inbiÊ¿Äth al-nafs, which one might even translate as the flow of the inner onto the outer â is a beautiful phrase that captures the dynamic way in which niyya mediates the inside and outside.
Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ« illuminates the relationship between the inside and outside through three analogies. Intention is like the bodyâs soul; it is similar to the rainwater that nourishes the ground of action; finally, action and intention are akin to word and meaning (Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ« 1997, 1:256â259). These multiple analogies allow us to view intention as source, sustainer, and substance of action. Yet Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ« also encourages us to approach intentions as taking place in a liminal space that is the scene of both coherence and displacement, unity and difference. He further complexifies this view when he posits the relationship between water and intention as ontological and not merely analogical. He does so in his discussion of purification rituals, where he elaborates the ingenious insight that the reason why some jurists do not require intention as a necessary condition for ritual ablution is because of the role water plays in this practice. Recall that according to QurʾÄnic discourse, water is the source of all life (Q 21:30). In Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ«âs imaginal schema, life/soul and intention are structurally identical (niyya for him is rūḥ maÊ¿nawÄ«). Thus, because water is life, its use in the practice of ablution already presupposes the presence of the soul (read: intention). Hence, there is no need to identify formal intention-making as a condition of ritual ablution, since the liquid substance one uses in this practice assumes the same relationship to flesh as intention does to action (Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ« 1997, 1:397).
7 Scholarship on Intentionality in Islamic Ethics
The deep resonance between the inside and outside insofar as the concept of intentionality in Islamic ethics is concerned has not always been appreciated by scholars. Paul Powers has studied the ritualistic and performative dimensions of niyya in Islamic law. He finds fault with those scholars who deploy niyya âto look for a âdeepâ or spiritual component of ritualâ (Powers 2006, 64). For Powers,
Niyya is what one does with the mind while making certain ritualised bodily movements and verbal utterances ⦠The legal texts do not indicate a capacity or mental mode such as âwillâ that is separate from, and which directs, the niyya. Rather, one simply intends, formulates niyya, and this is the inner self in a ritual mode. There is nothing âfurther insideâ than niyya, no âselfâ standing back while the mind/body performs the acts of ritual.
Powers 2006, 203
While Powers rightly draws attention to the âphysical, bodily, and praxis-oriented qualities so central to Islamic ritual law and practice,â his limited sources reflect only a provisional and partial view of niyya in Islamic law and ethics (Powers 2006, 72). For Talal Asad, this position sees ritual prayer, for example, as âan external effectâ even if âwill and intent are viewed as a conjoined internal causeâ (Asad 2018, 81).10 On my reading, however, Powers effectively partitions the inside and outside, leaving little room for understanding the meaning and function of ritual in the broader framework of Muslim piety.
I thus question Powersâ hasty conclusion about âno selfâ in ritual worship. Unfortunately, he does not engage with works of moral philosophy and legal theory, which do presuppose a moral self and discuss the transcendental consequences of actions.11 Pre-modern Muslim jurists in fact cited the ḥadÄ«th of intention in both works of substantive law and in texts of legal theory. I provide two illustrations to make this point.
My first illustration comes from the Andalusian jurist and littérateur Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064). He justifies his jurisprudential approach to the issue of buying and selling musical instruments by recourse to the ḥadÄ«th of intention. On the one hand, the sale of musical instruments is forbidden, argues Ibn Ḥazm, when the buyer intends to use such instruments in sinful behaviour (fisq), such as listening to music in a way that arouses illicit sexual desire. On the other hand, the purchase of the same instruments is permissible for someone who seeks self-comfort and pleasure (tarwīḥ al-nafs), which in turn might strengthen oneâs willingness to perform the devotional rituals. âHe seeks to enliven himself by means of music,â explains Ibn Ḥazm, âand he is obedient and virtuous, and his action [of buying these instruments] is validâ (Ibn Ḥazm 2003, 7:567; cited in Kaddouri 2013, 234). It is noteworthy that Ibn Ḥazm makes repeated references to a self that intends and becomes either pious or impious due to the effects of intention. The invocation of this âselfâ thus problematises Powersâ claim about the lack of a self behind ritual performance.
My second illustration comes from a text of legal theory. The Egyptian ḤanafÄ« jurist Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1563) discusses niyya in a major text on legal rules and axioms. He invokes the ḥadÄ«th of intention in his discussion of the juristic maxim, âthere is no reward except with niyya.â He explains that the ḥadÄ«th of intention occasions âa verdict on or a moral assessment of actionsâ (ḥukm al-aÊ¿mÄl), which is of two types: transcendental and empirical. The first verdict or assessment âpertains to the afterlife and concerns the question of reward or punishmentâ (Ibn Nujaym 1999, 17). We can call this âthe transcendental ḥukm,â to borrow words from Ebrahim Moosa (1998). The second assessment â or, âthe empirical ḥukmâ â concerns âthe validity or invalidity of actions in this worldâ (Ibn Nujaym 1999, 17). While a jurist often has to restrict himself to determine the empirical validity or invalidity of human actions, Ibn Nujaym acknowledges that intentions also have consequences in the afterlife and implicate a soul or self, a moral subject (al-ḤamawÄ« 2011, 1:63â67). The ḤanafÄ« jurist Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-ḤamawÄ« (d. 1098/1687) further clarifies that the ḤanafÄ«s â as opposed to the ShÄfiÊ¿Ä«s â lack consensus on the necessity of niyya as a prerequisite for the empirical validity of an action. Yet, the ḤanafÄ«s unanimously affirm the transcendental implications of niyya, that is, its significance for thinking about reward or punishment in the afterlife (al-ḤamawÄ« 2011, 1:63â67).12 Thus, the transcendental ḥukm, which pertains to the afterlife and implicates a soul, forms a part of the legal discourse about niyya (Moosa 1998).
These two illustrations â the first from Ibn Ḥazm and the second from Ibn Nujaym â serve to demonstrate my point, namely, that jurists are cognisant of moral subjectivity and attend to both the empirical and transcendental aspects of norms. I thus remain wary of the claim, on the part of Powers, that Islamic substantive law does not presuppose a moral self. Below I consider how other scholars have studied intention to highlight some alternative perspectives on the subject matter in the study of Islamic ethics.
The legal historian Oussama Arabi has studied niyya in the context of modern legal reform by concentrating on the Egyptian jurist Ê¿Abd al-RazzÄq al-SanhÅ«rÄ«âs (d. 1971) efforts to modernise Islamic law. The latter activated a subjectivist notion of intentions in legal practices by turning to the ḤanbalÄ«, and to a lesser extent MÄlikÄ«, treatment of intent or ulterior motive in contract law. The âpietist subjectivist bent of ḤanbalÄ« lawâ emphasises both the intent of the buyer and the seller (for example, with reference to an arms seller whose customer might use a purchased weapon to execute a mass shooting) (Arabi 1997, 220). This subjectivist bent appealed to al-SanhÅ«rÄ« because of its resonance with âthe modern French theory of the determining cause or motiveâ (Arabi 204). Al-SanhÅ«rÄ«âs reformist efforts illustrate that Islamic legal traditions can be read in multiple ways to support different ideas about ethics and moral responsibility.
The historical anthropologist Brinkley Messick directly approaches the question of subjectivity: is there a theory of the self that is implied in Islamic legal thought and practice? For Messick, the writings of Muslim theologians and jurists on intention elaborate âcrucial components of the legal theory of the sharÊ¿Ä« subjectâ (Messick 2001, 153). Messick emphasises the usefulness of contextualising this ethical subject within âa history of the self and the individualâ that is distinct from Eurocentric conceptualisations of subjectivity and individuality (Messick 2001, 151). The contours of the Muslim ethical self also become clear when this self is posited in relation to God. While a âseparation of intentionality and expressionâ does not characterise the divine word, human language indicates a lack of equivalence between thought and expression (Messick 2001, 178). It seems to me that the crucial point here is to appreciate the vulnerability and uncertainty that infuses all human intentions and actions. Thus, a moral action, according to the Islamic ethical tradition, expresses the agency of a self, but its immediate and final meaning remains contingent on two factors that exceed the self, namely, public interpretation and divine judgment.
Arabi and Messick both highlight the need to situate the jurisprudence of intent in broader social, political, and intellectual contexts. Likewise, it is also important to acknowledge the complex intersectional realities in which contemporary Muslims observe norms that they take to be divinely sanctioned, that is, norms based in the SharÄ«Ê¿a. Muslimsâ everyday practices are situated in networks of local and global histories (of nation-states, market economies, and ethical traditions) as well as vectors of embodied differences, such as race/ethnicity, class, gender, sexual orientation, and bodily capacity. As historian of Islam and Muslim feminist scholar Kecia Ali points out, âOur experiences differ dramatically based on our race and socio-economic status, our family configurations, our sexual orientations, our marital statuses, our geographic locationsâ (Ali 2016, 205). Thus, in our bid to identify the moral self, or ideas about interiority and subjectivity, we have to be cautious. The sources might reveal a reified self at work, but this generic âun-markedâ self will not do for everyone. In other words, after recovering a moral self in classical Islamic law, there still remains the question: How do we bridge the gap between the legal traditionâs idealised moral self, one who thrives in textual spaces, and ordinary Muslim selves, those who survive in physical spaces? The key is to engage in critical and creative acts of translation, whether translating between textual representation or social reality, or interior states and physical actions.
The need to approach intentionality within the contingencies of social life was acknowledged by Muslim moral theologians such as al-GhazÄlÄ«. For Ebrahim Moosa, al-GhazÄlÄ« saw intention as the elixir that purifies knowledge and practice. A focus on inner motive, Moosa argues, has the capacity to humanise those moral acts that appear as improper or subversive (Moosa 2005, 131). Thus, our judgments about our own actions and othersâ actions should resist the convenient but crude binary of good and evil. Sometimes, evil intentions lurk behind good deeds and vice versa. It goes without saying that the interpretation of intention is not so easy, but the point here is that attention to intent and motive complexifies, and can thus humanise, a range of actions whose moral status we might not understand at first sight. In his insightful commentary on al-GhazÄlÄ«, Moosa also theorises the central dyad that concerns us in this chapter, namely, the relationship between the inside and outside. These two terms animate a paradox that consists of an âinwardness of faith that is incommensurate with its outwardness â an exterior of faith not identical with its interiorâ (Moosa 2005, 132). This incommensurability, however, sets the stage for approaching Islamic ethics as a project of self-transcendence.
8 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the salience of ḥadÄ«th texts as important sources for the study of Islamic ethics as well as the need to engage with ethical themes and questions on the part of researchers in ḥadÄ«th studies. In the above analysis, I have situated âthe ḥadÄ«th of intentionâ in three discursive formations that illuminate its analytical purchase for the critical study of Islamic ethics. Intentionality in this ethical tradition is a psychosomatic orientation that presupposes the dialogue of self and society and relates to communal formation as well as the legal/moral divide of human actions (which I explored by looking at how intention is important for both the empirical and transcendental valences of juridical-moral norms). To a large extent, these three conceptual points of reference enabled me to grapple with the psychoanalytical challenges to the intentional subject. In the Islamic ethical tradition, the spiritual and material dimensions of intentionality are not easily separable. The actions we undertake with our limbs both extend and inform psychic life. The movements of the heart, too, seek bodily forms. Intention, therefore, is irreducible to inner experience or linguistic or bodily performatives. I have also suggested above that this view of intentionality resonates with scholarship on religious practices. Finally, I underscored the need to engage in critical and creative acts of translation when thinking about intention at the threshold of the inside and outside.
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This ḥadÄ«th, which is the first report recorded by al-BukhÄrÄ« in his á¹¢aḥīḥ, appears with slight modifications in six additional âbooksâ of this collection. Here, I cite the opening version in KitÄb Badʾ al-Waḥy (âBook of the Beginning of Revelationâ), BÄb Badʾ al-Waḥy Ê¿alÄ RasÅ«l AllÄh (âChapter on How the Divine Revelation Started to Be Revealed to AllÄhâs Messengerâ). For an insightful analysis of this report, see de Francesco (2013).
The first saying is cited from al-Khaá¹Ä«bâs (d. 463/1071) al-JÄmiÊ¿ (âThe Compendiumâ) and the second from al-BayhaqÄ« (d. 458/1066) (al-SuyÅ«á¹Ä« 1986, 42â43).
Let me mention here a few ShÄ«Ê¿Ä« reports in order to illustrate the fact that intentions are central in both SunnÄ« and ShÄ«Ê¿Ä« ḥadÄ«th canons. Ê¿AlÄ« b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 95/713) is reported to have said: âNo action is valid without intention.â The Prophet Muḥammad is reported to have said: âThe intention of a believer contains more goodness than his action, whereas the intention of the unbeliever contains more wickedness than his action, and every doer does according to his intention.â Here, action only brings forth a part of the intention, which contains more goodness in case of a good action and more wickedness in case of an evil action. This view of intention coheres with Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ«âs views discussed above, as soul and meaning are the standing reserves of potentiality from which bodies and words derive their actuality. Several reports attributed to JaÊ¿far al-á¹¢Ädiq (d. 148/765) are especially illuminating. For example: âThe needy and believing servant of God prays, âOh Lord! Grant me so that I can do this or that act of goodness. So, because God the Most Sublime and Sanctified knows the truth of his intention, God grants him the same reward that he would have received had he performed that action, for God is All-Encompassing and Ever-Kind.â In another narration, JaÊ¿far al-á¹¢Ädiq justifies the eternity of hellish punishment and paradisiacal pleasure based on the fact that God has perfect, eternal knowledge of believersâ and unbelieversâ intentions. For all reports, see al-MaÌzandaraÌniÌ 2008, 8:265â268.
Roy P. Mottahedeh briefly discusses the link between niyya and political loyalty with reference to vows in fourth/tenth century BÅ«yid contexts (Mottahedeh 1980, 65â67).
The ḥadÄ«th scholar Muslim b. al-ḤajjÄj (d. 261/875) opens his collection with âFaith,â while âPurificationâ opens the other four books of the six canonical books (al-kutub al-sitta) in SunnÄ« Islam.
In his al-RisÄla (âEpistleâ), al-ShÄfiÊ¿Ä« (d. 204/820) remarked: âBoth [the QurʾÄn and the Sunna] came to him [Muḥammad] from Godâs grace, just as God intended, and just as other acts of grace came to himâ (al-ShÄfiÊ¿Ä« 2015, 48â49).
Ibn Taymiyya (2004, 18:246) makes a similar point in his analysis of this ḥadīth.
This paragraph and the next two are also discussed in Mian 2022.
Al-GhazÄlÄ« approaches niyya under five subheadings: the virtues of good intention, its reality, how intention is superior to action, the relationship between action and intention, and the difference between intention and choice.
Asad further states: âWhat worries me about this way of looking at the problem is that the most important point of the prayer (the subject learning to articulate her faith) is missed, and the traditional norm being learned is confused with the experience of the performed â that is, with what she thinks the prayer means. The recited words and body movements in prayer aim not at creating a belief (an intellectual doctrine) but an attitude of reverence and a desire (intention) to get closer to God. I stress that I refer here not to the private experience of every performer but to the point of the prayer as stipulated by the discursive traditionâ (Asad 2018, 81).
Missing from Powersâ account are several important treatments of niyya by pre-modern and modern Muslim jurists and theologians. A broader view of niyya reveals that a host of traditionists and jurists themselves recognise its spiritual dimensions. See, for example, the following works on niyya, which are all missing from Powersâ book: Ibn AbÄ« l-DunyÄ (d. 281/894), al-IkhlÄsÌ£ wa-l-Niyya (âSincerity and Intentionâ); al-SuyÅ«á¹Ä« (d. 911/1505), MuntahÄ l-ÄmÄl (âUltimate Hopesâ); al-QÄrÄ« (d. 1014/1606), Taá¹hÄ«r al-Ṭawiyya (âSmootheing the Foldsâ); al-KÅ«rÄnÄ« (d. 1101â1690), IÊ¿mÄl al-Fikr (âActivate the Thinkingâ); Ibn Ê¿AjiÌba (d. 1224/1809), TashiÌl al-Madkhal (âSimplifying the Introductionâ); al-ḤusaynÄ« (d. 1332/1914), KitÄb NihÄyat al-IḥkÄm (âBook on the Goal of Legislationâ). In addition to these monographs, there are countless texts in various genres where Muslim authors from a range of disciplinary backgrounds comment on niyya.
See also Ibn KamÄl PÄshÄâs (d. 940/1534) discussion of this point in his treatise on the first âbookâ of al-BukhÄrÄ«âs á¹¢aḥīḥ (MajmÅ«Ê¿ RasÄʾil al-Ê¿AllÄma Ibn KamÄl BÄshÄ [âCollection of Treatises of the Scholar Ibn KamÄl PÄshÄâ]). Already in the late third/ninth and early fourth/tenth centuries, the Egyptian ḤanafÄ« jurist AbÅ« JaÊ¿far al-ṬaḥÄwÄ« (d. 321/933) argued that the report, âactions are indeed according to intentions,â does not establish âthe principle that the appropriate intention must accompany a speech act for the act to be deemed legally valid. He reinterprets the ḥadÄ«th as confirming simply that Divine reward in the hereafter for a given action correlates with the agentâs intention in performing the actionâ (Syed 2017, 160).