1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on seclusion (Ê¿uzla),1 which is a contentious theme that has barely been analysed, not least from an ethical perspective, as opposed to a mystical one. It behoves us to delve into this topic from the perspective of earlier works and other figures who wrote or compiled traditions on seclusion. I will begin therefore with a brief historiography of Ê¿uzla in Islam so that we may understand various ideas and works on this subject to better realise Ê¿Abd al-GhaniÌ l-NaÌbulusiÌâs (d. 1143/1731) contributions. This will follow with some historical context, followed by a selection of traditions which seem to capture al-NaÌbulusiÌâs motives, while a subsequent section will consider whether withdrawing benefit from society presents a problem, despite corruption within society. Finally, the virtue of humility will be evaluated to consider whether it may be congruent with secluding oneself from society.
Notions of âsocialityâ or interaction are inevitably bound by judgments of morality and relate to ethics, which means the nature and tensions of these relations may provide valuable insights, but the converse is also true, as argued by John Barbour, who believes that there is an urgent need for an ethics of seclusion (Barbour 2004, 4). This begs the question how seclusion relates to ethics and how this understanding may be achieved. If sociality, synonymous in Arabic with á¹£uḥba (companionship) and mukhaÌlaá¹a (social interaction) among Muslims, has been understudied, seclusion has had almost no attention.2 Yet, we are given the impression by al-NaÌbulusiÌ, in his main work on the topic: TakmiÌl al-NuÊ¿Å«t fiÌ LuzÅ«m al-BuyÅ«t (âPerfecting Praiseworthy Qualities by Imposing Home-Seclusionâ),3 that his seclusion was motivated by the ḥadÄ«th traditions which urge this practice, primarily in times of severe trials due to moral decline. The ensuing practice is meant to act as a protective buffer from society. Yet, it is undeniable that al-NaÌbulusiÌ felt little appreciated by society too, and this caused him considerable consternation. In fact, he turned his attention to seclusion partly for having failed to attain a prominent teaching position (Schlegell 1997). As an eminent scholar in an antagonistic society, he felt the need to justify his rationale via the application of the Islamic tradition to his social reality, which thereby granted him the prerogative to seek separation from society on theological grounds. Such an assessment appears in line with the task of moral knowledge, determining the right action in a particular situation, as Hans Gadamer argued, and the requirement for seclusion certainly demanded an appropriate response for a scholar of al-NaÌbulusiÌâs stature (Gadamer 1989, 313â317). We may furthermore extend what Gadamer said about law, to the sources al-NaÌbulusiÌ uses and his approach towards them, that is that they do not exist solely âin order to be understood historically, but to be concretised in [their] legal validity by being interpretedâ such that the interpretations may function in contexts (Gadamer 1989, 309). The TakmiÌlâs and GhÄyat al-Maá¹lÅ«b fÄ« Maḥabbat al-MaḥbÅ«bâs (âThe Peak of the Goal in Loving the Belovedâ) self-referential and part-ethnographical appraisals represent al-NaÌbulusiÌâs style of argument and showcase his deft use of the aḥadiÌth. Whereas moral texts written by preceding Muslim authors (such as many of those mentioned below) are usually written timelessly and, therefore, offer little or no insight into how the authorsâ practical lives, relations and experiences may have shaped their opinions or determined their intellectual trajectories and lived experiences.4
In Islam interpersonal social links are meant to strengthen peopleâs disposition to act in the correct way, while seclusion is typically discouraged (Leaman 1999, 125). Although al-NaÌbulusiÌ presents the Prophet as a moral exemplar, he does not make explicit comparisons between his own sequestering and the Prophetâs retreats, nor that he is undertaking it as part of his affiliation to the Sufi NaqshabandÄ« path. The main motivation for the Sufis to withdraw from society is imitatio prophetae â for our purposes here â the custom of the Prophet Muḥammad to isolate himself in a cave on Mount ḤiraÌʾ prior to Islam (Knysh 1999, 316). MaḥmÅ«d b. Ê¿AliÌ al-KaÌshaÌniÌ (d. 735/1334) in the MisbaÌḥ al-HidaÌya (âLantern of Guidanceâ) goes as far as to proclaim khalwa (seclusion) an innovation of the Sufis â the Sunna was, in fact, âsocial engagementâ (á¹£uḥba) and its âexcellence excelleth other excellencesâ â since the Prophetâs retreats preceded the sending of the Sunna. Al-KaÌshaÌniÌ does however soften his objection noting that for the seekers of God khalwa might be waÌjib, just as Moses required it to achieve propinquity to God so that he could converse with him (SuhrawardÄ« 1891, 41â42). Additionally, when oneâs faith is at peril we find the requirement to disassociate rather emphatic in the traditions around which al-NaÌbulusiÌâs arguments and conduct revolve.
Regarding emulation, âtrue Islam,â according to Ê¿AlÄ« SharÄ«Ê¿atiÌ (d. 1977), must be discovered ânot in scripture but in the activity of exemplary Muslimsâ something our figure is keen to emphasise (Lee 2018, 122).5 Indeed, one of the ways in which moral judgements are evaluated, modified and corrected is by âconsulting the behaviours of moral exemplars, who are widely acknowledged as deserving emulation,â or, at least, looked to for inspiration (Cuneo 2014, 17). Not only did al-NaÌbulusiÌ achieve such prominent acceptance among his contemporaries, his legacy was also spoken fondly of, even in the mid-twentieth century, although it had faded somewhat in the interim period after a few decades since his death. The preeminent Levantine scholar, YÅ«suf al-NabhaÌniÌ (d. 1350/1932), for instance, regarded him to be the âgreatest gnostic sageâ of the past three hundred years (al-NabhaÌniÌ 1983, 194).
Nevertheless, there had to be a higher ethical perspective that ennobled the action and attracted the respect of others even if this may not have initially featured as a motivation for al-NaÌbulusiÌ. Indeed, duty, obligation and rightness are but one part of ethics or morality, âthere is the whole other area of the values of personal and interpersonal relations and activitiesâ (Stocker 1976, 455). Such values belong to the throbbing centre of the human moral constitution, and, as Mark Sainsbury reminds us, âthe throbbing centres of our lives appear to be describable only in vague termsâ (Sainsbury 1996, 251). For the purposes of this study then, considering al-NaÌbulusiÌâs arguments in a phenomenological frame will be vital to aver a distinctive epistemological enterprise, and whether his attitude was influenced at all by personal relations. Even though his stated aim is to gather aḥadiÌth for instance, both the introduction as well as digressions further in the TakmiÌl expressing moral outrage reveal his discontent and loathing of society. These factors appear so dominant that even his mystical proclivities surprisingly pale beside them. The purpose of this chapter will be to evaluate the ethical stance of al-NaÌbulusiÌ regarding seclusion by assessing his use of ḥadiÌth through a critical analysis of his works which deal with this topic, mainly the TakmiÌl al-NuÊ¿Å«t fiÌ LuzÅ«m al-BuyÅ«t, GhÄyat al-Maá¹lÅ«b fÄ« Maḥabbat al-MaḥbÅ«b and briefly the WasÄʾil al-TaḥqÄ«q wa RasÄʾil al-TawfÄ«q (âThe Means of Truth-Seeking and the Letters of Providential Guidanceâ).
2 Historiography
Writings on seclusion in the very early period of Islam (around the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries) are mainly compilations of ḥadiÌth traditions subsumed in various works of ḥadiÌth literature, usually as chapters with varying lengths of traditions. The genre lodges itself embryonically into the broader works on zuhd (asceticism), which overlap chronologically with the earlier works on ḥadiÌth (sometimes even preceding them) and often taking the form of mere compilations of traditions. We begin to see some philosophical observations with more original theological contributions on the topic in the fourth century by AbÅ« SulaymÄn Ḥamd b. Muḥammad al-Khaá¹á¹ÄbiÌ (d. 386/996 or 388/998) which reaches its apogee in AbÅ« ḤaÌmid al-GhazaÌliÌ (d. 505/1111), whose disquisition is the most thorough of all works reviewed on this topic. Al-NaÌbulusiÌâs work blends this latter trend with a concerted delivery of two chapters of traditions with virtually no commentary, while in other areas of his work, he veers into a sociocultural critique interspersed with invectives aimed mostly at fellow scholars.
Ê¿Abd AllÄh b. al-MubÄrakâs (d. 181/797) al-Zuhd wa-l-RaqÄʾiq (âThe Renunciation and Heart-Softening Reportsâ) has 1627 traditions and according to Fuat Sezgin (d. 2018) it is the oldest book to have reached us from this period on the topic of zuhd (renunciation). According to Yunus Yaldizâs study on Ibn al-MubÄrak, seclusion was generally practiced by ascetics and renunciants (Yaldiz 2016, 46, 145). Zuhd is also connected to the idea of á¹£amt (silence) and dhikr (the recollection of God), as these are related acts of obedience which acquire greater significance during seclusion, as exemplified in the lives of personalities such as the Companion AbÅ« Ḥudhayfa b. al-YamÄn (d. 36/656) and RabÄ«Ê¿ b. Khuthaym (d. 62/682). In fact, á¹£amt and dhikr were sometimes used as metonyms for khalwa and Ê¿uzla (Yaldiz 2016, 164â165). Although the latter work is not about âseclusionâ per se it contains abundant traditions that refer to it.6
AbÅ« Bakr b. AbÄ« l-DunyÄ al-BaghdÄdÄ« (d. 281/894) compiled a work, al-Ê¿Uzla wa-l-InfirÄd (âSeclusion and Isolationâ), which continues in the vain of the early muḥaddithÄ«n by including a sanad (chain of transmission) for each report, many of which are statements by the salaf who gave importance to seclusion. In one such report a man comes to ShuÊ¿ayb b. Ḥarb (d. 196/811 or 197/812) and says he has come to socialise with him, whereupon he tells him that he has taken to isolation for forty-years. Ibn AbÄ« l-DunyÄ thereupon beseeches: âO God: I seek refuge in propinquity to one whose closeness distances me from youâ (Ibn AbÄ« l-DunyÄ 1997, 94). Ibn AbÄ« l-DunyÄ does not directly share his own thoughts on the topic although it seems quite likely that discussion of the subject arises from a favourable sentiment towards seclusion.
The earliest systematic monograph dedicated to the topic of seclusion appears to be KitÄb al-Ê¿Uzla (âThe Book of Seclusionâ) by al-Khaá¹á¹ÄbÄ« who was a ShÄfiÊ¿Ä« jurist and litterateur. Al-Khaá¹á¹ÄbÄ« was not promulgating isolation by any means, rather, he was arguing for avoiding the company of bad associates even if that meant quarantining oneself. He argued: âan excess in all things is reprehensive. The best of affairs is in moderation; virtue is flanked by evilâ (al-Khaá¹á¹ÄbÄ« 1990, 236). Moreover, isolation, does not entail leaving the Friday or quotidian congregational prayers nor avoiding greeting others or abandoning various noble customary practices â although the latter may be âconditional exceptionsâ (fa-innahÄ mustathnÄtun bi-sharÄʾiá¹ihÄ). Al-Khaá¹á¹ÄbÄ« pragmatically explores beyond textual precepts to advise people (by which he means scholars), who are uniquely fit to undertake this practice to consider whether they have the independence to distance themselves, and, if it is the case, then, the choice is theirs to make individually. But this should never extend to shunning members of oneâs household and neighbours. Excessive socialising is the main target of his reprobation (al-Khaá¹á¹ÄbÄ« 1990, 58â59). In a commentary of several QurʾÄnic verses and a tradition by an early Muslim scholar on the theme of animals, al-Khaá¹á¹ÄbÄ« demonstrates his expository skill by linking them to represent the variation in dominant human character traits and then uses, among others, the metaphor of a dogâs barking as being zoomorphic for an irascible personâs pugnacity. He then attempts to provide some psychological relief for those that must endure such incivility by stating that they are to regard such individuals as their animal counterpart and not pity them since their physicality is not like that of an animal, for which they supposedly have sufficient a respite (al-Khaá¹á¹ÄbÄ« 1990, 159â163). This nuance by the author highlights the rich variation in the way in which seclusion has been retreated.
References to isolation were made in works even prior to al-Khaá¹á¹ÄbÄ«, albeit these were typically brief, including a single page in al-Waá¹£ÄyÄ (âThe Commandmentsâ) of al-ḤÄrith al-MuḥÄsibÄ« (d. 243/857).7 The latter argues that one ought not to part with their religion when the devils from jinn and humans inspire one another (towards heedlessness) with adorned speech. Two types of peopleâs company should be kept: one type is those who inspire you to virtue and reverence of God, the other type is those that assist one in their temporal affairs. If both needs may be fulfilled by one person, then others besides that individual should be avoided. Only the helper to virtue is not harmful to oneâs religion, which is why the most meritorious act and safest precaution is keeping aloof from people, it is greater than that which is feared. He advises his companions not to mix with people, yet acknowledges that few people can accept this advice because enduring patience in this regard is difficult to bear (al-á¹£abr Ê¿alÄ l-waḥda shadÄ«d). He then delimits sociality by saying âshun people from the heart, afford them connection [only] through greetings and by means necessitated as per their rights as Muslimsâ (al-MuḥÄsibÄ« 1986, 104). There is also a book attributed to al-MuḥÄsibÄ« entitled KitÄb al-Khalwa wa-l-Tanaqqul fÄ« l-Ê¿IbÄda wa-DarajÄt al-Ê¿ÄbidÄ«n (âThe Book of Seclusion and Movement in Worship, and the Levels of Worshippersâ), which according to Gavin Picken, extolls the virtues of spiritual retreat (khalwa) from worldly life and particularly when it is simultaneous with frequent recitation and reflection upon the QurʾÄn. The one pursuing seclusion is advised to adopt silence and to view necessary speech âas a disaster that has struckâ (Picken 2010, 83).
Scholars have also discussed seclusionâs relationship to travel, and how the two can further oneâs relationship with God. Al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ« (d. 298/910) stated, for example:
I came to love withdrawing in seclusion (khalwa) at home, as well as going forth into the [deserted] countryside. And I would wander about in the ruins and amongst the tombs situated near the city. This was my constant practice. And I sought sincere companions who might be of assistance to me in this matter, but I did not succeed and I withdrew into those ruins and places of retirement.
Radtke and OâKane 1996, 17
These words seem to have been expressed after al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ«âs return from pilgrimage in Mecca, where he underwent a spiritual experience that led him to resolve to live a life devoted to God. However, he was unsuccessful in finding kindred spirits on his sojourn, nor effective spiritual tutelage. It is especially important to consider al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ« as his popularity ascended greatly due to the theosophist-mystic MuḥyiÌ l-DÄ«n Ibn al-Ê¿ArabÄ«âs (d. 638/1240) writing on him; who, of course, greatly influenced al-NaÌbulusiÌ (Radtke and OâKane 1996, 17). Indeed, Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ« whom al-NaÌbulusiÌ considered al-shaykh al-akbar (his greatest master) deemed á¹£amt and Ê¿uzla as some of the prerequisites that the traveller ought to strive to acquire on his journey toward union with God (AteÅ 1968).
Not only did seclusion play an important role in the thought of Muslim scholars, but also a central one in the rituals of many Sufi orders. Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn al-BayhaqiÌâs (d. 458/1066) al-Zuhd al-KabiÌr (âThe Major Epistle on Asceticismâ) has one section of six on the theme of âseclusion and obscurityâ (al-Ê¿uzla wa-l-khumÅ«l). While ShihÄb al-DÄ«n al-SuhrawardiÌ (d. 632/1191) dedicates three chapters of his Ê¿AwaÌrif al-MaÊ¿aÌrif (âThe Esoteric Insights of the Gnosticsâ) describing the rules of khalwa (retreating). Khalwa played an important role in the rites of Sufi orders, including the KubraÌwiyya,8 the QaÌdiriyya,9 the ShaÌdhiliyya,10 and the Khalwatiyya,11 which derives its name from it (Knysh 1999, 314â316). Both in earlier examples of zuhd among Sufis and their later counterparts, including al-NaÌbulusiÌ, the focus is usually a lifestyle preoccupied with interior conscionable concerns and scrupulous behaviour (Yaldiz 2016, 165).
The most extensive and systematic work on the topic is al-GhazaÌliÌâs IḥyaÌʾ Ê¿UlÅ«m al-DiÌnâs (âRevival of the Religious Sciencesâ) sixth book from the quarter designated for âworship,â which lists the preconditions of undertaking Ê¿uzla; he also covers the topic broadly in his MinhaÌj al-Ê¿ÄbidiÌn (âThe Curriculum of the Worshippersâ) and his MinhaÌj al-Ê¿ÄrifiÌn (âThe Curriculum of the Gnosticsâ). The arguments for both sides are presented in the IḥyaÌʾ and al-GhazaÌliÌ sets out to explain these meticulously. He proffers seven benefits of socialising with people (which receives virtually no treatment in al-NaÌbulusiÌâs main work on the subject), and offers a partial retreat as an alternative. He stresses that seclusion might even be undertaken for selfish ends, such as gaining a reputation as a mystic, or other such sanctimonious purposes (al-ZabiÌdiÌ 2012, 380â416). Murtaá¸aÌ al-ZabiÌdiÌâs (d. 1205/1790) commentary on the IḥyaÌʾ entitled ItḥaÌf al-SaÌda al-MuttaqiÌn (âThe Benefactions of the Cultivated-Faithfulâ) expands on the seminal work by adding useful explanations and inputs. For example, al-ZabiÌdiÌ says that certain early Muslim scholars believed every believer had the power of intercession and that this ought to be a motivating factor in forging abundant relations with other âbelieversâ â rather than secluding oneself â since you may ultimately benefit from a specific believer whom you had befriended (al-ZabiÌdiÌ 2012, 314â317). Al-NaÌbulusiÌ does not address the conundrum of scholars withdrawing in times of corruption, and unwittingly further perpetuating corruption through their absence from the role of publicly guiding people, although he may have appealed to his dedication to publishing works and teaching some students in his defence (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 2010, 138). Again, al-GhazaÌliÌ is far more exacting and nuanced in his treatise on this point as on so many others on the subject.
More recently scholars have examined the TakmiÌl and discussed the spiritual seclusion practiced by Muslim scholars. Gibril Fouad Haddad critiqued the TakmiÌl of al-NaÌbulusiÌ in a journal article that also mentioned accounts of various Muslim renunciants (Haddad 2017, 91). The nature of isolated retreats by prominent Muslim figures are worth considering in light of Hermann Landoltâs point in his entry on khalwa for the Encyclopaedia of Islam: âspiritual isolation from the world was considered higher than material seclusion and it is clear that periodic retreats rather than permanent seclusion were practiced in realityâ (Landolt 1977). Even prolonged durations away from interaction with people tended to be punctuated by occasional visits to others or receiving guests as al-NaÌbulusiÌâs case reveals.
3 Historical Context around the Time of al-NaÌbulusiÌâs Seclusion
The first half of the eighteenth century was argued by Ottoman specialists, such as Andre Raymond, to be a period of urban development and commercial expansion, rejecting the theory of decline (Aladdin 1985, 23). Lejla Demiri and Samuela Pagani agree that âdeclineâ is no longer an acceptable âdescriptive term to characterise the Ottoman period in the Arab-speaking territoriesâ while cautioning that concepts differ across civilisations (Demiri and Pagani 2019, 6).
Intriguingly and perhaps in contradistinction to âurban development and commercial expansionâ salving the decline narrative, al-NaÌbulusiÌâs primary disquiet with the sociocultural atmosphere of late eleventh/seventeenth century Damascus was, in fact, its âdecline,â albeit in morality. âMoral degenerationâ was posited as the primary justification for his retreat from public life (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1998, 25â26). Negative moral influences are not the only reason why al-NaÌbulusiÌ confined himself to his house in Damascus for several years. At the same time, to interpret his actions as motivated merely by a desire for spiritual edification would be to overlook its complexity. The immediate cause seems to have been captured in the following remarks:
I was severely affected by the wretched state of affairs that seriously affected our land, Damascus, as well as the dangerous pronouncements and severe calamities which had befallen her. These state of affairs determined that I cease meeting with people except a few who believed in what I had to say and shared the same convictions. I resolved not to leave my house except if necessary. This was due to the appearance of disbelief and its spread between them [the Muslims] without any compunction. I counted and relied on God in bearing harm, patience at misfortune, excessive hypocrisy, the appearance of schisms and felt much alienation from people when I did not find anyone who agreed on the clear truth, let alone someone helpful, due to the incredible amount of corruption of this age, sinfulness, widespread misguidance among laity and scholars alike.
al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 130
Abdul-Karim Rafeq highlights the disaffection al-NaÌbulusiÌ had felt when he had been informed about the injustices of excessive taxation âinflicted on the peasants by the sipahis, the feudal lords, which resulted in the emptying of the countrysideâ (Rafeq 2009, 10). This urbanisation led to prominent Ê¿ulamÄʾ from the four schools of SunnÄ« jurisprudence to issue verdicts censoring the sultanic orders and the feudal practices which had led the sipahis to drive this poor class from their villages and their âhomelandâ (waá¹an). They urged the peasants to take a stand against their oppressors who were brazenly contravening the SharÄ«Ê¿a. Al-NaÌbulusiÌ himself had issued a fatwa on this issue entitled: TakhyiÌr al-Ê¿IbaÌd fiÌ SuknaÌ al-BilaÌd (âGiving People the Option to Live where they Chooseâ). He rebuked the sipahis (Ottoman cavalrymen) for attempting to coerce the peasantry to return to ruralisation and till the lands so that tax revenues may be collected after having driven them out in the first instance (Rafeq 2009, 10â11). His unequivocal denunciation of those in power demonstrates how earnestly al-NaÌbulusiÌ treated issues of social justice.12
Al-NaÌbulusiÌ was not retreating as a monadic hermit who simply sought to indulge in esoteric practices for personal spiritual gain but, rather, or perhaps also, someone that was deeply concerned with the social injustices affecting his people. The withdrawal therefore was, in some regards, a protest and many of his writings during this period were the medium by which he raised his voice and deep dissatisfaction.13 This supports Nir Shafirâs observation that the widespread pietistic turn in the tenth/sixteenth and eleventh/seventeenth centuries Ottoman Empire as captured by its âmorality literature,â or the naṣīhÌ£at-nÄma (advice book) genre which mushroomed in the period, was not simply religious in the devotional sense but had political implications and, indeed, was sometimes motivated by overwhelmingly political events, as the above case shows.
4 Motives for Withdrawal: A Selection of AḥadiÌth from the TakmiÌl
The TakmiÌl was compiled during al-NaÌbulusiÌâs retreat and its first two chapters seek to justify his seclusion by reference to sixty-two ḥadiÌths that are occasionally interspersed with brief social commentary.14 In this way, al-NaÌbulusiÌ revealed how he personally read the contemporary state of affairs to which the traditions were meant to apply.15 The first chapter of his work pertains to disassociating from the public in times of âtribulationâ (fitna), the second is on shunning the imaÌms of âfitnaâ in the mosques. My focus will be on the first of these chapters as it has a broader application, applied as it is to the masses.
Al-NaÌbulusiÌâs use of the aḥadiÌth to bolster his case for seclusion is somewhat selective. It is notable that the general thrust of aḥadiÌth in the major ḥadÄ«th collections on âthe ethics of socialityâ (aÌdaÌb al-á¹£uḥba) push in the direction of prioritising companionship (á¹£uḥba) and brotherhood (ukhuwwa).16 Ê¿Uzla removes one from fulfilling the ethical imperatives promulgated in these aḥadiÌth, even though Ê¿uzla in itself is not considered an absolute virtue, in the same way that âcompassionâ or âgenerosityâ are considered (both of which, ironically, require others).17 Usually Sufis are thought to have other higher spiritual objectives which lead them to pursue isolation from society. This does not seem to be the case with al-NaÌbulusiÌ. As we will see from a sample of some of the aḥadiÌth considered below, there are traditions which portend various ominous circumstances where Muslims have been told to withdraw from society on account of certain problems within that society.
Some aḥadiÌth refer to specific types of events, usually internecine conflict, while others address a generally foreboding time in the distant future, and may have application in a variety of situations. An example of a specific event during âthe time of strifeâ (zaman al-fitna) when the Prophetâs companions were at war is alluded to in the following tradition. In response to whether he should carry his sword, AbÅ« Dharr al-GhifÄrÄ« (d. 32/652) was told by the Prophet that if the olive trees are sullied by blood (in reference to the trees in Medina) then: âstick to your housesâ (kÅ«nÅ« aḥlaÌsa buyÅ«tikum) (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1998, 7).18
Of those traditions which describe a general state of widespread corruption or anarchy several problems arise to which attention will now be drawn. The ethical precept in many such aḥadiÌth either recommends or strongly proposes one to withdraw from society given various states of tumultuous affairs. Both SufyaÌn al-ThawriÌ (d. 97/778) and al-GhazaÌliÌ were of the opinions that it was permissible to isolate oneself from society.19 Referencing their opinions al-NaÌbulusiÌ goes one step further by claiming it is âwaÌjib and fará¸â (both terms implying varying degrees of obligation with it being intensified in the latter) to isolate oneself from society in his time. He does not provide specific âevidenceâ (daliÌl) for this point, instead proclaiming:
It is equivalent to Islam and faith (Ä«mÄn) in our times. Whoever therefore ignores this and intermingles with people then his Islam and Ä«mÄn are mere lip service without a reality in the heart, like the Islam of a hypocrite.
al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1998, 2220
Another ḥadiÌth which al-NaÌbulusiÌ refers to is the tradition narrated by AbÅ« Burda (d. 103/721 or 104/722 or 723):
There will be strife, hostile separation and grave disagreement. When that time arrives you must take your sword and break it. Then sit in your house, until a sinful hand comes to you or a preordained death.
al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1998, 921
AbÅ« Burda confirms that the prophecy of the Prophet was realised when he says: âwhat the Prophet Muḥammad said, happenedâ (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1998, 9). Al-NaÌbulusiÌâs reliance on this ḥadiÌth suggests that he favours withdrawal from society in times of strife, as well as adopting a passive acceptance of oneâs fate in such times. The act of isolation, itself, in such traditions is justified by those facing unpalatable circumstances, rather than stemming from a mystical or spiritual motive for those with a surfeit of numinous stamina. This externalist approach of al-NaÌbulusiÌ impresses upon the reader that it is the situations highlighted in the traditions and their attendant precepts that are the cause of his motivation to withdraw.
5 Corruption, Deprivation of Benefit to Others and Obligations to Society
It is important to explore al-NaÌbulusiÌâs views of âothersâ during his seclusion from mainstream society. A paradox occurs with his decision to seclude himself which involves the relationality between the individual and society. His ethical outlook, informed by his epistemology, required him to disengage from the corruption of society. However, some of the aḥadiÌth he relied upon suggest it is society rather than al-NaÌbulusiÌ that may benefit most from his withdrawal. For instance, in one ḥadiÌth which he quotes, AbÅ« SaÊ¿iÌd al-Khuá¸riÌ says the Prophet Muḥammad was asked: âWho is the best person?â Among the people mentioned is a believer in a valley (or a barren area) who fears his Lord and distances people from his evil (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1998, 10).22 Muḥammad Ê¿Abd al-RaḥmaÌn al-MubaÌrakpÅ«rÄ« (d. 1353/1934) explains its rationale thus: âSo he does not wrangle with people nor argue with themâ (al-MubaÌrakpÅ«riÌ 2011, 296). The above tradition is quoted by al-NaÌbulusiÌ, but another which he does not mention might reflect upon him more positively and would better explain his actions:
I heard the Prophet â upon him blessings and peace â say, âPeople will see a time when the best property will be sheep. A person leads them to the summit where it rains, fleeing for the sake of his religion away from strifes.â23
The former narration depicts the isolationist as sparing society his own harm, while the latter sees him fleeing from societyâs harm.
Although some of the aḥadiÌth which al-NaÌbulusiÌ quotes seem to suggest that society may benefit from the seclusion of certain difficult individuals, al-NaÌbulusiÌâs own view is that seclusion from a corrupt society benefits the individual who chooses such an isolated path. Irrespective of which attitude is adopted, arguably, the path of seclusion contains a paradox. On the one hand, if society is corrupt, surely an ethical individual â not least a scholar â has a duty to engage in and reform that society, a point captured in a number of letters which al-NaÌbulusiÌ writes (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 2010, 121). If, on the other hand, an individual is corrupt, while his withdrawal may benefit society, it is unlikely that a corrupt individual will seclude himself simply to benefit society. Nonetheless, it could also be argued that the semi-isolation of some of the spiritual elite might raise the spiritual aspirations of ordinary believers by representing an exemplary ethical standard and this may have partly motivated al-NaÌbulusiÌ. Such a strategy may confer religious repute to those who practice seclusion (as it certainly did to al-NaÌbulusiÌ) and help gain admiration which results in a following. This may, in turn, benefit society if the secluded individual is a virtuous person seen as worthy of emulation.
Withdrawing from society, while it faces moral upheaval rather than seeking to improve it from within, does have its antecedents in Islamic literature. Precisely such a line of argument is enlisted by Ê¿Abd al-RaḥmaÌn Ibn al-JawziÌ (d. 597/1200) in á¹¢ayd al-KhaÌá¹ir (âCapturing the Mindâs Destructive Tendenciesâ): âthat I benefit myself alone is better than I benefit others while harming myselfâ (Ibn al-JawziÌ 2011, 140). This reasoning may well be based on the understanding that privileging spiritual self-care is oneâs primary obligation. Does the pursuit of spiritual self-interest in the midst of such corruption then constitute [SharÄ«Ê¿a-justified] âpsychological egoism,â a term used by Joel Feinberg. Psychological egoism being a theory which states that humans pursue their own self-interests. Al-NaÌbulusiÌâs position, however, might be better described as âethical egoism:â all people ought to pursue their own well-being; it is about what ought to be the case (Feinberg 2013, 167). This stance indicates, âsavingâ oneself â however an individual defines it so â is given precedence over contributing to the welfare of others and it seems that this is al-NaÌbulusiÌâs outlook during the said period. In al-NaÌbulusiÌâs own words the following were some of the intolerable moral and ethical problems he encountered that led him to focus inwardly:
Know that the tribulations which demand seclusion from people in our age, have been enumerated by the Prophet, as narrated in the explicit traditions quoted earlier. These include corruption becoming rampant and widespread. It is now so pervasive and has burgeoned to the extent that people have declared its permissibility, they have been assisted in that by the wicked scholars who ridicule a person and then declare: âHe is a public sinner and backbiting a public sinner is not considered unlawful.â As for the laity they say: âWe have only spoken the truth.â It also includes: honouring materialistic people, to the extent that they pardon every transgression of theirs and call it âobedience;â out of coveting their wealth, while severely despising the destitute, whom they consider bereft, wretched. They say: âIf God was pleased with them, he would have provided them with material provisions and enriched them.â It also includes the dominance of evil people over the people of truth so that you will see the pious believer fearful religiously and personally from slipping in front of a hypocrite, a profligate and criminal who is undeterred what religion he belongs to (even after claiming Islam and of having faith). You will see this believer around such type of people suffer considerably, at the hands of those who excoriate him and attack him with despicable actions and words relating to his honour, his religion, his intellect, assisted by a coterie of wicked people. Various other examples exist that would prolong this work. These matters then and their likes, are corruptions like a âsliver of the dark night,â [to those who do] not find anything wrong in them in the slightest and indulge in them without compunction. They do not recognise them as problematic and nor consider them consequential. Some conceited folk even consider this age superior to the past, praising their contemporaries out of sheer ignorance, blind hearts, an extinguished insight due to eating the unlawful: âAnd whoever God wants to try with strife, you will not avail him from God in the slightestâ [Q 5:41]. How incomparable: that age of mutual love to this age of hypocrisy, tyranny and hostility?
al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1998, 25â26
The QurʾÄnic call to pay heed to oneâs own affairs (which appends his work dedicated to the theme of seclusion), as well as al-NaÌbulusiÌâs interpretations in the previous quote, apparently gave him the justification to withdraw the benefit of his presence from others and to focus on preserving himself.
This leads us to the question of whether spiritual self-preservation amounts to tacit harm of others and how to determine benefit and harm for oneself and society. Indeed, al-GhazaÌliÌ, but not al-NaÌbulusiÌ, suggests that one drawback of seclusion is that it prevents one from âinviting to virtue and curtailing evilâ (al-amr bi-l-maÊ¿rÅ«f wa-l-nahy Ê¿an al-munkar). Echoing this, albeit politically, according to AbÅ« Naá¹£r al-FaraÌbiÌ (d. 339/950), the virtuous political regime is one in which its inhabitantsâ souls are all as healthy as possible: âthe one who cures souls is the statesman and he is also called the kingâ (Butterworth 2010, 42; al-FaraÌbiÌ 1971, 24).24 However, al-NaÌbulusiÌ forestalls such objections of social and political apathy by bringing a tradition of Anas b. MaÌlik (d. 93/712) where he asserts that someone asked the Prophet when should inviting to virtue and curtailing evil be ceased:
He said: âIf what manifested in previous communities (umam) manifest in you.â âWe said: O Messenger of God what was it that manifested in previous communities.â He said: âSovereignty among the young, depravity among senior folk and knowledge being the lot of those who are despicable (wa-l-Ê¿ilm fiÌ rudhaÌlatikum).â
al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 3325
Here al-NaÌbulusiÌ brings in Zayd b. YaḥyÄ b. Ê¿Ubayd al-KhuzÄÊ¿Ä« (d. 463â464/1071) to explain the meaning of the latter phrase as: âif knowledge is borne by the profligateâ (idhaÌ kaÌna al-Ê¿ilmu fÄ« l-fussaÌq) and then elaborates who the âfussÄqâ (profligates) are in his opinion:
The profligate are those who insist on backbiting in their gatherings, spreading gossip, envy, arrogance, self-conceit, consuming the unlawful, hypocrisy, ostentation, giving verdicts to curry favour with popular sentiments and in order to side with their objectives, and the use of subterfuge âin legal mattersâ (SharÄ«Ê¿a), to make falsehood truth and truth falsehood, to terminate endowments and ownership, to meddle in SharÄ«Ê¿a contracts for the sake of temporal gains and other such matters which would be too long to illustrate and which would be unsavoury to spread.
al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 33
It appears that there are more sinister affairs that are rife in society, and that al-NaÌbulusiÌ does not deign to mention these matters because he finds them deeply abhorrent. His emphatic outbursts elsewhere are not similarly truncated which supports the idea that al-NaÌbulusiÌâs arguments and condemnation for virtually excommunicating his entire society are not expressed in full in the TakmiÌl.
In order to further disambiguate the moral dimension which he mentions we must delve into another of his texts, the GhÄyat al-Maá¹lÅ«b. This work offers a more integrated insight into the struggles al-NaÌbulusiÌ faced, and which led him to perceive his contemporaries so morally wanting that he could not bear to associate with them.26 Although his opinion of people was derogatory, and possibly contemptuous, he did not go so far as to insinuate that they were âruinedâ and perhaps he proves that by eventually abandoning his retreat. In the discussion on âgazing at beautiful facesâ (al-naáºar ilaÌ wujÅ«h al-ḥisaÌn), al-NaÌbulusiÌ appeals to a ḥadiÌth, for his own defence, in which the Prophet Muḥammad is reported to have said: âIf you hear a person say that people are ruined; assuredly, most ruined is he.â27 He appeals to the commentary of YaḥyaÌ al-NawawiÌ (d. 676/1277) to clarify two possible interpretations of this depending on whether the word âruinedâ (ahlak) is in the nominative or accusative case. If in the former case, then it means that the person referring to them, is himself the most ruined among the people. While in the latter situation it means that he presumes them to be ruined, not that they are, in reality, ruined (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 83). Were one to say that âpeople are ruinedâ, the supercilious pronouncement belies a callous proclamation of omniscience which, unsurprisingly, al-NaÌbulusiÌ does not use in the TakmiÌl, even though his opinions regarding fellow residents of Damascus seemingly betrayed such an attitude.
After relaying numerous incidents from the Prophet Muḥammadâs times concerning the âdissolute conduct of some Muslims,â including sexual liaisons and prostitution, al-NaÌbulusiÌ says the âacts of ignoranceâ (jaÌhiliyya) during that period were greater than his own eraâs corruption and evil (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 87). As further examples to highlight the impiety characteristic of that age â yet similarly present in his own time â he mentions theft, fraudulent activity, armed robbery, homosexuality, extra-marital sex, drinking alcohol, false accusations, hurling insults and having the worst suspicions about others (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 88).28 Al-NaÌbulusiÌ further clarifies that one is not to think that iniquity, evil, abhorrence and licentiousness are an exclusive feature of his times and that the past, even the virtuous era, was somehow empty of such decadence.29 The prominent wars between the companions are better forgotten and not spread, he says, as well as those that occurred after them. Evil is present in all times, and much in that way could be mined from the books of âḥadiÌth, narrations and historyâ (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 83). Still, licentiousness, false testimonies, and calumny were sparse in the first âthree-favoured-centuriesâ (khayr al-qurÅ«n) which represented greater virtue, it is later that these vices became widespread (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 89). The predecessors would consider thinking ill of one another as being forbidden, spying as unlawful and it would only be hypocrites who would fall foul of such sins. Nowadays, he inveighs, âno one thinks such things to be forbidden; very few individuals are free from themâ (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 91). His arguments continue to pivot almost entirely on the explicitly moral.
One understands the moral duty to speak boldly which al-NaÌbulusiÌ feels (and duly responds to in writing) when he quotes a tradition on the authority of AbÅ« SaÊ¿iÌd al-KhudriÌ (d. 74/693) that the Prophet Muḥammad said in a sermon: âLet a man not be prevented, out of awe for the people, from speaking the truth if he knows it.â Al-KhudriÌ then cried and said: âby AllÄh we saw things and were âtimorously reticentâ (fa-hibnaÌ) (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 91).â30 In yet another instance he quotes the Prophet:
Let none of you detest himself. The companions asked: âO Messenger of God, how are we able to detest ourselves?â He said: âHe sees an affair pertaining to the rights God speaks of, and about which he should interject, but he refrains from doing so. God will say to him on Judgement Day: âwhat prevented you from speaking about such and such?â He will say: âfear of people.â God will respond: âIt was me from whom you should have been more afraid.ââ
al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 1731
Silence, al-NaÌbulusiÌ goes on to say, would be tantamount to a blemish in the character of the Prophet Muḥammad, contradicting Godâs epithet for him in the QurʾÄn: âYour virtues are indeed magnificentâ (Q 68:4; al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 17). By mentioning this, al-NaÌbulusiÌ presents himself as someone following in the footsteps of the Prophet by making knowledge-driven interventions.
Indeed, many of the scholars al-NaÌbulusiÌ includes as practitioners of isolation taught from the privacy of their homes and did not entirely deprive others of their knowledge, even if the number of their beneficiaries may have dwindled post-isolation. This is referred to by Gibril Haddad as âqualified asocialityâ and quite accurately sums up the manner in which most scholars mentioned in the TakmiÌl practiced seclusion (Haddad 2017, 91). Withholding knowledge, besides being a condemned practice, is evidence of miserliness.32 Knowledge is the foundation of love, a silent person who is knowledgeable cannot uplift others ethically. Through the generosity of his speech, however, he can bring deliverance and tranquillity to them (Khalifa 2010, 227). One might still incline to charging a recluse like al-NaÌbulusiÌ with ingratitude as AbÅ« Ê¿UthmÄn Ê¿Amr al-JaÌḥiẠ(d. 254/868 or 255/869) states: âyou cannot show gratitude to God; you cannot show it except through speechâ (al-JaÌḥiẠ1906, 136; also quoted in Khan 2008, 54). Al-JaÌḥiáºâs argument seeks to convince his reader of the inferiority of silence â a typical characteristic of seclusion â âwere silence more preferable ⦠the superiority â¦[of] human beings over other [creatures] would not be recognisedâ (Khan 2008, 155). If one were to accept the above premise as a charge against al-NaÌbulusiÌ, ignoring his thirsty pen during his retreat would ironically mean this narrow interpretation would itself lend to an uncharitable constriction of generosity, the pen too has a tongue. Moreover, al-NaÌbulusiÌ permits occasional access to himself which vindicates him from this charge.33 Considering this, to reinforce the earlier point of al-NaÌbulusiÌâs engagement, it is likely that he did not see himself as being taken to silence and he certainly did not forego all human contact, as a small flock of his close associates maintained visits. Therefore, contrary to a lone undertaking concerned solely with interior progress and spiritual unveilings, al-NaÌbulusiÌ continued to seek engagement with and benefit society especially through his prodigious output.34
6 Attitudes to Seclusion: A Reflection of True Humility or False Humility?
Demonstrating humility to God is different from showing humility to fellow humans. Al-NaÌbulusiÌâs departure from the view of earlier self-deprecatory scholars, who believed that one should ascribe corruption to themselves, ostensibly appears arrogant. The argument might be inferred from those earlier scholars, that in order to preserve oneâs spiritual integrity, assumption of exogenous corruption was woefully self-defeating, as it would lead to oneâs ego assuming one was better than others.35 Rather, despite evident societal dissolution, one is required to reflexively contort their perception, and to regard themselves as being of a lesser moral standing than people in society, or at least to outwardly manifest this position. The empirical reality to undergird the Damascene shaykhâs dismay with his social circumstances is supported prima facie by his personal account, our limited accessibility to the effects on his personal state notwithstanding. Therefore, should al-NaÌbulusiÌ have affected self-diminution if he was unable to genuinely view himself as being corrupt and society as virtuous, in contradistinction to the advice of others such as al-GhazaÌliÌ and AbÅ« l-QÄsim al-QushayriÌ (d. 465/1073) who thought it proper to view oneself as being the party guilty of moral deficiencies in such a scenario?36 Al-NaÌbulusiÌ was unwilling to do so and thus radically departs from what would seem a fundamental commitment to any serious spiritual-mystical sojourn in the lives of some earlier practitioners of this type of seclusion, perhaps even undermining its spiritual essence.
To reiterate, self-perception when considering isolation is explained in the following two ways: one leaves society because people are noxious or, conversely, that one regards themselves as objectionable and ethically-wanting. Al-GhazaliÌ and al-QushayriÌ say one must view themselves as being corrupt and loathsome. This latter position, al-QushayriÌ asserts, emerges from having crushed oneâs ego while adopting the former stance is to manifest superiority over creation. Whoever effaces his ego is humble; he who feels supercilious towards any individual is arrogant (al-QushayrÄ« 2013, 138). Al-NaÌbulusiÌ adopts the opposite position. Among the aḥadiÌth which address this conundrum are two prima facie paradoxical traditions. The first suggests seclusion to stave off oneâs evil from people; the second that seclusion is meant to protect one from the evil of others. Nonetheless, sequestering oneself in the above aḥadiÌth is meant as a protective measure rather than to prevent corruption, either to oneself or others. Therefore, one who solely seeks spiritual edification through reclusion is not ipso facto directly acting on those aḥadiÌth which encourage isolation, based on al-NaÌbulusiÌâs compilation. Al-NaÌbulusiÌ does not seem to be acting primarily for the achievement of such esoteric rewards and nor therefore sees âhumilityâ as an important issue to address within the TakmiÌl.
If the content of al-NaÌbulusiÌâs literary output and othersâ high-esteem of him and his self-perception were to be taken at face value, then it seems he was justified in taking his stance: society was corrupt, he was not. This does not seem contrary to humility or objectionable on moral grounds albeit, the stance is highly controversial in light of the principles of Sufi thought discussed above. Given al-NaÌbulusiÌâs extensive use of source-texts we must admit that his rationale for seclusion was to some degree motivated by the Prophet through his traditions. In addition, it is incontrovertible that his emotions and sentiments clearly influenced his undertaking. It is arguable that if al-NaÌbulusiÌ was less morally incensed and sensitive he may not have been incentivised by the aḥadiÌth alone to forego contact with mainstream society, particularly if he had achieved a prominent teaching position. This seems realistic given that he gave up his seclusion in 1098/1687 and led an integrated public life buttressed by a swell in following that will ostensibly have helped subdue residual feelings of emotional detachment and pain (Shafir 2019, 613â614). The emotions and feelings evinced by al-NaÌbulusiÌ give us a better idea of his attitude in a way that a list of aḥadiÌth or impersonal anecdotes of others who undertook this practice would never disclose. After all, âemotions are part and parcel of ethical deliberationâ (Nussbaum 2009, 172).
As illustrated above, the foundation of al-NaÌbulusiÌâs moral epistemology is seen through the lens of received tradition and is heavily supported by his personal interpretations and experiences. Neither the religious elite nor the common-folk are spared vitriolic diatribes, effectively dismissing them as wastrels. Together the TakmiÌl and GhÄyat al-Maá¹lÅ«b â both of which were written during the seven-year seclusion â functioned as justifications for al-NaÌbulusiÌâs extreme measures and sought to persuade readers of his moral judgement about the unbearable inhabitants of his city. What makes this period of his life relevant to study is that solitary action produces reflexives, these are insights that are developed when alone through sustained, focussed, concerted effort, which lead to a âculturally skilful development of thoughtâ (Cohen 2016, 153â155). The salience of this self-society relation almost in absentia through a written corpus expresses al-NaÌbulusiÌâs reading of his milieu and his subsequent ascription of meaning to religious texts, which reflect the underlying spirit of those texts according to his view, and in application to his particular circumstances. Hans Gadamer would concur that the undertaking of the interpreter of a text is that he must relate it to his situation in order to understand it at all (Gadamer 1989, 324). Historical interpretation expresses not merely the linguistic expression of texts, but what the texts betray by delving âbehind them and the meaning they express to inquire into the reality they express involuntarilyâ (Gadamer 1989, 336). Texts need explication, so that they are understood not only in terms of what they say but also what they exemplify (Gadamer 1989, 336). What al-NaÌbulusiÌâs arguments exemplify is that he was eminently capable of weaving the rich aḥadiÌth corpus to his context and skilfully apply it in a demonstrably favourable manner in congruence with his moral constitution.
7 Conclusion
The underlying rationale and the hermeneutic employed in al-NaÌbulusiÌâs analysis of severing social ties with most others is generously expatiated in the TakmiÌl. Beyond quoting aḥadiÌth extensively in the latter work, the GhÄyat al-Maá¹lÅ«b further captures his arguments related to the prevailing social and moral injustices which undergird his case for seclusion (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 130). Together these texts display considerable insight into his moral sentiments at the time of writing. The theoretical basis of al-NaÌbulusiÌâs claim uses aḥÄdÄ«th to support his actions, but it is clear they were not the only motivating force. Of course, al-NaÌbulusiÌ may have felt compelled by the influence of religious texts to withdraw from society around 1090â1091/1679â1680, but arguably other forces were also at play, like unbearable societal corruption and his feelings of alienation (NaÌbulusiÌ 2010, 97).37 Even though he was palpably a Sufi, the mystical element appears dim in his considerations to âwithdrawâ or practice Ê¿uzla from society.
The TakmiÌl and GhÄyat al-Maá¹lÅ«b are personal attempts by al-NaÌbulusiÌ to combine his judgement on society with his religious hermeneutics to justify the drastic measures he takes. Written prior to the conclusion of his retreat, the former does not account for the reasons why he subsequently gives it up. Yet, it does show that moral issues were the significant rationale for his social disengagement even as no coherent moral theology is exposited. Together with other works written during the seclusion, much about his self-perception and personal struggles is revealed, giving us a glimpse of this understudied perspective about him which, as the above analysis demonstrates, in this instance, was driven largely by his moral theology. We also better understand his independence in the conclusions he came to, based on his reading of the texts, history and his specific context, for example, in the discussion on humility. This shows Islam to be a discursive tradition that may diverge considerably on ethical issues which are not straightforward to navigate based upon a simple reading of primary texts. Indeed, the texts about seclusion provided the necessary rationale for both engagement with, and the abdication of, the lauded social responsibilities towards others so emphasised in Islam. The application of these texts may change based on the subjective judgement of an individual, not only due to the reading of such texts, or even external socio-political circumstances, but also subject to the vicissitudes of inner emotional rifts caused, to some extent, by societyâs reception of oneâs ideas and their personal admiration or dislike of a public figure. Useful as the TakmiÌl is, it would be a stretch to attribute a coherent ethics of seclusion to al-NaÌbulusiÌâs writings on this topic, yet, that he was ethically motivated in his withdrawal from society is undeniable, and it was the aḥÄdÄ«th that were ostensibly the mainstay of such an undertaking.
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âSeclusionâ has a number of synonyms besides Ê¿uzla in Arabic which all connote voluntary seclusion, self-imposed isolation or retreat and these constitute a fundamental principle of asceticism (zuhd): khalwa, waḥda, infiraÌd, inqitaÌÊ¿ (see Knysh 1999, 314â316). A further word introduced by Ibn BaÌjja (d. 533/1139) is tawaḥḥud for the isolation undertaken by a philosopher, such philosophers are referred to as ghurabaÌʾ by the Sufis. He does this because he does not live in a virtuous city where people base their actions on rationality and the use of the intellect (see Ibn BaÌjja 1978, 18â19).
One of the most extensive works on ethical social conduct with others is AbÅ« ḤÄmid al-GhazaÌliÌâs (d. 505/1111) KitÄb ÄdÄb al-Ulfa wa-l-Ukhuwwa wa-l-á¹¢uḥba wa-l-MuÊ¿Äshara (âThe Book of Etiquettes of Affection, Brotherhood, Companionship and Social Interactionâ) in IḥyÄʾ Ê¿UlÅ«m al-DÄ«n (âRevival of the Religious Sciencesâ) (al-GhazaÌliÌ 2002, 213â299). According to Hellmut Ritter the fervour behind al-GhazaÌliÌâs penning of this section âarises from the spirit of Islamic mysticismâ established by Sufis (Ritter 2003, 324â325). Ritter says that Ignaz Goldziher (1888â1890, 1â39) has dealt with the concept of brotherly solidarity in the Islamic social ethic but his concern is chiefly with the early period of Islam: âMuruwwa und DÄ«n.â
For the manuscript of this work, see al-NaÌbulusiÌ n.d., fols. 356bâ376a. There is also an edited version published under al-MuslimÅ«n fiÌ Zaman al-Fitan KamaÌ Akhbara al-RasÅ«l (âMuslims in the Time of Strife as Told by the Messengerâ), and edited by MajdiÌ b. Manṣūr b. Sayyid al-ShÅ«ra (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1998), referred to in-text by the authorâs original designation: TakmiÌl al-NuÊ¿Å«t fiÌ LuzÅ«m al-BuyÅ«t. A non-academic translation of this text exists in English with a lengthy introduction praising the work and lauding its importance, based on the former work, entitled: The Virtues of Seclusion in Times of Confusion (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 2017). Excerpts from passages in the TakmiÌl, which are translated here, are my own translations.
In arguing for the importance of moral considerations today, Osvaldo Rossi argues that self-perception has now incorporated a new self-subjectivity, a broadly focussed one that centres on relationships: âas a âselfâ in front of the others, [which] referred to the world, to meaning, to God and so onâ which has led to a more balanced equilibrium between knowing and acting (Rossi 1990, 107â110).
According to Sharīʿatī, the knowledge of this authentic version of the religion depends on: the history of Islam, especially in its early days; study of the contemporary world and its needs; familiarity with Islamic scripture, and receptivity to the most mystical elements of religion (Lee 2018, 121).
This work is representative of a genre of works which include al-Zuhd by HannÄd b. al-Sariyy (d. 243/857) and a work of the same title by AbÅ« Bakr b. AbÄ« Ê¿Äá¹£im (d. 287/900); al-Tafarrud wa-l-Ê¿Uzla (The Tract on Aloofness and Isolation) by AbÅ« Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-ÄjurrÄ« (d. 360/970); al-RisÄla al-Mughniya fÄ« l-SukÅ«t wa-LuzÅ«m al-BuyÅ«t (âThe Comprehensive Epistle on Silence and Connubial Confinementâ) by AbÅ« Ê¿AlÄ« al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. Ê¿Abd AllÄh al-BaghdÄdÄ« (d. 471/1078); Ê¿Izz al-Ê¿Uzla (âThe Honour of Isolationâ) by AbÅ« SaÊ¿Ä«d Ê¿Abd al-KarÄ«m b. Muḥammad al-SamÊ¿ÄnÄ« (d. 562/1166); al-Ê¿Uzla (âThe Tract on Seclusionâ) by AbÅ« l-Faraj Ê¿Abd al-RaḥmÄn b. Ê¿AlÄ« al-JawzÄ« (d. 597/1201); Uns al-Munqaá¹iÊ¿Ä«n ilÄ Ê¿IbÄdat Rabb al-Ê¿ÄlamÄ«n (âThe Congeniality of those Sparing themselves for the Worship of the Lord of the Worldsâ) by al-MuÊ¿ÄfÄ b. IsmÄÊ¿Ä«l al-ShaybÄnÄ« (d. 623/1233); al-Ê¿IbÄdat wa-l-Khalwa (âThe Tract on Worship and Seclusionâ) by Muḥammad b. ShÄkir al-DÄrÄnÄ« b. ShÄkir al-KutbÄ« (d. 764/1363).
Avoiding people was a common trope that was frequently mentioned in works of exhortation. Gibril Fouad Haddad gives several references to the practice of âsilenceâ (á¹£amt) which al-MuḥÄsibÄ« mentions, namely, that nine tenths of worship is in avoiding people (see Haddad 2017, 101).
A Sufi order founded by Najm al-DÄ«n KubrÄ (d. 618/1221) which is based on al-mawt al-irÄdÄ« (death by volition).
A Sufi order founded by Ê¿Abd al-QÄdir al-JÄ«lÄnÄ« (d. 561/1166) rooted in service to humanity and submission to the will of God.
A Sufi order founded by AbÅ« l-Ḥasan al-ShÄdhilÄ« (d. 656/1258) that is known for lifelong learning and gratitude to God, for which it is sometimes known as the á¹arÄ«qa of gratitude.
This order was founded by ʿUmar al-Khalwatī (d. 800/1397) which was fundamentally about withdrawing from the world for mystical purposes.
Social concerns are deemed to be emotions that are influenced by the welfare of others, emotions such as happiness or joy, âor outcomes that would lead to those feelings.â These are also known as âfortunes-of-othersâ emotions (see Mesoudi and Jensen 2012, 419â433, 426â427). Being sensitive to the emotions and states of others motivate prosocial behaviours, which is behaviour intended to help other people (see Mesoudi and Jensen 2012, 426â427). For more on whether religions influence prosociality (see Preston, Salomon and Ritter 2014, 149â169).
He only elaborates on political oppression but there is a sense that other vices are being left unsaid. The following chapter brings some of these to surface based on records towards the end of al-NaÌbulusiÌâs life but which are likely to have resembled some of the problems which poverty will likely have caused when he was remonstrating about the prevalence of vices in society, such as prostitution and mercenary-harlot alliances in defiance of public morality (see Rafeq 2009, 180â196).
This combination of aḥadiÌth and social commentaries marries elements of timelessness and contemporary social issues. The QurʾÄnic and ḥadiÌth sources foreground the first half of the book, several digressions notwithstanding, while the latter half of the book refers to the corruption besetting society and with which those sources are in conversation. For more on the commentarial impulse to timeliness/timelessness (see Blecher 2018, 184â145). The disadvantage of this approach, rather than a more specific but not necessarily atomistic one, is that we do not attain a nuanced insight into exactly which traditions are used for which particular purpose, or how some are even relevant to the argument being made. Even if the current work is not hermeneutically sophisticated it manifests a thorough engagement with the tradition in the first half, before assessing the practices and views of other Muslim scholars which are used as auxiliaries. This opposes the accusation of intellectual decline by showing the vibrancy of al-NaÌbulusiÌâs production on this theme. Even the longstanding military decline had some recovery in the eleventh/seventeenth century, albeit embedded in centuries of steady decline. To say that the military decline, or irregularities in the provincial governmentsâ rule (such as the rise of âdynasty governorsâ), signifies intellectual decline is unfair, as it compares the modernisation of the thirteenth/nineteenth and fourteenth/twentieth centuries with the âallegedly staticâ tenth/sixteenth, eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries (see Barbir 1980, 3â6). Furthermore, due to inflation and the rise of an expanding janissary army in Istanbul, the livelihoods of the military forces spread throughout the Ottoman provinces were threatened. This resulted in the need to strengthen the governors of those regions to maintain local order. The state also resettled thousands of janissaries away from Istanbul to keep them away from brewing trouble in the political heartland; which led to trouble elsewhere (see Barbir 1980, 16â17).
In al-NaÌbulusiÌ we see the fleshing out of the eschaton âendâ when using ḥadiÌth traditions. Eschatological discourse is either futuristic or realised. In futuristic eschatology, the eschaton foretold by the scripture is still to happen; eschatological events are still in the future. Realised eschatology are those traditions which contain events which have been fulfilled; the eschaton is thus in the past. The Prophet Muḥammadâs death inaugurated eschatological expectations relating to seclusion. None of the traditions recounted by al-NaÌbulusiÌ refer to events which may occur in the Prophetâs life. For credit for these terms and for a useful comparison with a Christian typology on eschatology see (DeRoo and Manoussakis 2009, 5â6). By bringing texts of futuristic tendencies, as well as antecedent application to the present, the case is made to make both the past and future predictions causally efficacious in the present.
This is because suḥba is a part of a spiritual foregrounding of moral philosophy, a sine qua non of attaining optimal spiritual maturity. Attaining the virtuous self is hardly ever a solitary exercise. It is both achieved in relation to interacting with others as well as through the input of othersâ ethical assistance especially spiritual masters. For instance, al-MuḥaÌsibÄ« encouraged seeking venerable masters as moral guides (see al-MuḥaÌsibÄ« quoted in Yazaki 2013, 37). Al-NaÌbulusiÌ encourages people to keep the company of the friends of God but then states, in an essay completed four years prior to his retreat, that owing to peopleâs negative opinions of others and most peopleâs corrupt objectives such pious people are in a state of ânecessary obscurityâ (khifaÌ á¸arÅ«rÄ«) (see al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1998, 181â183).
The requirement for Ê¿uzla is much more subjectively determined and applies to a narrow range of circumstances. This is different from saying, in the Nietzchean conception, that references to absolute values are futile and that one must guide their actions or limit them by the âjuridical sanctions of positive lawâ (see Rocci 1990, 219â225, 219). Murtaá¸aÌ al-ZabiÌdiÌâs commentary ItḥaÌf al-SaÌda al-MuttaqiÌn on al-GhazaÌliÌâs IḥyaÌʾ Ê¿UlÅ«m al-DiÌn, KitÄb ÄdÄb al-Ulfa wa-l-Ukhuwwa wa-l-á¹¢uḥba wa-l-MuÊ¿Äshara (âBook on the Etiquettes of Affection, Brotherhood, Companionship and Social Interactionâ) stretches to three hundred pages while his commentary on Ê¿uzla amounts to a mere one hundred pages, highlighting the importance placed on both topics but the predominance of the former.
The ḥadÄ«th is related by AbÅ« DÄwÅ«d 2009, 6:319: Awwal KitÄb al-Fitan (âBook of Tribulationsâ), BÄb al-Nahy Ê¿an al-SaÊ¿y fÄ« l-Fitna (âChapter on the Prohibition of Engaging in Viceâ). Ḥils or ḥalas is a cloth used to prevent saddle-sore on the back of a riding beast. The metaphor aptly compares material which is pressing upon the animal and is firmly in place with the way a person should remain confined to his house. The cloth also prevents major friction which is painful to the animal, just as a person avoids civil strife by withdrawing from society.
There were others who held this belief too such as: IbraÌḥiÌm b. Adham (d. 161/778), DÄwÅ«d al-ṬaÌʾiÌ (d. 165/782), Fuá¸ayl b. Ê¿IyaÌḠ(d. 187/803), YÅ«suf b. AsbaÌá¹ (d. 110/810) and Bishr al-ḤaÌfi (d. 227/841) (see al-ZabiÌdiÌ 2012, 317).
For al-NaÌbulusiÌâs understanding on Islam and Ä«maÌn see (al-NaÌbulusiÌ 2000, 95â128).
The ḥadÄ«th is related by Ibn MÄja 2009, 5:109: KitÄb AbwÄb al-Fitan (âBook of Tribulationsâ), BÄb IdhÄ IltaqÄ l-MuslimÄni bi-SayfayhimÄ (âChapter on When Two Muslims Confront One Another with Their Swordsâ); Ibn Ḥanbal 1999, 29:496.
The ḥadÄ«th is related by al-BukhÄrÄ« 1422]2001[, 4:15: KitÄb al-JihÄd wa-l-Siyar (âBook on Fighting for the Cause of AllÄhâ), BÄb Afá¸al al-NÄs Muʾmin MujÄhid bi-Nafsih wa-MÄlih fÄ« SabÄ«l AllÄh (âChapter on the Best Man is the Believer who Participates in the Fight with His Life and Propertyâ); Muslim 1991, 3:1503: KitÄb al-ImÄra (âBook on Governmentâ), BÄb Faá¸l al-JihÄd wa-l-RibÄá¹ (âChapter on the Virtue of JihÄd and Keeping Watch over the Frontierâ).
Al-BukhaÌriÌ 1422 [2001], 9:53: KitÄb al-Fitan (âBook of Tribulationsâ), BÄb al-TaÊ¿arrub fÄ« l-Fitna (âChapter Staying with the Bedouins during Tribulationsâ).
According to NaÌá¹£ir al-DiÌn al-ṬūsiÌ (d. 672/1274), virtuous friendship is the crucial element that was missing in al-FaraÌbiÌâs utopian vision. âThe best friendship is the love between good and virtuous men, who share a hunger for perfection and for the Divineâ (Gianotti 2015, 82). It seems it was precisely this quality of friendship which al-NaÌbulusiÌ searched for but could not find.
The ḥadÄ«th is related by Ibn MÄja 2009, 5:147: KitÄb AbwÄb al-Fitan (âBook of Tribulationsâ), BÄb Qawlihi: âYÄ AyyuhÄ l-LadhÄ«na ÄmanÅ« Ê¿Alaykum Anfusakumâ (âChapter on the Words of AllÄh: âO You Who Believe! Take Care of Your Own Selvesââ).
This text was also written during al-NaÌbulusiÌâs seclusion and hence complements some of the critiques made about society contained in the TakmiÌl.
Muslim 1991, 4:2024: KitÄb al-Birr wa-l-á¹¢ila wa-l-ÄdÄb (âBook on Virtue, Joining of the Ties of Kinship and Enjoining Good Mannersâ), BÄb al-Nahy Ê¿an Qawl Halaka al-NÄs (âChapter on the Prohibition of Saying: âThe People are Doomedââ).
ḤadÄ«th commentaries, even the non-conventional type, like al-NaÌbulusiÌâs TakmiÌl, may function as âan exegetical history that connects the audiencesâ current social and historical context to the pastâ (see Blecher 2018, 177). Al-NaÌbulusiÌ was not a historian, yet his overview of Damascene society portrays insights that are useful for analysing his moral thought. In this sense, his value might be likened to when al-ṬabarÄ« writes contemporary history as its author, rather than a compiler or editor; his self-authored section is recognised as âhighly distinctiveâ and valuable (see Shoshan 2004, xxxiii). Al-NaÌbulusiÌâs decision to seclude himself because of corruption appears to contradict his confession of the Prophetâs era being mired more in vice than his own, unless, it may be argued that, certain vices of his age â and he does differentiate between the two â were more malignant and nefarious, thus compelling his drastic course of action. It may also be the case that he was more personally affected by the issues prevalent in his society, hence, the need to consider his emotional state. Perhaps he was overwhelmed as the target of hatred, which evoked such an extreme reaction from him.
This is said in reference to the first three generations of Muslims, beginning with the first who witnessed the Prophet Muḥammad in their lives and so forth.
The ḥadÄ«th is related by al-TirmidhÄ« 1996, 4:58: KitÄb AbwÄb al-Fitan (âBook of Tribulationsâ), BÄb MÄ JÄʾa MÄ Akhbara al-NabÄ« AṣḥÄbahu MÄ Huwa KÄʾin ilÄ Yawm al-QiyÄma (âChapter on What the Prophet Informed His Companions Would Occur until the Day of Resurrectionâ); Ibn MÄja 2009, 5:141: KitÄb AbwÄb al-Fitan (âBook of Tribulationsâ), BÄb al-Amr bi-l-MaÊ¿rÅ«f wa-l-Nahy Ê¿an al-Munkar (âChapter on Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrongâ).
The ḥadÄ«th is related by Ibn MÄja 2009, 5:142: KitÄb AbwÄb al-Fitan (âBook of Tribulationsâ), BÄb al-Amr bi-l-MaÊ¿rÅ«f wa-l-Nahy Ê¿an al-Munkar (âChapter on Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrongâ); Ibn Ḥanbal 1999, 17:359.
Al-NaÌbulusiÌ clearly laments the lack of enthusiasm among people who have not appreciated their scholars and have consequently not preserved their scholarsâ written or intellectual legacy. This clarifies his stance on knowledge-sharing as being a bountiful act from which others may benefit (see al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 132).
He does feel unvalued; gaining respect was seen as important for him as a public figure (see al-NaÌbulusiÌ 1995, 130). Reference to respect as an important interpersonal commodity can be seen in many works such as the following example where Ê¿Abd al-RaḥmaÌn Ibn al-JawzÄ« contrasts two people, one of whom has far greater knowledge but due to a particular obnoxious sin is disgraced by people and they no longer pay him respect. His counterpart with far less knowledge, fulfils the rights of God and is held in higher esteem in peopleâs hearts (see Ibn al-JawzÄ« 2011, 277).
We know al-NaÌbulusiÌ had great faith in books having the power to educate and transform people. As Bakri Aladdin has pointed out, it was the books themselves that were the real teachers of al-NaÌbulusiÌ (see Aladdin 1985, 82â84).
This is a common trope in Sufi discussions on humility. In Sufi parlance, humility, is to see everything which comes to you as coming from God. Al-ShiblÄ« is said to have asked YÅ«suf b. AsbÄá¹ about the extreme limit of humility. He replied: âwhen you come out of your house, you consider everyone you see better than yourselfâ (Nurbaksh 1988, 81â82). Fuá¸ayl said: âWhoever sees himself as having worth has no share in humility,â while Bayazid said humility was when a person âsees himself as possessing neither station nor state and sees no one among Godâs creatures worse than himselfâ (Nurbaksh 1988, 86).
Philosophers during the Enlightenment such as Spinoza (d. 1677), Friedrich Nietzsche (d. 1900) and David Hume (d. 1776) vehemently opposed this view, disparaging humility and disregarding it as a virtue; ostensibly they would laud al-NaÌbulusiÌâs stance on this point (see McPherson 2016, 163, 212).
The context, which for brevity I do not delve into here, plays a crucial part in convincing al-NaÌbulusiÌ to seek refuge from social interactions. It is worth noting: âPeople often overestimate the degree to which language itself determines meaning and underestimate the role that context plays in every act of interpretationâ (see Camper 2018, 17).