1 Introduction
The dichotomy of God versus human is central in QurʾÄnic discourse and permeates most reflections in ontology, epistemology, and ethics. For example, Godâs roles as the Bestower of bounty (al-MunÊ¿im) and the Speaker (al-Mutakallim) have been the focus of inquiries into the ethical obligations placed upon humans and the sources of knowledge in Islamic scholarship. The search for understanding this dilemma pushed Muslims to explore a methodology for understanding Godâs discourse and uncovering His will â either through the QurʾÄn or through the Prophet Muḥammadâs words and deeds.
The difference in methodology between jurists and Sufis around what is apparent (áºÄhir) and what is inward (bÄá¹in) formed a central axis in discussions within the fields of tafsÄ«r (QurʾÄnic exegesis), ḥadÄ«th (Prophetic reports), fiqh (Islamic law), uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory), and Sufism (Islamic mysticism). However, the search for the sources of ethical knowledge against the universality of the Lawgiver stimulates serious inquiry into the role of the individual in ethical judgment. The question of individual moral knowledge prompts us to explore interrelated issues such as: (1) the capacity to know an ethical judgment inwardly, which relates to the source of the judgment and its evidence; (2) the competence to understand the Lawgiverâs intent addressed to individuals; (3) the ethical responsibility in applying general judgments and principles, or the fatwÄ (legal opinion) of the muftÄ« (jurisconsult) to specific private realities (scrutiny and caution); and (4) individual moral responsibility and choice in the face of contradictions in muftÄ«sâ legal opinions â for example, in the case of different opinions on a particular case, how should the individual choose?1
The issue of individual moral knowledge is not only limited to questions of ethical responsibility but also connected to the concept of âconscienceâ understood as
The faculty within us that decides on the moral quality of our thoughts, words, and acts. It makes us conscious of the worth of our deeds and gives rise to a pleasurable feeling if they are good and to a painful one if they are evil.
Despland 2005, 3:1939
The concept of âconscienceâ in the Islamic tradition is a controversial issue for Western scholars. For instance, William Tisdall appealed to the Arabic language to prove that Islam lacks the ethical conception which is called âconscienceâ (á¸amÄ«r) claiming that â[n]either in the Arabic itself nor in any other Muhammadan languages is there a word which properly expresses what we mean by conscienceâ (Tisdall 1910, 62). This approach led the Encyclopedia of Religion (Despland 2005, 3:1944) to conclude that: âThe notion of conscience as internal organ is not found outside of Christianity. As commonly understood, it is peculiar to the West.â This debate on the existence or non-existence of âconscienceâ in Islam began at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ignaz Goldziherâs insight was critical when he noted: âThe assumption that a word alone can be taken as a credible proof of the existence of a conception, has shown itself to be a prejudiceâ (Goldziher 1917, 16). Indeed, he quoted the two ḥadÄ«ths under study here to prove that
didactic sentences, principles mirroring ethical conceptions, should be tested by more than a word, a terminus technicus, such as those which are used in the consideration of the âquestion of conscienceâ in Islam.
Goldziher 1917, 16
In this vein, Bryan W. Van Norden coined the term âlexical fallacyâ to argue that simply because a word for a concept does not exist in a particular tradition, it does not mean that the concept is not operative in it (Ban Norden 2003, 101â102). RashÄ«d Riá¸Ä (d. 1354/1935) argued that the âqalbâ (heart), in a specific context, refers to what is known in modern Arabic as âá¸amÄ«râ (conscience). It means knowing from oneself through spiritual and emotional engagement (al-wijdÄn al-ḥissÄ« wa-l-maÊ¿nawÄ«). He also quoted the first ḥadÄ«th âconsult your heart â¦â to prove this meaning (Riá¸Ä 1367/1948, 9:419).2
The concomitant dichotomy of reason and revelation has also dominated modern discussions about Islamic ethics,3 hindering further inquiry into conscience and its authority in the Islamic tradition. The present study unveils understudied spaces where Muslim jurists, legal theorists, Sufis, and ethicists have discussed the role of individual conscience in the development of moral judgments from different perspectives.
In order to flesh out these issues, this study shall investigate two central ḥadÄ«ths: âconsult your heart and consult your selfâ4 and ârighteousness is good conduct, and sin is that which rankles in your chest and which you would hate for other people to look upon.â These two ḥadÄ«ths have been chosen for their content and special status in the field of Islamic ethics. The two ḥadÄ«ths point to the innermost dimension in humans â that which takes place in the heart, stirs in the self, and occurs within thought â in order to distinguish between the righteous and the sinful. The special status of these two ḥadÄ«ths is attested by the fact that they were included by ImÄm al-NawawÄ« (d. 676/1277) in his collection of forty ḥadÄ«ths, wherein each is considered
A core fundamental among the fundamentals of religion, described by scholars as [the core] upon which Islam is premised, or as being half of Islam, or one third of it, or something approximating that.
al-NawawÄ« 2004, 14â15
The reception of the two ḥadÄ«ths will be explored within the disciplines of ḥadÄ«th commentaries, uṣūl al-fiqh, fiqh, and Sufi literature. Looking at Muslim juristsâ and theoristsâ engagement with these ḥadÄ«ths, I shall focus on al-GhazÄlÄ«âs (d. 505/1111) understanding of waraÊ¿ (abstinence), Ibn Taymiyyaâs (d. 728/1328) approach, and al-ShÄá¹ibÄ«âs (d. 790/1388) interpretation of ijtihÄd al-mukallaf (exerting oneâs reasoning for personal judgment). My approach investigates the specific ethical question of the inward aspect (bÄá¹in) on three levels. First, it looks at meta-ethics, as it explores the theoretical and epistemological basis relating to the sources of judgment and the criteria for specifying righteousness and sin. Second, I examine the scriptural ethics, represented by key ḥadÄ«ths as the primary gateways for the study of ethics within the ḥadÄ«th corpus.5 And third, I turn to applied ethics, which focuses on specific cases and individual applications.6
2 References to the Inward Dimension (BÄá¹in) in the ḤadÄ«th Corpus
The ḥadÄ«ths associated with the issues of the role of the individualâs inward dimension may be approached through scrutiny of the transmission and narrations, and/or interpretation, both direct and indirect. While the locus of direct interpretation can be accessed in the books of ḥadÄ«th commentary, indirect interpretation may be gleaned from the titles of books and chapters in ḥadÄ«th compendiums that employ the device of chapter and topic headings directly addressing this subject.
2.1 The ḤadÄ«ths of the Inward Dimension (BÄá¹in)
There are two central ḥadÄ«ths that refer to the inward dimension of the human in the attainment of knowledge of righteousness (birr) and sinfulness (ithm): the ḥadÄ«th of WÄbiá¹£a b. MaÊ¿bad (d. 89/708) and that of al-NawwÄs b. SamÊ¿Än (d. 50/670). It was reported that WÄbiá¹£a came to ask the Prophet about righteousness and sinfulness, so the Prophet said:
O WÄbiá¹£a! Consult your heart and consult your self (three times). Righteousness is that towards which the self feels tranquil, and sinfulness is that which rankles in the self, and wavers in the chest, even when people have offered you their opinion time and time again.7
As for al-NawwÄs b. SamÊ¿Än, it was transmitted that he said:
I asked the Messenger of God about righteousness and sinfulness, so he said: righteousness is good conduct (ḥusn al-khuluq), and sinfulness is that which rankles in your chest and which you would hate for other people to look upon.8
There is a slight difference in the narrations of the ḥadÄ«th of WÄbiá¹£a. Consultation is reported to be sought from both the heart and the self together in some narrations,9 but in others, consultation is reported to be sought from the self alone.10 Whereas WÄbiá¹£aâs version enquires about the knowledge of righteousness and sinfulness, others seek the knowledge about the permissible (ḥalÄl) and the prohibited (ḥarÄm), and some ḥadÄ«ths even report mention of certitude (yaqÄ«n) and doubt (shakk).11 The sign of righteousness or certitude is occasionally expressed as âtranquility (á¹umaʾnÄ«na) of the heart or the self,â and on other occasions as âstillness (sukÅ«n) of the heart or the self.â Sinfulness is expressed on one occasion as âthat which rankles in the self;â on another as âthat which rankles in the heart and wavers in the chestâ (Aḥmad 2001, 29:528), and on yet a third occasion as âthat which rankles in the chestâ (AbÅ« YaÊ¿lÄ 1984, 3:162). Sufis have engaged in extended discussions on the self and the heart, but these ḥadÄ«ths do not help in differentiating between the self and the heart, because they add in the term âchest.â However, the central formulation in the ḥadÄ«th of WÄbiá¹£a is âConsult your heart. Consult your selfâ and the common denominator among all the narrations is turning towards the inner dimension of the human being. This is meant to distinguish between righteousness and sinfulness, between the permissible and the prohibited. The ḥadÄ«th is connected to the dichotomy of the apparent (áºÄhir) and the inward (bÄá¹in), which manifested strongly thereafter, particularly in the writings of the Sufis, who speak of âthe scholars of the apparentâ (Ê¿ulamÄʾ al-áºÄhir) in opposition to âthe scholars of the inward dimensionâ (Ê¿ulamÄʾ al-bÄá¹in), as we find, for instance, in AbÅ« ṬÄlib al-MakkÄ«âs (d. 386/998) work (al-MakkÄ« 2001, 1:326, 423â424, 443).
The ḥadÄ«th variant that mentioned certitude (yaqÄ«n) and doubt (shakk) can be linked to the intensive discussions on knowledge (Ê¿ilm), its definition and process as we find in philosophy, theology, and ūṣūl al-fiqh. The MuÊ¿tazilÄ«s considered sukÅ«n al-nafs (lit., âtranquillity of the soulâ) a condition for knowledge. Thus, when conviction does not correspond to reality (muá¹Äbaqa lil-wÄqiÊ¿), it should be considered ignorance; which was criticised harshly by SunnÄ« ūṣūl al-fiqh (al-BÄqillÄnÄ« 1998, 178â182; al-ShÄ«rÄzÄ« 2003, 4; al-KalwadhlÄnÄ« 1985, 1:36). The MuÊ¿tazilÄ«s defined knowledge as âbelieving a thing to be as it is to one selfâs tranquilityâ (iÊ¿tiqÄd al-shayʾ Ê¿alÄ mÄ huwa bihi maÊ¿a sukÅ«n al-nafs ilayh),12 and a similar definition can be found in philosophy in relation to rhetorical argument. Ê¿Abd al-JabbÄr (d. 415/1025) developed an epistemology of sukÅ«n al-nafs as mental persuasion that corresponds to outward realities (al-muá¹Äbaqa fÄ« l-khÄrij), and he understood it as an additional attribute of scholarship (Ê¿Älim) and not as an essential element of the definition of Ê¿ilm itself. Hence, the subjective standard of inner conviction must be reinforced by an objective standard, and, thus, the tranquillity of the self belongs to rationality rather than psychology, because lay persons, muqallids (people who follow othersâ opinions), psychologically can have the tranquillity of the self without its rational basis (Ê¿Abd al-JabbÄr n.d., 12:16â33; al-KindÄ« 1950, 1:171; Butterworth 1977, 63; Rosenthal 2007, 47f, 63, 211; Wilmers 2018, 151â152, 156, 163; Elkaisy-Friemuth 2006, 58â60, 169; Goodman 2003, 148â149).13 Note, however, that this understanding of sukÅ«n al-nafs is outside the scope of this paper as it is related mainly to the rational process of attaining knowledge and not to the inward dimension and conscience.
Going back to the two mentioned ḥadīths, I should note that they have provoked disagreement, as is clear from the words of Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), who spoke of jurists being divided into two groups according to their stance:
A group among the predecessors (salaf) advocated deeming them authentic (á¹£aḥīḥ) and acting upon that which is indicated by their apparent meaningsâ¦, then there are reports attributing to others a position advocating attenuating them, deeming them weak (á¸aÊ¿Ä«f), and reinterpreting their meanings.14
As for the group, who ascribed a weak validity to these ḥadÄ«ths, they did not only discourage people to act upon them, but also saw a contradiction between those ḥadÄ«ths that restrict guidance (hidÄya) to the QurʾÄn and the Sunna and those that refer to consultation of the heart and the self. For, in their view, God is the Legislator (al-MusharriÊ¿) and He has clarified all matters of religion either directly or indirectly. Indeed, even the Prophet had been commanded in the QurʾÄn to rule between people according to what God had shown him (Q 4:105), not according to his own opinion, nor by what his self had instructed. If this was the case with the Prophet himself, then it is all the more applicable to others. Whosoever is ignorant of Godâs proclamations is obligated to ask the scholars who understand Godâs intention, not to ask his self. The scriptural evidence is the sole reference for knowing the permissible and the prohibited, the meaning of which is affirmed by a number of ḥadÄ«ths and reports. It would seem that the choice for which this group has opted in order to resolve the supposed problem is to weigh between the ḥadÄ«ths that gives preference to one over the other. This is done without attempting to interpret or harmonise them, or even claim abrogation â the available options for dealing with âcontradictory ḥadÄ«thsâ (al-Khaá¹Ä«b 2011, 286â289; al-ShumunnÄ« 2004, 157â161). It would have been possible to restrict consultation of the heart to cases in which scriptural texts are absent or in cases where divergence exists between scholars on a particular issue. However, this too was ruled out based on the aforementioned argument regarding the status of the scriptural text as the sole authority with proclamations encompassing all realities.
As for the other group who advocated classifying these ḥadÄ«ths as authentic (á¹£aḥīḥ) and acting upon their apparent meanings, al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« reported some disagreement but did not convey the arguments through al-ṬabarÄ«, although they are mentioned in the books of uṣūl al-fiqh. It appears that al-ṬabarÄ« opted for an intermediate position between the two groups, so he interpreted the ḥadÄ«ths in a restricted manner,
either because he considered the ḥadīths to be authentic, or because he considered those among them that indicate their [apparent] meanings to be authentic.
al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« 1992, 2:663
However, the position advocating the attenuation of these ḥadÄ«ths, deeming them weak (á¸aÊ¿Ä«f), did not continue after al-ṬabarÄ«. We find no clear trace of this position in the various sources of ḥadÄ«th.15 It would appear that numerous ḥadÄ«ths that reported on this topic within the ḥadÄ«th corpus precluded the endurance of the position advocating such ḥadÄ«ths to be deemed forgeries. This is especially the case because these ḥadÄ«ths buttress each otherâs reliability, due to the abundance of their sources and the trajectory of their chain of transmission, as they were imparted from seven Companions (á¹£aḥÄba) and one among the Successors (tÄbiÊ¿Å«n).
2.2 Interpretations of the Ḥadīth
With the decline of the position advocating the weak reliability of these ḥadīths, the discussion turned to their interpretation and the search for their intended meaning. These ḥadīths provoked a central dilemma connected to the sources of knowledge, namely the authority of the heart and the self. The interpretations of the scholars of ḥadīth reflect their positions vis-à -vis this issue. For if we examine the chapter headings under which these ḥadīths have been included, we will find them revolving around ethical content, such as: righteousness and sinfulness; manners and good conduct; temperance, piety, and abstaining from ambiguous matters; in addition to some jurisprudential topics, such as the books of sales, testimony, judgments and rulings. The discussions of the ḥadīth commentators revolved around three central issues: (1) the boundaries of the authority of the heart and the self; (2) the concepts of righteousness and sinfulness; (3) How to reconcile and harmonise between the ḥadīth and others that might contradict it. We now turn to these issues in more detail.
2.2.1 The Authority of the Heart
One group rejected the authority of the heart and the self, and on this basis, deemed these ḥadÄ«ths to be weak. Another group took the opposite position and embraced the apparent meaning of these ḥadÄ«ths. Al-ṬabarÄ« was opposed to taking these ḥadÄ«ths in their general apparent meaning. He argued that the meaning of these ḥadÄ«ths is restricted, ânot as those have presumed, that it is a commandment directed to the ignorant (juhhÄl) to act according to what their selves have arrived at and reject whatever they deem repulsive, without asking their scholarsâ (al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« 1992, 2:664). Thus, two central questions arise here: what are those things that one should refer to the heart? And is this applicable to all hearts?
Al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316) determined that
the self (nafs) possesses an awareness, rooted in the fiá¹ra (innate disposition), of outcomes or results that are praiseworthy and those outcomes which are not. However, the appetite (shahwa) can overcome inner restrictions in such a way that it can obligate the person to act in a way that is self-harmful, such as the thief who is overcome by the appetite to steal, [despite] being afraid of the punishment that may befall him.
al-Ṭūfī 1998, 204
Ibn Rajab (d. 795/1393) affirmed the same meaning, maintaining the position that consultation of the heart is connected to those ḥadÄ«ths that speak of the innate disposition that God has built into people (al-fiá¹ra al-latÄ« faá¹ar al-nÄs Ê¿alayhÄ).16 However, something might arise that may corrupt this fiá¹ra, as a result of the actions of devils or parents. Thus, truth and falsehood are not ambiguous for the percipient believer â rather, he knows the truth from the light that surrounds it, so his heart accepts it; and he recoils from falsehood, so he condemns it and does not affirm it (Ibn Rajab 1999, 99â101).
However, because the fiá¹ra may become disturbed by external influence, the authority of the heart remains, on the one hand, imprecise and ill-suited for generalisation to all individuals and, on the other hand, also ill-suited for all issues about which one seeks consultation. The position advocating the authority of the heart in absolute terms would, thus, infringe upon the authority of the scriptural text and that of the scholars. It is possible here to distinguish between three interpretations.
The first interpretation followed the apparent meaning of the ḥadÄ«th, while restricting its applicability to the person seeking an answer alone, namely WÄbiá¹£a b. MaÊ¿bad, for the specificity of the personâs condition such as the tranquillity of his self in comparison to others, and being gifted with a light that distinguishes between truth and falsehood (al-MunÄwÄ« 1972, 1:495â496). However, the ḥadÄ«ths on this topic clearly demonstrate that WÄbiá¹£a was not unique, as the question was reportedly raised by others. Because some ḥadÄ«ths are articulated in a general form, there is no rationale for such specification.
The second interpretation holds that the ḥadÄ«th is not specific to the person seeking an answer. Rather, it is specific to a particular kind of heart. Thus, it is addressed to a person whose chest God has expanded with the light of certainty when he was given an opinion based on mere conjecture or inclination without sharÊ¿Ä« (legal) evidence (al-MunÄwÄ« 1972, 1:495). Al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ« (d. 320/932) predates others in advocating this meaning, as he specified that the heart an individual seeks consultation from should be the heart of âthe truthfulâ (muḥiqqÅ«n). By this, he means the people of truth possess a path towards God and their appetites have been controlled to the extent that their selves have become consorts of their hearts (al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ« 2010, 2:39â40). However, Ibn Ê¿IllÄn (d. 1057/1647) held that the intended meaning here is the self and the heart of a person among the people of ijtihÄd; for if this were not the case, then the person would be obligated to ask a mujtahid (Ibn Ê¿IllÄn 2004, 5:41). Thus, he reverts the entire issue to the actions and choices of the jurist, not to those of the muqallid (follower) of a madhhab (legal school), or the person seeking consultation.
The third interpretation attests that the ḥadÄ«th is meant for all believing hearts, but that it is specific to ambiguous issues, or to the field of transactions (buyÅ«Ê¿) in particular. Thus, whoever has said that seeking consultation of the heart is specific to ambiguous issues in general has interpreted the ḥadÄ«th of WÄbiá¹£a in light of the ḥadÄ«th of al-NuÊ¿mÄn b. BashÄ«r, who narrated from the Prophet:
That which is permissible is clear, and that which is prohibited is clear, and between these two are ambiguous matters that many people do not know.
al-BukhÄrÄ« 1895, 3:53; Muslim 1991, 3:1221
Al-ṬabarÄ« was among the first to advocate this position, as he dealt with the juristic applications of these ḥadÄ«ths. Therefore, he âdid not apply them in every domain of fiqhâ (al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« 1992, 2:663). Thus, seeking consultation from the heart does not apply to the legislation of actions or instituting acts of worship, nor to leaving aside SharÄ«Ê¿a rulings. The authority of the self and the heart, then, lies in issues that are licit (mubÄḥ) or in cases where sinfulness has been cast in doubt. It covers the area of mundane choices (muÊ¿ÄmalÄt) in life where people find themselves hesitant about a decision.
Some of the jurists who have commented on the ḥadÄ«th, such as al-ṬūfÄ« and Ibn Rajab followed al-ṬabarÄ«âs construal. Ibn Rajab attempted to create a balance between the authority of the self, on the one hand, and the authority of the scriptural text and the muftÄ«, on the other. Thus, he divided thoughts that occur in the self into those addressed by scriptural texts and those that are not. In the case of issues addressed by scriptural texts, the believer has no option but to obey God and his Prophet, and what occurs in the self is of no consequence. As for cases that have not been addressed by scriptural texts, authority belongs to the evidence, if it exists, or to the self of the tranquil believer, if no evidence exists (Ibn Rajab 1999, 2:103). This implies that Ibn Rajab remarkably narrowed the space in which one can refer to the heart, privileging the scriptural text, the actions of the predecessors (salaf), and the authority of the muftÄ«.
2.2.2 The Concepts of Righteousness and Sinfulness
WÄbiá¹£a and al-NawwÄs had both inquired about righteousness and sinfulness but were provided different answers, which led to different interpretations by scholars. Righteousness, in the ḥadÄ«th of WÄbiá¹£a, is âthat towards which the self feels tranquil (mÄ iá¹maʾannat ilayhi al-nafs),â whereas in the ḥadÄ«th of al-NawwÄs, it is âgood conduct (ḥusn al-khuluq).â Al-ṬaḥÄwÄ« (d. 321/933) strived to bring the two ḥadÄ«ths into harmony and suggested that since good conduct is occasioned by the tranquillity of the self, the two answers are in agreement (al-ṬaḥÄwÄ« 1994, 5:387). However, Ibn Rajab considered the difference in the Prophetâs explanation of righteousness to be due to a variance in the meaning of the term itself, as it carries two connotations. In the context of the treatment of the rest of creation, it means doing good (iḥsÄn), which includes doing good to oneâs parents (birr al-wÄlidayn). It also means performing all acts of obedience, both apparent and inward. Ibn Rajab considered the ḥadÄ«th of al-NawwÄs to encompass the second meaning, because âby good conduct, one might mean adopting the ethics of the SharÄ«Ê¿a and the manner of God.â However, he did not clarify which meaning is applicable to the ḥadÄ«th of WÄbiá¹£a (Ibn Rajab 1999, 2:97â99). As for al-RÄghib al-Iá¹£fahÄnÄ« (d. 502/1108), the ḥadÄ«th of WÄbiá¹£a does not explain the concepts of righteousness and sinfulness, but somewhat clarifies their legal status (ḥukm) (al-RÄghib al-Iá¹£fahÄnÄ« 2009, 64). This is because the meaning of righteousness is amplitude (saÊ¿a), and the meaning of sinfulness is delay (ibá¹Äʾ), for ârighteousness (birr) is amplitude in knowing truth (Ê¿ilm al-ḥaqq) and doing good (fiÊ¿l al-khayr),â and sinfulness (ithm) âis a name for actions that inhibit reward (mubá¹iʾa Ê¿an al-thawÄb)â (al-RÄghib al-Iá¹£fahÄnÄ« 2007, 160; 2009, 114).
It seems, as such, that al-RÄghib wanted to suggest that the abundant commission of good actions bequeaths the self an expansion in the chest and tranquillity in the heart. As for al-ṬūfÄ«, he considered that if righteousness is opposed to sinfulness, then it pertains to what the SharÄ«Ê¿a demands in terms of obligations or recommendations, sinfulness pertains to what the SharÄ«Ê¿a prohibits; whereas if righteousness is opposed to ingratitude, then it means doing good (iḥsÄn). The ḥadÄ«th of al-NawwÄs includes two signs of sinful acts, namely, its effect on the self and its wavering within it, because of its sense of an ill outcome, and hating for others to look upon the thing. However, al-ṬūfÄ« gave preponderance to there being a single composite sign (al-ṬūfÄ« 1998, 204â205).
Al-ṬūfÄ« and Ibn Rajab attempted to translate righteousness and sinfulness into the juristic categories of human actions (al-aḥkÄm al-fiqhiyya). On the one hand, Al-ṬūfÄ« categorised the signs of righteousness and sinfulness into four possibilities: (1) ithm (sinfulness) or ḥarÄm is that which rankles in the self, with fears that other people will observe it, such as zinÄ and ribÄ; (2) birr (righteousness) is that which does not rankle in the self and there is no fear of the observation of others such as Ê¿ibÄda, eating and drinking; (3) mushtabih (ambiguous) is that which rankles in the self but with no fear of other people observing (4) or where one fears other people observing him but it does not rankle in the self. The last two (3 and 4) oscillate between sinfulness and righteousness and are encompassed by the category of abhorred acts from which one ought to distance oneself (al-karÄha al-tanzÄ«hiyya). Guarding against ambiguous acts is considered to be obligatory (wÄjib). Coming into contact with them is sinful, whereas guarding against them is a path to absolution for the religion (dÄ«n) and honour (Ê¿irá¸). This is obligatory, for the path to what is obligatory is, in turn, also obligatory (al-ṬūfÄ« 1998, 210).
Ibn Rajab, on the other hand, considered sinfulness to be of two levels: the higher level is where both signs are established. The lower level is where the action is objectionable to the performer of the action. This is only applicable if the heart is among those that have been expanded by belief and the muftÄ« offers his opinion merely on the basis of supposition (áºann) or inclination toward whim (mayl ilÄ hawÄ) without sharÊ¿Ä« evidence where he grants the person the right to an individual review. However, Ibn Rajab did not clarify the legal status of referring to what is in the self in this case. Rather, he defined righteousness as that which is permissible (ḥalÄl) and sinfulness as that which is prohibited (ḥarÄm). In so doing, he recognised the tranquil heart for which the chest expands (mÄ sakana ilayhi al-qalb wa-insharaḥa ilayhi al-á¹£adr) is righteous and permissible, while its opposite is sinful and prohibited (Ibn Rajab 1999, 2:101).
Righteousness and sinfulness are ethical principles. Yet, commentators such as al-ṬūfÄ« and Ibn Rajab occupied themselves with the translation of the significations of righteousness and sinfulness into a juristic language within the system of the permissible and the prohibited (manáºÅ«mat al-ḥalÄl wa-l-ḥarÄm). Thus, the idea that righteousness implies amplitude, for example, pushes one to search for its constituent parts in an attempt to regulate and specify what is righteous and permissible, what is sinful and prohibited â and what is ambiguous. No acts of righteousness fall outside being either recommended (mandÅ«b) or obligatory (wÄjib), as pointed out by al-ṬūfÄ«.
However, righteousness, in its qualification as an ethical principle, refers, in my opinion, to a broader conception than that as it encompasses two things: truthfulness (á¹£idq) in action, i.e., achieving the intended aim of the action, and good conduct (iḥsÄn) in action, i.e., performing it in the most perfect way. This means that righteousness is a concept that refers to quality, not to quantity or the degree of obligation in action (obligatory and recommended). It thus aims to transcend the formalism of apparent judgments or mere performance apart from consideration for the intent or the anticipated value of actions. This meaning remains unexamined in the books of ḥadÄ«th commentary. For righteousness is a concept that surpasses juristic language and transcends to the ethical sphere.
Al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ« held the position that ambiguity only occurs for the scholars of the apparent (Ê¿ulamÄʾ al-áºÄhir), because âthey found no revelation in its regard, nor any tradition attributed to the Prophet, so it appears to them as ambiguous, sometimes as permissible and at other times as prohibited, and they corrupted the witness (shÄhid) that is within their hearts and the proof (ḥujja) with which God provided themâ (al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ« 2010, 2:42). But this does not occur for âthe truthful onesâ (muḥiqqÅ«n) who find within their hearts the clarification of ambiguous matters. Whatever makes their hearts feel tranquil, they count among the permissible, and whatever makes their hearts waver and from which they recoil, they count among the prohibited. For in the view of âthe truthful,â no ambiguous matter falls outside what is either permissible or prohibited, and this is a level of reflection at variance with the aforementioned ambiguous matters with which the jurists occupied themselves. An ambiguous matter for the jurist does not fall outside the category of abhorred acts from which one ought to distance himself/herself (al-karÄha al-tanzÄ«hiyya), as made clear by al-ṬūfÄ«. However, al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ« counted that towards which the heart feels tranquil as permissible, and that for which the heart wavers as prohibited. I surmise that he had in mind a meaning specific to the jurists, which he clarified in another book when he spoke of abstaining from appetites and avoiding desires for the purpose of refining the self and training it so that the heart is not corrupted â not in the sense of prohibiting that which is permissible (al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ« 1993, 64). This meaning is connected to the principle of striving for perfection of action, which transcends the action of the people of the apparent (ahl al-áºÄhir).
These opinions have generally sought to present interpretations that preserve the authority of the scriptural text and that of its specialists and prevent the transformation of normative judgments into individual subjective judgments. This is particularly the case as the self is susceptible to contingencies, such as desires and appetites, which disrupt the objectivity of its judgments. Accordingly, there were three interpretations; the first interpretation understood âconsulting the heartâ as a reference specifically to the hearts of the people of truth who relinquished their appetites and submitted to psychological exercises that refined them and rendered their judgments as trustworthy. The second interpretation specified consulting the heart over ambiguous issues, where the line between permissible (ḥalÄl) and prohibited (ḥarÄm) is blurred. This ambiguity occurs mainly in individual choices and in the absence of evidentiary arguments. Here individuals are addressed by the SharÄ«Ê¿a because they are aware of the innermost aspects of their selves. The third interpretation understood consulting the heart as a reference to the heart of the independent jurist (mujtahid) or the critical ḥadÄ«th scholar (al-muḥaddith al-nÄqid) who has acquired cumulative evidentiary knowledge. In all these interpretations, scholars tried to minimise the subjective role of the individual in favour of the objective judgment of the scholars in general.
3 Consulting the Heart: Rational Proofs and the Sources of Knowledge
The previous discussion revolved around the text of the ḥadÄ«th in two aspects: that of the ḥadÄ«th being firmly established, and that of its signification and its relation to other scriptural texts. However, the authority of the inward dimension (bÄá¹in) is connected to discussions and branching issues that fall under the domains of fiqh, uṣūl al-fiqh, and Sufism. This is because the authority of the inward dimension relates to a central issue â namely, the sources of knowledge by which sharÊ¿Ä« knowledge is established and the arguments for the rulings (aḥkÄm) of actions, which are matters where the jurists differ from the Sufis. The ḥadÄ«ths of consulting the heart or referring to the stirrings of the heart (ḥawÄzz al-qulÅ«b) are connected to numerous issues; among them are inspiration (ilhÄm), juristic preference (istiḥsÄn), blocking the means of prohibited actions (sadd al-dharÄʾiÊ¿), piety (waraÊ¿) and caution (iḥtiyÄá¹).17
3.1 Inspiration (IlhÄm) and Rational Proofs
The jurists based their knowledge on a master principle: theoretical speculation (naáºar) and evidentiary inference (istidlÄl). In doing so, jurists held that in every ruling (ḥukm) there must be a fundamental principle (aá¹£l) upon which it is based. Thus, they did not deem it permissible for a legally obligated individual (mukallaf) to undertake an action if they do not know its sharÊ¿Ä« ruling. These rulings were specified according to an established methodology in uṣūl al-fiqh, which inquires into the evidence and proofs upon which fiqh is based. They applied this method to assess particular actions by attributing to them a specific ruling in the science of fiqh. However, inspiration (ilhÄm) is neither theoretical speculation (naáºar), nor evidentiary inference (istidlÄl), and, therefore, it has been a cause for controversy in uṣūl al-fiqh (Ibn Ê¿AqÄ«l 1999, 1:18; AbÅ« YaÊ¿lÄ 1990, 1:82). Can fiqh be based upon the inspiration of the heart? Is seeking the adjudication of the heart an action of the independent jurist (mujtahid) or the madhhab-follower (muqallid)? What is the authoritative reference if all proofs are absent? These questions fall directly under our discussion of the ḥadÄ«ths under study.
The evidentiary inference has been employed with the âconsult your heartâ ḥadÄ«th in order to prove the authority of inspiration.18 This is an area of inquiry where the positions of the uṣūlÄ«s (legal theorists) have differed and three positions are distinguishable.
The first position holds that inspiration is an absolute sharÊ¿Ä« proof and an inward revelation analogous to rational theoretical speculation and evidentiary inference. It would appear that the rejection of the authority of inspiration in the books of uṣūl is related to two issues: the juristsâ conceptualisation of what may be deemed as adequate âproofâ in their convention; and their response to those who pay no heed to rational theoretical speculation holding that âthere is no proof except inspiration.â So, they give precedence to it over rational theoretical speculation (al-SamarqandÄ« 1984, 679; al-MÄwardÄ« 1994, 16:53; al-DabÅ«sÄ« 2009, 3:369â391; al-FanÄrÄ« 2006, 2:445).
The second position holds that inspiration is not proof, neither with respect to the individual who is inspired (mulham), nor with respect to others, i.e., regardless of whether it is transitive or intransitive. The reason for this is the absence of divine basis and the distrust towards those who carry fallible meditations (al-SubkÄ« 2003, 111; Ibn AmÄ«r al-ḤÄjj 1983, 3:296). Ruling out inspiration as a path to knowledge or as a proof among other proofs is due to the paths of knowledge and to the conceptualisation of the validity of proofs. The paths of sharÊ¿Ä« knowledge were restricted by al-ShÄfiÊ¿Ä« (d. 204/820) to the scriptural text. He clarified elsewhere that resorting to ijmÄÊ¿ (consensus) and qiyÄs (analogy) is within the category of á¸arÅ«ra (exigency) (al-ShÄfiÊ¿Ä« 1938, 39, 599). This means that the locus of sharÊ¿Ä« knowledge is either a revealed scriptural text, or, in absence of a direct scriptural text, rational theoretical speculation regarding a revealed scriptural text. However, the uṣūlÄ«s who came after al-ShÄfiÊ¿Ä« agreed upon the convention of istidlÄl (evidentiary inference), which is to search for proofs outside the four sources (QurʾÄn, ḥadÄ«th, consensus, and analogy). IstidlÄl is based upon rational theoretical speculation, thereby excluding inspiration (al-DabÅ«sÄ« 2009, 3:375; al-SarakhsÄ« n.d., 2:185â186; al-BukhÄrÄ« n.d., 3:358).
The third position is that it is obligatory to act upon true inspiration, but only with respect to the individual who is inspired. It is impermissible to invite others to it. Al-DabÅ«sÄ« and al-SamarqandÄ« (d. 540/1145) attributed this position to the majority of scholars (al-DabÅ«sÄ« 2009, 3:369; al-SamarqandÄ« 1984, 679; Ibn AmÄ«r al-ḤÄjj 1983, 3:296; al-ZarkashÄ« 1994, 8:114; Ibn al-NajjÄr 1993, 1:330â332; Ibn Rajab 1999, 2:104). However, those who hold this position consider inspiration to be conditional proof, not self-standing independent proof. Thus, it is not permissible to act upon it, except in the absence of all other proofs (al-DabÅ«sÄ« 2009, 3:369; al-SamarqandÄ« 1984, 679; Ibn al-NajjÄr 1993, 1:330â332).
According to the first position, inspiration is considered as a path to knowledge that is established in the heart without theoretical speculation or evidentiary inference. The testimony of the heart without proof holds precedence over the proof-based opinion of the muftÄ«. This has been understood from the ḥadÄ«th of WÄbiá¹£a itself, meaning that the heart of the individual occupies a dynamic role in the ethical valuation of actions, owing to the fact that the inspiration of the heart is analogous to revelation. However, the problem with this position is the possibility that inspiration can stand independently from all other proofs, or in opposition to them (al-DabÅ«sÄ« 2009, 3:388). Even if it is indeed an âinward proofâ (ḥujja bÄá¹ina), the characteristics of proofs sanctioned by the uṣūlÄ«s in rulings do not apply. Proofs, according to them, are the rational proofs that depend on the one hand on scriptural texts and, on the other, on theoretical speculation and evidentiary inference. Further, among the necessary conditions of proof is that it should be expressed first, whereas in the case of inspiration, âthe scope for expressing it narrowsâ (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1971, 177). A proof must be suitable for debate and be binding upon another (al-DabÅ«sÄ« 2009, 3:377; 1:133â134), meaning that it is open to generalisation. Obligation and generalisation, however, are established upon the characteristic of what is apparent to everyone, which is not the same in the case of inspiration.
The majority of scholars did not deem inspiration to be entirely without merit, but they only resorted to it in cases of exigency where worthy proofs were absent. What is implied by this is that proofs vary in degree, so direct scriptural proofs are given precedence over indirect scriptural proofs. Thus, qiyÄs (analogy) and ijmÄÊ¿ (consensus) were considered to be an exigency in the absence of a scriptural text. If all apparent proofs are lacking, the individual who is inspired resorts to inspiration as an exigency. Such a ruling is established for the individual alone, so others should not be invited to it. Obviously, this avoids the arbitrariness of judgment and ensures stability while still allowing for some discretion in cases where no apparent evidence is available. This view remains consistent with the theory of the uṣūlÄ«s.
3.2 The Heart That Offers Opinion: al-GhazÄlÄ«, on Piety and Caution
The ḥadÄ«th of WÄbiá¹£a, and others, are a fundamental principle within scholarship that addresses the subject of piety (waraÊ¿). The two imÄms al-JuwaynÄ« (d. 478/1085) and al-GhazÄlÄ« deemed it foundational within their chapters on this topic. Al-GhazÄlÄ« spoke of what he called âthe heart that offers opinion (al-qalb al-muftÄ«),â and he drew a parallel between the opinion (fatwÄ) of the heart and that of the muftÄ« in terms of ethical responsibility and the juristâs connection to the actions of the heart. The individual âis taken with respect to his self â between himself and God â by the opinion of his heartâ (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 3:3; 2:113; see also al-JuwaynÄ« 2007, 15:320). At the same time, the actions of the heart fall outside the authority of the jurist due to two reasons: the first is because the theoretical speculation of the jurist is specific only to the rulings of the actions of the limbs and that which becomes apparent from inward actions. In other words, the jurist is concerned only with what can be regulated and is general to all legally obligated individuals. This differs from âthe piety of the God-conscious (muttaqÅ«n) and the righteous (á¹£Äliḥūn),â who aspire to a station higher than that of the generality of the legally obligated. For that reason, the latter do not only stop at the boundary of the obligatory and the prohibited, rather, they abstain from everything in which there is ambiguity; and they also abstain from some things that are licit out of fear that they may lead to what is illicit. Then, if their station is elevated further, they abstain from many licit fortunes which distract them from the pleasure of proximity to God. The second reason is that the jurist âdoes not discuss the stirrings of the hearts and how to act upon them,â because his theoretical speculation relates to the earthly world (dunyÄ) (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 1:19, 2:113, 4:213). On this basis, the individual shoulders the majority of the heartâs actions themselves since it is s/he who is acquainted with their own particulars. While this is a broad conception of piety that al-GhazÄlÄ« discussed at length, he did not grant the legally obligated individual complete authority to determine what is valid or invalid in piety in case he passes over into obsessiveness and affective overburdening. Some piety falls under the laws of fiqh in terms of regulation and codification, and that which cannot be regulated is deferred anew to the legally obligated pious individual (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 2:112).
Importantly, consultation of the heart is not absolute. It is subject to restrictions and particulars at which one must stop for it not to disrupt the system of apparent rulings. This is because the purpose of scrutinising the conditions of the inward dimension is to arrive at a higher station of devotion in worship. On this basis, al-GhazÄlÄ« stipulated that the intended meaning of consulting the heart is,
that which the muftī has declared permissible. As for that which he has declared prohibited, it is obligatory to refrain.
al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 2:118
Here, it is possible for us to distinguish between two cases. The first is the case of conflict between the opinion of the muftÄ« and the opinion of the heart, which is implied by the ḥadÄ«th of WÄbiá¹£a (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 1:224), i.e., that the opinion of the heart is given precedence over that of the muftÄ«, because the heart is the locus of accountability for blame and the acquisition of reward.
So, if the heart of the muftī ruled in favour of deeming something obligatory and it was mistaken in so doing, he is rewarded for that. Indeed, whosoever presumed that he had performed ritual purification must pray, then if he prayed and then remembered that he had not performed the ablution, he receives a reward for his action. If he remembered and then left performing it, he is punished for it ⦠and all that is by considering the heart to the exception of the limbs.
al-GhazÄlÄ« 2011, 5:153
Moreover, the heart might be harmed by accepting that in which there is a stirring. It is obligatory, therefore, to listen to it. Venturing upon any action with a stirring in the heart harms it and brings darkness upon it, irrespective of the reality of the ruling as determined by God or its formulation by the muftÄ« (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 2:113).
The second case is doubt and ambiguity, involving two competing beliefs, each with its own proper ground. Al-GhazÄlÄ« attempted to regulate the implications of ambiguous matters. He determined that in cases of doubt, the legally obligated individual shall consult his heart in the same way the Messenger of God commanded WÄbiá¹£a to consult his heart. Al-GhazÄlÄ« thus calls upon the legally obligated individual to go beyond simply avoiding what is prohibited and to shun ambiguous matters. For a while the opinion of the muftÄ« is grounded on probabilities, the opinion of the heart pertains to piety and needs to be shielded from ambiguous matters. Such a station is higher than the theoretical speculation of the jurist which stops at clear-cut boundaries. Although al-GhazÄlÄ« attempted to regulate the fundamental principles of ambiguous matters (shubah) by means of the logic of the jurist, the details and applications of these ambiguous matters cannot be regulated. On this basis, he delegated them to the heart, not to the muftÄ« (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 2:99, 103, 86, 118).
The heartâs stirrings, in terms of their capacity as a standard in determining what is ethical, do not only depend on the heart as the locus of legal obligation. They also depend on the heart possessing âinsights into discrete contextual indicants for which the scope of speech narrowsâ (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 2:125). Thus, it is not possible to regulate them according to the laws of fiqh, but they may be realised by means of âthe contextual indicants of conditions (qarÄʾin al-aḥwÄl)â (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 4:213).
Because the heartâs stirrings differ according to individuals and realities, it is possible to posit a general fundamental principle for them. Namely, âthat which he finds to be closer to his whim and to that which is implied by his nature, the opposite of it is more worthyâ (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 2:170). Because these issues and conditions are in the utmost of subtlety, ânot every heart can be depended uponâ (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 2:118). For that reason, â[the Prophet] did not refer everyone to the consultation of the heart. Rather, he only said that to WÄbiá¹£a because of what he had known of his conditionâ (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 2:117). This does not mean that consultation is to be restricted to the hearts of specific individuals, but rather that the command revolves around specific characteristics that adorn hearts, which may be attained through cultivation, watchfulness, and avoiding ambiguous matters. For hearts are two extremes and a median: the two extremes are an obsessive heart that recoils from everything and a covetous indulgent heart that is at ease with everything, and these two hearts are to be given no consideration. Rather, consideration is owed to what al-GhazÄlÄ« on occasion called âthe heart of the scholar who has attained success that is watchful of the subtleties of conditions,â which on another occasion he called âthe pure moderate heart (al-qalb al-á¹£ÄfÄ« l-muÊ¿tadil).â Even though al-GhazÄlÄ« admits to the scarcity of this type of heart, he opens the door to whoever âdoes not trust his own heartâ to âsolicit the light from a heart bearing this descriptionâ in order that he may present his case to it (al-GhazÄlÄ« 1982, 113, 118).
3.3 The Heart as Exhorter: Ibn Taymiyya and Giving Preponderance to the Heart
Ibn Taymiyya reaffirmed the authority of the scriptural text, by holding the position that any belief or action needs to be grounded in sharÊ¿Ä« evidence (Ibn Taymiyya 2001, 2:101; 2005, 10:477; 1991a, 1:244; 2005, 18:65; 2005, 22:27; 1987, 5:134). According to him, the scriptural evidence reflects Godâs intent and what He loves and abhors. Hence, it behoves the legally obligated individual to examine the evidence without yielding to his or her whim. However, the Lawgiverâs ruling may be absolute or specific. As clarified by the Lawgiver, absolute rulings are principles and generalities which encompass an infinite number of particularities (Ibn Taymiyya 2001, 2:102; 2005, 10:478). Specific rulings, on the other hand, are those technically termed âestablishing the ratio legis (taḥqÄ«q al-manÄá¹).â If a specific scriptural text exists in which the ruling is clarified, this expresses Godâs intent more clearly. However, if Godâs intent is hidden due to the absence of evidence or its ambiguity, or because the proofs contradict one another, establishing what God loves and what God abhors becomes the locus of ijtihÄd.
It is here that Ibn Taymiyya cites three schools: the first is to give preponderance to one position by the mere choice and will of the legally obligated individual. This is the position of the theologians, jurists and some of the Sufis. However, he determined that,
Giving preponderance to one position by mere will, without relying on any scholarly basis, whether hidden or apparent, is not a position that is held by any of the imÄms of knowledge and temperance.
Ibn Taymiyya 2005, 10:269; 2001, 2:93
The second is to refer to pure qadar (divine decree), because of the absence of overriding authoritative reasons (al-asbÄb al-murajjiḥa) from the perspective of the SharÄ«Ê¿a, and to avoid the introduction of personal will and whim into the action. This is because the introduction of whim dithers between being prohibited, disapproved, or descending from the station of perfect obedience to God. Surrendering to qadar here is to give preponderance by means of something that cannot be attributed to the individual and in which he has no will. It is Godâs action with regard to the individual. This is, according to Ibn Taymiyya, the method of Ê¿Abd al-QÄdir al-JÄ«lÄnÄ« (d. 561/1166) and his like among the great shaykhs. The third is to give preponderance to one position based on an inward reason, such as taste (dhawq), inspiration (ilhÄm), or inclination of the heart (mayl qalbÄ«). Here, Ibn Taymiyya added that if the heart that is abundant in God-consciousness (al-qalb al-maÊ¿mÅ«r bi-l-taqwÄ) gives preponderance to a position by its will, then it is a sharÊ¿Ä« overriding authority (tarjīḥ sharÊ¿Ä«) with respect to itself. Guiding indications may occur within the heart of the believer regarding things that cannot be expressed. This is because God has built within his servants an innate disposition (fiá¹ra) towards the truth, and has placed within the heart of each believer an exhorter (wÄÊ¿iáº), just as he placed an exhorter for the believer within the Book and the apparent SharÄ«Ê¿a. Within each of the two exhorters, there are commandments and prohibitions, accompanied by exhortations and admonitions. This implies that there is a correspondence between apparent commandments and inward commandments. And in the case of the heart that is abundant in God-consciousness, the commandments and prohibitions that occur within the believerâs heart are identical to the commandments and prohibitions of the QurʾÄn, so one is strengthened by the other. Thus, there is sinfulness and righteousness âroaming and waveringâ (taraddud wa-jawalÄn) within the chests of creation. If the servant exerts their utmost in obeying God and guarding against Godâs wrath, God becomes his or her hearing and sight and comes to be within his or her heart and sense. Indeed, he or she mostly wills what God loves and detests that which He abhors. When a heart becomes abundant in God-consciousness, matters are disclosed and become open to it, unlike the darkened ruinous heart. The action of this heart (i.e., al-qalb al-maÊ¿mÅ«r bi-l-taqwÄ) here is stronger upon its bearer than the weak and illusory analogies, just as it is stronger than the many apparent meanings and claims of continuity (istiṣḥÄb) that the jurists cite as proof (Ibn Taymiyya 2001, 2:98â99; 2005, 20:27â29, 44â46, 19:280â285, 10:268â273, 477; 1986, 8:70; 1991b, 1:7).
Resorting to the inward overriding authoritative factor (al-murajjiḥ al-bÄá¹in) here takes place after the exhaustion of all apparent evidentiary indicants. The believer in this case may either opt to give preponderance to this inward reason, or to give preponderance merely based on his or her will and choice. However, giving preponderance to something merely on the basis of personal choice is to be avoided because it can be unstable, oscillating between prohibition or disapproval, or descending from the station of perfect obedience to God. The servant may also be requested to contradict his or her whim.
3.4 Everyone Is Their Own Jurist: al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« and Establishing the Ratio Legis
Al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« argued that these ḥadÄ«ths are connected to the legally obligated individualâs ijtihÄd in establishing the ratio legis (taḥqÄ«q al-manÄá¹). When it comes to knowing its ruling, every action is in need of two exercises in theoretical speculation: the first is an exercise in theoretical speculation with respect to the scriptural evidence of the ruling (dalÄ«l al-ḥukm). This is something in which the heart has no place. For deeming something detestable based on the extent to which the self feels at ease without any scriptural evidence is the methodology of the people of innovation (bidÊ¿a), and opposed to the ijmÄÊ¿ of Muslims. The second is an exercise in theoretical speculation regarding the locus in which the ruling is revealed (maḥall al-ḥukm), as many of its applications are deferred to the legally obligated individuals without requiring them to meet the condition of fulfilling the status of ijtihÄd or of SharÄ«Ê¿a knowledge.19 If the layperson were to ask the muftÄ« about actions that are not of the type performed in prayer â whether their commission by a person during the performance of prayer would render their prayer invalid â the muftÄ« would answer: if the action is negligible, it is forgivable, but if it is excessive, it would invalidate the prayer. The layperson here is in no need of clarification from the muftÄ« in specifying what is excessive and what is not, for such specific judgment goes back to each legally obligated individual self to decide. This means that judgments of validity and invalidity depend upon the self of the legally obligated individual, i.e., deferring to the heart is restrictive in nature, so it does not undermine the scriptural evidence of the SharÄ«Ê¿a (al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« 1992, 2:666â667; 1997, 2:300, 5:16â17, 25). As for determining general rulings, engaging in theoretical speculation on scriptural evidence and establishing the ratio legis that require ijtihÄd, they are to be referred to the jurists. This is because the ruling authority of jurists rests on sharÊ¿Ä« knowledge, which is specific to their domain and distinguishes them from others. To refer to the jurist is to refer to the SharÄ«Ê¿a, and the muqallid is in need of an exemplar to follow (al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« 1992, 2:858â862). This means that consultation of the heart does not nullify the authority of the jurist.
Al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« stresses the regularity of the SharÄ«Ê¿a, the generality and consistency of its rulings, and its exemption from loopholes, and thus runs on a singular law encompassing all legally obligated individuals. This regularity, however, does not nullify the variances and differences between individuals, whether in terms of the difference in their conditions, or the variance in their cognitive abilities. On this basis, al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« determines that the purpose of sharÊ¿Ä« rulings relating to customs (such as transactions and adjudications), as well as many acts of worship, is the regulation of the avenues of benefits, so that peopleâs affairs may become well-ordered. Regulation, to the extent that it is possible, is closer to abiding by Godâs intent. As for matters that cannot be regulated, they are deferred to the trust and private affairs of legally obligated individuals (amÄnÄt al-mukallafÄ«n), such as prayer, fasting, menstruation, ritual purity, and other such matters (al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« 1997, 2:526â527). Furthermore, absolute commandments and absolute prohibitions (i.e., those for which the Lawgiver has not specified particular boundaries) are intended to be unregulated by the Lawgiver and are delegated to the theoretical speculation of the legally obligated individual to engage in ijtihÄd. This is because the commandments and prohibitions must have intelligible meanings that can be understood independently but are still left without regulation. The aim here is to accommodate individual differences and conditions and variances in the performance of duties, which fall outside the circle of well-regulated obligations in which all are equal (al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« 1997, 2:148). This includes commandments such as those in favour of justice, goodness, forgiveness, patience, and gratitude, and prohibitions against injustice, indecency, bad conduct, and transgression (al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« 1997, 3:235, 392â398, 401). This point opens the door for the individual creative effort,20 which differentiates between people in their goodness, and for distinctions between ethics and fiqh where the ethical realm goes beyond what is licit.
As for the stirrings of the hearts, they cannot be regulated, and they encompass personal revelations (mukÄshafÄt) and miracles (karÄmÄt). These cannot validly be taken into consideration except on the condition that they do not contravene a sharÊ¿Ä« ruling nor a religious principle. Moreover, the domain of acting upon mukÄshafÄt and karÄmÄt is in matters that are licit, or desirable pursuits in which there is room for manoeuvre, such as warning, giving glad tidings, and the pursuit of benefits that one hopes may successfully be attained. All this is based upon the fundamental principle determined by al-ShÄá¹ibÄ«, namely that the SharÄ«Ê¿a is general and not specific. Its fundamental basis cannot be contravened and its consistency cannot be broken (al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« 1997, 2:457, 466â468, 471â473).
Al-GhazÄlÄ« discussed exhaustively what cannot be regulated among the actions of legally obligated individuals under the topic of âpiety (waraÊ¿),â and included a cryptic part to guide the pious scholar. Al-ShÄá¹ibÄ«, however, addressed the same point under what he called the theoretical speculation of legally obligated individuals (naáºar al-mukallaf), or under the fiqh of the self, which generally revolves around âestablishing the ratio legis.â The two approaches are complementary, as they refer to the individualâs effort and role in the valuation of actions. Overlapping occurs between the approaches of al-GhazÄlÄ« and al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« in that issues of piety intersect with issues of establishing the ratio legis. If piety is taken to mean the avoidance of ambiguous matters, then establishing the ratio legis is a broader category, because it addresses ambiguous matters and other issues. Al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« even made space for that which the Lawgiver deliberately left unregulated so that the legally obligated individual may move freely based on their ijtihÄd and according to their condition. Al-GhazÄlÄ« primarily occupied himself with the responsibility of the individual from a Sufi perspective, and therefore opened the door to the stirrings of the hearts in order that some licit things that may harm the self may be avoided. Al-ShÄá¹ibÄ«, on the other hand, occupied himself with the regulation of the fundamental principles of the SharÄ«Ê¿a. He thus posited a cohesive theoretical framework for it, closing the door to the stirrings of the hearts except when they do not contravene sharÊ¿Ä« principles or rulings, such as mushtabihÄt or licit actions, to exclude what some extremist Sufis did when they followed their inspiration and freed themselves from the juristic rulings.
4 The Sufi Discourse on Consciences
Ibn Ê¿AjÄ«ba (d. 1224/1808) noted that âamong the foundational principles of the people of taá¹£awwuf is to refer to God in all thingsâ (Ibn Ê¿AjÄ«ba 2002, 2:417). However, this absolute recourse to God cannot be achieved by sticking to the method of the jurists only and contenting oneself with the apparent actions. The Sufis, thus, expanded in two directions: first, in valuating human actions in such a way as to encompass actions of the heart, and that there are rights owed to God in the beliefs of the hearts and what they acquire. These are referred to as âthe inward knowledgeâ (Ê¿ilm al-bÄá¹in),21 which pertain to what the Sufis call musings (khaá¹arÄt), which are, as al-MuḥÄsibÄ« (d. 243/857) says, âthe causes for hearts to turn to every good or evilâ (al-MuḥÄsibÄ« 2003:84â85). The second expansion came in the direction of the sources of knowledge of divine will, which governs peopleâs actions. This will encompass âapparent commandmentsâ (awÄmir áºÄhira), expressed by scriptural texts, and âinward commandmentsâ (awÄmir bÄá¹ina), embodied in inspiration (ilhÄm) and the consultation of the heart. Al-QushayrÄ«âs (465/1073) definition of musings reflects this aforementioned expansion, as he defined musings as âa discourse that comes upon the consciencesâ (khiá¹Äb yaridu Ê¿alÄ l-á¸amÄʾir) (al-QushayrÄ« 1989, 169). This is a definition that encompasses two meanings:
The first meaning is that the heart is a discrete power (quwwa khafiyya) or a divine spiritual subtlety (laá¹Ä«fa rabbÄniyya rūḥÄniyya). This is the discerning aspect of the human that is addressed, punished, admonished, and answerable. The khaá¹arÄt, which come upon this heart, vary based on their sources and types and are differentiated by means of signs and terminologies. Al-MuḥÄsibÄ« divided the musings of the hearts into three types: a forewarning from the Most Gracious (which may be direct, without an intermediary, or through the mediation of an angel), a command from the self, and a whispering from the devil. Al-QushayrÄ« clarifies that each of these types takes a convention specific to it, âso, if it is from an angel, it is inspiration (ilhÄm); if it is from the self, it is called presentiments (hawÄjis); if it is from the devil, it is the whispering (waswÄs); and if it is God who has placed it in the heart, it is a true musing (khÄá¹ir ḥaqq)â (al-MuḥÄsibÄ« 1986, 297â299; al-QushayrÄ« 1989, 169â170). The Sufis were thus cognisant of the complexities of that which roams within the human and the different causes that prompt actions. This is a vision that is more layered and complex than that of the Greek philosophers regarding the three powers of the soul: the appetitive power, the irascible power, and the rational power.22 This complexity can be explained based on the spiritual experience and the scriptural sources.
The second meaning is that the Sufisâ inquiry into divine will (and what God loves and abhors) generated their interest in the varieties of discourse, both apparent and inward. With regard to the inward discourse, they considered all its forms regardless of the source because they believed that the inward revelation complements the apparent revelation. Inquiry into the inward revelation requires differentiating it from what may be confused with it, such as the whisperings of a devil or the whims of a self. The inward revelation takes two forms: inspiration from an angel and the true musing from God, each of which represents a source for the valuation of the individualâs actions. On this basis, al-SuhrawardÄ« (d. 632/1234) considered that âthe esoteric sciences (al-Ê¿ulÅ«m al-ladunniyya) within the hearts of those devoted to God are a kind of communicationâ (al-SuhrawardÄ« 2000, 2:37). However, this differs from the way of the jurists, who restricted themselves to knowing the discourse of revelation (scriptural texts) which represents the general and apparent divine will. In the absence of scriptural evidence, jurists had to negotiate how much leeway they were willing to give to the heart within the non-textual sources. By contrast, the Sufis did not have the same concern for they operated within the realm of the heart and had more space to elaborate and theorise. For jurists, it remained limited to psychology in relation to what is evident and what is apparent in terms of testimony, while for the Sufis it became completely grounded in the deep psychological domain of the heart, beyond the domain of what is apparent. While some uṣūlÄ«s objected to the rejection of inspiration, for the lack of grounding of its source, the Sufis posited standards and signs that aid in differentiating between one musing and another.
From the sum total of their discussions, it is possible to say that the distinction between musings is based on two things. The first rests on the consideration of the musing in light of the apparent revelation. The second is premised on the special characteristics linked to taste and experience. The divine musing is in concord with a fundamental sharÊ¿Ä« principle, untouched by license or whim, and followed by a sense of calm and expansion (burÅ«da wa-inshirÄḥ). The musing of the self mostly invites following an appetite or a sense of pride, which is not in accord with a fundamental sharÊ¿Ä« principle. It also admits licenses and is followed by a sense of dryness and tightness (yubs wa-inqibÄá¸). The angelic musing brings nothing but good, whereas the satanic musing mostly invites us towards sin, although it may also bring good, which is cause for ambiguity. The differentiating factor between the angelic and satanic muse is that the first is supported by evidentiary indicants and is accompanied by an expansion, contrary to the satanic, which turns one away from evidentiary indicants and is accompanied by restrictiveness. If a person is confused regarding the origin of their musing, it is up to them to stop and ascertain, either by looking into their heart or asking the scholars. Thus, according to Ibn Ê¿AjÄ«ba, it is among the characteristics of the people of taá¹£awwuf âto consult the hearts regarding those matters that occur [to them],â i.e., if they did not find an apparent revelation in its regard (al-MuḥÄsibÄ« 2003, 89; al-QushayrÄ« 1989, 169â170; al-JÄ«lÄnÄ« 1976, 26â27; ZarrÅ«q n.d., 288â289; al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ« 2010, 2:42, 54; Ibn Ê¿AjÄ«ba 2002, 3:14; 2:417).
The principle of referring to God in all things also affected the Sufisâ way of gauging actions on the basis of the principle that all the servantâs movements and moments of stillness ought to be through God. This is because referring to God absolutely demands following commandments that may be divided into two kinds: the first is to take from the earthly world (dunyÄ) sustenance (qÅ«t) which is the selfâs right to avoid whims and desires (ḥaáºáº al-nafs), and to perform obligations and become occupied with avoiding sins, both apparent and inward. This is the adherence to apparent commandments. The second is to follow the inward commandment, which comes from the exalted Truth. God commands His servants and prohibits them by means of true musing or by the inspiration of an angel. This inward commandment is linked to what is licit with no ruling in the SharÄ«Ê¿a and is left to the servantâs choice. However, here, the individual may relinquish choice and await the inward commandment regarding the issue at hand â and if he is then commanded, he complies. Indeed, al-JÄ«lÄnÄ« and others âcommand the performance of that which is recommended and not obligatory, and proscribe that which is discouraged and not prohibitedâ (Ibn Taymiyya 2005, 10:265). Thus, there remains no scope for the five legal rulings23 with respect to the specific individual. This is because the recommended (mustaḥabb) is subsumed into the obligatory (wÄjib), the discouraged (makrÅ«h) is subsumed into the prohibited (ḥarÄm), and the licit (mubÄḥ) does not exist, because it becomes appended either to commission or to omission. In fact, al-JÄ«lÄnÄ« calls for the abandonment of those musings which, upon consideration in light of the Book and the Sunna, it becomes clear that they are of the self and its licit appetites (such as eating, drinking, sexual intercourse, and other such things).
Ibn Taymiyya highlighted the disputation among the jurists over the meaning adopted here by al-JÄ«lÄnÄ« and others because the jurists affirm the five legal rulings. However, the work of the jurists applies to rulings in general (Ê¿umÅ«m) and the work of the Sufis applies to the rulings of the elect (khawÄṣṣ). Thus, al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ« differentiated between ârefining the self,â by barring it from some licit appetites and âprohibition,â positing that by barring the self from its desires, the training of the self is achieved such that it is subdued and softened. Therefore, the renunciation of the heart is meant to purify the heart. For the sake of these meanings, fiqh24 for the Sufis is the science of the path of the hereafter, as clarified by al-MuḥÄsibÄ«, al-GhazÄlÄ«, and others (al-JÄ«lÄnÄ« 1976, 26â28; Ibn Taymiyya 2005, 10:296â299; al-ḤakÄ«m al-TirmidhÄ« 1993, 63â65). This provides room to both distinguish between fiqh and ethics and give more scope for the individual creative effort that is based on self-discipline.
5 Conclusion
This study has shown that the inward dimension, with its various interpretations and the scope of its authority, has occupied an important space in various disciplines of the Islamic moral tradition. However, taking the perspective of how the two ḥadÄ«ths were interpreted offers a different outlook to what is often gleaned from MuÊ¿tazilÄ«sâ and AshÊ¿arÄ«sâ discussions on the sources of moral value judgments (taḥsÄ«n and taqbīḥ). Moral conscience is a third category, besides reason and revelation, used to assess the moral quality of our thoughts, words, and deeds. This chapter proves that the common assumption of the absence of individual decision making in Islamic ethics is an oversimplification.
The contemporary scholarship about Islamic ethics has reduced Islamic ethics to two meta-ethical theories: ethical rationalism and ethical voluntarism (divine command theory). This taxonomy has implicitly emphasised the common understanding among some Western scholars that the Islamic conscience is an external scriptural conscience. This study identifies the rich Islamic discussions on individual conscience and its authority in ethical judgments. The inward dimension of the soul is substantiated through the discussion of three concepts: (1) inspiration (ilhÄm) (2) the musings (khawÄá¹ir) that come upon the individual conscience in general, and (3) the preponderation of the heart (tarjīḥ al-qalb) and its inclination towards a particular action or judgment.
Traditionally, there were two main positions vis-à -vis the two key ḥadÄ«ths discussed here. The first is represented by ḥadÄ«th commentators who reinforced the authority of the scriptural text and the scholars to prevent the transformation of juristic rulings into individual judgment based upon human whims. On this basis, the apparent or general meaning of the ḥadÄ«th was rejected. Jurists, uṣūlÄ«s and Sufis adopted the second stance and sought to negotiate the strength of the authority of the conscience. In fact, the majority of uṣūlÄ«s considered that in the absence of rational proofs, inspiration plays the role of an inward proof with respect to the individual who receives inspiration to the exception of others. In so doing, the recourse to inward dimension is needed as a departure from the apparent sense-determinate towards the individual inward dimension that cannot be made apparent, generalised, or regulated. The Sufis, however, have a vision of divine command that is broader than that of the jurists. For them, the issue is no longer limited to the commands and prohibitions stated in the scriptural texts, nor to those dos and donâts that can be gleaned from the apparent meanings of these texts, but also encompass the inward dimensions of individuals and the actions of hearts. In order for their position to be made feasible, Sufis needed to broaden the sources of knowledge of divine will. On this basis, they discussed âthe inward revelation,â represented in inspiration and consultation of the heart, because it is deemed a divine discourse, coming either directly from God or through the medium of an angel.
In the negotiations over the authority and space of individual conscience, some scholars such as al-GhazÄlÄ«, Ibn Taymiyya, and al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« pursued a middle route, through which they attempted to reconcile between the apparent and the inward in terms of the discussions about consultation of the heart and to give preponderance to it. Al-GhazÄlÄ« argued for âthe heart as muftÄ«,â with the ḥadÄ«th as a fundamental principle for piety (waraÊ¿). This piety directs itself towards the actions and choices of individuals, an issue that does not occupy the jurist. The individual takes charge of the majority of the actions of the heart, as it is the individual who is acquainted with its particularities. The heart becomes the locus of legal and moral obligation and possesses âinsights into discrete contextual indicants,â which cannot be regulated by the laws of fiqh.
Ibn Taymiyya weighs between the action of the heart and some of the preponderations that the jurists adopt (such as weak analogy, the apparent meaning, and claims of continuity [istiṣḥÄb]), and considers that the inclination of the heart in this instance is stronger with respect to the individual than the overriding authoritative claims of the jurists.
Al-ShÄá¹ibÄ«, while refusing the heart as a source of evidence or a source of issuing rulings, established a balance between the absolute and the individual, the regulated and unregulated, and the authority of the scriptural text and the jurist on the one hand, and the responsibility of the legally obligated individual on the other. Those issues that cannot be regulated are to be deferred to the trusts and private affairs of legally obligated individuals. Indeed, there are spaces which the Lawgiver intended to leave unregulated by delegating them to the theoretical speculation of legally obligated individuals so that they may engage in ijtihÄd according to their capacity, cognition, and condition. This is because affairs of the conscience come down to intelligible meanings in which individuals differ.
To conclude, subjective interiority was inherent in the Islamic tradition and not necessarily imported and introduced by modernity.25 This goes against the widespread Weberian notion that the normative structure of Islamic law leaves no room for individual ethical decisions and moral resistance against legal authority and political power. According to Max Weber (d. 1920),
a âsacred lawâ is unable to develop the concept and the institutions of a formally rational justice because the weight of material religious ethics will always force the judge to define justice in the light of material considerations inherent in the case which he has to try. It will, therefore, produce âKadi-Justiz.â The mixture of ethics and law is considered to be an efficient impediment against the formal rationalisation of law.
Johansen 1997, 2
Mohammad Fadel (2014), Baber Johansen, and Talal Asad also proved that this assumption is untenable and the latter emphasised that,
subjective interiority has always been recognised in the Islamic tradition ⦠what modernity does bring in is a new kind of subjectivity, one that is appropriate to ethical autonomy and aesthetic self-invention â a concept of âthe subjectâ that has a new grammar.
Asad 2003, 225
The classical discussions around the authority of the inward dimension and the boundaries of its investment in ethical knowledge fall within the core of ḥadīth-centric discussions around the idea of the ethical conscience and its role in specifying right and wrong, which in turn is worthy of attention in further studies.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Mohammed El-Sayed Bushra for his valuable help in fixing the language of an early draft of this chapter. I also thank Samer Rashwani and Rajai Ray Jureidini for their editorial help in later versions, Feriel Bouhafa, and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. A version of this chapter was previously published in the Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies, edited by Bouhafa (see al-Khatib 2021).
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Recently, few studies discussed the moral role of the individual in Islamic law. Mohammad Fadel discussed the ethical dilemma facing muqallids (imitators) as a result of the ethical pluralism generated by uṣūl al-fiqhâs individualist ethical paradigm, and he proposed that âthe muqallid plays a central role in maintaining the integrity of Islamic law by monitoring would-be mujtahids to ensure that they conform to Islamic ethical idealsâ (Fadel 2014, 106). Similarly, Baber Johansen suggested a differentiation between forum internum and forum externum inherent to Islamic Law which, âlike most legal systems, obliges those that appeal to it to choose their own options and to take ethical decisionsâ (Johansen 1997, 20).
For more discussion about âá¸amÄ«râ see Heck 2014, 292â324 and Leirvik 2006.
See for example: Makdisi 1983, 47â64; Frank 1983, 204â223; Hourani 1985, 57â66; Kelsay 1994, 101â126; Shihadeh 2016, 384â407; Al-Attar 2019, 98â111.
Lit. âseek fatwÄ from your heart and seek fatwÄ from yourself.â The variant narrations of the two ḥadÄ«ths will be discussed below.
Taha Abdurrahman (ṬÄhÄ Ê¿Abd al-RaḥmÄn, b. 1944) has mentioned that it has been customary for jurists not to pay heed to the ethical aspects of scriptural texts, as a result of their paramount interest in commandments, which he named the commandment-based (iʾtimÄrÄ«) orientation. This orientation may be summarised as âseeking rulings simultaneously denuded from both the divine witness (al-shÄhid al-ilÄhÄ«) and the inward ethical dimension (al-bÄá¹in al-akhlÄqÄ«),â whereas âdivine command (Ämiriyya) is the basis of the existence of the apparent legal decree, and divine witnessing (al-shÄhidiyya al-ilÄhiyya) is the basis of the existence of the inward ethical dimension of these rulingsâ (Ê¿Abd al-RaḥmÄn 2017, 1:205â206). However, I shall clarify in the course of this study the inaccuracy of this generalisation.
I have developed a specialised academic syllabus entitled âScriptural Ethics: Ethics in the QurʾÄn and the ḤadÄ«thâ for graduate students specialising in the âApplied Islamic Ethicsâ MA program at the College of Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, starting in fall 2019.
Narrated by Ibn AbÄ« Shayba 1997, 2:259; Aḥmad 2001, 29: 533; al-DÄrimÄ« 2000, 3:1649: KitÄb al-BuyÅ«Ê¿ (âBook of Salesâ), BÄb DaÊ¿ MÄ YarÄ«buk ilÄ MÄ lÄ YarÄ«buk (âChapter on Leaving That Which Stirs Doubt Within You in Favour of That Which Does Notâ); al-ḤÄrith 1992, 1:201: BÄb fÄ« l-Birr wa-l-Ithm (âChapter On Righteousness and Doubtâ); AbÅ« YaÊ¿lÄ 1984, 3:160; al-ṬaḥÄwÄ« 1994, 5:386: BÄb BayÄn Mushkil MÄ Ruwiya Ê¿an RasÅ«l AllÄh fÄ« l-Birr wa-l-Ithm MÄ HumÄ? (âChapter Clarifying Problematic Narrations Attributed to the Messenger of God on Righteousness and Sinfulness: What Are They?â); and AbÅ« NuÊ¿aym 1996, 2:24. Al-NawawÄ« (2004, 14â15) said: âa good (ḥasan) ḥadÄ«th,â and Ibn Rajab (1999, 2:95) said: âand this ḥadÄ«th has been narrated from the Prophet â upon him be Godâs blessings and peace â via numerous routes, some of which are good.â
Narrated by Ibn AbÄ« Shayba 1989, 5:212: KitÄb al-Adab (âBook of Mannersâ), BÄb MÄ Dhukira fÄ« Ḥusn al-Khuluq wa-KarÄhiyyat al-Fuḥsh (âChapter on What Has Been Mentioned Regarding Good Conduct and the Abhorrence of Indecencyâ); Aḥmad 2001, 5:386; 29:180; al-BukhÄrÄ« 1989, 110â111: BÄb Ḥusn al-Khuluq idhÄ FaqihÅ« (âChapter âGood Conduct if [Only] They Understoodâ); Muslim 1991, 4:180: KitÄb al-Birr wa-l-á¹¢ila wa-l-ÄdÄb (âBook on Righteousness, Maintaining Relations, and Mannersâ), BÄb TafsÄ«r al-Birr wa-l-Ithm (âChapter on Explaining Righteousness and Sinfulnessâ); al-TirmidhÄ« 1996, 4:196: KitÄb AbwÄb al-Zuhd (âBook on the Doors of Temperanceâ), BÄb MÄ JÄʾa fÄ« l-Birr wa-l-Ithm (âChapter on What Has Been Reported on Righteousness and Sinâ); al-KharÄʾiá¹Ä« 1999, 35: BÄb al-Ḥathth Ê¿alÄ l-AkhlÄq al-á¹¢Äliḥa wa-l-TarghÄ«b fÄ«hÄ (âChapter on Encouragement and Promotion of Upright Conductâ); Ibn ḤibbÄn 2012, 5:272: IkhbÄruhu á¹¢allÄ LlÄh Ê¿alyahi wa-Sallam bi-l-Ajwiba Ê¿an AshyÄʾ Suʾila Ê¿anhÄ (âChapter on Reports of the Prophetâs â upon Him be Godâs Blessings and Peace â Answers to Things About Which He Was Askedâ), Dhikr al-IkhbÄr Ê¿ammÄ Yajibu Ê¿alÄ al-Marʾ min al-TaÊ¿Ähud li-SarÄʾirihi wa-Tark al-Ighá¸Äʾ Ê¿an al-MuḥaqqarÄt (âMention of Reports About What a Person is Obligated to do in Terms of Commitment to [Being Watchful of] his Secrets and Abstaining from Excusing Minor Sinsâ); al-BayhaqÄ« 2011, 21:30: KitÄb JimÄÊ¿ AbwÄb Man TajÅ«zu ShahÄdatuhu wa-Man lÄ TajÅ«zu min al-AḥrÄr al-BÄlighÄ«n al-Ê¿ÄqilÄ«n al-MuslimÄ«n (âBook on the Anthology of Chapters on Whose Testimony is Permissible and Whose is Not Among Free Muslims of Majority and Sound Mindâ), BÄb BayÄn MakÄrim al-AkhlÄq wa-MaÊ¿ÄlÄ«hÄ allatÄ« Man KÄna Mutakhalliqan bihÄ KÄna min Ahl al-Murūʾa AllatÄ« Hiya Shará¹un fÄ« QabÅ«l al-ShahÄda Ê¿alÄ á¹¬arÄ«q al-Ikhtiá¹£Är (âChapter on Clarifying the Noblest and Most Excellent of Manners, Which Render a Person as Among the People of Chivalry, Which is a Condition for the Acceptance of Testimony by Way of Abridgementâ); and al-BayhaqÄ« 2003, 9:408: BÄb fÄ« MuÊ¿Älajat Kull Dhanb bi-l-Tawba minhu (âChapter On the Treatment of Each Sin by Repenting From Itâ), Faá¹£lun fÄ« MuḥaqqarÄt al-DhunÅ«b (âSection on Minor Sinsâ).
As narrated by Aḥmad 2001, 29:533; Ibn AbÄ« Shayba 1997, 2:259; AbÅ« YaÊ¿lÄ 1984, 3:160; al-ḤÄrith 1992, 1:201; and al-DÄrimÄ« 2000, 3:1649.
As narrated by Aḥmad 2001, 29:528; and al-ṬaḥÄwÄ« 1994, 53:386.
As narrated by al-ṬabarÄnÄ« 1984, 1:117; and al-Mukhallaá¹£ 2008, 2:265.
It seems that the MuÊ¿tazilÄ«sâ definition of Ê¿ilm has been developed and revised by some late MuÊ¿tazilÄ« scholars (see Ê¿Abd al-JabbÄr n.d., 12:13; al-Baá¹£rÄ« 1964, 1:10; al-MÄzarÄ« 2002, 97).
For more discussion on sukÅ«n al-nafs, see al-Ê¿AskarÄ« 1998, 81; Bouhafa 2019, 67; Johansen 2013, 127â144.
After relating a number of ḥadÄ«ths, both marfÅ«Ê¿ (attributed to the Prophet) and mawqÅ«f (attributed to a Prophetic companion (á¹£aḥÄbÄ«)), al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« summarised the words of al-ṬabarÄ« from his book TahdhÄ«b al-ÄthÄr (âRefinement of the Traditionsâ) (al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« 1992, 2:659). We do not know precisely which ḥadÄ«ths have been deemed weak (á¸aÊ¿Ä«f), as some ḥadÄ«ths to this effect have been verified in the two authentic books of ḥadÄ«th (al-BukhÄrÄ« and Muslim) or in one of them. Also, the extant copy of TahdhÄ«b al-ÄthÄr is incomplete and does not contain this discussion, nor could I find anyone else who has cited these words from al-ṬabarÄ«.
With the exception of that which appears, in a very limited fashion, in the criticism of the chain of transmission of the âconsult your heartâ ḥadÄ«th, connected to the weakness of a particular transmitter, or one transmitter not hearing the narration from another transmitter. In all cases, this is a criticism directed at the chains of transmission, not to the ḥadÄ«th in its origin, which is transmitted through numerous paths (see Ibn Rajab 1999, 2:94â95).
On fiá¹ra, see Vasalou 2016; Holtzman 2015, 163â188.
IstiḥsÄn is defined by some ḤanafÄ«s as a nuanced and subtle evidence that the mujtahid is unable to express properly (dalÄ«l yanqadiḥu fÄ« nafs al-mujtahid taqá¹£uru Ê¿anhu Ê¿ibÄratuh), although he/she feels it in his/her heart. This definition, according to Shams al-DÄ«n al-BarmÄwÄ« (d. 831/1428), makes istiḥsÄn close to ilhÄm in the ḤanafÄ« view (al-BarmÄwÄ« 2015, 5:180), but istiḥsÄn, in contrast to Ibn Ḥazmâs (d. 456/1064) view, is classified as a sort of evidence, not personal preference (tashahhÄ«) (see al-DabÅ«sÄ« 2009, 3:369, 404; al-TaftÄzÄnÄ« n.d., 2:163; Ibn Hazm n.d., 6:60). Furthermore, conceiving ijtihÄd as a malaka (faculty) that enables the mujtahid to do his job spontaneously, makes istiḥsÄn acceptable even beyond the ḤanafÄ« school (see al-ṬūfÄ« 1997, 3:192). As for sadd al-dharÄʾiÊ¿, al-ShawkÄnÄ« (1999, 2:196; see also al-BÄjÄ« 1995, 2:697â698) considered this ḥadÄ«th as evidence that supports it; in the sense that the individual shall consult his heart in the case of doubt or uncertainty and leave out some permissible actions to avoid what is prohibited. These two concepts belong to the toolbox of the mujtahid per se. The other concepts belong to the space of individual moral judgment. Hence, the following headings will be dedicated to discussing them in detail.
Those in support of the authority of inspiration have marshalled it as evidence in a number of sources, including: al-DabÅ«sÄ« 2009, 3:372; al-SamarqandÄ« 1984, 680; al-BarmÄwÄ« 2015, 5:182; al-FanÄrÄ« 2006, 2:445; al-ZarkashÄ« 1994, 8:117; and al-KÅ«rÄnÄ« 2008, 4:38.
After putting our ḥadÄ«th in the context of doubtful cases where everyone is obliged to refer to his own conscience and abide by its response, Muhammad Abdulla Draz (Muḥammad Ê¿Abd AllÄh DrÄz, d. 1958) discussed the role that the individual conscience plays in the institution of moral duty based on two points: understanding a rule and applying it, where there is a whole gamut of options between the undetermined and the determined. A similar perception was discussed by al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« under âratio legis (taḥqÄ«q al-manÄá¹).â Draz concluded that it is âthe recourse to individual effort, to ensure that oneâs duty is in conformity with the objective reality, is a universal duty, incumbent upon the most ignorant man, as well as the most competentâ (Draz 2008, 63â65).
It seems that Draz coined what he called âeffort créateurâ (creative effort) based on what al-ShÄá¹ibÄ« mentioned here. For more details see Draz 2008, 257 f.; al-Khatib 2017, 107â108.
Ê¿Ilm al-bÄá¹in refers to what al-ḤÄrith al-MuḥÄsibÄ« called âinward worshipâ (Ê¿ibÄda bÄá¹ina) which consists of the inward actions and virtues such as waraÊ¿ (piety), ikhlÄá¹£ (sincerity), and niyya (intention). In contrast, the apparent knowledge (Ê¿ilm al-áºÄhir) consists of the knowledge of ḥalÄl (permissible) and ḥarÄm (prohibited). This classification of knowledge emerged with al-MuḥÄsibÄ«, and then became popular in Sufi literature such as AbÅ« ṬÄlib al-MakkÄ«âs work (see al-MuḥÄsibÄ« 1975, 81â88; al-MakkÄ« 2001, 1:363â380).
This is the classic version of the Platonic tripartite soul, but some studies show that Plato (d. 347â348 BCE) was hesitant about the tripartite division or there is more than one tripartite relation in the Republic (see Plato 2003, 135 f; Finamore 2005, 35â52; Robinson 1995, 119â122; Fronterotta 2013, 168â178; Corrigan 2007, 99â113).
The five legal rulings in fiqh are: obligatory (fará¸), recommended (mustaḥabb, mandÅ«b), permissible/ licit (mubÄḥ), discouraged/disapproved (makrÅ«h), and prohibited (ḥarÄm).
Lit., âcomprehension; understanding.â
Although Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen defended the opposite of this position (1997, 23â25, 384).