It is now possible to assess the virtue theories of al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna in the overall context of their eudaimonist ethics. First, we have seen that both authors consider moral virtue to be an instrumental good in relation to the final and self-sufficient human end, which they define in purely contemplative terms. Given that the final end in faculty psychological terms is identical with the perfection of the theoretical intellect, which does not employ a bodily organ, to the exclusion of the rest of the human faculties, each of which operates through a bodily organ, moral virtue must involve at least some degree of separation from the body. We have also seen that both authors view the way to happiness to involve the soulâs ontological ascent towards purely incorporeal existence and that Avicenna explicitly employs the Platonic terminology of purification, which identifies moral virtue with the human soulâs separation from the body. Second, despite all this, we have also seen that both philosophers, nevertheless, commit themselves to the Aristotelian ideal of moderation in their definition of moral virtue.
As a result, there are two contradictory ethical ideals for the human being: one that corresponds roughly to Aristotelian metriopatheia, moderation of passions, and another that corresponds to Stoic-Neoplatonic apatheia, extirpation of passions. Therefore, the following problem arises: how is the ethical end of becoming an incorporeal intellect compatible with that of virtue as an intermediate psychical state? The tension between these two ethical ideals is not resolved even by taking into account that the contemplative end is ultimately eschatological and that in the afterlife the human soul, in any case, will become purely incorporeal. Pure intellectuality, which for al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna is identical with pure immateriality, nevertheless, constitutes the human good, even if it can be only partially realized in this world. Since all value is derivative of what constitutes the good for the human being in absolute terms, it is hard to see how one could arrive at the definition of virtue as moderation. One possible answer is that the tension cannot be resolved but the distinct Greek ethical currents on which al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna draw result in an inherently contradictory ethical system. However, in the following, I will argue that we can interpret the ethical thought of both al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna in a way that makes it coherent.
The internal tension within the ethical theories of al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna is resolved by introducing the idea of moral progression. This interpretation is supported by both textual evidence presented by the two authors and the historical precedent and influence of the Platonists of late antiquity. Among the latter, the idea of ethical progression was present in two distinct senses. First of these is a distinction between pre-philosophical and philosophical ethics. In the late ancient introductions to philosophy, one of the ten formulaic questions discussed concerned the correct starting point for the study of philosophy.1 Ethics occupied a dual position because on the one hand, character formation was an indispensable prerequisite for the study of philosophy, while on the other hand, philosophical ethics, such as Aristotleâs Nicomachean Ethics, required knowledge of logical argumentation and would have to follow at least the study of logic.2 Thus, there are two kinds of ethics within the philosophical curriculum: the âpopular ethicsâ preceding philosophy and the rationally argued ethics as one of the philosophical disciplines. Many of these philosophical introductions were translated into Arabic, and a paraphrase of one such introduction is attributed to al-FÄrÄbÄ«.3 Druart has argued in several articles that this distinction between two levels of ethics is essential for understanding the ethical thought of many Arabic philosophers of the formative period, including al-FÄrÄbÄ«.4 While in the late ancient curriculum, philosophical ethics was situated right after logic, in the Arabic curriculum, all of practical philosophy is transposed to the very end of philosophical studies. In Arabic philosophy, then, ethics occupies the ambivalent position of the very beginning and the very end of philosophy.5 Pre-philosophical morality would have to be mainly social or conventional in nature, and in the Islamic context, it becomes easily identified with religious morality. We have seen that both al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna emphasize the political-religious context of character formation.
The distinction between popular and philosophical ethics would seem to entail a plurality of ethical ends. Given that moral virtue stands in an instrumental relation to contemplative perfection, the fact that the common people and philosophers have different cognitive goals presumably implies that they also have different ends as regards moral virtue. Thus, the second distinction of moral progression arises because of the first distinction and concerns the psychological content assigned to virtue. Virtue as Aristotelian metriopatheia, then, corresponds to popular ethics, while virtue as Stoic apatheia corresponds to philosophical ethics. These represent the goals of character training for non-philosophers and philosophers, respectively. This interpretation is supported by the late ancient precedent of the Neoplatonic ladder of virtues, discussed in chapter 8, where the virtues form a progression from a political to a purificatory level corresponding to the ethical ideals of metriopatheia and apatheia, respectively. However, there is no explicit evidence that any of the Greek texts transmitting the idea of a ladder of virtues were translated into Arabic, although the general ethical ideal was transmitted in the Arabic Neoplatonic corpus as a whole. It is also the case that neither al-FÄrÄbÄ« nor Avicenna explicitly adopts the Neoplatonic classification and terminology. Nevertheless, they could have been aware of the notion of a ladder of virtues, as it could have been present, for example, in Porphyryâs lost commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. Alternatively, since the Arabic philosophers were confronted by two conflicting ethical ideals even in the texts attributed to Aristotle, they could have arrived at similar harmonizing conclusions independently.
In any case, al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna relate virtue to a political-religious context on the one hand and a philosophical context on the other. Their ethical writings also suggest that they do consider these to correspond to distinct requirements as concerns the degree of virtue. Many Arabic philosophers express this more explicitly. Miskawayh designates two levels of happiness: a worldly life of virtue and purely contemplative happiness.6 Regarding the application of religious law, the Brethren of Purity postulate a philosophical-divine worship (al-Ê¿ibÄda al-falsafiyya al-ilÄhiyya), which goes beyond the requirements of religious law.7 In Ibn Ṭufaylâs philosophical fable of Ḥayy Ibn YaqáºÄn, the intellectually and morally perfected protagonist follows a purely contemplative life with more stringently ascetic precepts, while he recognizes that the more lenient requirements of religious law are sufficient for most people.8 On the other hand, the idea that different requirements of virtue should apply to distinct groups of people based on their natural capabilities and inclinations is hardly unique to philosophy, as it can be found in, for example, Islamic theology or Sufi thought.9
The Neoplatonic progression of virtue becomes fully complete in what may perhaps be called the altruistic turn of Neoplatonic ethics. Identifying ethics, as I have done so far, with the progressive acquisition of moral and intellectual virtues aiming for the ultimate goal of self-perfection makes it seem entirely egoistic. This is especially the case when viewed from the contemporary perspective of deontological and consequentialist ethical theories where the morality of acts is defined primarily in relation to other moral agents. While the ethical thought of the late ancient Platonists has traditionally been interpreted as inherently self-centered, many scholars have argued that it necessarily entails other-regard.10 Related to this, while Neoplatonic ethics has traditionally also been viewed as an apolitical reading of Plato, it now seems obvious that it instead involves a political aspect in that the perfected philosopher must return to the âPlatonic caveâ to share his perfection with others.11 For both al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna, it is clear that complete virtue culminates in altruistic concerns in different senses. It is reasonable to view this final aspect of their ethical thought as resulting from their ultimately Neoplatonic reading of virtue.
1 Al-FÄrÄbÄ«
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs ethical writings justify the interpretation that he understands moral virtue in terms of progression in the double sense of a distinction between pre-philosophical and philosophical ethics corresponding to two distinct stages within the development of virtue.12 As regards the first distinction, it is clear that al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs writings accord ethics an ambivalent position as both the beginning and end of philosophy. Al-FÄrÄbÄ« presents moral virtue as a necessary prerequisite for philosophical studies in several works. His paraphrase of an Alexandrian introduction to philosophy states that the moral dispositions (akhlÄq) of the appetitive soul must be corrected before the study of philosophy so that the appetites (shahwa) are oriented towards what is virtue in reality, as opposed to the false virtues related to the two lower parts of the soul.13 In the Attainment of Happiness, al-FÄrÄbÄ« draws on the Republic to present the prerequisites for a student of philosophy, which include both intellectual and moral qualifications:
For he who sets out to inquire ought to be innately equipped for the theoretical sciencesâthat is fulfill the conditions prescribed by Plato in the Republic. He should excel in comprehending and conceiving that which is essential. Moreover, he should have a good memory and be able to endure the toil of study. He should love truthfulness and truthful people, and justice and just people, and not be headstrong or a wrangler about what he desires. He should not be gluttonous for food and drink and should by natural disposition disdain the appetites, the dirham, the dinar, and the like. He should be high-minded and avoid what is disgraceful in people. He should be pious, yield easily to goodness and justice, and be stubborn in yielding to evil and injustice. He should be strongly determined in favor of the right thing. Moreover, he should be brought up according to the laws and habits that resemble his innate disposition. He should have sound conviction about the opinions of the religion in which he is reared, hold fast to the virtuous acts in his religion, and not forsake all or most of them. Furthermore, he should hold fast to the generally accepted virtues and not forsake the generally accepted noble acts. For if a youth is such, and then sets out to study philosophy and learns it, it is possible that he will not become a counterfeit or a vain or a false philosopher.14
The beginning of the passage insists that the student of philosophy should be innately (bi-l-fiá¹ra) disposed to virtue. However, this does not make pre-philosophical character training any less necessary, as is apparent in the latter part of the passage, just as theoretical talent does not mean that one could dispense with the study of philosophy.15 The passage conveys two essential aspects of al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs understanding of moral virtue. First, he sees it as a necessary prerequisite for theoretical studies. Second, he makes religion the primary conduit of pre-philosophical moral education. As regards the second aspect, al-FÄrÄbÄ« clearly considers pre-philosophical virtue to be conventional or religious. Thus, an aspiring philosopher should adhere to the religious and âgenerally acceptedâ virtues (al-fÄá¸Äʾil allatÄ« hiya fÄ« al-mashhÅ«r faá¸Äʾil).16 This is also evident elsewhere in the same work in the definition of the âvain philosopherâ (al-faylasÅ«f al-bahraj): âThe vain philosopher is he who learns the theoretical sciences but without going any further and without being habituated to doing the acts considered virtuous by a certain religion or the generally accepted noble acts. Instead, he follows his desires (hawan) and appetites (shahawÄt) in everything, whatever they may happen to be.â17 Like the Greek Neoplatonists, al-FÄrÄbÄ«, then, emphasizes the necessity of moral virtue before one undertakes the philosophical studies. However, he also explicitly identifies pre-philosophical with religious virtue so that one learns to be virtuous in this conventional sense by adhering to the moral norms of the particular religious community to which one pertains.18
In other contexts, al-FÄrÄbÄ« presents moral virtue as the culmination of theoretical sciences and emphasizes the role of theoretical knowledge as an indispensable precondition for virtue. In al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs Alexandrian introduction, this idea is expressed through the maxim âperfection of knowledge is actionâ (tamÄm al-Ê¿ilm al-Ê¿amal).19 In the Aphorisms, al-FÄrÄbÄ« emphasizes that not only philosophical knowledge about virtue but also knowledge about theoretical philosophy is required for becoming truly virtuous:
One of the benefits of the theoretical part of philosophy is that it is necessary for the practical part from various aspects. One of them is that an action becomes virtue and correct only when the human being has come to attain true knowledge about the virtues that are virtues in reality and the virtues that are presumed to be virtues but are not so, has habituated his soul to the truly virtuous actions so that they become a disposition (hayʾa) in him, has come to know the degrees of existence and ranks of merit and how all things descend to his degree within it and accord him his rightful position that is the degree and rank among the ranks of existence that has been bestowed to him, and has come to prefer what he should prefer and avoid what he should avoid and not prefer what is presumed to be preferable and not avoid what is presumed to be avoidable. This is a state that is not attained and perfected except after experience and complete demonstrative knowledge and the completion of physical and metaphysical sciences according to the correct order and arrangement until he, in the end, reaches the science dealing with happiness that is in reality happiness ⦠Then he will know how the theoretical and deliberative virtues come to be the cause and principle for the coming to be of the practical virtues and arts. All this comes to be only through the practice of theoretical reflection and passage from one degree and rank to another [within the sciences].20
Al-FÄrÄbÄ« here addresses virtue in the philosophical sense, as founded on philosophical knowledge, which is distinguished from any common sense or religious notions of virtue. Corresponding to the position of ethics within the Arabic philosophical curriculum, al-FÄrÄbÄ« locates the acquisition of virtue in this sense at the very end of philosophical education, that is, after all of theoretical philosophy. After the completion of theoretical philosophy, then, the student of philosophy âprogresses to the practical part, and may begin to act the way he is supposed to act.â21 The same idea of philosophical virtue founded on theoretical knowledge is repeated in the Virtuous City in terms of the faculties of the soul in a previously cited passage.22 In consequence, there are two kinds of moral virtue for al-FÄrÄbÄ«: pre-philosophical, identified with conventional or religious morality, and philosophical, which is demonstrative in the sense that value concepts are derived from non-moral facts.
If pre-philosophical virtue is based on religious or commonly shared opinions, while philosophical virtue is founded on demonstrative knowledge, how are the two related? In a further passage of the Aphorisms, it becomes clear that al-FÄrÄbÄ« considers the commonly shared and philosophical concepts of virtue to be at least relatively close to each other:
We posit two persons: the first has learned all of what is contained in Aristotleâs books on the physical, logical, metaphysical, political, and mathematical sciences but all or most of his actions are contrary to what is considered to be good according to the first opinion shared by all (bÄdiʾ al-raʾy al-mushtarak Ê¿inda al-jamÄ«Ê¿). The second person is such that all of his actions are in accordance with what is considered to be good according to the first opinion shared by all but has no knowledge about the sciences that the first person has learned. This second person is closer to becoming a philosopher than the first, all of whose actions are contrary to what is considered to be good according to the first opinion shared by all, for he is more capable of attaining what the first person has attained than the first person is capable of attaining what the second person has attained. For philosophy, according to the first opinion and in reality, is for the human being to acquire the theoretical sciences and for all of his actions to become in accordance with what is good according to the first common opinion and [what is good] in reality. He, who only restricts himself to the theoretical sciences, without all of his actions being in accordance with what is held to be good by the common opinion, is prevented by the habit ingrained in him of performing the actions that are good according to the first opinion shared by all. Therefore, he is more likely to be prevented by the habit of his actions becoming in accordance with what is good in reality. But he who has habituated himself to the actions that are in accordance with what is held to be good according to the first opinion shared by all is not prevented by his habit of learning the theoretical sciences or of his actions becoming in accordance with what is good in reality.23
For a devoted Aristotelian like al-FÄrÄbÄ« to claim that a virtuous but philosophically ignorant person is closer to being a philosopher than a non-virtuous one fully versed in Aristotelian philosophy is in itself surprising. In addition, al-FÄrÄbÄ« claims that this is true even if the first person is virtuous only in the sense that he adheres to the commonly shared norms of virtue. This is explained by the fact that, despite his theoretical knowledge, it is harder for the second person to habituate his soul towards what is good in reality (mÄ huwa fÄ« al-ḥaqÄ«qa jamÄ«l) when his vicious actions are firmly established in him than it is for the virtuous person to acquire theoretical knowledge and philosophical virtue. Clearly, the commonly shared opinions about virtue are sufficiently close to demonstratively based virtue for the former to be conducive to the latter. However, why should the common sense and philosophical ideas of virtue concur to such an extent? For al-FÄrÄbÄ«, this is the case because religious notions of virtue are, or at least should be, derived from philosophical ethics, which is precisely the reason why religion becomes the ideal conduit for pre-philosophical education. In his political philosophy, al-FÄrÄbÄ« defines a âvirtuous religionâ (milla fÄá¸ila) as a religion in which the doctrine and practice are derived from theoretical and practical philosophy, respectively.24 In particular, the âvirtuous lawsâ (al-sharÄʾiÊ¿ al-fÄá¸ila) are derived from the universals of practical philosophy, that is, the voluntary intelligibles discussed in the previous chapter.
The passage, nevertheless, also shows that pre-philosophical and philosophical virtue are two distinct things for al-FÄrÄbÄ«, despite the fact that religious ethics is ultimately derived from philosophical principles. Even if someone who adheres to religious norms should be considered virtuous, clearly, one who possesses virtue in the philosophical sense is even more virtuous. If both religious and philosophical ethics are derived from the universals of practical philosophy, in what sense are pre-philosophical and philosophical virtue different? The obvious difference is that pre-philosophical virtue is conventional in the sense that it is learned by means of moral education within a religious community. In contrast, philosophical virtue is justified by philosophical arguments. The transition from pre-philosophical to philosophical morality, then, means that the moral agent comes to understand the reasons due to which virtuous actions and dispositions are virtuous. This cannot be the only difference, however. In the passage cited above, acquiring such psychical dispositions that make one prefer what is commonly held to be good will help one later develop dispositions that accord with what is âgood in reality.â This means that the conventional understanding of the good is in some sense deficient when compared to what is good in reality. The implication is that religious and philosophical virtue constitute two distinct ethical ends.
The pluralism of ethical ends is further supported by al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs political philosophy. While al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs intellectualist understanding of happiness would seem to restrict it only to philosophers, al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs philosophy of religion assures that non-philosophers attain a form of happiness employing symbolic representations of philosophical knowledge, that is, religious beliefs derived from philosophical truths.25 As a result, philosophers and non-philosophers pursue different cognitive ends related to either the theoretical or the imaginative faculty. This means that the seemingly uniform ethical end of happiness diverges into a plurality of ends where each class within the city is oriented towards the perfection or happiness that corresponds to its âdegree in humanity.â26 If moral virtue is defined in terms of its instrumental value for the final end, the different cognitive ends should entail different kinds of virtue. In the Virtuous City, al-FÄrÄbÄ« states that the psychical dispositions related to the pursuit of happiness are in part class-specific.27 In the Aphorisms, he says that virtue as a balanced (muÊ¿tadil) psychical state is relative to not only a particular time and place but also to a particular group (á¹Äʾifa) of people.28 What constitutes a virtuous disposition, therefore, cannot be determined universally for all classes of people.
As a result, it is clear that moral virtue for al-FÄrÄbÄ« constitutes a plurality of ethical ends in the sense that 1) the degrees of religious and philosophical virtue are different and 2) virtue is class-specific. Based on this, and since we have seen that al-FÄrÄbÄ« relates the necessity of moral virtue precisely to the end of theoretical perfection, it would seem natural to conclude that virtue for philosophers constitutes a more demanding goal than for the non-philosophers who attain happiness by means of their imaginative faculty. Yet, interpreting al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs theory of virtue in terms of moral progression still presents the problem that al-FÄrÄbÄ« explicitly defines the individual virtues as Aristotelian intermediate dispositions. However, when we take a closer look at al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs ethical writings as a whole, we find that he only defines moral virtues in terms of Aristotelian moderation in the Exhortation to the Way to Happiness and the Selected Aphorisms. The first of these is a pre-philosophical work and the second a collection of âaphorisms.â In contrast, in the Virtuous City, following a passage on contemplative happiness, al-FÄrÄbÄ« does not introduce the Aristotelian doctrine of moderation at all. Instead, he defines virtuous dispositions and actions only in instrumental terms as those that are conducive to happiness.29 This implies that al-FÄrÄbÄ«, in fact, does not think that the virtues leading to contemplative happiness can be universally defined in terms of mediate dispositions. Rather, it seems to be the case that since moral virtue is both instrumental and class-specific, virtue consists of regulation of desires and emotions in a different sense for a soldier, for example, for whom the irrational faculties are indispensable for fulfilling his function, than for a philosopher. As a result, we may conclude that virtue as Aristotelian moderation serves the political ends of the city, while virtue as the intellectâs separation from the body serves the philosophical end of pure contemplation. This results in something like the Neoplatonic grades of political and purificatory virtues, which for the philosopher represent two successive stages of his moral development based on religious morality and philosophical knowledge, respectively.
If this is indeed what al-FÄrÄbÄ« believes, why does he not present the doctrine of a ladder of virtues more explicitly? Perhaps he is not aware of the Neoplatonic doctrine and, therefore, never explicates his ethical theory in its terms. In addition, al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs primary focus is on political philosophy and Aristotelian moderation is primarily a political goal. In the Aphorisms, al-FÄrÄbÄ« does, nevertheless, make a sharp distinction between the physical and contemplative lives, which doctrine he attributes to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle:
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are of the opinion that human beings have two lives. The subsistence of the first is due to nourishment and the external things that we need today for our survival. This is the first life. The other is that in which the subsistence is due to its essence without its requiring for the subsistence of its essence things external to it but it is sufficient in itself for its continued preservation. This is the afterlife (al-ḥayÄt al-akhÄ«ra). For a human being has two perfections, first and last. The last one is attained for us in this life and in the afterlife30 when it is preceded before by the first perfection in this life of ours. The first perfection is that a human being does the actions of all the virtues, not that he merely possesses virtue without performing its actions, for the perfection consists in his acting, not that he acquires the dispositions (malakÄt) from which the actions ensue ⦠By means of this perfection, the last perfection is attained for us, which is ultimate happiness, that is the absolute good (al-khayr Ê¿alÄ al-iá¹lÄq). It is what is preferred and desired for its own sake and notâat any moment at allâpreferred for the sake of something else. The rest of what is preferred is preferred only for the sake of its usefulness for attaining happiness, and each thing becomes good when it is useful for attaining happiness. Whatever obstructs it in some way is bad.31
Thus, the physical and contemplative lives form two progressive stages where virtuous actions and the Aristotelian âexternal goodsâ form part of the first life while they prepare for the attainment of the second life.32 Since al-FÄrÄbÄ« in the Aphorisms defines virtues as Aristotelian intermediate dispositions, we may perhaps conclude that it is virtue in this Aristotelian sense that has value only in the physical life. In contrast, virtue in the second life is defined in terms of what is conducive to contemplative happiness. Even here, al-FÄrÄbÄ« does not state that contemplative happiness requires that bodily desires and emotions should be eradicated altogether. As in the Virtuous City, he instead remains completely noncommittal in the question of what kinds of psychical states and actions are conducive to contemplative happiness. Still, based on all of the above, it seems clear that al-FÄrÄbÄ« does endorse the idea of a progression of virtue, where virtue as Aristotelian moderation is connected with the pre-philosophical or religious stage. While the ultimate ethical end of pure incorporeality would seem to entail the identification of moral virtue with liberation from bodily affections to the greatest extent possible, al-FÄrÄbÄ« never says so explicitly.
The final degree of virtue for a philosopher involves transmitting his theoretical and practical knowledge to the larger public. In the Attainment of Happiness, al-FÄrÄbÄ« states that the philosopher, insofar as he is truly a philosopher, must convey his theoretical knowledge and practical wisdom to the rest of the people, whether they accept him as their leader or not.33 In the Platonic context, this means that the philosopher must return to the âcave,â34 rather than remain in the bubble of solitary contemplation. The political realization of virtue can be seen as one more aspect in which the perfect philosopher comes to resemble the incorporeal intellects. Just as the First and the separate intellects overflow their perfection to the existents below them, so does the intellectually and morally perfect human being. In this cosmic context, however, the self-sufficiency of the First and the intellects entails that they cannot act for the sake of the lower beings but their creative activity is instead something additional that follows necessarily from the perfection of their essence.35 In consequence, the seemingly altruistic concern of the perfect philosopher is, in effect, a necessary consequence of his theoretical perfection, which does not necessarily entail genuine regard for others.
2 Avicenna
We have seen that Avicennaâs theory of virtue involves a similar tension that was present in al-FÄrÄbÄ«: Avicenna seems to advocate two contradictory ethical goals. On the one hand, there is virtue as moderation of passions, corresponding to the Platonic-Aristotelian metriopatheia. On the other hand, there is virtue as purification of the soul from bodily affections, corresponding to the Stoic-Neoplatonic apatheia. While the tension is also present within single treatises, in part, it is one between different works. I have so far presented Avicennaâs account of moral virtue based on the Healing and some shorter ethical and psychological treatises. This may be called Avicennaâs metriopathic account of virtue, of which the Healing is the prominent representative. I have until now mostly ignored the Pointers and Reminders since it paints a very different picture of virtue, which at first glance does not seem to fit together with the Healing. In the following, I will argue that the Pointers and Reminders is the prime representative of Avicennaâs apathetic account of virtue. Furthermore, as for al-FÄrÄbÄ«, the incoherence of Avicennaâs ethics becomes only apparent when it is interpreted in terms of a plurality of virtuous ends. That is, the metriopathic and apathetic accounts should be understood as political-religious and philosophical ends on the one hand and as two successive stages in the moral progression of the philosopher on the other.
It is essential to observe that Avicenna discusses virtue in different contexts, some of which are political-religious. We have seen that Avicenna in the Healing, and some other works, defines virtue as an Aristotelian intermediate psychical disposition, even if the framework is otherwise Platonic-Galenic rather than Aristotelian. In both De anima, I.5 and Metaphysics, IX.7, Avicenna understands virtue as a state of ascendancy (istiÊ¿lÄʾ) of the rational part of the soul over the irrational parts, which serves the end of directing reason away from the impulses of the bodily faculties.36 Even though Avicenna claims this to be a mediate disposition, the end goal of diverting reason from the body sounds more akin to the ethical goal of Neoplatonism than that of the Republic or the Nicomachean Ethics. Avicenna introduces the Platonic cardinal virtues as mediate dispositions concerning concrete spheres of human activity only in Metaphysics, X.5, where the focus is on prophetic legislation as a method of character formation.37 The context is, then, political-religious in the sense that these are the virtues that the prophetic religion should instill in the populace at large. Avicenna here explicitly associates the mediate dispositions not only with the purificatory end but also with the political ends related to the well-being of the city. The cardinal virtues are purificatory in the sense that they dissociate the rational soul from bodily affections to some extent. However, they also serve non-philosophical ends, such as procreation and military defense, which are necessary for the good of the community.
We have also seen that Avicenna accords religion a central role in the habituation of the soul to virtuous dispositions. Is religious virtue, then, pre-philosophical for Avicenna in the sense that it was for al-FÄrÄbÄ«? It has been suggested that Avicennaâs reluctance to accord ethics an independent position in his major philosophical works is explained by his contentment with relegating the role of philosophical ethics entirely to religious law,38 which would mean that there is only religious ethics justified by the rational origin of revelation. Clearly, this is not the case, for Avicenna explicitly accords religious law and philosophical ethics complementary roles in character formation.39 Religious regulations are beneficial for the purificatory end of submitting the bodily faculties to reason and should, therefore, be employed for this end alongside philosophical ethics. Given that Avicenna motivates the metriopathic doctrine of virtue by primarily political concerns, surely the soldier and the philosopher should have distinct goals as concerns the regulation of their subrational faculties. That is, the philosopher should go further in his pursuit of purely contemplative existence. Since Avicenna, in the final chapters of the Pointers and Reminders, addresses virtue in relation to the philosopher, we have an excellent textual basis for assessing whether this is indeed the case.
The account of virtue in the Pointers and Reminders is remarkably different from the Healing and similar works, not only in its contents but also in its terminology. Avicenna here dispenses with the classical language of virtue ethics altogether and employs religious terms instead. As we have seen, this is also true of the Pointerâs discussion of the theoretical end where philosophical terms are translated into religious-mystical concepts. In the Pointers, ethical subjects are addressed mainly in the eighth and ninth namaá¹s of the second part. The first of these has a direct parallel in Metaphysics, X of the Healing in that both are concerned with the questions of happiness, the afterlife, and prophetic legislation. However, in the Pointers, Avicenna speaks of the necessity of purificatory virtue for the âknowers,â that is, the philosophers, in relation to their contemplative end:
When the knowers (Ê¿ÄrifÅ«n) and unblemished (mutanazzihÅ«n) shed of themselves the pollution of the association with the body (daran muqÄranat al-badan) and become dissociated from its preoccupations (infakkÅ« Ê¿an al-shawÄghil), they will reach the world of saintliness and happiness (Ê¿Älam al-quds wa-l-saÊ¿Äda), the highest perfection will be engraved in them, and they will attain the highest pleasure about which you have already learned. This pleasure is not entirely absent when the soul is in the body. Rather, those who become immersed in reflecting on the divine power (taʾammul al-jabarÅ«t) and who abandon bodily preoccupations (al-muÊ¿riá¸Å«n Ê¿an al-shawÄghil) achieve, while in the body, an abundant portion of this pleasure, which may take hold of them and distract them from everything else.40
The passage does not mention virtues, as either Aristotelian intermediate dispositions or Platonic cardinal virtues, nor are these concepts introduced elsewhere in the Pointers. Nevertheless, the passage is concerned with virtue since virtue for Avicenna means a psychical disposition that is conducive to happiness. Moreover, and in contrast to Metaphysics, X.5 of the Healing, virtue is here addressed explicitly from the perspective of the philosopher pursuing the contemplative end, excluding any extraneous concerns related to prophetic legislation. In this context, moral virtue signifies the purification of the rational soul from all preoccupations related to the body and its psychical faculties since such a psychical state is what enables complete devotion to contemplative activity. Clearly, Avicenna here understands virtue in terms that resemble Neoplatonic apatheia rather than Platonic or Aristotelian metriopatheia.
The nature of philosophical virtue is qualified further in the ninth namaá¹, âOn the stations of the knowersâ (FÄ« maqÄmÄt al-Ê¿ÄrifÄ«n), which is concerned with the spiritual progression of the philosopher.41 This chapter has no parallel within the Healing. The very first âreminderâ (tanbÄ«h) attests to the unique moral qualities of the philosopher in terms of his being liberated from bodily concerns:
In their present lives, the knowers have stations (maqÄmÄt) and ranks (darajÄt) that pertain only to them to the exclusion of others. It is as if, while being clothed by their bodies, they have shed their bodies, become free from them, and attained the world of saintliness.42
In the following two reminders, Avicenna defines an ascetic (zÄhid) as âone who discards the enjoyments and goods of this world.â He states next that while asceticism (zuhd) for the ânon-knowers,â that is, the non-philosophers, means trading worldly for otherworldly enjoyments, for the knower it means refrainment (tanazzuh) from everything that distracts his essence (sirruhu) from the truth, and consequently disregard (takabbur) for everything but the truth.43 Further on, Avicenna states that in order to attain his contemplative end, the knower needs exercise (riyÄá¸a) for various reasons. The first of these, removal of any preference besides the truth, is directly related to character formation and is attained through what Avicenna now calls âtrue asceticismâ (al-zuhd al-ḥaqÄ«qÄ«).44 If the knower persists in these exercises, he will gradually become more completely absorbed with the truth. The knowerâs moral and intellectual progression culminates in the stage of âarrivalâ (wuṣūl) where preoccupation with anything but the truth is a distraction (shughl) and relying on what pertains to the animal soul is a weakness (Ê¿ajz).45
As a result, only contemplative activity possesses intrinsic value, since it is the activity corresponding to the human soulâs essence. Subrational interests should be abolished insofar they distract the human being from his contemplative activity. Therefore, ascetic practice is for Avicenna a necessary method that enables the philosopher to direct his appetites entirely to the contemplative end that corresponds to the perfection of the human soulâs rational essence. Nevertheless, it is also clear that asceticism is not an end in itself, and the necessity of asceticism as a method of character training does not mean that the accomplished philosopher should see no value in this world, or even that he should necessarily lead an ascetic life at all:
The knowers may differ in their aspirations (himam) according to their different thoughts (khawÄá¹ir) that are based on their different motivating concerns (dawÄÊ¿Ä« al-Ê¿ibar). Misery (qashaf) may seem equal to luxury (taraf) for the knower, or he may prefer misery. Similarly, bad and good odor may seem equal to him, or he may prefer bad odor. This is so when the concern in his mind (al-hÄjis bi-bÄlihi) is such that it disdains everything but the truth. He may incline toward ornaments (zÄ«na) and love the best of each genus, or hate deficiency and worthlessness. This is so when he considers his habits as being accompanied by external states (yaÊ¿tabir Ê¿Ädatahu min á¹£uḥbat al-aḥwÄl al-áºÄhira). For he seeks beauty (bahÄʾ) in everything, because it is excellence favored by the First Providence (maziyyat ḥaáºwa min al-Ê¿inÄya al-Å«lÄ) and closer to that toward which his inclination is turned. All of this may differ between knowers and may differ in one knower from one time to another.46
It should be noted that the reference here is to a philosopher who has already reached his moral and theoretical end. In contrast, the previous passages about the necessity of ascetic practice related to someone who is still training to become a philosopher. Accordingly, the fully accomplished philosopher no longer needs asceticism as such since his psychical dispositions are already developed in a way that directs his desires exclusively to the contemplative end. Therefore, while he sees little value in anything besides the contemplative truth, he may still appreciate the value of material things insofar as they reflect the absolute beauty. Thus, he may prefer the most perfect specimens within each genus since they best reflect the perfection of the First within that genus. He may similarly choose to lead a luxurious life or prefer an ascetic life. It is precisely because he has developed psychical dispositions that make his attitude towards external goods one of complete ambivalence that he may choose or reject them equally.
Thus, the picture of moral virtue in the Pointers is utterly different from that of the Healing and the other works discussed previously. Avicenna here omits the traditional terminology of virtue ethics, as well as the classical lists of virtues of Platonic or Aristotelian origin. Virtue is discussed only implicitly as regards the training of the subrational faculties of the human soul towards the ultimate end of the purely contemplative life. Most remarkably, any notion of moral virtue as moderation of passions and appetites is entirely absent. Instead, moral virtue as the goal of character formation is a psychical state that corresponds to Neoplatonic apatheia, where reason is wholly liberated from desires directed towards non-contemplative ends. Here, Avicenna is discussing virtue as it relates to the contemplative end of the philosopher, whereas when he introduced the cardinal virtues in the Healing, the context was the good of the religious community as a whole. Therefore, the conclusion is that virtue as Aristotelian moderation is for Avicenna a political-religious end, whereas virtue as purification of the soul is a philosophical end. Given that Avicenna emphasizes the necessity of both religious and philosophical means for character formation, a further conclusion is that for the philosopher, these constitute two successive stages within his moral progression. That is, the religious ordinances represent only the first step in the process of redirecting desires from those that follow the bodily affections towards those that correspond to the intellectual essence.
Finally, in further passages of the ninth namaá¹, Avicenna explains more precisely what he understands moral virtue to mean at its highest philosophical-contemplative level:
The knower is cheerful (hashsh), joyful (bashsh), and smiling. Due to his modesty (tawÄá¸uÊ¿), he honors (yubajjil) the humble man (á¹£aghÄ«r) as he honors the noble (kabÄ«r), and he is as delighted (yanbasiá¹) with the destitute (khÄmil) as he is with the eminent (nabÄ«h). How could he not be cheerful when he is delighted (farḥÄn) with the truth, and with every other thing, for he sees the truth in it? How could he not treat everyone as equal when everyone is equal to him, objects of compassion (ahl al-raḥma) who have occupied themselves with falsehoods (qad shughilÅ« bi-l-bÄá¹il)?47
The knower is not concerned with prying into affairs of others (al-tajassus wa-l-taḥassus), nor is he lured to anger at observing reprehensible actions (munkar), the way compassion seizes him, for he discerns (mustabá¹£ir) Godâs secrets in destiny (qadar). If he bids good actions (amara bi-l-maÊ¿rÅ«f), he does so with gentle advice (bi-rifq nÄá¹£iḥ), not with harsh reproach (bi-Ê¿unf muÊ¿ayyir). If he exaggerates the good deeds (jassama al-maÊ¿rÅ«f), it may be because he wishes to guard them against those who have not adopted them (rubbamÄ ghÄra Ê¿alayhi min ghayr ahlihi).48
The knower is courageous (shujÄÊ¿). How could he not be when he is free from the fear of death (bi-maÊ¿zil Ê¿an taqiyyat al-mawt)? He is generous (jawÄd). How could he not be when he is free from the love of falsehood (maḥabbat al-bÄá¹il)? He is forgiving of offenses (á¹£affÄḥ li-l-dhunÅ«b). How could he not be when his soul is beyond being injured by human beings (nafsuhu akbar min an tajraḥahÄ dhÄt bashar)? He is forgetful of rancor (nassÄʾ al-aḥqÄd). How could he not be when his memory is preoccupied with the truth (dhikruhu mashghÅ«l bi-l-ḥaqq)?49
These passages, first, mention several concrete virtuous character traits that pertain to the philosopher entirely devoted to contemplation: modesty, courage, treating people as equals, discretion, lack of anger, compassion, gentleness, courage, generosity, forgiveness, and lack of rancor. Partly coinciding with the more comprehensive lists in Avicennaâs concise ethical treatises,50 these are religious virtues with no apparent connection with the Platonic or Aristotelian lists of virtues. It is clear that these virtues are not the result of moderating appetites and emotions into intermediate dispositions but instead of complete preoccupation with contemplative activity and consequent disinterest in subrational activities. That is, the knower possesses these virtues because his desires are directed exclusively upwards towards the contemplative good. Therefore, he attributes no value to things that are lower in comparison. Consequently, he is courageous because liberated from attachments to bodily life, he is not afraid of death. The philosophical virtues are, then, apathetic in the sense that they arise out of the complete elimination of worldly desires. Second, the passages also show that philosophical virtues are not apathetic in the sense that they would entail the elimination of all emotions but only of negative emotions, such as anger and rancor. Thus, the philosopher is joyful in his contemplation of the truth, consonant with Avicennaâs claim, discussed previously, that contemplative pleasure constitutes the highest pleasure, and he feels compassion towards his less fortunate fellow-beings.
In consequence, as for the Greek Neoplatonists, complete philosophical virtue perhaps somewhat surprisingly culminates in altruism. The goal of becoming an incorporeal intellect advocated by Avicenna at first glance appears to be centered entirely on the moral agentâs relation with himself. Nevertheless, it has repercussions for his relations with others. Again, this is partly the result of the knowerâs detachment from worldly ends. He treats all people equally because they are all equal to him in their pursuit of false ends. He is generous because worldly goods are of no value to him. He is forgiving because human beings cannot offend him in a way that would affect him. In part, his compassionate attitude towards human failings seems to arise out of his awareness of the âbigger picture.â That is, even things that initially seem evil ultimately may serve a purpose in divine providence. In both aspects, then, it seems less to be the case that the knowerâs other-regard is motivated by his genuine interest in the well-being of others and more that it is an accidental consequence of contemplative perfection.
Again, as for the Greek Neoplatonists, the position that Avicenna assigns to altruism is firmly founded on the metaphysical basis of his ethics.51 In the metaphysical part of the Healing, Avicenna raises the question of other-regarding goodness (jÅ«d), or beneficence, in a chapter devoted to the ontological priority of the final cause (ghÄya/Ê¿illa ghÄʾiyya).52 As we have seen, for a given species of existents, its final cause, the perfection of existence, and goodness are synonymous terms. Avicenna now states that beneficence and goodness are relational terms in that the same thing constitutes beneficence for the agent (fÄÊ¿il) from which it proceeds, insofar as it is not affected by it, and goodness for the patient (mafÊ¿Å«l) that is perfected by it.53 Avicenna next defines beneficence as the âgiverâs bestowal of a benefit to another without deriving compensation in return.â54 He emphasizes further that, contrary to popular belief, gratitude, praise, and fame are also forms of recompense. Therefore, an agent cannot be considered beneficent if he receives even such forms of immaterial recompense in return.55 The primary reference is clearly to the First, and by extension to the separate intellects, for whom goodness consists of perfect contemplative activity corresponding to their essence, from which the downward directed creative activity overflows as a consequence. Thus, beneficence is not an end for their activity but its consequence.56 That is, the First is beneficent because He is good but He is not good because He is beneficent. By the same principle, the perfected human essence should overflow its goodness to others without this altruistic activity forming part of its telos, which is contemplative happiness. The goodness of the perfected philosopher, then, is defined entirely in terms of the internal relations within himself. However, its consequence is other-regarding goodness that overflows from his perfected essence to his fellow human beings.
See Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, xxviâxxvii; Gutas, âThe Starting Point of Philosophical Studiesâ; Hein, Definition und Einteilung der Philosophie, 382â384.
Gutas, âThe Starting Point of Philosophical Studies,â 116â117. Hence, Simplicius (d. ca. 560) [cited from Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 323] states: âPerhaps, then, there is every need of an ethical pre-catechism, but not supplied through Aristotleâs Ethics, but through habituation without texts, and through non-technical exhortations, both written and unwritten, to straighten our character, and after that the logical and demonstrative method. After those, we shall be able to take in scientifically the scientific discussions of character and research into reality.â
See, in particular, Hein, Definition und Einteilung der Philosophie, 247â251. For al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs introduction as a paraphrase, or even a translation, of a late Alexandrian treatise, see Gutas, âThe Starting Point of Philosophical Studies.â
Druart, âAl-Kindiâs Ethicsâ; Idem, âAl-Razi (Rhazes) and Normative Ethicsâ; Idem, âAl-Farabi on the Practical and Speculative Aspects of Ethicsâ; Idem, âLa philosophie morale arabeâ; Idem, âAl-FÄrÄbÄ«, Ethics, and First Intelligiblesâ; Idem, âThe Ethics of al-Razi.â
Cf. the statement of Abū Sahl al-Masīḥī (10th cent.), cited in Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 172, that ethics as practiced precedes and as an object of study follows theoretical philosophy.
Miskawayh, TahdhÄ«b al-akhlÄq, 82â86.
Mattila, âThe Philosophical Worship of the IkhwÄn al-á¹¢afÄʾ.â
For the ethics and the conception of religion in Ḥayy Ibn YaqáºÄn, see Kukkonen, âNo Man Is an Islandâ; Idem, Ibn Tufayl, 79â94, 111â126.
As an example, see Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 44â47, for al-GhazÄlÄ«âs distinction between salvation (najÄt) and happiness (saÊ¿Äda) in reference to a minimalist versus contemplative afterlife, the latter of which culminates in a vision of God.
For an altruistic reading of Plotinusâ ethics, see Remes, âPlotinusâs Ethics of Disinterested Interest.â
See, in particular, OâMeara, Platonopolis.
I have argued for this previously in Mattila, âThe Ethical Progression of the Philosopher in al-RÄzÄ« and al-FÄrÄbÄ«.â Druart has, moreover, applied the distinction between pre-philosophical and philosophical ethics to al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs ethical thought, without suggesting that it would also correspond to a progression in the content ascribed to virtue.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, âRisÄla fÄ«-mÄ yanbaghÄ«,â §â¯3, 53. The relevant passage is translated in Druart, âAl-Farabi on the Practical and Speculative Aspects of Ethics,â 476.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, KitÄb Taḥṣīl al-saÊ¿Äda, §â¯62, 94â95 [translation cited from Mahdi, Alfarabiâs Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, 48]. For the Platonic basis of the passage, see Republic, VI, 485b.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ« states in various works that moral virtue results from habituation, that is, it is learned, even if some people are naturally more endowed to learn to be virtuous than others are. See al-FÄrÄbÄ«, Fuṣūl muntazaÊ¿a, §§â¯9â13, 30â34; Idem, KitÄb al-TanbÄ«h Ê¿alÄ sabÄ«l al-saÊ¿Äda, §â¯7, 55â56. See also the discussion in al-FÄrÄbÄ«, Lââ¯harmonie entre les opinions de Platon et dââ¯Aristote, §§â¯42â46, 108â117, on the inborn versus learned nature of moral dispositions (akhlÄq), even if the attribution of the treatise to al-FÄrÄbÄ« is contested.
In contrast, KitÄb Taḥṣīl al-saÊ¿Äda, §â¯40, 74, presents three levels of what is virtue 1) according to the common opinion (fÄ« al-mashhÅ«r), 2) within a particular religion (fÄ« milla mÄ), and 3) in reality (fÄ« al-ḥaqÄ«qa). Supposedly, 1) is at least in part derived from 2).
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, KitÄb Taḥṣīl al-saÊ¿Äda, §â¯63, 95â96 [translation cited from Mahdi, Alfarabiâs Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, 48].
Religion and virtue are, nevertheless, connected also for the Greek Neoplatonists, especially after Plotinus, in the sense that theurgic rites occupy a central position for the ascent within the grades of virtue.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, âRisÄla fÄ«-mÄ yanbaghÄ«,â §â¯5, 53.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, Fuṣūl muntazaÊ¿a, §â¯94, 95â96 [my translation].
Ibid, §â¯94, 98.
See chapter 9.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, Fuṣūl muntazaÊ¿a, §â¯98, 100â101 [my translation].
See, in particular, al-FÄrÄbÄ«, âKitÄb al-Milla,â §â¯5, 46â47.
See, for example, al-FÄrÄbÄ«, On the Perfect State, ch. 17, §§â¯1â2, 278â280.
See, for example, al-FÄrÄbÄ«, KitÄb Taḥṣīl al-saÊ¿Äda, §â¯49, 81.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, On the Perfect State, ch. 16, §â¯2, 260â262.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, Fuṣūl muntazaÊ¿a, §â¯20, 39; §â¯29, 47.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, On the Perfect State, ch. 13, §â¯6, 206. See also similar instrumental definitions of virtue in IḥṣÄʾ al-Ê¿ulÅ«m, V, 64; KitÄb al-SiyÄsa al-madaniyya, 72â74.
See Butterworth, Alfarabi: The Political Writings, 25, note 22, for the manuscripts supporting this reading, as opposed to the one chosen by Najjar and by Dunlop in al-FÄrÄbÄ«, Fuṣūl al-MadanÄ«, 39, where it is rendered: âThe last results to us not in this life but in the afterlife.â
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, Fuṣūl muntazaÊ¿a, §â¯28, 45â46 [my translation].
Al-FÄrÄbÄ« employs the terms first and second perfection here differently from their usual technical epistemological sense, for which see chapter 4. Although the first perfection is here also what enables the attainment of the second perfection, identified with happiness, al-FÄrÄbÄ« now defines the first perfection in terms of virtue rather than in epistemological terms.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, KitÄb Taḥṣīl al-saÊ¿Äda, §â¯57, 92.
See OâMeara, Platonopolis, 185â197, where al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs political philosophy is interpreted as an explicated reading of Greek Neoplatonic political thought in an Islamic context.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ« makes this point in the case of the First in On the Perfect State, ch. 2, §â¯1, 90.
Avicenna, Avicennaâs De anima, I.5, §â¯13, 46â47; Idem, The Metaphysics of The Healing, IX.7, §§â¯21â22, 354â355. See also the discussions in chapters 7 and 8.
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, X.5, §§â¯10â11, 377â378.
Kaya, âProphetic Legislation.â
See, in particular, Avicenna, âRisÄla fÄ« al-kalÄm Ê¿alÄ al-nafs al-nÄá¹iqa,â §â¯8, 197 [translation cited with modifications from Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 71]: âPurification through works is accomplished by methods mentioned in books on ethics and by an assiduous performance of religious duties (al-waáºÄʾif al-sharÊ¿iyya) and customs (al-sunan al-milliyya), such as rites of worship (Ê¿ibÄdÄt) relating to the body, property, and a combination of the two. For restrainment to what is required by religious law and its statutes (mará¸iyyÄt al-sharÊ¿ wa-ḥudÅ«dihi), and undertaking to submit to its commands, have a beneficial effect on subjugating the soul that incites to the evil (al-nafs al-ammÄra bi-l-sūʾ) to the rational soul which is at peace, that is, making the bodily appetitive and irascible faculties subservient to the rational soul which is at peace.â
Avicenna, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, VIII.14â15, 32â33 [my translation here and in following passages].
See the discussion in chapter 5 for Avicennaâs employment of Sufi terminology to characterize the experiential aspect of contemplative happiness.
Avicenna, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, IX.1, 47.
Ibid, IX.2â3, 57â59.
Ibid, IX.8, 78â80.
Ibid, IX.18, 94.
Ibid, IX.25, 107â108.
Ibid, IX.21, 101. This passage may be compared with Plotinus, Enneads, I.4.12, even if this treatise is not included in the Arabic rendering of the Enneads [translation by Armstrong]: âThe good man (ho spoudaios) is always happy, his state is tranquil, his disposition contented and undisturbed by any so-called evils if he is really good. If anyone looks for any other kind of pleasure in the life of virtue, it is not the life of virtue he is looking for.â
Ibid, IX.23, 104â105.
Ibid, IX.24, 106.
See chapter 8.
For the metaphysical basis of altruism in Plotinus, see Remes, âPlotinusâs Ethics of Disinterested Interest,â 11â13.
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, VI.5. See also al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 3, VI.5, 125â127.
Ibid, VI.5, §â¯39, 231.
Ibid.
Ibid, §§â¯40â42, 231â232.
Ibid, §§â¯42â46, 232â233. See also Avicenna, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 3, VI.5, 127: âHence, the truly generous (al-jawwÄd al-ḥaqq) is the one from whom benefits flow (tafīḠminhu al-fawÄʾid), but not due to his desire of nor intended search for something that will come back to him.â