Even though the classical and medieval concept of happiness is not primarily defined in subjective affective terms, the concepts of pleasure and happiness are intimately related. The classical philosophers since Plato discussed the degree to which pleasure should be involved in the good human life.1 All the classical sources of Arabic philosophical ethics, Plato, Aristotle, Galen, and the Neoplatonists, represent an anti-hedonistic ethical stance to different extents. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the rejection of the pursuit of sensible pleasures as the human end is a persisting theme in Arabic philosophy. Yet, Plato, Aristotle, and even the Neoplatonists, nevertheless, incorporated pleasure into a happy life.
Plato and Aristotle offered two different physiological-psychological explanations of pleasure, both of which lived on in the Arabic tradition. The Platonic definition of pleasure as a restoration of the natural state, where the paradigmatic example is pleasure resulting from quenching oneâs thirst, was adopted, for example, by the philosophical group of the Brethren of Purity (9thâ10th cent.; IkhwÄn al-á¹¢afÄʾ) in their 30th epistle devoted to pleasure.2 Aristotle rejected the Platonic definition and gave his account in books VII and X of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle defines pleasure as the supervenient effect of an âunimpeded activity,â that is, the perfect activity of a psychological faculty, such as the perfect hearing of beautiful sounds.3 The definition results in a hierarchy of pleasures conditional on the perfection of the activity: the more perfect the activity, the more intense the pleasure.4 Since theoretical thought is the most perfect of all activities, unimpeded contemplation must result in the greatest possible pleasure. Thus, the highest instance of pleasure is that enjoyed by God contemplating Himself, where the activity and its subject and object are entirely perfect. In the Metaphysics (XII.7, 1072b13â26), Aristotle affirms this to be a pleasure that even humans may intermittently enjoy. As a result, even though pleasure is not the goal of theoretical activity, it just happens to be the case that the contemplative life is the most choice-worthy alternative also because it is the most pleasant life.5
The Arabic Neoplatonic sources both reinforce and modify the Aristotelian conception of pleasure. In his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, as quoted in the Happiness and Its Attainment, Porphyry summarizes the Aristotelian position concerning the relationship between happiness and pleasure: âPleasure is the completion (nihÄya) of the natural, unimpeded (allatÄ« lÄ Ê¿Äʾiq fÄ«hÄ) activities of the living being so that it is connected (maqrÅ«na) with happiness, existing as long as it exists (mawjÅ«da bi-wujÅ«dihÄ), but it is not itself happiness.â6 In the commentary on this passage, Porphyry emphasizes the Aristotelian point that even though pleasure occurs together with the human end, it is not itself the end: âPleasure is like the completion in degree (ka-l-nihÄya fÄ« al-martaba) because it occurs last, but it is not perfect (kÄmila), because we do not stop there, but we search for something further.â7 Beyond this, the Arabic Platonic and Neoplatonic sources introduce an eschatological aspect to the subject of pleasure. I will address eschatology in chapter 6. However, it should be stated here that the fact that for Plato and the Neoplatonists, in contrast to Aristotle, the rational soul is an immortal substance reinforces the hedonistic argument for contemplative happiness: pleasures related to the intellect are not better than sensible pleasures only because they are more intense but also because they are eternal. In the Theology of Aristotle, the Arabic paraphrase of Plotinusâ Enneads, the sensible and true pleasures, related to the bodily faculties and the intellect, respectively, are contrasted, for example, in the following passage: â[a person immersed in the sensible world] does not realize that he has removed himself from the pleasure that is a true pleasure (ladhdha ḥaqq), since he has chosen the transient pleasure (ladhdha dÄthira) that has no permanence or constancy.â8
Al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna both adopt the Aristotelian definition of pleasure in a slightly modified form, as well as the consequent view of a hierarchy of pleasures. Thus, not only is the contemplative life not devoid of pleasure but it also happens to be the most pleasant kind of life. The Aristotelian claim that intellectual activity is the most pleasant human activity, therefore, represents an essential argument for identifying happiness with theoretical activity. Since both authors also think that the human soul, or at least the intellect as its highest part, is immortal, the eschatological aspect of the possibility of eternal contemplative bliss forms an essential part of their argument. Beyond this, their accounts of pleasure also constitute the first layer of the psychological content of happiness.
1 Al-FÄrÄbÄ«
Pleasure is arguably not as integral a part of al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs account of happiness as it will be for Avicenna. Al-FÄrÄbÄ« discusses pleasure in four different contexts, anti-hedonism, character formation, Godâs self-contemplation, and the afterlife, but he does not clearly connect it with happiness. His account of pleasure is essentially Aristotelian: he defines pleasure in Aristotelian terms, and the second of the above perspectives draws on the Nicomachean Ethics and the third on the Metaphysics. Although pleasures for al-FÄrÄbÄ« form a hierarchy with contemplative pleasure at the peak, he does not explicitly employ it as an argument for contemplative happiness. Nevertheless, when the four different perspectives are combined, they certainly make a case for the superiority of the contemplative life even on hedonistic grounds.
The general tone of al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs ethics is not particularly ascetic, but, like practically all Arabic philosophers, he rejects the hedonistic identification of the human end with sensible pleasures. In his political works, he identifies appetitive pleasures as one class of false human ends that people mistakenly believe to constitute happiness. Within the classification of political formations loosely based on Platoâs Republic, the ignorant cities (al-madÄ«na al-jÄhiliyya) are those whose inhabitants identify happiness with some false human end or another. Among them, the âcity of depravity and basenessâ (madÄ«nat al-khissa wa-l-suqÅ«á¹) is that where happiness is believed to consist of the enjoyment of all kinds of sensible pleasures (al-ladhdha min al-maḥsÅ«s), in particular, the pleasures of food, drink, and sex, and fun and play (al-hazl wa-l-laÊ¿b) are preferred as the highest activity.9 In the Political Governance, al-FÄrÄbÄ« adds that among his contemporaries, the appetitive faculty, the psychological basis for the pleasures of the senses, is especially predominant among Bedouins and Turks, who are fond of women, in particular.10 In addition, al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs concise summary of the Symposium, known as On Pleasure (FÄ« al-ladhdha) in the Philosophy of Plato, introduces a distinction between the âtrue pleasureâ (al-ladhdha allatÄ« hiya fÄ« al-ḥaqÄ«qa ladhdha) and what is considered pleasure by most people and sought by the hedonists (aṣḥÄb al-ladhdha).11 Among these, only the first class forms part of the happy life. However, the Platonic duality of pleasures is not the basis on which al-FÄrÄbÄ« builds in his other works.
Elsewhere, al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs starting point is a modified Aristotelian definition of pleasure. In the Philosophy of Aristotle, he defines the pleasant (ladhÄ«dh) as âperceiving in the most excellent manner the most excellent object of perception (mudrik afá¸al idrÄk idrÄkan afá¸al).â12 This is not a literal rendition of the Aristotelian definition of pleasure as a supervenient effect of an unimpeded activity. However, it amounts to something similar reformulated in terms of perception: pleasure is the result of the perfect act of perception of the perfect object of perception.13 As for Aristotle, pleasure is the result of a perfect activity, but it is also something additional to that activity insofar as it is defined in terms of perception of that activity. This is the standard formulation of the Aristotelian definition of pleasure in the Arabic tradition, which will be adopted by Avicenna, among others.14
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs definition of pleasure has two consequences for its ethical value. First, the fact that pleasure follows from perfect perception and a perfect object of perception means that pleasure in itself is a good. Second, since the intensity of pleasure is conditional on the excellence of its two constituent parts, the act of perception and its object, the higher pleasures are both more intense and more valuable than the lower ones. Al-FÄrÄbÄ« formulates this principle explicitly in the Philosophy Aristotle: âThe more complete (atqan) his perception of the object, the more perfect (akmal) his pleasure. The more excellent and perfect in himself the human being who perceives, the more complete (atamm) and perfect his pleasure in perceiving it.â15 Consequently, pleasures form a hierarchy based on the perfection of the act of perception and the object that is perceived. Since intellection is the most perfect activity and the intelligible forms are the most perfect objects of perception, perfect intellection must also result in the greatest amount of pleasure. In the Philosophy of Aristotle, al-FÄrÄbÄ« states that causal knowledge about the world brings about pleasure that is directly proportional to the excellence of oneâs understanding and the objects of oneâs knowledge: âYet, when the human being understands any of these things, he finds pleasure (ladhdha) and joy (faraḥ) in it. The firmer and nearer to certainty his knowledge, the greater his rejoicing (surÅ«r) and his pleasure in what he understands (yaqif Ê¿alayhi). The more perfect in its existence (akmal wujÅ«dan) the object he perceives and understands, the greater his joy and pleasure in his perceiving it.â16
This principle of a hierarchy of pleasures is elaborated further in the Exhortation to the Way to Happiness, where it provides a more secure basis for the refutation of hedonism:
We say that it is easy for us to perform the bad (qabīḥ) action because of the pleasure we experience in doing it, whereas when we acquire the good (jamÄ«l), it seems to us to bring us pain (adhan). This is because we assume that pleasure is the goal (ghÄya) of every action, so we seek this alone in everything we do. Now, pleasures include some that result from sense perception, like the pleasures consequential to something heard, seen, touched, or smelled, and others that are consequential to understanding (mafhÅ«m), like the pleasures resulting from leadership, power (tasalluá¹), domination, and knowledge. We always seek (nataḥarrÄ) more the pleasures consequential to what is sensed, and we suppose that they are the goal of life and that the perfection of life (kamÄl al-Ê¿aysh) comes from our indulging in them from the beginning of our existence. Moreover, these pleasures include those that are a means to necessary things, whether for us or for the world. Nourishment, whereby we stay alive, is necessary for us, whereas reproduction is necessary for the world. Because of this, we suppose that they are the goal of life, and we suppose that they are happiness. In addition to this, the objects of our senses constitute what is best known to us since we perceive them most strongly and can attain them most readily. Through investigation and reflection, however, it has become clear that they divert us from most good things (khayrÄt) and withhold us from the greatest means of attaining happiness. For when we see that a sensible pleasure makes us relinquish a good action, we are inclined to eschew the noble, whereas when a human being becomes strong enough to forsake these pleasures or partake of them in an appropriate measure (bi-qadr), he has approached the praiseworthy character traits (akhlÄq).17
The context of the passage is pleasure and pain as a means to character formation, to which I will return in the context of virtue. What concerns us now is the doctrine of pleasure itself and its relation to happiness. First, the Aristotelian theory of pleasure provides al-FÄrÄbÄ« an argument against any simple form of hedonism, understood in the sense of equating the highest human end with the pursuit of immediate sensible pleasures. Al-FÄrÄbÄ« agrees that it is natural for us to equate the human end with sensible pleasures. This is because these are the most familiar, immediate, and intense pleasures that we know and because they result from activities that are necessary for our survival, such as eating and sex. Upon rational reflection, however, we understand that sensible pleasures not only do not constitute the human end but also hinder its attainment. This is because the pursuit of sensible pleasures often prevents us from pursuing the actions that are genuinely virtuous or good and contribute to our attaining the real human end.
Second, the passage introduces a novel classification of pleasures into sensible (maḥsÅ«s) and conceptual (mafhÅ«m). This classification is based on the Platonic tripartition of the soul, where the first class is related to pleasures of the appetitive soul and the second to the pleasures resulting from the irascible and rational parts of the soul. Al-FÄrÄbÄ« does not explicitly say that pleasures related to the motivational ends of the irascible and rational parts, such as power and knowledge, are better or more intense than bodily pleasures. However, this should follow from his definition of pleasure, in which a higher activity produces more pleasure. Therefore, our initial supposition that sense pleasures are the highest kind of pleasure is mistaken and is due to the fact that we are not yet familiar with the higher forms of pleasure.
To support this, al-FÄrÄbÄ« introduces a kind of hedonistic calculus where each action is evaluated based on the pain and pleasure it will cause in the long run.18 The pleasure and pain brought about by human actions are either immediate (Ê¿Äjila) or postponed (Ê¿Äqiba). While sensible pleasures are usually immediate, their immoderate pursuit may later result in pain or distress that overweighs the initial pleasure. Similarly, while virtuous actions may initially be painful, they may later bring about greater pleasure than the initial pain. Again, al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs point is mainly related to pain and pleasure in character formation, and by postponed pain, he in part means religious sanctions (sharÄ«Ê¿a) aiming for the instilment of virtue in people. However, this seems to be also a more general point concerning the nature of sensible and non-sensible pleasures. Since the former are immediate, we are inclined to pursue them. However, by rational reflection, we realize that by eschewing them for the sake of higher activities, we may ultimately derive more pleasure. This is true, in any case, when the eschatological aspect is introduced: virtuous actions will ultimately result in eternal pleasure and the pursuit of sensible pleasures, for al-FÄrÄbÄ« at least, in either non-existence or eternal pain.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs hierarchy of pleasures is completed by the parallel passages of the Virtuous City and the Political Governance, drawing on Aristotleâs Metaphysics, XII.7, which discuss the divine pleasure of God intellecting His essence:
Now, since pleasure, happiness, delight, and joy result all the more by perceiving the most beautiful by means of the most accurate perception, and since the First is the most beautiful absolutely and the most splendid and most adorned and His perception of Himself is the most accurate perception and perfect knowledge, the pleasure that the First enjoys is a pleasure the real nature of which we cannot understand and the massive extent of which we cannot grasp but by reference and in relation to the minuscule pleasure we have when we suppose that we have perceived what we take to be most beautiful and splendid by means of some accurate act of perception, whether that be through sense perception, imagination, or through intellectual knowledge (Ê¿ilm Ê¿aqlÄ«). Since in this state, we experience a pleasure that we suppose surpasses all others in extent, and we experience the ultimate degree of joy in ourselves as a result, then to compare His knowledge and perception of what is most perfect and beautiful to our knowledge and perception of what is most perfect and most splendid, is to compare His delight, pleasure, and joy in Himself to the pleasure, delight, and joy we have in ourselves. But since there is no way to relate our perception to His perception, nor our knowledge to His knowledgeâthough if there is some relation, it is minusculeâthere is, then, no way to relate our pleasure, delight, and joy in ourselves to that of the First. Even if there is some relation, it is minuscule; for how could there be any relation between what is a small part and something the extent of which is infinite in time, between something deficient in so many ways and something of the utmost perfection?19
Since Godâs self-contemplation involves both the perfect act and the perfect object of perception, that is, perfect intellection of the divine essence, the intensity of the resulting pleasure must be the greatest possible. Humans may experience a minuscule variant of this pleasure in the most perfect act of perception possible for the human being. Although al-FÄrÄbÄ« does not say it here, the greatest possible human pleasure should thereby result from intellection, which when brought to perfection may mirror at least slightly Godâs contemplative activity. The ultimate pinnacle of human pleasure is the one that the perfected human souls experience in al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs philosophical paradise, once they come to contemplate their own perfected intellectual essence.20
When the distinct parts of al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs account of pleasure are combined, as for Aristotle, the pleasure involved in the contemplative life emerges as an important argument for identifying happiness with intellectual activity. The consequence of the definition of pleasure in terms of the excellence of perception is that intellectual pleasure must be the most intense of all pleasures, given that intellection is the most perfect kind of perception. Our initial impression that sensible pleasures are the strongest pleasures, therefore, must be mistaken. However, even if Aristotle also concedes that the intellect might be immortal, for al-FÄrÄbÄ«, the argument of pleasure is more integrally connected with pleasure in the afterlife. It is ultimately the fact that the theoretical life will lead to eternal contemplative bliss that tilts the hedonistic calculus from sensible to intellectual pleasures. Al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs hedonistic argument remains somewhat implicit in his writings, and his account of the hierarchy of pleasures, in general, is not fully developed. Avicenna elaborates on both of these aspects to present a more systematic account of pleasure.
2 Avicenna
Avicenna discusses pleasure in several works, most notably in the final metaphysical parts of his two major philosophical summas, the Healing and the Pointers and Reminders, as well as in the Beginning and Return. These constitute three parallel discussions formulated in very similar terms, in which Avicenna approaches pleasure from two main perspectives: divine self-contemplation and happiness. Whether influenced by al-FÄrÄbÄ« or the Aristotelian tradition in general, Avicenna also builds a hierarchy of pleasures on an Aristotelian definition of pleasure. In contrast to al-FÄrÄbÄ«, however, Avicenna in all three works formulates his discussions of happiness explicitly in terms of pleasure, which makes the relationship between pleasure and happiness much more intimate than was the case for al-FÄrÄbÄ«. Consequently, the superiority of intellectual pleasure becomes Avicennaâs most important explicit argument for contemplative happiness, which at the same time constitutes Avicennaâs most elaborate argument against simplistic hedonism identifying happiness with sensible pleasures. In further contrast, Avicenna introduces all of his discussions of happiness with the question of the afterlife, which means that his hedonistic argument for intellectual happiness is at the outset founded on the fact that the soulâs intellectual pleasure is not only more intense but eternal. Nevertheless, as the following discussion will show, Avicennaâs intention is not to address happiness only as an otherworldly state but to present an argument that shows that contemplative happiness is the most pleasant state in both lives.
In the Pointers and Reminders, Avicenna begins the eight namaá¹ concerned with happiness and pleasure with a rhetorical argument against identifying pleasure and happiness with immediate sensible pleasures:
The common people have assumed that the strong and high pleasures are the sensible pleasures, while other pleasures are weak, all of them unreal imaginations (khayÄlÄt ghayr ḥaqÄ«qiyya). It may be possible to remind (yunabbih) those among these people who possess discernment (tamyÄ«z): are not the most pleasant things in this class that you describe sex, food, and other things of this kind? Still, you know that someone capable of a victory (ghalaba), even in an insignificant thing, such as chess or backgammon, may refuse the food or sex that is offered to him for the sake of the estimative (wahmiyya) pleasure of the victory. Sometimes food and sex are offered to someone seeking temperance and control over the health of his body (al-riyÄsa maÊ¿a á¹£iḥḥat jismihi) accompanied by modesty (fÄ« á¹£uḥbat ḥashmihi). Yet, he withdraws his hand from both in order to guard his modesty. Therefore, in this case, the guarding of modesty is inevitably more choice-worthy (Äthar) and pleasant than sex and food. If generous (kirÄm) people are presented with the opportunity to take pleasure in giving to others what they need, they choose it over taking pleasure in the competing object of an animal desire (bi-mushtahÄ á¸¥ayawÄnÄ« mutanÄfis fÄ«hi), and in doing this, choose others over themselves, hastening to offer to them what they need. Similarly, the magnanimous (kabÄ«r al-nafs)21 think little of hunger and thirst when protecting their honor, and despise fear of death and sudden destruction in the face of the battle of the combatants. Many times, they rush towards danger for the sake of the pleasure they anticipate from praise, even after their death, as if the praise could reach them once they are dead. It has become clear, then, that the internal (bÄá¹ina) pleasures are higher than the sensible pleasures. Moreover, this does not only concern the rational beings (Ê¿Äqil) but also the speechless (Ê¿ujm) animals, for some of the hunting dogs hunt even when hungry and preserve their prey for their master and even carry it to him. The nursing animals choose their offspring over themselves and often expose themselves to greater dangers in protecting them than they would to protect themselves. If the internal pleasures are greater than the external, even when not intellectual, what do you presume of the intellectual pleasures? Therefore, we must not listen to someone who says: âIf we reach a state in which we do not eat, drink, or have sex, what kind of happiness will that be for us?â He who says this must be told in answer: âO you miserable person! Perhaps the state of the angels and what is above them is more pleasant, delightful, and enjoyable (anÊ¿am) than the state of the animals. Indeed, how could there even be a relation between the two so that they might be compared?â22
The rhetorical question at the end of the passage is clearly a reprimand to those who consider Avicennaâs philosophical paradise of the unembodied soulâs eternal contemplative bliss to be no match for the very physical pleasures that the Quran promises in paradise. Still, even if Avicennaâs focus is on the afterlife, the point of the argument is directed against simple forms of hedonism in general. It is a rhetorical argument in the sense that Avicenna does not yet base it on a definition of pleasure, which he will introduce shortly after. Instead, he appeals to the everyday observations that we have of pleasure as motivating the actions of human beings and even non-human animals. The point of the argument is that while we often believe sensible pleasures to be the highest, and even only, kind of pleasure, our experiences show that both human beings and animals often choose other things over sensible pleasures. What is remarkable about this passage is that Avicenna makes pleasure the motivating cause for the pursuit of the non-sensible ends of victory, virtue, altruism, and honor. It is not only the case that humans often choose other ends over sensible pleasures because they consider them more valuable but they also believe that they will result in more pleasure. The crux of the argument, then, practically identifies the human end with pleasure to the extent of making Avicenna a hedonist: people are not mistaken in believing that the ultimate end of human activities is pleasure but only in identifying which activity results in the most intense pleasure.
The argument implicitly assumes a hierarchy of psychical activities based on Avicennaâs faculty psychology, and thereby introduces the actual argument for contemplative happiness. In all three works, this argument employs an Aristotelian definition of pleasure, for which Avicenna offers his perhaps most elaborate formulation in the Beginning and Return:
Pleasure results from perception, not the attainment of perfection (ḥuṣūl al-kamÄl), for pleasure is a perception of what is suitable (idrÄk al-mulÄʾim). Sensible pleasure is to perceive what is suitable among the sensibles (idrÄk al-mulÄʾim al-ḥissÄ«), and it must occur suddenly. This is because the senses sense what is different (yuḥiss bi-l-khilÄf) and do not sense what is similar to the sensing organ in quality. When the sensible quality is established (istaqarra) in the sensing organ, its arrival at the organ is no longer sensed. Therefore, sensation occurs only before the quality is established, and sensible pleasure is to sense a sudden occurrence of what is suitable. As for the sensible suitable things that arrive, exist, and are not sensed, there occurs no pleasure. Similarly, for domination (ghalaba), when it is present (waqaÊ¿at) but not sensed, no pleasure occurs. Those who believed that sensible pleasure is a return to the natural state (al-rujÅ«Ê¿ ilÄ al-ḥÄl al-á¹abÄ«Ê¿iyya) were mistaken. Once it is attained, there occurs no pleasure. For this return is not pleasure but the cause in some things for bringing about pleasure. Pleasure is a perception of that return insofar as the return is suitable. In sum, sensible pleasure is a sensation of what is suitable, and similarly for every pleasure. The suitable for each thing is the good that is proper to it (al-khayr alladhÄ« yakhuṣṣuhu), and the good that is proper to the thing is its perfection (kamÄluhu), which is its actuality, not its potentiality.23
First, towards the end of the passage, Avicenna explicitly refutes the definition of pleasure as a return to the natural state, perhaps against some of his contemporaries advocating the Platonic theory. It is erroneous because the return is not the cause of pleasure as such but only applies to a subset of sensible pleasures, such as the paradigmatic case of quenching thirst. Second, although Avicenna formulates his definition of pleasure in slightly different terms, it comes very close to the one presented by al-FÄrÄbÄ«. As for al-FÄrÄbÄ«, pleasure is the function of two variables: an act of perception and an object of perception. As regards the latter, a given psychical activity results in pleasure when the perceived object is âsuitableâ for the psychical faculty in question.24 At the end of the passage, and more elaborately in the two other works, Avicenna specifies further that suitability means perfection or actuality of a particular psychical activity.25 As for the former component, the fact that perception is a necessary condition for pleasure means that even when a psychical activity is perfected but, for some reason, it is not perceived, no pleasure will come about. This is an essential qualification because it will provide Avicenna with the theoretical grounds for explaining why we do not always seem to experience contemplative pleasure. The theory also explains in physiological-psychological terms the immediacy of sensible pleasures: the sense organs perceive sensible qualities, such as colors, sounds, or tastes, as momentary transformations in a sense organ once it receives a sensible quality. Therefore, the resulting pleasure is instantaneous and quick to subside once the perception of the sensible quality subsides. In addition, if a sense organ receives identical sensible qualities for a prolonged period, it no longer perceives them as intensely, and, therefore, the resulting pleasure will also be feebler. This provides a causal explanation for the distinction between the âquickâ pleasures caused by physical sensations and the âslowâ pleasures resulting from inner faculties and the intellect. This is relevant for Avicennaâs argument since it explains why we tend to prefer the external to the internal pleasures.
As for Aristotle and al-FÄrÄbÄ«, the first consequence of this theory is that pleasure in itself is a good. Pleasure follows when we perceive the optimal functioning of some psychical activity or another, and, therefore, it confirms the correctness of that activity. For each psychical faculty, there are proper goods or perfections that result in pleasure once the attainment of that perfection is perceived. Thus, for example, the pleasure of the appetitive power (shahwa) results from perceiving a suitable sensible quality (kayfiyya maḥsÅ«sa) of one of the five senses, such as due to having sex or enjoying delicious food. The pleasure of the irascible faculty results from victory (áºafar), domination (ghalaba), or revenge, the pleasure of estimation (wahm) from hope (rajÄʾ), and the pleasure of memory from agreeable recollections.26 The pleasure of the theoretical intellect is conditional on the perception of truth and that of the practical intellect on good (jamÄ«l) actions, or perhaps also on receiving praise and esteem (karÄma).27
The second consequence is that the intensity of pleasure is directly proportional to the excellence of both the act of perception and its object.28 Avicennaâs discussion of pleasure and happiness occurs in all three works towards the end of their final metaphysical parts. At this point, he has already established in the psychological part that the psychical faculties form an ascending hierarchy of excellence and perfection from the simple life activities of nourishment and reproduction, present even in plants, up to rational thought, present only in the human being. In the present context, Avicenna only has to spell out what consequences this has for pleasure: if a psychological faculty is more perfect and complete (atamm) in its activity, and more enduring (adwam) and accessible (awá¹£al ilayhi/aḥṣal lahu) for its subject, and if its perception is also stronger (ashadd idrÄkan), then the resulting pleasure will also be more intense (ablagh) and abundant (awfar).29 Intellectual apprehension of an intelligible form, that is, a universal concept, is stronger (aqwÄ) and more enduring than sense perception of a sensible form for two reasons. First, the intelligible object is unchanging and universal. Second, in the intellectual act of perception, the intellect perceives the intelligible essence (kunh) in itself and âunites with it becoming in some manner (Ê¿alÄ wajh mÄ) identical with it.â30 Since both of the components involved are qualitatively higher than in sense perception, the pleasure resulting from pure intellection has to be greater, to the extent that âthere is no relation (nisba) between the two.â31
Again, the hierarchy of pleasures culminates in the pure pleasure experienced by God, or the Necessary Existent (wÄjib al-wujÅ«d) in Avicennan terminology, contemplating His perfect intelligible essence in a perfect act of intellection:
For the Necessary Existent, who is ultimate perfection, beauty, and splendor, and who intellects Himself in that ultimate perfection, splendor, and beauty by a complete act of intellection (bi-tamÄm al-taÊ¿aqqul) in which the intellectual apprehender and the intelligible are as if one in reality (Ê¿alÄ annahumÄ wÄḥid bi-l-ḥaqÄ«qa), His self (dhÄtuhu) is for His self the greatest lover and beloved, and the greatest subject and object of pleasure (lÄdhdh/multadhdh) ⦠For the First is the best perceiver by the best act of perception of the best object of perception, and, hence, He is the best subject and object of pleasure. This is something with which nothing can be compared (lÄ qiyÄs ilayhi). We do not have other names for these concepts (maÊ¿Änin), and he who finds them repugnant can make use of others.32
So far, all of this appears to be merely a more elaborate and systematic presentation of the argument that was already present in al-FÄrÄbÄ«, even if somewhat implicitly. In contrast to both Aristotle and al-FÄrÄbÄ«, however, Avicenna goes on to show that his theory of pleasure also accounts for the intuitive implausibility of the superiority of intellectual pleasure. That is, even for those of us familiar with intellectual pleasures, the claim that intellectual pleasures are always more intense than physical pleasures does not seem to be supported by experience. Avicennaâs first explanation for this was given already by al-FÄrÄbÄ« implicitly. However, Avicenna states it in much clearer terms: people tend to prefer physical to intellectual pleasures because they have never experienced the latter. If someone has never experienced a particular pleasure, he cannot know what that pleasure feels like nor develop a desire for it, even if he knows theoretically that a psychical perfection and the resulting pleasure must exist for this activity.33 The position of most human beings with respect to intellectual pleasures is, then, like that of the impotent towards sexual pleasures, or of the deaf towards the pleasures of music and the blind towards visual beauty.34 All of them know theoretically that such pleasures must exist, but since they have never experienced them, they cannot understand what they feel like and, therefore, do not develop a desire for them. Consequently, Avicenna concludes rather brutally, the rational person should not presume that âevery pleasure is like the pleasure that donkey has in its belly and its thighs.â35
Avicennaâs second point is novel and takes advantage of the fact that pleasure is conditional not only on the presence of the perfection of a psychical activity itself but also on that it must be correctly perceived as such by the subject who experiences it. The perfection of a psychical activity, or even its perception by the corresponding faculty, does not necessarily result in the feeling of pleasure if some impediment (mÄniÊ¿) or distraction (shughl) obstructs its accurate perception.36 In such a case, a psychical faculty may even desire and take pleasure in what is contrary to its perfection. Avicenna employs an example from among the physical pleasures: a sick person does not take pleasure in sweets.37 This is not due to a deficiency in the sensible object or the psychical activity, since sweetness is a suitable sensible quality for the faculty of taste, and tasting sweet things, therefore, represents a perfect activity for that faculty. Instead, it is due to a deficiency in the act of perception: the disease prevents the tasting faculty from accurately perceiving the suitability of the sensible quality and, therefore, obstructs the pleasure that should normally result. Again, this is true not only of human beings but of all animals: an animal, due to some impediment, may sometimes have no desire for the food that it usually enjoys.38
The same principle applies to intellectual pleasure: perfect theoretical thought does not necessarily result in pleasure if there is something that obstructs us from correctly perceiving it as the perfection of the theoretical faculty. As it happens, the human soulâs embodied state presents a constant impediment for us to be adequately aware of our intellectual perfection. The body both distracts the rational soul from desiring its proper perfection in the first place and, if the intellectual faculty were to attain its perfection, from correctly perceiving it as perfection and, therefore, experiencing the corresponding pleasure.39 In this world, the human rational soul is, then, like a sick animal whose appetite for what is good for it has been distorted by a disease. Once the obstruction of the body disappears, however, the human soul will experience unimaginable pleasure:
If the intellectual faculty had brought the soul to a degree a perfection by which it is enabled, when it separates from the body, to achieve that complete perfection that is appropriate for it to attain, it would be like a benumbed person who is made to taste the most delicious food and exposed to the most appetizing state but who does not feel this, but who then has the numbness removed, experiencing as a result momentous pleasure all at once. This pleasure would not be of the same genus as sensible and animal pleasure at all, but a pleasure that is similar to the good state (al-ḥÄl al-á¹ayyiba) that belongs to the pure and living (celestial) substances. It is more sublime and noble than every other pleasure.40
Nevertheless, we may still experience intellectual pleasures to a limited extent even in this life. Since the body is what obstructs intellectual pleasure, the extent of intellectual pleasure is conditional mainly on the human beingâs ability to free his desires from being directed towards physical pleasures.41 To support his argument, Avicenna suggests that if you were contemplating a difficult problem (taʾammalta Ê¿awÄ«á¹£an), and you were suddenly distracted with a physical desire, you would choose to continue with your reflections, if you are of ânoble soulâ (karÄ«m al-nafs).42 Avicenna, however, portrays the extent of contemplative pleasure that is possible for the embodied soul in strikingly different terms in different works. In the Beginning and Return, Avicenna explains that even if we may gain some such pleasure, it is weak due to the influence of the body.43 In the Healing, he similarly states that when freed from our bodily desires, we may experience some feeble image of the ultimate contemplative pleasure when we solve theoretical problems. However, its relation to the true contemplative pleasure is still far even from the relation that the pleasure of smelling delicious food has to the pleasure of tasting it.44 In the Pointers and Reminders, however, Avicenna claims that the human being may attain a âconsiderable degreeâ (ḥaáºáºan wÄfiran) of intellectual pleasures to the extent that it may âoverpower him and distract him from everything else.â45 Since this latter passage concerns the alleged mystical aspects of Avicennaâs thought, I will return to it in chapter 5.
In sum, Avicenna constructs a systematic hedonistic argument for identifying happiness with theoretical activity based on the claim that intellectual pleasure is the most intense and most enduring kind of pleasure, even if most of us only rarely experience it in this world. Since Avicenna introduces all of his discussions of happiness with the question of the afterlife, his primary motivation is clearly to show that the contemplative life of the unembodied soul is the most pleasant, and thereby to support his philosophical interpretation of paradise against a literal interpretation of the Quran. Even taking this into account, Avicenna still comes very close to being a hedonist: happiness is pleasure, and because the highest and most enduring pleasure is intellectual pleasure, happiness is intellectual pleasure. However, Avicenna is not a hedonist because the human good or happiness and the pleasure that results from it remain distinct. In the Pointers and Reminders, Avicenna states explicitly that the truth is the only intrinsically valuable human end, and even contemplative pleasure may turn out to be a distraction if it is sought for its own sake.46 Nevertheless, the result may appear slightly paradoxical. Avicennaâs main argument for identifying the human end with a specific activity is the amount of pleasure that it produces but yet he insists that the end itself is not pleasure. However, this is only the case when Avicennaâs discussions of pleasure and happiness are taken out of the context of his overall philosophy. As it turns out, for Avicenna, as for al-FÄrÄbÄ«, the contemplative nature of happiness is determined by objective theoretical grounds, while pleasure is something that follows as a consequence.
For a general account of pleasure in classical philosophy, see van Riel, Pleasure and the Good Life.
IkhwÄn al-á¹¢afÄʾ, RasÄʾil IkhwÄn al-á¹¢afÄʾ, III (30), 52â83. For the Platonic account of pleasure, which varies considerably between dialogues, see van Riel, Pleasure and the Good Life, 7â43. The source for Arabic philosophers is probably the Timaeus, in which Plato defines pleasure as a return to the natural state (64câd). In the Arabic translation of Galenâs epitome of the Timaeus (JÄlÄ«nÅ«s, Galeni compendium Timaei, 19), pleasant (ladhÄ«dh) is defined as âa complete and instantaneous return to the natural stateâ (al-rujÅ«Ê¿ jumlatan fÄ« dafÊ¿a ilÄ al-ḥÄl al-á¹abÄ«Ê¿iyya). For the Platonic theory of pleasure in AbÅ« Bakr al-RÄzÄ« (d. 925), see Adamson, âPlatonic Pleasures in Epicurus and al-RÄzÄ«.â Adamson argues against Goodmanâs interpretation of al-RÄzÄ« as an Epicurean hedonist, presented in Goodman, âThe Epicurean Ethic of Muḥammad Ibn Zakariyâʾ Ar-Râzîâ; Idem, âHow Epicurean Was RÄzÄ«?â For Miskawayh, who follows the Platonic account of pleasure in one treatise and the Aristotelian in another, see Adamson, âMiskawayh on Pleasure.â
For the two accounts of pleasure in NE, VII and X, see van Riel, Pleasure and the Good Life, 43â78. Although the definition of pleasure in book VII (1153a14â15) as the âunimpeded activity of a disposition in its natural state (energeia tÄs kata phusin hekseÅs ⦠anempodiston)â appears to identify pleasure with the activity itself, and hence amount to hedonism, in book X (1174b32â33), pleasure is identified as something additional that âperfects the activity ⦠as a supervening perfection (teleioi de tÄn energeian ⦠hÅs epigignomenon ti telos/tammamat al-ladhdha al-fiÊ¿l ⦠ka-tamÄm mÄ yaṣīr fÄ«hi min baÊ¿d).â Both van Riel and Shields, âThe Metaphysics of Pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics X,â interpret the two accounts as ultimately compatible, explaining the difference by the distinct emphasis required by the context.
See van Riel, Pleasure and the Good Life, 58â61.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X, 1177a22â27.
Ghorab, âGreek Commentators on Aristotle,â 78.
Ibid.
Pseudo-Aristotle, âUthÅ«lÅ«jiyÄ Arisá¹Äá¹ÄlÄ«s,â VII.49, 91. The passage renders Enneads, IV.8.8 but the term âtrue pleasureâ is added by the Arabic editor. See van Riel, Pleasure and the Good Life, 94â120, for Plotinusâ account of pleasure, in particular, (112â114) the distinction, inspired by the Stoics, between pleasure as an affection (pathos) related to the irrational soul and joy (khara) or âpure pleasureâ (hÄdonÄ katharÄ) as a special kind of non-affective âpleasureâ of the intellect.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, On the Perfect State, ch. 15, §§â¯16â17, 254â256.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, KitÄb al-SiyÄsa al-madaniyya, 103.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, Alfarabius de Platonis philosophia, 12. For the illusory and true pleasures in Plato, see van Riel, Pleasure and the Good Life, 14â17. However, Plato mainly formulates the distinction in the Republic and the Philebus rather than the Symposium.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, Falsafat Arisá¹Å«á¹ÄlÄ«s, 61.
See also al-FÄrÄbÄ«, KitÄb al-SiyÄsa al-madaniyya, 46, for a similar definition in the context of the divine pleasure of self-contemplation.
In the case of Miskawayh, Adamson, âMiskawayh on Pleasure,â 211, suggests that the introduction of the additional element of perception to the Aristotelian definition of pleasure is a residue of the Platonic account in which pleasure results from the perception of the restoration of a natural state.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, Falsafat Arisá¹Å«á¹ÄlÄ«s, 61.
Ibid, 60.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, KitÄb al-TanbÄ«h Ê¿alÄ sabÄ«l al-saÊ¿Äda, §â¯13, 67â68 [translation cited with modifications from McGinnis and Reisman, Classical Arabic Philosophy, 113].
Ibid, §â¯14, 68â69.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, KitÄb al-SiyÄsa al-madaniyya, §â¯30, 46â47 [translation cited with modifications from McGinnis and Reisman, Classical Arabic Philosophy, 90]. For a parallel passage, see al-FÄrÄbÄ«, On the Perfect State, ch. 1, §â¯14, 84â86.
For contemplative pleasure in the afterlife, see chapter 6.
For the virtue of magnanimity (megalopsukhia/kibar al-nafs), or âgreatness of soul,â see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV.3, 1123a35â1125a35. Aristotle defines a magnanimous person as âone who thinks himself being worthy of great things and, in reality, is soâ (ho megalÅn hauton aksiÅn aksios Ån/alladhÄ« yuʾahhil nafsahu li-l-umÅ«r al-Ê¿aáºÄ«ma wa-huwa li-dhÄlika ahl) and states his primary concern to be with honor. For a recent study of the adoption of this virtue in the Islamic world, see Vasalou, Virtues of Greatness in the Arabic Tradition.
Avicenna, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, VIII.1â2, 7â10 [my translation].
Avicenna, al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maÊ¿Äd, III.14, 110 [my translation]. See also similar definitions of pleasure in Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, IX.7, §â¯4, 348; Idem, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, VIII.3, 11.
The definition is repeated in a previous passage in the context of divine pleasure (al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maÊ¿Äd, I.12, 18): âFor pleasure is nothing but the perception of the suitable insofar as it is suitableâ (inna al-ladhdha laysat illÄ idrÄk al-mulÄʾim min jihat mÄ huwa mulÄʾim).
In The Metaphysics of The Healing, IX.7, §â¯4, 348, Avicenna equates pleasure to the good (khayr) of a particular life activity and states that pleasure consists of an âawarenessâ (shuÊ¿Å«r) of the agreeability (muwÄfaqa) or suitability (mulÄʾama) of the state attained. Next, he identifies the agreeable with the attainment of âperfection in actâ (al-kamÄl bi-l-fiÊ¿l) of a particular life function. In al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, VIII.3, 11, he defines pleasure as âperception and attainment (nayl) of what for the perceiver (Ê¿inda al-mudrik) is a perfection and a good insofar as it is such.â
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, VIII.7, §â¯18, 298; IX.7, §â¯4, 348; Idem, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, IX.7, 14; Idem, al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maÊ¿Äd, I.12, 18. For the pleasures related to estimation, see also Black, âEstimation (Wahm) in Avicenna,â 25â27.
These last two candidates are suggested in al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, IX.7, 14.
See, for example, Ibid, VIII.9, 25: âIt is well-known that the relation (nisba) of one pleasure to another is the relation of an object of perception to an object of perception (nisbat al-mudrak ilÄ al-mudrak) and of perception to perception.â
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, IX.7, §â¯5, 348.
Ibid, VIII.7, §â¯18, 298; IX.7, §â¯4, 350â351; Idem, al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maÊ¿Äd, I.12, 18; III.14, 112; Idem, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, VIII.9, 24â25.
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, VIII.7, §â¯18, 298.
Ibid, VIII.7, §â¯16, 297 [translation by Marmura with modifications]. See also al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maÊ¿Äd, I.12, 18.
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, IX.7, §â¯6, 349; Idem, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, VIII.8, 19â20.
Ibid.
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, IX.7, §â¯7, 349.
Ibid, VIII.7, §â¯17, 298; IX.7, §â¯8â9, 349â350; Idem, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, VIII.5â6, 17â18; Idem, al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maÊ¿Äd, III.14, 111.
Ibid.
Avicenna, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, VIII.10â11, 26â28.
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, VIII.7, §â¯17, 298; IX.7, §â¯14, 351; Idem, al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maÊ¿Äd, III.14, 111.
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, IX.7, §â¯17, 352 [translation by Marmura with modifications].
Ibid, IX.7, §â¯14â15, 351; Idem, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbihÄt, vol. 4, VIII.15, 33.
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, IX.7, §â¯15, 351.
Avicenna, al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maÊ¿Äd, III.14, 112â113.
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, IX.7, §â¯14, 351.
Avicenna, al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, vol. 4, VIII.15, 33.
Ibid, IX.18, 94â95.