1 Aim of the Book
AbÅ« Naá¹£r al-FÄrÄbÄ« (d. 950/1) and AbÅ« Ê¿AlÄ« al-Ḥusayn Ibn SÄ«nÄ (d. 1037), known in the west by his Latinized name Avicenna, are arguably the two most influential authors of the classical period of Arabic philosophy.1 Avicennaâs status in the history of philosophy in the Islamic world is unparalleled to the extent that scholars today often divide it into pre-Avicennan and post-Avicennan periods. Al-FÄrÄbÄ« was a significant influence on Andalusian philosophers, notably Ibn BÄjja (d. 1139), Averroes (Ibn Rushd; d. 1198), and Maimonides (Ibn MaymÅ«n; d. 1204), but also on Avicennaâs thought, and thus the Islamic east. Both authors addressed all areas of philosophy in their works but neither is known primarily as a moral philosopher. Avicennaâs most famous contributions pertain to metaphysics and philosophical psychology. Al-FÄrÄbÄ« is known, in particular, for his logical and political writings, besides being an eminent authority in musical theory. All of this helps to explain the surprising fact that, despite their prominence, the ethical thought of neither author has received much scholarly attention. The present book is, therefore, the first monographic study on their ethics.
This lacuna in scholarship reflects a broader phenomenon of a relative lack of scholarly interest in Arabic philosophical ethics. This is perhaps the case due to its seemingly reductive nature in the sense that it is firmly based on classical philosophy. Thus, the ethics of Islamic theology (kalÄm), in particular, focusing on theodicy and the ontological and epistemological status of value concepts, has aroused more interest in scholars.2 Even within Arabic philosophy, the emphasis has been more in the Hellenic genre of philosophical therapeutics, and authors such as al-KindÄ« (d. after 870) and AbÅ« Bakr al-RÄzÄ« (d. 925),3 than the more traditionally structured virtue ethics. Consequently, there are no detailed studies on the ethical thought of even the most well-known philosophers, such as the trio of al-FÄrÄbÄ«, Avicenna, and Averroes, or Miskawayh (d. 1030) as the most influential moral philosopher for the posterity. This is not to say that there has been no research at all as important articles and book chapters have been written on the ethical thought of many philosophical authors, including al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna,4 and ethical subjects have been approached from various tangential angles.
The principal aim of this book is precisely to present a systematic study of the ethical thought of al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna. This aim involves several claims that the book strives to make. The first claim is that neither authorâs ethical thought is, in fact, derivative of classical authors in any straightforward sense. While it is true that in their primary accounts of virtue, they draw on Aristotle and Plato, respectively, this represents only a superficial aspect of their ethical thought. In the end, both authors build their ethical theories on a complex combination of classical and Islamic influences where the result cannot be reduced to any of their predecessors. This is true especially when their virtue ethics is situated in the context of their holistic philosophical systems.
The second claim is that the ethical thought of these two authors cannot be adequately understood as abstracted from philosophical psychology, cosmology, and metaphysics, in particular. For the present book, this has the surprising result that many of its discussions will not be purely ethical but will also concern those aspects of theoretical philosophy on which the ethical concepts are ultimately founded. This intertwining of ethics with theoretical philosophy has the further consequence that the study of the ethics of al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna contributes to a better understanding of their philosophy in general. When set in its proper context, not only is ethics grounded in theoretical philosophy but also many aspects of theoretical philosophy may be viewed through an ethical prism.
The third claim is that the two authors indeed have an ethical theory. This might not be immediately clear for two main reasons. First, the low status of al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna as moral philosophers is not entirely unfounded since neither of them composed a major ethical work akin to Aristotleâs Nicomachean Ethics or Miskawayhâs Refinement of Character Traits (TahdhÄ«b al-akhlÄq). Nevertheless, they did address ethical subjects in a great number of works, and when taken together, these discussions formulate an ethical theory. Second, their ethical writings do not necessarily appear to be internally coherent in all regards. The problem is that the two authors define virtue in both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic terms, that is, as moderation of and liberation from passions. The contradiction, moreover, concerns the two levels of the ethical theory: the upper level of explicit discussions of virtue, in most cases, suggests a theory of moderation, while the underlying level seems to demand that virtue should consist of the soulâs separation from the body. My claim is that this tension between two contradictory ethical ideals is merely apparent and that the ethical theories of both authors are coherent.
The structure of this book follows from the three claims I want to make. First, since neither author composed a major ethical treatise, the ethical theory must be reconstructed from various works. In many cases, these treatises approach ethical themes tangentially in a non-ethical context. This means that I will not follow the order of the ethical writings that they did compose. Instead, the book is divided into two main parts devoted to happiness and virtue. These are divided further into chapters, which address the primary components of the two concepts. This might be problematic if it were to constrain the ethics of al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna to a conceptual framework that is not their own. As regards the primary division, this is not the case since both authors explicitly define ethics as a discipline with happiness and virtue as its two principal objects of study. As for the subdivision into chapters, I believe that it is justified as a plausible interpretation of the primary elements of their theories of happiness and virtue.
The subsequent sections of this introduction address the Greek sources of Arabic philosophical ethics and the explicit definitions of the subject matter of ethics made by the two authors. The division of the first part into chapters follows the idea that the Arabic concept of happiness is composed of successive layers. The first chapter addresses the preliminary definition of happiness as the final end of the human being. The second chapter presents the Aristotelian function argument as the first argument for identifying the final end with theoretical excellence. The third chapter is concerned with pleasure, which both provides a further argument for contemplative happiness and constitutes an affective component for the psychological state of happiness. The fourth and fifth chapters deal with the definition of happiness with respect to its contents from a psychological and cosmological viewpoint, respectively, and the sixth chapter is concerned with the eschatological component of the concept of happiness. The division is based on my analysis of the constituent parts of happiness but is also justified by the way al-FÄrÄbÄ«, in particular, addresses distinct aspects of happiness in different contexts.
The second part on virtue builds on the notion of contemplative happiness established in the first part. Thus, the seventh chapter examines virtue from the viewpoint of its essentially instrumental relation to happiness. The eighth chapter addresses the explicit theory of virtue, which appears to contradict the notion of virtue presented in the previous chapter. The ninth chapter is concerned with the rational aspect of virtue, in particular, the role of moral deliberation and the epistemological status of morality. Finally, the tenth chapter concludes the book by arguing for the consistency of the ethical theories of al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna: the tension between the two contradictory ethical ideals is resolved when the ideas of moral progression and different constituencies for the application of virtue are introduced.
As regards the internal structure of the chapters, each chapter is introduced by the classical and often early Islamic background of the subject in question. This serves the purpose of giving the context in which al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna develop each aspect of their ethical theories and highlighting the diversity of their sources. The introductions are generic and their aim is, therefore, not to provide a meticulous philological study of the ethical sources that the two authors employ. It is certainly highly desirable that much more research on the Arabic transmission of Greek ethical sources and their adoption and adaptation by the first Arabic philosophers will be carried out in the future.
In each chapter, the introductory section is followed by subsequent sections on al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna. This is perhaps the most curious choice I have made concerning the bookâs structure. The approach of presenting the ethical thought of two philosophical authors in a single book might be questioned in itself. Beyond this, I, in effect, constrain their ethical theories to a single conceptual framework. This is the case even though the two authors composed very different works, which address ethical subjects in different manners. However, I believe that the approach makes sense for three reasons. First, in their explicit definitions of ethics, the two authors share an essentially identical conception of its subject matter. Second, I believe that the underlying structure of their ethical theories is, in fact, the same. This is the case in large part because Avicenna adopts the general contours of al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs psychological, cosmological, and metaphysical theories, in which both authors ground their ethics. Third, given their near unanimity in many respects, the thematic structure provides the benefit of highlighting the similarities and differences between the two authors as regards each of the constituent parts of their ethical systems. In many cases, it seems clear that Avicenna draws on al-FÄrÄbÄ« in his ethical thought, as he does in various areas of philosophy. However, it is also clear that Avicenna develops many aspects of ethics more systematically than his predecessor did. Obviously, it is also true that the two philosophers manifest significant differences as regards both their general approach to ethics and particular questions, and I have strived to indicate these in each of the chapters.
2 Classical Sources of Arabic Ethics
As is well-known, the genesis of the Arabic philosophical tradition in the ninth century took place in the midst of a comprehensive philosophical-scientific translation movement from Greek into Arabic.5 Thus, Aristotleâs works, Neoplatonic treatises, paraphrases of Platoâs dialogues, late ancient commentaries, and treatises conveying many further authors and traditions formed the context in which early Arabic philosophers formulated their ideas. While the impact of a particular classical author or stream of thought varied between both authors and areas of philosophy, Arabic philosophical ethics, in general, gives the impression of employing a particularly syncretistic mix of classical authors.6 It is possible to distinguish three major classical strands of ethical influence: 1) Aristotle, 2) Plato and Galen, and 3) Neoplatonism. Even if some Arabic philosophers were influenced by one of these strands more than another, most of them drew on an eclectic combination of classical sources in their ethical thought.7 Thus, while al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna are self-identified Aristotelians, and Aristotle plays a prominent role in their ethical thought, they are far from being orthodox Aristotelians as moral philosophers. Instead, as I aim to show in this study, their ethical systems draw on classical sources in a complex way, manifesting a tension between Aristotelian and Neoplatonic influences, in particular, while also drawing on Plato and Galen. I will discuss the specific ways in which these three strands of classical influences emerge in the ethical thought of al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna in the course of this study. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to first introduce each of them in more general terms.
3 Aristotle
Aristotleâs Nicomachean Ethics is undoubtedly the single most important classical work for the genesis of Arabic philosophical ethics.8 The Arabic transmission of the treatise, however, appears to have been a surprisingly complex process.9 An Arabic translation of the whole text survives only in a single manuscript preserved in Fez.10 Ullmann has shown that this text is, in fact, an amalgam of two translations so that books IâIV were translated by IsḥÄq Ibn Ḥunayn (d. 910/11) and books VâX possibly by Usá¹Äth (fl. first half of the 9th century).11 Thus, the work was translated twice during the ninth century. In addition, there were at least three other texts that conveyed its ideas for Arabic readers. The Summa Alexandrinorum (Ikhtiá¹£Är al-iskandarÄniyyÄ«n) is a paraphrase, later translated into Latin, which seems to depend on the translation of the Fez manuscript.12 A second text reworked the themes related to virtue and vice. It was incorporated early on into the Arabic Nicomachean Ethics as an additional book between the sixth and seventh books, resulting in eleven books in the Arabic version.13 The Happiness and Its Attainment (KitÄb al-SaÊ¿Äda wa-l-isÊ¿Äd), whose traditional attribution to al-Ê¿ÄmirÄ« (d. 991) is disputed,14 employed yet another translation or adaptation of the Nicomachean Ethics,15 as well as Porphyryâs (d. ca. 305â¯CE) commentary on the work.16
Given the different channels of transmission, it is sometimes difficult to assess the level of familiarity that a specific author had with Aristotleâs major ethical work. The first translation was apparently produced in al-KindÄ«âs circle, and al-KindÄ« cites the work by name.17 Despite this, his surviving ethical writings show little trace of Aristotelian influence.18 Al-FÄrÄbÄ« is perhaps the first Arabic author clearly familiar with the text, and he famously wrote a commentary on at least a part of the work, which we no longer have.19 Indeed, some of al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs writings, such as the Exhortation to the Way to Happiness (KitÄb al-TanbÄ«h Ê¿alÄ sabÄ«l al-saÊ¿Äda), draw heavily on the first chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics.20 However, his Philosophy of Aristotle (Falsafat Arisá¹Å«á¹ÄlÄ«s) puzzlingly omits to mention the work altogether, even if it does mention most of the other works in the Aristotelian curriculum. Ibn Ê¿AdÄ« (d. 974), al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs Christian pupil, draws on the Nicomachean Ethics in his Purification of Character Traits (TahdhÄ«b al-akhlÄq).21 Nevertheless, the bulk of the work can hardly be characterized as Aristotelian. Avicenna mentions Aristotleâs Ethics as the authority for ethics in his Parts of the Intellectual Sciences (AqsÄm al-Ê¿ulÅ«m al-Ê¿aqliyya).22 Still, his ethical writings show surprisingly little direct influence of the work.
In contrast, passages in the Happiness and Its Attainment depend directly on the extant Arabic translation of the Nicomachean Ethics.23 Miskawayhâs Reformation of Character Traits also manifests familiarity with the entire work, probably through the Summa Alexandrinorum.24 Nevertheless, both works are also very eclectic in the way they employ Greek sources. In the Islamic west, some passages in Ibn BÄjjaâs Rule of the Solitary (TadbÄ«r al-mutawaḥḥid) and the Epistle of Farewell (RisÄlat al-WadÄÊ¿) also employ a variant of the Aristotelian text, while Averroes composed a commentary of the entire treatise.25 As a result, in many cases, it is evident that the authors had some access to the whole of the Nicomachean Ethics. In other cases, it is not clear whether these philosophers, who followed Aristotle in most areas of philosophy, departed from Aristotle in their ethical thought for philosophical or historical reasons. That is, whether they chose to disregard some aspects of the Nicomachean Ethics or whether they did not have the entire work at their disposal.
Despite all this, it is clear that the Nicomachean Ethics played a decisive role in the ethical thought of many Arabic philosophical authors, whether directly or indirectly. Aristotleâs discussion of the concept of happiness in book I, in particular, constitutes, as I will argue, the foundation for the Arabic philosophical concept of happiness. First, it provides a preliminary definition of happiness as the final and self-sufficient human end (1097a15âb21). Second, it presents the so-called function argument (1097b22â28) for the claim that the human end should be identified with the function that the human being has as a species. Aristotle is equally influential in the question of virtue. The definition of virtue as a mediate disposition and the moral and intellectual virtues discussed in books IIIâVI form the standard presentation of virtue for Arabic philosophers, alongside the Platonic cardinal virtues. The two were often fused together both in late antiquity and in Arabic philosophy. Many prominent themes of the Nicomachean Ethics, however, did not find an equally universal audience. Neither al-FÄrÄbÄ« nor Avicenna accords the themes of justice or friendship (discussed in books V and VIIIâIX, respectively) any prominence in their ethical writings, whereas among Arabic authors Miskawayh, in particular, discusses both of these extensively.
As regards the overall ethical ideal transmitted by Aristotleâs Ethics, practically all Arabic philosophers agreed with the intellectualist reading of happiness in the tenth book (1177a12â1178a14), whether they were familiar with it or not. Nevertheless, the work as a whole does not, in fact, convey an entirely intellectualist ethical outlook. Instead, the good life for Aristotle would seem to consist of all rational and subrational human activities as practiced in moderation.26 Thus, the more starkly intellectualist ethical outlook adopted by most Arabic philosophers is not altogether Aristotelian. However, the Arabic Aristotelians could go beyond the Ethics to find support for an intellectualist ethical ideal in Aristotle. In the Metaphysics, the activity of the First Cause is identified with pure intellection, while De anima presents the human psychological faculties as a hierarchy with theoretical thought at its peak. As we will see, for al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna, these two works provide important arguments for identifying happiness with the excellence of theoretical thought.
4 Plato and Galen
The ethical influence of Plato and Galen, to a large extent, goes hand in hand, and thus it makes sense to discuss them together. Platonism had its most decisive impact on Arabic philosophy, in general, through its late ancient synthesis, but for ethical and political philosophy, in particular, Plato also had a crucial unmediated influence. The question of the transmission of the Platonic corpus into Arabic is a complex one and has not yet been sufficiently researched.27 However, as in the case of the Nicomachean Ethics, it is clear that knowledge about Platoâs dialogues was conveyed through various channels. Indirectly, Platonic material was transmitted in doxographies, gnomologies, and citations in various works.28 As for the direct transmission, there is no certain evidence that any Platonic dialogue was translated into Arabic in its entirety.29 However, a significant number of them was rendered as paraphrases. Many of these, including the paraphrases of the Timaeus and the Republic, were authored by Galen.30 Al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs Philosophy of Plato (Falsafat AflÄá¹Å«n), thus, discusses briefly no less than 32 of Platoâs dialogues.31
Consequently, several Platonic dialogues influenced Arabic ethical thought in different ways, whether by direct or indirect means. Many Arabic authors, including Avicenna, founded their theory of virtue on the Platonic cardinal virtues and the underlying moral psychology as presented in the Timaeus and the Republic, as opposed to the Aristotelian account of moral virtues.32 In these works, the general Platonic ethical ideal appears as the moderate one of the harmonious and ordered activity of the appetitive, spirited, and rational psychical powers under the guidance of reason. Transmitting the Platonic ideal of virtue in a different way, dialogues such as the Crito, Phaedo, and Apology, along with the gnomological collections of sayings, conveyed the idea of Socrates as a philosophical embodiment of virtue. This ideal appears, for example, in al-KindÄ«âs Socratic treatises, where the life of Socrates is identified as one of rigorous asceticism.33 Among Platoâs dialogues, the Phaedo (cf. 67Aâ68B), in particular, contra the Republic, further contributed to this more ascetically inclined ethical ideal by identifying virtue with the soulâs separation from the body.34 Beyond this, the Platonic dialogues also played a role in two subjects intimately connected with Arabic philosophical ethics. For philosophical eschatology, the Phaedo, in particular, transmitted the idea of philosophical paradise as eternal contemplative bliss of the human soul.35 Since Aristotleâs Politics was apparently never translated into Arabic in its entirety,36 Platoâs Republic became the most important classical source for Arabic political philosophy.
Galen (d. ca. 216â¯CE) is, of course, more famous as a physician, and his influence on Arabic medicine was paramount. However, within the sphere of ethics he was also an important philosophical influence.37 Galenâs ethical thought is essentially Platonic, the Platonic tripartition of the soul forming its psychological basis.38 Two of his ethical treatises, On Character Traits (Peri ÄthÅn/FÄ« al-akhlÄq), which survives only as an Arabic paraphrase, and On Passions and Errors of the Soul (Peri diagnÅseÅs kai therapeias tÅn en tÄ hekastou psukhÄ idiÅn pathÅn/MaqÄla fÄ« taÊ¿arruf al-insÄn Ê¿uyÅ«b nafsihi), had a significant impact on Arabic moral philosophy. This is particularly apparent in the Arabic genre of ethical treatises that can be characterized as philosophical therapeutics in the sense that these treatises offer rather practical advice for curing vices and psychical affections.39 On Character Traits, in particular, also influenced the more systematic ethical writings, including, as we will see, Avicennaâs conception of virtue. As for Galenâs general ethical ideal, it seems to waver between the moderation of the Republic and the asceticism of the Phaedo.40 In On Character Traits, he, however, clearly inclines towards the intellectualist ethical ideal.41 In consequence, even though the Platonic notion of virtue in the Republic can be read as compatible with the Aristotelian ideal of moderation, the Arabic Plato and Galen both contributed to the intellectualist ethical ideal adopted by Arabic philosophers.
5 Neoplatonism
The interpretation of Platoâs thought by Plotinus (d. 270â¯CE) and his late ancient followers made an even more significant impact on Arabic philosophy than Plato himself. Once again, the Arabic transmission history of Greek Neoplatonic texts is rather complicated.42 As regards Plotinus, while he was virtually unknown in the Islamic world by name,43 parts of books IVâVI of the Enneads were rendered freely into Arabic in the ninth century resulting in a hypothetical Arabic Plotinus source. All three known Arabic texts conveying Plotinusâ philosophy are derived from this source.44 The longest and most important of these is the Theology of Aristotle (UthÅ«lÅ«jiyÄ Arisá¹Å«á¹ÄlÄ«s), which, moreover, exists as a shorter and a longer recension. While the name of Proclus (d. 485) was more familiar in the Islamic world, many of the Arabic texts transmitting his works were not attributed to him. In particular, among the surviving Arabic texts rendering parts of the Elements of Theology, one of them was attributed to the Aristotelian philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. ca. 200â¯CE) and another, Book of the Pure Good (KitÄb al-Khayr al-maḥá¸), which later acquired fame in the Latin world as the Book of Causes (Liber de Causis), to Aristotle.45 While many further Neoplatonic texts were translated into Arabic, those with distinctly ethical import include the commentaries on the Golden Verses of Pythagoras attributed to Iamblichus (d. ca. 320) and Proclus,46 and, in particular, Porphyryâs commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, which survives in neither Greek nor Arabic.47
For Aristotelians like al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna, their adoption of Neoplatonic ideas was undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that two of the key metaphysical treatises in the Arabic Neoplatonic corpus were attributed to Aristotle, whether they accepted this attribution as authentic or not. The Arabic Plotinus and Proclus had the critical function of complementing Aristotleâs relatively brief genuine discussion of philosophical theology in terms of the First Cause of motion in the cosmos, in book XII of the Metaphysics, with the Neoplatonic emanationist account of the gradual downwards progression of being from the first principle.48 Even if the Arabic treatises conveying the thought of Plotinus and Proclus, for the most part, are not devoted to ethics, the cosmological ideas of descent and reascent of existence and the origin of the human soul in the intelligible world are, nevertheless, of utmost importance for Arabic philosophical ethics. This is because they provide the ontological grounds for identifying the human ethical end with intellection in the sense that it is identified with the soulâs ascent towards purely intellectual existence. Moreover, along with the Platonic corpus, Neoplatonism contributes to a philosophical eschatology of the human soulâs eternal contemplative bliss.49 All of this provides a further argument for an intellectualist interpretation of happiness.
As for the more specific ethical stances conveyed by Arabic Neoplatonic sources, the Arabic Plotinus seems to be of prime importance. Plotinus devoted treatises of their own to virtue (Enneads, I.2) and happiness (Enneads, I.4). In the latter, his position is that since the âtrue selfâ of the human being is the intellect, happiness should consist of the life of the intellect, while moral virtue and the Aristotelian external goods are of no intrinsic value.50 The treatise is not included among the Arabic Plotinian texts, but the intellectualist ethical stance comes through also in the Theology of Aristotle. If Plotinian metaphysics and psychology are hardly ethically neutral in themselves, the anonymous Arabic redactor inserts ethical interpolations of his own.51 Thus, he explicitly identifies intellectual activity with virtue and nobility and the sensory realm with vice and baseness. As for the former treatise, it develops a distinction between the âpoliticalâ (politikai) and âpurificatoryâ (kathartikai) grades of virtue, corresponding to the ideas of virtue as moderation in Platoâs Republic versus virtue as the soulâs freedom from bodily affections in the Phaedo. Plotinusâ followers developed further the idea of an ethical progression proceeding through increasingly intellectualist grades of virtue.52 Although it unclear what the precise Arabic sources for conveying this idea are, al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs ethical thought can be read in a way that comes close to the Neoplatonic ideal of grades of virtue.53 The Neoplatonic sources also convey a second kind of distinction, concerning the status of ethics in general, between pre-philosophical ethics, consisting of moral education that dispenses with rigorous philosophical arguments, and philosophical ethics founded on theoretical knowledge. Druart has argued that this distinction is essential for understanding the ethical thought of many Arabic philosophers, starting from al-KindÄ«.54
In sum, the Arabic mixture and transmission history of Greek ethical ideas is a highly complicated one. Thus, even if it is true that Arabic philosophical ethics depends on classical sources, it is not derivative of them in any simple way. It is rather as if the Arabic philosophers had a rich menu of ethical texts of Greek provenance at their disposal from which they, in most cases, picked in a rather eclectic manner. As regards the general ethical ideal conveyed by the main classical components of Arabic philosophical ethics, all of them contributed to the intellectualist reading of the human end to different extents. At the same time, they contain a tension between two distinct ethical ideals: one of moderation, represented by Platoâs Republic and Aristotleâs Nicomachean Ethics, and another that is more intellectualist, represented by the Phaedo and Neoplatonism. In this book, I will argue that this tension is both present and ultimately resolved in the ethical thought of al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna.
6 Conception of Ethics
Before proceeding to the study of the ethical thought of al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna, it is worthwhile to see how they conceive the nature and aims of ethics. Arabic philosophers adopted from late antiquity a curricular scheme of philosophy where theoretical philosophy was divided into 1) logic, 2) physics, and 3) metaphysics, between which the mathematical quadrivium occupied variant positions.55 In the Arabic curricular order, practical philosophy followed all parts of theoretical philosophy and thus concluded the study of philosophy. In its classical Aristotelian division, practical philosophy was divided further into 1) ethics, 2) economics, and 3) politics. The very first Muslim philosopher, al-KindÄ«, in On the Quantity of Aristotleâs Books (FÄ« kammiyyat kutub Arisá¹Å«á¹ÄlÄ«s), justifies the final position of practical philosophy by the grounds that practical philosophy, which serves the practical end of becoming virtuous, represents the âfruitâ (thamara) of the theoretical sciences.56 This is apparently the case in the sense that knowledge about virtue should in some sense be grounded in theoretical knowledge. Both al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna share this general view about the position of practical philosophy as the crowning part of the philosophical curriculum.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ« presents his most complete account of the contents and order of the philosophical sciences in his curricular works, in particular, the Enumeration of Sciences (IḥṣÄʾ al-Ê¿ulÅ«m), but also in the first section of the Attainment of Happiness (KitÄb Taḥṣīl al-saÊ¿Äda).57 In these treatises, the final part of philosophy is called the âpolitical scienceâ (al-Ê¿ilm al-madanÄ«) in the former and the âhuman scienceâ (al-Ê¿ilm al-insÄnÄ«) or political science in the latter.58 This science differs from all parts of theoretical philosophy in that it is concerned with human voluntary (irÄdÄ«) acts, dispositions, and ends,59 as opposed to the existents that are independent of human volition. Thus, political science, in general, investigates 1) happiness as the end of human actions, 2) virtues and vices, and 3) the political means by which 1) and 2) are realized.60 In all this, happiness forms the central concept: it is the ultimate end for virtuous actions and dispositions on the one hand and virtuous political or religious governance on the other. Al-FÄrÄbÄ« does not, then, distinguish between ethics and political philosophy as clearly distinct sciences but both of them instead constitute a single âhuman science.â Accordingly, al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs view of philosophical ethics is highly political and, thus, agrees with the political context in which Aristotle situates ethics at the end of the Nicomachean Ethics (1179a33â1181b23).61 Nevertheless, al-FÄrÄbÄ« explicitly distinguishes between an ethical and political part of the human science. The aim of the former is to 1) define happiness, 2) differentiate between true and presumed happiness, and 3) determine the voluntary actions and character traits that lead to happiness. The aim of the latter is to investigate the ideal polities that best realize happiness and virtue.62
In his curricular treatise, Parts of the Intellectual Sciences, Avicenna, first, makes a primary distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy.63 The aim of the former is to gain âcertain beliefsâ (al-iÊ¿tiqÄd al-yaqÄ«nÄ«) concerning the existents that are independent of human actions, whereas the aim of the latter is to attain âsound opinionsâ (á¹£iḥḥat raʾy) about things related to human actions for the end of performing good actions. Following the classical tripartition, Avicenna then divides practical philosophy into ethics, economics, and political philosophy based on whether they operate at the level of an individual, a household, or a political association, respectively.64 Finally, he defines ethics, in particular, as knowledge concerning the character traits (akhlÄq) and actions that lead to happiness in this life and the next, where Aristotleâs Ethics constitutes the authoritative work. In sum, al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna share a conception of philosophical ethics that may be characterized as eudaimonist, meaning that the central concern of ethics is happiness and its attainment.
Despite the clear distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy at a curricular level, for both authors, ethics is also intimately related to theoretical philosophy. In the Attainment of Happiness, al-FÄrÄbÄ« presents the curriculum of sciences as a gradual progression where one science leads to another. In particular, theoretical knowledge about the psychical and intellectual principles culminates in the question of the ultimate end of the human being,65 introduced as a theoretical question preceding political philosophy. Druart has argued that for al-FÄrÄbÄ«, ethics consists of a theoretical and practical part, where the former, contra Aristotle, is a demonstrative science with a metaphysical basis.66 Despite his presentation of practical philosophy as separate from theoretical philosophy, Avicenna in the Parts of the Intellectual Sciences, nevertheless, includes knowledge about the afterlife (maÊ¿Äd), also dealing with the nature of worldly and otherworldly happiness, among the applied parts (furÅ«Ê¿) of the metaphysical science.67 Ethics proper is, then, apparently restricted to an inquiry concerning the means for attaining happiness.
This theoretically based conception of ethics manifests itself in practice in that both authors often address ethical themes in non-ethical contexts, while neither author composed a major ethical treatise. Consequently, the primary sources of this study are composed of a rather diverse collection of writings. For al-FÄrÄbÄ«, who elevates the concept of happiness to a central position in his philosophy, this includes many of his most well-known philosophical works. Among these, only the short treatise of Exhortation to the Way to Happiness is a primarily ethical work, while the Selected Aphorisms (Fuṣūl muntazaÊ¿a) also contains explicitly ethical sections. Besides these, he addresses ethical themes in the trilogy of works consisting of the Attainment of Happiness, the Philosophy of Plato, and the Philosophy of Aristotle, where the first is devoted mainly to political philosophy and the last two to an exposition of the thought of the two classical authorities.68 Finally, al-FÄrÄbÄ« discusses happiness and virtue in both theoretical and political contexts in many other works. These include, in particular, On the Principles of the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City (FÄ« mabÄdiʾ ÄrÄʾ ahl al-madÄ«na al-fÄá¸ila), Political Governance (al-SiyÄsa al-madaniyya), and the Book of Religion (KitÄb al-Milla).
Avicenna has a reputation for having neglected ethics, and it is true that his ethical contributions are disappointingly meager when compared with those he made to other areas of philosophy.69 Despite this, he does discuss ethical themes in many works. He situates his main discussions of happiness, in the context of the afterlife, at the end of the metaphysical parts of his two major compendiums, the Healing (al-ShifÄʾ) and the Pointers and Reminders (al-IshÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt). The corresponding section of the Beginning and Return (al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maÊ¿Äd) also addresses happiness and pleasure in a more concise form. Beyond this, he also discusses ethical subjects in various other sections of the compendiums: value concepts in the metaphysical parts, virtue in both the metaphysical and psychological parts, and the epistemological status of moral propositions in the logical parts. Besides the compendic works, Avicenna wrote a series of shorter treatises addressing ethical subjects. These include the three treatises, the Piety and Sin (RisÄlat al-Birr wa-l-ithm), the Science of Ethics (RisÄla fÄ« Ê¿ilm al-akhlÄq), and the Covenant (RisÄla fÄ« al-Ê¿ahd), that possibly have their origin in a more extensive book on practical philosophy that is now lost.70 Many other epistles, such as the Treatise on Love (RisÄla fÄ« al-Ê¿ishq) and the Epistle of the Present (RisÄla fÄ« al-tuḥfa), also complement the picture of his ethical views, while the Treatise of Immolation on the Afterlife (al-RisÄla al-aá¸á¸¥awiyya fÄ« al-maÊ¿Äd) is important for the eschatological aspect of happiness. As a result, for both al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna, their ethical discussions are fragmented in a great number of works and even different sections of a single work. It is the aim of this study to reconstruct their ethical theories from this diverse collection of sources.
In this book, I will employ the term âArabic philosophyâ as shorthand for the philosophical tradition of the Islamic world that was primarily conveyed in Arabic. Thus, it is, in particular, not a reference to the ethnicity of the philosophersâneither al-FÄrÄbÄ« nor Avicenna was an Arab but al-FÄrÄbÄ« was probably of either Turkish or Persian origin (see Rudolph, âAl-FÄrÄbÄ«,â 536â541) and Avicenna was Persian. The term is perhaps particularly pertinent to the early period with which this book is concerned since Arabic remained at this time the exclusive language of philosophy in the Islamic world, even if Avicenna also composed one of his major works in Persian. While Arabic retained its status as the primary language of philosophy until the contemporary period, after Avicenna, Persian became gradually more prevalent, as did later Turkish, Urdu, and other languages.
For overviews of kalÄm ethical theories, see Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics; Shihadeh, âTheories of Ethical Value in KalÄm.â For important recent contributions to theological ethics, see, for example, Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ«; Vasalou, Ibn Taymiyyaâs Theological Ethics.
See, for example, Goodman, âThe Epicurean Ethic of Muḥammad Ibn Zakariyâʾ ar-Râzîâ; Druart, âAl-Kindiâs Ethicsâ; Idem, âThe Ethics of al-Raziâ; Adamson, Al-KindÄ«, 144â159; Idem, âHealth in Arabic Ethical Works.â
For overviews of ethical thought in the Islamic world, see Gutas, âEthische Schriften im Islamâ; Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam; Adamson, âThe Arabic Traditionâ; Idem, âEthics in Philosophy.â As for studies on the ethics of al-FÄrÄbÄ« and Avicenna, see Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 78â92; Druart, âAl-Farabi on the Practical and Speculative Aspects of Ethicsâ; Idem, âAl-FÄrÄbÄ«, Ethics, and First Intelligiblesâ; McGinnis, Avicenna, 209â226.
For the translation movement in general, see Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture; Idem, âThe Rebirth of Philosophy and the Translations into Arabic.â
For the employment of classical sources in Arabic philosophical ethics in general, see, for example, Druart, âLa philosophie morale arabeâ; Adamson, âThe Arabic Traditionâ; Idem, âEthics in Philosophy.â
For an Arabic ethical treatise mixing Plato and Aristotle, attributed to a certain Nicolaus, see Lyons, âA Greek Ethical Treatise.â For the combination of classical influences in Miskawayh, see Walzer, Greek into Arabic, 220â235; Endress, âAncient Ethical Traditions.â
The Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia, in contrast, were either not translated into Arabic or their influence was minimal. For bibliographical knowledge in Arabic sources about these two works, see Badawiâs introduction in Arisá¹Å«á¹Älis, KitÄb al-AkhlÄq, 12â17.
See Ullmann, Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Ãbersetzung; Akasoy, âThe Arabic and Islamic Reception of the Nicomachean Ethicsâ; Ramón-Guerrero, âRecepción de la Ãtica Nicomaquea en el mundo árabe.â
The most recent edition of the manuscript is Arisá¹Å«á¹Älis, The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics by Akasoy and Fidora in 2005. The text should be used taking into account the corrections in Ullmann, Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Ãbersetzung. For the Fez manuscript, see also Arberry, âThe Nicomachean Ethics in Arabicâ; Dunlop, âThe Nicomachean Ethics in Arabic, Books IâVI.â Ibn al-NadÄ«m, KitÄb al-Fihrist, 252, mentions the translation and attributes it to IsḥÄq Ibn Ḥunayn (d. 910/1). For the more eclectic ethical treatise also contained in the manuscript, see Lyons, âA Greek Ethical Treatise.â
Ullmann, Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Ãbersetzung, vol. 2, 15â19.
Ibid, vol. 2, 72â122. The Arabic version has survived only in the form of fragments. The Latin text has been edited in Woerther, La Summa Alexandrinorum.
Ullmann, Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Ãbersetzung, vol. 2, 67â71. Ullmann believes the seventh book to have already formed part of the Greek manuscript translated by Usá¹Äth.
See Wakelnig, âNeoplatonic Developments,â 267.
Ullmann, Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Ãbersetzung, vol. 1, 11; Ramón-Guerrero, âRecepción de la Ãtica Nicomaquea en el mundo árabe,â 319.
Ibn al-NadÄ«m, KitÄb al-Fihrist, 252, mentions that the translation of the Nicomachean Ethics is accompanied by Porphyryâs commentary in twelve books. It is not clear whether there were twelve books in the Arabic translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, Porphyryâs commentary, or both of them combined. The last alternative would agree with the surviving Arabic translation of the Nicomachean Ethics in eleven books. In addition, the passage mentions a commentary by Themistius (d. ca. 388â¯CE).
Al-KindÄ«, âFÄ« kammiyyat kutub Arisá¹Å«á¹ÄlÄ«s,â 369. Moreover, al-KindÄ« states that the work consists of eleven books.
Druart, âAl-Kindiâs Ethics,â 334â335; Adamson, Al-KindÄ«, 145â146.
Ibn al-NadÄ«m, KitÄb al-Fihrist, 263, states that al-FÄrÄbÄ« wrote a commentary on âa part of Aristotleâs Ethicsâ (tafsÄ«r qiá¹Ê¿a min KitÄb al-AkhlÄq li-Arisá¹ÄlÄ«s), which implies that he did not necessarily possess the entire work.
See the analysis of the relationship between the two works in Malletâs introduction and footnotes of al-FÄrÄbÄ«, âLe rappel de la voie à suivre pour parvenir au bonheur.â
See Urvoy, Traité dââ¯Ã©thique dââ¯Abû Zakariyyâ Yahyâ Ibn Ê¿Adi, 21â23.
Avicenna, âAqsÄm al-Ê¿ulÅ«m al-Ê¿aqliyya,â 107.
For examples, see Pohl, âDie aristotelische Ethik im KitÄb al-SaÊ¿Äda wa-l-isÊ¿Äd,â 209â213.
See Dunlopâs introduction in Arisá¹Å«á¹Älis, The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, 28â31.
The Latin translation of the commentary on the tenth book has been edited in Averroes, Le plaisir, le bonheur, et lââ¯acquisition des vertus.
For the tension in Aristotleâs ethical ideal, see, for example, Nagel, âAristotle on Eudaimoniaâ; Cooper, âContemplation and Happinessâ; Dahl, âContemplation and Eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics.â
See Rosenthal, âOn the Knowledge of Platoâs Philosophy in the Islamic Worldâ; Idem, âOn the Knowledge of Platoâs Philosophy in the Islamic World: Addendaâ; Walzer, âPlatonism in Islamic Philosophyâ; Klein-Franke, âZur Ãberlieferung der platonischen Schriften im Islamâ; Gutas, âPlaton: Tradition arabe.â
Gutas, âPlaton: Tradition arabe,â 862â863. A non-literary channel of transmission for Platonism through the Sabians of ḤarrÄn has also been suggested. For a refutation of this thesis, see De Smet, âLe Platon arabe et les Sabéensâ; Idem, âLââ¯héritage de Platon et de Pythagore.â
For Arabic citations of passages in the Republic, suggesting the possibility of a complete Arabic translation, see Baffioni, âFrammenti e testimonianze platoniche nelle RasÄʾil degli IkhwÄn al-á¹¢afÄʾâ; Reisman, âPlatoâs Republic in Arabic.â
See Gutas, âPlaton: Tradition arabe,â 851â861, for a summary of Arabic knowledge about each of the dialogues.
The dialogues in the order that they are mentioned by al-FÄrÄbÄ« are Alcibiades I, Theaetetus, Philebus, Protagoras, Meno, Euthyphro, Cratylus, Ion, Gorgias, Sophist, Parmenides, Alcibiades II, Hipparchus, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Symposium, Theages, Lovers, Charmides, Laches, Phaedrus, Crito, Apology of Socrates, Statesman?, Phaedo, Republic, Timaeus, Laws, Critias, Epinomis, Menexenus, and Letters.
For an incomplete list of such authors, see Walzer, Greek into Arabic, 222.
See Adamson, Al-KindÄ«, 146â149.
For Arabic knowledge about the Phaedo, see al-Ê¿ÄmirÄ«, A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul and its Fate, 29â42; Biesterfeldt, âPhaedo arabusâ; Gutas, âPlaton: Tradition arabe,â 854â855. For the essentially Platonic context of al-KindÄ«âs ascetically inclined ethical ideal, see the overview of al-KindÄ«âs ethics in Adamson, Al-KindÄ«, 144â159.
For al-Ê¿ÄmirÄ«âs employment of the Phaedoâs eschatological myth in al-Amad Ê¿alÄ al-abad (chs. XVIâXVIII), see Rowsonâs introduction (30) and commentary (304â314) in al-Ê¿ÄmirÄ«, A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul and its Fate.
For Arabic testimonies about the work, which suggest the existence of an Arabic paraphrase or a partial translation, see, however, Pines, âAristotleâs Politics in Arabic Philosophy.â
See Strohmaier, âDie Ethik Galens und ihre Rezeption in der Welt des Islams.â
For Galenâs philosophical context, see, for example, Chiaradonna, âGalen and Middle Platonismâ and Singerâs introduction in Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, 18â42. For his ethics, see Walzer, âNew Light on Galenâs Moral Philosophyâ; Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, 109â134.
For this genre and its Galenic background, see Druart, âLa philosophie morale arabeâ; Strohmaier, âDie Ethik Galens und ihre Rezeption in der Welt des Islamsâ; Adamson, âHealth in Arabic Ethical Works.â Druart (183) distinguishes between 1) popular and 2) systematic ethics, placing al-KindÄ« and al-RÄzÄ«âs (d. 925) Spiritual Medicine (KitÄb al-Ṭibb al-rūḥÄnÄ«) in the first category and al-RÄzÄ«âs Philosophical Life (KitÄb al-SÄ«rÄ al-falsafiyya) and al-FÄrÄbÄ« in the second. Moreover, she identifies the former as Hellenistic emphasizing Galenâs influence, in particular. Adamson, âEthics in Philosophy,â 110â112, situates the ethical writings of al-KindÄ«, al-BalkhÄ« (d. 934), and al-RÄzÄ« in the Galenic strand.
For the assessment that Galen does not take a clear stand between metriopatheia and apatheia, see Donini, âPsychology,â 194; Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, 22.
The relevant passage is cited in chapter 8.
See DâAncona, âGreek into Arabic.â
For Plotinusâ anonymous yet highly influential status in the Islamic world, see Rosenthal, âPlotinus in Islam.â While a few references to Plotinus have been traced in Arabic texts, none of these attribute any of the works conveying his thought in Arabic to Plotinus.
Most of the Arabic Plotinian texts are edited in BadawÄ«, AflÅ«á¹Ä«n Ê¿inda al-Ê¿arab. Their English translations appear in the 1959 edition of the Enneads by Henry and Schwyzer as organized alongside the corresponding Greek passages. For the Arabic Plotinus in general, see, in particular, Aouad, âLa Théologie dââ¯Aristote et autres textes du Plotinus Arabusâ; Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus, 5â26. As regards the three Plotinus sources, for the Epistle on Divine Science (RisÄla fÄ« al-Ê¿ilm al-ilÄhÄ«), falsely attributed to al-FÄrÄbÄ«, see Aouad, âLa Théologie dââ¯Aristote et autres textes du Plotinus Arabus,â 571â574; for the sayings attributed to the âGreek Sageâ (al-shaykh al-yÅ«nÄnÄ«), see Rosenthal, âAsh-Shaykh al-YÅ«nÄnÄ« and the Arabic Plotinus Sourceâ; Aouad, âLa Théologie dââ¯Aristote et autres textes du Plotinus Arabus,â 579â580; for the Theology of Aristotle, see Aouad, 544â570; Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus; DâAncona, âThe Theology Attributed to Aristotle.â
For the Arabic transmission of Proclus, see, in particular, Endress, Proclus Arabus; Idem, âProclus de Lycieâ; Wakelnig, âProclus, Arabic.â
The two treatises have been edited in Iamblichus, Neuplatonische Pythagorica in arabischem Gewande; Ibn al-Ṭayyib, Proclusâ Commentary on the Pythagorean Golden Verses.
For this commentary, see Ullmann, Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Ãbersetzung, vol. 2, 63â66; Hugonnard-Roche, âPorphyre de Tyr: Commentaire sur lââ¯Ãthique.â For citations preserved in the Happiness and Its Attainment, see Ghorab, âGreek Commentators on Aristotle.â
In al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs case, for the impact of Aristotelian metaphysics on the one hand and Neoplatonic emanationism on the other, see Druart, âAl-Farabi and Emanationismâ; Idem, âAl-FÄrÄbÄ«, Emanation, and Metaphysicsâ; Reisman, âAl-FÄrÄbÄ« and the Philosophical Curriculum,â 56â60.
See, for example, chapters XIVâXVIII of al-Ê¿ÄmirÄ«âs al-Amad Ê¿alÄ al-abad, and Rowsonâs commentary on these chapters (295â314), on the human soulâs immortality, position between the sensible and intelligible worlds, and contemplative afterlife, which draw both on the Arabic Phaedo source and the Arabic Plotinus and Proclus.
For Plotinusâ treatise on happiness, see, in particular, Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, 139â152.
Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus, 49â75.
Dillon, âMetriopatheia and Apatheiaâ; Idem, âPlotinus, Philo and Origen on the Grades of Virtueâ; OâMeara, Platonopolis, 40â49; Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 337â344; Baltzly, âPathways to Purification.â
Mattila, âThe Ethical Progression of the Philosopher in al-RÄzÄ« and al-FÄrÄbÄ«.â
Druart, âAl-Kindiâs Ethicsâ; Idem, âAl-Razi (Rhazes) and Normative Ethicsâ; Idem, âAl-Farabi on the Practical and Speculative Aspects of Ethicsâ; Idem, âLa philosophie morale arabeâ; Idem, âAl-FÄrÄbÄ«, Ethics, and First Intelligiblesâ; Idem, âThe Ethics of al-Razi.â
For the late ancient curriculum of philosophy and its Arabic adoption, see Gutas, âPaul the Persian on the Classification of the Parts of Aristotleâs Philosophyâ; Idem, âThe Cycle of Knowledgeâ; Hein, Definition und Einteilung der Philosophie; Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy.
Al-KindÄ«, âFÄ« kammiyyat kutub Arisá¹Å«á¹ÄlÄ«s,â 369, 384.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, KitÄb Taḥṣīl al-saÊ¿Äda, §§â¯9â20, 55â64.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, IḥṣÄʾ al-Ê¿ulÅ«m, V, 64â69; Idem, KitÄb Taḥṣīl al-saÊ¿Äda, §§â¯19â20, 63â64. In the former treatise, practical philosophy is followed by the Islamic sciences of jurisprudence (fiqh) and rational theology (kalÄm), for which al-FÄrÄbÄ« accords the essentially political function of virtuous legislation and dialectical defense of the beliefs and laws in the virtuous community.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, IḥṣÄʾ al-Ê¿ulÅ«m, V, 64.
Ibid, 64â65.
For al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs political reading of Aristotelian ethics, see Neria, âAl-FÄrÄbÄ«âs Lost Commentary on the Ethics,â 72â75.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, IḥṣÄʾ al-Ê¿ulÅ«m, V, 67.
Avicenna, âAqsÄm al-Ê¿ulÅ«m al-Ê¿aqliyya,â 105.
Ibid, 107. Interestingly, Avicenna also wrote a treatise on economics, that is, household management (tadbÄ«r al-manzil), translated in McGinnis and Reisman, Classical Arabic Philosophy, 224â237.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, KitÄb Taḥṣīl al-saÊ¿Äda, §§â¯15â16, 60â62.
Druart, âAl-Farabi on the Practical and Speculative Aspects of Ethicsâ; Idem, âAl-FÄrÄbÄ«, Ethics, and First Intelligibles.â
Avicenna, âAqsÄm al-Ê¿ulÅ«m al-Ê¿aqliyya,â 114â116. Thus, the question of happiness pertains to the last section of metaphysics, which Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 288â296, has called the âmetaphysics of the rational soul.â
Reisman, âAl-FÄrÄbÄ« and the Philosophical Curriculum,â 54, calls these three works the âhistorical and educational ethics trilogy.â
Kaya, âProphetic Legislationâ reiterates the view of Avicennaâs neglect of practical philosophy and suggests that the reason for this is that for Avicenna, Islamic law occupied the position of philosophical ethics.
See Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 94â96.