In the aftermath of New Historicism and Cultural Materialism, the field of Shakespeare Studies has been increasingly overrun by post-theoretical, phenomenological claims. Many of the critical tendencies that hold the field todayâpost-humanism, speculative realism, ecocriticism, historical phenomenology, new materialism, performance studies, animal studies, affect studiesâare consciously or unwittingly informed by phenomenological assumptions. This book aims at uncovering and examining these claims, not only to assess their philosophical congruency but also to determine their hermeneutic relevance when applied to Shakespeare. More specifically, Unphenomenal Shakespeare deploys resources of speculative critique to resist the moralistic and aestheticist phenomenalization of the Shakespeare playtexts across a variety of schools and scholars, a tendency best epitomized in Bruce Smithâs Phenomenal Shakespeare (2010).
1ââThe Unphenomenal âThis Nothingâs More than Matterâ
2âThe Spectre of the Cartesian Subject
3âMisrepresentations Shakespeare and the Phenomenologists
4âWhat Phenomenology? Kant to Levinas
5âSpontaneous Me
6âThe Harm That Good Men and Women Do
7âAffective styles
8âA Pastoral Philosophy
9âWhat Matters in Shakespeare?
10âUndialing the Dialectic
11âThe Maladies of Abstinence No More Cakes and Ale
12âThe Naturalization of Reason Who Is Afraid of Ferdinand Derrida?
13âDoing Shakespeare To the Things Themselves
14âReading Shakespeare Is There a Text in This Play?
15âIf Caliban Is a Chimpanzee and Other Posthumanist Conditions
16âThe Aesthetic Ideology
17âThe Aesthetic Fallacy
18âThe Fallacy of Representation
19âThe Fallacy of Immediacy
20âThe Fallacy of Presentism
Bibliographical References
Index
The finished publication could be bought by University libraries, scholars, academics, and funded researchers: that is its primary and only market. The bookâs international appeal is restricted to the English-speaking academic world. The relevant fields are English, Comparative Literature, Literary Theory, and Philosophy.