Hegelâs Science of Logic is widely acknowledged as one of the greatest works of European philosophy. However, its contribution to arguably the most important philosophical problem, Pyrrhonian scepticism, has never been examined in any detail. Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel's Theory of Judgement fills a great lacuna in Hegel scholarship by convincingly proving that the dialectic of the judgement in Hegelâs Science of Logic successfully refutes this kind of scepticism. Although Ioannis Trisokkas has written the book primarily for those students of philosophy who already have an interest in Hegelâs epistemology and philosophy of language and/or his Science of Logic, it will also appeal to those who investigate the problem of scepticism independently of the Hegel corpus.
Ioannis Trisokkas, Ph.D. (2009), University of Warwick, taught Philosophy for many years at Warwick and Sheffield. He was an Early Career Fellow at the Warwick Institute of Advanced Study and a DAAD Junior Research Fellow at the Eberhard-Karls Universität Tübingen.
All interested in Hegel's epistemology, philosophy of language and metaphysics and/or his Science of Logic, and anyone concerned with Pyrrhonian scepticism.