This article responds to Hans Kippenberg's, Willem Drees's, and Ann Taves's commentaries on my book, The Problem of Disenchantment. It presents an overview of the key arguments of the book, clarifies its use of Problemgeschichte to reconceptualize Weber's notion of disenchantment, and discusses issues in the history and philosophy of science and religion. Finally, it elaborates on the use of recent cognitive theory in intellectual history. In particular, it argues that work in event cognition can help us reframe Weber's interpretive sociology and deepen the principle of methodological individualism. This helps us get a better view of what the ‘problems’ of Problemgeschichte really are, how they emerge, and why some of them may reach broader significance.
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Asprem Egil . The Problem of Disenchantment: Scientific Naturalism and Esoteric Discourse, 1900–1939. Leiden: Brill, 2014.
Asprem Egil . “How Schrödinger’s Cat became a Zombie: The Epidemiology of Science-Based Representations in Popular and Religious Contexts.” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, in press.
Drees Willem B. Religion, Science and Naturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
Eddington Arthur . The Nature of the Physical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928.
Elster Jon . “The Case for Methodological Individualism.” Theory and Society 11/4 (1982), 453–482.
Gerth Hans H. , and Wright Mills C. . “Introduction: The Man and His Works.” In idem (trans., eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 3–76. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
Larson Jr., James R. “Evidence for a Self-Serving Bias in the Attribution of Causality.” Journal of Personality 45/4 (1977), 430–441.
McCauley Robert . Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Radvansky Gabriel A. , and Zacks Jeffrey , Event Cognition (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
Schumpeter Joseph . “On the Concept of Social Value.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 23 (1908–1909), 213–232.
Sgarbi Marco , . “Concepts vs. Ideas vs. Problems: Historiographical Strategies in Writing History of Philosophy.” In Pozzo Riccardo , and Sgarbi Marco (eds.), Begriffs-, Ideen-, und Problemgeschichte im 21. Jahrhundert, 69–80. Wiesebaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2011.
Sørensen Jesper , . “Past Minds: Present Historiography and Cognitive Science.” In Martin Luther H. , and Sørensen Jesper (eds.), Past Minds: Studies in Cognitive Historiography, 179–193. London and Oakville: Equinox, 2011.
Taves Ann , and Asprem Egil . “Experience as Event: Event Cognition and the Study of (Religious) Experience.” Religion, Brain, and Behavior (In press).
Tenbruck Friedrick H. “The Problem of Thematic Unity in the Works of Max Weber.” The British Journal of Sociology 31/3 (1980), 316–351.
Weber Max , . Economy and Society. Edited by Roth Guenther , and Wittich Claus , translated by E. Fischoff et al. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
Wilson Deirdre , and Sperber Dan . Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1986.
Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), 350.
Willem B. Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
See especially Asprem, The Problem of Disenchantment, 556–60.
Asprem, The Problem of Disenchantment, 29; quote from Marco Sgarbi, "Concepts vs. Ideas vs. Problems: Historiographical Strategies in Writing History of Philosophy," in Riccardo Pozzo and Marco Sgarbi (eds.), Begriffs-, Ideen-, und Problemgeschichte im 21. Jahrhundert (Wiesebaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2011), 69–80, 76.
Robert McCauley, Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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This article responds to Hans Kippenberg's, Willem Drees's, and Ann Taves's commentaries on my book, The Problem of Disenchantment. It presents an overview of the key arguments of the book, clarifies its use of Problemgeschichte to reconceptualize Weber's notion of disenchantment, and discusses issues in the history and philosophy of science and religion. Finally, it elaborates on the use of recent cognitive theory in intellectual history. In particular, it argues that work in event cognition can help us reframe Weber's interpretive sociology and deepen the principle of methodological individualism. This helps us get a better view of what the ‘problems’ of Problemgeschichte really are, how they emerge, and why some of them may reach broader significance.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 684 | 112 | 15 |
| Full Text Views | 209 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 42 | 2 | 0 |