Kapitel 16 Fichtes Kritik des Reflexionsmodells von Selbstbewusstsein
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Against the background of the criticism that the reflection theory of self-awareness has drawn from the Heidelberg School, a criticism first directed a Fichte, this article addresses the question of how Fichte’s reasoning in his Attempt of a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre relates to the reflection theory of self-awareness. The question is motivated by the observation that Fichte seems to combine explicit criticism of this theory with affirmative adoption of some main features of the same. The article concludes that Fichte succeeds in pointing out an immediate self-awareness, consisting in the self-awareness in thinking, which is, however, not suited for functioning as a first cause of consciousness, and, if forced to function in this way, falls prey to the vicious circle object to the reflection theory.