Do animals count for less?
In: Global food security: ethical and legal challengesSearch for other papers by T. Visak in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Purchase instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Purchase instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
It is broadly accepted that at least some animals disserve our direct moral consideration. However, it is controversial whether they should count as much as human beings do. David DeGrazia has explicitly defended that moral status can come in degrees and that even those animals that deserve our moral consideration might have less moral status than humans do. DeGrazia uses two models for arguing that animals have less moral status: the Unequal Interests Model and the Unequal Consideration Model of Degrees of Moral Status. I take issue with both ways of defending degrees of moral status. I argue that unequal interests should not be conceived as implying unequal moral status. In fact equal consideration of interests can lead to different treatment if interests are different, but then the considered beings do still have equal moral status. Furthermore, I argue that DeGrazia’s defence of unequal consideration is unconvincing. I conclude that DeGrazia failed to establish degrees of moral status and less moral status for animals.
Terms and Conditions | Privacy Statement | Cookie Settings | Accessibility | Legal Notice | Sitemap | Copyright © 2016-2026