Interpretation is one of the fundamental research methods employed in philosophy. However, two basic forms of interpretation are often not clearly distinguished: historical interpretation and systematic interpretation (latter is also called regulative interpretation; see Nowak 1989, pp. 107–110). The aim of historical interpretation is to reconstruct what the author intended to convey at the time the statement was made. This approach typically requires knowledge of the historical and biographical context in which the author lived. By contrast, systematic interpretation assigns meaning to a philosophical expression based on the interpreter’s own questions or problems, which are relevant within the context of his own culture or society. In this case, the historical or biographical context is of secondary importance. As Bogusław Wolniewicz points out, in the second type of interpretation:
We are therefore not concerned with the intentions or motives of the author. What we are faced with are certain theses, the origin of which is irrelevant, as our sole interest lies in the logically necessary consequences of those theses and in their possible justifications. We could put it this way: this type of interpretive inquiry does not aim at the meaning intended by a person, but rather at the ‘intended meaning’ of a system of statements.
WOLNIEWICZ 1968, p. 53
Let us illustrate these two modes of interpretation with the example of a dispute about Plato. According to Popper (1945), the logic of the socio-political system outlined in the Republic necessarily leads to a closed, authoritarian, and totalitarian society. In Popper’s interpretation, Plato is portrayed as a forerunner of modern totalitarianisms (Nazism and Communism). Plato’s defenders, however, have accused Popper of ignoring the biographical and historical context of the Republic. As Bambrough notes, “Plato’s friends rightly remind us not to consider particular measures or institutions without regard to their context. The institutions of the Republic must be understood in connection with the central moral doctrine of the dialogue” (Bambrough 1962, p. 104). For instance, Reale (1996) argues that in ancient philosophy, ethics was closely linked to politics, and that the literary form of the dialogue itself rules out any possibility of coercion in the introduction of the ideal polity. The contrast between these two modes of interpretation is also observed by Bambrough:
The Republic cannot be scheduled as an ancient monument, and preserved only as an object for study by philosophical archaeology. It is a major contribution to a debate that still continues. Ethical, political and philosophical ideas do not go out of date like scientific ideas. A great work of philosophy remains modern in the way that a great work of literature is alive for one generation after another.
BAMBROUGH 1962, p. 101
These two kinds of interpretation may lead to different results, which can in turn become a source of misunderstanding. The texts collected in this volume employ both methods of interpretation. In the first part, (“On Historical Contexts of Philosophy”) the contributors primarily adopt a historical approach and/or focus on historical issues. By contrast, in the second part, (“On the Cultural Context of Philosophy”) the authors engage in systematic interpretation, with a strong emphasis on the cultural and social context in which their own philosophical reflection is embedded.
Given these characteristics, the essays included in this volume are less directly engaged in a discussion of Francesco Coniglione’s theses. Nevertheless, his work remains an implicit reference point, as it inspires the themes addressed across the various domains of his intellectual journey: philosophy of science, the history of Polish analytic philosophy, science and technology studies, ontology, and the cultural and historical context of philosophy. As already noted in the preface to the first volume, a comprehensive account of Francesco Coniglione’s biography and intellectual itinerary is provided in the essay by Borbone and Brzechczyn (“An Unquiet Mind: The Philosophical Journey of Francesco Coniglione”) contained in that volume. For this reason, we will refrain here from elaborating further on this aspect.
Giovanna R. Giardina, in her paper “Desire (Epithymia) in Aristotle’s Biology,” analyzes the function of desire in Aristotle’s biological and philosophical works. Although from an intellectualist perspective desire may appear irrational, it nonetheless plays a crucial role in sustaining the vital functions of living organisms, such as nourishment and reproduction. Marian A. Wesoły, in the paper “The Elements of Aristotle’s Analytics: Three Terms Through One Mediating Diagrammed into Three Syllogistic Figures,” offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s Analytics, based on a reconstruction of the lost syllogistic figures.
In his contribution, “The Reasons for the Delay in Studying the Science of the Humanistic and Renaissance Period by the Italian Philosophical Historiography of the 19th and 20th Centuries,” Ennio De Bellis draws inspiration from an important international conference on Italian positivism held in Catania in September 2007 and organized by Francesco Coniglione (see Coniglione et al. 2008), to examine how 19th- and 20th-century historiography approached Humanistic and Renaissance thought. He highlights how the main reason for the delayed development of Renaissance science studies in Italy lies in the enduring influence of Idealism and the dominant historiographical paradigms developed in Germany.
The next two papers provide a historical contextualization of the figure of Benedetto Croce. In the article “Benedetto Croce: Epistemologist of Complexity,” Giuseppe Giordano argues that the Neapolitan philosopher was not entirely anti-scientific. Rather, Croce criticized the historical form taken by science, namely Positivism and its abstract reductionism – an approach that, in his view, fails to account for the qualitative complexity of reality, particularly the spiritual dimension of human life.
Claudio Tuozzolo, in his article “Weber’s Ideas in the Young Croce’s ‘Elliptical Comparison,’” compares Max Weber’s concept of ideal types with Croce’s notion of elliptical comparisons. According to the author, Weber developed the concept of ideal types – used in the social sciences – in his 1904 essay “Die ‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis” (The ‘Objectivity’ of Scientific and Social-Political Knowledge), where he also acknowledged Marx’s use of ideal types, thereby implicitly aligning himself with the theorization developed by the Poznań School, to which Coniglione devoted several of his studies (see the aforementioned contribution by Borbone and Brzechczyn). Tuozzolo, however, contends that the idea of “typical concepts” can already be found in Croce’s early works and that, historically, it precedes Weber’s formulation. Croce conceived of types as elliptical comparisons based on a selective abstraction of empirical data grounded in a particular hypothesis. This selection process – what Croce also referred to as abstraction – enabled the formation of ideal types that serve as tools for understanding empirical reality, though they should not be conflated with that reality itself. This distinction was often overlooked by Marx’s critics, who interpreted his laws – such as the theory of value – in a positivist fashion.
The second part of this volume, “On Cultural Contexts of Philosophy,” opens with a paper by Jerzy Marian Brzeziński. In his article “Ethical Context of Conducting Scientific Research in Social Sciences,” Brzeziński identifies three distinct ethical dimensions of scientific activity. In the first, scientists operate as creators; in the second, they act as researchers investigating specific fields; and in the third, they function as employees of state or private universities, competing for grants and resources. Each of these roles presents unique ethical challenges. For instance, in social science disciplines such as psychology, education, or sociology, the subjects of research are living individuals. Consequently, the research must uphold the autonomy, dignity, and safety of participants and must not violate their right to privacy.
In the following paper, Krzysztof Kiedrowski “Leszek Nowak’s Categorial Interpretation of Marxist Dialectics” offers a categorial interpretation of dialectics, which served as the ontological foundation for both the idealizational theory of science and the development of a unitarian metaphysics. Nowak’s reading of Marxian–Engelsian dialectics exemplifies a systematic mode of interpretation. A similar approach is adopted by Diego Fusaro in his contribution, “Greatness and Limits of Leszek Nowak’s Thought,” in which he examines the strengths and weaknesses of Nowak’s social theory, drawing on Francesco Coniglione’s writings on Nowak and the Poznań School of Methodology. In his view, the significance of Nowak’s thought lies in his radicalization of Marx’s method and in his identification of conflicts not only within the economic sphere (i.e., class struggle) but also in the realms of politics and culture. However, Fusaro argues that the limitations of Nowak’s system stem from an insufficient consideration of the philosophical relationship between Hegel and Marx, as well as from the neglect of the crucial Marxian category of praxis.
In the final three papers, the thought of philosophers such as Schelling, Ortega y Gasset, and Dilthey is examined. However, the authors do not interpret these thinkers through their own philosophical frameworks; rather, they situate them within the broader cultural developments of their respective times. For example, Antonio Carrano, in “The Beginning No Less Than the End: on Mythology and History in Schelling,” presents the ideas of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling within the context of the cultural movement known as German Idealism. In particular, the author explores how German conceptions of history, theology, and mythology in the first half of the 19th century shaped Schelling’s thought, aligning with Francesco Coniglione’s thesis on the need to critically reconsider the opposition between logos and myth. Clementina Cantillo investigates the socio-cultural context of philosophy at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. In her article “History, Science, and Thought in the Dynamism of Cultures: the Contribution of Ortega y Gasset,” she analyzes Ortega’s distinction between civilization and barbarism, along with his concepts of cultural greatness and the pluralism of truth. According to Cantillo, Ortega y Gasset’s reflections remain highly relevant in today’s world, especially for their attempt – also supported by Francesco Coniglione – to achieve a genuine “alliance” between philosophy, science, and technology.
Giancarlo Magnano San Lio, in “Forms of Knowledge, Identities, and Cultures,” reflects on the distinction between civilization and culture, a distinction he argues remains significant in mass societies. His starting-point is the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, which he interprets through the lens of Horkheimer and Adorno’s critical theory from the Frankfurt School. Unfortunately, the author was not able to revise his essay, as all the other contributors had the opportunity to do during the peer review process, because he passed away during the course of 2024. The editors wish to express their deep sorrow for the loss of a distinguished scholar, who was also a key figure at his university, where he also served as Vice-Rector.
Giacomo Borbone and Krzysztof Brzechczyn
References
Bambrough, R. (1962). Plato’s Modern Friends and Enemies. Philosophy. The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, XXXVII, 140, 97–113.
Coniglione, F., Bentivegna, G., Magnano San Lio, G. (2008). eds., Il positivismo italiano: una questione chiusa?, Atti del Congresso tenutosi a Catania, 11–14 settembre 2007. Acireale-Rome: Bonanno Editore.
Nowak, L. (1989). Remarks on the Christian Model of Man and the Nature of Interpretation. Social Theory and Practice. An International and Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Philosophy, 1(15), 107–117.
Popper, K.R. (1945). The Open Society and its Enemies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Reale, G. (1996). Historia filozofii starożytnej, vol. 2: Platon i Arystoteles [History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. 2: Plato and Aristotle]. Lublin: Wyd. KUL.
Wolniewicz, B. (1968). Rzeczy i fakty. Wstęp do pierwszej filozofii Wittgensteina [Things and Facts. The Introduction to Wittgenstein’s First Philosophy]. Warsaw: PWN.