1 The Place of Ethics in Philosophy
We will here consider both normative ethics (systems of prescriptions and proscriptions) and academic ethics (descriptive analytic studies dealing with at least apparently ethical phenomena). Normative ethics is ethics in the more traditional meaning. This is the domain Aristotle had in mind when he placed ethics under practical philosophy.1 It is worth continuing the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical and practical,2 bringing at least some order to the multiplicity of philosophical domains â but not as any sort of absolute division.
Updating and simplifying Aristotleâs classification, we might characterise the basic sub-divisions of philosophy as follows:
Theoretical philosophy (whose core is gnoseology) deals above all with knowledge. And the chief value here is truth.
Practical philosophy deals with action. And its core value is the good.3
As is well known, Aristotle distinguishes two areas in practical philosophy: ethics and politics (in the narrower sense of the word).4 With certain reservations, we can maintain this division. We must remember that ethics in the traditional sense (normative ethics) possesses a really philosophical character, rather than scientific ethics â whose research methods approach those of the specialist sciences where only the final research results are of major interest to philosophy. As for Aristotleâs âpoliticsâ, on account of the different meaning we attach today to this term, it would seem better to call the field that the Stagirite had in mind âsocial philosophyâ â without forgetting the normative aspects of this field.
The issues of normativity and descriptiveness, and the relationship of ethics to social philosophy have only been touched upon here, and will be discussed in more detail later.
2 Ethics and Morality
Let us now turn to ethics, our main focus, and ask how it differs from social philosophy â both being a part of practical philosophy. Of course, whenever we ask what makes item A different from item B, we do assume some basic similarity. Well, the features that jointly characterize ethics and social philosophy are implied by their both belonging to practical philosophy: they both consider human action and the striving to achieve some good. However, ethics determines or investigates what constitutes a valuable (or purportedly valuable) activity of an individual (secondarily: of a group) â regardless of any inter-individual organization. Social philosophy, on the other hand, considers organizations or institutions arising in the course of the development of relations between the people that make up a community.
Now, when characterizing ethics, we speak about a âvaluable actionâ, but this is an inadequate characterisation â not every action considered valuable has been evaluated from an ethical standpoint. Making yourself some shoes or a coat is undoubtedly a worthwhile activity, but rather in an economic, not an ethical, sense. So, it should be said that ethics investigates (or determines) morally or ethically valuable action. But now this characterization falls into the manifest error of ignotum per ignotum â a circular definition. To avoid these errors, we need to disclose the specific nature of ethical or moral action. In the first place I claim that the concepts of âethicalâ and âmoralâ are not equivalent, though they sometimes appear to be.
We say, for example, an âethical systemâ but not a âmoral systemâ. On the other hand, we say âa moral human beingâ rather than an âethical human beingâ. But both âmoral evaluationâ and âethical evaluationâ are used.
What is the difference between these concepts? Perhaps we will understand better moving from adjectives to nouns: âethicsâ and âmoralityâ.
Ethics (in the traditional sense) is a system of rules and norms, governing valuable5 courses of action. So, it is a logical construction (in a broad sense). This is the meaning when we speak of Stoic Ethics or Medical Ethics, etc.
Morality is the set of attitudes, views and dispositions of an individual or (secondarily) a social group concerning action that is valuable in a certain aspect.6 So, it is a psychological construct. It is in this sense that we speak of The Morality of Mrs Dulska,7 or when we speak about âbourgeois moralityâ, as sociologist Maria Ossowska does.
With these initial characterisations of the nouns in mind, the meaning and proper use of the corresponding adjectives becomes clear.
âEthicalâ in a general (neutral) sense means: âconcerning the system or principles of ethicsâ. For example, an âethical judgmentâ means âan evaluation on the basis of an ethical systemâ. We are not concerned here with whether the judgment is favourable or unfavourable. However, the expression âethicalâ can also be used with the presumption of a positive attitude, for example when we say: âMr Aâs actions were highly unethicalâ. In this case we are not saying that his actions âdid not relate to an ethical systemâ, but that they âwere no in accordance with a (recognised) system of ethicsâ. Here the adjective âethicalâ includes a positive valuation (and âunethicalâ â negative), not neutral as in the previous example.
The situation is analogous with the adjective âmoralâ. In a general (neutral) sense it means âconcerned with the domain of moralityâ. This is the meaning when we speak of a âmoral judgmentâ concerning someoneâs course of action, meaning that this course of action is merely being assessed in terms of a set of views, of an individual or of a group, concerning what is good action. But we need not have decided whether the action was positive or negative. But we sometimes use the concept âmoralâ with the presumption of a positive assessment, for example in the sentence: âMr K followed highly moral motivesâ (meaning in accordance with the morality of the individual or group or social circle that is judging Mr K).
To be precise, we should emphasize that the adjective âmoralâ can also be used in another sense â a non-ethical sense, which we will not be dealing with here. In some expressions, âmoralâ means ânot sensoryâ, even âspeculativeâ. For example, there is sometimes said to be a âmoral discomfortâ as opposed to the âphysical painâ which is nearly always related to the irritation of sense organs. The English sometimes call philosophical or speculative subjects the âmoral sciencesâ. In some expressions, the word âmoralâ means more or less the same as pertaining to the âsubjectâ. This is the meaning when, for example, we speak of âmoral certaintyâ, not based on objective, e.g. mathematical, facts. âMoral responsibilityâ, based on subjective factors that cannot be measured, is opposed to âlegal responsibilityâ which is associated with concrete, defined sanctions.
The distinction between âethicsâ and âmoralityâ (and correspondingly, âethicalâ and âmoralâ) is significant when it represents a distinction between action undertaken on the basis of conviction and action undertaken due to principles or rules. In many cases, however, especially where we are dealing with a basic characterisation, ethical and moral act can exhibit the same detailed features. We will now move on to characterising those features.
3 The Nature of Ethical Action
Let us consider one of the most fundamental epistemological problems in ethics, one that demands solution when we use tentative expressions such as a âcertain valuable course of actionâ. The problem is: What is the specific nature of the ethical or moral value of a course of action?
As we have seen, action may be deemed valuable (âgoodâ) when it brings any material benefit, even a temporary one. For example, someone might say after bandaging an injured leg, or after taking and eating a neighbourâs goose, âThat was worthwhile! That was a good thing to doâ. But were these ethically (or morally) valuable actions (even from the perspective of the actor)?
No. The agent may call them âgoodâ but they would not call them ethical or moral. Neither would they call them unethical or immoral â they may not qualify them as having an ethical dimension at all. So what marks out those âgoodâ actions as ethical? What is specific ethical about actions deemed ethical in a system of ethics?
Not an easy question. The greatest difficulty is to find a characterisation that includes not only action which is positive in a system of ethics â what we can call âethical humanitarianismâ8 â but also actions which may be egocentric (even extremely so) but yet are in accordance with the norms and goals of some ethical system. For example, the acquisition of greater and greater knowledge as part of a program of self-perfection, or â a drastic case â deceiving and murdering in the pursuit of power in Machiavelliâs ethics (sic!).
In order to make a start on this characterisation of ethical action, which must be so broad as to include contradictory conceptions, we need to analyse the structures of ethical systems in general. Every complete system of normative ethics contains: a more or less precise definition of its âhighest goodâ; a hierarchy or values worthy of realisation in virtue of their relation to this highest good; and prescriptions and proscriptions which show the way to realise the âethicalâ goals.
As a case in point, let us take the ethical system of the stoics. The highest good is
Now, let us take a look at an almost opposite system: the maximally egoistic (or egocentric) system of Max Stirner. Here we find another âhighest goodâ: the joy of my own Self. Greater or lesser personal pleasures (changeable pleasures, depending on the moment) represent a hierarchy of ethical values. There are prescriptive commands like: âBe an egoist!â, âDisregard all the delusions of social ethicsâ, âDo not be a slave of any ideaâ, etc. â these are the norms of this ethical system.
So, if ethical conduct â in the objective-relative meaning of the word considered here â is action which consciously9 aims to realise the highest good and the subordinate values of the ethical system by satisfying the behavioural norms, then âethical actionâ (in that system) might be sharing your last piece of bread with a stranger (in a humanitarian ethical system) or, for example, âpushing over one who is fallingâ (in Nietzscheâs system).
The paradoxical use of âthe ethicalâ, relativising it to an ethical system in question, will be further considered later on. For now, to fill out what we have just said about ethical conduct, we can, it seems, put forward the following, briefer characterisation: ethical action (or moral action) aims to bring an important good to a living being. This formulation of the thesis of course requires some clarification and justification.
4 Commentary to the Characterisation
We should above all draw attention to the aspect of intention in the characterisation, marked out by the expression âethical action aims â¦â (more precisely we should say, âthe agent aims â¦â). Unwitting actions, then, do not qualify as ethical (or moral): if someone aims a gun at their friend, being convinced it is unloaded, and fires and kills their friend, this action is not considered unethical here. At most it is foolhardy. The stoics already emphasized the key meaning of intention for ethical conduct, arriving, in this way, at some extreme statements: even action which brings about the unhappiness of many must be considered moral if it is undertaken with good intentions.
This position has frequently met with opposition: Can we really consider conduct which is objectively harmful ethical, because its intention was to bring relief or even joy? Can we, for example â invoking La Fontaineâs famous fable of The Bear and the Gardener â consider the bearâs act of killing the gardener with a stone moral, because the bear only wanted to kill a fly that was sitting on the gardenerâs head, disturbing his sleep?
I do believe we should consider the bearâs conduct as ethical (leaving aside his merciless intention to kill a fly!), because the intention was good. If we feel shocked by this characterisation, that is because we wrongly interpret the bearâs âconductâ as the bearâs âkillingâ. This substitution on our part related to the famous âElectraâ paradox of Eubulides which shows that we cannot substitute coextensive terms at liberty in intensional contexts. Let us recall the most important aspects of this paradox. Electra may say: âI see a veiled figureâ. The veiled figure is her brother Orestes. But Electra cannot say, âI see Orestesâ if she does not recognise him. âTo seeâ here is an intensional term. Though the case involves implication and not substitution of coextensive terms, the case is similar to the Bear and the Gardener. In the sentence âthe bear planned to free the gardener from his discomfort by killing the fly on the gardenerâs forehead with a massive stone slabâ, we cannot just replace the words that follow âplannedâ with âthe death of the gardenerâ, even though the gardenerâs death was the direct result of the bearâs throwing the rock. In extensional logic the truth of q follows from the truth of p â q and the truth of p. But when an intensional functor is directed at p, the analogous inference is not valid. âPlannedâ is just such an intensional term directed at p.
What is this âsignificantâ good in our characterisation? Where is it stated that one good is significant and another not?
In every case, it is the ethical system (of normative ethics) in question which settles the matter, which serves to judge the value of an action. In other words, the concept of âsignificanceâ is not absolute but relativized.
To demonstrate the relativity of this concept, let us consider a drastic (but historically grounded) example. From the perspective of the Holy Inquisitionâs ethics, it was ethical to burn a heretic alive at the stake, because it aids the salvation of their soul â an important good granted to a living being. (Physical death and bodily suffering do not, here, represent an overriding âsignificant goodâ for the being concerned.)
The same conduct (burning a heretic alive at the stake) would have been judged utterly unethical by supporters of Epicurusâ system (indeed by the vast majority of civilised people of a humanitarian disposition). The execution for them was depriving a living being of a significant good, their
The foregoing discussion, together with the example of the Inquisition, leads to certain paradoxical consequences. If an ethical intention is sufficient for an act to be regarded as ethical, then burning the heretics should be considered ethical even from a humanitarian perspective. After all, the Inquisition wanted to make the heretic happy by burning them; they wanted them to reach heaven, a place of eternal happiness, thanks to a process of tortuous purgation here on earth. This is a consequence which is only apparently unacceptable. If the Inquisitor really believed that he would make the heretic happy by delivering them to heaven, to that extent he acted ethically (and even in a humanitarian way â wanting the happiness of another being). But to the extent they intentionally put the heretic through unspeakable agony, they act highly unethically (from this point of view).
We might say: Do we not frequently put our loved ones through lesser pain so they can enjoy lasting joy (for example, putting a child through an operation)? Does the Inquisitor behave in the same way, according to his conscience? Earthly suffering is a triviality in comparison with the âeternal blissâ it makes available.
If we really did accept the Inquisitionâs (religious-)ethical system, we would have to acknowledge their behaviour towards the heretic as ethical â on condition the Inquisitor only acted out of those motives. But we (by âweâ, I mean the overwhelming majority of contemporary, civilised people) have a different attitude: a positive attitude that rejects the superstitions of eternal happiness in heaven in return for terrible suffering on earth, just as we reject the superstitions of eternal suffering in hell as punishment for infidelity here on earth. We consider the deliberate infliction of pain for illusory goals as the opposite extreme to a positive humanitarian ethics.
One might interrupt again: âFor the Inquisitor, that was no superstition. He was fully convinced that he is offering the highest joy for a momentâs suffering.â
If he were convinced that in reality he was sending the heretic to the flames entirely for the purpose of making what he deemed heretics happy, we cannot deny his actions their ethical status. So, why does this conclusion shock â that the Inquisitorâs actions may be deemed ethical? Because we know that it is not true that the Holy Inquisition, burning heretics, was guided exclusively by a sincere love for them â not even a deluded and misguided love. For we know that the real motives for sending people to the flames were completely unethical: the predominant desire was to deter other heretics who might undermine the authority of the Catholic Church. These were power games, sometimes even stooping as low as to act to confiscate property to improve oneâs own wealth â or the wealth of the Holy Inquisition â¦
That is why it is so difficult to accept that the conduct of the Inquisitor might have been ethical. It would be much easier if we believed that they only sent people to their deaths completely convinced that the âvictimsâ would finally be happy. Everything we know about the Inquisition argues against this assumption of burning out of love, even insane love. That is why we shrink from the thought of recognising the Inquisitorâs actions as ethical.
We spoke about a âliving beingâ (more precisely: a being taken to be conscious), and not only about mankind. Some ethical systems also imply that we can act ethically or unethically towards animals, and even towards plants, if we attribute to them a certain primitive level of consciousness, the ability to feel pleasure or pain. Humanitarian ethics condemns cruelty towards animals, and some pan-mystic systems condemn the excessive destruction of plants and minerals. The ancient Hindu perspective based on the principle of tat tvam asi (âThou are thatâ) approaches this attitude.
5 The Relativist Position and the Humanitarian Position
In the objectivist-relativist approach we have adopted until now a course of action is called ethical in accordance with an appropriate ethical system, i.e. with a system that: (a) sets out what the âsignificant goodsâ are â the highest good and the hierarchy of related values and (b) provides the norms of action whose purpose is the realisation of those values.
In this approach:
(
(
(
(
This, frequently paradoxical, objectivist-relativist concept of the ethical is extremely useful in ethological11 research because: (a) as befits a scientific attitude, it does not privilege any particular ethical system in descriptive-analytical contexts; (b) it is very broad and apparently includes all possibly objects of academic ethical research â any acts deemed valuable in any system of ethics.
However, it often happens that we more or less consciously, based on an ethical system like the humanitarian system, call âethicalâ only that action which contributes to increasing the joy of others or reducing their suffering.12 This conception of the ethical does not have a ethological character, a scientific character, but is instead normative and necessarily non-scientific13 â however, it may be closer to the heart of any civilised person.
From the perspective of the âhumanitarian ethicsâ we have been discussing, a characterisation which would be adequate for the ethologist would suffice. For the âhumanitarianâ it is not enough to say that certain behaviour aims to bring an important good to a living being. They would require the following supplementations:
(a) It is of basic significance that we are concerned with granting significant goods to other beings; granting oneself important goods should be a matter of self-improvement;
(b) In bringing a good to some, we should not at the same time do wrong to others;14
(c) There is usually also an aspect of self-sacrifice. âEthicalâ is usually applied to conduct where the agent brings someone a good by denying themselves (lesser or greater) things of value or by overcoming obstacles. That is why no one will consider a kiss from a beloved an ethical action â though it makes another being happy without bringing harm to others (conditions 1 and 2 thereby satisfied), but it is not an act of self-sacrifice or self-denial; on the contrary it brings the agent happiness too.
This is how ethical conduct is on the whole understood in the contemporary civilised world. We may note that though this characterisation of the ethical as it appears in humanitarian ethics may personally suit many researchers (one hopes!) it does not serve for ethological purposes, because it reduces the scope of consideration excluding many cases of action which should be studied as ethics in the context of descriptive-analytic academic study â when we study anything that has ever been deemed ethical by anyone.
6 Ethics and Social Philosophy
Ethics considers the action of the individual apart from any social organisation or institution. Even if there were no society, we could still â at least in certain systems â consider the ethical status of human action, even if it were only towards oneself or towards animals.
Doctrines advocating the self-perfection of mankind as the highest good, the perspective of perfectionism, would also be (self)assessed as ethical. Positive ethical behaviour is human action that attempts to sublimate sensory desires into artistic creativity, while negative ethical conduct would be, for example, getting completely drunk every day and behaving like an âanimalâ (my apologies to the animal kingdom!).
In a similar way, from the perspective of Buddhist ethics (or even from the perspective of a humanitarianism which is more familiar), the conduct of a hunter who kills animals merely to satisfy a killer instinct is highly unethical â even if the hunter was alone in the world. (Let us say our hunter is alone in unchartered territory near the South Pole and he or she pulls out the eyes of each penguin encountered.)
Social philosophy â in contrast to ethics â deals with the activity of individuals and groups in the context of organisation and institutions, the creations of interpersonal relations.
âSocietyâ, the reference point for individual and group action in this perspective, may be the most numerous possible collectivity â the whole of humanity, as conceived of in the cosmopolitan theories of the cynics, stoics, Christians, socialists ⦠But âsocietyâ can also be narrowed down to just two people: there were social relations between Robinson and Friday on Defoeâs otherwise uninhabited island. The institution of slavery is reinstated (the relation of master and slave). A relation between individuals can be called social even when it is the most primitive âinstitutionâ or organisation. It need not be the result of deliberate organising activity, indeed all the basic social institutions (family, language, hunter-gathered groups â¦) emerged spontaneously.
We call good action in the domain of ethics ethical (or moral according to the situation). We often call good action in the domain of social life proper or just, although this last epithet in particular stands out when we think of social action in terms of theories of âtotal egoismâ.
Distinguishing ethics from social philosophy (or better: normativity15 ) only happens at a relatively advanced level of mankindâs civilisational development. At lower levels of this development, the necessary distinctions are lacking: moral value (or ethical value) is identified with social value and greater weight is given to the social perspective â it is easier to understand as it invokes external factors like orders and prohibitions issued by social institutions. There are analogies to what we find in the areas investigated by genetic psychology and the history of philosophy. A child first gets some understanding of its surroundings, only later do they discover their own âIâ. Greek thinkers were first of all âphilosophers of natureâ (the Ionian school), only later did they turn to the study of human nature (with Socrates and the sophists). Focussing attention on âinternalâ, subjective factors and according them key significance requires a certain maturity of thought. That is why social judgements precede ethical judgements in the history of humanity (as reflected in the development of the individual).
7 Ethical and Social Normativity
We call the set of ethical norms (prescriptions, prohibitions) ethical normativity. It should be carefully distinguished from social normativity â a set of norms in social philosophy. The distinction is important partly because the two are often confused. So often it happens that the normative prescriptions and prohibitions of social philosophy are presented as ethical norms!
Before we move on to examples, let us make ourselves aware once again of the differences between ethics and social philosophy.
(Normative) ethics regulates the conduct of human individuals with regard to the acquisition or avoidance of some key âimportantâ value, with the additional condition that this value (or âidealâ where its realisation is pursued) is set regardless of any organisational or institutional connections of individuals. If it were not for human society and its institutions, ethical norms such as âlove every living being and avoid (if at all possible) harmâ would be still be in force. Or others, like: âpursue pleasure ceaselesslyâ, âimprove yourself constantly (by exercising the will, deeper knowledge of the world, etc.)â, etc.
Normative social philosophy provides, as we have already seen, prescriptions and prohibitions for conduct â taking into account society and its institutions. âShow solidarity with the leaders of the working classâ, âdefend your motherland at all costsâ, âdo not degrade the social class you belong to by contact with a member of a pariah groupâ, âincline others, if necessary, by force, to advocating your groupâs political views and to acting according to these viewsâ â these are a sample of the social norms of various systems.
The assumed good of the society16 or a portion of that society is always paramount here. But these social norms may sometimes collide with ethical norms propounded as absolutes by individuals, norms like: âDo not killâ, âDo no lieâ, âDo not force anyone to act against their will or convictionsâ.
It turns out that some courses of action can be deemed proper (socially valuable) and at the same time unethical. Though the maxim âthe ends justify the meansâ has been considered right by some social actors, they often admit that it is not ethical.
Closer analysis reveals that the same norm can sometimes have a social character while in other circumstances an ethical nature. For instance, the principle âHelp those who sufferâ or âBe actively kind towards othersâ. These are social norms when the value espoused in the behaviour recommended is justified as a good for the society; but the same norms are ethical if they are justified by their being conducive to some âsignificant goodâ for a human being, regardless of social expediencies. For example, we might believe that active kindness and help for others enriches in an important respect the character of human beings.
Comparing the social perspective with the ethical shows, as we have already seen, that the second perspective, the ethical, is deeper and more âfundamentalâ. Society, understood as a collection of specific individuals, is a kind of construction and at the same time a kind of abstraction. âSocietal goodâ is only in an indirect way an individualâs good (and certainly not necessarily for all individuals). Besides, societyâs good tends to be understood rather narrowly and âhorizontallyâ as material wellbeing â the absence of poverty or the exploitation of one social group by another. The value of culture (whether intellectual, aesthetic, etc.) to be supported for the sake of society is rarely appreciated. Or whether an act is âjustâ or not (a social value) â abstracting from the agentâs intention: we do not need to inquire too much into the agentâs experience to evaluate whether their conduct has contributed to the realisation of a societal good. This is why the social philosophy of communism condemns âliberalsâ who often have the best of intentions, but whose actions are deemed âsocially hostileâ by communists.
The situation is completely different when it comes to ethics. Here we do indeed need to look deeply into a person, into their intentions. If the intentions are good, the resulting action cannot be regarded as unethical.
Ethics â in contrast to social philosophy â considers the realisation of the good for a specific human being, goodness directly concerning a person. The good here is not, on the whole, understood as âmaterialâ good(s), comfort or economic prosperity but as spiritual goodness: the joy of learning or the experience of beauty, satisfaction from self-discipline or from contributing to another personâs happiness ⦠And this is why the ethical point of view is deeper or âhigherâ â it develops in human history later than society and requires a higher degree of spiritual maturity.
8 Critique of Normative Ethics
Having distinguished ethical from social normativity (and what follows from that â ethics from social philosophy), we can now focus our attention on ethics itself and ask ourselves whether ethics in the normative form we have been considering hitherto is scientific in nature. Put briefly: Is normative ethics science?
On closer inspection, it turns out that normative ethics is not scientific in nature. The following are the main reasons for this conclusion:
(1) Normative ethics is dogmatic: it does not establish its norms in a scientific manner, basing them instead on â revelation, personal feeling, etc. Science, on the other hand, as we shall see shortly, elicits its ânormsâ from empirically (objectively) established relations.
(2) Normative ethics is absolutist: ethical norms are universally and absolutely binding; science does not provide this kind of norm.
Every academic or scientific judgment is relativized: to changing experience (in the empirical sciences) or to varying conventions (in the formal sciences).
We do encounter normative judgments in science (whether technical or practical), but they are always relativized.
Case. The owner of a sick dog enters a vetâs and asks for the animal to be put down. The vet says: âGive it an arsenic pillâ.
This is not an absolute commandment; itâs shorthand for a conditional judgment: âIf you want your dog to pass on (i.e. to cease suffering), please give it the following â¦, etc.â. In general: Science never says: âDo unconditionally and absolutely A, B, C â¦,â instead it says, âIf you want to achieve goal X, proceed as follows ⦠(use such and such means) â¦â
We might ask: On what basis is science able to issue norms â even conditional norms, relativized to a goal? There is no magical rationis normativae analogous to Molièreâs facultas dormitiva. The conditional norms proposed by science are based, simply, on the commonest conditional judgements like âIf p, for which judgments (when we are dealing with empirical sciences) does one claim there is a relationship between cause and effectâ which in intentional human action is a connection between the means and the goal. So, this is the basis for assertive-conditional judgments which are then transformed into conditional-normative judgment of the kind âIf you want to achieve q, do pâ.17
Someone might say: âBut ethics also puts forward conditional-normative judgments. For example, the principles of Christian ethics can be interpreted to mean: If you want to be saved â follow the Ten Commandments and the Churchâs Commandments.
It is easy to note the difference between this âconditionalityâ and the normative conditionality of scientific judgments. The condition here stated (âIf you want to be saved â¦â) is offered with the clear intention to express absolute obligation and its fulfilment. Making it more explicit, the sentence would read as follows: âIf you want to be saved â and you absolutely should want this â follow the Ten Commandments, etc.â
As we see, the conditionality of normative judgments in ethics is only apparent: at the core of these judgments there lies an absolute obligation from the domain of ethics.
The situation is different with science. The requirement of an âabsolute obligation to actâ may be connected to scientific normative judgments but still remains strictly non-scientific. âTo build a bridge of such and such length, use materials of such and such load-bearing capacityâ. Expanding the sentence to expose its âsuppressedâ structure (its conditional structure), the proposition takes the form: âIf you donât want your bridge to collapse, use â¦â, etc. Expanding it more still (to reveal the normativity), the proposition is: âIf you want the bridge you build not to collapse â and you should want this â use â¦â, etc. This formulation reveals the fact that the âshouldâ is not in the domain of science itself but is dictated by social conditions â that we have a social obligation as a bridge builder (or as any other member of society), not to expose other members of society to risks of injury or death.
To be sure that the judgment containing âshouldâ is not an integral part of a scientific judgment, it is enough to recall the facts of cases where engineer-saboteurs deliberately built bridges on poor foundations in occupied countries. They used the same scientific principles (technical rules) but abandoned the normal social duty to achieve a goal that science told them they would achieve â the collapse of the bridge (during the passage of enemy tanks for example).
So, science does not itself contain absolute obligations. Social obligations are, in fact, connected with (conditional) scientific norms, but they remain essentially separate. Scientific norms have an objective value in their practical application, as we have seen, because they are based on objectively (scientifically) confirmed causal relations (in the case of empirical science) or formal relations (in the case of logical-mathematical sciences).
There is, then, a basic difference between scientific judgments and the judgments of normative ethics. Leaving aside the difference in the way the judgments are justified, it is also worth drawing attention to the principle of the absolute obligation (the absolute imperative) governing action in ethics â and the lack of any such principle in science. These principles only appear for science when science is put to use for social or other similar purposes.
We may further ask: Why does science not issue in absolute norms?
The answer is related to the fact that science does not establish the highest values, the values governing action, the ideals to which humanity should aim.
We should also not forget that human beings set themselves chief goals of action, not as a researcher in a scientific enterprise, but as a living being, acting to satisfy their desires. In other words: human needs define the goals and the task of science is: (a) to critically assess the possibilities of achieving these goals; (b) where appropriate to indicate the means of achieving those goals.
Examples: (a) Considering the goal of mystical ethics â to connect with the divine â science can point to the unprovability of the existence of God, and thus to the chimerical nature of mystical ethics. (b) Considering, for example, the goals of âsocialist ethicsâ (respect for the social good, respect for work, solidarity, etc.), science (pedagogy, psychology, sociology) can look for means to achieve this goal â¦
But again: science does not establish goals and it does not issue in absolute norms of action.
It should be noted that although science does not set the highest goals of human action, it can significantly contribute to the realization by man (not as a scientist, but as a willing and acting being) of new goals of action, when, for example, science discovers new phenomena, new sides of reality, new points of view on it.
9 KotarbiÅskiâs Normative Ethics
A supporter of normative ethics (that are absolutely binding) is Tadeusz KotarbiÅski. In a sense,18 he takes a Socratic position: man has a conscience that dictates what is right and what is wrong, and it is this conscience that is the source of absolute moral standards.
However, it seems that what KotarbiÅski includes under âethical normsâ is to a great extent social norms. After all, it is for social â and not purely individual, internal and fundamental â reasons that every person should recognize the standards that KotarbiÅski espouses. Forcing others cannot be what KotarbiÅski deemed ethical; however, he may have deemed it right for the good of society. In other words: the requirement, the obligation to perform certain acts considered ethical, belongs here to the meta-system. It no longer has an ethical character, but a social character.
From the point of view of the theory and practice of social life, solidarity and diligent (urgent) cooperation is required from all people. It is from the point of view of social norms, not ethical, that Prof. KotarbiÅski (as we shall see) requires that a man should not be a coward, that he should be a âtrustworthy guardianâ.19
One cannot â from the position of ethics recognizing the freedom of beliefs and feelings â require them to be thrown away like rags, replacing them with beliefs and feelings of the âregulatorâ. Moreover, it is impossible to recognize such behaviour for psychological reasons: no one can be forced to feel sympathy or love for a person or an idea. You can bring about a significant change in beliefs and feelings only in a free discussion, when your interlocutor has the uninhibited will to accept the idea of it and reject it.
However, forcing people to behave (and not to hold beliefs!) in accordance with the lawgiverâs will is not only possible, it may be effective, because social normativity does not refer to intentions. It would be enough to convince the legislator of oneâs externally correct behaviour to become a member of society.
But let us return to KotarbiÅskiâs defense of normative ethics. KotarbiÅskiâs normative-absolutist position was clearly visible in his polemics against Sartreâs ethical relativism, about which I spoke in a lecture devoted to contemporary French philosophy.20 Sartre21 is mistaken, according to KotarbiÅski. There do exist absolute and universal ethical values: cruelty, fraud and cowardice are everywhere viewed as immoral and have always been. KotarbiÅski says more or less the same thing in the political magazine âPolitykaâ [âPoliticsâ]: âDeterminists and indeterminists, materialists and spiritualists etc. insofar as they think reasonably [emphasis added by Åubnicki], must agree that goodness, bravery and respect for the law deserve recognition while cruelty, cowardice and fraud deserve contemptâ.
What can be said in opposition to KotarbiÅskiâs absolutist ethical view? Perhaps his own gnoseological views, for the eminent philosopher stigmatized the theories of âabsolute valuesâ as hypostasis in the Platonic style.
Indeed, gnoseological critique reveals that ethical values (as well as others: logical, aesthetic, etc.) are the product of thought and experience and human needs â not only physical but also spiritual â and like all human products are not absolutes that rule (this would be the hypostasis that KotarbiÅski himself opposes so strongly). They are changeable and dependent on the era, environment, specific situation and above all on the experiences, aspirations and thoughts of the individual. It is not the value that is a separate entity, one can say following KotarbiÅskiâs reism, but a concrete object with the features to satisfy our needs. These features, âvaluableâ for us, we detach in a naive thought from a specific object, we âidealizeâ (generalize, project above ourselves) and in this way we create hypostases of the absolutes that rule us.
It should be noted that KotarbiÅski himself in some of his statements states the relativism of ethical evaluation: â[â¦] at different times and in different countries, moral judgments are made so differently, the evaluations seem so inconsistent â¦â. âAfter all, conscience is unequal to conscience, its voice changes over the centuries and every country is a custom â¦â.22 How do these claims fit with the absolute ethical normativity developed further in the same work? What is the basis for the claimed consistency â presented a little further on23 â of the judgments of human conscience?
But from the general and fundamental criticism â let us move on to consider the individual âcommon and absoluteâ ethical values quoted by KotarbiÅski in âPolitykaâ. For each of them, it is in fact possible to show a community (or an individual) or a situation in which they were not or are not recognized.
Kindness, such as forgiving your enemy, was considered whining in Rome, by the Germans, Satanist sects, the Nazis, by Nietzsche â¦
Courage in many situations and in our environment is considered evil: for example, when a hooligan throws himself at an armed policeman â¦
âRighteousness is a valueâ â is an analytic judgement, as the notion of righteousness already includes a positive valuation.24 But we were interested in what is deemed righteous. In the morality of some groups, it is a mark of righteousness to report the wrongdoing of a close friend or father to the authorities. Will everyone agree to this?
And the cruelty? The Inquisition used elaborate torture on its enemies âin the name of Godâ, considering this highly just and certainly ethical. These operations were not just about necessary self-defence â for that it would suffice to kill the enemy without inflicting cruel suffering. This was the cruelty of needless and deliberate suffering. And flaying, impaling, breaking on the wheel, tearing by horses â used by military and state authorities during the Thirty Yearsâ War? And still in the eighteenth century, the dismemberment practiced by the âenlightenedâ Empress Catherine the Great: cutting off of hands, legs and then (finally) the head? And in Sparta: throwing handicapped children into the ravine in the mountains of Taygetus? And the Inuit leaving old, infirm tribesmen at abandoned rest stops, condemning them to starvation and death by freezing?
It was all supposed to be highly fair, socially valuable and ethically valuable for the communities discussed (at this level of analysis â as I have already emphasized â social norms are not distinguished from ethical norms).
Even cowardice is usually stigmatized not for ethical reasons (for prioritising exclusively oneâs own safety and related mental state), but for biological and social reasons: cowardice weakens the ability of the group to survive in the struggle of the group to which the coward belongs. Cowardice can also lose its negative evaluation under certain conditions and be considered ⦠nice, or at least funny. For example â an emotional girl who herself is a writer dreams of meeting her favourite writer. But when she rings the doorbell of his apartment and hears footsteps approaching, loses her courage and runs away ⦠Or consider another girl, who on seeing a mouse, jumps on the table ⦠â can this cowardly behaviour be considered unethical or anti-social? Can we finally stigmatize as unethical cowardice of Kordian, who was unable to fulfil his social obligations, or the cowardice of Henri Amiel, who showed us his anxiety with incredible vividness in Fragments dâun journal intime?
âFraud is negativeâ is also an analytical judgment, just as ârighteousness is positiveâ is. One cannot argue about the truth of analytic judgments (unless by undermining the principle of identity). But let us strip this proposition of its âanalyticityâ and say, âcheating is a negative thingâ â and we see at once that this proposition does not hold true in all situations, in all environments, or for all individuals. Deceiving a terminally ill person, assuring him that his condition is not dangerous, is not immoral. The lie of Bishop Myriel (in Les Misérables of Victor Hugo) â declaring that he himself had given the silverware to the galley slave Valjean (who had in fact stolen it) â is considered by many highly ethical. But even cheating for less lofty purposes â cheating enemies for instance â is considered right by many groups and individuals. And Machiavelli, as is known, believed that cheating was a perfectly legitimate means for a monarch to consolidate his power.
This is how the myth of the absolute and universal character of ethical values is dispelled. I would like to emphasize once again that in many of these cases, the assessment is rather of a social than ethical nature â but also that the distinction between ethical and social norms is not everywhere realised.
10 Humanity and Ethical Values
After this ârelativisticâ argument, one can ask the author a âpersonalâ question: âDo you not then recognize that goodness, righteousness and courage are positive, moral qualities, and cruelty, cowardice â negative, immoral features?â
To this, I will answer: I personally consider kindness (as defined in a particular situation) to be a noble quality, but I do not consider it an âabsolute and universal valueâ. The characterisation of a certain human disposition as âgoodnessâ is subjective and depends on the situation in which this purported âgoodnessâ manifests itself. Here is someone âgoodâ, as Mahayana describes it: X sees Y attacking Z with a knife in his hand. Not wanting Y to commit a mortal sin, X intervenes and kills Z immediately. Now Y can no longer commit the crime of murder! And here is a âgoodâ lady who feeds a bird with live flies, so the bird is not hungry ⦠Is the âkindnessâ of the self-sacrificing Mr X, or the compassion of the lady for the bird moral?
Goodness cannot be assessed âabsolutelyâ and abstractly, but relatively and concretely: in a specific situation. But if that is the case, one must not make an absolutist-ethical statement: âgoodness has always and everywhere been considered a moral valueâ and still less: âgoodness must always and everywhere be deemed a moral valueâ.
Certainly, in many cases we will agree with KotarbiÅski that such and such a feature is moral and another immoral â in certain specific situations. However, our assessments will differ in many specific situations. What is more, my own personal assessments from several decades ago are often very different from those of today. And I am not sure whether in a few years or more my assessments will not change again. After all, experience grows (but it also becomes routine â¦); thoughts and feelings become deeper â but also come to terms with the realities of life; aspirations and interests are not fixed â¦
Man forges values in society and the world not as immutable lumps of bronze, but as constantly evolving ideals â products of his own mind and experience. Each person has specific, unique ideals that change even in the course of his own life, including patterns of conduct and their hierarchy of values.
A conscious man is the creator of values and is their constant sculptor. At some point in his life he may adopt a certain ethical outlook (and more than one âethicalâ system can take root in a personâs life, one following the other or even co-existing â it is enough to recall Saul-Paul, Augustine, Pascal, Tolstoy, Papini and so many others). This does mean that he venerates some ideals, and therefore cannot be accused of cynical nihilism â as Sartre was charged by KotarbiÅski. But though the noble man respects his ideals at every stage of his moral development, he should at all times remember that they are not a âpredeterminedâ absolute value to which he, the man, is subordinated, but that he himself has put them to the forefront and that under the influence of new experiences and thoughts he has the right to change them â as a creator of values, not their slave. This is what Sartre meant in his critique of Esprit de sérieux.
[â¦]
11 A Few Words about Ethology
But enough about normative ethics with its absolute values, prescriptions and prohibitions that cannot be justified in the place of science. Researchers contrast this kind of non-scientific ethics with a non-normative, descriptive-analytic subject: ethology.
Ethology does not ask which absolute goal of action should be deemed âethicalâ, nor enquire how to act to make action ethical. It investigates what goals and what action were considered ethically valuable in various groups during various periods. Comparing various systems and ethical practices offers rich material as a basis for formulating philosophical hypotheses. For example, concerning the existence of universally accepted ethical norms. We see from this that ethology is not an isolated science, but one with closely ties to psychology, sociology, ethnology, etc. It should be of great interest to the philosopher too â especially since the views it investigates are of a fundamental nature, concerned with the purpose of human life and the means of realising that purpose.
â¦
In this work, which is without doubt somewhat controversial, I have tried to take a new look at some of the traditional problems in the theory of ethics and I have proposed some distinctions which might be of help. In particular, I have been interested in: characterising ethical acts in a way that is useful for ethology; the nature of ethical evaluation and its relativization to ethical systems and the value of normative ethics in the context of the theory of knowledge. The main distinctions I have drawn on are: (1) ethics and morality; (2) ethical and social normativity; (3) conduct on the basis of principles and conduct on the basis of emotional impulse. I am aware of that several of the solutions offered are debatable and will be grateful to the reader for any critical remarks.
Of course, I do not claim to have exhausted the list of fundamental epistemological problems â still less of gnoseological problems â in ethics. Serious study is required to address, for example: the ânature versus nurtureâ debate in ethics; how the freedom of the will is to be conceived in ethical matters; and many other matters. But even the problems we have managed to touch on seem worthy of thought and discussion.
Bibliography
Aristotle, Topics A 14, 105 b 19; Eudemian Ethics I, 8; MetaphysicsVI, 1.
KotarbiÅski, Tadeusz. Sprawy sumienia [Questions of Conscience]. Warszawa: KsiÄ Å¼ka i Wiedza, 1956.
Ossowska, Maria. âZagadnienie powszechnie uznanych norm moralnychâ [The Issue of Universally Recognised Moral Standards]. Studia Filozoficzne, no. 3 (1957): 80â96.
Spinoza, Baruch, trans. G.H.R. Parkinson Ethics, V, prop. XLII. London: David Campbell Publishers, 1989.
Znamierowski, CzesÅaw: âNaczelna norma moralna i jej pochodneâ [The Supreme Moral Norm and Its Derivatives]. Studia Filozoficzne no. 3 (1957): 97â117.
Topics A 14, 105 b 19; Eudemian Ethics I, 8.
Metaphysics VI, 1.
Perhaps it would be good to add the proviso that I am not treating so-called âphilosophical valuesâ as absolute, eternal and unchanging Platonic ideas. I rather view them as the reified properties of objects capable of satisfying (what we believe to be) our most fundamental (and frequently most noble) needs.
Nichomachean Ethics X, 9.
We will shortly explain the particular significance of this valuable course of action.
Cf. footnote 3.
Polish play by Gabriela Zapolska, satirising bourgeois morality (editorâs remark).
By ethical humanitarianism I do not mean a definite system of ethics but a broad (not narrowly defined in virtue of its generality) type of ethical system in which one of the leading norms is the prescription to act in accordance with a universal kindness.
Awareness of principles or rules is key to being able to distinguish ethical from merciful action, even in a humanitarian system. One may give up something for someone when gripped by compassion without being in possession of any conscious ethical principles. This will then be an act of mercy (evaluated positively in a humanitarian system), but it will not be an ethical course of action. It is only when action is on the basis of consciously held principles of an ethical system that it is ethical action, for example, when we treat Pigmies with respect thought they may be ugly by our sense of beauty or living at a low cultural level. We hold to the principle that the dignity of every human being deserves respect.
Distinguishing merciful action from ethical has led some important philosophers to deny the value of feeling in ethics altogether. The Stoics already claimed that feeling (for example, compassion) muddies the purity of ethical action in a similar that emotion reduces the effectiveness of a surgical operation. Kant also wrote that qualifying action as ethical assumes the elimination of emotional aspects â an opinion that met with the well-known and witty riposte of Schiller in the epigram of Gewissensskrupel. It seems to me that the strictness of thinkers on this point contains a double non sequitur: from the fact that ethical action is based on principles and not feelings it does not follow that feelings may not accompany ethical action â feelings which may be positively assessed. It is also (perhaps all the more) the case that it does not follow that feeling has no value in ethics. After all, the values of humanitarian ethics, advocated by both the Stoics and Kant, were established on the basis of feelings: love, compassion, universal kindness â¦
A person who acts ethically and at the same time without feeling (insofar as this is even possible) may perhaps inspire respect but the society will remain indifferent to them â as they are indifferent to that society. A person who only acts on the basis of noble impulses may enjoy the love of their community but they will rarely be respected. Long-term respect and deep attachment are usually only granted to those who act ethically together with strongly positive feeling. (We should emphasize that these claims about societyâs attitude to various kinds of action is independent of the ethical positions they espouse. The assessment of feeling, however, is here undertaken from the perspective of humanitarian ethics.)
See sec. 7 for the difference between social and ethical normativity.
See sec. 12 for the nature of ethology and its tasks.
See CzesÅaw Znamierowski: âNaczelna norma moralna i jej pochodneâ [The Supreme Moral Norm and Its Derivatives], Studia Filozoficzne, no. 3 (1957): 97â117.
On the non-scientific character of normative ethics â see sec. 8.
We are not here considering the casuistic question as to how far the âminorâ suffering of some can be tolerated if it is a condition of the âgreaterâ joy of others.
We will address normativity in sec. 7.
Social norms can also serve the good not of the entire society but of an individual â but an individual of that society and as such a member of society. For example, Machiavelliâs maxim for the monarch: âBe as cunning as a foxâ or the principle (which conceals a norm): âthe monarch is permitted to do everything (cheat, poison, strangle, burn) to acquire power,â because âil fine giustifica i mezziâ (âthe ends justify the meansâ â a principle which can lead to both a social and an ethical norm).
There undoubtedly exists an analogy between the relationship of science to life goals and the relationship of logic to genuinely true judgments. The purpose of logic is not to decide whether a judgement in question is true. That is the role of other, empirical sciences, which compare the judgment in question with experience. Despite this, logic supports the empirical sciences by means of: a) critical investigation whether a scientific conjecture is methodologically sufficiently justified, b) investigation of the implications that can be drawn from judgments deemed true on non-logical grounds (i.e. on the basis of empirical evidence). It is precisely because it does not fall to logic to guarantee the truth of judgments that the conditional judgement is so characteristic: if (judgement) p (is true), then (judgment) q (is true). Logic âtakes responsibilityâ not for the truth of p, but for the truth of the judgment q if the truth of p is assumed â and this latter truth cannot be guaranteed by logic. Nevertheless, the logician is a person living in the real world and in possession of their own experience. So, it might happen that their own experience forces them to reject â for non-logical reasons â p as false. This rejection is no longer the work of a logician, concerned exclusively with consequences, but the decision of one seeking genuine truths.
It is said that it is not the business of science to judge whether a given life goal is valuable. These questions are settled by the varied needs of human action. Science can, however, perform a service to ethics by: (a) critically investigating whether a goal recommended by an ethical system is feasible or achievable; (b) investigating possible means of achieving the extra-scientific goals propounded (i.e. in the domain of human needs and human action). If, in these circumstances, science proposes norms of action, it does so in the form of conditional norms: If you want to achieve B, apply means A. Science cannot guarantee the value of goal B (the goal might be, for example, as it was for Hitler, the removal of an âenemy raceâ). Science only seeks to provide effective means of achieving the assumed goal (in the case referred to science dictates how to build gas chambers and cremation ovens). Fortunately, the academic is not only a dispassionate researcher evaluating the effectives of possible means to a given goal; they are also (and perhaps above all) a sensitive and active human being with their own ethical goals. On the basis of the ethical goals they themselves have developed, they may refuse to search for means to realise certain goals and might even decide to fight against them in society. And though this is not something taking place in the academic world, they use what they have learned when the issues relate to normative scientific judgments even though the main arena here is outside academia.
In another respect, KotarbiÅskiâs views differ from those of Socrates. According to KotarbiÅski, ethical views are independent of oneâs theoretical position (see Tadeusz KotarbiÅski, Sprawy sumienia [Questions of Conscience], Warszawa: KsiÄ Å¼ka i Wiedza, 1956). Socrates, the forefather of âintellectual ethicsâ, believed that ethical views are a consequence of theoretical concepts. KotarbiÅskiâs thesis on ethical conduct as independent of philosophy may throw some light on the distinction made above (in sec. 3) between conduct based on a positive emotional impulse and conduct based on ethical principles. Undoubtedly the first type of conduct is independent of philosophizing. The latter, on the other hand, seems to be quite closely (although significantly ambiguously) related to oneâs worldview, as revealed, for example, in the different nature of the ethical act of the theist and freethinker â consequently subject to different assessments. A follower of Christianity, when he acts in accordance with the ethical principles of his system, justifies his conduct out of âthe fear of Godâ, the desire to serve God, the future reward in paradise, or the fear of torment in hell. Can such conduct, dictated by fear or anticipation of remuneration, be called âpurely ethicalâ? On the other hand, a freethinker who acts in accordance with the principles of autonomous ethics is capable of purely ethical acts, because he can, like Spinoza (Ethics, V, prop. XLII), proclaim that Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. As we can see, the nature and value of ethical action varies depending on the philosophical worldview providing the justification.
KotarbiÅski, op. cit., 14â15.
At a session of the Polish Philosophical Society in Warsaw, 31 January 1958.
In condemning lâesprit de sérieux, Sartre contests the subordination of mankind to the values we ourselves have created â and yet have unwittingly alienated from ourselves and made absolute.
KotarbiÅski, op. cit., 9.
Ibid., 9, 24.
A few weeks after writing these words, I found a similar treatment in Maria Ossowska, âZagadnienie powszechnie uznanych norm moralnychâ [The Issue of Universally Recognised Moral Standards], Studia Filozoficzne, no. 3 (1957): 80â96.