9.1 Introduction
This final chapter will draw some lines of the analysis developed in this study together. I will do so by reflecting on some general trends in the development of conceptual approaches to equality and non-discrimination standards that have become apparent and seem to stand out across jurisdictions. This also provides room for some broader and more normative observations.
The first two trends I like to highlight regard core background factors without which developments in the legal conceptualization of equality and non-discrimination discussed in this study are difficult to fully appreciate. They concern the tremendously increased and still expanding interventions by modern states in social and economic life (Section 9.2) and what seems to be the ever more important role played by judicial bodies in shaping legal standards, including equality standards (Section 9.3).
Content-wise, the development of approaches to equality and non- discrimination as legal concepts from (more) formal towards (more) substantive understandings constitutes arguably the most important trend to pay attention to. It runs like a common thread through the previous chapters (Section 9.4). A final content-related trend which stands out, regards the increasing complexities involved in the interpretation and application of equality standards resulting from the development of the various modalities of discrimination that have taken shape, be it in a robust or as yet only fledgling form. If anything, these dynamics illustrate once more that the conceptualization of equality and non-discrimination standards is an ongoing process which is bound to continue (Section 9.5)
9.2 The Increasing Reach of Equality as a Legal Standard – Its Interconnecting Function
As discussed in Chapter 2, the increasing reach of equality standards in modern societies results from their central, interconnecting function within the prevailing legal framework.1 They are switched on as soon as the state starts regulating society and social relations by adopting laws or policies.2 Whether the state provides for a justice system, old age pensions or welfare benefits, or whether it regulates trade and commercial relations, if it does it has to do so without discrimination. If the latter is not the case, equality standards may work as a lever to challenge this.
As in modern societies state intervention has typically increased tremendously, the reach of equality standards has grown in its wake. Even in states with a strong liberal tradition of non-intervention by state powers, such as the US, this is at stake, but it arguably becomes most prominent in jurisdictions which have adopted human rights, including social rights, as their overarching legal framework. The reach of equality standards is often further increased by covering horizontal relations in (parts) of social life. Of old, employment is the most regulated of these areas.3 If we take the EU as an example, a trend is discernible towards broader regulation of discrimination in the area of goods and services.
This much more expanded reach of equality as a legal standard makes it into a potentially radicalizing legal principle. Whether it actually becomes so, however, depends to a significant degree on its conceptual scope: to what extent does an extension of the material scope of equality standards combine with a conceptual development from a limited, (more) formal towards a more far-reaching, substantive approach? As has become apparent in the preceding chapters, in the far majority of jurisdictions figuring prominently in this study, an overall trend towards taking more substantive notions on board is clearly visible. Before discussing the significance of this general development, the crucial role of judicial bodies in this evolution merits some more attention.
9.3 The Central Role of Judicial Bodies
9.3.1 Increasing Interplay and Mutual Influencing across Jurisdictions
The interpretation and application of equality standards by judicial bodies constitutes a driving force in the conceptual development of equality as a legal concept. What stands out in this respect and has frequently been noticed in the preceding chapters, is the increased interplay between such bodies and the mutual influence they seem to have on each other in developing the various concepts of equality and discrimination discussed in this study.4
This trend is part of a much more general one in human rights law.5 Though judicial bodies are in all sorts of ways legally confined in exercising their role in adjudication and judicial review by the specific legal mandates they have been granted, they usually have quite some leeway in terms of how to conceptualize and interpret fundamental rights provisions. As these standards are often formulated in a broad and general way, they leave much interpretive space. Equality standards are no exception. As this study shows, judicial bodies have used this space time and again. In doing so they often look to other jurisdictions for inspiration and for what they may perceive as best conceptual practices, be it explicitly or implicitly.
Interaction of this nature facilitates aligning the core concepts and modalities of discrimination developed in various jurisdictions into a broadly shared, overarching conceptual framework – without, of course, doing away with the many differences between them or with the myriad peculiarities at play within each jurisdiction. This phenomenon may not be new as such – the way in which the US Griggs case influenced European conceptualizations of indirect sex discrimination is a case in point6 – but it could only become a much more common practice since the information revolution took off with much increased speed after the turn of the century.
Interestingly, mutual influencing has turned out to be more than one-way traffic. Over time, judicial bodies from both the Global North and South seem to have come to operate as a web of interconnected hubs; with shifting importance or influence flowing from each of these hubs depending on the particular subject matter involved. The preceding chapters provide quite some examples of this. Whereas the initial conceptualizations of direct, indirect and positive discrimination or positive action seem to have been dominated by Western jurisdictions, the further elaboration of these ‘old’ concepts as part of a more robust substantive equality perspective is much more prominently developed in Global South jurisdictions.7 Regarding intersectional discrimination, the South African Constitutional Court has shown that it intends to take the lead in developing this largely underdeveloped concept.8 Last but not least, the particular influence now exerted by the CRPD, a global human rights instrument, on the development of the concept of reasonable accommodation stands out.9
9.3.2 Decisive Role in How Much ‘Bite’ Equality Standards Actually Have
If anything, this study has shown how the critical function of equality standards in holding authorities, employers or other duty bearers to account depends to a considerable extent on the way in which judicial bodies shape the applicable review standards and apply these in concrete cases. In this regard, the strictness or leniency of the scrutiny with which the justifications put forward to save a particular rule, policy or measure are assessed is of crucial importance. The various elements of this inquiry – assessing the legitimacy of the goal; the degree of fit between means and ends, including the comparability of the cases; consideration of other rights and interests at stake – involve many normative considerations and assessments. As a consequence, the outcome of equality and non-discrimination analysis may inevitably vary with the perspectives taken.10
The wide interpretive space which seems to be part and parcel of applying equality standards means that judicial bodies usually exert a lot of power. How they use this power will depend on a variety of factors, but most importantly it seems to imply that any further developments may depend to a large extent on the particular composition of these bodies. Whether this is a strength or a weakness may be up for discussion, but it does suggest that advancements made so far – and I consider the development of (more) substantive approaches to equality as positive – are not to be taken for granted unless they become also more firmly embedded in solid legislative frameworks. The latest developments in the case law of the US Supreme Court, heavily restricting the space for affirmative action measures in higher education, are a case in point.11
9.3.3 Limits of the Judicial Role within the Trias Politica
Judicial bodies may hold governments to account and push them to act on their responsibilities under equality standards, but they cannot take over the designing and implementation of laws and policies. In the preceding chapters this was also a recurring theme, particularly when discussing the reach of the concepts of indirect discrimination, (reasonable) accommodation and positive discrimination or positive action. Where equality standards require taking difference into account by treating people differently in accordance with their particular situation and needs – in line with the second limb of the Aristotelian adagium – the treatment due is often open-ended. This type of equality claim is more difficult to handle for judicial bodies than claims to be accorded the same treatment as other people already receive.12 It shows that a more fully substantive approach to equality standards depends on interventions by the legislative and administrative powers, that is ultimately on the political process.
National judicial bodies have to negotiate the tensions between their role in holding the other branches of government to account, and leaving these proper deference within the confines of the larger constitutional framework they operate in. Though the position of international courts is different, they also have to face a very similar and important issue: how much deference to leave to the national authorities.13
9.4 From a (More) Formal towards a (More) Substantive Approach
The process of mutual influencing between jurisdictions sketched above may well inform the overall trend in the development of legal approaches to equality and non-discrimination which has become apparent in the preceding chapters: a move from a (more) formal equality approach towards (more) substantive perspectives.
This development is core to how the various modalities of discrimination have been – and still are – shaped into multifaceted and multilayered concepts. This turn to a more articulate and more fully substantive reading of equality standards, characterized by an impact oriented approach, is of crucial importance. It takes the outcome of any treatment as the yardstick for complying with equality standards, regardless the sameness or difference of the treatment involved.
This is not to say that formal equality is not important. On the contrary, it is a vital element of a substantive equality approach even if it has a limited reach only. As explored in Chapter 2, striving for formal equality was fundamental to the recognition of historically disadvantaged groups as ‘like cases’ deserving the equal protection of their fundamental rights and freedoms, on an equal basis with other groups who had been accorded such rights. Articles 1 and 2 of the UDHR and the equality standards included in the subsequent human rights conventions and in national constitutions attest to this.
The prohibition of discrimination expresses this by providing particular protection against all sorts of exclusions explicitly based on race, sex, religion and many other grounds which have been added to the list of protected grounds in the past decades.14 Experience has shown that classifications on these ground have often resulted in more than incidental, structural patterns of disadvantage. For this reason distinctions based on these grounds are sensitive and to be approached with much more suspicion than ‘ordinary’ classifications. They should not be easily accepted. In judicial review this distinct protection offered by non-discrimination standards usually translates into more stringent scrutiny of the justifications put forward for differential treatment.
The general prohibition of discrimination – with its focus on direct discrimination and thus formal equality – has proven to be an important instrument to challenge all sorts of exclusions suffered by the groups protected by it. Formal equality is indeed still a driving force for many equality and non-discrimination claims, including, for instance, claims for equal access to marriage and pension benefits for same-sex couples, or equal legal personhood for mentally disabled persons. In such situations formal equality is a prerequisite for an equal outcome and runs parallel with substantive equality.
The examples show that the relationship between formal and substantive equality is not a zero-sum relationship; they are not always opposites. As discussed in Chapter 3, if taken on its own, however, formal equality can turn into a barrier to substantive equality.15 This happens in particular when the conceptualization of equality is limited to formal equality. In Aristotelian terms this is at stake when equality is restricted to the first limb of the adagium that ‘like cases are to be treated alike’ and the second limb is discarded, which calls in addition for treating ‘unalike cases unalike in proportion to their unalikeness’. Only if the two parts are accepted as operating in tandem a fully substantive approach to equality comes into view, which takes unequal outcome as its core concern. A formal approach is insufficient for providing meaningful guidelines for how to deal with and accommodate difference.16
9.4.1 Manifestations of Substantive Equality – Indirect Discrimination, (Reasonable) Accommodation and Remedial Measures
Moving attention to the impact and effect of any treatment as the yardstick for identifying (potential) violations of equality standards has resulted in the development of several distinct modalities of discrimination. As explored in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the concepts of indirect discrimination, (reasonable) accommodation and positive discrimination or positive action are all linked to a more outcome oriented, substantive equality approach.
Indirect discrimination connects to a substantive approach by bringing the disparate impact of seemingly neutral criteria under the reach of equality standards. It has become a commonly accepted part of non-discrimination analysis across a wide range of jurisdictions. Particularly in India and Canada, it has been heralded by the apex courts as an instrument to tackle structural and systemic discrimination.17 Concrete examples of case law on indirect discrimination from a variety of jurisdictions show the concept may indeed reach more structural forms of discrimination, but whether it will actually work in this way depends ultimately on the ‘bite’ with which it is applied in concrete cases.18 The examples discussed also show that tackling indirect discrimination has in addition some clear inherent limits in addressing structural and systemic discrimination which is embedded in the fabrics of society. It does not necessarily reach the underlying dominant standards and power relations shaping social realities.
The concept of (reasonable) accommodation is much less developed as the analysis in Chapter 6 shows, but it has gained more prominence since the turn of the century. In several jurisdictions it operates under the umbrella of indirect discrimination. In others a lack of (reasonable) accommodation has also appeared as a distinct sui generis form of discrimination. The CRPD is a prime example of the latter by formulating a duty of reasonable accommodation specifically geared to meeting the individual needs of disabled persons.19
Beyond the specific context of the CRPD, a duty of (reasonable) accommodation has long roots in the application of equality standards in relation to other groups whose particular position and needs have to be taken into account, such as religious minorities.20 As a general notion, it ties in with the second limb of the Aristotelian formulation, which requires that unalike cases are treated unalike. In this more generic form a duty of accommodation is not limited to disability but may cover any protected ground. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR provides some clear examples of this approach by stipulating that discrimination may also occur if states, without providing an objective and reasonable justification, fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different.21 In Canada and South Africa a more general duty of accommodation applicable to all protected grounds is also regarded as an integral part of a substantive reading of equality standards. Interestingly, this duty of accommodation is put on a par with a prohibition of indirect discrimination. The lines between these concepts are seen as fluid, as they both emanate from the same substantive conception of equality and are both triggered by the disparate effect of neutrally formulated rules or policies on (members of) a protected group.22
Affirmative action policies are also linked to a substantive approach to equality. It is the most contested of all the concepts discussed in this study. This is reflected in how remedial measures are approached under equality standards. Review models for dealing with positive discrimination or positive action vary significantly between jurisdictions. In jurisdictions in which affirmative action is approached as highly contested, judicial scrutiny tends to be very strict. In jurisdictions in which remedial measures are seen as part and parcel of a substantive equality approach, assessment is much more lenient. In this context in particular, differences between the equality approaches adhered to in different jurisdictions become most apparent.
Almost all jurisdictions figuring in this study have moved towards a (more) substantive approach to a greater or lesser extent. The most common manifestation of this development has been the broad adoption of the concept of indirect discrimination. Approaches to positive discrimination or positive action are much more mixed; those regarding (reasonable) accommodation are often still in a nascent state.
The US is an exception to this trend by adhering much more strongly to a formal equality approach. Though the US Supreme Court played an important role in the initial development of the concept of indirect discrimination, over time it has adopted a very restrictive approach to it, particularly so where constitutional equality standards are concerned. The Court has become equally restrictive in its approach to affirmative action. Even in the US, however, elements of a substantive approach to equality are present in respect of reasonable accommodation of disabled people and of religious groups.
9.4.2 Intersectional Discrimination as a Crosscutting Dimension of the Other Modalities of Discrimination
Intersectional discrimination is also informed by an eye for unequal impact, be it within and across disadvantaged groups. As a modality of discrimination it has a distinct character by its crosscutting dimensions. Intersectional discrimination can appear as part of direct or indirect discrimination analysis.23 In addition, addressing intersectional discrimination may also figure in positive discrimination or positive action policies.24 Though I did not come across case law regarding intersectional discrimination in the context of (reasonable) accommodation, intersectional issues can no doubt be present in this context as well.
Intersectional discrimination as a legal concept is the least developed of the concepts I discuss in this study, though its importance is generally acknowledged in academic scholarship. To indeed integrate this concept into the equality and non-discrimination framework is arguably the biggest challenge lying ahead. If anything, addressing intersectional discrimination adds another layer to the increasing complexity of legal conceptualizations of equality and non-discrimination.
9.5 Increasing Complexity – an Ongoing Process
Undoubtedly, equality and non-discrimination analysis has never been simple or straightforward. In whatever modality it appears, it involves making all sorts of assessments to decide whether distinctions made (or lack of distinction) are justified or not. Many of these include normative deliberations, which may very well vary with perspectives taken. Assessing the legitimacy of the goal of rules, policies or measures; the fit or proportionality between the means chosen and this goal, including the comparability of the cases involved; the balancing with other rights and interests which may be at stake; all these assessments are often susceptible to a wide array of normative considerations.25
A recurring observation in this regard has been how in this type of assessment the more stringent scrutiny due when classifications are based on a protected ground may be offset by other factors which may influence levels of scrutiny applied by judicial bodies. The particular area of law or society or other rights and interests involved, as well as degrees of disadvantage suffered may all pull in different directions. This issue surfaces time and again regarding all the modalities of discrimination.26 It helps explain why application of equality standards is often characterized as unpredictable or elusive.
The complexities of equality and non-discrimination analysis have increased over the course of time in most jurisdictions by several developments. To start with, the list of protected grounds has expanded in most jurisdictions – often quite considerably. This enhances the protection provided by non- discrimination law for a larger number of groups, but it also leads to new challenges. The most important of these may well be the development of a certain hierarchy between protected grounds, be it explicitly or implicitly. As not all forms of discrimination are as invidious, differing levels of scrutiny have been developing for different grounds of discrimination, either expressly or in more hidden form.27 Though this seems a logical corollary of the expansion of protected grounds, it adds another layer of complexity to non-discrimination analysis. Several other complexities can be traced to the development of the particular modalities of discrimination which accompany the turn to more substantive equality approaches.
9.5.1 Complexities Flowing from the Development of Particular Modalities of Discrimination
Where indirect discrimination is concerned, apart from difficulties in distinguishing direct and indirect discrimination particular problems may be attached to establishing the disparate impact of rules, policies or measures on a protected group.28 Using either quantitative or more qualitative indicators, or a combination of both, may make a considerable difference. Moving towards a more qualitative analysis – as seems to be a general trend across jurisdictions – is indispensable, as for many groups protected by non-discrimination standards no disaggregated statistical data may be available to start with. Qualitative analysis is not necessarily easier or straightforward.29
In instances of indirect discrimination which boil down to a lack of (reasonable) accommodation, application of the concept of indirect discrimination shares in the complexities deriving from the latter modality of discrimination. The most important one would seem to be the problem of the often open-ended character of (reasonable) accommodation. Where discrimination comes in the form of an unjustified difference in treatment, a point of reference exists for the treatment due. When a discrimination claim is about unjustified equal treatment, which is characteristic for a claim for (reasonable) accommodation, this is much more fuzzy. What degree of accommodation of difference is sufficient or not to avoid a violation of equality standards is often open-ended.30
This issue of open-endedness may not be a prime concern when individual, personalized accommodation is due. In such cases, the accommodation demanded is usually quite concrete and specific. Deciding whether it can be provided without imposing a disproportionate burden will also be quite concrete. Where more collective forms of (reasonable) accommodation are concerned, this is different. Collective accommodation usually requires the development of general policies and allocation of financial or other scarce resources. For example, improving access to all public buildings for disabled people, granting decent pregnancy and maternity leave or accommodating the religious needs of pupils to pray at school are much more open-ended regarding their achievement levels. Particularly where accommodation requires the allocation of scarce resources, the legislature and administration are in the lead in deciding the pace and level of fulfilling duties of (reasonable) accommodation. The position of judicial bodies in assessing when they are at fault in this regard seems quite comparable to their role in social rights adjudication; it brings along similar complexities and questions regarding the proper division of powers between the branches of Government.31
Turning to the difficulties involved when designing positive discrimination or positive action measures, the demarcation of the groups which should benefit may present particular dilemmas. Both overinclusion of those favoured by affirmative action (the ‘creamy layer’ problem), or underinclusion of equally disadvantaged individuals may be problematic (in India for example by excluding Christian and Muslim members of the scheduled castes because they do not belong to the Hindu religion).32 As with (reasonable) accommodation, this problem is all the more difficult to handle where the resources to be more equally distributed are scarce – which is inherently the case with places in higher education or higher functions, but also an issue in terms of the financial means available for all sorts of remedial policies. Budgets are always limited, even in affluent states. Scarcity calls for more distinct targeting of remedial measures to the most disadvantaged groups – for instance along intersectional lines – but such more narrow tailoring may also imply painful choices have to be made between those who are ‘most deserving’ and those who are ‘less deserving’. This in turn may create unwanted competition for scarce resources between and within disadvantaged groups.
The growing attention for intersectional discrimination may well raise the most difficult challenges yet. Once you start looking for it, intersectional discrimination seems everywhere and may appear as ‘the norm, rather than the exception’.33 As intersectional discrimination cuts across all modalities of discrimination, the particular complexities it brings along are relevant for all of them.
The core value of the concept of intersectional discrimination for equality analysis may at the same time be a pitfall. Awareness of intersectionality is indispensable for problematising the inequalities existing within disadvantaged groups, which may be glossed over if the focus is exclusively on the particular list of grounds protected by non-discrimination standards. Social realities are indeed much more fuzzy and complicated. At the same time, it is unclear what degree of further delineation of subgroups is workable or desirable before it turns into unmanageable fragmentation. Each person’s position in society flows from an intricate and ultimately unique mix of characteristics and experiences. If taken to its ultimate extreme, then, an intersectional approach to equality and non-discrimination would require what I have described as a substantive equality approach in an absolute sense: that is a substantive equality approach which would treat every person always and everywhere in a completely personalized way, taking all the myriad, particular differences and needs of this person into account.34
From the perspective of what law can deliver, this type of striving for fully individualized justice for all is an unfulfillable goal.35 In addition, an absolute, singular focus on the unique, individual experiences of disadvantage and oppression would detract from what non-discrimination standards are at bottom about; it would risk losing sight of the broad, structural patterns of disadvantage and discrimination shaping society and the power relations between social groups.
This brings me back to the core of what equality and non-discrimination analysis has to deal with: what is the proper level of generalization or particularity to be chosen in designing law and policies? How broad or narrowly tailored should classifications be?36 By and large, law and policies have to be based on generalizations; the use of all sorts of proxies is inevitable. Law has to make choices between those who benefit and those who are burdened all the time. Classifying is so to speak part of the life of law. Some space exists for more fully personalized treatment for sure, but law cannot operate on this basis as matter of principle. In my view, what equality standards – and more particularly their expression in terms of a prohibition of non-discrimination – can and should do is to prevent that certain groups are time and again disadvantaged or burdened. Non-discrimination provisions intend to address structural and systemic patterns of disadvantage and exclusion suffered by particular groups, not incidental forms of unfavourable treatment. They seek to provide heightened protection for such vulnerable groups by identifying a number of grounds as suspect or protected grounds. The realities of intersectional discrimination reveal the limitations of this grounds-based approach. This is why they pose a distinct conceptual challenge. Intersectional perspectives force us to rethink how and to what extent a grounds-based approach can still be used where discrimination is compounded by the intersection of two or more of these grounds.
9.5.2 Fuzzy Boundaries between the Various Modalities of Discrimination
Last but not least, increasing complexities in equality analysis seem to flow from the blurred lines between the various modalities of discrimination. Fuzzy boundaries may exist between direct and indirect discrimination, and between indirect discrimination and (reasonable) accommodation.37 In addition, remedial measures, (reasonable) accommodation and ‘ordinary’ social policy are sometimes hard to distinguish. There may also be quite some unclarity when such measures may turn into ‘ordinary’ discrimination.38
These blurred lines show that notwithstanding efforts at further systematization and fine tuning of all these concepts to fit them nicely into coherent and consistent legal doctrines – a distinct preoccupation of legal scholars and professionals, including myself – realities on the ground are often much more opaque. Legal concepts are an indispensable tool for mapping realities and getting a better grip on them, but they cannot fully capture the complexities of either law or life.
Coming to the end of this study, a question that self-evidently presents itself is where to go from here. If anything, the preceding chapters show how the conceptualization of equality and non-discrimination as legal standards is an ongoing process. It will not stop at this particular point in time. Though this may be a platitude, it is no less true for that matter. Whatever future developments will bring, I hope the preceding analysis will prove helpful in better getting to grips with them.
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3.
Alkema called this the function of the equality principle as a schakelbepaling, which I translate here as ‘interconnecting provision’: it starts operating as a legal obligation for the state wherever state regulation is involved, even if the particular regulation is not legally required as such. He used this term in particular in the context of state regulation in social policy areas. In these areas, the state usually has no obligation to develop particular social programmes or grant benefits – and equality standards as such do not require it – but if the state does, such provision must conform to equality standards and as a result usually become subject to judicial review. E.A. Alkema, Schakelbepalingen. Enige beschouwingen over samenhang en werking van de rechten van de mens, Oratie UvA, 1981 (Interconnecting provisions. Some reflections on the cohesion and working of human rights, Inaugural lecture, University of Amsterdam, 1981); E.A. Alkema, Het internationale gelijkheidsbeginsel en de Nederlandse staatsrechtelijke verhoudingen, in: Staatsrecht, buitenlandse betrekkingen en de internationale rechtsorde, Preadviezen Staatsrechtconferentie 1986, Nijmegen 1987, p. 64–105 (The international equality principle and Dutch constitutional relations, in: Constitutional law, foreign relations and the international legal order, 1986, p. 64–105).
The ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (Convention No. 111) dates from 1958. It is widely ratified by 175 states.
The US Supreme Court seems to constitute a notable exception. It does not seem to be open to transnational developments. If anything, its approach to indirect discrimination and affirmative action is moving in the opposite direction of developments elsewhere.
See Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1.
See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1.
See for further elaboration Chapters 4, 5 and 7.
See Chapter 8, in particular Section 8.3.3.
See Chapter 6.
See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1; Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2.
See Chapter 7, Section 7.4.1.
See Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2; Chapter 5, Section 5.3.5 ; Chapter 6, Section 6.6.3.
Cf. Y.Shany, Toward a general margin of appreciation doctrine in international law? European Journal of International Law, 2006, p. 907–940.
See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3.
See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.
See in particular Chapter 3, Section 3.3.
See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1.
See Chapter 5, Sections 5.3.2–5.3.6.
See Chapter 6, Section 6.5.
See Chapter 6, Section 6.4.
See Chapter 6, Section 6.4.2.
See Chapter 6, Sections 6.4.1–6.4.3.
See Chapter 8, Sections 8.3.2 and 8.3.3.
See Chapter 7, Section 7.5.
See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.
See Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2; Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3; Chapter 7, Section 7.4.2.
See Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2.
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.4.2.
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2.
See Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2; Chapter 5, Section 5.5; Chapter 6, Section 6.6.3.
See Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2; Chapter 5, Section 5.5 ; Chapter 6, Section 6.6.3.
See Chapter 7, Section 7.5.1.
Xenidis, Multiple discrimination in EU anti-discrimination law, 2018, p. 42.
See Chapter 3, Section 3.1.
See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1; Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2.
T. Loenen, Recht en het onvervulbare verlangen naar individuele gerechtigheid. Over verfijning van regelgeving, vage of open normen, en concrete toetsing aan grondrechten, (Law and the unfulfillable longing for individual justice. On differentiation in regulation, vague or open norms, and concrete human rights review), RM Themis 1996, p. 123–136.
See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.5.
See Chapter 7, Section 7.5.2 and 7.5.3.