Commencing in 1947 and culminating in 1958 with the publication of the Traité, Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca sought, discovered, and developed a philosophical system designed to be a rapprochement between dialectic (reason and logic) and rhetoric (the art of adapting arguments to audiences). âPhilosophies premièresâ sets forth the philosophical blueprint for Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tytecaâs New Rhetoric Project [NRP]; further, as it marks Perelmanâs turn to rhetoric, this article is an extraordinarily important work in the history of twentieth-century rhetoric.1
The Occupation of Belgium and the Holocaust make no explicit appearance in Perelmanâs 1949 article, âPhilosophies premières et philosophie régressiveâ [First Philosophies and Regressive Philosophy].2 Nevertheless, underlying this landmark article are Perelmanâs experience of the war and his concern with the most pressing philosophical questions that arose in its wake. For Perelman, the primary intellectual exigencies of the postwar period were the interrelated crises of justice, philosophical reasoning, and responsibility, crises of reason to which âPhilosophies premièresâ offers prescient answers.
Perelmanâs experience during the war had brought him face to face with totalitarianism. After the war, Perelman and his wife set about the task of reconstructing Belgian society and assisting European Jews to find their way to Palestine/Israel. To help create the conditions for cultural rapprochement, he celebrated the actions of the Queen and the Cardinal of Belgium, both of whom he believed worked to save Belgian Jews.3 In fact, the postwar reconstruction of Belgium plays a clear role in Perelmanâs development of a regressive philosophy. For instance, Perelmanâs contemporaries, such as André Lerminiaux and the former Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland, view this period of reconstruction as offering an occasion for positive re-creation.4 When the war ended, Perelman returned to his teaching post in the winter of 1945. Perelman had finished De la justice while in hiding from the Nazis.5 He later noted that this âstudy was finished in August 1944, having been written during the worst excesses of National Socialism. It was nevertheless published with its reluctant conclusion, and in conformity with the rigorous methodology of logical positivismâ.6 That reluctant conclusion, one that he worked through between 1944 and 1948, was that justice had no basis in reason. At this point, Perelman concluded in favor of logical positivism, holding that scientific knowledge is the only kind of factual knowledge and that other doctrines are to be rejected as meaningless.
Two other conclusions attended his commitment to logical positivism in the immediate aftermath of the war. First, he made a clear distinction between the vita activa and vita contemplativa, agreeing with the Enlightenment philosophers that the domain of philosophy was the latter. Perelman taught a course on logic during the first semester of his return to the Université libre de Bruxelles. A notebook in the Perelman Archives, labeled â1944â1945â, contains a narrative outline of his view of logic. In the first paragraph of the notebook, he wrote, âphilosophy deals with matters of contemplation, not actionâ.7
A second conclusion followed: because philosophy and reason were limited to âmatters of contemplationâ, there could be no reasonable or rational basis for action. Yet this conclusion was troubling for Perelman. In a Convocation speech delivered to his students on October 8, 1949, Perelman ruminated on the consequences of this limitation: âthe theoretical crisis that tormented your elders during the period between the wars ⦠resulted from the limitations of the scientific method to scientific problems, leaving us without rules of action, without conviction that one could honestly accept outside of science itselfâ.8 Because there were no rules of action, Perelman suggested, there was no positive doctrine developed to oppose fascism, allowing many to âdegenerate into cynicismâ and indifference, marking a significant failure of responsibility and conscience during the war.
Perelman struggled with his conclusion that justice and value judgments were arbitrary, the limitation of philosophical reason to contemplation, and with the failure of many to act responsibly before and during World War II. His trajectory from logical positivism to rhetoric is a result of his evolving view that many philosophers held a severely limited and truncated vision of reason. This struggle is apparent in the conference proceedings (1947 and 1949) and articles that constitute the prelude to the Traité, particularly those published in the 1940s and his collaborative article with Olbrechts-Tyteca of 1950.9 These publications chart his search for a method of securing justice and making value judgments, a philosophy of action, and a project that could extend reason into matters of responsibility. But it is in âPhilosophies premièresâ that Perelman first mentions rhetoric as an answer to the crises of justice, philosophical reason, and responsibility.
âPhilosophies premièresâ also adumbrates how Perelman and Olbrechts- Tytecaâs NRP charts a third way between logical positivism and radical relativism. For one, Perelman anticipates in âPhilosophies premièresâ the problems of radical postmodernity. Perelman joined many postwar theorists, including Horkheimer and Adorno, in the resistance to the reign of a disembodied Enlightenment rationality.10 However, Perelman identified what Habermas would later call the âperformative contradictionâ in the conclusion that radical skepticism was the only alternative to Enlightenment rationality.11 âPhilosophies premièresâ remains a strikingly elegant attempt to foil what Foucault has called the âEnlightenment blackmail of reasonâ, the assumption held by logical positivists and radical skeptics that if reason does not yield absolute and eternal Enlightenment knowledge, there can be no knowledge.12
In âPhilosophies premièresâ, Perelman also responds directly to Sartreâs 1943 Ãtre et le néant [Being and Nothingness] by exposing the failure of radical skeptics to see that they had been held hostage by Enlightenment blackmail in accepting the Enlightenment criterion for truth, rejecting it, and then making skepticism an absolute.13 Indeed, âPhilosophies premièresâ navigates from this performative contradiction to chart a third way between Enlightenment rationality and radical skepticism with an approach that he labels regressive philosophy.
Regressive philosophy, Perelman argues, provides the human community with a mode of philosophical reasoning located between the extremes of Enlightenment rationality and radical skepticism. In this space between extremes, Perelman identifies contingent truths and values dependent on a rhetorical mode of reasoning, one making moral judgments possible. But Perelman does not respond only to the dichotomy of seventeenth- and eighteenth- century notions of rationality versus modern skepticism in this article; he also offers here a powerful critique of Aristotelian first philosophies.
We might think that Perelman and the NRP are âAristotelianâ or âClassicalâ. After all, in their respective accounts of the history of the NRP, both Olbrechts- Tyteca and Perelman detail their intellectual voyage from logical positivism to rhetoric, which brings them, via the steppingstones that are Brunetto Latini and Jean Paulhan, to Aristotleâs rhetoric and, for Perelman in particular, the entire Greco-Latin tradition of rhetoric and topics.14 Seeking a foothold for a new and expanded sense of reason in values and sources shared by the authors and the audience, Perelman details that Aristotle was âconsidered by everyone the father of modern logicâ, and thereby invokes Aristotle as a source of authority for valorizing rhetoric.15
However, Perelman also distinguishes Aristotelian logic from the regressive philosophy that is the new rhetoric by establishing the antimony of âfirst philosophiesâ and âregressive philosophyâ, which in turn demonstrates how Perelman positions Aristotle as adhering to the Classical definition of truth and the use of dialectic in finding immutable knowledge. In a later exchange with Stanley Rosen, Perelman noted that what he called âthe classical tradition, starting with Plato and Aristotle, continues with St. Augustine, St. Thomas [Aquinas], Duns Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza and is carried on by empiricism and logical positivism, as it is represented by early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicusâ.16 Perelman continued:
[T]he tradition I call classical assigns but little importance, as far as achieving science and contemplation goes, either to practice or to the historical and situated aspects of knowledge. This viewpoint is held in common by Plato and Aristotle, as well as by thinkers such as Descartes. The tradition I call classical includes all those who believe that by means of self-evidence, intuitions either rational or empirical-or supernatural revelation, the human being is capable of acquiring knowledge of immutable and eternal truths, which are the perfect and imperfectible reflexion of an objective reality.17
The classical tradition, Perelman noted, was not open to truths that were fluid, partial, and in contradiction. In âPhilosophies premièresâ, Perelman rescues rhetoric by detaching it from Aristotleâs metaphysics. Perelman appropriates Aristotleâs rhetoric as the expression of regressive philosophy, doing so to check the reach of first philosophies. Perelman would eventually argue that Aristotle did not have much regard for rhetoric, and that Aristotle saw rhetoric as a tool of persuading ignorant audiences, unable to follow complex apodictic reasoning.18
To develop an alternative to first philosophies, Perelman drew from the work of Ferdinand Gonseth and his mentor at Université libre de Bruxelles, Eugene Dupréel; both are cited in âPhilosophies premièresâ. Perelmanâs rhetoric required a philosophical grounding, which was provided by the âopen philosophyâ of Gonseth and by Dupréelâs axiology and sociology. In retrospect, Gonseth and Dupréel were much more influential than Aristotle in provoking Perelmanâs rhetorical turn. Perelman and Gonseth met in 1947 and remained lifelong friends.19 A Swiss professor of mathematics, Gonseth was the editor of Dialectica, the journal that published âPhilosophies premièresâ. Gonseth advanced an alternative to first philosophy that emphasized experience in time rather than eternal knowledge as central to the philosophical enterprise. Gonseth held that theory and experience are intertwined, that reason should yield to the lessons of experience. Experience, according to Gonseth, could only be understood and theorized with dialectic, which consists of four principles (wholeness, duality, openness to revision, and responsibility), discussed in âPhilosophies premièresâ.20
Perelman equates âopen philosophiesâ with âregressive philosophyâ and called on the writing of Eugene Dupréel to establish an epistemology for a regressive philosophy. Dupréel, whose work Perelman summarized in a two- part article published over two issues of Dialectica. argued that there are limits to human knowledge, and that the history of abandoned knowledge claims reveals the power of new experience to challenge received wisdom.21 With Gonseth and Dupréel, Perelman established the parameters of his rhetorical turn. As one reads âPhilosophies premièresâ, then, the immediate intellectual network within which Perelman operated as well as his originality becomes apparent.
If Perelman first mentions rhetoric as an answer to the crises of justice, philosophical reason, and responsibility in âPhilosophies premièresâ, it is in this article that he provides a metaphysical foundation for rhetoric, a grounding that is not absolute but firm enough to base contingent truths. In so doing, it identifies and avoids the performance contradiction that plagues post-Enlightenment thought. âPhilosophies premièresâ navigates between the absolutes of first philosophies and radical skepticism by identifying contingent truths, those strong enough to warrant temporally restricted knowledge, but open to further modification and change. Knowledge need not be timeless and eternal, nor is understanding impossible. With regressive philosophy and rhetoric, it is possible to move beyond the demands of certainty and the pitfalls of aporia to arrive at contingent but reasonable judgments. Once liberated from the performance contradiction of post-Enlightenment thought, questions of values, justice, and action could be judged in the light of a regressive philosophy, one that sought progress, learned from mistakes and errors, and improved in time.
Anticipating Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecaâs 1958 article, âDe la temporalité comme caractère de lâargumentationâ, âPhilosophies premièresâ deploys the idea of temporality to distinguish first philosophies from regressive philosophy. While first philosophies focus on eternal principles, thereby marking one moment in time-generally from the past-as original, the source of its present-day principles, a regressive philosophy does not privilege any one particular moment:
[The proponents] of regressive philosophy situate the present in a historical becoming, of which they do not believe themselves capable of privileging any moment by removing it a priori from all evolution. They challenge Aristotleâs principle that calls for an absolutely first term to any regressive series.22
âPhilosophies premièresâ provides a framework for a philosophical reason that allows for justice and the life of action. The four principles Perelman borrows from Gonseth (wholeness, duality, openness to revision, and responsibility) and the careful juxtaposition of first and regressive philosophies provide tentative answers to the intellectual crises Perelman confronted in the postwar setting. Rhetoric was the answer, although rhetoric makes but a brief appearance in the article. To develop this answer, Perelman establishes in âPhilosophies premièresâ a metaphysical basis for dialogue and rhetoric:
Regressive philosophy does not seek utopian perfection, rather, it aspires to problem solving through constant deliberation and human interaction- carried out by a society of free minds interacting with each other that accounts for the advantages and disadvantages of the positions human take as they deliberate in the context of lived experience.
It is this step from a regressive metaphysic/philosophy to the free minds interacting, to rhetoric, which is important in the history of rhetoric. Perelman turned to rhetoric out of a concern for metaphysics. Rhetoric ensures for Perelman both the freedom of minds to interact and the responsibility for judgments in the field of action. With the following words from âPhilosophies premièresâ, Perelman announces his rhetorical turn for the first time, rooting his view of the ancient discipline in responsibility:
Only rhetoric, and not logic, allows the understanding of putting the principle of responsibility into play. In formal logic, a demonstration is either convincing or it is not, and the liberty of the thinker is outside of it. However, the arguments that one employs in rhetoric influence thought, but never force his agreement. The thinker commits himself by making a decision. His competence, sincerity, integrity, in a word, his responsibility are at stake. It is this practical aspect, this almost moral aspect of philosophical activity that allows the rejection of a purely negative skepticism. The skeptic rejects every absolute criterion, but believes that it is impossible for him to decide since he lacks such a criterion, just as in first philosophies. But he forgets that in the domain of action, not to choose is still making a choice, and that one runs even greater risks by abstaining than by acting. Dogmatism and skepticism are both opposed to the principle of responsibility, because they both search for a criterion that would make the choice necessary, and would eliminate the liberty of the thinker. It is precisely the principle of responsibility that, by affirming the personal commitment of the thinker in philosophical activity, constitutes the only valuable refutation of negative skepticism.
This is a critical passage in that it juxtaposes rhetorical logic with the two alternatives, brilliantly illustrating how formal logic and radical skepticism are both victims of Enlightenment blackmail in assuming that knowledge must be absolute, thereby absolving both of responsibility for their theses. Rhetorical logic requires commitment and responsibility because it provides the guide for human action. In this vision, rhetoric serves as the bridge between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa, thereby holding accountable those who advocate values that become the touchstones for action, and thus affecting as well the welfare of local and universal audiences.23
âPhilosophies premièresâ received a rejoinder, in German, from Swiss philosopher Michel Bernays (1950), to which Perelman responded (1952).24 Bernays wrote that Perelman had misinterpreted Gonseth and, foreshadowing complaints made by critics of the NRP, argued that Perelman had failed in âPhilosophies premièresâ to adequately account for the real, the necessary, and the absolute. Perelman, also foreshadowing his response to the critics of the New Rhetoric, argued that regressive philosophy would learn from the mistakes made by first philosophies, modify the rules of knowledge based on experience, and would focus on an unforeseeable future rather than explained past.
Translation and Commentary
Chaïm Perelman, âPhilosophies premières et philosophie régressiveâ. Dialectica 3:11 (1949) 175â191
As a crystal reconstitutes itself from one of its particles, all philosophy creates itself from the idea of an open dialectic, and carries, in itself, the same dialectical character.1
Ferdinand Gonseth
A number of metaphysicians, including Bergson and Heidegger, consider metaphysics the only knowledge of consequence and use the word to refer to their own philosophies. But a large number of eminent metaphysicians, among them Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, had only disdain for metaphysics and used the word to discredit the philosophy of their adversaries. DâAlembert once noted that those referred to as metaphysicians had little regard for one another. âI have no doubtâ, he added, âthat this title will soon be an insult to our great minds, just as the name sophist which, although it meant wise, was debased in Greece by those who bore it and rejected by the true philosophersâ.2
The preceding remarks should, I think, convince the few who would still doubt it that declaring oneself an adversary of metaphysics does not mean that one does not do metaphysics. On the contrary, the very fact of opposing a certain conception of metaphysics presupposes that one advocates another conception of metaphysics; this needs to be made explicit, if it is only implicit. In a very interesting study, Mr. Everett W. Hall has recently analyzed the metaphysical assumptions of four types of positivism (Mach, Comte, Watson, Carnap).3 Even without this analysis the conclusion is predictable; he who is opposed to a certain manner of treating a problem remains himself within the same problematic. Indeed, such oppositions produce a continuous expansion and dialogue about the meaning of the word âmetaphysicsâ. This happens not through an automatic and necessary dialectic, but through the dialectic directed by the philosopherâs concerns. The first metaphysicians set forth a particular philosophy of being [être]; those opposed advocated a different philosophy of being. By expanding its meaning, Aristotle gave metaphysics its first dialectical movement and identified it as the study of being as being and ontology. Kantian criticism treats dogmatic metaphysics with disdain, and shows that all theories of being must be preceded by a theory of knowledge: the first principles of philosophy would be those of epistemology and not those of ontology. Since Kant, and for more than a century, metaphysical debates would be about the primacy of ontology or epistemology, and the opposition to their variants, realism and idealism. Then, at the end of the nineteenth century, the debate broadened. Under the influence of pragmatism, the philosophy of values, and Bergsonism, a strong current of philosophical thinking developed, which integrated the theory of knowledge into a general theory of action. It proclaimed the primacy of a philosophy of action, philosophy of life, and philosophy of values. It is within a metaphysics broadened by these various developments that different conceptions of metaphysics will struggle to establish the primacy of their principles. But, despite their differences, all of these metaphysics can be considered first philosophies.
Aristotle wrote a treatise on first philosophy, the first to be called several centuries after his death a metaphysics. First philosophies refer to any metaphysics that purports to determine first principles such as the fundamentals of being (ontology), of knowledge (epistemology), or of action (axiology). First philosophies position first principles as absolute and that they underlie all philosophical questions. The word âfirstâ informs the argumentation used to establish the primacy of first philosophies. A principle is first when it comes before all others in a temporal, logical, epistemological or ontological order; but any insistence on this point serves only to emphasize its primacy or axiological pre-eminence. That which is first or basic, that which precedes or presupposes all the rest, is also first in order of importance.
As systematic metaphysics, first philosophies establish an interdependence among ontology, epistemology, and axiology. The course taken by first philosophies is determined by a starting point constituted by a necessary reality, a self-evident concept, or an absolute value before which one can only yield. Hence, this type of metaphysics relies on irreducible criteria as the legitimating authority, which in turn provides the foundation on which we can construct a progressive philosophy. The history of thought shows us that first philosophies struggle constantly against each other, each setting forth its own principles, its own criteria that it considers as necessary or evident, without regard to the possible legitimacy of principles established by other first philosophies. Each first philosophy constitutes a threat for the others. What results is a merciless struggle of these doctrines of first philosophy; all are incapable of finding a common language or common criteria. In this struggle, each first philosophy by its very existence challenges all those that it opposes; each manages to avoid being bothered by other systems simply by disqualifying them altogether. History reveals that the most violent attacks against âmetaphysicsâ were almost always waged by metaphysicians who could not accept the âultimate criteriaâ or the âself-evident intuitionâ of their adversaries, without having to also accept the fundamental propositions of their systems.
When an âopen philosophyâ conflicts with metaphysics, it does so unlike a first philosophy struggling against another first philosophy; instead, it offers itself as a metaphysics which contrasts with every first philosophy. I will call such a metaphysics regressive philosophy. An analysis of the characteristics specific to every first philosophy and a description of regressive philosophy will permit us to better understand the latter and will give us the opportunity to make clear the broad meaning that this new approach gives to the word âmetaphysicsâ, allowing it to encompass both first philosophies and regressive philosophy.
Rarely does a first philosophy begin directly, as in the Ethics of Spinoza, with the affirmation of its first principles, of what it considers as necessary, evident, or immediate, by explicitly establishing its starting points.4 The method of first philosophy usually begins with an expression of doubt and a critical examination of different possible starting points that it dismisses as insufficient. It is in this way that Descartes first digs out the sand of misleading opinions before reaching the bedrock of the first truth: he makes use of what we could call the regressive method in order to continue, on the basis of an unfaltering foundation, the progressive development of his metaphysics.5 But it is important not to confuse regressive method and regressive philosophy, because regressive philosophy differs from every first philosophy in the different status accorded to the propositions that lead to the use of the regressive method. Regressive philosophy, like first philosophy, also allows for interruptions, axioms, and starting points, which result from a regressive analysis. But the two ways of philosophizing differ in the weight given to the ontological, epistemological, or axiological status of these starting points. First philosophies consider them as fundamental, and seek to find a criterion of necessity, of self-evidence, or of immediacy that justifies in absolute terms the first truth that one establishes as the basis of the system. Regressive philosophy considers its axioms, its criteria, and its rules as resulting from a factual situation, and it gives them a validity measured by verifiable facts.
We will return to explore at length this distinction, but for now we may keep the idea that the common object of first philosophies and regressive philosophy is the study of the status of fundamental propositions concerning being, knowledge, and action; metaphysics, in this now broadened sense, concerns itself not with first truths, but with the examination of the status of principles, whether or not one considers them first truths.
Suppose that a first philosophy speaks of the same facts or the same problems as regressive philosophy, suppose that it leads to the recognition of the fundamental characteristic of a same set of propositions; the differences between the two will be revealed when it concerns what one means by fundamental.
First philosophy considers as fundamental the absolute first, that which is presupposed by everything that is not fundamental, not only in fact, but also in law. But which law are we talking about? It is a law prior to every positivistic law. Similarly, in first philosophy, when one refers to the demands of reason, it is in the name of a concept of reason that is not empirical, but absolutist. And when one speaks of logical necessities, it is prior to any positivistic idea of logic.
While what is fundamental in a regressive philosophy is relative to the facts that philosophy has systematized, and is considered only as a fact (more important maybe than to others, but always contingent), in first philosophies, the thinker bases his judgment on an intuition or a self-evident fact, thus on a psychological fact, in order to affirm the universal, unconditional, and even absolute validity granted the contents of this intuition or of this self-evident fact. In common language, metaphysics is used pejoratively to describe this transcendence beyond experience and concrete conditions of verification. This transcendence [of concrete conditions of verification] results from analogical reasoning, whereby the fundamental propositions of first philosophies are established just like derived propositions by relating them to something anterior that is no longer just another proposition, but an intuition or a self-evident fact, and to which one grants (for the purpose at hand) the value of an absolute criterion. Regressive philosophy, on the other hand, will consider these fundamental propositions, within the system, as joined to their consequences.
This claim of the absolute, which cannot be justified either by basing it on the consequences of principles (which are contingent facts) nor by granting the evidence the fragile status of a psychological fact, compels any builder of a first philosophy to develop [concevoir] in a similar manner a theory of being and a theory of knowledge. A first philosophy is always, by definition, in search of definitive and perfect elements that will provide an invariable and eternal basis for a metaphysical system. If it is a theory of first being, this being will be necessary, thus eternal; unconditional, thus substantial and absolute; atomic, thus simple. It will be a theory of the perfect being, the ultimate foundation of all reality. If its basis is provided by the theory of knowledge, one will begin searching for a first truth, self-evident and immediate, intuitive or rational, with a clarity that forces adherence. Or perhaps, finally, one will begin looking for an absolute and intrinsic value, an eternal norm of all human conduct. Let us immediately remark that the primacy granted to that which constitutes the starting point of the system, and which will make of it a realism, an idealism or a pragmatism (in the broadest sense of the word), will influence the whole development of a first philosophy, because each theory of being will be completed by a correlative epistemology and axiology, and vice versa. In order to complete the ontology, one will need to conceive of a privileged knowledge that is capable of knowing the first being, whose perfection will be the ultimate norm of all that is worthy.
Epistemology will determine the nature of the privileged reality and the absolute value, which may be known by our first truths. Axiology will provide the characteristics that will distinguish reality from appearance, and true knowledge from that which is not. Finally, whether one begins with being, knowledge, or value, each first philosophy will have to make a complete voyage from a stable, definitive, perfect starting point. The idea of perfection, of something completed, invariable, will be the defining characteristic of all first philosophies.
That which is considered as perfect and complete is, by definition, nonperfectible, independent of every subsequent experience, of every new discovery, of every new method, of every comparison with othersâ opinions, of every discussion with other men. That which is perfect and no longer open to correction is independent of every subsequent fact. Truths, once established, are forever. These considerations allow us to understand how first philosophies have always been both individual and universal. They cannot coexist with knowledge that is socially constructed, but instead begin with the self-evident facts of a single mind [esprit] that are then declared to be universally valid. First philosophies have neglected the historically conditioned aspect of knowledge, insisting that eternal truths were their only responsibility.
Similarly, reason in first philosophies is a temporary instrument designed to achieve eternal knowledge; reason is modeled by thinking that conforms to the requirements [problématique] of a first philosophy.
Once in possession of certain absolute truths about which men cannot agree, the great difficulty faced by first philosophies is to explain the manner in which disagreement can appear in the domain of knowledge or that of action, and how the relative can be derived from the absolute, the imperfect from the imperfect, the real from the apparent, disorder from order. It is scandalous for every first philosophy to see men oppose self-evident facts, to see men prefer error to truth, appearance to reality, evil to good, unhappiness to happiness, sin to virtue. In the search of an ultimate foundation for necessary agreement, first philosophers are at pains to explain the existence of disagreement, error, and sin. To do so, they will have to introduce a second element, a sort of obstacle, an antivalue, a devil, which would allow them in turn to explain all deviation from the eminent order. Such obstacles and antivalues will be expressed in the following manner: the subjective opposed to the objective, imagination to reason, pleasure to duty, matter to spirit, and so on. The initial monism, transformed in a dualism, will explain both the world of necessary being and that of beings with freedom and responsibility by tempering, through the influence of the antivalue, the hold of absolute values on human beings. The introduction of this dualism will produce juxtapositions of law and norm, necessity and responsible choice, and will reserve a decisive, but perfectly inexplicable place for human liberty. In fact, if the logic of first philosophies lends itself to a progressive development starting from first truths, if it allows, if need be, the introduction of the cursed universe of the antivalue as a complement of an ideal world, the relations between these two universes, their contingency and their evolution (which, strictly speaking, constitute the world of history) remain perfectly incomprehensible, unless we construct alongside the first philosophy (on which we had based all hope) a regressive philosophy that we will associate with the first philosophy only by a sleight of hand.6
The disrepute of metaphysics, conceived of as first philosophy, is explained by two different reasons. One has especially surprised laypeople, all those who know metaphysics from the outside, and the other has especially influenced specialists of philosophy. What impressed men of science was the inability, which metaphysicians proved, to come to agreement on what should be considered as self-evident and necessary. First philosophies thus provided the spectacle of a plurality of opposed dogmatisms that contrasted strangely with the unified concept of a common knowledge, which constitutes the scientific ideal. What importance was it necessary to grant to these disputed facts, to these necessities rejected by men who seem sincere and normal? Scientists from different disciplines who were involved in metaphysical debates had the impression that they were faced with people living in different universes, which contributed, moreover, to the sense of unreality caused by the metaphysical constructions. On the other hand, specialists of philosophy took the role of critics within a particular philosophical system in the assessment of first philosophies. They criticized first philosophies especially for their inability to construct a coherent system that, once its principles have been established, takes into account the whole given of experience. In fact, it is not enough to disqualify anything that does not agree with the principles of a first philosophy by treating it as appearance, error, sin, or nonsense; one still needs to justify the existence of this appearance and of this error, of this sin or of this nonsense.
Those opposed to every first philosophy are the antimetaphysical philosophers, those who in the history of philosophy are commonly treated as relativists and skeptics. The point of view of the latter is purely negative: they place themselves in opposition to first philosophies, they deny the existence of every absolute, of every unconditional, of every first principle. But negation still does not constitute a philosophy: it is necessary to provide the reasons for this negation. They showed themselves to be sullied by the same defects as the first philosophies, the object of skeptical criticism, since very often, their reasons also assume the validity of first and unconditional principles that are, moreover, not explicit. For any antiabsolutism or any antidogmatism to be taken seriously, it must endeavor to remove the metaphysical affirmations at the basis of the critique. A similar provisional opposition to every first philosophy, if it does not wish to fall under its own critique, can consist only of a regressive philosophy.
Regressive philosophy opposes the status given by first philosophies to necessary being, to the first truth, and to the absolute value. Whereas for first philosophies, the acquisition of indisputable starting points provides a base for a series of subsequent deductions, for regressive philosophy it will be a matter of only a provisional limit to its investigations, a limit that is a landmark but not a light.7 The value of these principles is not determined by some self-evident fact or some privileged intuition, but by the consequences that one can draw from them and that are none other than the facts that serve as a concrete starting point to all philosophical research. Whether it is a matter of a scientific problem or a psychological âconcernâ, philosophy always begins by certain pieces of information which one can analyze, refine, purify, disqualify, or justify, but which one must take into account. Instead of being illuminated by some intuition that precedes the facts and that is independent of them, the fundamental principles of regressive philosophy are, instead, clarified by facts and their consequences. Within a domain that is more or less limited by knowledge, each philosopher is free to start with different facts and to introduce a certain coherence or a certain systematic spirit that does not need to encompass the totality of knowledge. But insofar as different philosophers live in the same universe and find themselves in the presence of the same type of facts, they must be able to incorporate them in their system of thought, be able to compare their ideas with those of their colleagues, and acknowledge and appreciate the differences of opinion that they perceive.
At the basis of regressive philosophy, we find again more or less, in a different perspective and coordination, Gonsethâs four principles of dialectic.8
The principle of wholeness [intégralité] presents a doubled consequence, which obligates the proponent of regressive philosophy to take into account the totality of experience that appears to him and to integrate this experience in such a way as to create an intimate interdependence between the facts from which he starts and the principles that must explain them. It is because of the principle of wholeness that only a regressive philosophy, which is less a completed and perfect system than an understanding that implies the incomplete and unfinished character of every philosophical construction, which is always capable of new developments and new corrections, can oppose the plurality of first philosophies. Proponents of a regressive philosophy are capable of mutual understanding, of discussion, of comparing their points of view and of adapting them. Discussion constitutes an essential element for the development of their thought, which is, in principle, open thought. Their disagreements are destined to be reduced, and, in this, resemble disagreements between scholars; in fact, a rectification in their system does not constitute a renunciation or a betrayal in regard to their principles, but on the contrary, the proof of loyalty to these principles.
In fact, while the principle of wholeness affirms the systematic character of every philosophy whose ideal is that of the unification of the totality of knowledge, its eternally incomplete character is implied by the principle of duality. This principle affirms that a system of thought, whatever it may be, never constitutes a complete, perfect system that would take into account all future experience, which has become superfluous and lacking in meaning. The rejection of this principle would affirm the possibility of constituting a complete and perfect system of knowledge within a single mind, which would exempt it from subsequent research as well as from new experience. Indeed, new experience would only be able to enter into the known schemas if there were a way to eliminate from the universe all unpredictability, all contingency, and thus all liberty, which give meaning to time and history. One even wonders what sense the distinction between being and thought would have in such a system. One sees right away that this system would be strange and inconceivable, incapable of maintaining its coherence.
The union of the principle of wholeness with that of duality constitutes the essential character of regressive philosophy: the other principles consequently follow from this.9 The first of these consequences, the principle of revisability, affirms that no proposition of a regressive philosophy is safe a priori from revision. Holding principles and propositions safe from rectification would place them outside the principle of revisability. As the principle of duality sets forth the imperfection of the systemâthat it must always be able to be adapted to new experiencesâthe rejection of the principle of revisability would be an a priori declaration that certain propositions would remain forever sheltered from modifications of their wording and their significance, even if subsequent changes might affect the other elements of the system.
Such propositions, once established, remarkable for their simplicity, their clarity, their self-evident fact, in a word, for their perfection, would introduce within regressive philosophy all the characteristic traits of a first philosophy. The fact of accepting propositions beyond the reach of review would only be possible if one adopted and used the criterion of perfection. Acceptance of perfect propositions, beyond change, would introduce, at the heart of a regressive philosophy that one wants to be both coherent and adaptable to the unforeseen, a problem that would provoke its disintegration.
Let us immediately remark that the affirmation of this principle of revisability affirms only the possibility of revising certain affirmations if pressing reasons appear to do so. Only new facts that did not correspond to the accepted system could prompt the revision of certain of its elements. And even so, a choice will almost always determine the elements of the system to be modified. The adaptation to a new situation will be the work of a man who will have considered the different possibilities that present themselves, and he will have made a judgment to make the revision, having understood the cause of and taking responsibility for the revision. This is the meaning of the principle of responsibility, which makes the informed decision of the researcher crucial in the development of a system of thought. To cite M. Gonseth, âa dialecticââand regressive philosophy is one of themââis neither automatic nor arbitrary; it is gained by a man conscious of his effort and his responsibility, by a man conscious of his commitment to the real and of his ultimate liberty of judgmentâ.10
The principle of responsibility introduces the human and moral element into scientific and philosophical work. It is man, as a last authority, who is the judge of his decision, and other men, his collaborators and adversaries, who judge both this decision and the man who chose it.
To have some moral or even simply human value, this decision cannot be a necessary choice. Where there is necessity, there is neither choice nor merit; moreover, in such conditions a machine could favorably replace human judgment.11 In fact, when the action has been determined once and for all, when the principles of revisability and of responsibility cannot be invoked because one has dismissed the effects of the principle of duality, machines could be constructed that would accomplish, without hesitation, the work that a man would not be able to do as rapidly and as impeccably. But, on the other hand, the decision of the researcher is never arbitrary. Man does not find himself faced with nothingness when he has to choose, and his decisions are not absurd. What influences his decision, like that of others, are arguments whose values he must himself assess. When he must adapt his system to new facts that create conflict in his mind, the researcher must invent possible modifications of his concepts, and choose that which appears most appropriate. If he desires to obtain the agreement of his peers, he would need, moreover, to justify this choice and to show the reasons for which it seemed preferable to him.
Here we see at work a form of argumentation already examined by Aristotle, which is nothing other than the rhetoric of the ancients, this logic that treats not the true, but the preferable, and which one might consider as the logic of value judgments, if this latter notion were not so confused.
Only rhetoric, and not logic, allows us to understand how the principle of responsibility is put into play. In formal logic, a demonstration is either convincing or it is not, and the liberty of the thinker is outside of it. However, the arguments that one employs in rhetoric influence thought, but they never oblige his agreement. The thinker commits himself by making a decision.
His competence, sincerity, integrity, in a word, his responsibility are at stake. When it is a matter of problems concerning foundations (and all philosophical problems are tied herein), the researcher is like a judge who has to judge equitably. We may wonder if, after having sought for centuries the model of philosophical thought in mathematics and in the exact sciences,12 we might not instead compare it to that of lawyers, who sometimes have to develop a new law and sometimes have to apply an existing law to concrete situations.
It is this practical aspect, this almost moral aspect of philosophical activity that allows the rejection of a purely negative skepticism. The skeptic rejects every absolute criterion, but believes that it is impossible for him to decide since he lacks such a criterion, just as in first philosophies. But he forgets that in the domain of action, not to choose is still making a choice, and that one runs even greater risks by abstaining than by acting.
Dogmatism and skepticism are both opposed to the principle of responsibility, because they both search for a criterion that would make the choice necessary, and that would eliminate the liberty of the thinker. And yet it is precisely the principle of responsibility that, by affirming the personal commitment of the thinker in philosophical activity, constitutes the only valuable refutation of negative skepticism.
The philosopher chooses his approach; his choice is free, but reasoned. What he isâhis temperament, his background, his milieu, all his knowledge and his value judgmentsâinfluence his choices as a thinker and explain his philosophy. This explanation is never entirely complete, however, because his choice is never entirely necessary.
In sum, regressive philosophy affirms that, at the moment the philosopher begins his deliberation, he does not start from nothing, but from a set of facts, which he does not consider as necessary nor absolute nor definitive but as sufficiently sure to allow him to establish his deliberation. He considers these facts as fragmentary, and he does not believe that the notions that help him to express them are perfectly clear nor fully developed. In a way these facts are already associated in his thought; progress in their systematization will allow him to develop the principles of his knowledge and to better understand, describe, and classify the elements of his experience. This experience is never complete; new facts can always provoke a questioning of the notions and principles of the initial [primitive] theory, the revision of which could lead to a better understanding of the earlier [ancien] facts. This revision, this adaptation, will not be done automatically, but will be the work of the thinker who is responsible for his actions and who commits himself by means of his decisions. This is why, moreover, he will question principles that are already accepted only if he believes that he has sufficient reasons for doing so.
The proponent of regressive philosophy will reject the very idea of a preliminary condition to his philosophy, holding that no doctrine must precede it or must be developed first. How does this rejection of a precondition influence his view of knowledge? If this precondition means the search for an absolute, first principle that would be anterior to his own principles, and which he denies as being absolute and first, his rejection of these first principles does not mean that he will follow a path that leads to endless regression, without sense or direction. If one asks him [i.e., the proponent of regressive philosophy] to revise his principles by contrasting them with pertinent facts, which introduce an element the system has not considered and will need to incorporate, he will rejoice at the possibility that his thought will be enriched. If the regression must permit a certain elucidation or the elimination of an incoherence or a disagreement, the regressive philosopher can reestablish coherence or agreement on new foundations that he will keep until a new fact modifies the situation. Indeed, some reason, some problem to solve, some difficulty to eliminate is necessary so that he takes the trouble to modify his prior position.
The regressive philosopher will use regression in an analogous way when one proposes that he examine âthe implicit philosophyâ of his system. If he feels it necessary, he will always be ready to revise his principles, all the while knowing that this revision of declared principles into implicit principles is neither necessary, nor automatic, nor definitive. Further, once they have been formulated, he could try to formulate their implicit principles on the condition that this research is of some interest. In fact, he cannot answer the proponent of a first philosophy with a response such as âIâll go this far, but no farther;â he cannot refuse to understand his adversary by arguing from a self-evident fact that would be removed from discussion. But he can refuse to accept that the implicit principles, once brought out, constitute the definitive and ultimate foundation of his philosophy, and a fortiori of every philosophy.
Before finishing with this description of regressive philosophy, let us note that it has its own problems and difficulties that match those of any first philosophy.
First of all, the principle of wholeness presupposes that one accepts certain logical rules that give the system its structure and make it a coherent and connected whole. Are these principles not themselves first truths, definitive and absolute, so that instead of being subjected to the system, they govern it? Should the principle of contradiction, for example, not be considered as protected from all subsequent revision? This objection, which seems telling, could be, for that matter, directed against the other principles of the system, and especially against the principle of wholeness itself.
Let us try to respond.
Any attempt to affirm principles of universal validity in the past could only succeed by admitting their formal expression, which is thus perfectly reconcilable with variations of object or field. The [formal] principle of contradiction demonstrates that the logical product of a proposition and its negation depends, for its interpretation and its application, on the meaning that we give to the words âpropositionâ, âtruthâ, and âfalsityâ. There is agreement on the meaning of such universal principles of thought in formal expression, which may not exist when they are applied to concrete cases. Which declarations constitute propositions? When may a proposition be considered as true or false? We know that these problems are very much discussed in philosophical thought. For that matter, let us note in passing that, as in ethics, the affirmation of values and universal principles is possible only by giving them a purely formal structure.13 Similarly, regressive philosophy can only affirm the principle of wholeness by not definitively determining precise and permanent rules for systematic and coherent thought. The second problem regressive philosophy faces is assigning new meanings to the traditional distinctions of philosophical thought. First philosophies fail to justify the passage of a first term to the second of such oppositions as the necessary and the contingent, the absolute and the relative, the real and the apparent, law and fact, and so on. Regressive philosophy finds itself before the opposite problem: its domain is the contingent, the relative, the apparent, and the factual [i.e., that of fact, fait]. It succeeds in justifying man and his liberty, the temporal and the historic but, to take into account the totality of experience, it must make a place in its conception for the normative, the real, the absolute, and the necessary. Unless it succeeds at this, it will have failed like every monism. By eliminating the opposition of matter and spirit, it will not have the means to distinguish the phenomena called material from the phenomena said to be spiritual within its materialist or spiritual system. We are not compelled to believe that regressive philosophy must necessarily derive law from fact, or appearance from reality. On the contrary, we are accustomed to invoking law only when fact is opposed, to talking about reality only by disqualifying an appearance. If law differs from fact, it also constitutes a fact, although of another type than that to which it is opposed. The affirmation of a norm constitutes a fact, although of a completely different nature than the fact of its transgression, and does not derive from it at all. Describing the rules of the real is not the simple repetition of the means that allow us to recognize the apparent, either. This will be one of the tasks of regressive philosophy: to take these traditional oppositions into account by making them relative, by making them compatible with its principles, by associating them with the whole of its doctrine, but nevertheless without making them disappear as if they were only phantasms of a metaphysical imagination.
What results from the preceding remarks is that the four principles of wholeness, of duality, of revisability, and of responsibility that characterize regressive philosophy have still not yet resolved all difficulties. At the heart of regressive philosophy are important problems whose solution seems, moreover, neither unique nor definitive.
Does the comparison of first philosophies and regressive philosophy reveal the incontestable superiority of the latter? An affirmative response would be in contradiction with the principles of this philosophy as well as with the facts themselves, because no one doubts that, even after reading this article, a number of philosophers will continue to affirm a first philosophy. Each of these two types of philosophy presents advantages and disadvantages; each extrapolates in its own way, and the adherence to one or the other is the result of a choice.
The proponents of a first philosophy base their argumentation on the existence of certain principles accepted both by them and by their interlocutors, and lacking anything else, they will search for these principles even in the theory of their adversaries. Their goal will be to transform this agreement of fact to an agreement of law, to make it a necessary agreement derived from a universal truth, and from which they may infer criteria for first truths. The proponents of regressive philosophy begin their argumentation on the historical fact that there are principles that had earned universal acceptance that then had to be abandoned, or whose significance had to be limited. They also point to the experience of scientific thought and its evolution to situate the principles that form the contemporary basis of our knowledge. The followers of a first philosophy transform current principles into eternal principles. Those of regressive philosophy situate the present in a historical becoming, of which they do not believe themselves capable of privileging any moment by removing it a priori from all evolution. They challenge Aristotleâs principle that calls for an absolute first term to any regressive series. The two attitudes take the experience of the past into account, but draw from it different conclusions for the future. The first philosopher holds that new experience will not lead to a modification of certain principles, which have resisted all prior assaults. Regressive philosophy points out that many principles have had to be abandoned, and that we can make no principle permanent unless we are certain that a new experience (in the broadest meaning of the word) will never call it into question.14 First philosophy searches for perfect knowledge, necessary or absolute; its ideal consists of finding some evident truth before which men can only yield, to which they can only adhere. Its ideal of liberty defines itself as the consent to being or to absolute order. Regressive philosophy accepts only an imperfect and always perfectible knowledge. It delights not in an ideal of perfection but in an ideal of progress. Regressive philosophy does not seek utopian perfection; rather, it aspires to eliminate the difficulties that arise through constant deliberation and human interaction carried out by a society of free minds interacting with each other that accounts for the advantages and disadvantages of the positions humans take as they deliberate in the context of lived experience. In principle, the follower of a first philosophy finds himself without any guide, in complete arbitrariness, in absolute doubt, before finding the principle that engages him and removes the need for his initiative. When he has given his adherence to certain principles, their consequences require following a strict logic in accordance with what he will call âthe demands of reasonâ. This rigidity, that makes the thought of these philosophers oscillate between skepticism and dogmatism, complete arbitrariness and inescapable necessity, does not appear in regressive philosophy where the man who decides is never completely confused or completely subjected to a necessary order. He always has reasons for acting, but these reasons do not ever entirely control him; he keeps his power of judgment. If he admits the existence of logical laws within a given system, his choice of a same system is guided by the much more supple rules of rhetoric, that is to say of the nonrestrictive logic of the preferable.
For that matter, this contrast of attitude is reflected in the theories of knowledge of first philosophies and of regressive philosophy. First philosophies are in search of simple, self-evident, rational, absolute elements, of necessary categories of the mind. Regressive philosophy understands the imperfect and incomplete character of all knowledge, of imprecision, of the equivocal, and of the confusion of notions, which can never be declared definitively clarified, whose meaning cannot be considered as absolutely invariable or fixed, independently of the problematic in which they appear. It [regressive philosophy] opposes progressive knowledge to perfect knowledge; it opposes dialectical knowledge to dogmatic knowledge. For every first philosophy, on the other hand, a crisis of foundations constitutes a defeat: the obligation of admitting that one was deceived by an apparent fact or by a fallacious necessity. However, after having made the indispensable ablations and modifications, the first philosopher will once again be able to hold onto a fundamental kernel, so much more solid because it was able to resist this latest assault. For regressive philosophy, every crisis of foundation constitutes a confirmation, a deepening of thought about which it can only rejoice. If first philosophies flourish during periods of stability and well-being, when one is satisfied with drawing consequences from accepted principles whether in the scientific or political, economic or legal domain, regressive philosophy characterizes periods of upheaval, of crisis, of instability in all domains.
The needs of stability are those that normally prevail in human thought. Man likes to believe that the principles of his thought and action are unshakable, that he will always be able to make a foundation of these principles, that he does not have to constantly worry about their solidity. Every social organization is founded on this principle of conservation, the human form of the principle of inertia, that explains the habits of individuals and groups, and the moral and religious needs of men reinforce even more their thirst for certainty and dogmatism. This is the reason why most contemporary thinkers have sought to reconcile concepts born of regressive philosophy with those of first philosophy. For some, natural knowledge can only be imperfect and regressive, but to this inferior knowledge one must contrast a supernatural revelation that would permit the acquisition of definitive truths. For others, a certain domain of knowledge, that of the material and the spatial, would arise from regressive philosophy, whereas one could count on absolute truths in the domain of the spiritual. For others still, only certain privileged facts (the atomic facts of Wittgenstein or the formal declarations of certain Neopositivists) would be definitive, all the rest being revisable. Finally, for the proponents of a Hegelian dialectic, a certain law of the phenomenaâs development would be the only permanent truth. All of these variants, and others still, consist in the limitation of the principles of wholeness and duality and consequently all regressive philosophy to a part of our experience. But, if the four dialectical principles allow for the characterization of regressive philosophy, are we not going to paralyze them by wanting to limit their application to one part of the field of thought? Are we not going to subordinate them to other principles that will determine the character of the proposed compromise? These principles will have to set the relationships between the domain of knowledge subjected to regressive philosophy and that which escapes its jurisdiction; it will be necessary to elevate a barrier between these two domains that, by the force of things, will be taken from regressive philosophy. The history of post-Kantian philosophy prompts us to believe that such an attempt to separate definitively two domains of thought is destined to fail. But a proponent of regressive philosophy is held to a certain modesty in his affirmations: the future does not belong to him, his thought remains open to unforeseen [imprévisible] experience.
This article reflects Perelmanâs thinking and research he had conducted since 1931. Given that this article outlines the philosophical vision of the NRP, it further clarifies the roles Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca played in the collaboration on it.
Our commentary and translation of this article was originally published in Philosophy & Rhetoric in 2003. Both are here revised, as we situate this article in the evolution of Perelmanâs thought that leads to his magnum opus with Olbrechts-Tyteca, the Traité. We thank the editors of Philosophy and Rhetoric for permission to reprint this commentary and translation. In addition, we thank the editor of Dialectica for permission to translate Perelmanâs article. Noemi Perelman Mattisâs help was invaluable as she assisted with the translation and provided us with critical insights into the work of her father.
N. Perelman Mattis, âChaïm Perelman: A Life Well Livedâ, in J. T. Gage (ed.), The Promise of Reason: Studies in the New Rhetoric, ed. (Carbondale, IL, 2011), 17.
In a short essay published by the Société belge dâétudes et dâexpansion in October 1945, Paul van Zeeland highlights Belgian energy in the creation of an economically prosperous state. Lerminiaux, writing of the renewal of various aspects of Belgian society, goes so far as to see the possibility of the creation of a utopia. The various essays in a more recent collection, Les reconstructions en Europe 1945â1949, also attest to the association of renewal with the idea of reconstruction. See P. van Zeeland, âConclusions: De lâéconomie de guerre à lâéconomie de paixâ, in La Belgique au lendemain de la guerre (Liège, 1945); see also D. Barjot, R. Baudou, and D. Voldman, eds., Les reconstructions en Europe 1945â1949 (Brussels, 1997).
C. Perelman, De la justice (Brussels: Office de publicité, 1945).
C. Perelman, âMy Intellectual Itineraryâ. Address delivered to the Hebrew University Faculty, Hebrew University, 1980. Hebrew University Archives.
C. Perelman, Logique 1944â1945 (Notebook), Brussels, Belgium: Université libre de Bruxelles, Perelman Archives BE.ULB-ARCH/89PP.
C. Perelman, âLe libre examen, hier et aujourdâhuiâ, Revue de lâUniversité de Bruxelles 2.1 (1949) 46â47. Our translation.
C. Perelman, âLes deux problèmes de la liberté humaineâ, in Library of the Xth International Congress of Philosophy (Amsterdam, 1948), 217â219; C. Perelman, âParticipation aux entretiens de Lund (1947) sur la nature des problèmes en philosophieâ, in Publications de lâInstitut International de Philosophie, ed. Raymond Bayer (Paris, 1949); C. Perelman, âLa question juiveâ, Synthèses (1945) 47â63; C. Perelman, âFragments pour la théorie de la connaissance de M. E. Dupréelâ, Dialectica 1.4 (1947) 354â366 and Dialectica 2.1 (1948) 63â77; C. Perelman, âMorale et libre examenâ, Les Cahiers du Libre Examen 7 (1947) 3â6; C. Perelman, âDe la méthode analytique en philosophieâ, Revue philosophique 137 (1947) 34â46; C. Perelman, âLogique et dialectiqueâ Dialectica 2 (1948) 126â130; C. Perelman, âProblemen uit de Moraalphilosophieâ, Débat 2 (1948) 72â86; C. Perelman, âLe problème du bon choixâ, Revue de lâInstitut de Sociologie 3 (1948) 383â398; C. Perelman, âVérité contre démocratieâ Cahiers du libre examen 5 (1948) 7â14; C. Perelman, âLiberté et raisonnementâ, Actes du IVe congrès des sociétés de philosophie de langue française (Neuchatel, 1949), 271â75; C. Perelman, âPhilosophies premières et philosophie régressiveâ, Dialectica 3.3 (1949) 175â191; C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, âLogique et rhétoriqueâ, Revue philosophique de la France et de lâétranger 140. 1â3 (1950) 1â35.
M. Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, Dialect of Enlightenment, trans. J. Cumming (New York, 1972).
J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. F. Lawrence, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, MA, 1987), 119.
M. Foucault, âWhat is Enlightenment?â, in P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (New York, 1984), 41â42.
J.-P. Sartre, Lâêtre et le néant. Essai dâontologie phénoménologique (Paris, 1943).
See L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, âRencontre avec la rhétoriqueâ, Logique et analyse 3 (1963) 5â6. C. Perelman, Lâempire rhétorique: rhétorique et argumentation (Paris, 1977), 9; C. Perelman, âOld and New Rhetoricâ, in J. L. Golden and J. J. Pilotta (eds.) Practical Reasoning in Human Affairs: Studies in Honor of Chaim Perelman (Dordrecht, 1988), 2â3; C. Perelman, âLa naissance de la nouvelle rhétoriqueâ, in Ars rhetorica antica e nuova (Genova, 1983), 14. See also Bolduc, Translation and the Rediscovery of Rhetoric; Bolduc, âTranslation in the History of the Birth of the New Rhetoricâ, in A. Kukulka-WojtasikâE. StarurskiâM. Dobrowolska de Tejerina (eds.,) Translatio et Histoire des idées: Idées, langue déterminants / Translatio and the History of Ideas, Idea, language, politics (Berlin, 2018), 1.65â72. Perelman would later acknowledge the influence of Jewish thought and argumentation.
C. Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities: Essays on Rhetoric and Its Applications (Dordrecht, 1979), 56.
C. Perelman, âReply to Stanley H. Rosenâ, Inquiry 2 (1959) 86.
Perelman, âReply to Stanley H. Rosenâ, 86.
C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de lâargumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique (Paris, 1958), 9; The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver (Notre Dame, IN, 1969), 7.
Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities, 101â02.
F. Gonseth, âMon itinéraire philosophiqueâ, Revue internationale de philosophie (1970) 398â433.
C. Perelman, âFragments pour la théorie de la connaissance de M. E. Dupréelâ, Dialectica 1.4 (1947) 354â366 and Dialectica 2.1 (1948) 63â77.
All quotations from âPhilosophies premièresâ may be found in our translation, below.
See D. A. Frank and M. Bolduc, âFrom vita contemplativa to vita activa: Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tytecaâs Rhetorical Turnâ, Advances in the History of Rhetoric 7 (2004) 65â86.
M. Bernays, âZur methodischen Diskussion (Bemerkungen zu Herrn Perelmans Erörterung âPhilosophies premières et philosophie régressiveâ)â, Dialectica 4.1 (1950) 43â45; C. Perelman, âRéponse à M. Bernaysâ, Dialectica 6.1 (1952) 92â95.
F. Gonseth, âConsidérations finalesâ, Dialectica (1948) 223. TN: Perelman does not include this citation in the original article.
See A. Lalande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie 5th ed (Paris, 1947), 602â604. TN: Perelmanâs page numbers are incorrect; this quotation appears at p. 620. Lalande is quoting from Jean le Rond dâAlembertâs 1759 âDiscours Préliminaire de lâEncyclopédieâ, in D. Diderot and J. dâAlembert, Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts, et des métiers (Stuttgart, 1966) 1: xxviii.
E. W. Hall, âMetaphysicsâ, in D. D. Runes (ed.), Twentieth-Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought (New York, 1947), 145â194.
TN: The influence of Spinoza on Perelman has not yet to date been sufficiently elaborated, but Spinozaâs Ethics provides examples of philosophical pairs in C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts- Tyteca, Traité de lâargumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique (Paris, 1958), 563, 591; The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver (Notre Dame, IN, 1969), 421, 446.
TN: Perelman will later explore the metaphors used by philosophers, including Descartes, to indicate their conception of philosophy. See C. Perelman, âAnalogie et métaphore en science, poésie et philosophieâ, Revue internationale de philosophie 23. 87 (1969) 5â7.
TN: NB that Perelman uses here the impersonal form âonâ rather than ânousâ.
See C. Perelman, âFragments pour la théorie de la connaissance de M. E. Dupréelâ, Dialectica 5 (1948) 66â77, especially 63â64. TN: The first half of this article appeared in Dialectica 1.4 (1947) 354â366.
See Dialectica 6, 123â124. TN: Perelmanâs reference appears erroneous. It is in his âConsidérations finalesâ, which appeared in Dialectica 2.2 (1948) 215â223 (at 221), that Ferdinand Gonseth alludes to his four principles. In the reprint of this article, Perelman adds the following references to this footnote: See also the remarks made by Bernays: âZur Methodischen Diskussion (Bemerkungen zu Herrn Perelmans Erörterung âPhilosophies premières et philosophie régressiveâ)â, Dialectica 4.1 (1950) 43â45, and our response in Perelman, âRéponse à M. Bernaysâ, Dialectica 6.1 (1952). 92â95.
TN: In a letter (28 July 1967), Perelman clarified to Luigi Mariani that first philosophies elude the effects of the principle of duality, so that meaning and truth cannot be modified by any future experience. Brussels, Université libre de Bruxelles, Perelman Archives BE.ULB-ARCH/89PP 24.2.
F. Gonseth, âLâidée de dialectique aux entretiens de Zurichâ, Dialectica 1 (1947) 36.
TN: In a postwar address he gave to ULB students, Perelman illustrates the search for a guide to action with references to the Occupation. Perelman, âLe libre examen, hier et aujourdâhuiâ. Revue de lâUniversité de Bruxelles 2, n.s. (1) 39â50. Perelman had taken notes on free will in Carnet 7 (begun in 1937), where he is most interested in a reference made to Aristotleâs Nicomachean Ethics; in 1946â1947 he takes notes on works dealing with free will by Saint Augustine, St. Anselm, Erasmus and Schopenhauer in carnet 33 (begun 20 January 1946, finished 9 April 1948), and by Fonsegrive, in Carnet 28 (begun 7 May 1946, finished 12 June 1946). Carnets 7 and 33 are in Brussels, Université libre de Bruxelles, Perelman Archives BE.ULB-ARCH/89PP 12; carnet 28 in BE.ULB-ARCH/89PP 43.
TN: With the term âsciences exactesâ, Perelman is thinking of a combination of such natural sciences as chemistry and physics, as well as formal sciences of geometry and calculus.
Cf. C. Perelman, âDe la méthode analytique en philosophieâ, Revue philosophique 137 (1947) 34â46.
Perelman, âFragments pour la théorie de la connaissance de M. E. Dupréelâ, 65.