1 The Framework for Liang Qichaoâs Use of Religious Concepts1
Chinese discourses on the role of religion in a modern society developed at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century in a coincidental context whose effects should not be underestimated. Just as key terms in the religious field were undergoing fundamental change, the scientific worldview, and especially Western evolutionary theories, found their way into academic and public discourses.2 In this chapter, I will employ the example of Liang Qichao
As I will here demonstrate by studying the example of Liang Qichao, key concepts from the religious field were deployed with a linear orientation towards the future and shaped by the expectation of progress. In some cases, this expectation of progress far exceeded that which was allocated to the realm of historical experience. This created a veritable overflow of expectation, which represents an essential aspect of temporalization. With respect to the European context, Koselleck hence concludes that fundamental social and political concepts of the threshold period reveal that the â[a]ctual, substantial experience and the space of expectation coincide less and less.â6
Such temporal semantics have considerable significance for the religious concepts in Liang Qichaoâs early thought. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the new, linear view of history grounded in evolutionary theory7 played a decisive role for how Liang coined religious concepts. This enabled Liang to develop his reflections on religion and faith in modern China on the basis of linear-historical analogies and anticipations. He thereby drew direct connections between the alleged progress of Western nations and Chinaâs present outlook, emphatically demanding an orientation towardsâor perhaps better, fixation onâthe future. The terms religion and faith, as Liang applied them, are in this sense temporalized and therefore inextricably embedded in the universalist perspective of a homogenizing realization of âprogressâ and âevolution.â8 This represents a continuity of Liangâs thinking at this point, which should not be forgotten in light of the frequently expressed criticism that he changed his political positions and terms at break-neck, confusing speed in the first half of the 1900s. Moreover, it must be recalled that the paradigmatic status of evolutionary theories in China is expressed less in coherent theses and assumptions, interpretations, and answers, than in how problems were identified and which questions were asked. All his political twists and turns notwithstanding, Liang Qichao steadfastly continued to ask certain questions. This includes the question of the preconditions for the establishment of a modern nation state and a modern society in China. Liang worked from the assumption that the genesis of a modern state and a modern society ultimately depended on impulses rooted in a collective subjectâs mental constitution and will. To be sure, both Liang and mainstream contemporary Chinese intellectuals believed that a modern state and society marked by institutional and functional differentiation had proven themselves to be the only viable options in the contemporary world. Yet they neither perceived the process of modernity as compulsive nor did they believe that contingent factors that eluded the will of the nation, the citizens, the constitutive people etc. played a decisive role in this. When a national crisis was diagnosed and social Darwinist assumptions came into play, therefore, concerted action remained the leading force.9
It is thus no coincidence that Liang composed his major texts on religion and faith at the same time that he advanced his famous works on the ethos of the ânew citizenâ (xinmin
In these years, Liang Qichaoâs writings are undoubtedly deeply influenced by Western and Japanese discourses. His vocabulary sometimes differs only negligibly from Western models and their Japanese adaptations, which applies to the religious field as well. However, the particular historical conditions of concept formation in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China must be taken into account. The paths of conceptual adaptions were transnational, sometimes continental, and the traveling concepts that developed served as more than mere husks for a multi-lingual use of terms. In the present instance, this can be seen primarily in Liangâs strong efforts to deploy Confucian and particularly Buddhist traditions in order to indigenize and ultimately make plausible the postulates of evolutionary theory. As will be shown, he went much further in this than, e.g., Thomas Huxley in Evolution and Ethics (1892), who, inter alia, brought notions of karma from Indian Buddhism close to his understanding of âcharacter.â12
The continental dimension of the formation of key religious concepts also bears fundamental significance for the performative side of concept formation orâto adopt Koselleckâs language once moreâfor the fact that basic political and social concepts were not just indicators of change, but themselves acted as factors of that change.13 Liang and many other Chinese intellectuals of his time believed that the social and political impact of the Western and Japanese concepts introduced to China, including the concept of religion itself, could be anticipated through the study of the Western past and present. This greatly strengthened their expectation of bringing the future within the Chinese presentâs scope of action through conceptual innovation. The battle over concepts could therefore not remain an academic matter. This may be one reason why the pertinent controversies were not fought according to the conventions of academic publishing, nor suggest that the participants even desired a distinction between scholarship and politics.
2 Zongjiao å®æ , xinyang ä¿¡ä»° and Liangâs Shifting View of Confucianism
In 1899, at the start of his exile in Japan, Liang reflected on a âreligious reformâ (zongjiao gaige
The Teaching of the Three Ages from the (annals) Spring and Autumn [however] states that the civilized world will [first come to] be at some other time. Its manifestations belong to the future. (â¦) When it is said that civilization is in the future, that mentality is progressive.16
Liang also brought Buddhism into play in order to dogmatically classify the religious contents of the Confucian Teaching of the Three Ages. To do this, he drew parallels between Confucianism and Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism, honoring those parts of Confucianism he associated with Mahayana and critically denigrating those he saw as overlapping with Hinayana postulates.17 This put Liang on a footing with Buddhist inspired Chinese thinkers of the late nineteenth century, who made positive reference to Mahayana as âChinese cultural heritageâ while vehemently rejecting the âIndianâ Hinayana, whose teachings they identified as an unworldly, Christian-like idea of paradise.18 With the term âbeliefâ (xinyang
About three years later, in February 1902, Liang published the text âPreservation as [Religious] Doctrine Is Not the Way to Exalt Confucius,â which made evident that his understanding of religion had changed. The concept of religion retained its close association to an evolutionary view of history, and so to its temporalizing effects, but the aspect of institutional and functional differentiation in modern societies and a view critical of religion now came to the fore. Looking at the contemporary West, Liang argued that an occasionally antagonistic relationship existed between âreligionâ and âscienceâ and that the former presented a danger to âfreedom of thought.â19 He placed this interpretation in the historic context in which religions were only completely useful to âprogress [of human society]â in the âfirst phase of evolution.â In regards to the contemporary Western societies, however, he underlined the institutional and functional demarcations of âreligionâ and âstate,â as well as âreligion,â âpoliticsâ and âeducation,â and contended that Christianityâs influence in politics and education had dwindled.20
In agreement with this evolutionist view on the history of religion, Liang intervened in the discussion on the relationship between Confucianism and religion. He now opposed the efforts to establish Confucianism as a state religion, efforts that had been underway since Kang Youweiâs memorial to the throne in 1898. Here, Liang clearly separated Confucianism from âreligion.â Confucius, he contended, had spoken exclusively about the (mundane) world, the state as well as the origins of morality and ethics. He was a philosopher, classical scholar, and educator, but not a religious scholar. His teachings did not have the force of religions, but neither did they have their deficiencies.21 In so saying, Liang reconceptualized Confucianism as political ethics, philosophy, and pedagogical teaching, turning it into a foundation for a modern state and society. It is precisely by not being a âreligion,â Liang believed, that Confucianism can remain viable for the future.
In the course of his rejection of Confucianism as a state religion, Liang also undertook a consequential internal differentiation of his concept of zongjiao. He now terminologically distinguished âreligionâ (zongjiao) from âfaithâ (xinyang) and âsuperstitionâ (mixin
3 Liangâs Evolutionist Conceptualization of Religion
Eight months after rejecting the efforts to establish Confucianism as a state religion, Liang published an article on the social Darwinist thought of the British sociologist and âevolutionistâ24 Benjamin Kidd that is instructive in our context. Liang had probably familiarized himself with Kiddâs writings through the Japanese translation of Kiddâs Social Evolution by Tsunoda RyÅ«saku, published in 1899.25
The article on Kidd made very clear that Liang examined religion and religious phenomena above all from the perspective of his reception of social Darwinist theories.26 At the beginning of the article, he placed the concept of religion within the framework of his universalist-progressive understanding of history:
For the past forty years, the world has been a world of evolutionary theories. Materialism prospers while idealism perishes in some distant corner. The sciences ⦠are flourishing, while the religions can barely retain their paltry stumps. Indeed, the evolutionary theories capture the millennia-old foundations of the old teachings in order to break and discard them. They are that through which [the teachings] are renewed.27
However, Liang was not concerned with the question of religionâs continued survival as such, but of religionâs value.28 He consequently followed Benjamin Kiddâs example and applied Social Darwinist postulates on the formation of human society, thereby reaching ethical conclusions.29 In particular, this included an ethic of individual sacrifice for oneâs collective that rooted in an evolutionist conception of death and the future (see below). Liangâs interest in the topics of individual sacrifice and view of death was kindled by contemporary Japanese discussions. As Mori explains, âthe problem of âdeath and nondeathâ and the problem of the âextinguishing and nonextinguishingâ of spirit ⦠was frequently taken up in Japan at that time â¦ââfor example, âToyama Masakazu, a former Shogunal official, had spoken of the âconsciousness that fosters developmentâ.â30 But whereas Toyama had broached this subject in the course of his critique of Kidd,31 Liang incorporated it in his enthusiastic adaption of Kiddâs thought.
In his article on Kidd, Liang clarified his perspective on the ethic of individual sacrifice by criticizing other social Darwinist theories as well as political and social theories. He thus differentiated the teachings of Kiddâa ârevolutionaryâ of evolutionary theoriesâfrom those of Darwin. While Darwin considered the present benefit of the individual or the âmajority of the speciesâ to form the core of evolutionary theory, Kidd, Liang argued, located the evolutionary goal in the future. Following this interpretation, Kidd saw lifeâs aim in the necessity of sacrificing the benefit of individual bodies (fenti
According to Liang, contemporary political and social theories gave insufficient consideration to this ethical consequence of evolutionary theory. This can be seen, Liang wrote, in the mistakes inherent in their conceptions of the present and future. In contrast to Kidd, according to whom the significance of revolution lies in its ability to produce the future, political and social theories had so far failed to give enough weight to the future in its relation to the present.34 Liang therefore cited Kidd to condemn utilitarianism, the ideas of the French revolution, those of German social democracy as well as the theories of Herbert Spencer for fixating on the self-interests âin the presentâ (xianzai
Rooted in this criticism of social and political theories, Liang followed Kidd to determine the socio-political and ethical importance of religion in the present:
⦠the selfish spirit [oriented] on the present is called ânaturalness.â Kidd believes that this naturalness is the most âindividual,â âunsocialâ and ânon-progressiveâ part of the human character. It (=naturalness) in no way aids but rather damages progress in preserving humanity as a whole. According to Kidd, restraint must be of primary significance for the progress of humanity. What is restraint? It is that with which religions sanction naturalness. If one wants community,37 if one wants progress, one has no choice but to suffer such sanctions. Religions are the antagonist and the supplement of naturalness. Often, religions and the bad trait of human naturalness will stand in opposition, and it is only afterwards that the unification of human communities can be advanced in order to effectuate their progress.38
âNaturalnessâ is here an ethical concept under which Liang subsumed the above-named fixation on self-interests âin the present,â which he stamped as âunsocial,â âan enemy of progressâ and therefore harmful to the existence of humanity. Whosoever pursues this fixation, Liang commented in agreement with Kidd, makes himself a âcriminalâ against evolutionary theories.39 This seemed to replicate one of Kiddâs central ideasâthat moral progress consisted in the subordination of individual egoisms to the good of the whole.40 Insofar as religions enhance such moral progress, they bear a fundamental significance for the reproduction of modern societies and the process of civilization. In accordance, Liang remarked the following in his travel notes from his multi-month trip to the USA and Canada in 1903:
The motives of Europeans and Americans are not all the same, but in my estimation the most important are their love of beauty, concern for social honor, and the idea of the future in their religion (emphasis addedâTF). These three are at the root of the development of Western spiritual civilization, and are what we Chinese lack most â¦41
In relation to Liangâs conceptualization of religion in connection with his progressivist view of history, however, the importance of âreligions,â as we have seen, was rather inexorably dwindling and was to vanish completely in a future period of âcivilization.â Liang consequently sidelined, in the aftermath of his reception of Kidd, the concept of religion, zongjiao, in favor of concepts such as âfaith,â âreligious thought,â âreligious spiritâ or âview of death and life.â Obviously, the institutionalized, clerical form of âreligionâ was no longer a central point of reference in Liangâs reflections on the foundations of a modern Chinese nation state.
4 From âReligious Thoughtâ to âCognizant Faithâ
In his article âOn the Merits and Demerits, Successes and Failure of Religious Personalities and Philosophers,â which appeared two weeks after his article on Kiddâs evolutionary theory, Liang again highlighted the concept of zongjiao, but eventually sidelined it in favor of the concept of âreligious thoughtâ (zongjiao sixiang
In contrast, the âmorality of religionsâ (zongjiao zhi daode
The substance of the further postulates on religious thought is closely related, whereby Liangâs explanations were marked by a multitude of cursory references to Western and Eastern philosophy and religion. Liang obviously wanted to bind the ethical practice of the evolutionary theories he had addressed in his article on Kidd to religious phenomena. In his second and third points,51 he accordingly claimed that religious thought strengthened oneâs vigor as well as oneâs orientation towards the future, undimmed by materialistic calculation of profit. This would happen because man would recognize the transient nature of materialistic desires, and the self would then manage to free itself from calculations of profit. Fourthly, religious thought built moral barriers through the dissemination of fear, preventing evil from being done. Liang was following Confucius, among others, when he found that fear prevented âthe lesserâ from doing evil. Christian and Buddhist dogmas, Liang believed, fulfilled a similar function. Dogmas such as the âLast Judgementâ may be shallow, but they are sufficient to fill âpersons of medium or low positionâ with dread. The Buddhist teaching of retribution for committed offences similarly produces fear.52 The fifth and last point discusses manâs âdetermination,â which Liang believed to be strengthened when religious thought removes the paralyzing fear of death.53
Two months after the publication of âOn the Merits and Demerits, Successes and Failures of Religious Personalities and Philosophers,â Liang came out decisively in favor of the Buddhist faith as the form of religious thought most appropriate for contemporary China. A practical interest remained the starting point of his reflections on the subject of religion, as the introductory sentences of his article âOn the Relationship between Buddhism and Social Orderâ made clear: âThere is a big question concerning the future of our homeland: âShould Chinaâs social order be gained and advanced through [religious] faith or without itâ?â54 The concepts of religion and civilization retained their temporalizing perspective when Liang claimed that the historical pinnacle of human civilization had not yet been reached and that religion and faith therefore continued to play a significant role in the formation of human society.55 The concepts of religions as well as of âreligious thoughtâ and âreligious faith,â however, now receded as the concept of âfaithâ (xinyang) took on a more prominent role.
In this context, Liang made a turn towards Buddhismânot Buddhism in its institutional form as a âreligion,â however, but Buddhism as âfaith.â Once again, therefore, the internal differentiation between religion and faith moved to the center of Liangâs work. Directly after the above-cited introductory sentences of his article, Liang found that faith must be rooted in religion. From this, he derived the following question: âSince China needs faith, which religion shall the faithful be a part of?â56 He considered neither Confucianism, which he had ceased to view as a religion in 1902, nor Christianity viable options for China. He consequently dedicated the majority of the article to a practically motivated apologia of the Buddhist faith.
As before, Liang identified the leading criterion for judging the practical significance of the Buddhist faith in the perspective of his social Darwinist interpretation of the social process. The Buddhist faith therefore appeared to be significant due to its ability to help individuals realize ethical demands that correspond to evolutionist postulates on human society. Liang accordingly underlined the willingness to make sacrifices and the selflessness of the individual encouraged by the Buddhist faith, but also the fundamental attention to worldly and thus civilizational matters, and vigorously defended Buddhism against the common criticism that it encourages an unworldly attitude.57 The core of Liangâs reflections on the Buddhist faith was its purpose as a âcognizant faithâ (zhi xinyang
Buddhismâs strongest guiding principle is âcompassion and wisdom [signifying a] two-folded cultivation.â From the beginning of making up oneâs mind to the attainment of Buddhahood, a major undertaking is transforming superstition and realizing awakening. This so-called awakening, meanwhile, does not mean only recognizing that Buddha exists [in awakening] and believing in this blindly. (â¦) In accordance with that which other doctrines call faith, the wisdom of the religionâs founders is believed to be out of reach for the faithful. They therefore believe that strengthening their faith counts as a successful result. In that which Buddhism terms faith, the wisdom of the faithful is considered something that can be of equal value to [the wisdom of] the founder of the religion.58
This reveals a further, practical facet of Liangâs interest in Buddhism, yet one that he did not elaborate on at this point: As a cognizant faith, Buddhism seemed superbly suited to laying the groundwork for the intra-societal coexistence of religious faith and science.
5 From Faith to Attitude: Liangâs âView of Death and Lifeâ
At the turn from 1904 to 1905, Liang published the two-part article âMy View of Death and Lifeâ (Yu zhi si sheng guan
The concept of âviewâ made it possible, on the one hand, for Liang to underline the ethical primacy of evolutionary theories, and disseminating the view of death and life promised, on the other, to increase the reputation of evolutionary theories and science as such in Chinese society. Tellingly, he complained here that scientific insights were adopted only gradually in China.61 From this perspective of realizing the scientific âcivilization,â Liang anticipated the socio-political relevance of the view of death and life, which lay in the connection between religious faith und evolutionary theory. To be sure, Liangâs interest was as before practical, focused on the mental foundations of the modern nation state and modern society.
The central topos of the view of death and life is immortality. Liang treated this topos in his âStudies on Deathâ (si xue
The first half of the text is dedicated to proving that all above-named religious and intellectual currents postulate an immortal part of human existence. It shall suffice to discuss the quintessence of Liangâs reflections, and to put the remainder of his partially comprehensive, annotated remarks aside. His discussions of Christianity and Confucianism in particular do not need to be recounted in detail.64
In relation to Buddhism, Liang highlighted the teaching that all phenomena were temporary in their becoming and passing. The only thing that lasts is the continuous succession of cause and effect, karma (jiemo
Karma and character, according to Liang, are part and parcel of a causal chain that continues on into infinity and influences future life as a whole. This causal chain does not exhaust itself in individual experiences of personal, earlier consequencesâas Liang underlines by juxtaposing the conceptions of âthe transmigration of the soulâ (lunhui
From a practical perspective, however, Liang pointed to a strong difference between Buddhism and evolutionary theories. The influence of Buddhaâs teachings had produced no âdeedsâ because the adherents aimed for âliberationâ (of the self from outer constraints) and to leave this world behind. The evolutionary theories, meanwhile, encouraged good deeds because they placed the struggle for existence and the improvement of the world foremost. Against the backdrop of this comparative examination, Liang brought his view of death and life into play. He wished to go beyond both Buddhism and evolutionary theories, as can be seen terminologically first of all in his declaration that he was calling âspiritâ (jingshen) that which the evolutionary theories termed âinheritabilityâ and Buddhism âkarma.â69 The view of death and life rested primarily on the concept of the Great Self and the related notion of âSmall Selfâ (xiao wo
That which rises up high until today and does not die is the self. That which was plundered thousands upon thousands of times in the past thousands upon thousands of years but did not die is [also] the self. Why is this so? The reason lies in the fact that the self possesses a collective body. The selfâs family does not die, and so neither does the self; the selfâs state does not die, and so neither does the self; the selfâs community does not die, and so neither does the self; the selfâs world does not die, and so neither does the self; even the selfâs great garden of the bhÅ«tatathatÄ does not die, and so neither does the self. (â¦) What does the Great Self mean? [It means that] the self is the collective body. What does the Small Self mean? [It means that] the self is the individual body.72
These statements are connected to a normative claim: According to Liang, insight into the immortality of the Great Self means responsibility. The lack of such insight leads to a misguided, purely materialistic, individualistic understanding of happiness and hinders, Liang argued, the development of appropriate conceptions of society and the future.73 Insofar as man knows of the Great Self and recognizes his responsibility, he experiences his present existence as the âSmall Self,â that is, as an âindividual unitâ (geti
Liangâs conception of the Great Self, which does not represent an entity autonomous of the Small Self, may avoid ham-fisted collectivism, but it remains completely vague from a moral-philosophical point of view. How is the individual to decide between two entities that he is a part of simultaneously, such as his family and the state, or his religious community and society? This remains unresolved. An orientation on the interests of the respectively larger entity, in this case the state or society, at the expense of the family or local religious community would become unsustainable as soon as the interests of humanity are brought into play. It is hardly a coincidence that Liang did not even attempt such reflections. The view of death and life is obviously just thatâa âviewâ that expresses an ethical attitude. It is not the foundation of a moral philosophy, political ethics or a religious doctrine.
Insofar as the view of death and life was intended to call forth a profound attitude of personal responsibility, putting death itself within the scope of the individualâs responsibility, it becomes clear that Liang highlighted once again the category of action. His adaptions of Buddhism as well as evolutionary theory are then also marked by the fact that they remain free of any appearance of fatalism or determinism. The imperative of a new view or attitude that postulates the world as the object of action becomes clearly visible. This is the âsupra-religiousâ character of Liangâs view of death and life, which promises neither relief for the conscience nor salvation, and remains open towards various professions of faith.
6 Concluding Remarks
Liang chose the words to designate his âview of death and lifeâ carefully, consciously avoiding the more common wording âview of life and death.â Based on what he believed evolutionary theory had postulated, he wanted to demonstrate that an ethically adequate view of life and death had to start from the acknowledgment of death as the precondition for the reproduction of life. In other words, death was not to denote contingency and meaninglessness, but instead should be regarded as a premise for the possibility of improving the actions of future generations. This conception of death constituted an extreme manifestation of Liangâs basic orientation towards the postulate of the malleability of history through concerted action. In doing so, Liang drew on an amalgamation of evolutionary theory and Buddhism that he had construed during the early 1900s and finally presented as his own âview of death and life.â The salient feature of Liangâs âviewâ is the assumption that science (evolutionary theories), religion and faith (Buddhism) all belong to the ethical preconditions for building modern society in general, and a modern nation state in particular. This was, arguably, the dominant perspective of his interest in Buddhist faith and the idea of the Great Self.
By the mid-1900s, however, Liang had dogmatically gutted the Buddhist faith. Both Pusey and Chang Hao interpret Liangâs notion of Buddhism in this manner. Pusey explains that Liang had ââsocializedââ the notion of karma âin two waysâ: once with his claim that âfamilies, clans, races and countries all had collective karmas,â and once by â[d]enying the doctrine of reincarnation,â with the consequence that now âonly society ⦠could suffer or enjoy the fruits of oneâs deeds.â76 Chang Hao reaches a similar conclusion about Liangâs writings on Buddhism when he assesses that Liang was more concerned with culturally affirming his ânew civic valuesâ than with achieving an âobjective presentation of Buddhist doctrines.â77 In this context, Pusey speaks of Liangâs âDarwinian Buddhism.â78 Liangâs contention with Buddhism indeed suggests that from 1904/05 onwards at the latest, he was primarily concerned with using a gutted Buddhist language to transpose his idiosyncratic appropriation of evolutionary theories into an âattitude.â
Overall, it seems as though Liang in 1904/05 took his earlier belief that religions could serve as a conductor for the socio-political efficacy of evolutionary theories in the modern world and, as it were, secularised it. In so doing, âreligious faithâ served as a conceptual hinge for Liangâs attempt to incorporate the whole field of religions into Social Darwinist ethics. It is therefore no coincidence that he explained his understanding of âreligious faithâ by referring to a particularly broad range of religious convictions (Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism etc.). At the same time, this allowed him to convey the impression that Social Darwinian ethics had an interreligious, or even nondenominational, foundation. For someone such as Liang, who had turned to the subject of religion in the context of addressing the question of Chinaâs national unity and socio-political reforms, this must have been a promising outlook. Equally important, by outlining this quasi-reconciliation of religion and science, Liang must have been convinced that he had opened up a perspective from which to offer a renewed understanding of indigenous âreligious thought,â and Buddhism in particular. In Liangâs eyes, such a reinterpretation might even help prevent a clash of religious thought and faith with progress in contemporary scientific civilization. For Liang, then, the reconstruction of religious faith signified an important step in temporalizing the conceptual field of religions so as to inscribe it into his progressivist, universalist and homogenizing linear view of history.
The fact that Liang eventually replaced the concept of faith with that of a âview of death and lifeâ should not be taken as evidence for his depreciation of religion. It might as well be the case that Liang wanted to preserve the autonomy of the religious field by upholding, at least to a certain degree, the conceptual distinction between religious faith and a view or attitude fostered by Social Darwinism. Chinese intellectual circles that vehemently advocated various brands of scientism discarded this distinction soon thereafter. It was Hu Shi who most prominently discussed the idea of the âGreat Selfâ in this context.79 Significantly, Hu essentially reduced the Great Self to an expression of his own faith in the omnipotence of science.80 The belief in the âGreat Selfâ became, as it were, the matter of an allegedly rational faith in science, which was expected to facilitate the comprehensive social diffusion of the scientific worldview. In contrast, Liang Qichao was becoming increasingly skeptical towards euphoric expectations regarding the progress of scientific civilization after World War One.81 It is therefore unsurprising that he seemingly abandoned, by the 1920s, his earlier attempt to integrate religious faith and evolutionary theory into a view of death and life. Equally unsurprising, Hu Shi disregarded Liangâs earlier reflection on the Great Self when he publicly confessed his belief in the immortality of the Great Self against the backdrop of his efforts to propagate a âscientific view of lifeâ in China.
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Much of this text is grounded in preliminary work from my article âDas GroÃe Ich: Religion, Evolution und Entpolitisierung bei Liang Qichao (1873â1929),â published in Oriens Extremus 41, no. 1/2 (1998/99), 193â210. In the course of reworking the older text, I have rethought Liang Qichaoâs understanding of âreligion,â âreligious thought,â âfaith,â and âviewâ and reached conclusions that partially diverge from my previous findings. I have also used the opportunity to make additions and correct some inaccuracies.
Many studies exist on the swift victory of evolutionary theories in China in the late Qing period. Their conclusions offer a comprehensive picture of the adaptions of evolutionary theories in China and Japan. See, e.g.: Pusey 1983, Furth 1983, Li 1993, Shen 2017.
Koselleckâs research on conceptual history focuses on the formative period of European modernity, and in particular on the so-called threshold period (c.1750â1850) in Germany; see Koselleck 2011, 15.
Koselleck 2011, 10.
Obviously, my article is not a comprehensive historical study of the concepts of âreligionâ and âfaithâ in the tradition of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Rather, I am arguing that the aspect of temporalization, which Koselleck regards as a key to understanding the genesis of modern political and social concepts, should receive more attention in the field of modern Chinese intellectual history.
Koselleck 2004, 80.
Comprehensive research meanwhile exists on the formation of the linear view of history in Chinaâsee for example: Wang 2008. Murthy; Schneider, eds. 2014.
On the formation of progressivist historical thinking in modern China before 1949, see Chinese Visions of Progress, 1895â1949, edited by Thomas Fröhlich and Axel Schneider (Leiden: Brill, 2020).
This had become clear even before Liang, in Yan Fuâs reception of evolutionary theories. Regarding Yan Fu, I study this decisive aspect of the diagnosis of a national crisis in Fröhlich 2020b.
Liangâs writings on religion and faith that I examine here appeared in his New Citizen Journal (Xinmin congbao
On this, see Fröhlich 2020a.
See the following passage by Huxley: âEveryday experience familiarizes us with the facts which are grouped under the name of heredity. Every one of us bears upon him obvious marks of his parentage, perhaps of remoter relationships. More particularly, the sum of tendencies to act in a certain way, which we call âcharacter,â is often to be traced through a long series of progenitors and collaterals. So we may justly say that this âcharacterââthis moral and intellectual essence of manâdoes veritably pass over from one fleshly tabernacle to another, and does really transmigrate from generation to generation. (â¦) The Indian philosophers called character, as thus defined, âkarma.â It is this karma which passed from life to life and linked them in the chain of transmigrations; and they held that it is modified in each life, not merely by confluence of parentage, but by its own acts. They were, in fact, strong believers in the theory, so much disputed just at present, of the hereditary transmission of acquired characters. (â¦) Indian philosophy, however, did not admit of any doubt on this subject; the belief in the influence of conditions, notably of self-discipline, on the karma was not merely a necessary postulate of its theory of retribution, but it presented the only way of escape from the endless round of transmigrations.â Huxley 1997, 317.
Koselleck 2011, 8.
The expression zongjiao was in use in Chinese to translate âreligionâ at this time, but had not yet established itself. The identical Japanese expression shÅ«kyÅ, in contrast, had been wide-spread in Japan since the 1880s; see Sun 2015, 79â80.
Liang 1989 [May 1899], 55.
Liang 1989 [May 1899], 58.
Liang 1989 [May 1899], 56. Among other things, Liang connects the notion of Great Unity, da tong
Chan 1985, 40, 137, 144. Liangâs study of Buddhism began as early as 1881 under the tutelage of Kang Youwei. According to Chan, Buddhist ideas received almost no reception with regard to political reform before the reform efforts of Kang Youwei and Zhang Binglin; see Chan 1985, 49.
Liang 1989 [Feb. 1902], 52.
Liang 1989 [Feb. 1902], 51â54.
Liang 1989 [Feb. 1902], 58.
Liang 1989 [Feb. 1902], 52.
Liang 1989 [Feb. 1902], 52.
Pusey 1983, 280. Liang had previously published a brief introduction to Kiddâs Principles of Western Civilization in Xinmin congbao (Issue 15, July 1902); see Mori 2004, 238.
A Chinese translation of Social Evolution by Timothy Richards was published in the same year in Wanguo gongbao
In their studies on Liangâs reception of Kiddâs evolutionary theory, Pusey and Chang treat the topic of religion only marginally; see Pusey 1983, 285; Chang 1971, 173.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 1902], 79.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 1902], 80.
In the article, Liang is almost certainly referring to Kiddâs 1894 book Social Evolution, which was translated worldwide and remained Kiddâs sole big success; see Davies 1927, 305â306; see also Mori 2004, 239. In addition, Liang referred to Kiddâs 1902 Principles of Western Civilization at the beginning of his article.
Mori 2004, 242.
Mori 2004, 239.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 1899], 78â80.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 1899], 81. This evolutionist understanding of the meaning of death is presumably the reason Liang turned to his âStudies on Deathâ two years later. In his article on Kidd, he was taking on a discussion of the defects of religious and philosophical understandings of death (in Confucianism, Daoism, the Egyptian cult of the dead, Brahman teachings, Christianity, and Buddhism) and contrasting them with Kiddâs âscientificâ understanding of âdeath,â which did not transcend the ârealm of life.â Liang 1989 [Oct. 1899], 82â84.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 1899], 84.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 1899], 84â86.
Liang, 1989 [Oct. 1899], 86.
The translation of qun
Liang 1989 [Oct. 1899], 80.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 1899], 79.
On Kidd, compare Davies 1927, 305â306.
Ebrey, ed. 1993, 339; the translation in Ebreyâs compendium is taken from: R. David Arkush and Leo O. Lee trans. and ed., 1989, Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 31 1899], 44â46. For the term âfaithâ (xin
Liang 1989 [Oct. 31 1899], 49.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 31 1899], 49. Liang had previously addressed the principle of freedom of religion in his text âPreservation as [Religious] Doctrine Is Not the Way to Exalt Confuciusâ in more detail; see Liang 1989, 54â55.
Liang believed that the moral quality of religion was rooted in the âsincerityâ of its believers; see Liang 1989, 49. This definition of the socio-political significance of religion as a means of moral education of the citizens can already be found in the writings of Kang Youwei and Tan Sitong
Liang 1989 [Oct. 31 1899], 46.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 31 1899], 46.
The dogmatic openness of this conception of religious thought is also revealed in Liangâs chosen historical perspective. He claimed that the majority of historyâs âheroesâ had possessed âreligious thought.â He counted Oliver Cromwell, Jeanne dâArc, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, und Giuseppe Mazzini among these heroes. He also mentioned Kang Youwei and Tan Sitong with the remark that they had studied Buddhism and, although their philosophy was neither particularly original nor profound, their religious thought had enabled them to ârock the universeâ; see Liang 1989 [Oct. 31 1899], 45.
The term si yu is closely related to the conception of the ânaturalnessâ of man that Liang introduced in his article on Kidd, which must be restrained to enable the formation of society.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 31 1899], 46.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 31 1899], 46â47.
Liang 1989 [Oct. 31 1899], 47â48.
Both points contain substantial and terminological overlaps with the âview of death and lifeâ, which Liang would reconceptualize two years later (see below). This also includes the Buddhist influenced discussion of a âbitter selfâ (ku wo
Liang 1989 [Dec. 30 1902], 45.
Liang 1989 [Dec. 30 1902], 45.
Liang 1989 [Dec. 30 1902], 45. Liang used the term jingjiao
Liang 1989 [Dec. 30 1902], 45, 48.
Liang 1989 [Dec. 30 1902], 46.
Liang 1989 [Dec. 30 1902], 46. The more barbaric a state, the more important religions are to unite the will of the people. However, if the highest point of civilisation has been reached in the world, the unity is completed through the âautonomous powersâ of the people; ibid.
Liang 1989 [1904], 4.
Liang 1989 [1904], 7.
Liang 1989 [1904], 1â2. Liang avoided the contested concept of the soul; on this concept, compare Liebenthal 1952.
Liang here spoke of jingjiao and explained that this is the teaching of a Christian sect that developed among the followers of Nestorius, a patriarch of Constantinople (428â431) and reached China in the Tang dynasty; on this, see also: Ren 1981, 1016. As mentioned, Liang also used jingjiao to refer to Christianity in general.
In both cases, Liang was primarily concerned with proving that the adherents believe in something immortal, be it the soul or, within the family and clan, the continuing impact of the deceasedâs past deeds as well as, in a broader context, the immortality of glory. Liang 1989 [1904], 5 (Christianity), 6 (Confucianism).
On Huxleyâs use of âcharacterâ and âkarma,â see above my quotation of the passage from Evolution and Ethics.
With the expression âold Indian religion,â Liang was presumably referring primarily to the âBrahman teachingsâ he mentioned elsewhere (see below).
Liang 1989 [1904], 2â3. Pusey points out that Liangâs use of âunitâ (phonetically translated as yaoni
Liang 1989 [1904], 3â4. Pusey examined the misunderstandings in Liangâs fragmentary readings of Darwin up to the year 1904, but without taking into account the Japanese reception of Social Darwinism. Philip Huang filled this gap and reached the conclusion that Liangâs study of social-Darwinist teachings was shaped less by Yan Fu than by KatÅ Hiroyukiâs (1836â1916) nationalist âinternational Darwinism.â Pusey 1983, 300â301, 306; Huang 1972, 87.
Liang 1989 [1904], 4â5.
Ren 1981, 48â49; Japanese-English Buddhist Dictionary, 38; Zhongwen da cidian, vol. 2, 5960.448; Raguin 1986, 368.
On this, see also Duan 2012, 177.
Liang 1989 [1904], 8.
Liang 1989 [1904], 9.
Liang was here quoting from Yang Duâs (1875â1931) preface to Liangâs text The Chinese Way of the Warrior (Zhongguo zhi wushi dao, 1904), in which Yang further argued that this relationship between the spirit and â(messenger-)bodyâ (Yang spoke of shen
Liang 1989 [1904], 9.
Pusey 1983, 297â298. Like Pusey, I am not able to judge whether Liang performed this adaption of the notion of karma âon his own authority or with the backing of some unspecified Buddhist schoolâ (ibid. 297).
Chang 1971, 237.
Pusey 1983, 293. Chang Hao similarly sees a âcollectivistic view of karmaâ in Liangâs understanding of Buddhism; see Chang 1971, 276.
See Huâs article entitled âBu xiuâwo de zongjiao
In his âPreface to [the Collected Contributions to the Debate on] Science and View of Life,â Hu designated the faith in the Great Self as the âhighest religionâ and integrated it into the âten commandmentsâ of his ânew view of life.â The latter was based on Huâs understanding of science, and in particular on his adoption of evolutionary theory; see Hu 1923, 25â27.
Kwok 1965, 136â139.