Introduction
Information gathered from our respondents and participant observation indicates that many new Muslims encounter the Salafi version of Islam first. The popularity of the Salafi message among converts may be explained by its reluctance to leave anything for interpretation Such certainty is likely to be attractive to newcomers who sometimes struggle to find their own way through the labyrinth of the new religion. Another factor could be the ubiquity of the current achieved through intense missionary activity â lectures, meetings, courses, and popular websites (Shanneik, 2011; Inge, 2016). Further, as most Polish converts come from practising Roman Catholic families and were educated in Catholicism, a tradition that offers a uniform and highly organised message created by a centralised institution, Salafism seems an obvious current of Islam to embrace. Many scholars, such as Rambo (1993, p. 5) or Wohlraab-Sahr (2006, p. 75) acknowledge that conversion is influenced by events that an individual has experienced in earlier life. These are: socialisation, including religious socialisation, institutions, ideologies, and the social and political environments the convert has lived in. Another factor contributing to the attractiveness of Salafism could be the monoreligious character of Polish society and the lack of knowledge of other religious traditions. In this respect, however, many our respondents do not seem representative for the general population of Polish Muslims. Some of them had encountered other religious traditions, be it through university, travelling abroad, family connections, or oneâs own religious explorations. Nonetheless, little knowledge of Islamâs traditions and its pluralistic character is not characteristic of convertsâ only. The same phenomenon has been observed in born Muslims who chose Salafism â although they had been raised in Muslim families and had received basic religious education, they were still unaware of Islamâs diversity and its intellectual richness (Inge, 2016).
Irish converts, whose traditionally Catholic upbringing and cultural background was similar to that of Polish Muslims, were perceived by Shanneik (2011, p. 511), who studied them in the 80s, to have chosen Salafism as a reflection of the Catholic habitus acquired early in life. âThe converts search for a univocal system that sets the norms and values of the individual on a daily basis. This pre-set plan of life that has parallels to the convertsâ former Catholic habitus that guarantees the correctness of their self-imposed identity of a true Salafi Muslim.â (Shanneik, 2011, p. 512). Salafism fills the void left by a life organised by the Catholic Church â âSince social authority and pressure no longer play such a role in society, converts need to be constantly reminded of hell and salvation expressed in halal and haram. While in the past the converts were passive and oppressed followers of the rules and standards of the Church and community, they are now following their own rules and judge others according to their own set standards. Converts tend to use the univocal system of norms and values set by religion to construct a community that enforces rules on individuals and which acts as compensation for the lack of social pressure.â (Shanneik, 2011, p. 513). Further she sees the Catholic habitus when converts âhaving experienced disorientation and instability, follow male authority figures who initiated them to Islam. The mentoring role of senior male figures (â¦) suggests a continuation of the Catholic habitus in its patriarchal form.â (p. 513)
The picture presented by Shanneik may be applied not only to a description of Polish Salafi women activities, but also of the relations they enter into with male activists of Muslim organisations and imams of Polish mosques, which constitute a repetition of the Catholic priest-female parishioner relation. As Shanneik states, âConverts reactivate former social structures and religious control through the construction of a new form of religious habitus.â (Shanneik, 2011, p. 513) While playing the role of a parishioner for the imam, the convert becomes a preacher for her fellow believers on the Internet. This is where she preaches âherâ truth ex catedra and chastises those who do not follow the rules she deems to be correct.
Polish Salafis are equally prone to following individuals (local imams, religious activists) or texts, especially ones found online (very often anonymous texts of unknown origin circulating on the Internet) and to granting themselves the right to their own, wholly arbitrary, interpretations of texts which they later impose on others. This is contrary to the Irish converts studied by Shanneik, whom she calls âatypicalâ Irish converts, [who], however, avoid any individual engagement with Islamic texts and rely on âreligious male authoritiesâ (Shanneik, 2011, pp. 512â513). We also need to remember that the Muslims she studied in the late 80s would not have used the Internet.
We are inclined to think that the tendency to interpret Islamic teachings individually is intensifying. This phenomenon was described by Piela (2012), who studied English-language online groups dominated by mostly American converts. We believe that such behaviour is characteristic not only for Salafis, but also for beginner Muslims in general, who are âunconscious Salafisâ.
Our respondents say that the period of interest in Salafism is often characterised by the need to follow all religious rules, often described as ârestrictiveâ, and enforce them on other Muslims. This attitude is often described in the interviews as âradicalismâ. Our respondents and forum users charge Salafis with embracing a Catholic-style cult of martyrdom and suffering. According to one user, they âturn life into some grim tomb without joy, music, celebration, colourful robes and beautyâ. Shanneik writes in a similar vein about the Irish Salafis. âThe converts believe that in order to reach salvation, a Muslim should sacrifice and devote him/herself to Allah through following strictly the Islamic sourcesâ (Shanneik, 2011, p. 505).
The stories of conversion add up to form a sketch of a trajectory that consists of stages shared by many Polish converts. After the initial period of individual searching comes the stage of socialisation. It is common for the converts to join groups dominated by the Salafi discourse or simply to find it the most useful narrative from among those available. Salafis willingly engage in introducing new members, following the obligation of preaching to both existing and potential Muslims. Inge writes (2016, p. 8): âFar from hiding their beliefs, Salafis consider it an important religious duty to âgive daÊ¿wahâ â that is, to proselytize â to those who in their view have not grasped âpureâ Islam, whether they are Muslim or not.â
Not all converts have been through a period of Salafism, yet those who have not are usually either persons very independent in their theological searches or ones who converted to Islam in prior to the time in which Internet became widely available in Polish homes. âThe Salafi stageâ of the conversion trajectory often ends with a crisis resulting in a dramatic departure from Islam or developing a middle position. It is also possible to remain a âmatureâ Salafi, yet such cases do not seem to be numerous, and certainly not among Muslims residing in Poland. One ought to remember, however, that the time period covered by our research is very short. Most of the conversions span over 10â15 years, the longest-lasting one being 27 years and the shortest 2. Thus, speaking of âremaining a Salafiâ might signify a period of many years.
The story told by Patrycja and her own reflections pertaining to her trajectory seem very typical here. Following the events she discusses below, Patrycja completed a course in theology, which enables her to assess her initial choices not only from her personal perspective, but also from that of Islamic theology:
Maybe now it is changing, but even ten years ago most religion classes and lectures were still (â¦) ones promoting a certain version of Islam and it is usually that pure, puristic one ⦠(â¦) Such a version of purism, of this black-and-white attitude to life, which is not bad, but is not suitable for everyone at every stage. You need some knowledge to recognise (â¦) where the person who (â¦) is giving the lecture, where they are from. In this intellectual and geographical sense, (â¦.) I was deeply fascinated by the Islam (â¦) I was listening to such things about which I did not know that they were not wholly suitable for me and there are multiple issues for a beginner, somehow, when she meets them suddenly, ones related to the social sphere, which might be quite problematic, such as being with non-Muslim family being haram, shaking somebodyâs hand being haram, (â¦) saying merry Christmas being haram. Everything, everything suddenly becomes haram. (Patrycja)
Anatolia, who has completed the whole journey from Salafism to Sufism (yet defines herself predominantly as Sunni) still highly values multiple aspects of Salafism, finding it a useful introduction to be utilised in teaching Islam to beginner Muslims due to the unambiguous character of Salafi teachings:
People give a lot of false information in all the discussions. I was initially convinced that all I was reading had to be true etc. Also, many of the sources I was reading at the beginning were Salafi ones I do not recognise as legitimate now. Not simply because I do not like them. (â¦) Rather, it is not my cup of tea anymore. But surely, what I do appreciate in Salafism is that those are such very concrete things. When thereâs the question of whether XYZ is allowed, the answer is: no, it isnât; or: yes, it is, because so and so; and not, as it is in the mainstream, that everything is relative etc. Yes, I think that for a beginner such concrete things, answers to questions, are needed to find some direction. (â¦) it did not discourage me personally. However, some of the things I was reading were radical to the point of being extremist, and that quite terrified me. But I could somehow (â¦) explain it to myself. (â¦) there was the famous (â¦) [one of the respondentâs groupâs members], because his views were (â¦) so extremist, (â¦) it was terrifying for me (â¦) So, usually when he wrote something, I would rush to someone and ask whether it was true, because I donât believe itâs true [laughter]. (Anatolia)
Sometimes, the âSalafi agentâ at the beginning of our respondentsâ paths was their husband, partner or an acquaintance introducing the convert to Islamic matters. Danutaâs husband, born a Muslim, initially under significance influence of Salafi ideas, eventually became a follower of the Sufi version of Islam with her:
I travelled such a path, I met the husband and his Islam, it is more Salafi. (â¦) But I thank him that he was searching as well and also became interested in Sufism, and because of that, we could achieve something together. (Danuta)
Even though (as our observations suggest) it seems that peak popularity of the Salafi current in Poland is already a thing of the past, it still attracts new Muslims. Respondentsâ first interactions with Salafi teachings happen predominantly in Salafi-oriented Internet groups. (RaÄius, 2011). Such a confrontation is often the beginning of a revision of oneâs attitude to Islamic teachings and its authorities, providing inspiration for oneâs own research. Those converts for whom encountering Salafism prompted a search for their own way, emphasise the role of rational thinking, an inner emotional compass and âcommon senseâ as the sole and ultimate signposts helping them navigate their religious dilemmas and searches among the wide offer in the Islamic market of ideas. Similar observations are made by Inge (2016) about British Salafi women, yet the criteria appear much simpler here. âThey were often guided simply by what âfeels rightâ or âwrongâ, as well as by how âIslamicâ a preacher appeared.â Some of our respondents speak about the significance of common sense which made them feel impervious to the Salafi discourse.
For Anna, the âinner compassâ was vital follow from the very beginning of her conversion. She comes from an atheist family, but, to avoid social ostracism, she was sent to Catholic instruction classes, while simultaneously being told by her parents ânone of this is trueâ. Before Islam, she had experiences with other religions as well. She was attracted by the universalist and spiritual values of religion, while a deeper study of Islam was spurred by external motives â as a convert, she had to answer her friendsâ questions:
I took what I liked (â¦), if something spoke to me (â¦) and that was, I guess, a kind of a healthy approach, and at some point, some 2 years after converting to Islam (â¦) I started investigating more and that didnât even come from within myself, it was just that when people around me were learning I was a Muslim, they would ask me about different things in Islam, about which I, quite naturally, didnât know, because my progress was, to an extent, based on my feelings, I also wanted to learn some things, I also didnât aim at immediately waking up as that 100% Muslim the next day. (Anna)
In the world of âthe chaos of Polish Islamâ (a reference to the haphazard institutional organization of Muslim life in Poland made by another respondent, Beata), treating oneâs own intuition, feelings and rational thinking as guides in religious life is a warranty of a spiritual wellbeing and a sense of acting right and in harmony with oneself for the respondents:
[Salafi prohibitions] are radical and hopeless, âcause why should I change my life completely if I have been listening to music so far, (â¦) music helps me relax, I feel better, why should I give it up? Because somebody just thought I should? Photographs. And why shouldnât I have the photos? I donât pray to them after all, these are just photos of my child. (â¦) Oftentimes, girls who were converting would say I should burn or throw away all photos of myself or my family. (â¦) this is absurd to me. Never in my life will I agree with that (â¦). What else? (MaÅgorzata)
At the beginning, I was young and callow. And then it proved that I was beginning to negotiate this Islam with myself to feel well, as not all solutions necessarily suit me (â¦) we, as converts, negotiate our Islam with those who were born Muslims, their culture and how they understand things. (Marysia)
Similarly to many other converts, Angelika describes difficult beginnings, when being âbombardedâ with prohibitions led to her experiencing pangs of conscience and a feeling of being âa sinful and bad personâ. Many narratives centre on particularly zealous Salafi converts, who, after a period of intensified efforts and attempts at reaching the ideal, reject Islam, oftentimes becoming its ardent critics.
I know many converts have it that way, (â¦) first we are bombarded with all that we are not allowed to do: music â haram, (â¦) you must wear the headscarf or else youâll go to hell. (â¦) surely if somebody told me that alcohol had been being withdrawn throughput the 23 years of the Qurʾan being revealed and it was actually only withdrawn completely in the last year, so it was a gradual change. So it is not that I become a Muslim and from that moment on I should not eat pork and listen to music. I donât believe that I should stop listening to music at all. (â¦) That would make living with that new religion of mine much easier. And here I got (â¦) the feeling that I keep doing something wrong, that I am imperfect, that everybodyâs saying what I should be like, and I am not like that, simply because I donât have proper conditions for that yet. If God allows, I will have them in the future, but now I donât or it is even that conditions in Poland donât allow applying them somehow on everyday basis, so normally. Now, I actually have a more relaxed attitude to my religion. (â¦) So, it was also that why I was feeling bad, because I read that I shouldnât do this, this, this, and suddenly Iâm thinking, what a bad person I am. (Angelika)
The dissonance between the Salafi message and the reality of the ummah leads new Muslims to experience feelings of anxiety, chaos and uncertainty (Górak-Sosnowska, 2015; Inge, 2016; RaÄius, 2013). Beata converted to Islam in Poland, where she subsequently participated in the life of the Muslim community for some time. The dissonance between the observation of the practice of Polish Islam in Poland and the Salafi message was leaving her embarrassed and concerned:
For many months, I was so lost that I didnât quite know which way to go. I was feeling Muslim, but it was all liberal in the mosque, and here I am, listening to scholars who are very restrictive, while I am somewhere in the middle, but Iâm feeling bad about it and I donât know which way to choose. I was torn like that for very long (â¦) It seems to me (â¦) that maybe I embraced [Islam] a bit too quickly. Some do it quickly and handle it, but others do it too quickly and they simply have this kind of chaos in their heads (â¦) a fair number of such people later depart from Islam or become, for instance, very restrictive. (â¦) I kept balancing like that for a few months and it was hard for me. Well, but later, slowly, slowly, it got a little more normal. And since we came here, to England, it has actually been better. (Beata)
Maja feels that she is able to feel better and more secure as her views evolve:
With time, my concept of God has broadened, it is less rigid, this concept of God has just become ⦠more appropriate for grasping various spheres of life. (â¦) when I visit the cemetery [on All Saintsâ Day], is that really a sin? I surely look at it less rigidly now. I am surely less afraid that something is haram. And the less you fear, the less you sin. I donât drink and Iâm not affected by somebody drinking bear. We can sit at a table together. (Maja)
Noor, calling the phase a period of individualization, sees the converts as âagents who are making meaning of their everyday religiosityâ (Noor, 2017, p. 91). She further states that âindividualization tended to occur mostly among those interlocutors who had experienced religious pressure from communal norms of piety. Advancing age and a growing realistic assessment of their capacities and of the possibilities of the extent to which they could actually live according to Allahâs rulesâ are also important factorsâ (Noor, 2017, p. 262).
It is very rarely that participants in online discussions define themselves as Salafis. This may result from a fear of criticism, as the irony and humour of new Muslims, both ones who have been through a Salafi period themselves and ones who have only encountered the discourse, is often aimed at the Salafi narration. The fear may also (or maybe primarily) pertain to being considered a radical, as Salafism has âbad pressâ and is often identified with radicalism or even Muslim terrorism (Inge, 2016).
Another reason for an unwillingness to explicitly describe oneâs views as Salafi (even though this is clearly indicated by the views themselves and by oneâs selection of sources) might be unawareness of the fact that the current has its name and is actually a separate current or the convertâs persuasion that it is the only real and possible Islam (a common slogan on the Polish Internet is âislam jest jedenâ â âthere is one Islamâ). Some participants of the online discussions who represent Salafi views, when asked about their religious affiliation, claim that they are against Salafism, just as they are against âother sectsâ. Can we, then, speak of âunconscious Salafismâ?
Several of our respondents from the UK expressed views which could be described as Salafi, yet none declared to be a supporter of the current. Most often, they identified as âsimply Muslimsâ, âSunnisâ, âfollowing the Qurʾan and the Sunnahâ. Another reason for this act of âpassingâ can be related to the wish to avoid tribal stigma connected with being seen as a âfundamentalist Salafiâ within the umma by ânormalâ Muslims and to decrease social stigma outside the umma where the more visible Salafis may be more discredited (Goffman, 1963).
Only one of our respondents, residing in Poland, declares to be a Salafi, yet, as she says, problems related to her family and her professional situation make it difficult for her to follow the ideal in practice. Thus, she is, in a sense, a âtheoretical Salafiâ:
In this theoretical sense, I would be most inclined towards the Salafiyah, (â¦) but this everyday life. Somehow, I am not what Iâd like to be, but thatâs what suits me, this clearer, rawer, I mean from those normal peopleâs perspective, (â¦) Islam. I donât like those fractions, only this clear, basic, original, from the origins when there was the Prophet, as he was conveying it, âcause even when there are schools, I couldnât fit into any school either. (Kornelia)
The clash between ideals and the necessity of functioning in a non-Muslim society, which is one of the reasons for disappointment with Salafism, pertains particularly to converts residing in Poland. For them, the need of acceptance from members of the various communities they belong to (family, colleagues, etc.), is much greater than it is for Polish converts residing in the UK. The latter emphasise the differences between practising Islam in Poland and in the UK, praising not only the well-developed Muslim infrastructure, or the opportunity for following oneâs faith fully and openly, but also the social culture which enables functioning of people of various cultures and religions. For some, the emigration became a hijra,1 allowing them to practice their faith freely. Many of the women cannot imagine a return to their homeland. Even a holiday trip to Poland becomes a problem that disrupts everyday functioning, forcing one to make uncomfortable decisions related to eating halal, wearing the hijab, or performing the Muslim prayers. Our respondents also mention the significance of the distance between them and their Polish families for the sense of freedom of religious practice. These circumstances create pressure to find solutions to survive socially by managing spoiled identity.
Roald points out 3 stages of conversion: love, disappointment, and maturity. At the third stage, new Muslims âstart to formulate their understanding of Islam with the reference to their specific cultural contextâ (Roald, 2004, p. 347; 2001). For many migrant converts, however, the stage might be significantly delayed, because they are not very well ârootedâ in society.
Marlena is planning to return from the UK to Poland, and therefore she finds it necessary to reformulate her understanding of religion:
For a moment, I was fascinated by Salafism, as that somehow brings you closest to (â¦) the religion, close to the Prophetâs times, but it is of little use today. Maybe you could live like that somewhere in the UK, but again Iâd be alone in that, Iâd need to join some group here, as the Salafism here is (â¦) so rigorous, harsh, to the point of being aggressive. So I removed myself from that a bit, because if I want to return to Poland, I have no chance of getting deeper into Salafism, as I wouldnât balance things, I think. In Poland, you need to adapt to the difficult reality. (Marlena)
Maja, who now lives in Poland but has also spent several years in the UK, speaks of the differences in the extent to which it is possible to practise strict Salafism at home and abroad, as well as the conflicts it may engender:
A few years ago, hard-line Salafism started to dominate Polish Internet, now it has calmed down a little, it could have been related to the fresh Polish migration to EU countries, mainly to the UK, but also to NL and DE. Those were Poles who had recently married and converted to Islam. It was a crowd mentality at times, the women from the UK would remove dollsâ eyes, forbid their children to watch Peppa the Pig, their followers would all burn photographs and family memorabilia from their whole lives, which they now regret. That would sometimes spur conflicts in groups, in which we are together, after all. The foreign newbies accused us, residing in Poland, of not practising well, of seeking excuses. Obviously, it led to defensive reactions, as we have to simply live with other people here, with our families, neighbours, we have to make our living, we live in very traditional communities, not to mention the vitriolic Islamophobia. We were angry with them glorifying martyrdom for faith, meaning our martyrdom, of course. We responded that they were living in a comfortable bubble, in a welfare state. When you are an immigrant, your husband is an immigrant too, you donât work or you do manual labour, you do not come into contact with your diaspora, because you pretend not to be Polish when there are Poles around, you only know random Muslims, uprooted as well, you are far from your whole family, then you live in a social vacuum where you can happily be Mrs Nobody, and this is a very comfortable position. Meanwhile, I am Mrs Somebody, living in my social networks, with my own place on the social ladder and with no plans for being dragged down. I will not wear the hijab, not only because I fear physical violence. I also fear ostracism, falling out of those networks, that we wonât get, me and my family, the minimum of respect that strangers are treated with. Maybe this is hypocrisy, but everyone must be bit of a hypocrite if they donât want to be perceived as martyrs or unhinged. (Maja)
In uncritical copying of the âancestorsâ generationâsâ behaviour, Patrycja sees a lack of realism which is detrimental for the ummah. Even though she corrects herself several times trying not to use the word âradicalismâ (which other respondents do use in their accounts), she eventually deems attitudes that separate one from oneâs environment to be radical:
[In their opinion] things are black and white. Nothing can be left uncertain. And that leads to great harm, because later they find out that life itself is the grey zone and this is the test for us and we need to get, to gather more knowledge. We need to look at how the Prophet actually lived, and not at what some only comment on his life, at the choices his first companions faced, (â¦) they were people of flesh and bone, they had certain weaknesses of their own and made mistakes and we should somehow learn from the mistakes. And if we use a mistake just to learn from it, it is a very nice thing. If we are, somehow, within the narrative of everything being, that golden age of Islam, the sahabah, who were almost angels, then we have the system which becomes black and white and also hard to follow. (â¦) it is radicalism of a kind, (â¦) a person looking at themselves only are radical too, as they donât listen to others. (Patrycja)
We are aware of the fact that these in-depth interviews do not reflect Polish convertsâ interest in various currents of Islam quantitively. This is particularly significant given the disproportional numbers of respondents interested in the Sufi and Salafi currents. Based on participant observation, we estimate that the number of followers of Salafism is much greater, particularly among new converts, while the number of Sufis is small.
The stage of crisis, which emerges as a significant event in our respondentsâ stories, is also absent (or hard to see) from the online narrative. Crisis is much harder to gauge than zeal from posts on social media. In borderline cases, members of the community only see the result of the change, in the form of different dress, lifestyle or a transformed online image. The difference between the convertsâ online narrative and our interviews can be explained with a reference to van Nieuwkerk (2006), who notices two fundamental differences between convertsâ narratives offline and online. The first one is their purpose â online narratives are supposed to be a source of inspiration for others, while the second one is the context of production â on the Internet one can perform a desirable version of oneself. It is a space for finding oneâs place in the virtual ummah to which the new Muslim wishes to belong (van Nieuwkerk, 2006: 108â113). We may also add other factors. The first of these is the length of time for which a given person has participated online. The most active ones are the relatively fresh converts, who want to âshare the truthâ, thus identifying and articulating their own place in the ummah. Long-term converts are either not very active in discussions or refrain from participating. Another factor present in the realm of Polish Internet is the hostile atmosphere. All these factors render large online groups a platform for duels of âtruthsâ rather than honest reflection.
For Polish converts, Salafism is predominantly a transitionary stage. The absence of âmatureâ Salafis, for whom embracing this current would result from their thoughtful reflection over several year, results from 1) the lack of an established Salafi environment or space that one could belong to, and 2) the difficulty of practising Salafism in Polish conditions.2 Being a Salafi in Poland could mean alienation, both in the small Polish ummah and in the Polish society in general. They are doubly stigmatized and contact with them can be considered by some ânormalâ Muslims as âcontagiousâ and increasing tribal stigma. Inge writes about the British Salafis who function in much more advantageous conditions than those present in Poland, that â[w]hile social networks were often crucial for the women to take the first steps towards joining a group that they might otherwise have avoided, becoming Salafi generally came at a social cost, rather than gain. They made some friends, but lost others â and many struggled to form attachments to fellow Salafis.â (Inge, 2016)
Polish and Global Inspirations
Outside the network of traditional transmission of knowledge, converts seek out knowledge in the global online ummah, where they can find a of variety preachers on YouTube or the popular site Halaltube. The only limitation is their English fluency â the only ones able to answer our question about inspirations from the epistemic âstarsâ of global Islam were those with a good command of English (although some lectures had been translated into Polish).
The choice of favourite preachers and writers seemed unrelated to their popularity on the Polish Internet.3 The one our respondents were most enthusiastic about was Nouman Ali Khan, while others held in high regard were also Tariq Ramadan, Omar Suleiman, Yasir Qadhi, Ahmad Deedat, Ismail Ibn Musa Menk/Mufti Menk, Yasmin Mogahed, Timothy Winter/Abdal Hakim Murad, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamza Yusuf, Fadhlalla Haeri, Bilal Philips, Jonathan Brown and Yusuf al-Qaradawi.
While Ali Khan, Omar Suleiman and Yasir Qadhi are relatively well known on the Polish Internet, the results do not reflect the popularity of Ahmad Deedat and Mufti Menk, who are currently popular among the Polish online ummah, or Bilal Philips and Yusuf Estes, popular several years ago. None of the respondents has mentioned Zakir Naik, who is enjoying a great deal of popularity on the Polish Internet.
While the Polish Internet is dominated by speakers from the circle of âmild Salafismâ (including Zakir Naik), with increasing presence of representatives of mainstream Islam, our respondents predominantly listen to theologians-specialists, whose narratives appeal to educated Western middle class, both with moderately liberal and moderately conservative religious views. Speakers remaining on the margins of our respondentsâ interests are ânicheâ ones â Sufis, ones who are âtoo academicâ, âtoo Salafiâ, or whose message is oversimplified.
Our respondents also find inspiration in Polish and Western literature, both popular-scientific like Janusz Danecki, Marek M. Dziekan, and other Polish researchers working in the field of Arab studies and Islam; Karen Armstrong â mentioned twice, and purely scientific like Karolina Rak, a Polish researcher specialising in Arab feminism.
The following names were provided by our respondents as inspiring religious authorities working in the Polish ummah: the Shia theologian imam Arkadiusz Miernik (4), the Palestinian imam Ali Abi Isa (2), the Palestinian mufti of the Muslim League Nidal Abu Tabaq, the Syrian imam Nezar Charif, as well as Polish converts: the researcher and educator Blanka Rogowska, the researchers Mariusz Turowski and JarosÅaw Banasiak. Most of the individuals mentioned in the responses are not active in the public sphere any more â three of them have withdrawn from activity, one has passed away, and one has moved abroad.
Another significant fact is that the greatest number of positive opinions were given about Arkadiusz Miernik, who, as a member of Stowarzyszenie JednoÅci MuzuÅmaÅskiej [Association of Islamic Unity], represents a part of the Polish Shia minority. His popularity among some of the Polish Sunni Muslims is due to his educational activity in social media (a vlog, a FB page, and the Al-Islam magazine), which is both accessible and of high intellectual quality. As âthe only intellectual of the Polish institutionalised Islamâ he is also perceived as âIslamâs ambassador in the out-of-ummah worldâ (Maja).
Other respondents agree with Maja and Faustyna that Miernikâs charismatic personality, Polishness, religious inclusiveness and high competences render him a perfect representative of the Polish ummah:
[as for] a Polish spiritual leader of sorts, I am closer to the Sunni than the Shia Islam, but he [Arkadiusz Miernik] seems so inclusive in what he does and so Polish, itâs a pity heâs not here, heâs sitting in England and we are lacking such characters, who simply arenât afraid to stir whatâs in the pot, to say, to stamp their foot and say, well, we want to eat our pierogi during the Ramadan. (Faustyna)
However, the Internet comments, as well as the number of views and likes of Arkadiusz Miernikâs lectures, make it apparent that not everyone is interested in this type of message. His Shia-ness is an insurmountable obstacle even when the lectures pertain to Sunni Islam exclusively. A member of a Muslim group evaluates his activity as follows: âJust the love one another and do as you please kinda stuff, whatâs next, LGBT? A hippie Islam. Besides, Shiites are a sect, not Muslims.â
Polish Islam Is Full of Braggadocio
A common motive which returns in almost every conversation with a convert is a lack of willingness for an unrestrained discussion of religious matters and a fear of expressing oneâs opinion. A fear of being judged prevents many women from participating in meetings, which is why many Polish converts withdraw from the communal life of the ummah. Multiple respondents perceive the phenomenon as âtypically Polishâ:
I would say that we Poles, weâre full of braggadocio. Everyone is the wisest one (â¦) (Patrycja)
those mutual attacks, I donât know whether I should blame it on Polish mentality, that âI know better and you donât, âcause my Islam is this and thatâ, and here it shows (â¦) that the person who keeps so showing off their knowledge doesnât know much as they only follow one particular school. (â¦) Born [Muslims] pass it [knowledge] from generation to generation, like the baton in a relay (â¦) converts want to show that theyâre better because they chose themselves and they wind themselves in the wrong direction (â¦). This is why I draw more from the born Muslims than from the converts. (MaÅgorzata)
(â¦) there are the four schools, which generally shouldnât be in conflict and in international groups there are often the opinions that one school says this and another says that and you shouldnât argue with the person, while for example among Poles, there are, unfortunately, arguments. They argue very often, there is often the viciousness (â¦) the Polish Muslim environment is a judgmental one, everybody is watching everybody else. (Beata)
According to Patrycja, the above is partially due to lack of knowledge about the diversity within Islam:
I do not participate in any forums. Arguments as to whether someone is supposed to wear their socks for prayer, pluck their eyebrows or paint their nails. These are things which are not insignificant, as there are certain rules (â¦) but thereâs a lack of recognising priorities. What is more important (â¦), is that we do not argue or exchange our opinions in a respectful manner. Also, let us not discuss issues we are not knowledgeable about. These two things are priorities, and not, for instance, wearing socks, on which there is not a consensus among scholars. Since there is this lack of consensus among scholars, it means that both things are good, it is not that they took it from God-knows-where, but there are options. (â¦) And here one believer will be scratching anotherâs eyes out because of that. (â¦) People often think like, now I am a Muslim and I shall be pure and cool, and they forget that they have the whole load of learnt behaviours, reactions, subconscious things, and all that remains and it is remains a task to address for the rest of your life. (Patrycja)
Anna is one of the persons who, after a longer initial period of âlonelyâ Islam, decided to enter a âcommunalâ stage which, as in many other cases, was a difficult experience reorganising oneâs thinking about oneself as a Muslim:
I was afraid that they would impose one style of being, rules, some group morality too much (â¦). At some point, I started mixing with different groups and watching what their Islam looked like and how other Muslims were practising it (â¦). Because, as I was very loose in that approach of mine and I had those Buddhist influences and different things, here I got really scared, and I didnât want to depart from Islam ⦠I had that inner dilemma, whether what I believe in is still Islam, or maybe I should rather follow what the Muslims are saying in order to be a good Muslim. I felt bad, terrible, and I had doubts, and I think that I am still in the process of departing from such thinking. I still feel that I havenât returned to the state from the time before I joined the groups. I am trying to return to that primary state, when I was doing it my way and feeling good. (Anna)
Maja experienced it in a similar manner when she entered the Muslim environment after years of being a âlonelyâ unsocialised Muslim:
I converted to Islam in the early 90s, I didnât know anyone because there wasnât anyone to know. I was practising that Islam alone, as an âacademic Muslimâ, rather from scientific books. And after several years, such a shock, Muslims! Of course, there were attempts to âstraighten my waysâ in many ways, only I am not interested in [othersâ] ideas for my life. Well, an academic background was also giving me confidence. For me, the environment of the ummah is very important, discussing things together is important, thatâs how the ummah is formed. It was thanks to meeting people, having discussions, reading books, and a perpetual dialogue with myself, people and books that I went a long way in Islam, learnt more about myself and my place. People avoid discussion for fear of fitnah, youâre supposed to be nice, but thereâs nothing better to stimulate your thinking. (Maja)
Reproducing and producing knowledge on their own constitutes a significant part of life for the convertsâ communities (Stoica, 2011; Górak-Sosnowska, 2015; Noor, 2017), particularly in religious communities suffering from weak religious infrastructure (Górak-Sosnowska, 2015).
Van Bruinessen (2011) distinguishes two ways of producing knowledge in âWesternâ Islam: one is the âreligious market modelâ which implies a hierarchical system: from âteacher/preacherâ to âstudent.â In this model, religious specialists or movements/associations are producers of Islamic knowledge. Consumers can choose from a range of options. This model assumes a strict distinction between the producers and consumers of religious knowledge.
In the second model, everyone is involved in the production of religious knowledge. Through such activities as online discussions, but also, for instance, the activity of youth organisations, the Muslim tradition is reinterpreted and adapted to the conditions European Muslims live in. In such circumstances, these are particularly the Salafis who work intensively to transfer the ârightâ knowledge that shapes fellow believersâ views in the spirit of Salafism (daÊ¿wah and tarbiyyah) (Noor, 2017).
âIslam Seems a Left-Wing Party to Me.â
For many of our respondents, Islam is irrevocably connected with social and political views. Generally speaking, conversion can be a way of sacralising politics for already politically active people. Earlier political ideas survive conversion and are accommodated within an Islamic framework (Allievi, 1998).
Most of them identify as Muslim feminists or persons for whom issues of gender equality are extraordinarily important. Feminist awareness in this group is very high and it even seems to rise after conversion to Islam: âI might have even become a greater feminist than I had been beforeâ (Alana). For some, their views on social equality are close to Islam. Several persons declare their views to be close to the left (which is not always precise, probably also in the specific understanding of the term on Polish political scene, we might expect that they mean cultural left). One identifies as a liberal Muslim (Daria) and one as a modernist (Angelika). Four persons identify as unequivocally left-wing (using the word âlewackaâ, which is an appropriation of a right-wing slur directed at supporters of left-wing politics, roughly equivalent to the English âleftieâ) and two as communists (which is very rare in Polish political discourse and, obviously, even rarer in the environment of the Polish ummah). For Anna, communist views, alongside a universalistic experience of spirituality, were the reason for choosing Islam as a religion closest to them. In Majaâs case, her growing interest in socialism, and later communism, intertwined naturally with her interest in Islamic social thought. Alana puts it in a straightforward manner: âIslam seems a left wing party to meâ.
We may speak of an overrepresentation of persons with left-leaning views among our respondents compared with the Polish society in general. This, however, comes as no surprise â the discourse of the Polish right, xenophobic, exclusionary, and hostile towards Muslims in particular, cannot attract too many of them (although there are some supporters of the Law and Justice or Konfederacja parties to be found among Polish Muslims). Islamic ideas are also in conflict with nationalism. Allievi (1998) claims that the marginalization of many Muslims on both domestic and international level attracts some who incline to the left. Islamic ideas can be useful as a form of liberation theology offering an accessible language of protest to marginalized groups (Winter, 2000, p. 100).
For Maja, MirosÅawa, Daria and Danuta, Islam is connected with environmentalism. They relate their ethical choices and dilemmas, pertaining to issues such as animal rights, to their religion: âIslam regulates all the things which enable me to live in harmony with people, in harmony with nature, in harmony with the whole world surrounding me.â (Daria) MirosÅawa finds it problematic to harmonise her feelings and thoughts on animal suffering and the ritual slaughter rule:
When I converted to Islam, I accepted it all and only then did I begin to have some self-reflection. It was automatic then, and now I am beginning to think about it deeper, for instance about the animal issues. And it absorbed me quite deeply and I started to read a lot on what it is like, on how animals feel (â¦), so when I read about those streets in Egypt washed with blood, I didnât feel good about it, and that is probably the main aspect that is controversial, this issue of halal slaughter (â¦). I always try to defend everything, and here I donât know. I know that this is best for us, that it is indeed meat without blood, pure and God-sacred, but I donât know ⦠(â¦) this suffering. I have a problem with it, and this is the most burning issue [for me]. (MirosÅawa)
Similar reflection led Maja to vegetarianism and Danuta to veganism: âI am vegan. (â¦) That was also tragic for me how we can inflict suffering on others, (â¦), and be in any religion. For me, it was a shock.â (Danuta)
It is also in this respect that we can observe dissimilarity between our respondentsâ narrative and the Internet discourse, the latter virtually completely disregarding it in discussions. Only a few dispersed texts and translations have appeared, and the general environmental awareness in the Polish ummah is still low. An exception to the rule was a blog published for years by a convert and largely devoted to eco-Islam (now already in an altered form http://polskaarabka.blogspot.com/). In 2020, the MZR launched the muzulmanie.pl website, intended to provide information not only about religious practices themselves, but also about such aspects of believersâ life as environmentalism. The state of environmental awareness in the Polish ummah reflects the awakening of the Polish society in general.4
The Crescent Surrounded by EU Stars
Most of our respondents appreciate European values, find them compatible with Islam and identify with Europeanness. One might risk the statement that Polish Muslims show pro-European sympathies to a degree larger than the average Polish citizen (which is also related to their greater interest in left-wing or liberal worldviews). For some, Europeanness is also a basis for Muslim identity. European Islam could be defined as âadapted to a Western setting, with its own local challenges and solutionsâ, which means âthat Muslim beliefs and practices and Muslimsâ modes of religiosity are transforming in western societiesâ (Noor, 2017: 89).
For Roald, it is obvious that the current Muslim religiosity is influenced by Western attitudes and that new Muslims play an important role in the blending of the various traditions (Roald, 2006: 66). Her studies of Swedish converts show that most of them (with a few exceptions) share their understanding of democratic ideas and human rights with the non-Muslim citizens of Sweden. (Roald, 2010: 325, 339) For Aleksandra, Faustyna and MirosÅawa, the idea of âpure Islamâ is a utopia which they replace with the idea of âEuropean Islamâ, compatible with fundamental European values. Aleksandra identifies predominantly as a European Muslim:
What I like the most is the European option, that I am a European Muslim. As Tatars or Bosnians can say that they are European Muslims, why the hell canât I, as European values are very close to me. And, well, I think that European Islam makes sense. Muslims in Europe (â¦) are quite a large group already, one you can identify with. Of course, they will be completely different things in a Bosnian village and in a Polish Tatarâs village, but they will still be close, as we have some set of common values, which are not necessarily related to Christianity, and it will still be closer than ideas from Pakistan, Malaysia or Indonesia. No, we have a completely different concept and also the completely different European approach to religious spirituality. I prefer the crescent surrounded by EU stars. I really like the fact that (â¦) we became united here in Europe. (Aleksandra)
Aleksandra thinks that it is possible to reconcile Islam with European values by interpreting the Qurʾan in a post-enlightenment spirit. In the cases which she finds particularly problematic (such as Islamâs attitude to homosexuality), she proposes to skip the inconvenient verses without unnecessary dispute and accept human rights:
It was somehow possible to reconcile Judaism with homosexuality, even though the Old Testament is very spicy. Christianity can be joined with that, so why not Islam? It is enough to drop a few problematic pieces and accept the European concept of human rights. (â¦) [I would discard] âslay the idolaters wherever ye find themâ,5 as The Sword Verse is very controversial (â¦) the European approach to religiousness is very close to me. I think that visitors from and residents of other countries might not understand it and deem us not to be Muslims, âcause what does she look like, whatâs she doing with the gays. In my opinion, this is not contradictory to religiousness at all. (Aleksandra)
MirosÅawa also finds the European identity and the ethical and cultural values related to it primary and believes that they are what European Muslims should shape their own European Islam in line with:
Public flogging, (â¦) is also simply unacceptable for me (â¦) our European identity, the culture we were brought up in, shapes how we perceive certain things present in Islam, so violence and aggression (â¦) I donât quite agree with that. Talking to people, I hear some clinging to it and saying that it is necessary, that there is no other way. And others negate it and sometimes resign from being Muslims (â¦). And, to my mind, not all Muslims living in Europe are able to comprehend it [that contemporary life in Europe brings other challenges], and additionally, they also often justify that, saying: âyou keep turning away from it, trying to find yourselves some comfortable solution instead of living according to the sunnah, as thatâs the way it was. And now we should show that the Prophet (peace be upon him) had such a terrible situation, so we shouldnât compare ourselves to him now.â Obviously, it is impossible to compare, as it is a completely different context and a different story, which does not mean that our problems are of small importance. (MirosÅawa)
Faustyna feels a member of the progressive European ummah more than one of the Polish ummah. Although progressive Muslims are excluded by mainstream Muslims everywhere, being a progressive Muslim in Poland is even more difficult for her:
I think that it is the same as everywhere globally, that progressive Islam is excluded by both sides â the mainstream ummah itself and the majority society, because who are they actually? Well, if you donât like mainstream Islam, the why are you even a Muslim, right? And when you go in the other direction, then, if you want to be a Muslim, then what is all that inclusivity about, and what is that, for instance, gay imam, or a woman leading a prayer about (â¦) I felt a little crushed, âcause it was like, if I want to be in the ummah, it must be the way they want it, right? And I canât have a different approach. Not to mention acceptance for Muslims of homosexual orientation, right? Or even Muslim feminists, for that matter, as that was obviously not permissible, so I think, that again, we are somehow very much dispersed and not quite rooted yet, ⦠that will be a slow process, as you need to come out of the closet a bit, and coming out of the closet from a minority, thatâs a whole higher level. (â¦) (Faustyna)
Another position is that presented by Kornelia, for whom the overarching idea remains that of âuniversal Islamâ, unconditioned socially or culturally: âIâm a sort of a spiritual caveman in this Islam, (â¦) I have a problem with fatwas, that it doesnât quite reach me, that they exist, that they pertain to Europe, to a certain situation.â (Kornelia). Her position remains a minority one among our respondents, yet seems quite popular in the Polish ummah.
Pierogi in a Mosque
Allievi calls the new Muslimsâ culture a âdo-it-yourself-cultureâ (bricolage culture), as the stage of conversion is followed by the phase of re-culturation, constituting a process of hybridisation occurring between various aspects of the local and the Muslim culture (Allievi, 1998, pp. 220â221).
Multiple researchers who have studied conversion write on the ânationalâ variants of convertsâ Islam. Roald mentions the âSwedish Muslimâ, a mixture of Islamic and Swedish values regarded as the âbest Swedeâ and the âbest Muslimâ (Roald, 2006, p. 58). Van Nieuwkerk reports on Dutch female Muslims calling themselves âsymbolic migrantsâ (van Nieuwkerk, 2006, p. 106), Nicole Bourque (2006) on Scottish Muslims, Ãzyürek on German ones, (2015, 2018), and RaÄius (2013) on Lithuanian ones.
Roald proposes to âconsider whether the rediscovery of the convert identity built on a merging of Scandinavian and Islamic values (â¦) is an instinctive reaction to (â¦) the downward step on the social ladderâ. This way, they âcan distance themselves from the problems (..) weighing down the Muslim community and keep (â¦) the superior status (â¦) and gain relief from the sheer weight of the burden of the Muslim ummah (Roald, 2006: 66). Such a diagnosis might apply to some Polish female Muslims as well. While there are very few Muslim immigrants of low social status in Poland, the sheer disrespect for Muslims in Poland might be a cause for escaping into a âPolish Islamâ. It is a fact of no mean significance that these are educated and professionally active women from big cities who speak of âPolish Islamâ. They are the ones who do not want to stand out from the crowd, do not want to be associated with immigrants from Muslim countries, and do not want to be represented by activists of non-Polish origin.
For some of our respondents, âPolish Islamâ is a phenomenon either realised already or to become real in near future. They are mostly the converts residing in Poland who perceive it predominantly as a blend of cultural identity with being a Muslim. Ãzyürek in her study of German converts goes further, saying that being an European convert to Islam can âsimultaneously challenge and reproduce biological and cultural racisms as well as a homogenous understanding of a German and European culture.â Converts have a tendency to disassociate themselves from born Muslims, treating their âwrongâ Islamic cultural practices with suspicion. Born Muslims should be taught âproper Islamâ. Thus, converts reinforce a Europocentric attitude. (Ãzyürek, 2014)
Salafism can be another way for converts to distance themselves from born Muslims and to achieve a stronger position. Salafism presents itself as superior to any culture. It is well-adapted to globalization because it emphasises Islamâs own deculturation and aspires to universal validity (Roy, 2008), tends to devalue nationalism and ethnicity as subordinate to religious identity (Zebiri, 2007, p. 96), placing new Muslims at the same level as born Muslims and, at least in theory, pushing aside cultural and ethnic differences (Ãzyürek, 2015, pp. 109â131).
Pirický writes about âSlovakizingâ and âBohemizingâ variants of Islam dominant among Czech and Slovak converts. In his opinion, the reason for claiming to be a moderate, ânationalâ Muslim is âa fear of expressing opinions that identify a person too closely with âforeignâ variants of Islamâ (Pirický, 2018). We believe that the same mechanism applies to Polish converts as well. While in the context of Western converts (as in the Swedish case described by Roald) one of the reasons is the fear of losing social status, in the case of Eastern Europe, the stakes are much higher â survival in society, or, at least, avoiding rejection or even physical aggression. Identifying with oneâs own nation is key to survival, both at the personal and the collective levels. It might be expected that the identification will be even stronger in the Czech Republic and Slovakia than in Poland, due to even smaller numbers of Muslims there and the absence of indigenous Islamic traditions such as the Polish Tatar Islam.
Maja finds it possible to create a culturally Polish âIslam of our ownâ in the future, which, however, requires time and a certain âcritical massâ. She is critical about the âbottom-up orientalisationâ of Muslim practices:
Iâm dreaming of something where you can be yourself. Like Victorian Muslims, classical Victorians to the bone. For me, they are a model of blending oneâs own culture with Islamic ideas in Europe. Let us eat żur [traditional Polish fermented rye soup], only without the pork sausage in it. (â¦) Sure â a group needs certain self-identity elements, but let them be our elements â bigos, sernik, makowiec [three traditional Polish foods] as tradition for post-Ramadan holidays (not for Eid). And here we have Ramadan coming and everybodyâs buying oriental decorations from Amazon and sharing recipes for oriental dishes. Well, I understand that thereâs the lack of tradition and models, thereâs the cultural void, that many women have husbands from Muslim countries and draw inspiration from them, but maybe it is worth making the effort and taking something of our own? For me, Islam is żur, this everyday life respecting the values, not âalhamdulillahâ, but âchwaÅa Boguâ [praise be to God]. (â¦) not some Scheherazade princesses (â¦) or [appropriations that look like] costumes. There is no religion without a culture, this is illusion, the only question is that of what we are going to dress the religion in â in a [traditional Polish] Åowicz headscarf, or in an abaya from the Persian Gulf. (Maja)
It is also according to Marysia that a âpureâ Islam, not culturally determined, does not exist and it is theoretically possible for a Polish Islam free from Arab cultural influence to arise in the future:
Because Islam generally isnât uniform everywhere. The culture is diverse even though certain assumptions are common. Islam could Africanise and mill it through its calques, so why canât we and why should we pretend to be Arabs or anyone else? (Marysia)
Similarly to several other converts, Faustyna believes that Polish Islam is being âArabisedâ predominantly in the top-down direction, by the Muslim League which is supposed to be multicultural, but its practices are those of âArabisingâ the Polish ummah:
And of course, it is obvious that there have never been any pierogi there, because that would of course be some heresy, right, to serve pierogi at a mosque? They must all be some Arab dishes, Turkish or Chechen ones. Well, and I have this feeling that, that the League is so powerful that those people whoâd like to change something, converts in particular, give up at a certain point. They donât have any strength left. (Faustyna)
Another prerequisite for the existence of a Polish Islam for our respondents is the convertsâ power in decision-making processes and participation in organising the life of the Polish ummah. Faustyna is one of those who speak of a lack of a Polish voice in the League, an organisation which, according to Maja, âhas appropriated the space of Polish Islamâ:
What Iâm missing is, so to speak, a Polish section. This Polish section is simply Arabising in many fields and I think this shouldnât be. And nobody really allows it, thereâs no Polish [Islam]. (â¦) (Faustyna)
For Faustyna, who used to be an activist before, the cultural and religious Arabisation of Polish Islam is an obstacle which prevents her from working for the benefit of the community. She left because she had felt her voice did not count, âdue to the Arab menâs behaviour (â¦) we were meant to be decorationsâ (Maja). Similarly to Maja, Aleksandra, Pamela, Franciszka and others, also having previously worked for the cause of Polish Islam, speak of their disappointment with inability to speak out in their own umma. Polish activists are only:
âpale facesâ supposed to legitimise Muslim Leagueâs activity with their presence, but are not allowed to speak for themselves. All the intellectuals have left because they had only been used for editing texts in Polish (â¦) and women activists are used to make sandwiches and clean the mosque, like the ladies who decorate altars [in Polish Catholic churches], it also looks good on the outside, âcause thatâs supposed to be equality. (Maja).
According to Faustyna, it is necessary for Polish Islam to âcut the umbilical cordâ from the Muslim League. The organisation, in her and other convertsâ (Aleksandra, Maja, Pamela) opinion is Arabising Polish Islam, curbing its development and not allowing anyone except the (Arabic) leadership, afraid of a plurality of opinions. Polish Islam should be part of European Islam and model itself on Western Europe, not the Middle East:
(â¦) there are, I think, a few learned gentlemen, but (â¦) they are tightly restrained (â¦) by the League (â¦) and do not want to free themselves from the restraints. Until this changes, until there are women educated in this respect (â¦) And Iâm not talking about being educated (â¦) in Arab countries, because (â¦) Islam is very much connected with the culture, (â¦) I donât know, maybe France or England (â¦) I think that at a certain moment there will be the critical mass, the fatigue, there will be the accumulation (â¦) of discontent and persons who will think, anyway, that this is not the way, and will want to implement a vision of Islam different from the Arabic one in their lives, and all that will pour out somewhere and maybe one more Islamic association will form. (Faustyna)
Angelika perceives the situation in Polish Islam from an entirely different perspective, finding the diversity of opinions in Polish Islam to be its weakness. In her opinion, a remedy for the âtheological chaosâ of the Polish ummah would be a charismatic scholar or imam of undisputed authority, who has not appeared so far. Such a person would serve as a source of cohesion for Muslims of different affiliations and introduce common standards. Maja thinks it is difficult to create a community with such a small number of individuals, each of whom has their own highly individualistic approach to religious matters:
What I can see (â¦) is lack of knowledge, (â¦) everybody enters, takes what they want and leaves. (â¦) It is better in England, because they can at least have some micro communities, some social contacts, religious authorities can form, while here it is all atomised, people are free electrons. (Maja)
The opinion of the âchaos in Polish Islamâ is also shared by Marysia. She describes the Polish ummah even more critically, as a concentration of exceptions to the rule:
these are people who are all such exceptions to the rule, a concentration of exceptions to the rule, it is like: âOh, youâre here. Cool. Come join us then. Oh, you too, come on in thenâ. Everybodyâs an exception, allegedly theyâre all the same, but in reality everybodyâs different. I have also met so many Muslims who were approaching their faith so differently that I doubt that there is such a thing as our Polish ummah. I do not think that such a thing exists, particularly since a large part of this ummah, in inverted commas, of ours are Arabs living here. (Marysia)
A growing number of Muslim immigrants, noted in particular by respondents living in Warsaw, complicates the image of Polish Islam seen as increasingly chaotic:
Warsaw has got quite a few mosques now and horrible divisions have appeared with them, especially that Wilanów and the League in Ochota are places where anyone can go (â¦), but over time, a few national mosques have been established as well. There is the Turksâ mosque, there is a mosque for those Caucasians, (â¦) and allegedly there are things said there that give you cystic fibrosis (â¦) I have never been there, but reportedly women are not allowed and bad things are happening there (â¦) (Aleksandra)
Another respondent who is sceptical about the feasibility of a Polish Islam is Patrycja. What appeals to her is the idea of an Islam above ethnic and cultural differences, a clear message addressed to a multi-ethnic mass of believers. Polishness, similarly to other forms of cultural expression, is but a nice addition:
I think there is no Polish Islam. I think that there are Polish Muslims, who have their culture, there are Muslims who come here from different countries and also partially enter into this culture, but (â¦) also have their background. This is actually proof that Islam is super universal. It can look really differently and have different approaches like that. However, it is not a problem for us that we stand for prayer in one row and we are doing the same in the same language and that is what unites us at that moment. (â¦) Sometimes Polish Muslims like such gadgets with Polish folklore elements or some white-and-red hijabs for Independence Day, those symbols of the Kruszyniany mosque, i.e. a mosque which looks like a small wooden church etc. They donât have to eat chicken with rice as itâs done everywhere in Asia (â¦) There is the question (â¦) of how much important the ethnicity is for them. (Patrycja)
Our respondents rather advocate for a Polish Islam to emerge rather than state that this has already happened. Nonetheless, many of them observe a definite discrepancy between the aims and lived experiences of Polish Muslims for whom blending into an imaginary, cosmopolitan ummah would be a road to nowhere.
72 Sects and Uber-Muslims
Discovering a diversity of opinions and currents leaves new Muslims anxious. Surprised by the theological richness of Islam, they set off in search of âpure sourcesâ âinstead of settling for one of the many cultural expressions born Muslim term Islamâ (Roald, 2004, p. 113). One of the convertsâ problems is not being rooted in the network of Muslim teachings and education, which could be analysed as âa westernisation of Islamâ consisting of âfragmentation of religious authority and the pluralization of Islamic knowledgeâ (Noor, 2017, p. 94). This pluralisation is caused not only by authorities (whom to deem such an authority remaining a most disputable issue) but also by the Muslim community as a whole.
If a new Muslim does not have earlier knowledge of the diversity of Islam derived from academic or popular-scientific sources (Aleksandra, Pamela, Maja, Marysia), initially she will usually treat the first interpretations of Islam she encounters as the only and binding ones. Then, there is the stage of learning about the multitude of currents within Islam. One of the reactions is discarding this diversity and accepting the attitude expressed in the call for âone Islamâ, an incredibly popular view on the Polish Internet, which usually constitutes a shutdown of any discussion, used by those who wish to exclude all opinions except their own.
It is difficult to establish to what extent Polish Muslims lack knowledge about the diversity of currents and opinions, and the functioning of Muslim law and legal schools. This is because our respondents do not constitute a representative group â they are individuals possessing substantial knowledge about their religion and willing to expand it. However, the observation of Internet discussions suggests that the ideas of diversity of opinions and the lack of a central authority are not commonly known. Suffice it to say that one of the attitudes observed with high frequency is treating fatwas as final legal verdicts.
Not moving beyond the stage described above and the bullying-like pressure young converts are subjected to are the primary obstacles for further religious development:
The Prophet says that there are 72 groups and only one of them is going to go to paradise, but this is just one group and this narrative is so terribly (â¦). This narrative used by certain groups is so strong that it seems that only their vision is such a vision of pure Islam, and a person who has [just] accepted Islam is just so susceptible. She wants to live well, she doesnât quite know how yet, wants to take on a lot from the start, well, and this vision, that there is just this one straight road and the only true one is just like that ⦠and if such a person enters into this narrative at the very beginning, then it will be difficult for her to open up to new things. I was entering into such a narrative because it seemed the only thing [available]. It is so available on the net, in such a prevailing amount, that it seems that it is just the truth. (Patrycja)
Some of our respondents represent the group of converts who deny the existence of schools and currents, which we estimate to be quite a large one. They identify as âsimply Muslims, following the Qurʾan and the Sunnaâ. According to Roald (2010, p. 113), numerous Scandinavian Muslim women rejects legal schools, wanting to follow the Qurʾan and the Sunna exclusively. In her view, this is âa consequence of their being faced by a multitude of Islamic expressionsâ and âthis methodology is used by new Muslims of various trends but with different results due to differences in outlookâ (2010, p. 114).
I know there are different schools, but (â¦) I wouldnât describe myself as a follower of any of them. I follow the Qurʾan and the Sunna, I listen to scholars, but to ones from various schools. So Iâd go for saying that Iâm rather [just] a Muslim (â¦) not to go astray somewhere, not to encounter a bad source (â¦) I am just a Muslim. (Ewelina)
Well, I mostly follow what the Qurʾan says. Then I reach (â¦) for what there is in the Sunna and (â¦) After all, the Prophet (may Godâs blessing be upon him) was also explaining, giving some kind of fatwas, also explaining the Qurʾan, so this is what I follow. What is most important for me is one of the hadiths, not to be too radical in religion, because that doesnât lead to anything good either, right? So I choose what I feel is good (â¦) I think that Iâm simply a Muslim, I do know that Muslims are divided into the Sunni, the Shia and so on. (Cecylia)
(â¦) frankly speaking, when I ask anyone who they are, they say theyâre just Muslims and I like such an approach, and actually I donât know anything about schools. When Iâm reading about something, if something is based in the Prophetâs Sunna or in the Qurʾan, if it is logical, I accept it, and if not, I keep searching and I just try to, kinda engage my own thinking. If something doesnât suit me, then, if itâs some fatwa that we donât have to stick to, I reject it then, and thatâs it, so I think Iâm just a Muslim. (Angelika)
Maria, who lives in the UK, clearly perceives the diversity of Islam in negative terms, finding it rather a burden for the faithful stemming from cultural and regional differences:
the issue of various mosques (â¦) Itâs not even about the background, but about the sects and factions in Islam. For example, here we have Sunni Muslims, but there are 4 schools, so one mosque follows the Hanafi one, another mosque follows the Shafiâi one, (â¦) now everybody goes to their own mosque because the teachings are a little different. They pray differently, there arenât many differences, but there are the small ones, and you just wonât find yourself in a mosque where theyâre doing everything differently. These are such things that itâs difficult to get over them and then you sometimes begin to get lost. For example, is it me who is praying the wrong way, or them? If you havenât spent some part of your life studying Islam and the differences between the madhabs, (â¦) this is terribly confusing, very. (â¦) then there are still again the stupid divisions into sects, (â¦) itâs often about where they came from. (â¦) I think that itâs quite a cultural and denominational mix, because there are terribly many of those factions when you start reading about how this Islam is divided. (â¦) Thereâs so much of it that you can go mad. Especially in England, there are such mosques that itâs just a different Islam, itâs a shock. (Maria)
In Aleksandraâs view, such an attitude signifies negating a complex reality and yielding to an illusion of simplicity and clarity.
There are people who are saying that they are some kind of uber-Muslims and that the division into the Sunni and the Shia and all the derivatives is a later one and that the Prophet and his companions only had one Islam. You need to discover and perform your role in anything and anywhere yourself. (â¦) a large part of converts would like to create such a niche for themselves and enter into such a role. Because this is very simple, (â¦) the illusion that the world may be simplier. (â¦) such a longing for a community, isnât that the same? Because now you have some 20 types of cereals to choose from at the shop and you donât know which to choose, and there used to be just one and people were happy. (Aleksandra)
A diversity of opinions is perceived as a potential trigger for conflicts and source of fitnah:
I used to try to explore the four schools, but I would find different things suiting me in each of them. I also donât listen to speakers, as each has some other position and this kinda messes with my head. It was the same when there were quarrels among sisters, in some discussions (â¦) because few people are able to have a discussion, it often finished with some quarrel, because nobody could respect another personâs opinion, because somebody listens to a different speaker, somebody follows a different school, when someone else is different, this is bad. So, all in all, I try to keep such things that I like for myself. (Franciszka)
When you want to push your opinion forward as the only one and shut othersâ mouths, or keyboards, you will shout that there is one Islam and you canât make fitnah. A multiplicity of opinions â it scares people! (Maja)
According to many of our respondents, the Muslim League, a religious organisation converts belong to, not only fails to educate new Muslims about the diversity of Islam, but also pushes forward the idea of âone Islamâ in various ways.
They all keep saying that there is one Islam, but it is diverse after all, so Iâd like to learn in Poland how I am to join this religion with being a Pole, and not just draw from Arab culture. Why should a bearded Saudi man be telling me about the things he knows partially from a customary and cultural perspective while this is not a religious approach? (Franciszka)
An Islam from the sacristy, remnants of Catholicism. The patterns of, you know, the parish priest, this rather unequal relation, a hierarchical one. (â¦) Many people also have no idea of what authority in Islam looks like, so that imam, some scholar etc. theyâre quite unfortunately mistaken for the priest. (â¦) Thereâs a kind of court arising from that. (Maja)
The anxiety resulting from lack of centralised authority and multiplicity of opinions forces the new Muslim either to undertake the time-consuming effort of learning about the differences or, which might seem a more âeconomicalâ option, to accept one interpretation as the only right one. A dose of distrust seems justified in such context: âOn the Internet, you donât know who it really is. There are various sects publishing [content] out there. (â¦) I am just a Muslim. I donât like sects.â (Daria)
Similar to individuals who are against defining their religiousness in a manner more precise than âMuslimâ, Anna, who chose Islam for its âsimplicity, universalism and spiritualityâ, finds it difficult to define herself:
I wouldnât like to choose a label, but Iâd rather go for it than say Iâm a Sunni. I generally identify with Islam simply more than with Sunnism. I used to say I am a Sunni, but rather because I am not a Shiʾa. However, I later decided that I did not need the label. I prefer to describe myself as a Muslim generally, rather a progressive one, but I am also interested in Sufism, it is closer to me. (Anna)
Sufism
Unlike in Poland, in Western countries the road for Sufi Islam, and sometimes for Islam in general, was paved by the so-called âWestern Sufismâ, which originated in the late 19th century as a result of changes in European religious life and mores (Sedgwick, 2016). An influx of immigrants helped transplant branches of traditional Sufi orders. These were subsequently joined by converts, making their first step towards Islam in general (van Niewkerk, 2006; Poston, 1992; Yarosh, 2018). Interest in Sufism and its popularisation in Western societies intensified with the coming of the âAge of Aquariusâ, with its search for Oriental spirituality, when thousands of young people headed for the East seeking the meaning of life. According to Dutton (1999, p. 163), Sufism is â(â¦) one of the main points of entry to Islam, especially to contemporary European and Americansâ.
Jawad claims that âSufism, as the core of Islam, encompasses what is the most attractive for converts to Islam. She states that Sufism âhas contributed to the process by which Islam is made (â¦) acceptable (â¦) way of life.â (Jawad, 2006, p. 154). Sufism is particularly significant in conversions of women from the Western world. According to Jawad, Sufi ordersâ adepts in Western countries are in particular women belonging to the higher classes, drawn to Islam by the spiritual values which Sufism has espoused. It speaks through emphasising the feminine side of spirituality and the womanly/maternal aspects of God and Godâs relations with humans (Jawad, 2006, pp. 154â160).
Poland, which was part of the Eastern bloc at the height of the Age of Aquarius, was either bypassed by all the above processes entirely, or affected by them only to a minimal extent. The interest in Buddhist and Hinduist traditions was extremely niche, while the popularity of the hippie culture was much smaller than in the West (Karczewski, 1992; Kosior, 1997; Krajewska, 2013; Kubiak, 1992, 1997; Tracz, 2012, 2014, 2018; Libiszowska-ŻóÅtkowska, 2003; Sipowicz, 2015).
Although there are no more obstacles precluding effective cultural communication nowadays, the share of the Sufi current in Polish Islam is very modest. It has only been within the last few years that we have been able to speak of a presence of Sufi elements in popular culture (popular Turkish historical drama series Ertugrul; in 2015 the Barbelo publishing house began publishing a Polish translation of the Masnavi poem by Jalal ad-Din Rumi, with two volumes published so far; memes quoting Rumiâs poetry began appearing on Facebook).
The only form of Sufi organisation has been the activity of Andrzej Saramowicz and the Polska Fundacja Sufich im. Dżelaladdina Rumiego [Jalal ad-Din Rumi Polish Sufi Foundation] he founded in 2012. Andrzej Saramowicz learnt about the Sufi movement during the time he spent in the West. He is a student of sheikh Hazrat Azad Rasool from India and the master of a branch of the Naqshbandiyah order. In spite of the activity and efforts the Foundation put into spreading knowledge about Sufi mysticism, as yet the idea of Sufi Islam has not become a popular one in Poland. The Foundation failed to reach Polish Muslims, many of whom were critical or sceptical about its activity, deeming it a non-Muslim group. The above situation was largely caused by the founder himself, who said publicly that he and his family were also practising Catholics and criticised Polish Muslims women wearing hijabs. As for those members of the Polish ummah who were searching for new spiritual paths, the Foundation helped them learn about Sufi practices and systematise their knowledge of the topic.
Thus, the influence of the Foundationâs activity on Polish Muslims and their attitude to Sufism remains minimal. The influence on the non-Muslims participating in the meditation meetings organised by the Foundation might not be of much greater significance. The persons who accept Islam during the meetings rarely join the Polish ummah. Their interactions usually remain limited to the meditation group and they themselves remain âephemeralâ converts.
The last 30 years of sociocultural changes in Poland has also resulted in a departure from traditional religion and an interest in new forms of spirituality typical for New Age. âEnlightenment seekers shopping for different religious alternativesâ (Yarosh, 2018) in Poland might arrive at the Zachodni Zakon Sufi w Polsce, branch of the Inayati Order, related to Hazrat Inayat Khan. Officially active in Poland since 1989 and registered in 1991, the group does not identify as an Islamic one, but as a secular one, open for everyone regardless of their religion.
The last few years of interest in new forms of spirituality has also resulted in (very chaotic, to be precise) mentions of Sufism in various online publications concerned with broadly understood esoterism.
The decades-long fascination with Sufi spirituality experienced by masses seeking their own way in the Western world is quantitatively different from the less-than-modest interest in Sufism in Poland. However, one factor they seem to have in common is the relatively low number of converts to Islam whose interest began with Sufism compared with other Islamic movements. Descriptions of this disproportion in the Western world can be found in Smith (2009), Hermansen (2000) or Yarosh (2018).
The absence of Sufism in Polish Islam results not only from lack of a lively tradition, but also from a specific discourse arising from Salafi ideas. This discourse has led to Sufi practices being associated with such concepts as shirk or bidʾa. Due to constant repetition, the associations are now at work even in persons unaffiliated with the Salafi movement. Because of inadequate translation of the term from English, Sufism is also called sekta, Polish for âsectâ on the Polish Internet. Even though the dictionary meaning of the term in Polish is âa faction of a religion; also: a group of people concentrated around a leader, with their own religionâ, its meaning implied in colloquial Polish is âa dangerous and organised group of hereticsâ, with strong negative connotations, thus closer to a cult. Another term used to refer to Sufism on the Polish Internet is dewiacja, Polish for âdeviationâ. Its negative connotations are just as strong as those of sekta and, even though its dictionary meaning is âa significant departure from norm in behaviour, actions or thinkingâ, it is predominantly used in the meaning of sexual deviation. Sufi practices are condemned by Internet users as non-Muslim, also due to their alleged sources in other traditions (Persian or Indian) and religions (Buddhism, Hinduism, etc.).
We have learnt that there are several women practising Sufism who follow particular tariqas and several individuals interested in Sufism among Muslim Internet groups users. Nonetheless, their experience is absent from the online discourse, which might result from their fear of criticism or being misunderstood. Most of them had moved abroad permanently and came into contact with Sufi practices during their stay in Muslim or Western European countries, sometimes drawing inspiration from practising husbands and their families. As Salafis, they may experience tribal stigma inside the umma but they can use their affiliation as a means of managing the spoiled identity with non-Muslims to lessen to stigma of being Muslim.
So it was in Danutaâs case. Her biography, family history and interests were connected to a pluralistic understandings of faith. Raised in a family of Catholics who actively participated in the life of the Church, she also came into contact with Judaism and Protestantism in her extended family and neighbourhood. Her further studies and religious searches revolved around Judaism and Hinduism. She came into contact with Sufi practices during her stay in India and Muslim countries, before she accepted Islam. Interaction with Andrzej Saramowicz allowed her to organise her knowledge about various forms of Sufism (âThere are so many sectarian factions hereâ). When she moved to the UK after converting to Islam, she began practising moderate Salafism together with her husband. However, she began to gradually lean back towards Sufism. The doubts she had originated from anxiety about both her own motivations and the opinion about Sufism common among Muslims, yet she eventually found mystic Islam to meet her needs best:
While I was reading, I already knew that Sufism was closest to me [because of earlier religious experiences]. And I was a little afraid. And I was afraid because of my husband. Sufism is not popular among Muslims, because it is a very spiritual and mystical version of Islam. And mysticism is often considered sinful because it adds even more variations. And this growing up to Sufism, am I really so mystical or do I [just] want to pretend to be a saint. But I decided that if I donât try and if Iâm not honest with myself, Iâll never find it out. And Iâll keep searching and be mistaken. Nothing will be perfect for me, so Iâm saying OK, I know my limitations, some of those earthly things that are tying me up, but I want to and I will strive for that. (â¦)
[People] will expect that you behave in this way or that. I want to be above it. I have one aim, and it is the aim of finding God. And I would like my life to be devoted to this aim, as Sufism has it. This is also taken from Hinduism, I heard it in some lecture somewhere, (â¦) that we are here, in this woeld, there are multiple diseases, and there is a suitable medicine for each disease. And religions are also those medicines. (â¦) This is something I take from Hinduism, because I think that we all are souls. And because we identify with different things, ideas, various problems arise. We must accept ourselves as souls. A soul which wants to find God. And what others are doing does not interest me at all. I have chosen my way, I am going to God. And this exactly is Islam for me. (Danuta)
Living in Poland, Maja had certain theoretical knowledge about Sufism, yet she never found it interesting until a certain moment. She surprised herself when she suddenly developed the interest in what she had earlier perceived as âesoteric nonsenseâ. Her doubts were caused by theological issues. After a certain time, practising in Poland was no longer sufficient for her and later she had the opportunity of participating in one of the ordersâ practices during her stay in the UK.
After so many years (â¦) it came to me in life, as if of itself. (â¦) my Islam (â¦) was evolving, I had this lightly Salafi approach. (â¦) and I became interested in this Sufism somewhat suddenly (â¦) There were the two basic obstacles (â¦) Iâve been reading quite a lot about it, Iâm about 80 per cent convinced. The theological obstacle, because all the time I had been troubled by the issue of whether wasila, i.e. the Prophetâs intermediacy, is possible, and whether certain elements really arenât shirk. It is also difficult for me, as a person of left-wing views, to accept the political quietism and the rather right-wing inclination common among Sufi orders. (â¦) There is also the issue related to psychology, it is difficult to overcome, because (â¦) there is the master, so something I had run away from. (â¦) (Maja)
Engaging in Sufi practices also means an opportunity of satisfying oneâs aesthetic needs related to religious practices:
I listen to music, I love music, I couldnât live without music. Poetry is important to me as well. And hereâs another nod towards Sufism. Sufism is simply above it all, it allows you to rejoice, also in culture, and I need it. This is so this-worldly, but I like it. In another dimension of Islam, you arenât supposed to listen to music. (Danuta)
Living in Poland, Anna had no opportunity of meeting anyone from Sufi circles. However, similarly to Danuta, thanks to her spiritual interests and earlier religious experiences (her own Buddhist ones and those reported by people she knew), she began practising Islam from dhikr and meditation:
The way I meditate is that I like to sit down, listen to dhikr and repeat (â¦) dhikr was my first form of prayer, that was my salat. Because that was actually what my Islam came from. From Sufism, and not from something else. I think that it was proceeding rather parallelly. I converted to Islam for rather universalist reasons. (Anna)
Danuta had an insight into the everyday aspect of Sufi practices thanks to her family relations and attempted to approach the topic of Sufism in an unbiased manner. She justifies her rejection of the idea using both rational and emotional reasons. As it was in Majaâs case, there are certain theological and psychological issues which make her hesitate:
I have used various sources on Islam. I tried, for example [to learn] about Sufism (â¦) The way X [a member of the respondentâs family living abroad] was acting, what she is telling, what hadiths she quotes, that was just a tiny bit unbelievable for me, and this Sufism reminds me a tiny bit of Christian mysticism. It also reminds me that thereâs the sheikh, whom you entrust with your life and your decisions and it just makes you think of a Catholic priest. So, I just donât have trust in this path in Islam. Iâd rather prefer those Wahhabis, who want to follow a straight path without those human additions, and in my opinion this Golden Chain in Sufism is kinda far-fetched. (Danuta)
Sufis among our respondents are overrepresented in comparison to the estimated proportion of Sufis in the Polish ummah. Moreover, the narratives of Sufism in the online ummah are different from those from the interviews with our respondents. The difference between the Western and the Central European experiences makes it difficult to speak of a parallel between the Polish and the Western interest in Sufism. In Poland, Sufism is an intermediate stage or a final one, arrived at after many years, rather than a point of departure. The low popularity of Sufism and the relatively low popularity of Salafism (particularly of the radical version), the two currents representing opposite ends of the orthodoxy spectrum, might result not as much from lack of sources as from lack of a social background â both are difficult to practise alone or in a small group. Therefore, Polish converts interested in Sufism are most likely to learn and practise this form of Islam abroad.
Conclusions
Presented here problems with affiliations highlight strategies of managing spoiled identity. In most cases, Polish converts to Islam follow a path which leads through a usually unconscious interest in Salafism. The âunconsciousâ Salafism results from a lack of knowledge about the traditions and diversity of Islam. The ideal quoted by many converts is âpure Islamâ, free from âcultural additionsâ which ostensibly define born Muslimsâ faith. There are multiple factors contributing to the popularity of Salafism in the initial phase of conversion. Some of them are the active presence of Salafi missionaries on the Polish Internet and the clarity of the currentâs message, the latter particularly appealing to those whose first religion was Catholicism. The confrontation of the radical new rules with the (lack of) opportunity for their application in everyday life often ends with a crisis. We can observe differences between Polish converts living in their homeland and those who immigrated to the United Kingdom (more about Polish Muslims in the UK in Chapter 3). For Muslims living in Poland, this stage comes rather quickly. This is because due to the small number of Muslims in Poland and the resulting lack of a support group one could belong to, the homogenous character of the Polish society, and the widely spread Islamophobia. In these conditions, the new Muslims quickly observe the inadequacy of Salafism in the Polish reality. Of a significant importance might be the fear of rejection and breaking family and friendship bonds, and losing sense of security and social position. For many women, a true breakthrough comes with a stay in the UK, where they can learn how diverse Islam is and how different British Islam is from the âtheoreticalâ Islam they know from Poland. Some of the converts living abroad remain Salafis not only because of the significantly greater ease of practice, but also because of the freedom they experience thanks to the social void they find themselves in as immigrants, far from their families and compatriots.
Such crises are nearly absent from the narratives to be found on social media, Polish ummahâs main meeting place. This indicates the largely self-made character of the convertsâ online discourse. Despite the immense role it plays in the life of the Muslim community, the Internet is perceived as a hostile space where the main activity consists in power play and judging others. It is for the fear of the above attitudes that the converts who have already been through the initial stage of infatuation with purist Islam avoid sharing their views or doubts online. Thus, many groups become places where new converts are trying to proselytise to popularise Salafi rules. They are commonly venues for fierce arguments about the âaccurateâ understanding of Islam. It is common for the whole ummah to be described as âjudgmentalâ, hence many converts speak of sharing their experiences and religious realisations only in a circle of sisters they are close with.
If the crisis does not end with rejection of Islam, the first option, more common in converts residing in Poland, is finding oneself in oneâs own version of Islam, which is an âIslam of the centreâ, adjusted to the needs defined by living in the Polish society (âpotato Islamâ). Another option, which is generally less common and found predominantly among emigrants, is moving to the position of a âmature Salafismâ. The attitude of the converts living in Poland who find themselves in the Islam of the centre does not require the support of a group. It can be practised individually and does not collide with their social roles. Some of the converts postulate the existence of a Polish or European Islam, which would combine Islamic ethical values with European human rights and/or Polish cultural traditions, to emphasise their separateness from the Muslims of Arab descent residing in Poland.
Several respondents interested in politics or social issues merge their views with Islam after conversion. Most of our respondentsâ views could be (quite broadly) described as left-wing-liberal. Most women identify as Muslim feminists, while interest in environmental issues is quite niche. Several respondents also speak of inclusive Islam, which includes various traditions and currents. Progressive Muslims constitute a small percentage, and their views make them feel quite estranged from the Polish ummah. Those interested in Sufism constitute a similarly niche group, as Polish Muslims have no opportunity to engage in Sufi practices due to lack of such tradition. Some respondents are also uninterested in Sufism due to the ubiquitous Salafi message which excludes the Shiaâ and the Sufi. It was only a stay abroad or their own research that led a handful of our respondents to become interested in Sufism.
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Here, a metaphor for emigration that references Muhammadâs withdrawal from Makkah in 622 AD and settlement in Medina. As that event also marks year 1 of the Islamic calendar, the use of this word can also symbolize a new beginning, a rebirth.
A small number of âmatureâ Polish Salafi women live and practice outside Poland, but none of them accepted the invitation to participate in our study.
The preacher (who is oftentimes a writer as well, for example Tariq Ramadan) uses his personal authority, described by Pilger-Strohl as âconstructed through the acknowledgement of âsubordinatesââ and therefore âmust be earned, and repeatedly reconfirmed. (â¦) is dependent on trust, loyalty and integrity (â¦) has the possibility (â¦) to influence othersâ (Pilger-Strohl, 2014).
On the wide interest in environmental issue among Swedish converts, see Roald (2010, p. 332).
Pickthall (1930).