Introduction
The estimates of the number of converts to Islam in Poland vary significantly, indicating between several hundreds and several thousands. So far there have been only a few quantitative surveys of Polish female converts to Islam – mostly student dissertations. For instance, Pawlik, (2007) conducted a study among Polish females who married Muslim men. Out of the 243 respondents, 39% were Muslim. Górak-Sosnowska’s (2015) sample in a study on Polish female convert Internet activity totalled 47 individuals. The largest quantitative study of Polish female converts to Islam with 171 respondents was conducted by Rogowska (2017) as a part of her PhD thesis on convert involvement in local communities; 124 of her respondents were women. Several qualitative studies were published as articles (Łojek-Magdziarz, 2007; Pędziwiatr, 2017), chapters (Rzepecka, 2001; Krotofil, 2011), and two monographs (Dudek, 2016; Ryszewska, 2018). This brief overview of existing studies on Polish female converts to Islam indicates that reaching more than a hundred of respondents presents a challenge. Moreover, due to the lack of sampling framework, it is impossible to draw a representative sample of Polish female converts to Islam.
It is likely that some of the respondents have participated in more than one research study. We personally know most of the authors mentioned above and share social networks with them. Moreover, based on their published methodologies, it is likely that many researchers have used similar places of participant recruitment – especially in Poland. Examples of such places include the local mosques and Islamic centres located in the largest cities, as well as events in which Muslims participate – such as the Muslim Reunion, an annual event organised by the Muslim League, attended by both Muslims of migrant origin and converts to Islam. As regards the questionnaires distributed online, there are also some prominent groups and forums that are frequently mined by researchers. The Muslim community in Poland is so small that if an extensive qualitative study about Polish female converts to Islam is published, often the participants are able to guess who was interviewed – even if the data was anonymised.
In our survey we asked the respondents whether they had participated in another study; and over half of them had, at least once. As the number of studies on Polish converts to Islam is relatively small and fairly easy to keep track of, this brings two methodological issues; one, we risked relying on the same respondents as other researchers. Thus, it was of significance to ensure that the questions we asked were different from those asked in previous studies with this population. The second one is that a significant proportion of our sample could be labelled as ‘duty Muslims’ or ‘everyday explainers’ (Harris and Hussein, 2018), that is, people who are often recruited to participate in research. Here, we are not going to present a representative picture of all Polish female converts to Islam, but rather, some insights about our qualitative and quantitative study participants. (Some of our interviewees declared that they had also completed the questionnaire.)
There were 127 respondents in our study. Seventy-five completed the whole survey questionnaire, and fifty-two left some questions unanswered. The questionnaire, designed with the use of online software, was placed on the project website. The questionnaire we developed was lengthy – the maximum number of entries was 259. We decided to use such a wide brushstroke approach, because we knew that the female converts population was very diverse. In this chapter, we focus on the basic descriptive data to draw up a social and religious profile of our respondents.
Demographic Profile
Our respondents are Polish women who converted to Islam. Most of them are between twenty and fifty years old, including fifty-three respondents in their 30s, thirty-two in their 40s, and thirty-one in their 20s. Ten respondents are over fifty years old and only one is younger than twenty. The average age of our respondents is thirty-six. Most of them embraced Islam in their twenties (sixty-four respondents), or thirties (twenty-seven respondents). Twenty respondents converted to Islam at an age younger than twenty, and twelve were over forty years old, as illustrated below.
In most cases, conversion occurred after reaching legal adulthood (which in Poland is marked by reaching the age of eighteen), and the average age at conversion was twenty-seven. Overall, conversion is not, therefore, an adolescent phenomenon, dovetailing with findings of other studies on conversion to Islam in Europe (Köse, 1997).
Age at conversion by year of birth
Source: Project survey data
Years in Islam by year of birth
Source: Project survey data
At the time of the data collection, most of our respondents had been Muslims up to ten years, with forty-four respondents – between five and ten years, and thirty-five respondents – less than five years. Thirty-six respondents had been Muslims for over ten years, including six who embraced Islam over twenty years earlier, as the chart below illustrates.
Most of our respondents are converts in the literal sense of the word – they have converted to Islam from another religion, most often Roman Catholicism (109 cases). Ten respondents indicated no previous religion, two had been Protestant, one Orthodox, and one Wicca. Three others indicated that had been Catholic, but later became areligious and, finally, embraced Islam. Asked about their current religious self-identification, 110 of our respondents declared that they were Muslim, eleven as Sunni, one as Shia, while three chose different identities – European, Polish and “a believer”. We further explore the paths leading to Islam and the different types of religious identities in Chapter 7.
Polish female converts to Islam who participated in our study are predominantly well-educated, middle class and live in large cities. Approximately half have a university degree (59) and the other half completed secondary-level education (56). 9 have completed vocational education programmes. Our respondents work full-time (53), are university students (22), and some run their own businesses (15). Twenty-four respondents do not work in paid employment. Most of those who do, are employed in professional positions (46), and many are executives (23). Thirteen are blue-collar workers. Our respondents work mostly in services, education, healthcare, commerce and administration. The sample corresponds with the profile of converts to Islam offered by several studies conducted among female converts to Islam in the West (Roald, 2006, p. 48; Badran, 2006, p. 197; van Nieuwkerk, 2006, p. 95).
Fifty-seven of our respondents live in a city of over 0.5 million inhabitants. One should take into account the urban landscape of Poland. The biggest city is Warsaw with 1.7 million inhabitants and there are only five more cities with over 500,000 inhabitants. Only six respondents live in small towns or villages of less than twenty thousand inhabitants. Others live in cities below 100,000 inhabitants (23) and villages up to 500 inhabitants (37). Interestingly, a significant proportion of our respondents (54) live outside of Poland. They live mostly in other European countries – the UK (34), but also in Germany (10). Other countries of residence include Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. A few live in Muslim-majority countries – Lebanon, Pakistan, Morocco, Qatar and United Arab Emirates. The large number of converts living abroad indicates clearly that one cannot speak about this group only in the Polish setting. This way we could exclude a significant number of Polish female converts who are Polish or consider themselves Polish, yet they live abroad. In order to complement our Polish-centric picture we decided to introduce a sample of Polish converts who live in the UK – the second biggest country in terms of the size of the Polish female converts community, according to our study.
The high number of Polish female converts to Islam who live outside of Poland seems to be explained by two reasons. The first one is the marginal number of Muslims in Poland – this makes potential encounters with Islam unlikely. The second one is that Poles are mobile. It is estimated that Poles were the second largest group of EU mobile citizens, with over 1 million living in other EU countries (Eurostat, 2021). Studies on Polish female converts to Islam generally focus on the women who live in Poland. While it is hard to estimate the number of Polish converts to Islam, many of them live in other European countries, mostly in Western Europe. This can definitely change the religious landscape of Polish Islam, as Polish converts communicate in Polish and maintain transnational social networks, regardless of the physical place of residence (Górak-Sosnowska, 2015). It is by no mean exceptional; the same pattern has been observed by Račius (2011) among Lithuanian converts to Islam, and across Central and Eastern Europe, in countries with marginal Muslim populations (Račius, 2020).
Most of our respondents are married (76), eighteen have a partner. Twenty- three respondents are single. The most frequent countries of origin of the husbands or partners are: Algeria (14), Egypt (11), and Poland (11). Other countries of husbands’ origin include: Morocco (8), Pakistan (6), India (4), Jordan (4), Libya (3), Palestine (3), Bangladesh (2), Lebanon (2), Saudi Arabia (2), and Turkey (2). Kenya, Iran, Iraq, Macedonia, Somalia, Syria, and Tunisia each were countries of origin of one husband. There are also two British and one Belgian-Moroccan husband. Women who live in Poland often have Polish (10) or Egyptian (9) husbands or partners. Over half of the participants have taken the last name of their husband.
Most of those who are married, were married in both civil (state) and Islamic marriage ceremonies. Marital patterns of Polish female converts to Islam differ based on the country of residence. Out of the twenty-three single participants, eighteen live in Poland and five in other EU countries. Participants who live in Poland are more likely to cohabitate (fifteen, compared to three respondents in other EU countries). Outside of Poland, the option of entering Islamic marriage only (no civil ceremony) is more popular (10) among the respondents than in Poland (3). The vast majority of our respondents’ husbands or partners are Muslim (81), and only nine are non-Muslim. Only those respondents who live in Poland have non-Muslim husbands or partners.
The much higher proportion of single female converts in Poland may be caused by limited possibilities of finding a Muslim spouse in Poland. Additionally, the conversion pattern in Poland is usually not related to a relationship or interactions with Muslims. Poland is culturally a largely homogenous country, and the dominant desire regarding cultural “Others” is their assimilation rather than integration (Zick et al., 2011). In West European countries, Muslim minorities may exert stronger pressure on their members to get married.
Polish is the dominant language in which respondents’ families communicate. It was selected by eighty respondents. At the same time, sixty-six respondents also use foreign languages to communicate with their family members, including their husband and his family, and sometimes also with their children. Among these, English is the most prevalent language of communication (39), followed by German (8). Other European languages include French, Dutch, Spanish and Italian. A handful of respondents communicate in Arabic (6); other languages used in Muslim-majority countries include Turkish, Urdu and Kurdish. Sometimes, respondents communicate in several different languages – Polish, a European language and a language used in a Muslim-majority country. In the case of respondents who live in Poland, most of them use Polish only (52), but a significant minority communicate in English (14) and two in Arabic. In the case of respondents who live in European countries the linguistic diversity is much broader, twenty-five communicate in Polish, and twenty in English. Among the respondents who live in a Muslim-majority country, four use English, two – Polish, two – Arabic and one a mix of Arabic, Polish and Spanish.
The political profile of our respondents is intriguing, compared to the mainstream Polish society. We asked them about their political views and voting preferences. Our respondents were free to choose all political options that fit to their views, and so they could have selected more than one. Around half of our respondents consider themselves to be liberals, a third identify as feminist and another third identify as leftist. There are also small but visible groups of respondents who declare being centrist, conservative, and right-wing.
It appears that our respondents declare mostly liberal/leftist/feminist views,1 which are on the one hand less visible among Polish mainstream population and on the other, not attributed to them in the mainstream Polish discourse about Muslims. Since 2015, the Polish political scene has been dominated by the right-wing conservative Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) party, which has now won the majority in the Polish Parliament twice and secured the position of the president. The largest opposition party is the centrist-liberal Civic Coalition (Koalicja Obywatelska). Other political options are represented by small, yet significant minorities in Polish parliament. Asked which political party they would vote for in the upcoming elections, almost half of our respondents declared that they had not chosen any political party. Out of those who had picked a political party, the two most popular were Civic Coalition and the Left (Lewica). The political and ideological profile of our respondents differs significantly from the Polish mainstream. Moreover, their views seem to contradict the stereotypical image of Islam and Muslims. They self-identify as liberal (whereas Islam is often deemed as inherently conservative), feminist (challenging the perceptions of the status of women in Islam) and leftist.
Embracing Islam
Becoming Muslim is an individual decision but has significant social consequences for the individual in question. Converts to Islam have to negotiate their new religion with themselves and their social circles (Duderija & Rune, 2019). In the following parts of the questionnaire, we have asked them about issues that are linked to their formal religious status as Muslims, religious practices, and how their religion is perceived by their significant others and wider society.
Most of our respondents have not formally left the Catholic Church by declaring apostasy.2 Only six of them admitted to having become apostates. Thus, the. majority are still formally members of Catholic Church. Most state that they do not consider it important. They do not feel any connection to the Catholic faith, and do not care if they are considered members of the Catholic Church. Some of our respondents have not formally abandoned the Catholic Church for family reasons. Leaving the Church in Poland is a burdensome procedure as one must declare apostasy in writing, provide the original certification of baptism, and attend a meeting with the parish priest. Such a meeting is sometimes unpleasant, even for non-Muslims. Two of our respondents indicated that they attempted to leave Church but were treated by the priest who saw them in an offensive manner and gave up mid-process.
Changing religion significantly impacts respondents’ dress, diet and daily practices, as well as religiosity style. Before conversion, around half were not religious. After conversion, all but one respondents declare they are religious. Most engage in Islamic practices – the five arkan al-din – the basic acts of faith considered obligatory in Islam. They give zakat (most of them, as much as is prescribed in Islam), they fast in the holy month of Ramadan (and again, most of them as much as it is prescribed), and they perform the five daily prayers (sometimes fewer times than five). Compared to these three pillars, relatively few of our respondents have gone on hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca: 12 have performed hajj, and 44 are planning to travel to Mecca one day. There are only a few respondents who declare that they are not pracitising.
Almost all of our respondents celebrate the two most important Islamic holidays – ʿEid al-Fitr and ʿEid al-Adha. Several celebrate Ashura (the Shia holiday commemorating the death of Al-Husayn) and Mawlid (the birthday of Prophet Muhammad). Some celebrate non-Islamic holidays, both religious and secular. Four out of ten celebrate Christmas, three out of ten – Easter, and two out of ten – the All Souls’ Day. In these cases, celebrating means active celebration and participation. Christmas in Poland is perceived not only as a religious holiday, but most of all (and despite its religious character) – a family holiday (CBOS, 2019). Easter plays a similar role. Celebrating these holidays gives the respondents an opportunity to meet their close family, as a matter of upholding Polish tradition. Moreover, the respondents celebrate secular holidays. The Independence Day is celebrated by four out of ten our participants and the Women’s Day – by three out of ten. Christmas and Easter are celebrated more often by the respondents who live in Poland. On the other hand, the Independence Day is celebrated more by those who live abroad.
Embracing Islam transforms value systems. Some norms or values accepted in secular environments can be considered morally wrong in Islam. Therefore, we asked our respondents whether certain actions are morally permissible. We selected issues fiercely debated in Poland, as well as those which are opposed based on traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Most respondents find the following acceptable: using contraceptives, in vitro reproduction, donating organs for transplantation, and male circumcision. Our respondents differ on the issues of: abortion, polygamy and death penalty. Same-sex marriage, euthanasia, cohabitation and vaccine refusal are believed to be immoral by most of our respondents. Social issues such as abortion, in vitro are currently hotly debated in Poland (Desperak, 2003; Mishtal, 2015; 2019; Kozub-Karkut, 2017), some of them – like same-sex marriage – do not even reach the level of public debate (Libura, 2009).
The respondents are selective in communicating their new faith. In all but four cases, the closest family know about their conversion. Some distant relatives and acquaintances may be informed. People with whom they live in the same building or work usually know about their conversion. two out of three respondents believe that their non-Muslim family accept their decision to embrace Islam. After coming out as Muslims, converts might become ‘intimate strangers’ to their closest family and friends, resulting in a painful experience of alienation (Ramahi & Suleiman, 2017).
Over two thirds have changed their diet and dress style. Over half of them have changed their lifestyle and relationship with unrelated males, and around a half – their friends. Changing diet or style of dress might mean different things in different context. In Poland, halal food is much harder to obtain and wearing the hijab is makes one more conspicuous than in culturally diverse societies of Western Europe. Some respondents eat only halal food, several exclude pork and/or alcohol, and some are vegetarians. Clothing-wise, respondents use a wide range of styles to abide by their new religion. Over half wear long trousers with a tunic or long skirts, another half wear loose clothing. Less than half wear the hijab. Other styles and accessories are far less popular with a handful of respondents wearing abayas, turbans, and just three – the niqab. The hijab is much more popular among those who live abroad, compared to those who live in Poland. We elaborate more on these embodied religious practices of Polish female converts to Islam in Chapter 6.
While there can be many reasons for wearing or not wearing the hijab, one is definitely to do with the sense of security. The respondents who live in Poland feel significantly less secure wearing the hijab or other Islamic attire at school, at work or generally in public. Many respondents who live outside of Poland declared that they do not wear the hijab in Poland but do so abroad. Some of them switch to a turban or other, less conspicuous head coverings, while others do not wear hijab at all in order to avoid negative reactions. While we are aware that veiled women in West European countries attract unwanted social and political attention, and often face Islamophobic prejudice (Almila, 2019; Bowen, 2007; Piela, 2021), being veiled may be even more challenging in Poland. Living in Poland appears to make the experience of being Muslim less comfortable. Poland-based respondents experience alienation due to being the only Muslim in their social networks. At the same time, respondents are exposed to a great deal of Islamophobic narratives in the media, regardless of their location. Respondents who live outside of Poland are accused more often of “betraying Poland” by embracing Islam than those living in Poland. The charge of “betraying the Catholic faith” is levelled at respondents in both subsets equally frequently. Chapter 4 reflects further on Polish Islamophobia and how does it impact identity management strategies of Polish female converts to Islam.
Social Activity of Polish Female Converts to Islam
Polish female converts to Islam constitute a minority within a minority (van Bommel, 2006), both in Poland and abroad. They are a minority among Polish Muslims who also comprise the indigenous Polish Muslims, the Tatars, as well as Polish Muslims of migrant origin. They are also underrepresented in Polish Muslim religious associations. Abroad, they are additionally immigrants. This positions them as outsiders in relation to majority Muslims. They share the same religion, interact regularly and learn together.
Before we analyse their interactions within the Islamic community, let us begin with those within the mainstream society. Most of our respondents socialize with both Muslims and non-Muslims. Most have non-Muslim acquaintances and even close friends.3 There is a visible gender pattern. Only three out of 127 respondents have no female non-Muslim acquaintances (compared to 104 who have some or many) and only seven have no non-Muslim close friend (unlike 98 others who do). As far as socializing with non-Muslim males is concerned, these interactions are less frequent – 25 respondents have no male, non-Muslim acquaintances whereas 53 have no male, non-Muslim close friends. At the same time, 33 respondents have several close non-Muslim male friends and 17 have many.
The same gendered pattern organizes interactions with Muslim close friends and acquaintances, with women being selected as friends more often than men. Muslim male friends are only slightly more popular than non-Muslim male friends with 14 out of 127 respondents who have no Muslim male acquaintances and 41 respondents who have no Muslim male friends. Only 5 respondents indicated they had no female Muslim acquaintances and 22 – no female Muslim friends.
Respondents tend to have more non-Muslim female friends and acquaintances than Muslim ones. Almost all of our respondents have at least some non-Muslim female acquaintances, and non-Muslims are close friends more frequently than Muslims. This is not surprising, as that Polish converts to Islam live in a non-Muslim-majority society and they naturally interact more with non-Muslims than Muslims. It is possible that Polish female converts to Islam do not consider shared faith to be the ultimate factor when investing in friendships. We do not know whether friendships with non-Muslims are from the time before the conversion (as pre-conversion friends may find it challenging to accept the new faith; Duderija & Rune, 2019, p. 152). The collected data does shed some light on social lives of Polish female converts to Islam.
Polish female converts to Islam have relatively limited opportunities for meeting other Muslims. They mostly meet them in informal settings and through their own efforts. The two most important social venues are Muslim local communities and the Internet. The latter is especially important for female converts who live in Poland (28 indicated that they often meet other Muslims this way, compared to only two respondents living in other European countries). While the online space also plays a significant role in enabling identity performance and socializing for non-Polish Muslims, (Piela, 2010; 2015), it seems that in Poland it is even more important. Many Polish female converts lack the access to other Muslims, as there are no local Muslim communities where they live. Only a handful of respondents indicated that they met new Muslim friends at meetings and events hosted by Muslim organisations.
Our respondents feel largely accepted by born Muslims. Only a few complain that they are not perceived as “real Muslims” and report discrimination by born Muslims. At the same time, most of our respondents socialize more with born Muslims than with other converts. It might be due to the minority status of the convert community, but also internal divisions within the convert section of the Polish ummah (Górak-Sosnowska, 2015). The warm relations between Polish converts to Islam and born Muslims can be also attributed to the background of immigrant Muslims living in Poland. Many of them graduated from Polish universities and secured employment, subsequently integrating, or even assimilating with the mainstream Polish society. While there are cultural differences between born Muslims (and their diverse backgrounds) and the Polish converts, born Muslims of migrant are perceived as well educated and integrated.4
According to our survey, most respondents participate in activities organised by the local ummah. Some of them are offered by local Muslim organisations, but often they are grassroots activities. These include mostly Jumu’ah prayers and meetings after these prayers, taraweeh prayers (during Ramadan), and iftars. Other activities include halaqa (studying Qurʾan), I’tikaf (night prayers at mosque), mawlid (Prophet’s birthday) and dhikr (reciting the name of God). Some of our respondents indicate that they have very limited opportunities to participate in such events as the closest mosque may be located hundreds of miles away.
Relatively few respondents (8) formally belong to a Muslim organisation. Three belong to the Muslim League, and one to each of the following: the Centre for Islamic Culture in Warsaw, the Association of Polish Muslims, Halaqa, the Association of Muslim Students in Duisburg and the UK-based Women of Faith. Except the Muslim League, none of the other organisations have a legal status of a religious association as defined by the Polish law. This means that legally, most of these organisations are just regular associations – as thousands of other associations in Poland. As such, they do not enjoy financial privileges granted to religious organisations in Poland, including significant tax exemptions and state subsidies5 (Skorek, 2017). Only the Muslim League can be represent Polish female converts to Islam as religious believers. All but the Association of Muslim Students in Duisburg are Polish organisations (run by Poles or residents of Poland; all of them are based in Poland except Women of Faith in the UK).
The marginal engagement of Polish female converts with formal Muslim religious associations is not unusual. In fact, the majority of European Muslims are not members of such organisations and, as a consequence, are underrepresented in the public discourse (Akbarzadeh and Roose, 2011). However, a lack of commitment to Muslim organisations may be related to the fact that they are negatively perceived by Muslims themselves. Most of our respondents believe that the interests of Muslims in Poland are not represented well enough (43 out of 127). Twelve believe that the interests are represented well only by individual Muslim activists. Only nine respondents believe that Muslim organisations represent well the interests of Polish Muslims.
Strikingly, a significant minority are members of an organisation (24 respondents, compared to 51 who are not), but only nine of them are members of a Muslim organisation. Over half were engaged in voluntary work in the year prior to completing the survey. It means that Polish female converts to Islam have the potential to contribute to the umma as they do for their local communities. Moreover, our respondents are active ambassadors of Islam. They actively engage with non-Muslims to explain Islam. Almost all are occasionally asked by strangers about Islam. A third published content related to Islam on the Internet. A fifth gave an interview about Islam to a journalist, and – as mentioned in the introduction – over half participated in another study related to Islam. Polish female converts often organise events – over half of respondents stated that they had organised events for Muslims and non-Muslims.
Sources of Islamic Knowledge
The concept of knowledge in Islam transcends the academic understanding of acquiring, processing and producing information. Learning is an Islamic duty and Arabic term ‘ilm is often contrasted with jahl – ignorance, referring to the pre-Islamic Arabia (Solihu, 2014: 25). In our study the sources of Islamic knowledge are important for one more reason, namely the small number of Muslims living in Poland and a lack of Islamic knowledge infrastructure. There are only a few purpose-built mosques across the country (two in Tatar villages located in the east of Poland, two in Warsaw and one in Gdansk). In some cities, Muslims congregate in Islamic cultural centres (that intentionally aim to provide more services than a mosque, such as outreach) for example the Kraków one. There are approximately 8 locations in Poland where formal religious instruction for Muslim students is organised and delivered. In order to participate in a collective prayer, or a program of study, many Polish Muslims would have to travel hundreds of miles. One could easily be the only Muslim in their town or village.
Most of our respondents first came into contact with Islam by meeting a Muslim outside a Muslim-majority country (36). Only 7 respondents indicated that they had first encountered Islam while travelling to an Islamic country. Other 32 respondents first encountered Islam without any interactions with a Muslim. 15 respondents in that subgroup first learnt about Islam from the Internet, 14 from literature (mostly academic) and 3 in classes (at school or at university).
In Western Europe we observe two forms of Islamic knowledge production and dissemination: the classical one – top-down, where knowledge is delivered at a local Islamic centre, a mosque, or a dedicated educational institution and production and exchange with active involvement of all stakeholders (van Bruinessen, 2010). In Poland, the former has limited scope due to the scant Islamic infrastructure. Thus the converts have to rely on their own study and interpretation of Islamic sources. The individually accessed textual source of knowledge about Islam that is used most frequently is the Qurʾan (in a Polish or an English translation). Other sources of Islamic knowledge are used by just over a half of our respondents. These include information gleaned from the Internet, (groups/forums for Muslims and websites about Islam), other Muslims such as one’s husband or friends, and literature (both academic and published by religious organisations). The majority of converts in our sample (49) use sources of information in a language different than Polish, mostly English. Only 28 respondents indicated that they used Polish textual sources to learn about Islam.
In her study on Romanian converts, Stoica (2011) indicates that online Islamic environments serve as an important repository of Islamic knowledge for Eastern European converts due to limited contact with other Muslims and no access to Islamic infrastructure. For Polish converts, online environments are an important space for acquiring Islamic knowledge, but also a space for meeting fellow Muslims. While there are sometimes ideological clashes between Polish Muslims who have different perspectives, the online environment offers Polish converts a sense of belonging (Górak-Sosnowska, 2015). There are dozens of personal blogs on Facebook, private groups for Muslims, as well as some podcasts and YouTube channels founded by Polish female converts to Islam.
Polish female converts to Islam use resources in Polish and English. The Polish resources include established websites such as Planeta Islam (n.d.) or a blog ‘Islam bez tajemnic’ (n.d.) (‘Islam without secrets’) that reaches out to people of all faiths and educates them about Islam. Some of our respondents mentioned the Salafi-oriented website IslamQA (n.d.). Interestingly, there has been no reference of official websites of the Polish Islamic religious associations. All the mentioned Polish websites are grassroots initiatives, some authored anonymously, and some by named Muslim (such as Arkadiusz Miernik, a Polish Shia Imam living in the UK) and non-Muslim authors (the ‘Islamista’ (n.d.) blog) known in the local or online Polish Muslim community.
The literature used by Polish female converts to Islam is academic and confessional, and variously in Polish or English. Often it is distributed free of charge at mosques, or brochures published by Islamic organisations (often in English or translated into Polish from English or Arabic). These are publications related to certain topics (for example, the status of women in Islam, prayer in Islam), Hadith collections or the theology of Islam more widely. Some of our respondents have also indicated that they study academic literature written by both Muslim and non-Muslim authors. The former include Tariq Ramadan, Tahar Ben Yelloun or Reza Aslan. The latter include the two founders of modern Arabic and Islamic studies in Poland – Janusz Danecki6 and Marek Dziekan.7 Asked about the scholars of Islam they consider authoritative, the respondents name mostly English-speaking, internationally known scholars who are Muslim (e.g. Mufti Menk, Zakir Naik, Nouman Ali Khan). Interestingly again, there is no mention of any Polish Muslim scholar in these responses. We expand on the significance of these scholarly influences in Chapter 7.
Conclusions
By using an online questionnaire, we have been able to draft a socio-religious profile of our research sample. Our respondents are mostly middle-class and live in larger cities. Unlike in Western Europe, many Polish female converts live outside of their home country. There seem to be significant differences in the marital status between converts based on their place of residence. Those who live in Poland are more likely to have a Polish husband, and a spouse more generally than those who live abroad.
Embracing Islam often does not result in formally leaving the Catholic Church. The majority of our respondents are still included in the official statistics as Catholics. This reflects the pattern of religiosity in Poland, where many more people declare anti-clericalism (a stance that is not necessarily correlated with atheism) than there are apostates, and a steadily growing number of Poles turn away from the Church and its teachings (Radzikowska, 2017; Zawadka, 2021). Politically, Polish female converts to Islam are on the left-centrist end of the political spectrum and many of them declare to be liberal or feminist. This alignment significantly deviates from the current majority Polish society and can be explained by a stronger relationship between leftist/liberal views and the critical views of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland (Bąk, 2021). While in the Polish context leftist views are often associated with atheism and rejection of spirituality, our study evidences the existence of a subset of the Polish population that embraces “leftist”/liberal values, such as social justice, women’s rights, and separation of religion from the state that is keen to frame these values religiously using a different faith tradition, such as Islam.
Polish female converts to Islam are inclusive in the process of building and maintaining their social networks – both with non-Muslims and Muslims. In fact, they have more non-Muslim female friends and acquaintances than Muslim female friends. This might result from the small size of the Muslim community in Poland. However, it can be observed also in the other EU countries where Polish female converts to Islam live. It seems therefore that religion is not the main dimension in network-building. Polish female converts to Islam actively participate in mostly grassroots activities and events led by the local ummah.
Most respondents practice the pillars of Islam. They also celebrate the two most important Islamic holidays – ʿEid al-Fitr and ʿEid al-Adha. Many also participate in Catholic and secular holidays in Poland, especially Christmas (which is considered by many to be a family gathering) and the Day of Independence. Polish female converts to Islam come out as Muslims to their closest family and in those social circles where they interact on a daily basis. Converting to Islam influences the diet, social life, and dress of many Polish female converts. Their dress style is significantly influenced by the place of residence – those who live in Poland tend to report more challenges related to wearing Muslim clothing in public.
Polish female converts to Islam tend to discover Islam in two different ways – through interactions with a Muslim, or through texts. While the sources of knowledge are diverse and include academic literature, online content, and interactions with other Muslims, most of them are in English, not Polish This suggests scarcity of Polish language resources about Islam. The existing ones are either brochures translated from English or Arabic into Polish, or blogs and websites developed by grassroots Muslims. In a similar manner, Polish female converts to Islam tend to follow English-speaking scholars in their search for religious authority.
While our sample does not allow us to draw conclusions that could be generalised onto the whole population of Polish female converts to Islam, our respondents’ answers help us elaborate on some unique features of this community. First, Polish female converts to Islam are likely more cosmopolitan the mainstream Polish population. A significant proportion of our respondents live outside of Poland, mostly in the UK. Out of those who are not single, most have partners or husbands who are not ethnically Polish. Many Polish female converts to Islam learn about their religion in English.
Second, our respondents, by virtue of being a small minority, are bound to interact with each other in person, or more often, virtually. This is regardless of the differences in their lifestyles, political views, or perception of religion and religiosity. Moreover, the anti-Muslim attitudes prevalent in the mainstream society strengthen their group solidarity and a sense of belonging in the otherwise troubled and internally divided Polish ummah (Pędziwiatr, 2011).
Third, despite the anti-Muslim sentiments, our respondents remain rooted in Polish society. They maintain family bonds, they have non-Muslim friends – often more numerous than Muslim ones. They want to feel at home in Poland. Being neither Tatar not immigrant Muslim, many of them see themselves as the representatives of Polish Islam.
References
Akbarzadeh, S. & Roose, J. (2011). Muslims, Multiculturalism and the Question of the Silent Majority. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 31(3), 309–325.
Almila, A. (Ed.) (2019). Veiling in Fashion. Space and the Hijab in Minority Communities. Bloomsbury.
Badran, M. (2006). Feminism and Conversion. Comparing British, Dutch, and South African Life Stories. In K. van Nieuwker (Ed.). Women embracing Islam. Gender and conversion in the West. University of Texas Press.
Bąk, M. (2021, February 8). Jak PiS wychował „lewaków‟. W ciągu roku aż dwukrotnie wzrosła liczba młodych Polaków o lewicowych poglądach. Bezprawnik.pl. https://bezprawnik.pl/lewicowe-poglady-mlodych-polakow/.
van Bommel, A. (2006). Muslim in the Netherlands or Dutch Muslim: a Minority within a Minority. In. E. van der Borght (Ed.). Affirming and Living with Differences (pp. 101–107). Brill.
Bowen, J. (2007). Why the French don’t like headscarves. Islam, the State, and Public Space. Princeton University Press.
van Bruinessen, M. (2010). Producing Islamic Knowledge in Western Europe: Discipline, Authority, and Personal Quest. In M. van Bruinessen & S. Allievi (Eds.). Producing Islamic knowledge: transmission and dissemination in Western Europe (pp. 1–27). Routledge.
CBOS (2019, December). Boże Narodzenie 2019. Komunikat z badań. nr 164/2019. Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej. http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2019/K_164_19.PDF.
Desperak, I. (2003). Antykoncepcja, aborcja i … eutanazja. O upolitycznieniu praw reprodukcyjnych w Polsce. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Sociologica, 30, 193–207.
Dudek, A. (2016). Poddaję się. Życie muzułmanek w Polsce. PWN.
Duderija, A. & Rune, H. (2019). Islam and Muslims in the West. Major issues and debates. Palgrave Macmillan.
Eurostat (2021, August). EU citizens living in another Member State – statistical overview, June, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_citizens_living_in_another_Member_State_-_statistical_overview.
Górak-Sosnowska, K. (2015). Between Fitna and the Idyll, Internet forums of Polish female converts to Islam. HAWWA. Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World, 13(3), 344–362.
Harris, A. & Hussein, S. (2018). Conscripts or volunteers? Young Muslims as everyday explainers, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46(19), 3974–3991. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1516547.
ISKK (n.d.). Statystyki na temat apostazji w Polsce. Instytut Statystyki Kościoła Katolickiego. Retrieved August 8, 2021, from http://www.iskk.pl/badania/religijnosc/303-statystyki-nt-apostazji-w-polsce.
Islam bez tajemnic (n.d.). Retrieved August, 8, 2021, from http://islambeztajemnic.wordpress.com.
Islam QA (n.d.). Retrieved August, 8, 2021, from http://islamqa.info.
Islamista (n.d.). Retrieved August, 8, 2021, from http://islamistablog.pl.
Köse, A. (1997). Religious Conversion: Is it an adolescent phenomenon? The case of native British converts to Islam. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 6(4), 253–262.
Kozub-Karkut, M. (2017). Religia w dyskursie polityki – polski spór o aborcję. Annales UMCS, 24(2), 237–255.
Krotofil, J. (2011). ‘If I am to be a Muslim, I have to be a good one’. Polish migrant women embracing Islam and reconstructing identity in dialogue with self and others. In K. Górak-Sosnowska (Ed.), Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe. Widening the European Discourse on Islam (pp. 154–168). University of Warsaw.
Libura, A. (2009). Metamorfoza pojęć ważnych społecznie. O próbach zmiany pojęcia małżeństwa w dyskursie na temat homoseksualizmu. Oblicza komunikacji, 2, 285–292.
Łojek-Magdziarz, A. (2007). New Islam in Poland – Polish Converts. ORMA. Revistă destudii etnologice şi historicoreligioase, 6, 55–62.
Mishtal, J. (2015). The politics of morality: the church, the state, and reproductive rights in postsocialist Poland. Ohio University Press.
Mishtal, J. (2019). Reproductive Governance and the (Re)definition of Human Rights in Poland. Medical Anthropology, 38(2), 182–194.
van Nieuwkerk, K. (2006). Gender, Conversion, and Islam. Online and Offline Conversion Narratives. In K. van Nieuwkerk (Ed.), Women embracing Islam. Gender and conversion in the West (pp. 93–119). University of Texas Press. https://doi.org/10.7560/712737-007.
Özyürek, E. (2010). German Converts to Islam and their ambivalent relations with immigrant Muslims. In A. Shyrock (Ed.), Islamophobia/Islamophilia. Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend (pp. 172–194). Indiana University Press.
Pająk-Patkowska, B. (2010). Wymiar lewica – prawica w Polsce – podziały ideologiczne w polskim społeczeństwie. Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne, 1, 79–96.
Pawlik, K. (2007). Kobieta w rodzinie muzułmańskiej na przykładzie małżeństw Polek z wyznawcami islamu [Unpublished master’s thesis]. University of Łódź.
Peppiatt, R. (2011). Women & Islam: The Rise and Rise of the Convert. The Independent, 6 November. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/women-islam-the-rise-and-rise-of-the-convert-6258015.html.
Pędziwiatr, K. (2011). “The Established and Newcomers” in Islam in Poland or the inter-group relations within the Polish Muslim community. In K. Górak-Sosnowska (Ed.), Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe. Widening the European Discourse on Islam (pp. 169–182). University of Warsaw.
Pędziwiatr, K. (2017). Conversions to Islam and Identity Reconfigurations among Poles in Great Britain. Studia Religiologica, 50(2), 221–239.
Piela, A. (2010). Muslim Women’s Online Discussions of Gender Relations in Islam. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 30(3), 425–435. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2010.515827.
Piela, A. (2015). Online Islamic Spaces as Communities of Practice for Female Muslim Converts who Wear the Niqab. Hawwa. Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World, 13(3), 363–382.
Piela, A. (2021). Wearing the Niqab. Muslim Women in the UK and the US. Bloomsbury.
Planeta Islam (n.d.). Retrieved August, 8, 2021, from http://planetaislam.com.
Račius, E. (2011). Revival at the expense of survival?. In K. Górak-Sosnowska (Ed.), Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe. Widening the European Discourse on Islam (pp. 207–221). University of Warsaw.
Račius, E. (2020). Muslims in Eastern Europe. Edinburgh University Press.
Radzikowska, J. (2017, April 16). Czy Polska to nadal katolicki kraj?. Polityka. https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/spoleczenstwo/1611795,1,czy-polska-to-nadal-katolicki-kraj.read.
Ramahi, D. & Suleiman, Y. (2017). Intimate strangers: perspectives on female converts to Islam in Britain. Contemporary Islam, 11, 21–39.
Roald, A. (2006). The Shaping of a Scandinavian “Islam”. Converts and Gender Equal Opportunity. In K. van Nieuwkerk (Ed.), Women embracing Islam. Gender and conversion in the West (pp. 48–70). University of Texas Press. https://doi.org/10.7560/712737-005.
Rogowska, B. (2017). Wpływ Polaków nawróconych na islam na społeczności lokalne w Polsce [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Łódź.
Ryszewska, M. (2018). Polskie muzułmanki. W poszukiwaniu tożsamości. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika.
Rzepecka, E. (2001). Małżeństwa Polek z wyznawcami islamu. Analiza czynników wpływających dezintegrująco na związki heterogeniczne. In D. Chmielowska, D. Grabowska & E. Machut-Mendecka (Eds.), Być kobietą w Oriencie. (pp. 176–201). Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog.
Skorek, A. (2017). Finansowanie Kościołów i związków wyznaniowych ze środków publicznych. Politeja, 46, 167–190.
Solihu, A. (2014). An Axiological Dimension of Qurʾānic Epistempology. Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies, 4(1), 21–38.
Stefańska, O. (2011). Drogi do islamu. Polskie konwertytki [Unpublished master’s theses]. Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities.
Stoica, D. (2011). New Romanian Muslimas. Converted women sharing knowledge in online and offline communities. In K. Górak-Sosnowska (Ed.), Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe. Widening the European Discourse on Islam (pp. 266–287). University of Warsaw.
Wierzbicka, A. (1997). Understanding Cultures through their key words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese. Oxford University Press.
Zawadka, G. (2021, March 16). Sondaż: Co młodzi Polacy sądzą o Kościele? Rzeczpospolita.pl. https://www.rp.pl/Kosciol/303169900-Sondaz-Co-mlodzi-Polacy-sadza-o-Kosciele.html.
Zick, A. et al. (2011). Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination. A European Report. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Certainly, the political labels used here, and the attempt to align political parties with political views have to be both viewed with caution. The concepts of right- or left-wing are hard to define in Western context, but in Central and Eastern Europe it is even more challenging due to the regions’ post-communist past. Given this context, the division between the right and the left becomes a matrix of three layers: the economic (the role of the state in the economy), the cultural (the attitude to “traditional” Polish values) and the historical (approach to the communist legacy; Pająk-Patkowska, 2010) ones.
The phenomenon of apostasy is becoming more pronounced in Poland, but detailed data is unavailable, because the Church does not make its records public regularly. According to the Polish Institute of Statistics of the Catholic Church (ISKK, n.d.), in 2010 there were 459 Poles who formally left the Catholic Church. An online “apostasy counter” indicated 2713 apostasies between December 2020 and November 2022 – see: https://mapaapostazji.pl.
We are using Polish word przyjaciel the equivalent of a ‘close friend’ in English, rather than just a friend, the equivalent of znajomy in Polish (yet we are using acquaintance to differentiate between these two types of relationship) – see Wierzbicka (1997).
This perception is in strong contrast to German converts’ views about born Muslims living in Germany. The former believe that the latter should be better educated, integrated, and “theologically reformed” (Özyürek 2010: 174).
See also the Polish Official Gazette, 2005, no. 231, item 1965.
Janusz Danecki is a professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Warsaw, and author of pioneering works in Polish on the Arabic grammar, an Arabic-Polish dictionary or the book Introduction to Islamic studies. Since 9/11 he has often appeared as an expert on Islam in the Polish media. He is considered to be one of the most renowned Polish scholars of Islam.
Marek Dziekan studied under Danecki and is a professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Łódź and the University of Warsaw. He writes about Arab culture, politics and literature. He strongly criticised the invasion of Iraq in the Polish media.