Introduction
In this case-study, we shall have a look at Galenâs interaction with Platoâs Timaeus. Particularly, and in connection to the two previous case-studies, we will examine the way Galen uses the Timaeus to put forward a âsomatisingâ interpretation of the human soul and the relation between body and soul. That is to say, how he explains the distinction between body and soul in terms of a distinction between different elemental qualities.
In the previous case-study, we noticed how Galen drew Plato into his Galenic history of natural philosophy by depicting him and Hippocrates as his main predecessors with regard to the question of human nature. Particularly through his interpretation of Platoâs Phaedrus 270c-d, he suggested that knowledge of the nature of everything is essential for knowing both body and soul. Galen explained this nature in terms of a primary substance common to everything, one consisting of the hylomorphic principles of a matter without quality and a mixture of the four elemental qualities as form. In this manner, it turns out that knowledge of the human soul, like knowledge of the human body, is dependent upon knowledge of this primary substance of mixture. This is in line with Galenâs stronger thesis in QAM, as we found in Case-Study I, namely, that the substance of the soul is a specific mixture of elemental qualities. It is also in line with his interpretation of the Timaeus, as various texts and testimonies show. In his dealings with the Timaeus, as we shall see in the present case-study, Galen recasts the Platonic opposition between body and soul into an opposition of elemental qualities. In this way, the mixture of elemental qualities can account for man âas a wholeâ, that is, as a hylomorphic substance.
The Timaeus must have been one of Galenâs favourite philosophical texts. Also, it is clear enough that, at least in his own explicit appreciation, Plato is Galenâs favourite philosopher. One might argue that he is indebted to Aristotle and the Peripatetics to at least the same extent, but he often seems less willing to acknowledge this influence than that of Plato.1 At the same time, it seems that Galen has little use for some ideas that are central to Platoâs work, most notably, his mythological and metaphysical speculations on the immortal, immaterial soul, and his theory of Forms. To put it in âintroduction to the history of philosophyâ terms: we know Plato from his mind-body dualism and theory of Forms and we know Galen (if he is in the book at all) as a doctor and scientist with a thoroughly sceptical attitude towards metaphysical speculation. Now, introductions necessarily involve simplifications, but there certainly is some justification for the worry that a Galenic Platonist might turn out to be a somewhat monstrous being (despite Ficino disagreeing).2 From the perspective of this difficulty, it is easy to see why Galen would love Platoâs Timaeus in particular: it does not only explicitly emphasize the tentative nature of its speculative content, as Galen likes to point out, but it is also the most âphysicalâ of Platoâs works. Furthermore, the elements play an important role in Timaeusâ story (though the geometrical elements are problematic for Galen, as we shall see), there is a lot on subjects that pertain to the medical science, and Timaeus speaks extensively of the physiological constitution of the human body and the whole cosmos as well as their mutual relation. Besides, the Timaeus might also be the most teleological of Platoâs works: the teleological design of the cosmos is a fundamental and structural aspect of Timaeusâ narrative. In fact, as has been pointed out, Galenâs own teleological outlook must have been strongly influenced by the tradition of the Timaeus, perhaps more so than by the Peripatetic tradition.3 Indeed, Galen draws on the Timaeus in various works, for example in PHP, where he aims to show the agreement of Plato with Hippocrates, in QAM, where he is out to argue for the dependence of the psychological on the physical and in UP, where the goal is to show the unsurpassed grandeur of natureâs inherent teleological design.
Therefore, it should not surprise us that Galen did not only write a summary of the Timaeus, which he presumably did for all Platonic dialogues, but also produced a commentary (in four volumes), which he did not do for any of the other Platonic dialogues.4 Unfortunately, we do not have the Greek text of his summary of the Timaeus, but we do have the Arabic translation attributed to the workshop of Ḥunayn ibn IsḥÄq.5 The Arabic edition was published by Kraus and Walzer in 1951, who conveniently included a Latin translation (Galeni Compendium Timaei Platonis). Krausâ Arabic edition is soon to appear in a new English translation by Das and Koetschet.6 Galenâs summaries of Plato were very popular in the medieval Arabic-speaking world and must have been a major factor in the transmission of knowledge of Platoâs works, as there seem to have been no direct Arabic translations of Platoâs work itself.7 Particularly in the case of the Timaeus, much of the Medieval Arabic knowledge of the text is dependent on Galen.8
Besides the Arabic translation of Galenâs summary, we also have fragments from his commentary. Galen named it â
It is useful to keep in mind that Galen, both in PHP and Trem. Palp., brought up the need for this commentary in the context of a discussion of humoural theory and the way Plato and Hippocrates relate to it. In particular, he tells us that Plato did not have anything else to say on the subject than what Hippocrates had already said, except for the fact that Plato discussed the underlying causes of why a certain humour is the way it is, e.g. why blood is red, bitter bile is yellow and sharp bile is black, whereas Hippocrates refrained from such inquiries, since they fall outside the scope of medical science.14 Interestingly, this implies that we can expect Galen in his commentary to also discuss things that lie outside the scope of medical science and were therefore not discussed by Hippocrates, despite his own suggestion that he merely comments on that which is relevant to the medical science.15 In fact, on the basis of these anticipatory remarks one would expect the commentary to explain how Platoâs reasoning about the underlying causes of the humours is congruent or incongruent with Hippocratic humoural theory as Galen views it. In fact, this could be said to be the tendency of some of the fragments we have, particularly of those collected by Larrain; as we shall see, the author of those fragments is indeed very critical of the underlying causes Plato proposes.
This case-study will draw not only on PHP and QAM, but also on Galenâs âsummaryâ of the Timaeus, the so-called Compendium, as well as the fragments of his commentary collected and edited by Daremberg and later republished by Schröder. Furthermore, we shall have a special focus on the contested fragments published by Carlos Larrain in 1992. These fragments are understudied, not to say almost completely neglected, presumably because Larrainâs assertion that they are excerpts from Galenâs Timaeus commentary has subsequently been questioned by Diethard Nickel (2002), who claimed they must have been written by someone deliberately imitating Galen.16 There is no doubt that these fragments show strong similarity with many attested Galenic writings and that their content generally fits well with Galenâs interpretation of the Timaeus elsewhere, as Nickel also observed. But so far there has been no study that analyses the fragments in relation to the rest of Galenâs work, except for the very brief critique by Nickel (based on only two of the thirty-four fragments) and Larrainâs own work in his edition of the fragments. What is more, Aileen Das has recently argued that these fragments already circulated with those collected by Daremberg in the 9th century Arabic tradition and that the question of their authenticity deserves a re-evaluation.17 Therefore, it may make sense to include a comparative discussion of Larrainâs fragments, here, against the background of Galenâs attested work. There is no need to attempt any definitive decision as to their authenticity, though our discussion of the fragments might have something to contribute to this debate as well. We will discuss and analyse some of the fragments, specifically those that lend themselves to comparison to Galenâs somatising Timaeus-interpretation as we know it from his attested work.
It is noteworthy that almost all of Galenâs works that particularly deal with the Timaeus are written around the same period: the final books of PHP, his Compendium and his commentary are probably all written between 169 and 180. Only QAM is of later date, presumably after 193, but could be said to take up the earlier work on the Timaeus in the context of a more speculative treatment of the relation between body and soul. This suggests that Galen worked on the Timaeus for a prolonged period of time, which led to various kinds of texts that are closely interrelated (even though they seem to serve different purposes) and might therefore be conceived as a unified project to some extent.18 Nonetheless, with only a few notable exceptions, there are no studies that systematically look into Galenâs dealings with the Timaeus, even though it must have been one of his most important philosophical source-texts.19
Since Galenâs work on the Timaeus is relatively uncharted territory, some further introductory observations about the various editions of fragments and their relation to the Compendium and other sources are in order. Although the Timaeus must have been a profoundly important text for Galen and his writings on the Timaeus were crucial for the Arabic transmission, we now unfortunately have only scatters and testimonies, which can be found in various editions, later Arabic sources and a few small collections of scholia. Moreover, as we mentioned before, some of these scatters are contested, so it will be useful to first chart the sources we now have available. Following this survey of the sources (paragraph 1), we shall proceed to a brief discussion of the scope of Galenâs commentary, both in terms of his specific selection from the Timaeus, and in terms of its subject and status (paragraph 2).
After these preliminaries, we shall discuss some general tendencies of Galenâs Timaeus-interpretation (paragraph 3), which we can then use for the subsequent comparative analysis of Larrainâs fragments (paragraph 4). This comparative analysis consists of four thematic subsections: (1) a discussion of the Aristotelianizing tendency of the author, (2) the somatisation of the soul, that is to say, the extent to which the soul is explained in terms of the elemental qualities, (3) the depiction of the soul as a dry and hot substance that exudes light, and (4) the role of the relation between substances and activities or movements in this reading of the Timaeus.
1 Sources
The most well known collection of fragments from Galenâs commentary is that from the Paris manuscript BnF gr. 2383, first published by Daremberg in 1848, and republished in a new edition by Schröder in 1934. This collection presumably contains fragments from the third of Galenâs four books only. Schröder republished the fragments collected by Daremberg with the addition of excerpts from the first and fourth book found in Al-RhÄzÄ«, Serapion and Maimonides, the Arabic excerpts translated into German by Kahle. These fragments have never been contested, as far as I know.
In addition, we have an edition of 34 possible excerpts published with a commentary by Carlos Larrain in 1992, under the title Galens Kommentar zu Platons Timaios. Larrain discovered these untitled and anonymous fragments in the 14th century Escorial manuscript known under the name Scorialensis and has proposed that they are summaries of the first two books of Galenâs commentary on the Timaeus.20 In his 1991 article on these fragments he suggested that they are âein zusammenfassendes Exzerpt aus den ersten beiden Büchern von Galens Timaioskommentarâ.21
Nickelâs rejection of Larrainâs view goes some way towards explaining the neglect his edition subsequently suffered, despite the potential importance of the material presented in it.22 Nickel argues that the fragments must be from an unknown author who has paraphrased several passages from original Galenic works, such as PHP and UP, and that therefore the âvalue of these texts for the study of Galen is very smallâ.23 A strongly formulated conclusion, perhaps deliberately chosen to counter Garofaloâs earlier assessment in his review of Larrainâs edition, which amounts to the exact opposite: âLa scoperta di Larrain di 34 nuovi estratti in un tardo manoscritto Scorialense gr. O III 11 (Revilla 230 del VI sec.) dunque del massimo interesse per gli studiosi di Galeno e del âTimeoââ.24
Nickel based his brief assessment on an analysis of only two of the thirty-four fragments (6 and 14). Fragment 6 is concerned with Platonistsâ responses to the question of how the communion of body and soul comes about (we shall discuss it below). Nickel states that âThe problem of ensoulment which is raised in this âexcerptâ did not interest Galen at allâ, but rightly adds that here the author might simply have been setting out the problem he sees with the Platonist position. This would indeed correspond to a rather common practice by Galen, i.e. setting out the possible (or actual) contemporary or earlier Platonistsâ answers to a problem related to their notion of soul, making their disagreement amongst themselves explicit, and pointing to the lack of clear answer in Platoâs own text.25 Furthermore, it is not the case, as Nickel asserts, that this issue is raised nowhere else in Galen except for in Prop. Plac., since the question of how a non-bodily soul could possibly acquire communion (
Nickelâs discussion of Larrainâs fragment 14, in turn, consists of a comparison of the fragment with parallels in PHP and UP. He argues that the fragment gives abbreviated and distorted versions of what is said there about the origin of the nerves. Certainly, Nickel is right about these parallels and also right in concluding that in Larrainâs fragment we find, at least, less elaborated versions of the passages in PHP and UP. On the other hand, as Aileen Das has argued in her reply to Nickel, it is not âuncharacteristic of Galen ⦠to reuse material from his own worksâ (this might even be somewhat of an understatement) and to rephrase more succinctly, and often with less clarity, what he has elsewhere worked out more elaborately. Das does not go into the particular distortions that Nickel observes, of which the ones relating to UP seem the most problematic to me (in PHP the differences observed by Nickel are slight changes in terminology amounting to less precise descriptions). However, here too, I think Nickelâs account is debatable, and his comparison of the end of fragment 14 with UP VI 18 is open to criticism as well. For instance, in the UP-passage, in the context of a discussion of the origin of the nerves, Galen states that no nerves can be seen to branch from the heart itself, but that it can be observed that some thin nerves reach (from another source) the membrane around the heart. In large animals, he continues, these thin nerves can even be seen to go into the heart itself, i.e. through the membrane. However, Galen adds, it certainly remains impossible to observe them branching from the heart itself, i.e. having a common source in the heart and then getting divided into separate nerves, since in these larger animals they are still clearly separated when they go into the heart.30 The author of fragment 14, on the other hand, remarks that these small nerves cannot even in the largest animals be seen to spring from the heart itself, presenting this as an argument against viewing the heart as source of the nerves.31 Nickel argues that this is a distortion of the text and proposes Larrainâs fragment is a âreversalâ of what Galen says in UP, since Galen said there that the nerves can be seen to go into the heart in large animals (although, again, they cannot be seen branching from the heart). Once more, I think this might be too quick a conclusion, since it seems more reasonable to assume that the author of Larrainâs fragment is presupposing the difference between observing that the membrane around the heart receives the nerves and observing that these nerves cannot be seen to branch from the heart itself, and then simply remarks that even in the largest animals these nerves cannot be seen to stem from the heart itself (although they can be seen to go in it, from elsewhere), as an argument against the source of the nerves being in the heart.32 Again, I find the reading in which the two selected passages complement each other more plausible than the conclusion that one is a kind of deliberate but faulty imitation of the other.33
Having said this, I agree with Nickel that the text in Larrainâs fragment 14 (and in some other fragments as well) is somewhat odd in places, and certainly less precise than the one in UP. In general, I think Larrainâs fragments are more difficult to read and make sense of than most Galenic texts. In discussing Larrainâs fragments, we shall encounter some of their textual oddities, which could in some cases cast doubt on their authenticity (as excerpts from Galenâs commentary) as well. However, I agree with Aileen Das that Nickelâs argument based on fragment 14 is not strong enough to ascribe the fragments to an imitator. There are many similarly odd passages in Galenâs undisputed works as well, some of which have more precise parallels in other genuine works too.34
As mentioned before, the question of the heritage of these fragments took a new turn with the publication of an article by Aileen Das in 2014. She not only engages with Nickel´s arguments, but also re-evaluates the matter in the light of the Arabic tradition, which was not taken into account in Nickelâs much briefer analysis. Das found that an Arabic translation of Galenâs Timaeus commentary had been current as early as the 9th century, and included both the fragments published by Schröder and Larrain together. She has shown that Larrainâs fragments were likely a part of the Greek manuscript of Galenâs commentary that was translated by Ḥunayn and others, and subsequently used by Al-RhÄzÄ«, pseudo-Thabit and Maimonides. Her analysis is supported by and building on that of Arnzen (2012), who seems to presuppose the authenticity of the Larrain fragments, but was perhaps unaware of the controversy, since he does not refer to Nickelâs article. Arnzen also gives a brief comparative analysis of Galenâs Compendium and the fragments of both Schröder and Larrain, from which it appears that the Compendium and the commentary fragments contain some overlapping and similar passages, and that deletions or omissions occurring in the commentary correspond to those in the Compendium. I think all of this shows that Nickelâs conclusions have been too rash. However, we still cannot be sure about the authenticity of Larrainâs fragments, i.e. we still cannot be certain whether they are excerpts or paraphrased summaries of Galenâs actual Timaeus commentary, as Larrain proposed. It is also noteworthy that in the 14th century manuscript Larrain found, each of the fragments are marked with an obelus at their beginning. Larrain merely notes this fact in his introduction, without going into it any further.35 Presumably, the author of this manuscript indicated that he considered the complete text to be either not original or damaged.36 Then again, I do not know which of these options is meant, nor on what basis, nor how to assess the judgement of the responsible scribe. Larrain is certain that the writer of his manuscript was one Neophytos Prodromenos, a 14th century monk and physician with an interest in the medical tradition, working in the monastery of Ioannes Prodromenos in Constantinople.37
It seems possible, though rather unlikely, that these fragments were interpolated into the Greek manuscript of the genuine commentary by an unknown pseudo-Galen, probably familiar with his Compendium, before they reached Ḥunayn. In the conclusion of her 2014 article, Das notes: â⦠the evidence presented above indicates that the fragments in Scorialensis graec.
Larrain, in his pioneering work with these fragments, might have been slightly overconfident in some of his conclusions and in some of the parallels he reports. This, perhaps, together with Nickelâs article â which may have also stated its case in rather strong terms to counter Larrainâs confident attitude and Garofaloâs positive review â may have, unfortunately, condemned these fragments to near oblivion in scholarship. Future work on the Arabic reception in particular might still bring new insights as well. Meanwhile it is worth considering to what extent these fragments could be compared with Galenâs treatment of the Timaeus in his genuine works, with a particular focus on the relation between body and soul.
Before we can do this, we should have a closer look at the relation between the Compendium and the commentary. Rashed has argued that the commentary is likely to have been written by Galen as a consequence of his epitomizing activity.39 As it appears from the medieval Arabic Liber Aneguemis, expertly analysed by Rashed, Galen found this particular part of the Timaeus to be in need of more than a descriptive summary given its exceptional value for the medical science. For this reason, and because it would benefit his intended audience, which supposedly required a more in-depth treatment, Galen would have decided not only to summarize the entire Platonic dialogue, but also to comment upon this particular section. The latter part of this reconstruction has come down to us, in the Liber Aneguemis, as a story about Galenâs writings on Platoâs Laws, but Rashed convincingly shows that it must have rather been the story of Galenâs summary of and subsequent commentary on the Timaeus.40 This would imply that Galen initially simply summarized the Timaeus, and from there on, possibly with the further impetus of some of his friendsâ interest, decided to comment on part of it.41 I find Rashedâs article convincing, but I do not agree with his suggestion that there would be anything enigmatic about Galen writing this kind of commentary on this specific section of the Timaeus, without an explanation of the kind he offers.42 Galen wrote so many commentaries on so many different authors (Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Chrysippus, Hippocrates, Erasistratus, Asclepiades of Bithynia etc.), including many commentaries on specific subjects within certain works or authors as well as commentaries that quote the commentated text, that it makes much more sense to me to consider this a common practice of his, rather than to look into particular reasons he might have had to write a commentary on a section of one his favourite works by one of his favourite authors.43 Besides, he used passages from this specific part of the Timaeus in other works as well, some of which are dated before the commentary, which indicates that he was already working with these parts of the Timaeus in any case. Finally, Galen frequently remarks that he wrote a certain work merely to gratify the needs of some friend or protégé. But it seems to me rather uncertain to what extent this is a rhetorical strategy to present himself in a certain manner (the modest figure that merely responds to the requests of others seeking to learn from him, rather than someone that is eager to produce writings and show off his knowledge) and to what extent such remarks refer to actual historical fact.44 That is to say, I think Rashed provides a convincing and sophisticated answer to a question that does not really need to be a question in the first place. This might simply be due to his point of departure, namely, asking the question âwhy would Galen write a commentary on a part of the Timaeus?â and finding the answer in a kind of synthesis of the previous work on the matter.45 In any case, whatever the specific relation between the Compendium and the commentary, I think it makes complete sense from Galenâs perspective on Plato, to engage intensively with the Timaeus, and particularly with this specific part of it.46 I hope this will become clearer when we look at Galenâs use of the Timaeus in other works, below.
Das and Koetschet, in their important recent study of Galenâs Compendium, conclude that it served not as a mere summary, but rather as an âisagogic or mnemotechnical textâ that was to prepare its reader for Galenâs âmore detailed exegeses (such as his commentary)â. Such a practice would find a parallel in that of contemporary Platonists, such as in the case of Alcinousâ Didaskalikos.47 Indeed, in some concrete respects, the Compendium prepares the ground for a more elaborate Galenic interpretation of the Timaeus, as we shall see below.
Besides the Compendium, the commentary fragments collected by Schröder and the possible excerpts published by Larrain, we also have some fragments found in Galenic scholia by Moraux and by Lorusso.48 Paul Moraux has found two fragments among scholia to Hipp. Elem., which he published in the Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik (1977). The first corresponds exactly to the citation found by Daremberg in Paris. Gr. 2147 and included by Schröder as the start of the first book.49 It states that, in his commentary, Galen said that the demiurge shaped man out of the elements50 and must certainly pertain to Tim. 42eâ43a, the place where both Schröder and Larrain thought Galen began his commentary (see below, on the scope of the commentary). In the second, we find a discussion on the elements being one or many in nature (Galen there equates Platoâs
In addition, Vito Lorusso has discovered two new fragments in scholia to The Therapeutic Method. These fragments were also published in the Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik (2005), along with an Italian translation. The first is about vision and must pertain, according to Lorusso, to Tim. 45b-d. Lorusso also remarks that this fragment shows resemblance to Larrainâs fragment 22 (on the same passage), particularly in its dependency on Aristotelian theory of vision.55 The second fragment discusses the theory of the formation of the colour red, and is related by Lorusso to Tim. 67câ68d, a passage lacking in both Schröderâs and Larrainâs editions.
2 Scope of the Commentary
As we have noticed, the title of his commentary (On the Medical Statements in Platoâs Timaeus) seems to imply that Galen, perhaps unsurprisingly, was primarily interested in the content that he considered pertinent to the medical science. However, as is well known, Galenâs notion of what is relevant to the medical science is quite broad â just think of his famous dictum that doctors need to be trained in philosophy in order to appropriately practice their art.56 Furthermore, we have also noticed that Galen thinks it typical of Plato to ask for the underlying causes that actually fall outside of the normal scope of the science of medicine, which might indicate that we could expect some of Galenâs commentary to cross this boundary as well, if only as a discussion and interpretation of what Plato says. Aileen Das points out another good indication for this: Galen does not include his commentary on the Timaeus in the list of books that the doctor should read in On the Order of My Own Books, and what is more, in On My Own Books he classifies it not among his medical works but among those that pertain to Platonic philosophy. Das has shown that Galen included in his commentary material that had âno clear application to medical practice or theoryâ but that was rather ârelated to broader debates about the nature of the soulâ and also that in his discussion of this material Galen âdraws on his own scientific or medical theoriesâ.57 In this sense, we could expect the commentary to show some overlap not with specifically medical works, but much rather with the more philosophical works on the soul in which Galen draws on the Timaeus as well, i.e. particularly PHP and QAM.
Finally, we learn from Mixtures (Temp.), HNH, Hipp. Elem. and other works of Galen, that the art of medicine largely consists of balancing nature. That is to say, it requires an understanding of the state of a particular individual in terms of the underlying principles behind generation and decay that rule nature in general.58 Therefore, the science of medicine cannot be mastered without some knowledge of the nature of man, and with that â since man is made of the same elements as everything else â some knowledge of natural philosophy.59 If your doctor does not understand that your body-parts are made out of a mixture of the four elemental qualities, but rather thinks there are atoms underlying them, he will not be able to rationally infer the right cure based on the symptoms of your disease.
Despite all of Galenâs remarks on not knowing the answers to speculative philosophical questions, he does fundamentally assume that the success of medical science is dependent upon adequate knowledge of human nature.60 It is useful to keep in mind this broad Galenic notion of the science of medicine and its relation to natural philosophy when studying his interaction with Platoâs Timaeus. On the other hand, it is equally useful to keep in mind that Galen rather consistently makes a distinction between knowledge, in the sense of something that is or can be scientifically proved, and questions on which we can only find plausible or likely answers.61 This distinction is particularly relevant in the context of his reading of the Timaeus and some of the subjects discussed there, as Galen himself remarks in PHP IX:
á½ Ïι μὲν á¼ÎºÏÎ±Ï á¼ÏÏὶ ÏοÏÎ¯Î±Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Î´Ï Î½Î±Î¼ÎµÏÏ á¼¡ Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á¼¡Î¼á¿¶Î½ καÏαÏÎºÎµÏ Î®, διÎὧν á½Î»Î¯Î³Î¿Î½ á¼Î¼ÏÏοÏθεν εἶÏον á¼ÏÎ¹Î´ÎµÎ¯ÎºÎ½Ï ÏαιΠÏá½° δὲ ÏεÏὶ Ïá¿Ï οá½ÏÎ¯Î±Ï Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï καὶ Ïῶν διαÏλαÏάνÏÏν á¼¡Î¼á¾¶Ï Î¸Îµá¿¶Î½ á¼Ïι Ïε μᾶλλον á½ Ïα ÏεÏὶ Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á¼¡Î¼á¿¶Î½ λÎγεÏαι ÏανÏá½¸Ï á½Ïὸ Ïοῦ θειοÏάÏÎ¿Ï Î Î»Î¬ÏÏÎ½Î¿Ï á¼ÏÏι Ïοῦ Ïιθανοῦ καὶ εἰκÏÏÎ¿Ï á¼ÎºÏείνεÏαι, á½¡Ï Î±á½Ïá½¸Ï á¼Î´Î®Î»ÏÏεν á¼Î½ Τιμαίῳ ÏÏῶÏον á¼Î½Î¬ÏÏεÏθαι μÎλλÏν Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ ÏιολογίαÏ, εἶÏα καὶ μεÏαξὺ καÏá½° Ïὴν διÎξοδον Ïοῦ λÏÎ³Î¿Ï ÏαÏενÏÎ¹Î¸Îµá½¶Ï Ïὴν á¼ÏÏÏαÏιν.62
My earlier remarks make it clear that the fashioning of our bodies is a work of the highest wisdom and power; but the statements of the most divine Plato about the substance of the soul and of the gods who formed us, and still more all that he says about our whole body, extend only to the point of being plausible and reasonable, as he himself pointed out in the Timaeus when first he was about to enter upon an account of the natural world, and again when he inserted the statement in the middle of the account.
tr. De Lacy
Galen gladly emphasizes that Plato made sure to repeatedly state the epistemological status of Timaeusâ discourse and also states that, because of its status as merely plausible, Plato had Timaeus deliver it, rather than Socrates himself.63 We also find this notion in Larrainâs fragment 17, though with more emphasis on difference in style. There, the author suggests that the poetical and elevated style of speculative cosmology better befits sophists than Socrates.64
In any case, the emphasis on the tentative nature of Timaeusâ cosmology does not mean in the least that the discourse is uninteresting to Galen, or not worth extensive exegesis. Therefore, we should also not be surprised to see him make statements in his commentary about things that fall under the header of speculation, as long as we keep in mind that these statements should not be read as propositions that fall under the header of scientific knowledge. We can also see from this passage that Galen uses his qualification of what is âplausibleâ (
With respect to the actual part of Platoâs text that Galen commented upon: both Larrain and Schröder (following Daremberg) propose a linking of their fragments to specific passages in Platoâs Timaeus (for the Greek fragments in Schröder the lemmata were part of the transmission). Larrain has 42e8â46c6 (attributed to the first book of Galenâs commentary) for his Fr 1â27, and 64a2â65a1 for his Fr 28â34 (attributed to the second book of Galenâs commentary). Schröder has 42e8â46a2 (first book) and 59e5â66d2 and 72e3â6 (second book) for the excerpts from Maimonides and Al-RhÄzÄ«, 76d3â81a2 for his nineteen Greek fragments (book 3), and finally 84e2â91c7 for excerpts from Maimonides and Al-RhÄzÄ« thought to belong to book 4.
Both Schröder and Larrain assume Galen started his commentary at Tim. 42e. If they are right, this would indeed make sense in terms of the title. That is, this part of the Timaeus is relevant to medical science in the broad Galenic sense, since it is where the nature of the human body comes into the picture. It would mean that Galen avoided commenting on the parts of Timaeusâ story that would be particularly uninteresting or unsuitable for his purposes, leaving out not only the introduction, narrative setting and the story of Atlantis,65 but also, more significantly, the beginning of Timaeusâ speech containing: the creation of the gods, the address of the demiurge to the created gods in which they are ordained to create the three other kinds of beings, the making of the immortal part of the soul by the demiurge and the description of the process and hierarchy of reincarnation. And, in fact, these are all subjects that Galen generally seems to have limited use for. Even if the title of his commentary were different, what would we imagine him to comment on these passages? These subjects all involve some notion of the divine maker or the immortal soul he gave us, beings that cannot be sufficiently explained in Galenic terms, since they are essentially non-bodily. They belong to the category of subjects that Galen lists in PHP IX, as not susceptible to scientific demonstration.66 Besides, even if Galen were to interpret these passages as descriptions of what is likely or plausible as opposed to true, and simply discuss them as such, they would still evidently harm the continuity he insists upon between him and Plato. Since Plato took these subjects into a direction that Galen has no use for, there is no reason for Galen to include them in his commentary.67
It is tempting to think that Galen started his commentary around the place where the body is introduced and the relation between body and soul becomes the subject at hand (42e). However, there is a relevant passage in Al-BÄ«rÅ«nÄ«âs KitÄb TaḥqÄ«q mÄ li-l-hind min maqÅ«lah maqbÅ«lah fÄ« al-Ê¿aql aw mardhÅ«lah (The Book Confirming What Pertains to India, Whether Rational or Despicable), which is a quotation from Galenâs commentary according to Larrain, Arnzen and Das, and which reports on subjects that are definitely part of the immediately preceding passage in the Timaeus from 41a6 onwards.68 This passage was apparently unknown to Schröder, which explains why he assumed the commentary to start further on in the text. Larrain, however, knew of Al-BÄ«rÅ«nÄ«âs citation, but proposed that Galen merely wrote about these subjects as an explanation to go with the actual start of the commentary in 42e6, where it is about âthe childrenâ, i.e. the gods as children of the demiurge. Larrainâs suggestion does not seem implausible to me, and I agree that it would be odd for Galen to start his commentary âOn the Medical Statements in Platoâs Timaeusâ with the demiurge speaking to the newly created gods about the immortal soul of man. It also makes sense that, given where he starts according to Larrain and Schröder, he would have to provide a short explanation to explain the term âchildrenâ in terms of the foregoing, especially considering that he was citing the passages he commented upon from the Timaeus. Furthermore, the passage starting at 42e, particularly the river-metaphor that is introduced to describe the state of the soul after its incarnation, is a passage for which Galen must have had a particular liking, since he comments upon it extensively in QAM as well.69 Although we cannot be sure whether Galen started commenting at 41a6 or 42e6, it seems reasonable enough to assume that it was around the introduction of the creation of the human body. With regard to the end of his commentary, we have testimonies from Al-RhÄzÄ« that pertain to Tim. 91b-c (included in Schröderâs edition), so it seems likely that Galen simply commented up until the end of the Timaeus (which perhaps makes it all the more pertinent that he skipped a large part of the beginning).
3 Basic Tendencies in Galenâs Interpretation of the Timaeus
The river metaphor Plato introduces in Tim. 43a to describe the chaotic kinetics of the body by which the soul becomes disturbed, must have made a strong impression on Galen. He brings it up in QAM as well, using this metaphor to fit Plato closer into his notion of the nature of man as a specific mixture of the elemental qualities, in which, as we shall see, wetness in particular comes to take over the role that the body as a whole plays in Platonic cosmology.70 Even in the Compendium, which generally remains relatively faithful to Platoâs text (although it is highly selective in the attention attributed to specific aspects), Galen distorts this metaphor so as to make it reflect his own doctrines. In Timaeus 43a, Plato describes how the gods made our bodies out of the elements and then bound the revolutions of the immortal soul into them, resulting in a perversion of the soulâs movement:
αἱ Î´Î Îµá¼°Ï ÏοÏαμὸν á¼Î½Î´ÎµÎ¸Îµá¿Ïαι Ïολὺν οá½ÏÎ á¼ÎºÏάÏÎ¿Ï Î½ οá½ÏÎ á¼ÎºÏαÏοῦνÏο, βίᾳ δὲ á¼ÏÎÏονÏο καὶ á¼ÏεÏον, á½¥ÏÏε Ïὸ μὲν ὠλον κινεá¿Ïθαι ζῷον, á¼ÏάκÏÏÏ Î¼á½´Î½ á½ Ïá¿ ÏÏÏοι ÏÏοÑÎναι καὶ á¼Î»ÏγÏÏ, Ïá½°Ï á¼Î¾ á¼ÏάÏÎ±Ï ÎºÎ¹Î½Î®ÏÎµÎ¹Ï á¼Ïον â¦71
These orbits, then, now bound within a mighty river, neither mastered that river nor were mastered by it, but tossed it violently and were violently tossed by it. Consequently the living thing as a whole did indeed move, but it would proceed in a disorderly, random and irrational way that involved all six of the motions.
tr. Zeyl
Plato here describes the chaos that results when the proper movements of the soul are brought into contact with the elements through the body. He depicts the overwhelming multitude of impressions befalling the soul with the metaphor of being dragged along in a river. This causes the soul to become devoid of understanding:
Î±á¼·Ï Î´Îá¼Î½ á¼Î¾Ïθεν αἰÏθήÏÎµÎ¹Ï ÏÎ¹Î½á½²Ï ÏεÏÏμεναι καὶ ÏÏοÏÏεÏοῦÏαι ÏÏ Î½ÎµÏιÏÏάÏÏνÏαι καὶ Ïὸ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï á¼ Ïαν κÏÏοÏ, ÏÏθÎαá½Ïαι καÏοÏμεναι κÏαÏεá¿Î½ δοκοῦÏι. καὶ διὰ δὴ ÏαῦÏα ÏάνÏα Ïá½° ÏαθήμαÏα νῦν καÏÎ á¼ÏÏÎ¬Ï Ïε á¼Î½Î¿Ï Ï ÏÏ Ïá½´ γίγνεÏαι Ïὸ ÏÏῶÏον, á½ Ïαν Îµá¼°Ï Ïῶμα á¼Î½Î´ÎµÎ¸á¿ θνηÏÏν. á½ Ïαν δὲ Ïὸ Ïá¿Ï αá½Î¾Î·Ï καὶ ÏÏοÏá¿Ï á¼Î»Î±ÏÏον á¼Ïίῠῥεῦμα, Ïάλιν δὲ αἱ ÏεÏίοδοι λαμβανÏμεναι Î³Î±Î»Î®Î½Î·Ï Ïὴν á¼Î±Ï Ïῶν á½Î´á½¸Î½ á¼´ÏÏι καὶ καθιÏÏῶνÏαι μᾶλλον á¼ÏιÏνÏÎ¿Ï Ïοῦ ÏÏÏÎ½Î¿Ï , ÏÏÏε ἤδη ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïὸ καÏá½° ÏÏÏιν á¼°ÏνÏÏν ÏÏá¿Î¼Î± á¼ÎºÎ¬ÏÏÏν Ïῶν κÏκλÏν αἱ ÏεÏιÏοÏαὶ καÏÎµÏ Î¸Ï Î½Ïμεναι, ÏÏ Ïε θάÏεÏον καὶ Ïὸ Ïαá½Ïὸν ÏÏοÏαγοÏεÏÎ¿Ï Ïαι καÏÎ á½ÏθÏν, á¼Î¼ÏÏονα Ïὸν á¼ÏονÏα αá½Ïá½°Ï Î³Î¹Î³Î½Ïμενον á¼ÏοÏελοῦÏιν.72
And so when certain sensations come in from outside and attack them, they sweep the soulâs entire vessel along with them. It is then that these revolutions, however much in control they seem to be, are actually under their control. All these disturbances are no doubt the reason why even today and not only at the beginning, whenever a soul is bound within a mortal body, it at first lacks intelligence. But as the stream that brings growth and nourishment diminishes and the soulâs orbits regain their composure, resume their proper courses and establish themselves more and more with the passage of time, their revolutions are set straight, to conform to the configuration each of the circles takes in its natural course. They then correctly identify what is the same and what is different, and render intelligent the person who possess them.
tr. Zeyl
Over time, when the bodily affections are less intense and more under control, the soul can stabilize in the body and regain its intelligence. Timaeus also stresses that education plays an important role here: the right educational training can reinforce this positive development of the soul. Conversely, a lack of such training could lead one to remain unaccomplished and devoid of understanding until the very end of oneâs life (
In his summary of this passage, however, Galen takes Platoâs metaphor of the river rather literally, namely, in terms of an abundance of moistness. He even states that according to Timaeus the cause for the return of intellect is dryness:
After this, he [sc. Plato] describes the things that happen to the soul necessarily because of its connection to the body: why it is without intellect at the beginning of its connection with it [the body] and why intellect arises second to it after this. Then, he made the cause of the first state an abundance of moisture and the cause of the second state dryness.74
According to Galenâs summary, the lack of intellect in the newborn is caused by an abundance of fluid or moisture: the cause of the ignorance of the newborn is not the binding to the bodily elements as such, but rather the abundance of one specific element or rather elemental quality, namely that of wetness. In Platoâs text, the metaphor of the river clearly referred to all four elements and the incarnation of soul as such, rather than to water or wetness particularly:
Ïολλοῦ Î³á½°Ï á½Î½ÏÎ¿Ï Ïοῦ καÏακλÏζονÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ á¼ÏοÏÏÎονÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á½ Ïὴν ÏÏοÏὴν ÏαÏεá¿Ïεν, á¼Ïι Î¼ÎµÎ¯Î¶Ï Î¸ÏÏÏ Î²Î¿Î½ á¼ÏηÏγάζεÏο Ïá½° Ïῶν ÏÏοÏÏιÏÏÏνÏÏν ÏαθήμαÏα á¼ÎºÎ¬ÏÏοιÏ, á½ Ïε ÏÏ Ïὶ ÏÏοÏκÏοÏÏειε Ïὸ Ïῶμά ÏÎ¹Î½Î¿Ï á¼Î¾Ïθεν á¼Î»Î»Î¿ÏÏίῳ ÏεÏιÏÏ Ïὸν á¼¢ καὶ ÏÏεÏεῷ γá¿Ï Ïάγῳ á½Î³Ïοá¿Ï Ïε á½Î»Î¹ÏθήμαÏιν á½Î´Î¬ÏÏν, εἴÏε ζάλῠÏÎ½ÎµÏ Î¼Î¬ÏÏν á½Ïὸ á¼ÎÏÎ¿Ï ÏεÏομÎνÏν καÏαληÏθείη, καὶ á½Ïὸ ÏάνÏÏν ÏοÏÏÏν διὰ Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï Î±á¼± κινήÏÎµÎ¹Ï á¼Ïὶ Ïὴν ÏÏ Ïὴν εÏÏμεναι ÏÏοÏÏίÏÏοιεν.75
For mighty as the nourishment-bearing billow was in its ebb and flow, mightier still was the turbulence produced by the disturbances caused by the things that struck against the living things. Such disturbances would occur when the body encountered and collided with external fire (i.e., fire other than the bodyâs own) or for that matter with a hard lump of earth or with the flow of gliding waters, or when it was caught up by a surge of air-driven winds. The motions produced by all these encounters would then be conducted through the body to the soul, and strike against it.
tr. Zeyl
Galen here makes a crucial interpretative step â one that is rather remarkable in the context of this summary, which generally stays close to Platoâs text and does not stand out for interpretative originality. Perhaps this indicates that this is truly how Galen reads the Timaeus, rather than it being a deliberate manipulation to fit his own agenda. Or perhaps it indicates that this is indeed such a crucial matter for him that he does not even want to leave it out in this generally more neutral summary. The next step, making dryness the cause for the coming to be of understanding, simply follows from the first step of making an abundance of wetness the cause of the lack of understanding. The notion that dryness or the decrease of the initial wetness of the newborn is the cause of understanding is completely absent from the text Galen is summarizing, and must be understood, I propose, as a way to rewrite the Platonic soul-body dynamics in terms of Galenic mixture and the predomination of specific qualities within it. As we have been able to gather from our previous two case-studies, this interpretation is in line with Galenâs approach in QAM and HNH, where the nature of the soul and the nature of man respectively were understood in terms of the mixture of the elemental qualities. Indeed, we find the exact same interpretative movement in QAM, where Galen uses the same passage from the Timaeus:
⦠ἠÏάÏÎ á¼Î½ á¼Ïεξá¿Ï εἴÏοιμι ξÏμÏανÏα ÏÏÏÏεÏον á¼Î½Î±Î¼Î½Î®ÏÎ±Ï á½ Î½ ὠΠλάÏÏν á¼Î³ÏαÏε λÏγον, á½Ïὸ Ïá½´Ï Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï Îµá¼°Ï Î»Î®Î¸Î·Î½ á¼ÏÏεÏθαι Ïὴν ÏÏ Ïὴν ὧν ÏÏÏÏεÏον á¼ ÏίÏÏαÏο, ÏÏὶν á¼Î½Î´ÎµÎ¸á¿Î½Î±Î¹ Ïá¿· ÏÏμαÏι. λÎγει Î³á½°Ï á½§Î´Î ÏÏÏ Î±á½Ïοá¿Ï ῥήμαÏιν á¼Î½ Τιμαίῳ καÏÎ á¼ÎºÎµá¿Î½Î¿ Ïὸ ÏÏÏίον Ïοῦ ÏÏ Î³Î³ÏάμμαÏοÏ, á¼Î½Î¸Î± ÏηÏὶ ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ Î¸ÎµÎ¿á½ºÏ Î´Î·Î¼Î¹Î¿Ï Ïγá¿Ïαι Ïὸν á¼Î½Î¸ÏÏÏον á¼Î½Î´Î¿á¿¦Î½ÏÎ±Ï Ïὴν á¼Î¸Î¬Î½Î±Ïον ÏÏ Ïὴν âÎµá¼°Ï á¼ÏίÏÏÏ Ïον Ïῶμα καὶ á¼ÏÏÏÏÏ Ïονâ, εá½Î´Î·Î»Î¿Î½ á½ Ïι Ïὴν á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏα Ïá¿Ï Ïῶν βÏεÏῶν οá½ÏÎ¯Î±Ï Î±á¼°Î½Î¹ÏÏÏμενοÏ.76
Perhaps I should discuss these all next â after first giving a reminder of that statement of Platoâs, that as a result of the wetness of the body the soul reaches a state of forgetfulness of what it knew before being bound into the body. For this basically is what he says â in these very words â in the Timaeus, in that part of the work in which he states that the gods craft the human being by placing the immortal soul âin a body replete with ebb and flowâ. It is quite evident that this is an oblique reference to the wetness of the substance of infants.
tr. Singer
It is âquite evidentâ, according to Galen, that Plato here intended to refer to the relative wetness of the substance of newborns, but merely expressed it in a veiled or allusive manner (
á¼Î³á½¼ μὲν οá½Î½ á¼ÏοÏεá¿Î½ á½Î¼Î¿Î»Î¿Î³á¿¶ ÏεÏὶ Ïοῦ διαÏλάÏανÏÎ¿Ï Î±á¼°ÏÎ¯Î¿Ï Ïὸ á¼Î¼Î²ÏÏ Î¿Î½. á¼ÎºÏαν Î³á½°Ï á½Ïῶν á¼Î½ ÏῠδιαÏλάÏει ÏοÏίαν Ïε ἠμα καὶ δÏναμιν οá½Ïε Ïὴν á¼Î½ Ïá¿· ÏÏÎÏμαÏι ÏÏ Ïήν, Ïὴν ÏÏ Ïικὴν μὲν á½Ïὸ Ïῶν ÏεÏὶ Ïὸν ᾿ÎÏιÏÏοÏÎλη ÎºÎ±Î»Î¿Ï Î¼Îνην, á¼ÏÎ¹Î¸Ï Î¼Î·Ïικὴν δΠá½Ïὸ ΠλάÏÏνοÏ, á½Ïὸ δὲ Ïῶν ΣÏÏÑκῶν οá½Î´á½² ÏÏ Ïὴν ὠλÏÏ, á¼Î»Î»á½° ÏÏÏιν, ἡγοῦμαι διαÏλάÏÏειν Ïὸ á¼Î¼Î²ÏÏ Î¿Î½ οὠμÏνον οá½Îº οá½Ïαν ÏοÏήν, á¼Î»Î»á½° καὶ ÏανÏάÏαÏιν á¼Î»Î¿Î³Î¿Î½, οá½ÏΠαὠÏάλιν á¼ÏοÏÏá¿Î½Î±Î¹ ÏελÎÏÏ Î±á½Ïá¿Ï δÏναμαι διὰ Ïὴν ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïá½° γεννήÏανÏα Ïῶν á¼Î³Î³ÏνÏν á½Î¼Î¿Î¹ÏÏηÏα.80
And so I confess that I do not know the cause of construction of the foetus. For I observe in this construction the utmost intelligence and power, and I cannot allow that the soul in the seed, which Aristotle calls vegetative and Plato desiderative, and which the Stoics consider not to be soul at all, but nature, constructs the foetus, since this kind of soul is not only not intelligent, but entirely devoid of reason; nor, however, can I entirely distance myself from that opinion, in view of the similarity of the offspring to the parents â¦
tr. Singer
The seed is a substance consisting of a mixture of the four elemental qualities. In other places, Galen seems to suggest that it is the seed itself, or a âpower in the seedâ that constructs the human being.81 Here, at the end of Foet. Form., we can see how he is still attracted to this view, but at the same time we see his inhibitions to fully commit to it. Lacking intelligence itself, a mixture of elemental qualities could not sufficiently explain the intelligent design Galen observes in natureâs creations. In the end, Galen does not seem to solve this tension by choosing to commit fully to any of the two possible directions. One might view this as philosophical inadequacy or scientific integrity, according to oneâs own taste. In any case, this tension has been the subject of much discussion already82 and we will not pursue the problem further here. I simply note that while, for example, Galenâs UP tilts more towards an emphasis on intelligent design and a wise artificer, his writings on the Timaeus rather seem to tilt towards the opposite aspect, which is striking, considering the prominence of the demiurge in Platoâs Timaeus itself. This makes Galenâs commentary on the Timaeus an interesting case to see to what extent the physiological explanation of the soul in terms of elementary qualities could be successful from a Galenic perspective. It has already been shown by Mario Vegetti that Galen displayed a tendency of somatisation of Platoâs Timaeus in PHP and QAM as well. Vegetti argues that, in PHP, the Timaeus has been particularly useful for Galenâs central doctrine of the division of the soul in three separate parts (
There are a few other general tendencies in Galenâs interpretation of the Timaeus, which will be less important for our analysis but can be briefly mentioned here.
In accordance with Middle-Platonist predecessors and indeed with his own work, Galen, in his reading of the Timaeus, places all causality with the demiurge, or intelligent nature, and understands Platoâs
Finally, it might be good to keep in mind that it is likely that Galen wrote the last books of PHP, the Compendium and the commentary on the Timaeus, quite soon after one another. They were also all included, together with QAM as well, under the header âWorks concerning Platonic philosophyâ in his On My Own Books. The many parallels, programmatic resemblance, and the fact that these works can be dated closely to each other, suggests that Galen undertook some sort of Timaeus-project. Hence, it might be fruitful to interpret the several results of it together or at least in relation to each other.93 Some of the tendencies described above can be found in all of these works, and come to the fore in a particularly lucid manner in those fragments of Larrainâs edition that are supposedly excerpted from the first book of Galenâs commentary. We shall now discuss some of these fragments, and compare them to some of Galenâs attested work on the Timaeus.
4 Comparing Galenâs Timaeus to the Larrain Fragments
4.1 Aristotelianizing Plato
One of the first things to notice, when looking at these fragments, is that even though they are supposed to be commenting on a Platonic text, two of the first three fragments are about Aristotle. In the first fragment, the author expresses his appreciation of Aristotleâs use of the so-called geometrical method in a book on vision and in the Problemata.94 As Larrain remarks, this is not unusual. Galen is wont to make methodological remarks at the beginning of his works, and he also specifically praises Aristotleâs scientific methodology on several occasions, including another work in which he is in fact writing about Plato and the Timaeus, namely in PHP.95 It is therefore not untypical, but still significant, that the author â in either case well-versed in Galenâs previous work â evokes Aristotle so prominently in what is likely to be an introductory passage at the very beginning of the commentary. In the second fragment, moreover, Platoâs notion of the underlying nature of things is criticized and discarded. In the third, the compositional hierarchy of homoeomerous and organic bodies is brought in. As we have seen in the previous case-studies, this is standard Galenic doctrine hailing from Aristotle, who is again explicitly referred to.
Let us have a brief look at these latter two fragments:
á½ Ïι διὰ Ïί Ïὸ μὲν á½Î´ÏÏ á½Î³ÏÏν ÏÎ á¼ÏÏι καὶ á¿¥Ï ÏÏν, ἡ δὲ γῠβαÏεá¿Î± καὶ ÏκληÏά, Ïὸ δὲ Ïá¿¦Ï á¼Î½Ï Ïε ÏÎÏεÏαι καὶ καίει, μαλακÏÏαÏÎ¿Ï Î´á½² καὶ εá½Î±Î»Î»Î¿Î¹ÏÏαÏÎ¿Ï á¼ÏÏιν á½ á¼Î®Ï, á¼ÏιÏκεÏÏÏÎ¼ÎµÎ½Î¿Ï á½ Î Î»Î¬ÏÏν Îµá¼°Ï Ïá½°Ï Ïῶν ÏÏεÏεÏÏÎÏÏν ÏÏημάÏÏν ÏÏÏÎµÎ¹Ï á¼Î½Î®Î½ÎµÎ³ÎºÎµÎ½, á¼Î¾ ὧν βοÏλεÏαι ÏÏ Î³ÎºÎµá¿Ïθαι ÏÎ±Ï Ïὶ Ïá½° ÏÏοιÏεá¿Î± Ïá½° αἰÏθηÏά, καὶ á¼Î½Î±Î»ÏÏν γε ÏαῦÏα καὶ Î´ÎµÎ¹ÎºÎ½á½ºÏ á¼ÏεÏα ÏÏοιÏεá¿Î± ÏοÏÏÏν á½ÏάÏÏειν, οá½Î´Î αá½Ïá½¸Ï á¼ Î´Ï Î½Î®Î¸Î· á¼Î½ÎµÎ»Î¸Îµá¿Î½ μÎÏÏι ÏανÏÏÏ. Ïá½°Ï Î³á½°Ï á¼Ïι ÏοÏÏÏν á¼ÏÏá½°Ï á¼Î½Ïθεν á¼Ïη θεὸν εἰδÎναι καὶ á¼Î½Î´Ïῶν, á½ Ï á¼Î½ á¼ÎºÎµÎ¯Î½á¿³ ÏÎ¯Î»Î¿Ï Îµá¼´Î·.96
That the reason why water is moist and fluid, earth is heavy and hard, fire is borne upwards and burns, and air is most soft and alterable, Plato, after examination, referred to the natures of the solid figures, from which he thought those perceptible elements are composed, and even though he indeed analysed them and showed that other elements underlie them, he himself was not able to go up to the whole. For he said that the principles still higher than those are known by God and by those men who are loved by God.
The structure of this fragment is reminiscent of the general philosophical method described by Galen in HNH and Hipp. Elem. and discussed in Case-Study II: to analyse the elements available to perception, that is to say, to break them down into final principles that cannot be further analysed and to determine the causal powers of these principles. We see the same terminology here as in those works â
That Plato was mistaken must be the meaning of the somewhat odd sentence â
We saw how Galen in PHP brought up the need for a commentary on the Timaeus in the context of Platoâs explanation of the human body (and its congruence with Hippocrates) and his reasoning on underlying causes for the humours being such as they are.102 In PHP, Galen still refrained from criticism on Platoâs choice, declaring that âthe question whether Platoâs opinions about these matters were correct or incorrect lies outside our present discussionâ.103 âThese mattersâ here refers to the discourse on the principles of the elements, which apparently belongs to theoretical philosophy (that is not to say that Galen does not engage with this question himself; he often does, in fact). After this remark, Galen continues to simply sum up Platoâs analysis of the elements in terms of the geometrical shapes, without criticizing it. In Larrainâs fragment 2, however, Platoâs reasoning about geometrical figures is quickly discarded. In that sense, this fragment would live up to Galenâs anticipatory remarks on his Timaeus commentary in Trem. Palp., where he states that the commentary will be critical of Plato (rather, I take it, than merely explanatory or descriptive as in PHP).104 Finally, it is easy to see why Galen would have no use for Platoâs geometrical shapes. They do not have any place or role to fulfil in the hylomorphic schema of primary matter and elementary qualities that Galen usually proposes, as we have seen in the previous two case-studies. Again, this is also one of the aspects of the Timaeus that is downplayed in Galenâs Compendium. The analysis of the elements in terms of geometrical shapes is only briefly mentioned and the emphasis is then immediately turned towards the respective qualities of the elements rather than their constitution from specific geometrical structures.105 Section 52bâ55d from the Timaeus, which discusses the geometrical figures, is left out of consideration entirely.106 As we mentioned briefly above, it is striking to note these similarities between the Compendium and the texts published by Larrain. Indeed, they could be taken as indications that the author of Larrainâs fragments must have been familiar with Galenâs Compendium, which in turn may make it more likely that the fragments are based on Galenâs actual commentary (it is one thing to assume that the original text was written by someone familiar with PHP and UP, as Nickel does, another that the author was also familiar with Galenâs summary of the Timaeus).
Thus, after what seems to be a fundamental critique of Platoâs natural philosophy, which has been anticipated in Galenâs attested works, in the next fragment Aristotle is brought up once more:
á½ Ïι á½Î¼Î¿Î¹Î¿Î¼ÎµÏῠκαλεῠὠ᾿ÎÏιÏÏοÏÎÎ»Î·Ï Ïá½° καÏá½° Ïὴν ÏÏÏÏην ÏÏÏÏαÏιν á¼Îº Ïῶν ÏÏοιÏείÏν γεγονÏÏα, Ïὴν ÏάÏκα, Ïὴν Ïιμελήν, Ïὸ νεῦÏον καὶ á½ Ïα á¼Î»Î»Î± ÏοιαῦÏα. Î´ÎµÏ ÏÎÏα δὲ á¼Îº ÏοÏÏÏν ÏÏνθεÏÎ¹Ï á¼¡ Ïῶν á½Ïγανικῶν á¼ÏÏιν, á½Ïθαλμοῦ καὶ γλÏÏÏÎ·Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ á¼Î³ÎºÎµÏÎ¬Î»Î¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ á½ Ïα á¼Î»Î»Î± ÏοιαῦÏά á¼ÏÏι, καὶ ÏÏίÏη ÏÎ¹Ï á¼Îº Ïῶν á½Ïγανικῶν ÏÏνθεÏÎ¹Ï á¼¡ á¼ ÏανÏÎ¿Ï Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏοÏ.107
That Aristotle calls âhomoeomerousâ the things that have come about as the first composite from the elements, flesh, fat, sinew and all other things that are such. That from these there is a second composition, namely that of the organs, of the eye and the tongue and the brain and all other things that are such, and that from the organic parts there is some third composition, namely that of the body as a whole.
The compositional hierarchy that Galen consistently employs is also presented at the outset here, in the Peripatetic terminology he is wont to use. Galen himself, at least, is well aware that Plato does not use this terminology. In both QAM and HNH, he remarks that Plato used the name
In general, it is safe to conclude â given the praise for the Aristotelian method, and the rejection of Platoâs notion of the underlying nature of things (presumably in favour of the hylomorphic scheme of the mixture of elemental qualities and prime matter) â that the author at least gives a Peripatetic twist to his reading of the Timaeus, not to say that he considers it necessary to introduce some basic Peripatetic conceptual apparatus at the very outset of his commentary to make what follows more understandable. As we know and as has been pointed out above, this Peripatetically inclined reading of the Timaeus â particularly the combination of emphasis on the distinction between homoeomerous bodies and organs with the tripartition and trilocation of the soul â can be considered typically Galenic. We also find a similar use of Aristotelian terminology to âclarifyâ the Platonic text in the longest Greek fragment preserved of Galenâs commentary in Schröderâs edition, where he comments on the passage about plants.110 On the other hand, while this specific way of Aristotelianizing Plato might be typically Galenic, Aristotelianizing Plato is a general tendency shared widely among earlier and contemporary Platonists. Hence, both Galen and/or the author of Larrainâs fragments might already have found themselves in a context in which Plato is an Aristotelianized Plato to some extent.111 However, it seems that the author of Larrainâs fragments did not only Aristotelianize Plato as many so-called Middle-Platonists did, but that he Aristotelianized Plato in a distinctly Galenic manner, with his emphasis on the soundness of Aristotleâs scientific method, the disapproval of Platoâs analysis of the elements in terms of geometrical figures, the introduction of the distinction between homoeomerous and anhomoeomerous bodies or organs and the Aristotelian influences in his discussion of Platoâs theory of vision.
4.2 Somatising the Soul
Let us have a look at the next fragment in Larrainâs edition, fragment 4, which happens to feature Galenâs favourite Platonic doctrine, the tripartition of the soul:
á½ Ïι Ïὴν Ïοῦ κÏÏÎ¼Î¿Ï ÏÏ Ïὴν δÏο á¼Ïειν á¼Î½ αá½Ïá¿· ÏεÏιÏÎ´Î¿Ï Ï á½ Î Î»Î¬ÏÏν ÏηÏίΠÏήν Ïε Ïαá½Ïοῦ καὶ Ïὴν Ïοῦ á¼ÏÎÏÎ¿Ï . καὶ ÏαÏÏÎ±Ï á¼Ïειν ÏηÏὶ καὶ Ïὴν λογικὴν Ïοῦ á¼Î½Î¸ÏÏÏÎ¿Ï ÏÏ Ïήν, μÏÏιÏν ÏÏÏ Î¿á½Ïαν Ïá¿Ï Ïοῦ ÏανÏá½¸Ï Î¿á½ÏίαÏ, á¼ÏÎÏÎ±Ï Î´á½² δÏο ÏÏ Ïá½°Ï á½Ïὸ Ïῶν διαÏλαÏÏÏνÏÏν á¼¡Î¼á¾¶Ï á¼ Î¼Î± ÏῠδιαÏλάÏει ÏÏ Î³Î³ÎµÎ½Î·Î¸á¿Î½Î±Î¹ θνηÏάÏ, ὧν Ïὴν μὲν á¼ÏÎÏαν á½Î½Î¿Î¼Î¬Î¶ÎµÎ¹ Î¸Ï Î¼Î¿ÎµÎ¹Î´á¿, Ïὴν δὲ á¼ÏÎÏαν á¼ÏÎ¹Î¸Ï Î¼Î·Ïικήν, οἰκίζειν δὲ Ïὴν μὲν á¼Î½ καÏδίᾳ, Ïὴν δὲ á¼Î½ á¼¥ÏαÏι.112
That Plato says that the soul of the cosmos has two cycles in it: that of the same and that of the different. And he says that the rational soul of man also has these, it being in some way a portion of the substance of the all, but along with the formation of it two other souls, mortal ones, have been created by the ones that formed us, of which the one is called âspirited partâ, and the other âdesiderativeâ, and the first dwells in the heart, the second in the liver.
As we have mentioned before, Galen appreciates the tripartition of the Timaeus better than that of the Republic and that of the Phaedrus with its horse and chariot metaphor, since in the Timaeus it is clear that there are not only three forms but also three separate parts (
Both the emphasis on the other two parts of the soul being mortal (without making any definitive statement on the mortality of the rational part), as well as the inclusion of their specific location, is typical for Galen.113 In that sense, this fragment too is at least very similar to Galenâs attested work.
The two cycles of the same and the different return in some of the other fragments and are given a specific somatic or elemental twist by the author, as we briefly mentioned before. They bring out an interesting difference between Plato and the author, one that also applies well to Plato and Galen. In Plato, these cycles are prior to the body that follows their movement, since, in Platonic cosmological narrative, soul has to be prior to body:
ὠδὲ καὶ γενÎÏει καὶ á¼ÏεÏá¿ ÏÏοÏÎÏαν καὶ ÏÏεÏÎ²Ï ÏÎÏαν ÏÏ Ïὴν ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á½¡Ï Î´ÎµÏÏÏÏιν καὶ á¼ÏÎ¾Î¿Ï Ïαν á¼ÏξομÎÎ½Î¿Ï â¦114
The god, however, gave priority and seniority to the soul, both in its coming to be and in the degree of its excellence, to be the bodyâs mistress and to rule over it as her subject.
tr. Zeyl
This applies to the world-soul as well as to our rational soul, which is fabricated out of its left-overs. However, that implies that, in a very fundamental sense, the movements of the world-soul are prior to the bodies that move in them, the bodies by which we can observe those very movements. Accordingly, Timaeus describes the movements and revolutions of the heavens before the creation of the heavenly bodies:
᾿ÎÏεὶ δὲ καÏá½° νοῦν Ïá¿· ÏÏ Î½Î¹ÏÏάνÏι ÏᾶÏα ἡ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏÏÏαÏÎ¹Ï á¼Î³ÎµÎ³ÎνηÏο, μεÏá½° ÏοῦÏο Ïᾶν Ïὸ ÏÏμααÏÎ¿ÎµÎ¹Î´á½²Ï á¼Î½Ïá½¸Ï Î±á½Ïá¿Ï á¼ÏεκÏαίνεÏο καὶ μÎÏον μÎÏá¿ ÏÏ Î½Î±Î³Î±Î³á½¼Î½ ÏÏοÏήÏμοÏÏεν â¦115
Once the soul had acquired a form that pleased him, he who formed it went on to fashion inside it all that is corporeal, and, joining center to center, he fitted the two together.
tr. Zeyl
This is a central point in Platoâs narrative, since it follows from the relation between soul and body as ruler and ruled, respectively. Soul, as ruler, has to be prior to body, as that which is ruled by soul. Galen, however, is wont to use an explanatory scheme that is quite different. For him, it is an axiom that the kind of activity a being undertakes is dependent on its specific bodily substance.116 This is a fundamental reversal of perspective. To Galen, the notion of movement apart from a bodily substance moving must have been completely foreign and in fact not understandable, as is the notion of soul apart from body. We can see this difficulty in Galenâs dealings with Plato and we see the subsequent manipulation of Platoâs text to fit Galenic preferences come to the fore in Larrainâs fragments in exceptional clarity. Whereas Plato would do no such thing, the author of these fragments explains the type of movement that the heavenly bodies make in terms of their specific substance, particularly, again, their relative wetness or dryness. And through the exact same reasoning, our own activities as human beings are determined by our relative dryness or wetness. This strong emphasis on the causal power of the mixtures of elemental qualities over soul has parallels in Galenâs attested work. As we have found in Case-Study I, Galen argues in QAM that the activities of our souls are dependent on the interaction of the four elemental qualities taking place in the organ from which the respective psychic functions are exercised. In the Larrain-fragments, this principle is extended to an analogy between the activities of human beings and heavenly bodies, which has its basis in an analogy between their respective bodily substances. This, too, is in line with several passages from genuine Galenic works, as we shall see below. Furthermore, it is notable that in his Compendium, Galen leaves out the remark we just quoted on the soul being prior to body, which forms a kind of apology by Timaeus for speaking of the body before the soul in his cosmogony.117
The author of these fragments projects this Galenic doctrine of the soul being dependent upon the mixture onto Platoâs Timaeus, taking as his point of departure the river metaphor used by Plato to describe the embodiment of soul. We have briefly discussed Galenâs reading of this metaphor above, and noticed how he, both in his Compendium and in QAM, steered the Platonic struggle of the soul with incarnation towards a struggle between elemental qualities, by taking the metaphor of the river to refer to the abundance of moisture in the substance of newborns, and adding to that the notion that dryness rather causes intelligence or understanding. In Larrainâs fragment 6, the same passage from the Timaeus is cited and interpreted in the same manner, with some additions with respect to the citation in QAM. It may be useful to quote the fragment in full:
á½ Ïι á½ ÏÏÏ Î¼á½²Î½ ἡ á¼ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá½´ Ïὴν ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïὸ Ïῶμα κοινÏνίαν (á¼Î´ÎξαÏο) á¼ÎºÏήÏαÏο, καὶ καθΠὠν Ïινα ÏÏÏÏον á¼Î½ÎµÎ´Îθη, καὶ Ïηνίκα δὲ μάλιÏÏα ÏοῦÏο á¼Ïαθε, ÏÏÏεÏον ἠμα Ïá¿· ÎºÏ Î·Î¸á¿Î½Î±Î¹ Ïὸ ÎºÏ Î·Î¸á½²Î½ á¼¢ καÏá½° Ïὴν ÏÏÏÏην ÏÏλληÏιν á¼¢ καÏά Ïινα μεÏαξὺ ÏÏÏνον, οá½Î´Î αá½Ïοá¿Ï Ïοá¿Ï ΠλαÏÏνικοá¿Ï á½Î¼Î¿Î»ÏγηÏαι. οá½ÏÏ Î´á½² μÏνον ὠΠλάÏÏν ÏηÏίΠÏá½°Ï Ïá½´Ï á¼Î¸Î±Î½Î¬ÏÎ¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï ÏεÏιÏÎ´Î¿Ï Ï á¼Î½ÎÎ´Î¿Ï Î½ Îµá¼°Ï á¼ÏίÏÏÏ Ïον Ïῶμα καὶ á¼ÏÏÏÏÏ Ïον, αἱ Î´Î Îµá¼°Ï ÏοÏαμὸν á¼Î½Î´ÎµÎ¸Îµá¿Ïαι Ïολὺν οá½Ïε á¼ÎºÏάÏÎ¿Ï Î½ οá½Ïε á¼ÎºÏαÏοῦνÏο, βίᾳ δΠá¼ÏÎÏονÏο καὶ á¼ÏεÏον. ÏοῦÏο δὲ οá½ÏÏÏ Îµá¼¶Ïε διὰ Ïὴν á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏα Ïá¿Ï οá½ÏίαÏ, á¼Î¾ á¼§Ï á¼Î³ÎνεÏο Ïὸ Ïῶμα, Ïὴν μὲν ÏÏÏÏην ÏÏÏÏαÏιν á¼Îº καÏÎ±Î¼Î·Î½Î¯Î¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏÎÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á¼Ïον, á¼ÏÎ¿ÎºÏ Î·Î¸á½²Î½ δὲ Ïοá¿Ï νεÏÏÏὶ ÏÎ·Î³Î½Ï Î¼ÎÎ½Î¿Î¹Ï ÏÏ Ïοá¿Ï ÏαÏαÏλήÏιον. á¼Ïεὶ δὲ θεÏμÏÏηÏα ÏÏμÏÏ Ïον á¼Î½Î±Î³ÎºÎ±á¿Î¿Î½ ἦν á½ÏάÏÏειν αá½Ïá¿·, ÏαÏÏῠδὲ εἶÏε Ïὸ διαÏοÏεá¿Ïθαι Ïὴν μεμειγμÎνην οá½Ïίαν á½Î³Ïὰν αá½Ïοῦ, διὰ ÏοῦÏο á¼Î½Î±Î³ÎºÎ±á¿Î¿Î½ ἦν, á½ ÏÏÏ Î¼á½´ ÏθαÏείῠÏὸ ÏÏμα, ÏÏονοήÏαÏθαι ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ á¼ÏιμειγνÏνÏÎ±Ï Î±á½Ïὸ Î¸ÎµÎ¿á½ºÏ á¼ÏιÏÏοὴν á¼ÏÎÏÎ±Ï Î¿á½ÏÎ¯Î±Ï á¼Î½Ïὶ Ïá¿Ï á¼ÏολομÎνηÏ.118
That it is not even agreed upon among Platonists themselves how the incorporeal soul acquires the communion with the body and is bound to it in some way, and especially the exact time when this happens, either at the same time with being born or with the first conception or at some time in between. Plato speaks only in this manner: that the cycles of the immortal soul are bound to a body that is subject to influx and efflux, they are bound in a great river and they donât rule and are not ruled over, but they produce violence and suffer it. It is like that he says due to the wetness of the substance from which the body comes about, since its initial structure consists of menstrual blood and semen, after birth nearly resembling solidified cheeses. Therefore it is necessary that it also had an innate hotness, but because of this, he says, the wet substance mixed with it was dissipated by it, and therefore it was necessary that the gods who mixed it in provided an influx of another substance to compensate what is lost, so that the body is not destroyed.
The first remarks of this fragment are again typically Galenic. The author points out that the doctrine of the incorporeal soul is so difficult to account for that even its adherents have not agreed upon how to do it, and then points towards the difference between what those Platonists hold and what Plato himself has actually said. The author emphasizes that Plato himself has not handed us anything to solve the difficulty of the communion (
According to this reconstruction, the reason for childrenâs lack of rationality is not that the soul has just been embodied and needs some time to come to its senses, control its new vehicle and remember the knowledge it previously had, but it is rather that the body of children is exceptionally wet, whereas intelligent bodies are more dry (as we shall see below). The reason given for the wetness of the newborn is a simple reference to the stuff from which it is generated: blood and semen. Human beings are understood in these fragments as composites of two conflicting elementary forces, wetness and dryness, and at first, the one that renders us intelligent is predominated by its opposite due to the wetness of our initial substance. After we are born, our substance is still soft and malleable, like a solidified cheese. For Nickel, this cheese-analogy was one of the reasons to ascribe the text to an imitator, since he considered it to be motivated by, but not consistent with, other, similar comparisons in authentic Galenic works.123 Das, however, has added several other passages in which Galen makes similar comparisons, and concludes that âGalen uses these metaphors to differentiate levels of moisture in the bodyâ.124 Here, too, Nickelâs conclusion might have been somewhat rash. One of the passages Nickel refers to for comparison is from Galenâs Mixtures. There, Galen also generalizes about the state of newborn animals that have their first composition from blood and sperm, âsubstances which are hot and wetâ.125 The context is that of blooded animals in general, although the prior discussion has been about man in particular. These two substances, blood and sperm, are said to enter into a continuous process of drying, which evolves into the construction of all the various kinds of homoeomerous bodies and organs while the child is in its motherâs womb. Even after the child has been born, it remains âextremely wetâ, even in its driest parts, the bones. Galen proceeds now to give a concrete example of this: when you eat a young animal that has just been sacrificed, you find its flesh to be relatively moist and flabby, and youâll find that even its bones resemble âsolidified cheeseâ.126 Because of this excess of moisture, baby animals are not pleasant to eat. Clearly, Galen is using this particular example because in this case we can actually see and taste or chew the flesh and parts of the newborn animal and in this manner empirically verify the texture. That does not mean, as Nickel seems to think, the comparison does not equally apply to human newborns. Both the immediately preceding and following context is specifically about human beings and their relative dryness and wetness in relation to their age. Neither should the comparison be restricted to the bones (which rather serve as an extreme example, being the driest parts), as becomes clear when one reads a few pages further, where it is the skin that is compared to solidified cheese.127 Therefore, the whole passage should be read as treating of the substance of blooded animals as such. It shows how Galenâs occasional remarks in QAM, UP and elsewhere on dryness and wetness in relation to the capacities of the (rational) soul, are rooted in his basic physiological ideas on the composition, formation and growth of human beings and indeed blooded animals in general.
In the fragments following Larrainâs fragment 6, the role of relative wetness and dryness is further elaborated, particularly in its relation to our rational soul. In fragment 7, it becomes clear that the predominance of wetness does not only trouble our soul around the time when we are born:
á½ Ïι á¼Î½ Ïá¿ ÎºÏ Î®Ïει μÏνη ἡ á¼ÏÎ¹Î¸Ï Î¼Î·Ïικὴ á¼Î½Î±ÏÎ³á¿¶Ï ÏαίνεÏαι, á½¡Ï Î¶Î·Ïεá¿Ïθαι ÏÏÏεÏον á½¡Ï ÏÏ Ïὸν á¼¢ ζῷον ἤδη διοικεá¿Ïαι Ïὸ á¼Î¼Î²ÏÏ Î¿Î½. μεÏá½° δὲ Ïὴν á¼ÏοκÏηÏιν Î¸Ï Î¼Î¿á¿¦ Ïι μÎÏεÏÏιν αá½Ïá¿·, λογικὸν δΠÏι á¼Ïγον οá½Ï á½ÏᾶÏαι. ÏοÏÏÎ¿Ï Î´á½² αἰÏίαν εἶναί ÏηÏιν ὠΠλάÏÏν Ïὴν á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏα Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏοÏ, καὶ δηλοῦÏι ÏοῦÏο Ïῶν μὲν á½Î³Î¹Î±Î¹Î½ÏνÏÏν οἱ μεθÏονÏεÏ, Ïῶν δὲ á¼ÏÏÏÏÏοÏνÏÏν οἱ Ïοá¿Ï á½Î³Ïοá¿Ï ÏάθεÏι καÏαληÏθÎνÏεÏ, á¼Î¾ ὧν á¼ÏÏι καὶ ὠκαλοÏÎ¼ÎµÎ½Î¿Ï Î»Î®Î¸Î±ÏγοÏ. οὠμÏνον δὲ á¼Ïὶ ÏοÏÏÏν á¼Î½Î±ÏÎ³á¿¶Ï ÏαίνεÏαι ναÏκÏÎ´Î·Ï Ïε καὶ á¼ÏÎ³á½¸Ï á¼¡ λογικὴ ÏÏ Ïá½´ ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïá½°Ï á¼°Î´Î¯Î±Ï á¼Î½ÎµÏγείαÏ, á¼Î»Î»á½° κá¼Î½ μεÏÏίÏÏ á½Î³Ïανθá¿, βÏÎ±Î´Ï ÏÎÏα μὲν νοá¿Ïαι, καÏαÏεÏομÎνη δὲ Îµá¼°Ï á½Ïνον á½ÏᾶÏαι.128
That during pregnancy only the desiderative [soul] is clearly manifest, so that it needs to be inquired whether the embryo is governed like a plant or already like an animal. After birth something of the spirited soul is in it as well, but there is no sight of any rational activity. Plato says that the cause of this is the wetness of the body, and of the healthy people those that are drunk with wine testify to this, of the unhealthy those who are seized by wet affections, from which the so-called lethargy comes. But the rational soul clearly appears torpid and idle with regard to its proper activities not only with those people, but even when it is moderately moistened thinking becomes heavier, and it can be seen to descend into sleep.
The first few lines of this fragment depict a gradual development of the three souls starting with the embryo. This schema, including the question whether the embryo, since it is governed by the desiderative soul only, should be considered a plant or an animal, is familiar from Galenâs genuine work. We also find it in the Greek fragments of his Timaeus commentary published by Daremberg and Schröder.129 The idea that Plato ascribed the lack of rationality in newborns to the wetness of their substance is also familiar by now and can be found, as we have noted, in QAM and Galenâs Compendium, as well as in some of the other fragments collected by Larrain (see below). Here, however, the author also takes another step, by going beyond the context of generation. First, the author claims that the lack of understanding due to predominant wetness can also be found in some extreme physical conditions, namely in the case of drunkenness or lethargy. Then, he continues to state that even a moderate increase in wetness can already hinder oneâs rational capacities and induces sleep. This is an important step; whereas Galenâs Compendium merely used the river-metaphor to make relative wetness and dryness into the causes of understanding or lack thereof departing from the state of the newborn, this fragment also specifies how the strife between these elemental qualities of our substance determines our capacities for understanding throughout our life.
As we noted above, in QAM Galen also generalizes the causal role of dryness and wetness with respect to understanding, so that it has a wider application than the context of generation:
á¼Î»Î»Î εἴÏÎµÏ á½Î³ÏÏÏÎ·Ï Î¼á½²Î½ á¼Î½Î¿Î¹Î±Î½ á¼ÏγάζεÏαι, ξηÏÏÏÎ·Ï Î´á½² ÏÏνεÏιν, ἡ μὲν á¼ÎºÏα ξηÏÏÏÎ·Ï á¼ÎºÏαν á¼ÏγάζεÏαι ÏÏνεÏιν, ἡ δΠá¼ÏίμικÏÎ¿Ï á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏι ÏοÏοῦÏον á¼ÏαιÏήÏει Ïá¿Ï ÏÎµÎ»ÎµÎ¯Î±Ï ÏÏ Î½ÎÏεÏÏ, á½ Ïον á¼ÎºÎ¿Î¹Î½ÏνηÏεν á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏοÏ. ÏÎ¯Î½Î¿Ï Î¿á½Î½ θνηÏοῦ Î¶á¿´Î¿Ï ÏοιοῦÏον Ïῶμα á¼Î¼Î¿Î¹Ïον á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏοÏ, á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ Ïá½° Ïῶν á¼ÏÏÏÏν; οá½Î´ÎµÎ½á½¸Ï οá½Î´Î á¼Î³Î³ÏÏÎ á½¥ÏÏΠοá½Î´á½² ÏÏ Î½ÎÏεÏÏ á¼ÎºÏÎ±Ï á¼Î³Î³ÏÏ á¼ÏÏι Ïῶμα θνηÏοῦ Î¶á¿´Î¿Ï , ÏάνÏα δΠὥÏÏÎµÏ á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï Î¿á½ÏÏ ÎºÎ±á½¶ á¼Î½Î¿Î¯Î±Ï μεÏÎÏει.130
If, then, wetness brings about mindlessness, and dryness understanding, then extreme dryness brings about extreme understanding, while a dryness mixed with wetness will take away from perfect understanding to precisely that extent to which it partakes of wetness. And indeed, which mortal animalâs body is of such a sort as to be without any share of wetness â like the bodies of the stars? There is none which is even close to this. And so too there is no body of a mortal animal which is close to extreme understanding; but all partake of mindlessness too just as they partake of wetness.
tr. Singer, slightly modified
Here, the degree to which a given body partakes of wetness is said to determine the degree to which it lacks âperfect understandingâ. Given the fact that no mortal animal is without any share in wetness, this kind of understanding is not to be found among them, though it is present in the stars, which are apparently completely devoid of wetness. In UP, too, we find this vertical hierarchy in which wetness predominates the substances on earth, hindering the development of their intellectual capacities, while it is inferred from the dryness of the heavenly bodies that they must be supremely intelligent.131 Although it is rather long, it is useful to quote the passage in full:
á¼Î»Î»Î ὠμÏÏ á¼Î½Ïαῦθα ÏαίνεÏαι Î½Î¿á¿¦Ï ÏÎ¹Ï á¼ÏικνοÏÎ¼ÎµÎ½Î¿Ï á¼Îº Ïῶν á¼Î½Ï ÏÏμάÏÏν, ἠκαὶ θεαÏαμÎνῳ Ïινὶ ÏαÏαÏÏá¿Î¼Î± Î¸Î±Ï Î¼Î¬Î¶ÎµÎ¹Î½ á¼ÏÎÏÏεÏαι Ïὸ ÎºÎ¬Î»Î»Î¿Ï Ïá¿Ï οá½ÏίαÏ, á¼¡Î»Î¯Î¿Ï ÏÏῶÏον καὶ μάλιÏÏα, μεÏΠαá½Ïὸν δὲ ÏελήνηÏ, εἶÏα Ïῶν á¼ÏÏÎÏÏν, á¼Î½ Î¿á¼·Ï Îµá¼°Îºá½¸Ï, á½ Ïῳ ÏÎÏ á¼ÏÏι καὶ ἡ Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï Î¿á½Ïία καθαÏÏÏÎÏα, ÏοÏοÏÏῳ καὶ Ïὸν νοῦν á¼Î½Î¿Î¹ÎºÎµá¿Î½ Ïολὺ Ïοῦ καÏá½° Ïá½° γήινα ÏÏμαÏα βελÏÎ¯Ï Ïε καὶ á¼ÎºÏιβÎÏÏεÏον. á½ ÏÎ¿Ï Î³á½°Ï á¼Î½ ἰλÏÑ ÎºÎ±á½¶ βοÏβÏÏῳ καὶ ÏÎλμαÏι καὶ ÏÏ Ïοá¿Ï καὶ καÏÏοá¿Ï ÏηÏομÎÎ½Î¿Î¹Ï á½ Î¼ÏÏ á¼Î³Î³Î¯Î³Î½ÎµÏαι ζῷα Î¸Î±Ï Î¼Î±ÏÏὴν á¼ÏονÏα Ïὴν á¼Î½Î´ÎµÎ¹Î¾Î¹Î½ Ïοῦ καÏαÏÎºÎµÏ Î¬ÏανÏÎ¿Ï Î±á½Ïá½° νοῦ, Ïί ÏÏá½´ νομίζειν á¼Ïὶ Ïῶν á¼Î½Ï ÏÏμάÏÏν; ἰδεá¿Î½ δΠá¼ÏÏι νοῦ ÏÏÏιν καὶ καÏΠαá½ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ á¼Î½Î¸ÏÏÏÎ¿Ï Ï á¼Î½Î½Î¿Î®ÏανÏα ΠλάÏÏνα καὶ ᾿ÎÏιÏÏοÏÎλη καὶ á¿ÎÏÏαÏÏον καὶ ᾿ÎÏÏιμήδην καὶ ÏÎ¿Î»Î»Î¿á½ºÏ á¼Î»Î»Î¿Ï Ï ÏοιοÏÏÎ¿Ï Ï. á½ÏÏÏΠοá½Î½ á¼Î½ βοÏβÏÏῳ ÏοÏοÏÏῳ â Ïί Î³á½°Ï á¼Î½ á¼Î»Î»Î¿ ÏÎ¹Ï Îµá¼´Ïοι Ïὸ ÏÏ Î³ÎºÎµÎ¯Î¼ÎµÎ½Î¿Î½ á¼Îº ÏαÏκῶν αἵμαÏÏÏ Ïε καὶ ÏλÎγμαÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïολá¿Ï ξανθá¿Ï καὶ Î¼ÎµÎ»Î±Î¯Î½Î·Ï â á¼ÏιγίγνεÏαι Î½Î¿á¿¦Ï ÏεÏὶÏÏÏÏ, ÏÏÏην Ïινὰ ÏÏá½´ νομίζειν αá½Ïοῦ Ïὴν á½ÏεÏοÏὴν εἶναι καθΠἥλιον á¼¢ Ïελήνην á¼¢ Ïινα Ïῶν á¼ÏÏÎÏÏν;132
But even here some intelligence appears to be reaching us from the bodies above, and the beauty of their substance forces anyone that sees them to be amazed at once, that of the sun first and foremost, that of the moon after that, and next that of the stars, and it is reasonable to suppose that the intelligence that dwells in them is exactly that much better and sharper than that in the earthly bodies as the substance of their body is purer. For when in mud and slime, in marshes, and in rotting plants and fruits animals are engendered which yet bear a marvelous indication of the intelligence constructing them, what must we think of the bodies above? But you can see the nature of the intelligence in man himself when you consider Plato, Aristotle, Hipparchus, Archimedes and many others like them. When a surpassing intelligence comes into being in such slime â for what else would one call a thing composed of fleshes, blood, phlegm, and yellow and black bile? â how great must we consider the pre-eminence of the intelligence in the sun, moon, and stars?
tr. May
Clearly, in this passage towards the end of UP, Galen points to the relative wetness of human beings as a hindrance to the development of their intellectual capacities.133 Whereas in QAM he stated that a being is removed from perfect understanding to the degree that it partakes of wetness, now we read that the heavenly bodies are that much more intelligent as their substance is purer, i.e. more like fire. Given the recurrence of this idea in various works, it makes no sense to put passages such as these aside by appealing to the rhetorical context of the epode of UP or QAM in general. In these passages, Galen is re-establishing the physiological basis of the psychic over against â presumably mostly Platonist â opponents. One important difference between these passages from Galenâs attested work and Larrainâs fragment 7, however, is that in the former the wetness and dryness are always attributed to the human body, whereas in the last sentence of Larrainâs fragment it is predicated of the rational soul itself. In this sense, the author of Larrainâs fragment seems to go a step further than Galen does in his attested works (as far as I can see), attributing specific elemental qualities to soul itself. We will come back to this issue in the discussion of some of Larrainâs other fragments below.
We noticed how, in Galenâs interpretation of the Timaeus, the causal role that relative dryness and wetness plays with regard to rational capacity, is rooted in the metaphor of the river that Plato uses for the description of the incarnation of the soul, or in more Galenic terms: for the phase of generation, of the embryo and the newborn. However, both in Larrainâs fragment 7 and in some of Galenâs attested works, as we have seen, this theme is taken beyond the context of generation alone. In fragment 7, particularly, the state of the newborn is compared to a state of inebriation, the implication being that drinking wine wets the substance of the soul. Also, the predominance of wetness is said to cause sleep. Both of these points are paralleled by an important testimony found in Al-RhÄzÄ«, supposedly pertaining to the first book of Galenâs commentary on the Timaeus and added to the commentary fragments by Schröder as an excerpt from the first book. Let us have a look at the Latin translation provided in Schröderâs edition:
Dixit Timaeus in primo libro suo: constituerunt medici et physici certam dietam hominibus qua non multiplicetur sanguis in eis, quod multiplication humiditatum in corporibus administrat defectum in intellectu. Et signum ad hoc est, quod multotiens invenimus quod illi quorum humiditas multiplicatur sunt ebetes et lenti et somni profundi et melancholici et moventur in eis egritudines quibus deficit eorum ingenium, et quoniam cerebrum humectatur, deficit eorum ingenium sicut accidit in ebrietate.134
In his first book Timaeus says: doctors and natural philosophers have set up a certain diet for men so that the amount of blood in them is not increased, because increase of wetness in bodies causes weakness in intellect. And an indication of this is that, often we have found that those in whom wetness is increased are obtuse and sluggish and sleep immoderately and are melancholic and mental illnesses are troubling them that make their natural intellectual capacity fail, and since the brain is moistened, their natural intellectual capacity fails just as if they are inebriated.
This text is particularly important because it is considered an excerpt from the first book of Galenâs commentary and shows great resemblance to what is discussed in Larrainâs fragments, particularly fragments 7â12, as Larrain has noted himself.135
As we see more often in the Arabic tradition, Galenâs text is simply attributed to âTimaeusâ.136 Interestingly, it is said here that doctors and natural philosophers have established diets to regulate the predominance of wetness in the body, since wetness decreases intellectual capacity. Of course, these particular thoughts on diet are not found in Platoâs Timaeus, but we do find them, notoriously, in Galenâs QAM,137 so it should not surprise us to find them in his Timaeus commentary as well. Schröder thought Al-RhÄzÄ«âs testimony pertains to Tim. 43a4â44b1, which is also where Galenâs beloved river-metaphor is introduced. This makes sense if we compare the passages from UP and QAM cited above:138 departing from this river-metaphor Galen develops an opposition between wetness and dryness that amounts to a rewriting of the Platonic struggle between soul and body. In this passage, the traditional themes of sleep and inebriation are added. It is also noted that mental illnesses causing damage to rational capacities can result from excessive moisture and that an increase of blood implies an increase in wetness. To all of this, again, there are parallels in Galenâs work. The predominant wetness of blood is well attested throughout Galenâs work. As we have seen in Case-Study II, in HNH Galen considers blood to be the cause of âsimplicity and artlessnessâ, which corresponds to the correlation between the increase of blood and decrease of intellectual capacities here due to the wetness of blood.139 Schröder points to a passage in Galenâs commentary on the Hippocratic Aphorisms (Hipp. Aph.), where it is said that those who are drunk with wine lisp because their brain becomes soaked by an excess of wetness, and that their brain is weighed down (
We find a similar comparison between inebriation and mental illness based on an excess of wetness as their common aspect in Galenâs commentary on the Hippocratic Epidemics (Hipp. Epid.), where he discusses an affliction called â
ÏÎ¿Î»Î»Î¬ÎºÎ¹Ï Î¼á½²Î½ Î³á½°Ï á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏι ÏολλῠÏοῦ ÏÏÏÏÎ¿Ï Î±á¼°ÏθηÏικοῦ μοÏÎ¯Î¿Ï , καθΠὠκαὶ Ïὸν á½Ïνον á½ÏÎ¸á¿¶Ï á¾¿ÎÏιÏÏοÏÎÎ»Î·Ï á¼Î´ÎµÎ¹Î¾Îµ γινÏμενον, á¼ÏεÏαι κῶμα, καθάÏÎµÏ á¼Î½Î¯Î¿Î¹Ï Ïῶν Î¼ÎµÎ¸Ï ÏθÎνÏÏν γίνεÏαι, ÏÎ¿Î»Î»Î¬ÎºÎ¹Ï Î´á½² διὰ μÏνην ÏÏξιν, á¼ÏÏι δΠὠÏε καὶ διΠá¼Î¼ÏÏ ÏαῦÏα ÏÏ Î¼ÏίÏÏει Î²Î±Î¸á½ºÏ ÎºÎ±á½¶ κÏμαÏÏÎ´Î·Ï á½ÏνοÏ, á¼Î»Î»á½° καὶ διΠá¼ÏÏÏÏÏίαν Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÏÏ á¼¡ ÏοιαÏÏη γίνεÏαι διάθεÏιÏ, οá½ÏÏÏ á¼¤Î´Î· νεκÏÎ¿Ï Î¼ÎÎ½Î·Ï Î±á½Ïá¿Ï, á½¡Ï á¼Ïá¿ÏμÎνα Ïá½° βλÎÏαÏα ÏÏ Î»Î¬ÏÏειν μὴ δÏναÏθαι.141
For often coma follows upon an excess of moisture of the primary organ of perception, according to which Aristotle has correctly shown sleep also arises, just as it happens with some of those who are intoxicated, though often it comes about by coldness only; and when it is both of these, a heavy and lethargic sleep occurs, but such a state also arises because of a deficiency of power, such as when the power has already died out, so that it is not possible to keep the eyelids raised up.
Thus, the association of predominant wetness with lack of intelligence and with sleep, as well as the examples of drunkenness and lethargy, both found in Larrainâs fragment 7, are well attested in Galenâs genuine works (we will return to the notion of lethargy below, in the discussion of fragment 9). In this last quotation, âcoldness onlyâ was added as an alternative cause for the same symptoms. This is paralleled by, among many others, a passage in book III of Galenâs The Affected Places (Loc. Aff.), where he goes into these matters somewhat more elaborately. There, damage in memory and the capacity for reasoning (
All of this corresponds well to Galenâs interpretation of the Timaeus in QAM, which we have discussed above. However, it is not simply the case that dryness and heat are beneficial to intellectual capacity per se, while wetness and coldness are detrimental per se. An excess in heat can, likewise, cause serious impairment of the intellectual capacities, but more in the sense of an overload that leads to a phrenetic or delirious state, i.e. a state characterized by a kind of overload of activity. In the words of Jouanna: âSo change to the mixtures of the brain towards an excess of either heat or cold produces contrasting effects on the intellectual faculties, either delirious excitement or the numbing of intelligence and memoryâ.146 Jouanna has shown that Galenâs descriptions of the effects of humoural mixture on the intellectual capacities in QAM are close to those of some Hippocratic writings. In The Sacred Disease, excess of bile (a dry humour) is said to cause an agitated madness, while excess of phlegm (a wet humour) causes a calm madness. In Regimen, the relative predominance of fire or water is said to increase or decrease intelligence respectively.147 Jouanna has also argued that Galen draws on an extensive tradition for the idea that the intellectual capacities of our soul can and need to be improved through dietary regime, exercise and choice of climate â i.e. through influencing oneâs mixture.148 I would merely add to this that Galen (as well as the author of Larrainâs fragments) through his somatising interpretation of Platoâs Timaeus, is concerned to give this tradition a firmer physiological and philosophical grounding by anchoring it in his favourite philosophical authority.
We find another interesting passage in this regard in the so-called Character Traits (extant only in Arabic). At the outset of the work, Galen states that he will ignore the questions on what it is that makes thought, anger and desire come about, and whether these things are called different souls, parts of the soul or different capacities of a single substance. Typically, Galen wants to discuss more practical matters in this work and stay away from difficult theoretical issues discussed elsewhere (he refers to PHP). Nonetheless, on the next page he proceeds to explain that, in his view, the essence of the strength of the spirited soul is identified as innate heat:
The essence of this strength, which enables someone to act patiently and steadfastly is, as far as I can see, innate heat, for the more powerful the movement of the innate heat, the more someone moves. Just as cold produces laziness, immobility and weakness, so heat produces energy, movement, and the strength to act. That is why the beginning of youth and wine arouse movement and power, while old age and chilling drugs produce laziness and weakness; they lead, in time, to the annihilation of actions and movements.149
As in other works cited above, coldness and wetness (this time particularly coldness, but again, they are related) are associated with degeneration, weakness and immobility, while dryness and hotness are associated with the opposite. In all passages cited, this association clearly has a strong causal sense. Likewise, in QAM Galen states that a higher quantity of heat in the heart (the seat of the spirited soul) makes one more âmanic and sharp-spiritedâ while a higher quantity of coldness makes one âlethargic, heavy and slow to moveâ.150 Thus, it seems that even in a work such as the Character Traits, which is emphatically about ethical philosophy and shuns the difficult theoretical discussion on what soul itself is, the same underlying schema that comes to the fore in QAM and Galenâs interpretation of the Timaeus is also at work. In this underlying schema, the qualities that are associated with the lower realm of the cosmos, wetness and coldness, are considered to cause passivity of the soul, while the qualities that are associated with the heavenly bodies, dryness and hotness, are considered to cause activity of the soul.
In UP we also saw the humours associated with the wetness of the lower realms.151 In Al-RhÄzÄ«âs testimony, however, it was blood in particular, apparently because of its predominant wetness. Since the various elementary qualities each have their specific relations to specific psychic capacities, it would make sense if the four humours too, being composed of different mixtures of the elementary qualities, accordingly relate differently to the exercise of psychic capacities. Indeed, an important passage from HNH, which we also cited in Case-Study II, shows that Galen took this into account:
á¼ÏÏι δὲ καὶ á¼ÏεÏÏÏ ÏÎ¹Ï Î»ÏÎ³Î¿Ï ÏÏ ÏÎ¹Îºá½¸Ï Î¿á½ ÏμικÏὰν á¼ÏÏν ÏιθανÏÏηÏα, καθΠὠν Îµá¼°Ï á¼ Î¸á¿¶Î½ á¼ÏιÏηδείÏν γÎνεÏιν οἱ ÏÎÏÏαÏÎµÏ á¼ÏÎ¿Î´ÎµÎ¯ÎºÎ½Ï Î½Ïαι ÏÏ Î¼Î¿á½¶ ÏÏήÏιμοι. ÏÏοαÏοδεá¿Î¾Î±Î¹ δὲ ÏÏá½´ Ïάλιν á¼Î½ αá½Ïá¿· Ïαá¿Ï Ïοῦ ÏÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÏάÏεÏιν á¼ÏÏμενα Ïá½° Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï ἤθη, ÏεÏὶ οὠκαὶ ἡμá¿Î½ á¼ÏÎÏÏθι γÎγÏαÏÏαι. ÏοÏÏÎ¿Ï ÏÎ¿Î¯Î½Ï Î½ á½ÏοκειμÎÎ½Î¿Ï Ïὸ μὲν á½Î¾á½º καὶ ÏÏ Î½ÎµÏὸν á¼Î½ Ïá¿ ÏÏ Ïῠδιὰ Ïὸν ÏολÏδη ÏÏ Î¼á½¸Î½ á¼ÏÏαι, Ïὸ δÎá¼Î´Ïαá¿Î¿Î½ καὶ βÎβαιον διὰ Ïὸν μελαγÏολικÏν, Ïὸ δΠá¼Ïλοῦν καὶ ἠλιθιÏÏεÏον διὰ Ïὸ αἷμα â¦152
There is also another physical account which has no little plausibility, according to which the four humours are proved to be effective in the generation of the dispositions which are appropriate to them. In it we first need to establish that the dispositions of the soul are consequent upon the mixtures of the body, about which we have written elsewhere. On this basis, sharpness and intelligence in the soul will exist as a result of the bilious humour, stability and firmness as a result of the melancholic, simplicity and artlessness as a result of the blood â¦153
This passage clearly refers to QAM (
This passage from HNH compares well to the next text-fragment in Larrainâs edition, fragment 8:
á½ Ïι Ïὸ αἷμα καὶ Ïὸ ÏλÎγμα á¼Î½ ÏλεονάÏÏÏί ÏοÏε καÏá½° Ïὸ Ïῶμα, βÏαδεá¿Ï καὶ νÏθÏÎ¿á½ºÏ ÎºÎ±á½¶ á½ÏνÏÎ´Î¿Ï Ï á¼ÏοÏελοῦÏιν, á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ Ïάλιν αá½Î¾Î·Î¸ÎµÎ¯ÏÎ·Ï Ïá¿Ï Ïολá¿Ï á¼Î³ÏÏ Ïνοί Ïε καὶ ÏÏονÏιÏÏαὶ γίνονÏαι καὶ εἰ á¼Î¼ÎÏÏÏÏ Î±á½Î¾Î·Î¸ÎµÎ¯Î·, ÏÏενεÏικοί.154
That blood and phlegm, whenever they excessively increase throughout the body, bring about slowness and sluggishness and sleepiness, just as when the bile is increased, they become wakeful and deep thinkers again, and when it is increased excessively, [they become] phrenetic.
Unfortunately, there seem to be some textual problems with this fragment. The word
From our comparison of Larrainâs fragments 4â8 with Galenâs attested work, we can at least conclude the following: the somatising interpretation of the Timaeus, through the introduction of the causal relation between relative dryness or wetness and rational capacities, corresponds both to passages from Galenâs work on humoural theory and to his notion that psychic capacities are dependent on the mixtures of elemental qualities. We find it supported by passages from works such as UP, QAM, Loc. Aff., Temp., HNH, as well as Galenâs Compendium and the testimonies on the first book of his Timaeus commentary. It is unavoidable to conclude that the author of these fragments was, at least, thoroughly familiar with Galenâs work and in strong agreement with it. Additionally, they discuss the same topics as Galen apparently discussed in the first book of his Timaeus commentary. As we have seen, the correspondences go much further than a resemblance to a few passages of major Galenic works such as PHP and UP (as it may appear from Nickelâs article). Moreover, despite some textual oddities, I have so far not found anything speaking strongly against Larrainâs conclusions, however confident they may have been in themselves.
4.3 The Soul as a Dry and Hot Substance That Exudes Light
Besides the Hippocratic tradition discussed by Jouanna and briefly referred to above, another clear precedent for these views on the relation between elemental qualities and rational capacity, is Heraclitus, who Galen also refers to in this context.156
In several of the extant fragments, Heraclitus associates a dry state of the soul with intelligence and a moist state with drunkenness, stupidity and death. Kahn says, in his commentary on the fragment in which Heraclitus calls the dry soul a ray or beam of light, wisest and best (CIX in his edition, 118 DK): âThis gives a new dimension to Heraclitusâ doctrine of the soul: just as moisture weakens the soul so that it may perish into water, so dryness strengthens and improves it to the point where it may be purified as light (not fire)â.157 Heraclitus relates the good state of the soul to the light of the heavenly bodies and Kahn points to the roots of this notion in pre-Socratic cosmology, which separates the upper and lower realms of the cosmos in terms of their respective elemental qualities: âThis conception is deeply rooted both in the language of early Greek poetry and in the theories of pre-Socratic philosophy. In poetic terms CIX defines the best condition of the psyche as a kind of aither, not fire as such but the clear and luminous upper sky, as contrasted with the murky and moist lower aer, comprising haze, mist, and cloudâ.158 In another fragment, Heraclitus relates a wet soul to inebriation, youth and faulty perception, all themes we have encountered in Galenâs interpretation of the Timaeus as well.159 In Larrainâs fragment 9, the author also refers to Heraclitusâ notion of the dry soul being wise, as we shall see below.
The river-metaphor of the Timaeus and its connotation of the flux of becoming is easily associated with Heraclitus.160 It is no coincidence that Galen refers to Heraclitus in QAM right after he has discussed it. Apparently, the idea of flux represented by the river is related by Galen to the notion of the wet soul and thereby contrasted to the soul that is dry and fiery. In a way, the contrast of flux and stability as we find it in Plato, is maintained in Larrainâs fragments with the notion of the two kinds of movements, one of which is round and continuously the same, i.e. stable, while the other is linear and goes in all directions, i.e. more chaotic and never the same. As we shall see, these two motions are determined by the relative dryness or wetness of the moving substance, which makes them either more or less like divine movements.
The characterization of the upper and lower realms in terms of different elemental qualities and the association of soul and intelligence with the qualities of the heavenly bodies, is something we have seen before in several of Galenâs works, and which we find also in the longest fragment we have of his commentary on the Timaeus. This is the second Greek fragment in Schröderâs edition, supposedly pertaining to 76e7â77c5 of Platoâs Timaeus, in which Galen divides the elements in more âmaterialâ and more âactiveâ ones:
⦠ἴδÏμεν δὲ μᾶλλον ἠλÎγει ÏεÏὶ Ïῶν ÏÏαγμάÏÏν αá½Ïῶν á¼Î½Î¸Î± ÏηÏὶ Ïὴν ζÏὴν ἡμῶν á¼Î½ ÏÏ Ïὶ καὶ ÏνεÏμαÏι καÏÎ á¼Î½Î¬Î³ÎºÎ·Î½ εἶναι. ÏεÏÏάÏÏν Î³á½°Ï á½Î½ÏÏν ÏÏοιÏείÏν, á¼Î¾ ὧν ἡ γÎνεÏÎ¹Ï Ïοá¿Ï γενηÏοá¿Ï á¼ÏÏι, γá¿Ï καὶ ÏÏ Ïá½¸Ï á½Î´Î±ÏÏÏ Ïε καὶ á¼ÎÏοÏ, á½ Ïι ÏοÏÏÏν Ïá½° μὲν á½Î»Î¹ÎºÏÏεÏα γῠÏε καὶ á½Î´ÏÏ á¼ÏÏί, Ïá½° δὲ δÏαÏÏικÏÏεÏα καὶ μάλιÏÏÎ á¼Î½ Ïοá¿Ï Î¶á¿´Î¿Î¹Ï Ïá¿¦Ï Ïε καὶ Ïνεῦμα, ÏÏεδὸν á¼ ÏαÏιν ὡμολÏγηÏαι â¦161
⦠we see that he speaks more of the matters at hand themselves where he says that our life necessarily consists in fire and pneuma. For there are four elements, from which the coming-to-be of generated beings comes about, namely from earth, fire, water and air, and almost everybody agrees that of those earth and water are the more material, while fire and pneuma are the more active, particularly in the living beings â¦
The extent to which Galen here stays true to the Platonic text is debatable. He quotes Plato with a slight variation: Platoâs Timaeus has â
These thematics from the Timaeus also recur in a passage on innate heat in Galenâs On Tremors, which we mentioned earlier. Notably, Galen also refers to Heraclitus in there. He explains the phenomenon of ârigorâ (
καÏá½° μὲν Ïὸν ÏÏῶÏον λÏγον Ïοῦ θεÏμοῦ, ÏοῦÏâ á¼ÏÏι αá½ÏοκίνηÏον αá½Ïοῦ, καὶ ÏοÏÏÎ¿Ï Î¼Î¬Î»Î¹ÏÏα δεá¿Ïαι ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïá½°Ï á¼Î½ÎµÏγείαÏ· μεγάλην δâ ὠμÏÏ Î±á½Ïá¿· ÏÏείαν καὶ Ïὸ ÏÏ ÏÏὸν ÏαÏÎÏει. ÏÎÏÏ ÎºÎµ Î³á½°Ï Ïὸ μὲν θεÏμὸν Îµá¼°Ï á½ÏÎ¿Ï Î±á¼´ÏεÏθαι καὶ ÏÏ Î¼ÏÏοÏάγειν αá½Ïá¿· Ïὴν ÏÏοÏήν· εἰ δὲ μὴ Ïὸ ÏÏ ÏÏὸν á¼Î¼Ïοδὼν á¼Î³ÎνεÏο, καὶ á¼Ïὶ μήκιÏÏον ÏÏοá¿ÎºÎµ. γίνεÏαι δâ á¼Î¼Ïοδὼν Ïὸ ÏÏ ÏÏὸν Ïá¿ ÏοιαÏÏá¿ Ïοῦ θεÏμοῦ κινήÏει, á½¡Ï Î¼á½´ á¼ÏÏλοιÏο á¼ÎºÏεινÏμενον. ÎºÎ¯Î½Î´Ï Î½Î¿Ï Î³á½°Ï á½Ïὸ ÎºÎ¿Ï ÏÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïὸ á¼Î½Ï á½Ïμá¿Ï á¼ÏοÏÏá¿Î½Î±Î¹ Ïῶν ÏÏμάÏÏν αá½ÏÏ. á¼Î»Î»á½° Ïὸ ÏÏ ÏÏὸν á¼ÏÎÏει Ïε καὶ κÏλÏει, καὶ Ïá¿Ï á¼Î³Î±Î½ ÏαÏÏÎ·Ï ÎºÎ¹Î½Î®ÏεÏÏ á¼ÏαιÏεῠÏὸ ÏÏοδÏÏν.166
By reason of its heat, it is self-moved, and very much needs this property in order to act. Yet cold too is very useful for it. For heat is accustomed to rise up and bring along its nourishment; if cold did not prevent this, it would proceed to the greatest heights. But cold does prevent heat from moving in this way, and thereby keeps it from dispersing and perishing. For there is danger that heat will leave the bodies because of its natural lightness and its tendency to move upwards. But the cold checks, hinders, and reduces the violence of this excessive motion.
tr. Sider and McVaugh
Heat naturally moves upward and our heat apparently would do so unhindered, and perhaps would add itself to the realm of the heavenly bodies, if it were not checked by the coldness that is mixed with it and that reduces it and keeps it down. Thus, the heat and air Galen mentions in his commentary on the Timaeus is our natural heat that is naturally constantly leaving us, moving upwards, and creating a constant need for replenishment. This heat, as we saw, is itself identified by Galen with our ânatureâ and âsoulâ. Supposedly, the cold that checks it is something else then, something more âmaterialâ or something that belongs more to the lower cosmic realm. In the same manner, wetness generally hinders our psychic activities while dryness makes us more intelligent. It is clear that there needs to be a balanced mixture of all four, for Galen, in order to have a properly functioning and subsisting human being. However, it is also clear that Galen rather often privileges the hot and dry by associating it with activity, intelligence and the heavens, while he often portrays the cold and wet as mere hindrances with respect to the exercise of our proper activities and associates them with passivity, lack of intelligence and the lower part of the cosmos. This is still the same paradox that we find so often in Greek philosophy: man finds his fulfilment in part of himself, while other parts hinder this same fulfilment. At the same time, man, as such, cannot be without any of these parts: were we fire like the sun, then we would move upwards and leave the earth; were we water like the river, we would not know of ourselves.
This general outlook is also displayed in Larrainâs fragment 9, which shows a lot of similarity to the various passages from Galenâs attested work discussed above.
I shall quote it in several parts, since it is a bit longer and requires some explanation:
á½ Ïι ÏαῦÏα μὲν ἰαÏÏικά ÏÎ¹Ï á¼Î½ εἶÏοι ÏεκμήÏια Ïοῦ Ïὴν λογικὴν ÏÏ Ïὴν á½Î³Ïá¿· ÏÏμαÏι κεÏÎ±Î½Î½Ï Î¼Îνην Îµá¼°Ï Ïá½°Ï Î¿á¼°ÎºÎµÎ¯Î±Ï á¼Î½ÎµÏÎ³ÎµÎ¯Î±Ï Î²Î»Î¬ÏÏεÏθαι, θεÏÏηÏÎ¹Îºá½¸Ï Î´á½² ÏιλÏÏοÏÎ¿Ï Ïὴν αἰÏίαν ÏειÏÎ±Î¸Îµá½¶Ï Îµá¼°Ïεá¿Î½, ὠμὲν αá½Î³Î¿ÎµÎ¹Î´á¿ Ïὴν Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï οá½Ïίαν εἶναι ÏάÏκÏν, ÏÏÏÏειÏον Ïὸν Ïá¿Ï αἰÏÎ¯Î±Ï Î´ÏÏει λογιÏμÏν, á¼Î½Î±Î½ÏιÏÏάÏη Î³á½°Ï Î±á½Î³á¿ á¼ÏÏιν ἡ Ïá¿Ï á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï ÏÏÏÎ¹Ï Îµá¼°Ï á½ Ïον Î³á½°Ï á¼ÏοÏÏÏεῠÏá¿Ï οἰκείαÏ, Îµá¼°Ï ÏοÏοῦÏον καὶ Ïῶν á¼Î½ÎµÏγειῶν ÏαÏÏÎ·Ï á¼ÏίÏÏαÏαι.167
That someone might say these medical observations are indications that the rational soul is damaged with regard to its proper activities when it is mixed with a wet body, and that when a theoretical philosopher is challenged to state the cause of this, he would say that the substance of the soul is of the nature of light and he shall give the common account for the cause, namely that, since the nature of wetness is utterly opposed to light, it shall be distanced from its activities to the extent that it is away from its proper nature.
This fragment starts out with a challenge to philosophers, which we also find in Galenâs attested work: how do you explain the fact that the activities of the (rational) soul are hindered due to specific changes in the body?168 The next part is more remarkable, because here the author comes up with a possible answer a âtheoretical philosopherâ would give, and which the author of these fragments seems to adhere to as well. This is a somewhat more speculative move than what we usually get in Galenâs works. It is not, however, in contradiction with it. After all, the answer consists simply in attributing a specific quality to the substance of the soul that is opposed to that of the one that hinders the soulâs activity, i.e. wetness. Furthermore, this quality, being âof the nature of lightâ (
The notion of a vehicle of the soul is also used in Platoâs Timaeus, in two ways. First, Timaeus states that each soul is assigned to a star as its vehicle, and later on in the text the body, or more particularly the head, becomes the vehicle for the soul.178 These two Platonic characterizations of the vehicle correspond to Galenâs location of the light-like pneuma in the head, eyes and heavenly bodies. Since the sun is not to be identified with the light it exudes, it might also make sense, given Galenâs comparisons between the brain and the sun, that the psychic pneuma that is produced and distributed from the brain, is not identical to its source, which would rather be something like the sun, i.e. a body of such mixture that it exudes something light-like. Therefore, the psychic pneuma should not be considered the substance of the soul, which is seated in the brain and rather produces and exudes the pneuma, using it as its instrument to extend itself throughout the body and outside of it. In the context of his theory of vision, Galen holds that this psychic pneuma meets with the air in such a manner that the air âforms one bodyâ with it, or is âassimilatedâ to it.179 The eye uses air as an instrument, in the same manner as the nerve is an instrument of the brain â as a medium for the psychic pneuma.180 In his Compendium, Galen gives the same abridged and altered version of the theory of vision from the Timaeus.181
In Larrainâs fragment 18, the author seems to build on this notion of psychic pneuma as a corporeal substance that is able, due to its fineness, to penetrate other bodies like fire does, but due to its mildness compared to fire, can do so without burning or damaging those bodies.182 The author cites from Timaeus 58c the passage on the different types of flames. As Larrain remarks, he also connects this passage to Timaeus 45b, where Timaeus describes the fire flowing through the eyes, which is milder, comparable to the light of day and therefore does not burn.183 In Larrainâs fragments 19 and 20, likewise, the pneuma which flows through the eyes is called
In fragment 21, the author emphasizes that, if according to Plato himself the world-soul stretched itself out through everything, it surely must have been pre-eminently present in the sun.184 Since our rational soul has some likeness to the world-soul, and the world-soul is pre-eminently located in the sun, it would make sense if our rational soul is light-like as well and if its substance would show some likeness to the substance of a heavenly body like the sun.185 The passage from UP that we discussed earlier, on the pre-eminent intelligence of the heavenly bodies and the intelligence coming down through the air, seems to correspond well to this fragment. The author of Larrainâs fragments connects this notion of the heavenly bodies â being supremely intelligent because of their fiery substance and communicating their intelligence through the light they exude â with the notion of the light-like pneuma that moves between the eyes and the brain and that is described as the primary instrument of soul in PHP book VII (a description repeated in Larrainâs fragment 25,3â4).186 Thus, visual perception and intelligence are strongly linked, as in Plato, but with more emphasis on the physiological underpinnings of this connection in terms of the light-like substance. This corresponds to the Galenic appreciation of dryness and heat as the qualities that increase intelligence and that are found pre-eminently in the heavenly bodies.187 The same idea seems to come to the fore in Larrainâs fragment 22 as well, where the interaction of the light of the sun and the light-like pneuma from the eyes explains visual perception.188
If the substance of soul is of the nature of light, then it has to be dry and warm, or have a substance that is fiery, like the stars. If the substance of the soul were then combined with something that is wet by nature, this combination would impede the activities of soul to the extent that its substance would not be as it should be in its ânaturalâ state, which seems similar to that of a star or heavenly body. Therefore, according to this fragment, the âembodimentâ of soul as it was depicted with the river-metaphor in the Timaeus, should be understood in terms of a kind of downward movement of a substance resembling the heavenly bodies towards the earth, including the changes it necessarily falls prey to on this journey. To step out of the Platonic cosmological frame a bit further, we might say: the generation of soul and intelligence on earth is dependent on the downward movement of intelligence from the heavenly bodies in the form of light, which forms the basis for our capacity of vision, cognition and understanding.189
The underlying pattern of thought here seems to be something like the following. The heavenly bodies are divine and eternal. Soul bears some resemblance to them with respect to these qualities. Light is the quality that fiery heavenly bodies emanate and through which, perhaps, they order events down below (day and night, the seasons, growth and decay of living beings). Soul, originally a fiery substance that is dry and hot, is exuded from purely dry and hot heavenly bodies. It reaches down through the air in the form of light and mixes with an earthy substance that is wet and cold. That makes it lose some of its power. At the same time, however, it burns up the wet and cold substance. Therefore, there must be additions of substance in order to acquire a precarious and ephemeral balance between those two opposed qualities, temporally united in a single substance. However, even if this ephemeral balance is acquired, the activities of soul as something that is light-like, are still impeded to the extent that it is mixed with a substance opposite to itself, as becomes clear from the end of the last quotation: â⦠since the nature of wetness is utterly opposed to light, it shall be distanced from its activities to the extent that it is away from its proper natureâ.190 In that sense at least, this schema seems to remain faithful to the Platonic notion of the composite of body and soul. In those last lines, we can also recognize a basic axiom of Galenâs we have referred to earlier, namely that activity is determined by substance (or nature): when the substance changes, so does the activity it causes. The phrasing is similar to the passage in UP that we referred to above, where it was said that the intelligence of the heavenly bodies is âthat much better and sharper than that in the earthly bodies as the substance of their body is purerâ.191
Interestingly, the author presents this account as common, or the one that is most at hand or readily available (
In the next lines of the fragment, Heraclitus is brought in again:
διὸ καὶ ÎºÎ±Î»á¿¶Ï á½ÏÎ῾ÎÏακκλείÏÎ¿Ï Î´Î¿ÎºÎµá¿ Î»ÎµÎ»ÎÏθαιΠξηÏá½° ÏÏ Ïá½´ ÏοÏÏÏάÏη. καὶ διὰ ÏοῦÏο δὴ καὶ Ïὴν δίαιÏαν οἱ ÏιλÏÏοÏοι κελεÏÎ¿Ï Ïιν á¼¡Î¼á¾¶Ï Ïοιεá¿Ïθαι διὰ ÏοÏÏÏηÏÏÏ Ïε καὶ ÏοιÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï á¼Î´ÎµÏμάÏÏν ÏοιαÏÏÎ·Ï Ïε καὶ ÏοÏαÏÏηÏ.192
And therefore it seems to have been stated also by Heraclitus rightfully: the dry soul is wisest. And for this reason also, the philosophers urge us to make a diet based on quantity and quality of foods that are such and so much.
The way Heraclitus is quoted here is slightly different than in QAM, but the meaning attributed to it is the same: the dry soul is wiser since the rational soul is naturally dry.193 We also find the notion of a specific diet that is conducive to changing oneâs substance for the better in order to improve intelligence. Al-RhÄzÄ« also reports this in the passage we quoted earlier, which Schröder and Larrain considered to be on the first book of Galenâs commentary. We also know it from QAM, where Galen claims to be able to prescribe diets that increase intelligence and memory.194 To take a concrete and practical example: in Loc. Aff., Galen suggests that loss of memory is due to cold and wet affections of the head, and should be treated by prescribing substances that warm and dry the head.195 Under the assumption that the relative dryness of the substance of the rational soul determines its intellectual capacities, it seems reasonable for philosophers to try and change their substance to become drier. This would involve, as we have seen, the soul becoming more active, closer to its original nature, hot and dry, exuding light and intelligence like the heavenly bodies do. That is to say, once the idea is established that the activities of the rational soul are dependent upon its substance, and that its substance is something that can be analysed as some kind of mixture of the elemental qualities, while at the same time we know that these mixtures are subject to change and that we can influence them via the qualities we bring them in contact with, it seems perfectly reasonable to assume that specific diets could be more or less conducive to the pursuit of wisdom because of the changes they bring about to the substance of the rational soul, especially considering the assumption that there is a hierarchy of mixtures corresponding to the vertical cosmic hierarchy. After all, the very fact that the soul, or the stuff of soul, moves from its primary source, i.e. the heavenly realm, to the realm of the earth â this Platonic background seems to be still in place to some extent â with the corresponding change in elemental qualities that are found in these respective regions, apparently prompts a change in its substance that is so intense, that it loses the rationality that defined its nature, as Galen (and the author of Larrainâs fragments) seems to interpret Plato. Thus, the struggle of soul with its newly acquired body is explained in terms of a struggle between elemental qualities predominantly found among the heavenly bodies and those predominating the lower realm.
Let us look at the next part of Larrainâs fragment 9:
á¼Î½ δΠá¼ÏÏμαÏÏν ÏÎ¹Ï Ïὴν ÏÏ Ïὴν εἶναι λÎγῠκαθάÏÎµÏ á½ Î Î»Î¬ÏÏν, á¼Î»Î»Î á½Ïημά Ïι διδÏÏιν αá½Ïῠαá½Î³Î¿ÎµÎ¹Î´ÎÏ. διὰ ÏοÏÏÎ¿Ï ÏÎ¿Î¯Î½Ï Î½ Ïá¿Ï κοινÏÎ½Î¯Î±Ï Î±á½Ïá¿ ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïá½° Ïῶν νεογενῶν ÏÏμαÏα γινομÎνηÏ, διὰ ÏοÏÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïá½° Ïá¿Ï Î²Î»Î¬Î²Î·Ï á¼ÏεÏαι, κινήÏÎµÎ¹Ï Î³á½°Ï á¼ÏοÏÏÎ·Ï Ïá¿Ï λογικá¿Ï ÏεÏαγμÎναÏ. á½ Ïαν δὲ á½Î³ÏÏÏÎ·Ï á¼ÏάκÏÏÏ ÎºÎ¹Î½Î¿Ï Î¼Îνη ÏαÏαÏοδίζηÏαί ÏÏÏ Î±á½ÏÎ¬Ï á¼Î½Î±Î³ÎºÎ±á¿Ïν á¼ÏÏι Îµá¼°Ï ÏαÏαÏὴν καὶ ÏÏάÏιν á¼ÏικÎÏθαι Ïὸ διοικοÏμενον á½ÏÎ á¼Î¼Ïοá¿Î½ Ïῶμα, ÏοÏá½² μὲν Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï κÏαÏοÏÏηÏ, ÏοÏá½² δὲ Ïá¿Ï á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏοÏ.196
Someone might say, like Plato, that the soul is something incorporeal, but he gave some kind of vehicle to her that is of the nature of light. This is why, accordingly, when the communion of her with the bodies of newborns comes to be, therefore also the indications of damage follow, for the rational has ordered movements. But when the soul is wet and is moved in a disorderly fashion, those are somehow hindered, and it is necessary that the body arranged by both comes to be in disorder and discord, where sometimes the soul wins, and sometimes the wetness.
The author emphasizes that Plato gave a luminous vehicle to the soul. As we have seen, this may go back to the star assigned to each soul, or the head as the soulâs abode. This remark seems to imply that even Plato himself did not strictly deny the soul all bodily qualities, or at least that he considered it necessary to give it a proper vehicle. Since the qualities of this vehicle, then, clash with the wetness of the body, the soulâs movements are perturbed. In the fragment, however, the opposition in the end is simply between soul and wetness, not between two different kinds of bodies of which the soul naturally inhabits one (which would also, obviously, amount to further problems). The phrase â
εἰ μὲν οá½Î½ ἡ ÏÏ Ïá½´ ÏελÎÏÏ á¼Î½Î¹ÎºÎ®Ïει, ÏεÏαγμÎÎ½Î±Ï á¼´ÏÏει Ïá½°Ï ÎºÎ¹Î½Î®ÏειÏ, á¼á½°Î½ δὲ ἡ á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏ, á¼ÏάκÏÎ¿Ï Ï á¼ÏάÏαÏ, á½Ïοá¿Î±Î¹ καÏá½° ÏÏαÏÎ¼Î¿á½ºÏ ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÎ±Î»Î¼Î¿á½ºÏ Î³Î¯Î½Î¿Î½Ïαι. κá¼Î½ á¼Ïὶ ÏλÎον δὲ κÏαÏήÏá¿, λήθαÏγοί Ïε καὶ á¼ÏοÏληξίαι καÏÎ±Î»Î±Î¼Î²Î¬Î½Î¿Ï Ïι Ïὸ ζῷον.197
Thus, if the soul wins completely, it holds ordered movements, but when the wetness wins, all movements are disordered, such as those that happen with spasms and quivers. And if it wins for the most part, lethargy and apoplexies take hold of the living being.
Here we see clearly, once more, that the relative predominance of the elemental qualities of a substance determines the quality of its movements: if wetness wins, the movements are of the disordered, irrational kind; if âsoulâ wins, the movements are of the ordered kind. This struggle between the qualities, which determines the relative intelligence of a substance, can also cause disease if wetness wins for the most part. The disorder caused by predominant wetness can cause extreme conditions such as lethargy. As we have seen, this relation of lethargy and predominant wetness (sometimes coldness), is found in attested Galenic works as well. The conception of soul as something that is luminous, or dry and hot, fits well with the explanation of psychic ailments, such as lethargy, in terms of mixture.
4.4 Substance, Activity and Soul in Platoâs and Galenâs Timaeus
The author of Larrainâs fragments takes over the dualism of ordered and disordered movements from the Timaeus. However, its explanation in terms of the elemental qualities is dependent upon the assumption that substance determines activity and the accompanying assumption that the substance of any given thing, including the soul, must consist of a specific mixture of elemental qualities. In Larrainâs fragment 10, these two kinds of movement are differentiated according to a hierarchy in which the circular motion is said to be the best. The other movements are considered inferior to it because they differ according to âthe more and lessâ (
In Platoâs Timaeus, the other movements, apart from the circular and wise one, are six in number and are essentially distinct from the circular one because their movement is characterized by the different. This second kind of motion is quite opposed to the circular motion of the same. It is not motion in one place, not uniform or regular, not systematic, and does not relate to the same things. This is irrational motion, and the six rectilinear motions fall under this qualification. Specifically, this is the motion attributed by Timaeus to the primary bodies, when they are governed by necessity, âbeforeâ or separated from the persuasion of reason. Everything within the cosmos is governed through some mix of these various kinds of motions, while those things that move more regularly and rationally have a larger share in the movement of the same. The circular movement that is always the same is the movement of the universe as such, which has no share in the other six, irrational movements.202 In Laws book X, the Athenian elaborates on this idea and distinguishes two basic kinds of motion.203 The first is motion that takes place in one place, and therefore round some centre, regularly and uniformly, in relation to the same things. This is the motion that is described there as most akin to âthe revolution of reasonâ (
The author of Larrainâs fragments seems to transform this idea of becoming like the gods by adapting our movements to one of becoming like the gods through altering our mixture into a substance that is more luminous and dry. This idea comes to the fore clearly in Larrainâs fragment 11, where the author states once more that the activities of the rational soul are damaged by wetness (â
In QAM Galen does something similar to what the author of Larrainâs fragments does, when he argues that our psychic capacities are dependent upon our mixture and that there are diets (in the broad sense of regimens) that could change mixture for the better, improving our capacity for memory and understanding by increasing the predominance of dryness, supposedly.210 In QAM, Platoâs
The important differences with Plato are (1) that the change that needs to be made is a change primarily in substance, rather than in motion, upon which a change in motion follows since substance determines activity, and (2) that this change of substance consists in a change in the elemental qualities of the substance of the rational soul. According to Galen, at least, such a change is not only effected by diet. Besides the fact that for Galen oneâs mixture is affected by many other factors besides food and drink,211 it is not only the case that mixture determines activity, but also that activity determines mixture, as we can see, e.g., in the following passage from Temp.:
ÏÎ¿Î»Î»Î¿á½ºÏ Î³á½°Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïῶν ÏÏÏει λεÏÏῶν á¼Î¸ÎµÎ±Ïάμην ÏαÏÏ Î½Î¸ÎνÏÎ±Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïῶν ÏαÏÎÏν λεÏÏÏ Î½Î¸ÎνÏÎ±Ï ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ Î¼á½²Î½ á¼Ïγίᾳ Ïε καὶ Ïá¿· á¼Î²ÏοδιαίÏῳ Ïὴν ὠλην κÏᾶÏιν á½ÏαλλάξανÏÎ±Ï á¼Ïὶ Ïὸ á½Î³ÏÏÏεÏον, ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ Î´Îá¼Î½ ÏαλαιÏÏÏÎ¯Î±Î¹Ï ÏλείοÏι καὶ ÏÏονÏίÏι καὶ διαίÏá¾³ λεÏÏῠκαÏαξηÏανθÎνÏαÏ.212
I have observed many naturally thin people become thickened, and naturally thick people thinned, the former as a result of changing their entire mixture for the wetter through idleness and self-indulgence, the latter as a result of a drying-out process arising from excessive labour, worry and a thin[ning] daily regime.
tr. Singer and van der Eijk
Here, it is activity or a lack thereof that changes mixture: by being idle and self-indulgent, oneâs mixture becomes wetter, while through labour and worry it becomes drier. This corresponds to the specific way the causality functions when conceived the other way around: wetness makes the soul inactive and dryness or heat stimulates the activity of the (rational) soul. Here we must also remember, however, that activity for Galen is always already activity of a specific substance and thus dependent on the condition of the substance prior to the activity that then alters that same substance.
We do find in Platoâs Timaeus the notion that certain bodies are proper to certain movements,213 but in no way should the substances of these bodies be taken to determine their movement, particularly not in case of the heavenly bodies. The reasoning in the Timaeus is rather the other way around: these substances were put there because they suit the movements that were already put there.214 Therefore, in Plato, it is essentially the movement or the mover (i.e. soul) that is wise, and not the body partaking of the wise movement, which is, rather, a hindrance. In the reading of Galen and the author of Larrainâs fragments, however, a specific quality of bodies becomes the hindrance, while another specific quality of bodies becomes the cause for the movement.
Conclusion
The question of the heritage of the fragments collected by Larrain must remain undecided for now. Yet, I think that this case-study shows that, at the least, Nickelâs conclusions have been too rash and the fragments published by Larrain are valuable for the study of Galen. We have seen how specific and idiosyncratic interpretations of the Timaeus that we know from Galenâs attested work can be found in these fragments as well; we have looked at testimonies that refer to the first book of Galenâs commentary and discuss the same content and issues that we find in Larrainâs fragments; we have not found any conclusive evidence that these fragments cannot be based on Galenâs actual commentary on the Timaeus; and we know that scholars working on the Arabic tradition conclude that these fragments must have been part of the Greek manuscript of Galenâs commentary before the 9th century. Therefore, without reaching a definite conclusion, I think it is fair to say that Larrainâs conviction that these fragments are âsummarizing excerptsâ from Galenâs commentary on the Timaeus, might well be the best explanation for the heritage of these texts so far.
We have found that the fragments propose a Galenic reading of Platoâs Timaeus, in which the opposition between body and soul is recast into an opposition between the elemental qualities that make up our bodily mixture, viz. the cold and the wet versus the dry and the hot. This corresponds to Galenâs project in QAM, which, as we have seen in Case-Study I, has a strong basis in other Galenic works. Besides the resemblances to Galenâs works on the Timaeus â his summary and commentary as well as PHP and QAM â we have also seen how the content of these fragments is not only consistent with, but shows parallels to, works such as HNH, UP, Temp., Loc. Aff. and Galenâs commentaries on Hippocratic treatises.
The specifically Galenic Aristotelianizing tendencies, the arguments against the cardiocentric theory of the soul in favour of the encephalo-centric one based in the analysis of the nerve-system, the characterization of the substance of the rational soul resembling the fiery substance of the heavenly bodies, the relation of this resemblance in substance to the theory of vision and understanding through the psychic pneuma exuded by the brain and the psychic pneumaâs similarity to the light of the heavenly bodies, the general characterization of dryness and heat as contributing causes to understanding and the characterization of wetness fulfilling the opposite role, the anchoring of this theory in the river-metaphor of the Timaeus, the application of this general theory to the different phases of human life from embryo to old age, to mental illnesses such as lethargy and to diet, the emphasis on bodily substance as cause of activity or movement â all of these themes are typically Galenic. It is true that the author of Larrainâs fragments takes some of these issues a bit further than Galen does in (most of) his attested work. We have also noted, however, that Galen considered his commentary on the Timaeus a work on Platonic philosophy and not something indispensable to practicing physicians, that is to say: we can expect it to be somewhat more speculative. Besides this, the anticipatory references to the commentary Galen gives elsewhere suggest a critical form of commentary, in which matters that fall outside of the scope of the medical science are also discussed.
We have also seen how, in general, both Galen and the author of Larrainâs fragments use the Timaeus to put forth a somatising interpretation of the soul and anchor it in Galenâs favourite philosophical authority. This Galenic interpretation of the Timaeus is in line with our findings in Case-Study I and II and points to Galenâs explorative inclination to try to understand man as a whole â including what is (in the Platonic tradition) considered psychic â in terms of the hylomorphic substance that he considers to be the substance of everything.
Cf. Van der Eijk (2009) 261 f., 263: âPlato, alongside Hippocrates, clearly stands on a higher pedestal for him than Aristotle and Theophrastus, let alone the older Stoics. Yet we should distinguish between overt and covert appropriation of an earlier thinkerâs ideas; and one of the points I intend to make in this paper is that Galenâs implicit use of Aristotelian thought is much more profound and pervasive than his explicit acknowledgement of his debt to Aristotle might suggestâ. See also DeLacy (1972); Singer (1991); Frede (2003) 75; Chiaradonna (2009) on Galenâs relation to âMiddle Platonismâ in particular. There are some themes around which Galen rather praises Aristotle instead of Plato as well, notably Aristotleâs account of scientific demonstration and the theory of the elements.
One significant simplification in this regard is the sceptic aspect of Platoâs work, which Galen emphasizes particularly with regard to the Timaeus: he often points out that Plato presented his cosmology there as a âlikely accountâ, i.e. as something which is not scientifically proven. Cf. Tieleman (2018).
Cf. Vegetti (1978) 37â41; Hankinson (1989) 211â18; Chiaradonna (2009) 245â47.
In Lib. Prop. XIII, Galen mentions the summaries of Platoâs dialogues, in eight volumes, as well as the âCommentary on the Medical Statements in the Timaeus, in four volumes. Cf. Arnzen (2012) 193 ff., who has found Arabic references to Galenic summaries of eight different dialogues, among which the Timaeus; Flemming (2008) 327; Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).
For an in-depth discussion of the authorship of this translation, see Das (2013) 41 f., who concludes (79): âIn absence of further comparative data, it is difficult to make a more specific assertion than that the Arabic translation of the Synopsis likely belongs to the output of Ḥunaynâs circleâ. Das and Koetschet (forthcoming) conclude that âthe more general attribution of the extant Arabic version of Com. Tim. to Ḥunaynâs workshop is fairly secureâ. I am very grateful to Aileen Das and Pauline Koetschet for letting me use the drafts of their new translation of the Compendium as well as their introduction (to appear in the Cambridge series Galen: Works on Human Nature); since these drafts do not yet have a definite page-numbering, I will simply refer to it in general when I refer to their introduction to the translation of the text.
Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).
Arnzen (2012) 181â267, 185: â⦠in all likelihood no direct Medieval Arabic translation of the complete Greek text of any authentic Platonic work was ever madeâ. On Galen particularly 193 f.; see also Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).
Arnzen (2012) 202â11; cf. Das (2013), for a more detailed discussion; see also Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).
Lib. Prop. XIX 46 K.
PHP VIII 508,6â9 De Lacy (V 682â3 K): âThese passages need not be quoted now, for it is better, as some of my friends request, that I comment elsewhere on the medical passages in the Timaeus. Many persons have written commentaries on the rest (of the Timaeus), some at greater length than was needed; but on these matters few have written, and they not wellâ. (tr. De Lacy); see also PHP VIII 522,34â6 De Lacy (V 702 K), referring back to the previous remark: âI have decided that for the present this is enough about the humors if, as some of my friends ask, I am going to write a commentary on the medical passages in the Timaeusâ. (tr. De Lacy)
Trem. Palp. VII 631,10 K:
For Nat. Fac.: Fr II, 11,15 and Fr XIX, 25,26 Schröder; for the lost On Hippocratesâ Anatomy: Fr I, 10,3 Schröder.
Schröder, Praefatio IX; cf. Das (2013) 12 f.
PHP VIII 506, 25â508,5 f. De Lacy (V 681â2 K).
Cf. Frede (2003) 80â1.
Nickel (2002) 73â8.
Das (2014).
Das (2013) 12â16, 16: âThese three texts [PHP, the commentary and the summary] constitute a period of Galenâs career that is marked by sustained and varied engagement with the Timaeusâ. Cf. Das (2020) 37 ff.; Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).
Vegetti (2000) devoted a chapter to this subject but does not take the commentary and compendium into account and focuses on PHP and QAM; Das (2013, 2014, 2020, and the forthcoming translation of the Compendium with Koetschet) has made invaluable contributions to the study of both the commentary and Compendium as well as the subsequent Arabic reception; Sorabji (2003) provides a brief but insightful general overview of the ancient reception of the Timaeus with regard to the âmind-body relationâ, with particular attention for Galenâs role.
Larrain (1992) 7 ff., 226; see also Larrain (1991).
Larrain (1991) 10.
Before Nickel, Ferrari (1998, 16 note 8) has remarked that the differences between Larrainâs fragments and those published by Schröder are so great that Larrainâs attribution of them to the first two books is âcompletely unfoundedâ: â⦠a suo avviso, gli estratti deriverebbero dai primi due libri del Commento al Timeo di Galeno. In realtà , come mi riprometto di dimostrare in altra sede, si tratta di unâattribuzione del tutto infondata che non tiene conto delle notevoli differenze, sopratutto di natura formale, tra questi frammenti e quelli in nostro possesso derivati dal III libro del commentario galenicoâ. I know of no text in which Ferrari makes good on his promise, so are unable to assess his judgement; Flemming (2008) 349 note 21 follows Nickel in saying Larrainâs edition âdoes not add to our Galenic materialâ; Hankinson (2009) 150 note 20, regards some of Larrainâs material as being âof doubtful provenanceâ.
Nickel (2002) 78.
Garofalo (1995).
Cf. for instance QAM 38,9â18 Müller (IV 775 K): âFor death takes place, according to Plato, when the soul is separated from the body. But why great voiding of blood, the drinking of hemlock, or a raging fever, causes this separation, I would have certainly have wanted to learn from him, if he were himself alive. But since he no longer is, and none of the Platonist teachers taught me any cause, on account of which the soul is compelled by those things that I have mentioned to be separated, I dare to state myself that not every form of body is suitable to receive the rational soulâ. (tr. Singer)
QAM 48,20â5 Müller (IV 788 K): âNow, this point in itself casts great suspicion upon the question, whether the whole substance of the soul can really be non-bodily. For how could it be brought into the nature opposed to itself by communion with the body, if it is neither some quality of the body, nor a form, nor an affection, nor a capacity?â (Singer) The formulations â
Das (2014) 4; Nickel gives De Sem.186,2â5 De Lacy (IV 632 K) and Temp. I 578â9 K; the additional parallels put forward by Das are: Praen. 114, II.8â9 ed. Nutton (1979); Hipp. Art. XVIIIa 597 K; Hipp. Off. Med. XVIIIb 842 K.
Nickel (2002) 75â6; Larrain fr 6; Schröder book III fr II (p. 11,4â9).
Nickel refers to Foet. Form. 88,12â21 Nickel (V 684 K) and his note ad locum, which provides other parallels, particularly for the notion of the diminishing of our substance and subsequent need for nutrition.
UP I 364,6â14 Helmreich (III 500 K): â
Larrain Fr 14,11â9: â
Cf. Trompeter (2018) 188â90 on these two passages from UP and Larrainâs fragment 14.
With regard to the fragments on the nerve-system and seat of the soul in general, namely Larrainâs 13A and B, 14, 15 and 16: they could be part of a commentary on Tim. 44d (Fr 15 quotes from Tim. 44d), as Larrain observes (109 ff), since there Timaeus speaks of the head as the most divine part of the body, containing the imitation of the revolutions of the universe. It would make sense for Galen (or a Galenically-inclined other author) to use this passage to elaborate on one of his favourite subjects: the arguments for the tripartition of the soul and the leading part of the soul having its seat in the head, including the refutation of kardiocentric and Stoic views on the subject. It might also be, to follow Nickelâs suggestion in a slightly different direction, that the author added parts from other works such as PHP and UP to his excerpts of Galenâs actual commentary. But, once again, we do not need to resort to the assumption of several authors merely because Galen would otherwise be repeating his own work.
An example is the passage from QAM that we discussed in Case-Study I (IV 774 K), where Galen simply stated that the soul as form of the body should be located at the level of the homoeomerous bodies because âthe activities primarily belong thereâ. Within the direct context of QAM itself this does not make any sense and is left completely unexplained.
Cf. Larrain (1992) 12: âDas Exzerpt ist in 35 Abschnitte untergliedert, deren Anfänge der Schreiber jeweils mit ââ
Larrain (1992) 12.
Larrain (1992) 226.
Das (2014) 11.
Rashed (2010).
Das and Koetschet (forthcoming) in their new translation of the Compendium, have included this text as its preface.
Cf. Rashed (2010) 89; Ferrari (1998) 14â34.
Rashed (2010) 89: âMais il pouvait se contenter dâune monographie pour établir ce point historique, qui ne lui aurait pas demandé de se confronter à chaque détail philologique dâun texte redoutable. Il nâest pas sûr que nous puissions un jour résoudre cette énigmeâ.
An astounding number of such commentaries can be found listed in Galenâs On my own books.
Cf. König (2009) 44; Das (2013) 3 f.
Ferrari (1998) argues that the commentary came about in the context of a tradition of private (teacher and friends/disciples) discussion of texts of interest, and emphasizes the importance of the interests of Galenâs friends, the first intended readership, as an impetus for the work to come about. Vegetti (2000) wrote on Galenâs general approach to the Timaeus, and will be discussed below. Rashed (2010), 89: âQuel était alors le but dâune telle entreprise? Deux réponses ont été proposées. Selon Franco Ferrari, Galien voudrait simplement rendre disponibles à des
I think the same idea comes to the fore clearly in Vegettiâs chapter (2000), although he focuses on PHP and QAM and leaves the commentary and summary out of his discussion.
Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).
Moraux (1977); Lorusso (2005).
Cf. Daremberg (1848) 36; Schröder (1934) 1, note 2; Moraux (1977) considers Darembergâs Paris. gr. 2147 âohne Zweifel eine Abschrift von Yâ, Y being Yalensis 234, from which his fragment is derived.
â
Moraux (1977) III 212â227 pp. 49â50.
See infra, Case-Study II, p. 144â8.
PHP VIII, 494,26 ff. De Lacy.
Larrain relates this second fragment found by Moraux to his own fragment 2 (see below).
Lorusso (2005) 47: âLa dipendenza di Galeno dalla teoria aristotelica della visione è presupposta, del resto, anche dal frammento edito da Larrain, dove si dice che il mezzo tra lâoggetto e lâocchio umano (
Opt Med I 53 K.
Das (2013) 37â9, all of this applies to the Greek fragments published by Schröder.
Cf. e.g., Temp. I 509â19 K, esp. 519: âNor can they discover the healthy daily regime without reference to that well-mixed nature, as they give instructions to cool the body which is hotter than it should be and, conversely, to heat that which is colder than it should be, and similarly to dry what is too wet, and moisten what is too dry. In each case, evidently, they are introducing what is lacking to something that is in excess, in order to bring about some kind of well-mixed and middle stateâ. (tr. Singer and van der Eijk)
This is not a view entirely peculiar to Galen, cf. Longrigg (1993) 2â3 with reference to Aristotleâs On Breath 480b24 ff. and Sense and Sensibilia 436a8 ff.
With emphasis on âscienceâ; there could be success in the sense of some kind of art of medicine completely based on empirical observation of symptoms, without knowledge of the human being (see Outline of Empiricism. 45 Frede and Walzer, 1985), but this is obviously not the art of medicine that Galen considers himself the advocate of, and not even in the strict sense a science as he sees it.
See infra, Case-Study I, p. 70â7. Cf. Frede (2003) 77: âSo Galen does distinguish between definitive answers, backed up by conclusive proof, and answers which, though not supported by proof, are supported by reasonable argument and are not ruled out by considerations to the contrary. Galen allows himself such plausible views, but is hesitant to express themâ. See also Chiaradonna (2009) 245 f.; Tieleman (2018); DeLacy, in his commentary on PHP (98,12; p. 623), lists instances in which Galen opposes plausibility and truth.
PHP IX, 598,5â11 De Lacy (V 791â2 K); Cf. Vegetti (2000) 73â4 on this passage.
PHP IX, 588,29â591,2 De Lacy (V 781â2 K); cf. Tim. 29c-d, 48d.
Cf. Larrain fr 17 and commentary 123â32; also Comp. Tim. I 11â16 p. 34 Kraus-Walzer.
These topics are also left out almost entirely in Galenâs Compendium, see Kraus-Walzer 33â5. Cf. Arnzen (2012) 215â20.
PHP IX 588,7 ff. DeLacy (V 780 K).
Cf. Baltussen (2003), who concludes that there was a âtrendâ of âpartial useâ of the Timaeus, before âin the second to fifth century AD the Platonists came to write continuous and full-blown commentaries on the Timaeusâ; he names Posidonius, Alcinous and Galen, and for Galen refers to Larrainâs fragments (69â70).
Larrain (1992) 10â11; Arnzen (2012) 222â7; Das (2013) 10.
QAM 42â3 Müller (780â2 K).
Jouanna (2009a) 198: âFor Galenâs reading of the Timaeus, the key point is that the excess of humidity in the body disturbs both intelligence and memoryâ.
Tim. 43a6-b2 ed. Burnet.
Tim. 44a5-b7 ed. Burnet.
Tim. 44b8 f. ed. Burnet.
Das and Koetschet (forthcoming) paragraph 7.
Tim. 43b5-c5 ed. Burnet.
QAM 42,8â17 Müller (IV 780 K).
Cf. Stroumsa (2005) 11â26.
QAM 47,11â6 Müller (IV 786 K); Tim. 41dâ42b; for Heraclitus see Kahn fr CIX.
Vegetti (2000) 72, with regard to Galenâs general use of the Timaeus, speaks of âmanipulationâ of the dialogue in a âstrictly material senseâ: â⦠egli si sente libero dalle costrizioni di scuola, il che gli consente, da un lato, un atteggiamento francamente critico la dove questo gli sembra necessario, dallâaltro un uso spregiudicato del dialogo, fino alla manipolazione ma non al tradimento, in senso nettamente materialisticoâ.
Foet Form 104,15 Nickel (V 700 K).
Foet. Form. 86,21â88,2 De Lacy (V 683 K); Sem. 98,1â3 De Lacy (IV 546â7 K); Nat. Fac. II 83â6 K.
See infra, Case-Study II paragraph 4. Cf. Hankinson (2008) and van der Eijk (2014).
Vegetti (2000) 71 f.
Tieleman (2003) 161.
Vegetti (2000) 76: âMa non è certamente questo lâaspetto principale del lavoro esegetico da Galeno sul testo del Timeo. Il suo nucleo centrale consiste nellâinterpretazione della teoria dellâanima e del rapporto anima/corpo, che costituisce il tema maggiore di PHP: allâosservazione imparziale di sostituiscono qui operazioni assai più interessate alla fruizione e all manipolazione del testo platonicoâ.
Tim. 33bâ34a; 36c-d; 37a-c; 43b-c; cf. Laws 896eâ898b, for what is in fact a clearer explanation than the one we get in the Timaeus.
Cf. Tim. 34b-c: âAs for the worldâs soul ⦠it isnât the case that the god devised it to be younger than the body. For the god would not have united them and then allow the elder to be ruled by the younger ⦠The god, however, gave priority and seniority to the soul, both in its coming to be and in the degree of its excellence, to be the bodyâs mistress and to rule over it as her subjectâ. (tr. Zeyl); 36d8-e1: âOnce the whole soul had acquired a form that pleased him, he who formed it went on to fashion inside it all that is corporeal, and, joining center to center, he fitted the two togetherâ. (tr. Zeyl); Cornford (1952) 93 on this latter passage: âNothing has yet been said about the bodies which display these motions and the additional motions of the seven circles. The intention is to emphasize the superior dignity of soul and the truth that the self-moving soul is the source of all physical motionsâ.
Cf. Das (2013) 81â95.
Das (2013) 83â5.
See Das and Koetschet (forthcoming), notes on paragraph 2.
Das (2013) 82 f.
Das (2013) 85.
See Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).
Larrain (1992) 21.
Cf. Larrainâs comments on Fr 1, 21â6; PHP II 104,3â5 De Lacy (V 213 K).
Larrain 27, fragment 2; the last sentence is a citation of Tim. 53d6â7, where it is about the principles that underlie the geometrical figures underlying the elements.
Cf. Vegetti (2000) 72â3.
This is also how Larrain interprets this sentence: âPlatons Versuch, die Elemente auf die Figuren der stereometrischen Körper zurückzuführen, betrachtet Galen â in deutlicher Anlehnung an Aristoteles â als gescheitertâ.
Rep. 511a6, ed. Burnet.
Rep. 511c8, ed. Burnet.
See infra, Case-Study II, paragraph 1 and 2, and p. 152â3 (with note 130 for references to HNH).
PHP VIII, 494,26 ff. De Lacy; VIII, 506,25 ff. DeLacy; VIII 6, 522,34 ff. De Lacy.
PHP VIII, 496,11â2 De Lacy (V 668 K).
Trem. Palp. 631,10 K.
Kraus and Walzer (1951) 59â60.
Cf. Arnzen (2012) 220â1; Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).
Larrain 41, fragment 3.
QAM 36,21â37,5 Müller (IV 773 K); HNH 6,11â20 Mewaldt (XV 7â8 K). Cf. Singer (2014) note 32 ad locum.
Cf. note 55 above.
Ed. Schröder (1934) 10 f. Cf. Das (2013) 17â37 for an excellent and detailed discussion.
Cf. Chiaradonna (2014) on Galen and Middle Platonism.
Larrain 50, Fr 4.
Cf. PHP VI 368,13 ff. DeLacy; QAM 44,2â12 Müller (IV 782 K); cf. Vegetti (2000).
Tim. 34c4â5 ed. Burnet.
Tim. 36d8-e1 ed. Burnet.
See infra, Case-Study I, p. 39â40.
See Das and Koetschet (forthcoming) notes on paragraph 4.
Fragment 6, ed. Larrain.
This fragment is reminiscent in style and structure of what Galen says in QAM (38,4â16 Müller, IV 774â5 K) in the context of the discussion of the possible immortality of the rational soul, namely that Plato did not provide an answer as to why death takes place when the body is disturbed by an excess of one of the elemental qualities, and the later Platonists are not able to account for it either.
QAM 42â3 Müller (IV 780â1 K).
Cf. Trem. Palp. VII 616 K, where the innate heat in each living being is identified as its nature or soul, being a principle of movement.
Cf. Schröder book III fragment 2 (pp. 10â1), on Tim. 76e7â77c5.
Nickel (2002) 75. The comparisons are with De Sem. II 5,29â30, CMG V 3,1, 186,2â5, where the embryo in its first stage of formation is compared to milk that is just beginning to curdle, and with De Temp. II 2, 44, 11â14 Helmreich, I 578â9 K, where the bones of young animals are compared to âsolidified cheeseâ. See also infra pp. 165â71 for a discussion of the articles by Nickel and Das (2014).
Das (2014), 4. The additional parallels put forward by Das are: Praen. 114, II.8â9 ed. Nutton (1979); Hipp. Art. XVIIIa 597 K; Hipp. Off. Med. XVIIIb 842 K. She also points out that it is important to note that âset cheese and curdled milk are products of different stages of the cheese-making processâ, which clarifies the continuity of these different parallels, and points to a passage in Alim. Fac. (VI 695â99 K), where Galen âgoes into some detail in distinguishing
Temp. I 577,16 ff. K.
Temp. I 579,1 ff. K.
Temp. I 614,9â10 K.
Fr 7, ed. Larrain.
Cf. Das (2013) 17 ff., Wilberding (2014) on Galenâs views on this issue and interpretation of this particular passage; Long (1982), Tieleman (1991), Gourinat (2008) on this same issue in Stoicism.
QAM 43,15â44,2 Müller (IV 781â2 K).
Cf. Frede (2003) 116 ff., who also refers to the similarities with the Pseudo-Aristotelian De Mundo.
UP II 446,12â447,8 Helmreich (IV 358â9 K).
Cf. Frede (2003) 118: âGalen here is presupposing that the elements themselves are ranked according to purity in the following order: fire, air, water, earth, and that accordingly bodies mixed from them are, depending on the proportion of the different elements in the mixture, more or less pure, terrestrial bodies being the most impure because of the large proportion of water and earth they contain. He may also assume that the elements themselves come in purer or less pure forms. In any case, the heavenly bodies will consist of particularly pure fire and hence will be the purest, first among them the sun. Thus the sun will be the most intelligentâ.
Schröder (1934) 2â3.
Larrain (1992) 8.
Das (2013) 94â5.
QAM 67,2â16 (IV 807â8 K).
QAM 43,15â44,2 Müller (IV 781â2 K); UP II 446,12â447,8 Helmreich (IV 358â9 K).
HNH Mewaldt 51,9 (XV 97 K); see infra Case-Study II, p. 156.
Hipp. Aph. XVIIIA 52 K.
Hipp. Epid. XVIIA 540 K.
Loc. Aff. VIII 160 K ff.
Loc. Aff. VIII 162,8â10 K.
Larrain Fr 12,9â13: â
See also on lethargy the testimony from ThÄbit Ibn Qurrah, translated in Larrainâs edition (188): âEs sagte Galen im âTimayusâ bei seinem Kommentar zum Wort des Platon: âDie beiden feuchten Mischungen sind das Blut und das Phlegma, die, wenn sie im Körper in gro
Jouanna (2009a) 197.
Jouanna (2009a) 197 ff.; see, e.g. Regimen I, 35,50â60: âIf in any case fire receive a power inferior to that of water, such a soul is of necessity slower, and persons of this type are called sillyâ. (tr. Jones) âSillyâ translates
Jouanna (2009a) 203.
Character Traits, ed. Singer (2013) 140 (27 Kraus), tr. Daniel Davies.
QAM 63,29â64,2 Müller (IV 804 K) tr. Singer.
See the passage quoted above, UP II 446,12â447,8 Helmreich (IV 358â9 K), more particularly 447,4â6.
HNH Mewaldt 51,9â16 (XV 97 K).
Tr. Hankinson (forthcoming), modified. I think it is better to not translate
Fr 8, ed. Larrain.
Larrain (1992) 79â80, 188; Arnzen (2012) 222â3; I quoted Larrainâs translation above, note 522.
QAM 47,9â18 Müller (IV 786 K).
Kahn (1979) 247; fragment CIX: â
Kahn (1979) 247.
Kahn (1979) fr CVI.
Cf. Mansfeld (1967) 21 ff.
Schröder (1934) 10â11.
Tim. 55eâ56e, 78a.
HNH 46,5 ff. Mewaldt (XV 35 K), 50,23â4 Mewaldt (XV 96 K), 51,9â18 Mewaldt (XV 97 K); Nat. Fac. II 9, II 135 K; Hipp. Elem. 154,5â6 De Lacy (I 506 K); PHP V, 502,23 De Lacy (V 676 K); Hipp. Aph. XVIIB 667 K. See also infra, Case-Study IV, p. 307 ff.
Trem. Palp. VII 614.
Trem. Palp. VII 617, tr. Sider and McVaugh.
Trem. Palp. VII 617â8 K.
Fr 9, ed. Larrain.
See particularly QAM 38â43 Müller (IV 775â783 K).
Tim. 41dâ42b.
QAM 43,10â44,2 Müller (IV 781â82 K).
QAM 47,9â18 Müller (IV 786 K).
Frede (2003) 120.
ibidem.
Ierodiakonou (2014) 235 ff.
Frede (2003) 121; Cf. Sem. 136,7â9 De Lacy (IV 584â5 K); Loc. Aff. VIII 66,9â67,6 K; PHP VII 474,3â7 De Lacy (V 642 K); cf. also Plotinus, Enneads IV, 8, 4.
PHP VII 474,22â9 De Lacy (V 643â4 K); cf. also PHP VII 442,36â443,2 De Lacy (V 606 K), where the second option is that the pneuma is the soulâs âfirst homeâ rather than its vehicle.
PHP VII 442,36â444,11 De Lacy (V 606 K); on pneuma see infra, Case-Study I, p. 61â4.
Tim. 41d-e, 69c.
PHP VII 460,28â33 De Lacy (V 627 K); Ierodiakonou (2014) esp. 14.
PHP VII 460,1â4 De Lacy (V 626 K), 474,3â7 De Lacy (V 642 K).
See the discussion in Das and Koetschet (forthcoming): Galen omits both what could be seen as the âatomistic elementsâ in the account of the Timaeus, such as the notion of the âparticles [that] emanate from visible objects and collide with visual rays (67d-e)â, as well as the âcentral comparison between vision and reflection in a mirror (46a-c)â.
Fr 18, ed. Larrain.
Larrain (1992) 134; Galen does the same in PHP VII 462,25 ff. De Lacy (V 629â30 K).
Fr 21, ed. Larrain.
And in fact we find such comparisons in Galen, see note 136 above.
PHP VII, 442,19â446,17 De Lacy (V 604â9 K).
Cf. Frede (2003) 120: âThat Galen assumes a close connection between intelligence, or, more generally, cognition, and light, becomes clear if we look at the role light plays in Galenâs doctrine of cognitionâ. Ierodiakonou (2014) 242: â⦠for it is exactly this luminous, light-like pneuma which, in line with the principle of like being perceptible by like, allows us to perceive and discriminate colours, to see objects, to have cognition, and to acquire some kind of understandingâ.
Fr 22, ed. Larrain.
Cf. Frede (2003) 118â9.
Fr 9, ed. Larrain.
UP II 446,16â9 Helmreich (IV 359 K).
Fr 9,8â11, ed. Larrain.
We know there were different variations of this fragment circulating, see Kahn (1979) ad locum.
QAM 67,2â16 (IV 807â8 K).
Loc. Aff. VIII 150â2 K.
Fr 9,11â19 ed. Larrain.
Fr 9,19â23 Larrain.
Fr 10,1â4 Larrain.
See Larrainâs notes ad locum.
Fr 10,1â2 Larrain.
Proclus, In Remp. i. 222 Kroll; Olympiodorus Commentary on Platoâs Gorgias 49.6 Westerink (ad 524d5â6); Philoponus, On Aristotleâs On the Soul 50.32 ff. Hayduck (and the notes ad loc. in van der Eijk 2006); I thank George Boys-Stones for some of these references. See infra, Case-Study I, p. 94â5.
Tim. 34a, 37aâe, 52e.
Laws 896eâ898b.
Tim. 90câd, see Sedleyâs (1997, 1999, 2017) classical studies on this subject.
Fr 11,1â2 Larrain.
Fr 11,2â6 Larrain.
Fr 11,9â11 Larrain; see Larrain (1992) 97: âDa
Das and Koetschet (forthcoming) notes on paragraph 4.
Fr 12,1â5 Larrain.
See particularly QAM 67,2â16 (IV 807â8 K).
See San. Tu. VI 40 K; see also infra, Case-Study I, p. 91â2.
Temp. I. 604â5 K.
Cf. Tim. 34A: âFor he assigned to it the motion proper to its bodily form, namely that one of the seven which above all belongs to reason and intelligence â¦â (tr. Zeyl). In 34C, however, Timaeus hurries to state that this order is only due to the narrative, and that the god made soul prior to body and to rule over body, see the earlier quotation above. It is telling that Galen in his Compendium leaves out Timaeusâ correction.
Cf. Cornford (1952) 78: âBut Platoâs rings symbolise motions and nothing else. The bodies which have the motions are not mentioned at all at this stage; they are fashioned later and set in the motions here provided â¦â