Introduction
In one of his best-known works, Galen argues for the thesis â expressed in its title â that âthe capacities of the soul depend on the mixtures of the bodyâ (
It is not always easy to pinpoint Galenâs position in QAM, since he extensively quotes and discusses Aristotelian, Platonic, Stoic and Hippocratic views on the soul in order to develop his own views.2 Yet, as we shall see below, close text-analysis permits us to find some positive doctrine which expresses a conception of the soul that is both more âmaterialisticâ (we shall see presently why the quotation marks are necessary) as well as more outspoken than in Galenâs other works and which, at the same time, develops the possibility of a causal reciprocity between the body and the (rational part of the) soul. With this combination, Galen distances himself from both complete material determinism and Platonic metaphysics, through an original version of the Aristotelian, hylomorphic conception of the soul. As we shall see, such a conception builds on other, earlier Galenic writings. This is important to note, particularly since QAM has often been taken as the odd one out, as a work that does not present genuine Galenic doctrine.3 By showing how QAM relates to Galenâs other work, we shall arrive at a better understanding of the treatise itself.
Right after the introduction of the central thesis expressed in the title, at the beginning of the text, Galen remarks that he has often examined this thesis in many ways, even in the company of the best philosophers, and always found it to be not only true, but also âbeneficial to those who wish to improve their own soulsâ.4 This addition immediately shows how the thesis of QAM is, for Galen, tied to an ethical practice. It is beneficial, says Galen, because a good mixture of the body (
It is also important to note that by mentioning the Pythagoreans and Platonists as examples, Galen suggests that this self-imposed altering of the mixtures of oneâs body in order to improve oneâs soul is a philosophical activity.5
After the introduction of the thesis, a large part of QAM is about showing how it is supported by the works of Aristotle, Plato and Hippocrates. But, as we shall see, Galenâs separate discussions of Aristotelian and Platonic doctrine serve another purpose than simply accumulating the support of the two greatest philosophical authorities. In the Aristotelian section (IV 773â75 K; discussed in paragraph 1 of this case-study) the proposed thesis is validated for the lower two parts of the soul (the tripartition familiar from On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP) is presupposed throughout QAM). However, a further step is also taken: it is demonstrated that the substance (
Galenâs flirtation with the notion that the substance of the soul is nothing but a specific bodily mixture has sparked controversy and debate among scholars. There has been a tendency to downplay the validity of this conclusion and to argue that it should not be accepted as serious Galenic doctrine. Indeed, there are some obvious problems with it. Galen has become renowned for his agnosticism on the substance of the soul, which he has also clearly expressed in works dated later than QAM. For some reason, he appears willing to be somewhat more speculative in QAM on this subject. To a certain extent a more speculative attitude might also be expected from this particular text, however. After all, according to Galen himself it is a work on âPlatoâs philosophyâ.6 I consider it plausible, for reasons to be discussed below, that in QAM Galen was working out the philosophical consequences of some of his earlier work on the human constitution and human nature. Perhaps merely by way of experiment, but certainly in a way that builds upon, and is mostly in accordance with, the rest of his work. That is to say, as opposed to most of the modern scholarly tradition, I do want to interpret QAMâs thesis on the substance of the soul as Galenic doctrine. Because a majority of the scholarly tradition is in disagreement with this approach, I will discuss alternative readings and possible objections in a separate section (paragraph 3) after my own analysis of the text.
One of the reasons why scholars have taken issue with the stronger thesis in QAM is that it is considered radical and deterministic. However, it will turn out that the worry about radical consequences of âmaterial determinismâ that have been said to follow Galenâs identification of the substance of the soul with a bodily mixture, is unjustified. As I shall argue, Galen rather ascribes to the rational part of the soul a divine-like capacity to transform the bodily mixture and to thus develop the virtues of the soul (paragraph 4). After being allotted certain natural capacities, dependent on the naturally given mixture of the body, man can and should initiate a second stage of formation by training and disciplining himself. It follows, however, given Galenâs critique of the Platonic notion of the rational soul as a separate or non-bodily entity, that this capacity to form itself is finally a capacity of the naturally given mixture itself. This leads to a notion of ethics which might seem paradoxical to some and which in any case poses some serious restrictions on the possible application of the ancient ideal Galen proposes: it appears as if the likelihood or even possibility of this second stage of formation depends upon a specific kind of natural mixture already. That is to say, in simpler terms: only those with the right natural predisposition for it will take upon themselves a project of self-amelioration.
To summarize: what I propose to do in what follows is to give a reading of QAM that is supported by other Galenic works and that takes the thesis of the substance of the soul being a mixture completely serious, without accepting the implied lack of human freedom and impossibility of traditional ethics as a necessary consequence.7
I hope to show that such a reading is possible when grounded in some of Galenâs views on human nature or the human constitution, which he elaborates upon elsewhere and presupposes in QAM. This notion of human nature builds on a combination of Aristotelian hylomorphism and the Hippocratic-Platonic tripartition and trilocation, with an exceptional and somewhat ambiguous status for the rational part of the soul.
For the aim of this case-study, some parts of QAM are more relevant to analyse than others. It may be helpful to give my overall view of the structure of the text at the outset. As we have noted, after a short introduction Galen first argues for the substance of the soul being a bodily mixture. The argument can be divided into an Aristotelian section on the lower two parts (773â5 K) and a Platonic section on the rational part of the soul (775â82 K), culminating in the acceptance of the position of Andronicus regarding the soul as a whole (782â3 K). Then, Galen states that the Stoics are on the same side, because they also hold that the substance of the soul is a certain mixture (783â4 K).8 In the part on the Stoics, Galen first mentions the ethical debate his position is likely to spark, only to state that he will return to this matter later (785 K; he will return to it at the end of the treatise, 814â822 K). In the text between 785 and 814 K, Galen argues for the central thesis of QAM (mostly through quotations from Plato, Aristotle and Hippocrates), that the capacities of the soul follow the mixture of the body, and not for the stronger thesis that the substance of the soul is itself a mixture, as he did in the part between 773 and 783 K. Therefore, the text between 785 and 814 K is less relevant to our analysis and will not be discussed in detail. As we shall see, however, the arguments for the thesis that the substance of the soul is a mixture should be understood in light of Galenâs central thesis that the capacities of the soul follow the mixtures of the body. That is to say, it fulfils a function within the overall argumentation for the central thesis (which does not imply that we should simply reduce its value to this function, especially when it can be shown that the stronger thesis coheres with other works).
1 Aristotle and the Non-Rational Parts of the Soul
1.1 Introduction of the Argument
Galen states that the starting-point (á¼ÏÏá½´) of his argument consists in the observation of the differences in actions and affections of small children. Such observation makes us realize that we are always already given a certain nature that is decisive for the state of our soul.9 This realization is of central importance to Galen and will conflict with what he presents as the Stoic view, namely that everyone has the potential for virtue.10 The apparent differences in those actions and affections imply a difference in capacities (
Since the observation of the differences between children forms the starting-point of the argument, the answer to the question about the substance of the soul will somehow have to do justice to these observed differences in the natures of children. Thus, although we are in a sense asking about one âthingâ, the substance or nature of the soul, this has to be something that is itself qualitatively variant to such a degree that it can account for the entire range of differences we observe in the actions and affections of small children. Given this point of departure, we can safely assume that whatever explanation of the substance or nature of the soul Galen turns out to prefer, it will have some emphasis on inherent qualitative variation.
Galenâs next step is the introduction of the tripartition familiar from PHP: there are three forms and parts (
ÏÏῶÏον οá½Î½ á¼ÏιÏκεÏÏμεθα ÏεÏὶ Ïῶν á¼Î½ καÏδίᾳ καὶ á¼¥ÏαÏι Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï εἰδῶν, ἠκá¼ÎºÎµÎ¯Î½á¿³ κá¼Î¼Î¿á½¶ ÏÏ Î½ÏμολÏγηÏαι ÏθείÏεÏθαι καÏá½° Ïὸν θάναÏον.13
Let us first, then, examine the forms of the soul in heart and liver, which are agreed by both him and me to perish at death.
tr. Singer, modified
These other two forms and parts are discussed in a kind of exchange with Aristotelian philosophy, while the discussion of the substance of the rational part of the soul will take the form of an argument against the Platonic doctrine of its immortality and non-bodily existence. Thus, Galen chose to divide his question on the substance of the soul into a discussion of the lower parts according to Aristotle, and the higher part according to Plato. Perhaps this points to a Platonist tendency, but it could also be a way to first establish Galenâs particular interpretation of Aristotelian hylomorphism, i.e. of the soul as form of the body. After all, Galenâs discussion of the rational part of the soul mostly takes the form of arguments against the Platonic doctrine of the soulâs existence as a substance separate from the body, leaving the â by then established â hylomorphic interpretation of the soul as the only alternative.
1.2 The Soul as Form of the Homoeomerous Body
In this paragraph, we shall delve further into the Aristotelian discussion of the lower two parts of the soul. Although it is only a relatively small part of the overall text, it requires quite a bit of explanation because it presupposes much from other Galenic works. Galen starts the discussion of the lower two parts of the soul with the remark that the common substance (
In his discussion of the lower two parts of the soul in the Aristotelian section (QAM IV 773â5 K), Galen assumes with âAristotle and his followersâ that the soul is the form of the body. Thus, besides his familiar Platonic-Hippocratic tripartition, he adopts, at the same time, a hylomorphic approach to the question of the nature and substance of the soul. However, he starts from the notion of a common substance (
Now, at this point Galen does not yet conclude that the form of the body, and thus the soul, is the mixture of elemental qualities that constitutes the homoeomerous bodies:
á½¥Ïθâ á½ Ïαν αá½Ïá½¸Ï Î¿á½ÏÎ¿Ï á¾¿ÎÏιÏÏοÏÎÎ»Î·Ï Îµá¼¶Î´Î¿Ï Îµá¼¶Î½Î±Î¹ Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï Îµá¼´Ïá¿ Ïὴν ÏÏ Ïήν, á¼ÏÏÏηÏÎον αá½Ïὸν á¼¢ ÏοÏÏ Î³Î á¼ÏΠαá½Ïοῦ ÏÏÏεÏον Ïὴν μοÏÏὴν Îµá¼¶Î´Î¿Ï Îµá¼°Ïá¿Ïθαι ÏÏá½¸Ï Î±á½Ïοῦ νοήÏÏμεν, á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ á¼Î½ Ïοá¿Ï á½Ïγανικοá¿Ï ÏÏμαÏιν, á¼¢ Ïὴν á¼ÏÎÏαν á¼ÏÏὴν Ïῶν ÏÏ Ïικῶν ÏÏμάÏÏν, Ïῶμα Î´Î·Î¼Î¹Î¿Ï ÏγοῦÏαν á½ ÏÎµÏ á½Î¼Î¿Î¹Î¿Î¼ÎµÏÎÏ ÏÎ á¼ÏÏὶ καὶ á¼Ïλοῦν á½¡Ï ÏÏá½¸Ï Î±á¼´ÏθηÏιν, οá½Îº á¼Ïον á½Ïγανικὴν ÏÏνθεÏιν.18
Therefore when this Aristotle himself says that the soul is form of the body, one must ask him, or his followers, whether we should understand form here to have been used by him in the sense of shape, as in the organic bodies, or in the sense of the other principle of natural bodies, that which crafts a body that is homoeomerous and simple in terms of perception, not having organic composition.
tr. Singer, modified
Apparently, at this point in the argument, there are two options for the definition of the soul as the form of the body: the shape of organic bodies and that which âcraftsâ the homoeomerous bodies. Also, both are considered a principle or cause (
The distinction between âhomoeomerous bodiesâ and âorganic bodiesâ employed by Galen in QAM is hierarchically the same as the difference between homoeomerous and anhomoeomerous bodies. In the context of QAM, where the substance of the soul is under consideration from the perspective of the tripartition related to the three main organs, the compositional level of the anhomoeomerous bodies is restricted to organs. This means that the second candidate for the form of the body, or the soul, the âother causeâ that âcraftsâ a body that is homoeomerous and simple, must be (the mixing interaction of) the four elemental qualities. Again, this kind of cause is not unique to human beings but common to all bodies in the cosmos:
Îá¼Î»Î»Î ἡμεá¿Ï γε ÏÏῶÏον μὲν á¼Îº Ïῶν αἰÏίÏν, Î¿á¼·Ï á¼ ÏανÏα διοικεá¿Ïαι Ïá½° καÏá½° Ïá½°Ï ÏÏ ÏειÏ, Ïοῦ θεÏμοῦ λÎÎ³Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏ ÏÏοῦ καὶ ξηÏοῦ καὶ á½Î³Ïοῦ, δεÏÏεÏον δΠá¼Î¾ αá½Ïῶν Ïῶν á¼Î½Î±ÏÎ³á¿¶Ï ÏαινομÎνÏν καÏá½° Ïὸ Ïῶμα ÏÏ ÏÏὸν καὶ ξηÏὸν εἶναί Ïινα ÏÏá¿Î½Î±Î¹ ÏÏ Î¼á½¸Î½ á¼Ïεδείξαμεν.25
But we have demonstrated, firstly from the causes by which everything throughout nature is governed, that is to say from the warm and the cold and the dry and the moist, and secondly, from obvious bodily phenomena, that there must be a cold and dry humour.
tr. Brock, modified
Galen considers the elemental qualities as the governing causes of all beings, since they, in their mutual interaction, decide the form (literally) that the smallest elements of those beings take. Therefore, in UP, Galen states that the mixture of qualities constitutes the specific substance (
As Galen proceeds to explain in the passage in UP, the nature of a part (i.e. a homoemerous body in this context) is determined by the specific state of its elemental qualities. The smallest bodies in turn determine the specific form of the larger ones, and thus also the specific functions and activities of these larger bodies.28 The
á¼Îº μὲν Î³á½°Ï Ïῶν ÏÏ Î¼á¿¶Î½ ÏοÏÏÏν á¼ÎºÎ±ÏÏον Ïῶν á½Î¼Î¿Î¹Î¿Î¼ÎµÏῶν á¼Î³ÎνεÏο, ÏÏ Î½Î¹ÏνÏÏν δὲ ÏοÏÏÏν á¼Î»Î»Î®Î»Î¿Î¹Ï á¼ÏοÏελεá¿Ïαι Ïὸ ÏÏῶÏÏν Ïε καὶ á¼ÏλοÏÏÏαÏον á½Ïγανον, á½ Î¼Î¹á¾¶Ï á¼Î½ÎµÏÎ³ÎµÎ¯Î±Ï á¼Î½ÎµÎºÎµÎ½ á½Ïὸ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏÏεÏÏ á¼Î³ÎνεÏο. ÏοÏÏÏν δὲ αá½Î¸Î¹Ï á¼Î»Î»Î®Î»Î¿Î¹Ï ÏÏ Î½ÏιθεμÎνÏν á¼ÏεÏον á½Ïγανον καὶ μεá¿Î¶Î¿Î½ γεννᾶÏαι, κá¼ÎºÎµÎ¯Ïν αá½Î¸Î¹Ï á¼Î»Î»Î®Î»Î¿Î¹Ï á¼ÏιÏλεκομÎνÏν ἡ Ïοῦ ÏανÏá½¸Ï á¼ÏοÏελεá¿Ïαι ÏÏμÏηξιÏ.30
Each of the homoeomerous parts came to be from these humours, and when they are conjoined with each other they produce the first and simplest organ, which was brought into being by nature for the sake of a single activity. When these [organs] are combined with each other in turn, another, larger organ is produced, and when these [larger organs] are joined with each other again, the structure of the whole is completed.
tr. De Lacy, modified
Galen adopts an hierarchical structure, in which the more complex level is produced from, or even by the more simple level. In this way, the structure of the whole seems, in the end, to a large extent determined by the way the elemental qualities interact at the most basic level and form or alter the homoeomerous parts. In HNH, Galen relates this causal hierarchy to his discussion of the soul in QAM:
á¼Ïεὶ ÏÎ¿Î¯Î½Ï Î½ καὶ Ïὸ αἷμα αá½Ïὸ δεá¿Ïαι Ïῶν ÏεÏÏάÏÏν ÏοιοÏήÏÏν, á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ξηÏÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ θεμÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏ ÏÏÏÏηÏοÏ, εá½Î´Î·Î»Î¿Î½ á½ Ïι καὶ Ïá¿Ï Ïῶν á¼Î»Î»Ïν ÏÏ Î¼á¿¶Î½ δεήÏεÏαι μίξεÏÏΠκαὶ διὰ ÏοῦÏο Ïὸ εá½ÎºÏαÏÏÏαÏον αἷμα μεθÎξει Ïι καὶ ÏλÎγμαÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïολá¿Ï ξανθá¿Ï καὶ μελαίνηÏ. á¼ÏÏι δὲ καὶ á¼ÏεÏÎ¿Ï ÏÎ¹Ï Î»ÏÎ³Î¿Ï ÏÏ ÏÎ¹Îºá½¸Ï Î¿á½ ÏμικÏὰν á¼ÏÏν ÏιθανÏÏηÏα, καθΠὠν Îµá¼°Ï á¼ Î¸á¿¶Î½ á¼ÏιÏηδείÏν γÎνεÏιν οἱ ÏÎÏÏαÏÎµÏ á¼ÏÎ¿Î´ÎµÎ¯ÎºÎ½Ï Î½Ïαι ÏÏ Î¼Î¿á½¶ ÏÏήÏιμοι. ÏÏοαÏοδεá¿Î¾Î±Î¹ δὲ ÏÏá½´ Ïάλιν á¼Î½ αá½Ïá¿· Ïαá¿Ï Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÏάÏεÏιν á¼ÏÏμενα Ïá½° Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï ἤθη, ÏεÏὶ οὠκαὶ ἡμá¿Î½ á¼ÏÎÏÏÏθι γÎγÏαÏÏαι.31
But since, then, blood too itself requires the four qualities (wet, dry, hot and cold), it is clear that it will also require a mixture of the other humours. So for this reason the most well-tempered blood will have a share to some extent of phlegm, and of yellow and black bile. There is also another physical account which has no little plausibility, according to which the four humours are proved to be effective in the generation of the states of character which are appropriate to them. In it we first need to establish that the states of character of the soul are consequent upon the mixtures of the body, about which we have written elsewhere.
tr. Hankinson
The qualities mix to form humours, the basic building blocks of the constitution of man, and the humours, in turn, are instrumental in the formation of character traits, which follow upon the specific mixture formed by the qualities. Thus, in this passage, with reference to QAM, we notice how the more simple level of physical composition does not only determine the more complex level of physical composition, but also the âpsychicâ category of character.
In On the Natural Faculties (Nat. Fac.) Galen also elaborates on the two phases of composition, describing how both come to be through different capacities of nature:
á¼Î»Î»Î ἡ μὲν γÎνεÏÎ¹Ï Î¿á½Ï á¼ÏλῠÏÎ¹Ï á¼Î½ÎÏγεια Ïá¿Ï ÏÏÏεÏÏ, á¼Î»Î»Î á¼Î¾ á¼Î»Î»Î¿Î¹ÏÏεÏÏ Ïε καὶ διαÏλάÏεÏÏ á¼ÏÏι ÏÏνθεÏοÏ. ἵνα μὲν Î³á½°Ï á½ÏÏοῦν γÎνηÏαι καὶ νεῦÏον καὶ ÏÎ»á½²Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïῶν á¼Î»Î»Ïν á¼ÎºÎ±ÏÏον, á¼Î»Î»Î¿Î¹Î¿á¿¦Ïθαι ÏÏá½´ Ïὴν á½ÏοβεβλημÎνην οá½Ïίαν, á¼Î¾ á¼§Ï Î³Î¯Î³Î½ÎµÏαι Ïὸ ζῷονΠἵνα δὲ καὶ ÏÏá¿Î¼Î± Ïὸ δÎον καὶ θÎÏιν καὶ κοιλÏÏηÏÎ¬Ï ÏÎ¹Î½Î±Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ á¼ÏοÏÏÏÎµÎ¹Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏ Î¼ÏÏÏÎµÎ¹Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïá¼Î»Î»Î± Ïá½° ÏοιαῦÏα κÏήÏεÏαι, διαÏλάÏÏεÏθαι ÏÏá½´ Ïὴν á¼Î»Î»Î¿Î¹Î¿Ï μÎνην οá½Ïίαν, ἥν δὴ καὶ á½Î»Î·Î½ Ïοῦ Î¶á¿´Î¿Ï ÎºÎ±Î»á¿¶Î½ â¦32
Generation, however, is not a simple activity of Nature, but is compounded of alteration and of shaping. That is to say, in order that bone, nerve, veins, and all other parts may come into being, the underlying substance from which the animal comes to be must be altered; and in order that the substance so altered (which we also call the material of the animal) may acquire its appropriate shape and position, its cavities, outgrowths, attachments, and so forth, it needs to be shaped.
tr. Brock, modified
These two capacities of nature involved in the genesis of beings correspond to the two compositional phases of homoeomerous and anhomoeomerous parts. The homoeomerous substances, such as bone, nerve and veins, come to be because of a mixing of the qualities in an underlying substance and subsequently require the right shape and position within the body, as well as the proper connections to other parts. The first stage is conceived as a capacity of nature described as generative and alterative:
á½ÏÏοῦν δὴ καὶ ÏÏνδÏον καὶ νεῦÏον καὶ á½Î¼Îνα καὶ ÏÏνδεÏμον καὶ ÏλÎβα καὶ ÏάνθΠὠÏα ÏοιαῦÏα καÏá½° Ïὴν ÏÏÏÏην Ïοῦ Î¶á¿´Î¿Ï Î³ÎνεÏιν ἡ ÏÏÏÎ¹Ï á¼ÏεÏγάζεÏαι Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¹ ÏÏÏμÎνη καθÏÎ»Î¿Ï Î¼á½²Î½ εἰÏεá¿Î½ ÏῠγεννηÏικῠÏε καὶ á¼Î»Î»Î¿Î¹ÏÏικá¿, καÏá½° μÎÏÎ¿Ï Î´á½² θεÏμανÏικῠÏε καὶ ÏÏ ÎºÏικῠκαὶ ξηÏανÏικῠκαὶ á½Î³ÏανÏικῠκαὶ Ïαá¿Ï á¼Îº Ïá¿Ï ÏοÏÏÏν κÏάÏεÏÏ Î³ÎµÎ½Î¿Î¼ÎÎ½Î±Î¹Ï â¦33
Now Nature constructs bone, cartilage, nerve, membrane, ligament, vein, and so forth, at the first stage of the animalâs generation, using a power which is, in general terms, generative and alterative, and, in more detail, warming, chilling, drying, or moistening; or such as spring from the blending of these â¦
tr. Brock, modified
Notably, Galen adds that the particular flesh (
The second phase, the construction of anhomoeomerous bodies through the combination of homoeomerous ones, is effected by the âshapingâ capacity:
Ïὴν δὲ ÏÏνθεÏιν αá½Ïῶν καὶ Ïὴν Ïῶν á¼Î¼ÏÏ Î¿Î¼ÎνÏν Ïλοκὴν καὶ Ïὴν Îµá¼°Ï Ïὸ á¼Î½ÏεÏον á¼ÎºÏÏ Ïιν καὶ Ïὴν Ïá¿Ï á¼Î½Î´Î¿Î½ κοιλÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï á¼°Î´Îαν καὶ Ïá¼Î»Î»Î á½ Ïα ÏοιαῦÏα δÏÎ½Î±Î¼Î¹Ï ÏÎ¹Ï á¼ÏÎÏα διÎÏλαÏεν, ἥν διαÏλαÏÏικὴν á½Î½Î¿Î¼Î¬Î¶Î¿Î¼ÎµÎ½, ἥν δὴ καὶ ÏεÏνικὴν εἶναι λÎγομεν â¦35
⦠while the bringing of these together, the combination therewith of the structures which are inserted into them, the outgrowth into the intestine, the shape of the inner cavities, and the like, have all been determined by a power which we call the shaping or formative power; this power we also state to be artistic â¦
tr. Brock, modified
The shaping power puts the homoeomerous parts together in such a manner that complex beings capable of exercising particular functions arise. This is the power Galen praises throughout UP and which will be known in later tradition as the âplastic facultyâ (
Galen describes both of these phases of generation as capacities of the same nature. Since this nature is wise, that is to say, since it operates according to an observable systematic teleology, the exercise of these two respective capacities would logically require a sufficient extent of coordination. The exercise of the first capacity must already anticipate the second.36 In QAM, both of these capacities of nature, are considered as causes for the formation of the human body. Through the first, nature manifests itself as cause of the generation of homoeomerous bodies, through the second, as cause of the shaping of organs and their interconnections.
But why, we may ask, is Galen so preoccupied with elaborating such a hierarchy of parts of our body? This is because he assumes that the simplest parts of our body hold the key to the question of our nature. Here we have to bring to mind a passage from the beginning of Hipp. Elem.:
⦠á¼Î»Î»á½° Ïá½° ÏÏῶÏά Ïε καὶ á¼ÏλοÏÏÏαÏα Ïá¿ ÏÏÏει καὶ μηκÎÏâ Îµá¼°Ï á¼Î»Î»Î± Î´Î¹Î±Î»Ï Î¸á¿Î½Î±Î¹ Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ½Î± ζηÏῶμεν, εἰ μÎλλοιμεν á¼¢ á¼Î½Î¸ÏÏÏÎ¿Ï ÏÏÏεÏÏ á¼¤ ÏÎ¹Î½Î¿Ï á¼Î»Î»Î¿Ï Ïῶν á½Î½ÏÏν á¼ÏιÏÏήμην á¼ÎºÏιβῠλήÏεÏθαι.37
⦠but let us find the parts that are first and simplest by nature and that are no longer capable of being dissolved into other parts, if we are to obtain precise knowledge of the nature of man or any other being.
tr. De Lacy, slightly modified
Apparently, Galen assumes that knowledge of the nature of any being can only be obtained by analysis of its smallest parts. Therefore, an investigation into the nature of man, or whatever other entity, would have to take the form of a structural analysis of its component parts.38 This becomes particularly relevant when we remember the identification of nature and substance in QAM referred to earlier: Galen stated that the words nature and substance mean the same in âthese kind of discussionsâ (
1.3 The Homoeomerous Bodies as Primarily Active
Basically, Galenâs question now is whether we should look for the soul on a macro- or a more micro-level of the formal organisation of our bodies. When we bear the quoted passage from Hipp. Elem. in mind, it is not surprising that Galenâs choice falls on the micro-level. The answer to the question of the nature or substance of a being must be sought in its smallest parts, after all. He adds, however:
á¼ÏοκÏινοῦνÏαι Î³á½°Ï á¼Î¾ á¼Î½Î¬Î³ÎºÎ·Ï Ïὴν á¼ÏÎÏαν á¼ÏÏὴν Ïῶν ÏÏ Ïικῶν ÏÏμάÏÏν, εἴ γε δὴ ÏοÏÏÏν εἰÏὶ ÏÏÏÏÏÏ á¼Î½ÎÏγειαι (δÎδεικÏαι Î³á½°Ï ÏοῦθΠἡμá¿Î½ á¼ÏÎÏÏθι καὶ νῦν, á¼Î½ δεήÏá¿, Ïάλιν εἰÏήÏεÏαι).40
For they [Aristotle and his followers] have to answer, necessarily, that it [the form of the soul] is the other principle of the natural bodies â since, indeed, to these the activities primarily belong (this has been shown by us elsewhere, and will be stated again now, if you require).
tr. Singer, modified
Galenâs justification for the choice in favour of the micro-level of our composition is that the âactivitiesâ primarily belong to this level. What does this mean? It may seem striking that the activity of our soul would primarily take place at the level of the elemental mixture that forms the homoeomerous body. In fact, it seems even more striking from an Aristotelian perspective, since it is stated in Aristotleâs work that the homoeomerous parts are for the sake of the anhomoeomerous ones exactly because actions and functions belong to the latter.41 Again, Galen is presupposing a lot of his own doctrine, and he now simply states that he has already explained this elsewhere. Singer notes that there is a parallel for the notion that the activities primarily belong to the homoeomerous bodies in Loc. Aff., where the same compositional hierarchy of manâs constitution appears as well, and where we find references to QAM.42 Unfortunately, however, the explanation remains missing there also, although it is clear that in this context Galen is speaking about the powers of the rational soul. The passage is about affections of the rational soul that damage the power of reasoning and memory. These affections are caused by a humoral imbalance (i.e. finally by an imbalance of the elemental qualities), which affects the homoeomerous parts of the brain, which âprimarily actâ. In this passage, Galen explains affections of the rational soul, such as lethargy, in terms of the homoeomerous bodies of the brain being affected by too much coldness or wetness.
There is another useful passage in this regard in Nat. Fac., in the same context as the quotations above on the generative and shaping powers of nature. In this passage, Galen explains how each animal has as many alterative powers (
We find more evidence of this privileged role of the homoeomerous bodies when it comes to the substance and activities of our functions in other works as well. In Opt. Corp. Const., Galen asks what the best constitution of our bodies is. He refers to Hipp. Elem. and Temp., and presupposes the theoretical framework which he has developed there.45 The question turns out to be whether the micro-level of the composition of homoeomerous bodies or rather the macro-level of organic composition is responsible for the optimal constitution. In the end, the answer is that both are indispensable. As in QAM, both levels of composition are considered to be causes for our functioning, though not in exactly the same manner:
ἡ μὲν Î³á½°Ï á¼Îº θεÏμοῦ καὶ ÏÏ ÏÏοῦ καὶ ξηÏοῦ καὶ á½Î³Ïοῦ ÏÏμμεÏÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÏᾶÏÎ¹Ï á½Î³Î¯ÎµÎ¹Î± Ïῶν á½Î¼Î¿Î¹Î¿Î¼ÎµÏῶν á¼ÏÏι Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á¼¡Î¼á¿¶Î½Î á¼¡ δâ á¼Îº ÏοÏÏÏν á¼ÏάνÏÏν Ïοῦ Î¶á¿´Î¿Ï Î´Î¹Î¬ÏλαÏÎ¹Ï á¼Î½ θÎÏει καὶ μεγÎθει καὶ ÏÏήμαÏι καὶ á¼Ïιθμῷ Ïῶν ÏÏ Î½Î¸ÎÏÏν á½ÏάÏÏει â¦46
For a healthy state of our body consists in a well proportioned mixture of the homoeomerous parts out of the hot, cold, dry, and wet, but the shaping of the animal from all of these [parts] consists in the position, magnitude, configuration and number of the component elements.
Clearly, the second level of composition is described in quantitative and spatial terms. Once the homoeomerous parts themselves are constituted through a specific mixture of the various qualities, at the second compositional level it is about how these parts relate to each other in terms of position, magnitude, configuration and number.47 In UP, these characteristics of the second stage of composition are called accidental, as opposed to the mixture of the elemental qualities, which forms the substance and nature of any part (
All of this corresponds to what Galen does in QAM, where he refers to the particular substance of each of the organs in which the soul resides (
á¼ÏÏá½´ δὲ κá¼Î½Ïαῦθα Ïá¿Ï εá½ÏÎÏεÏÏ, εἰ ζηÏήÏαιμεν, á½ ÏÏÏ Î´Î¹Î±ÎºÎµÎ¹Î¼ÎÎ½Î¿Ï Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á¼Î½ÎµÏγοῦμεν á¼ÏιÏÏα. ÏÏá½´ ÏÎ¿Î¯Î½Ï Î½ Îµá¼°Ï ÏοῦÏο Ïῶν ἤδη δεδειγμÎνÏν á¼Î½ á¼ÏÎÏÎ¿Î¹Ï á½ÏομνήμαÏιν á¼Î½Î±Î¼Î½Î·Ïθá¿Î½Î±Î¹, ÏÏῶÏον μὲν á½¡Ï á¼Îº θεÏμοῦ καὶ ÏÏ ÏÏοῦ καὶ ξηÏοῦ καὶ á½Î³Ïοῦ Ïá½° ÏÏμαθΠἡμῶν κÎκÏαÏαιΠδÎδεικÏαι δὲ ÏεÏὶ ÏοÏÏÏν á¼Î½ Ïá¿· ΠεÏὶ Ïῶν καθÎ῾ÎÏÏοκÏάÏην ÏÏοιÏείÏν γÏάμμαÏιΠδεÏÏεÏον δὲ Ïοῦ διοÏίÏαÏθαι Ïá½°Ï ÎºÏάÏÎµÎ¹Ï Ïῶν μοÏίÏνΠεἴÏηÏαι δὲ καὶ ÏεÏὶ ÏοÏÏÏν á¼Î½ Ïοá¿Ï ΠεÏὶ κÏάÏεÏν á½ÏομνήμαÏινΠá¼Ïεξá¿Ï δὲ ÏοÏÏÏν, á½¡Ï á¼ÎºÎ±ÏÏον μὲν Ïῶν á½Ïγανικῶν Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï Î¼ÎµÎ»á¿¶Î½ á¼Î½ á¼Ïει Ïῶν á¼Î½ á¼Î±Ï Ïá¿· μοÏίÏν αἴÏιον Ïá¿Ï á¼Î½ÎµÏγείαÏ, Ïá½° δÎá¼Î»Î»Î± ÏÏμÏανÏα Ïá½° ÏÏ Î¼ÏληÏοῦνÏαÏὸ Ïᾶν á½Ïγανον á¼ÎºÎµÎ¯Î½Î¿Ï ÏάÏιν á¼Î³ÎνεÏο.50
And here the starting-point of our enquiry must be the investigation as to what is the constitution of the body at the time when our functioning is at its best. Now at this point we must make reference to matters which have been demonstrated previously in other works. First, that our bodies are a mixture of hot, cold, dry and wet. This was shown in our treatise on The elements according to Hippocrates. Secondly, that one must distinguish between the mixtures of different parts â as discussed in our work on Mixtures. The next point is that each of the organic parts of the body has one cause of activity from the parts that it has in itself; and everything else that goes to make up that organ as a whole comes into being in accordance with that purpose.
tr. Singer, modified
The cause of activity from the parts within the organ must refer to the homoeomerous bodies. We cannot assume that each organ as a whole has one activity â that would not make sense as most organs have many different activities according to Galen. So what must be meant here is, again, that each of the activities of the organ has a single cause deriving from the homoeomerous bodies the organ has within itself. Thus, this cause of activity, located âinâ the organs, is not a separate immaterial substance of any kind but rather the formal aspect of the most elemental level of composition, namely, the specific mixture of elemental qualities that forms the homoeomerous part, which is said to be primarily active.51
It is at this micro-level of composition that qualitative change is generated and the conditions for the activities of the soul, such as perception, are created, because Galen views the elemental qualities as a kind of primary agents of activity and change:
Îá½¥ÏÏâ, εἰ μὲν Ïá½°Ï ÏÏÏÏÎ±Ï Ïε καὶ ÏÏοιÏειÏÎ´ÎµÎ¹Ï á¼Î»Î»Î¿Î¹ÏÏÎ¹Îºá½°Ï Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¹Ï Î¶Î·ÏοίηÏ, á½Î³ÏÏÏÎ·Ï á¼ÏÏὶ καὶ ξηÏÏÏÎ·Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏ ÏÏÏÏÎ·Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ θεÏμÏÏηÏΠεἰ δὲ Ïá½°Ï á¼Îº Ïá¿Ï ÏοÏÏÏν κÏάÏεÏÏ Î³ÎµÎ½Î¿Î¼ÎναÏ, ÏοÏαῦÏαι καθâ á¼ÎºÎ±ÏÏον á¼ÏονÏαι ζῷον, á½ ÏαÏÎµÏ á¼Î½ αá½Ïοῦ Ïá½° αἰÏθηÏá½° ÏÏοιÏεá¿Î± á½ÏάÏÏá¿Î καλεá¿Ïαι δâ αἰÏθηÏá½° ÏÏοιÏεá¿Î± Ïá½° á½Î¼Î¿Î¹Î¿Î¼ÎµÏá¿ ÏάνÏα Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï Î¼ÏÏια â¦52
Therefore, if you wish to inquire into which alterative powers are primary and elementary, these are moisture, dryness, coldness, and warmth, and if you wish to inquire into the things that arise from the mixture of these, there will be so many of these in each animal as it has perceptible elements. The name perceptible elements is given to all the homoeomerous parts of the body.
tr. Brock, modified
The qualities are described here as
καὶ ÏÎ¿Î¯Î½Ï Î½ á¼Ïειδὴ Ïῶν Ïοῦ Î¶á¿´Î¿Ï Î¼Î¿ÏίÏν á¼ÎºÎ±ÏÏον ἰδίαν á¼Î½ÎÏγειαν á¼Î½ÎµÏγεá¿, Ïῶν á¼Î»Î»Ïν á¼Î½ÎµÏγειῶν Îµá¼°Ï ÏοÏοῦÏον διαÏÎÏÎ¿Ï Ïαν Îµá¼°Ï á½ Ïον καὶ αá½Ïὸ διαÏÎÏει Ïῶν á¼Î½ÎµÏγοÏνÏÏν αá½ÏάÏ, διαÏÎÏει δὲ Ïá¿· θεÏμÏÏεÏον, á¼¢ ÏÏ ÏÏοÏÏεÏον, á¼¢ á½Î³ÏÏÏεÏον, á¼¢ ξηÏÏÏεÏον á½ÏάÏÏειν, á¼¢ καÏá½° ÏÏ Î¶Ï Î³Î¯Î±Î½ Ïι ÏοÏÏÏν ÏεÏονθÎναι, Ïὴν κÏᾶÏιν αá½Ïῶν ÏÏ Î»Î±ÎºÏÎον á¼ÏÏὶ Ïá¿· Ïὴν á¼Î½ÎÏγειαν ÏÏ Î»Î¬ÏÏονÏι.53
Therefore, when each of the parts of the organism performs a particular activity, which differs from other activities to the extent that the part itself differs from those parts that perform those activities â that is, differs by being hotter, colder, moister, or drier, or by being affected in terms of a conjunction of these [qualities] â you must preserve their activity by preserving their mixture.
tr. Johnston and Horsley, modified
The parts Galen is referring to here are, again, homoeomerous parts, as is clear from the immediate context. Shortly before this passage, he states that he shall return to the discussion of the disease that befalls the homoeomerous parts, âto which the activities of the living being primarily belongâ (
Galen grounds the very possibility of activity in this most fundamental level. In Hipp. Elem., he emphasizes that qualitative difference is a necessary condition for the functions of the soul, indeed for the very existence of the soul. There, he argues that perception can only arise in a body if we assume that the four elemental qualities that make up the body are âchanged and mixed and altered through and throughâ (
The dependence of all parts of the body on the mixture of the elementary qualities also becomes manifest in the case of the activities being damaged. If the mixture is of a bad quality, the organs are not able to perform their basic activities, while, if they are of good quality, their activities are performed well:
διὰ Î³á½°Ï Ïὴν á¼Îº Ïῶν ÏεÏÏάÏÏν Ïοιὰν κÏᾶÏιν á¼ÎºÎ¬ÏÏÎ¿Ï Ïῶν μοÏίÏν ὡδί ÏÏÏ á¼Î½ÎµÏγοῦνÏÎ¿Ï á¼Î½Î¬Î³ÎºÎ· ÏᾶÏα καὶ διὰ Ïὴν βλάβην αá½Ïῶν á¼¢ διαÏθείÏεÏθαι ÏελÎÏÏ á¼¢ εμÏοδίζεÏθαί γε Ïὴν á¼Î½ÎÏγειαν καὶ οá½ÏÏ Î½Î¿Ïεá¿Î½ Ïὸ ζῷον á¼¢ ὠλον á¼¢ καÏá½° Ïá½° μÏÏια.57
For, since each part functions such as it does because of the specific mixture of the four [qualities], it is absolutely necessary that through damage of these qualities the activity is either completely destroyed or at least impeded, and that this is how the animal becomes sick either as a whole or with respect to certain parts.
All activities of living beings are eventually dependent on the mixture of the elemental qualities that form their most basic components. The capacities of the parts that exercise our functions and activities are decided on this micro-level, because that is where quality resides. Galen is quite clear that this goes for every part of the human body that fulfils any particular function:
á¼Î¼Î¿á½¶ μὲν οá½Î½ καὶ ἡ ÏÎ»á½²Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïῶν á¼Î»Î»Ïν á¼ÏάνÏÏν á¼ÎºÎ±ÏÏον διὰ Ïὴν á¼Îº Ïῶν ÏεÏÏάÏÏν Ïοιὰν κÏᾶÏιν ὡδί ÏÏÏ á¼Î½ÎµÏγεá¿Î½ δοκεá¿.58
Thus, it seems to me that the vein, and each of all the other [parts] as well, functions such as it does because of the specific mixture of the four [elemental qualities].
Again, âeach of all the other partsâ must include the three main organs in which the three parts of the soul reside and that are also made up of mixtures. That is to say, the functioning of the liver, heart and brain, âinâ which the respective parts of the soul reside, is determined by the specific mixture of its component homoeomerous parts, which are primarily active.
Another interesting passage in this regard can be found in the discussion of melancholy in Loc. Aff. book III, chapters 9 and 10.59 In the ninth chapter, Galen states that it âappears reasonableâ (
á¼Ïεὶ Î³á½°Ï á¼¤Ïοι κÏᾶÏÎ¯Ï á¼ÏÏιν ἡ ÏÏ Ïá½´ Ïῶν δÏαÏÏικῶν ÏοιοÏήÏÏν, á¼¢ á½Ïὸ Ïá¿Ï κÏάÏεÏÏ Î±á½Ïῶν á¼Î»Î»Î¿Î¹Î¿á¿¦Ïαι, Ïὴν μὲν á½¡Ï á½Ïγανικῷ μοÏίῳ Ïá¿· á¼Î³ÎºÎµÏάλῳ Î»Ï Î¼Î±Î¹Î½Î¿Î¼Îνην Ïολὴν á¼Ïὶ Ïὸ Ïῶμα ÏεÏÏάÏθαι ÏηÏι Ïοῦ á¼Î³ÎºÎµÏÎ¬Î»Î¿Ï , γίγνεÏαι δὲ ÏοῦÏο καÏá½° Ïá½°Ï á¼Î¼ÏÏάξειÏÎ Ïὴν Î´Î á½¡Ï á½Î¼Î¿Î¹Î¿Î¼ÎµÏεῠÏὴν κÏᾶÏιν á¼Î´Î¹ÎºÎ¿á¿¦Ïαν á¼Ïὶ Ïὴν διάνοιαν.61
Since the soul either is a mixture of the active qualities, or is altered by the mixture of these qualities, he [Hippocrates] says that the bile damaging the brain as an organic part affects the body of the brain, and this happens through stoppages; but the bile that damages the mixture as a homoeomerous part, affects the mind.
The relation with QAM is clear, and at the end of chapter 10 Galen makes it explicit himself, saying that in that particular work he has demonstrated (
In another passage earlier in Loc. Aff., Galen distinguishes two views on the soul and its relation to the body: some of the philosophers say that the soul is in its surrounding body as we are in a house; others say that the soul is the form of the body and as such inseparable from it. Galen, as often, is not too explicit on his preferences, but it is clear from this passage that he finds the latter view more appealing because it is better able to explain why the rational capacities are altered when the substance of the brain is altered.62 After all, what he proceeds to do in the following book of Loc. Aff., is to show how various affections of the rational soul, such as lethargy, phrenitis or melancholy, are caused by alterations in the mixture of the brain in terms of the humours and elemental qualities (or by alterations in another body part, in the case of an affection through sympathy). Likewise, at the beginning of QAM, Galen states that the philosophers did not properly understand the notion of capacity (
We can see, now, how the capacities of the soul depend on the mixture of the body in the most fundamental sense possible, according to Galen: the kind of activity a living being can exercise is determined by the way the elemental qualities interact and form its homoeomerous bodies; these homoeomerous bodies exercise the activities in a primary sense and are, in turn, part of the organs as the locations from where these functions are exercised.
Now that we know why the activity must primarily (
1.4 The Substance of the Soul as Mixture
After Galen decides that soul, as form of the body, must be located at the level of the homoeomerous bodies because these are primarily active, he concludes the following:
καὶ μὴν εἴÏÎµÏ á¼Î¾ á½Î»Î·Ï Ïε καὶ Îµá¼´Î´Î¿Ï Ï á¼ ÏανÏα ÏÏ Î½ÎÏÏηκε Ïá½° ÏοιαῦÏα ÏÏμαÏα, δοκεῠδâ αá½Ïá¿· Ïá¿· ᾿ÎÏιÏÏοÏÎλει Ïῶν ÏεÏÏάÏÏν ÏοιοÏήÏÏν á¼Î³Î³Î¹Î³Î½Î¿Î¼ÎνÏν Ïá¿ á½Î»á¿ Ïὸ ÏÏ Ïικὸν γίγνεÏθαι Ïῶμα, Ïὴν á¼Îº ÏοÏÏÏν κÏᾶÏιν á¼Î½Î±Î³ÎºÎ±á¿Î¿Î½ αá½Ïοῦ ÏίθεÏθαι Ïὸ εἶδοÏ, á½¥ÏÏε ÏÏÏ ÎºÎ±á½¶ ἡ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï οá½Ïία κÏᾶÏÎ¯Ï ÏÎ¹Ï á¼ÏÏαι Ïῶν ÏεÏÏάÏÏν â¦64
And surely if all such bodies are composed of matter and form, but according to Aristotle himself the natural body comes to be because the four qualities come to be in the matter, it is necessary to posit the mixture of these as the form of it, so that the substance of the soul too will somehow be some mixture of the four â¦
Thus, through the hierarchical schema of the various levels of our constitution, his notion of the homoeomerous bodies as primarily acting and the linking of the parts of the soul to the main organs, Galen has now integrated Aristotelian hylomorphism into the Platonic-Hippocratic tripartition-trilocation he posited as axiomatic from the outset.65 The soul is the form of the body in the sense of a mixture of elemental qualities that comes to be in a prime matter and forms homoeomerous bodies that are primarily active and reside in the larger compositions that are the three main organs. The different soul parts reside in these organs, that is to say: as the formal aspect of a hylomorphic unity, they make up the micro-level of their constitution that is the primary cause of their specific activity. As we have seen, this notion of soul is prepared in other writings of Galen. Thus, it seems as if Galen, in QAM, actually did display that audacity needed to make statements on the substance of the soul which he referred to in his Causes of Symptoms (Caus. Symp).66 In any case, as we shall see below, further on in QAM he does not only applaud the Peripatetic Andronicus for defining the substance of the soul as a mixture, but also praises him for his audacity.67
Now, besides being audacious (for reasons that involve more than the overcoming of a sceptical or agnostic attitude, as will become clear below), this may also seem like a rather strong conclusion: the substance of the soul, the cause of our actions and affections, is nothing more than a particular mixture of the four elementary qualities? Is this not an extremely âphysicalistâ position? And does this not amount to some kind of determinism, without room for free will?68 Indeed, many scholars have found it difficult to accept this conclusion as Galenâs own, and have developed interpretations of QAM that weaken its status (see below, paragraph 3).
So far we have left out two important general points, however, which, I think, add nuance and complexity to Galenâs position. First, there is the question of the âdemiurgeâ of the mixture, which we briefly alluded to above. Even if it is the case that the specific mixture of the elemental qualities makes up the substance of the soul and therefore all capacities, affections and activities of the soul are dependent on this mixture, the exact ramifications of this view are utterly unclear as long as it remains unspecified what the specific formation of the mixture itself is dependent upon. Galen has some answers to this question of the âdemiurgeâ of the mixture and we shall treat those at the end of this paragraph. Secondly, we have to qualify the extent of Galenâs conclusion in the Aristotelian section in the following two ways. First, as in the example of small children at the beginning of QAM, we seem to be still in the context of an early or compositional phase of the body. As we saw in the quotation above, Galen states that âthe natural body comes to be because the four qualities come to be in the matterâ. In other words, at least when it comes to this passage in QAM, it is clear from the text that the focus here is on the initial formation of the soul through the mixture. As we shall see below (paragraph 4), we can differentiate between an initial and natural formation of the mixture that accounts for the childrenâs differences in natural character, and a later formative causality that springs from the rational part of the soul and that is apparently supposed to complete this initial formation. This brings us to the second qualification: this entire discussion (at this point in the text) still pertains only to the lower two of the three forms or parts of the soul. As we have seen, right before the beginning of the Aristotelian section, Galen remarked that Plato considered the rational form of the soul to be immortal, whereas he himself is unable to take position in the matter.69 This remark structured the discussion that followed, for it led to the division into the Aristotelian section on the lower two parts and the Platonic section on the rational part of the soul. Galen returns to this division between the mortal parts and (possibly immortal) rational part of the soul only after the Aristotelian section, which must mean that the conclusion proposed there, that the substance of the soul must be some mixture of the four elemental qualities, is not valid at this point for the rational part of the soul. Indeed, when Galen takes up the discussion of the rational part of the soul, he does so by asking whether it too (i.e. as the lower two parts) can be considered a particular mixture.70 As we shall see, Galen will eventually accept the same conclusion for the rational part of the soul as well, but in a more tentative and careful manner and not without some preliminary discussion, which conveys the exceptional position of the rational part with regard to the mixture. For now, it is sufficient to remember that Galen has postponed the discussion of the rational part of the soul, and that it takes place in the context of a discussion of the views not of Aristotle, but of Plato.
With these two general points in mind â the unanswered question of the âdemiurgeâ of the mixture and the restricted extent of Galenâs conclusion so far â we must observe three things with regard to this conclusion. First, nowhere in the remaining text of QAM does Galen distance himself from the conclusion that the
A closer look at this sentence â from the section that we have referred to as the Platonic section (775â782 K) â also shows the close connection for Galen between the thesis that the substance of the soul is a mixture and the central thesis he presented at the beginning of QAM, that the capacities of the soul follow the mixtures of the body:
εἰ μὲν οá½Î½ λογιζÏμενον Îµá¼¶Î´Î¿Ï Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï á¼ÏÏι θνηÏὸν, á¼ÏÏαι καὶ αá½Ïὸ κÏᾶÏÎ¯Ï ÏÎ¹Ï á¼Î³ÎºÎµÏÎ¬Î»Î¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïάνθâ οá½ÏÏÏ Ïá½° Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï εἴδη Ïε καὶ μÎÏη Ïá½°Ï Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¹Ï á¼ÏομÎÎ½Î±Ï á¼Î¾ÎµÎ¹ ÏῠκÏάÏειΠÏÎ¿Ï ÏÎÏÏιν αá½Ïá½´ οá½Î½ ἡ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï οá½Ïία â¦72
If, then, the rational form of the soul is mortal, it too will be a particular mixture, [namely] of the brain, and thus all the forms and parts of the soul will have their capacities dependent on the mixture â that is, on the substance of the soul.
tr. Singer, slightly modified
First of all, the substance of the soul is again equated with the mixture here, but this time it is suggested (for the first time) that this equation may be valid for all parts of the soul. The conclusion presented here in hypothetical form is the same as the one Galen approvingly ascribes to Andronicus right after the Platonic section in which he argues against the immortality and incorporeal existence of (the rational part of) the soul (see below). The structure of the text here is telling. Schematically, it has the following form: argument for the substance of the lower two parts of the soul being a mixture of the elemental qualities; introduction of a dilemma concerning the rational part: it is either mortal, and then it too (and thus the entire soul) will be a particular mixture, or it is separate and immortal, as the Platonists argue; arguments against one leg of the dilemma, i.e. the Platonic doctrine that the soul is a separate, immortal substance; introduction (and approval) of Andronicusâ position that the substance of the whole soul is a mixture. This is particularly noteworthy because it has been argued that Galen, in the passage in which he introduces Andronicusâ view, would merely be spelling out the consequences of an Aristotelian position, rather than giving his own doctrine on the substance of the soul.73 What is more, he says that if it is the case that the rational form of the soul is also (
⦠καὶ διὰ ÏοῦÏο ÏοÏαÏÏÎ±Ï Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¹Ï á¼Ïειν Ïὴν οá½Ïίαν ÏαμÎν, á½ ÏÎ±Ï á¼Î½ÎµÏγείαÏ, οἷον Ïὴν á¼Î»Ïην καθαÏÏικήν Ïε δÏναμιν á¼Ïειν καὶ ÏονÏÏικὴν ÏÏομάÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏÎ±Ï Î¼Î¬ÏÏν á¼Î½Î±Î¹Î¼Ïν κολληÏικὴν â¨ÎºÎ±á½¶â© á¼°ÏοÏÎδÏν á¼Î»Îºá¿¶Î½ á¼ÏÎ¿Ï Î»ÏÏικὴν â¨ÎºÎ±á½¶â© á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï Î²Î»ÎµÏάÏÏν ξηÏανÏικήν, οὠδήÏÎ¿Ï Ïῶν εἰÏημÎνÏν á¼ÏγÏν á¼ÎºÎ±ÏÏον á¼Î»Î»Î¿Ï ÏÎ¹Î½á½¸Ï ÏοιοῦνÏÎ¿Ï ÏαÏÎαá½Ïὴν Ïὴν á¼Î»Ïην. αá½Ïη Î³Î¬Ï á¼ÏÏιν ἡ ÏαῦÏα δÏῶÏα, καὶ διὰ Ïὸ δÏναÏθαι Ïοιεá¿Î½ αá½Ïá½° ÏοÏαÏÏÎ±Ï á¼Î»ÎÏθη Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¹Ï á¼Ïειν, á½ Ïα Ïá½° á¼Ïγα.77
⦠and therefore we say that the substance has as many capacities as activities; for example that aloe has a capacity of cleansing and toning the mouth of the stomach, of agglutinating bleeding wounds, of cicatrizing grazes, and of drying the wetness of the eyelids â without there being some other thing that performs each of these actions apart from the aloe itself. For it is the aloe that does these things; and it is because it can do these things that it is said of it that it has these âcapacitiesâ, as many as the actions.
tr. Singer, slightly modified
The substance, being the aloe, is itself active and does things. Therefore, we say that it has the capacity to do those things, recognizing that it can do the things it does. That does not mean that there is some thing that the aloe has besides the substance that it is, it is just a way of saying that this substance can do what we observe it doing. It is also clear from the example of the aloe that a single substance could have several capacities. Galen states that we could say the same thing about the rational soul âwhich is seated in the brainâ. Once we recognize that it is a substance that is primarily active and that does things, and that we attribute âcapacitiesâ to this substance on the basis of its activity, it becomes evident that proving that the substance of the soul is a mixture of elemental qualities is more than conducive to proving the thesis that the capacities of the soul are dependent on the mixture of the body. This could be the very reason that Galen is so much more explicit on the substance of the soul here than in his other work â i.e. this notion of the substance of the soul serves his purpose of proving the central thesis of QAM. However, I think that we should be careful not to brush aside his account of the substance of the soul being a mixture as a mere tool to prove the main thesis expressed in the title, especially not since, as we have seen, it is coherent with some of his earlier writings. In any case, such an approach would also be reasoning in the wrong direction. I consider it both more fruitful and more elegant to employ the opposite perspective: Galen argues for the main thesis of QAM because he has what he thinks are good arguments for it, and one of those arguments is that it is plausible that the substance of the soul is actually a mixture of elemental qualities.
Finally, after the Platonic section (IV 775â782 K), Galen rhetorically asks whether it is not obvious that the mortal part of the soul is in every way a slave to the body, if even the rational part changes along with the mixture of the body, as he has just shown, and then repeats the earlier conclusion once more:
á¼Î¼ÎµÎ¹Î½Î¿Î½ δὲ Ïάναι μὴ Î´Î¿Ï Î»ÎµÏειν á¼Î»Î»Î αá½Ïὸ δὴ ÏοῦÏΠεἶναι Ïὸ θνηÏὸν Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï, Ïὴν κÏᾶÏιν Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏοÏ, á¼Î´ÎµÎ¯Ïθη Î³á½°Ï á¼Î¼ÏÏοÏθεν ἡ θνηÏá½´ ÏÏ Ïá½´ κÏᾶÏÎ¹Ï Î¿á½Ïα Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏοÏ.78
It is even better to state that the mortal part of the soul is not âa slave toâ, but that it actually is precisely this, i.e. the mixture of the body, for it has been shown above that the mortal soul is a mixture of the body.
tr. Singer, modified
This is a very explicit repetition of the conclusion reached in the Aristotelian section.
It is also an important passage because here Galen makes a clear distinction between the notion that the soul is merely dependent on or follows (i.e. is a slave to) the mixture of the body on the one hand, and the notion that the soul actually is the mixture on the other, and then proceeds to express his preference for the latter option.
At this point in the text Galen is ready to take the next step, and to commit himself to the view that the substance of the entire soul is nothing but a mixture of elemental qualities, which he introduces as the view of Andronicus the Peripatetic. We shall get to that passage below, after we have delved into the preceding discussion of the rational part of the soul, which takes place, as we have noted, in a Platonic context.
1.5 Soul and Nature
For now, what remains to be discussed in this paragraph, is the role of the âdemiurgeâ of the mixture. If the mixture is the substance of the soul and therefore causes the affections and activities of the soul, then we have to wonder what is responsible for the formation of the mixture itself. We have noticed that Galen, in QAM, seems to attribute a âdemiurgicâ or crafting activity to the elemental qualities. He does so in the following passage in Hipp. Elem. as well:
εἴÏÎµÏ Î¿á½Î½ αá½Ïαι μὲν ἴδιαί ÏινÏν á½ÏάÏÏÎ¿Ï Ïι ζῷÏν, αἱ δὲ Ïὴν ὠλην οá½Ïίαν á¼Î»Î»Î¿Î¹Î¿á¿¦Ïαί Ïε καὶ μεÏÎ±Î²Î¬Î»Î»Î¿Ï Ïαι ÏÏῶÏαί ÏΠεἰÏι Ïá¿ ÏÏÏει καὶ κοιναὶ ÏάνÏÏν Ïῶν á½Î½ÏÏν καὶ Ïῶν ÏÏοιÏείÏν Î´Î·Î¼Î¹Î¿Ï Ïγοί, δá¿Î»Î¿Î½, á½¡Ï á½Î³ÏÏÏÎ·Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ξηÏÏÏÎ·Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ θεÏμÏÏÎ·Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏ ÏÏÏÏÎ·Ï á¼ÎºÎ¬ÏÏÎ¿Ï Ïῶν á½Î½ÏÏν ÏÏ Î½Î¹ÏÏῶÏι Ïὴν οá½Ïίαν.79
Thus, if these [qualities] are peculiar to some animals, but those that alter and change the whole substance are primary in nature and common to all beings and crafters of the elements, it is clear that wetness, dryness, hotness and coldness form the substance of every being.
tr. De Lacy, modified
He also does so, here:
αá½Ïαι Î³á½°Ï Î¼Ïναι Ïὴν á½ÏοκειμÎνην οá½Ïίαν á¼Î»Î»Î¿Î¹Î¿á¿¦Ïαι Ïá½´Ï Ïε Îµá¼°Ï á¼Î»Î»Î·Î»Î± μεÏαβολá¿Ï Ïῶν ÏÏοιÏείÏν εἰÏὶν αἴÏιαι καὶ ÏÏ Ïῶν καὶ ζῴÏν Î´Î·Î¼Î¹Î¿Ï Ïγοί.80
⦠for they [the four elemental qualities] alone, by altering the underlying substance, are causes of the change of the elements into each other and crafters of plants and living beings.
tr. De Lacy, modified
We notice how the elemental qualities (primary in nature and common to all beings) are not only presented as the agents of change and constituents of the substance of all beings, but are also called
Îοá½ÏÏ Î¼á½²Î½ ÏοÏÏÏαÏον Ïῶν ζÏÏν á½ á¾Î½Î¸ÏÏÏοÏ, οá½ÏÏ Î´á½² καὶ Ïεá¿ÏÎµÏ á½Ïγανα ÏÏÎÏονÏα ζÏῳ ÏοÏá¿·. Î¿á½ Î³á½°Ï á½ Ïι Ïεá¿ÏÎ±Ï á¼ÏÏε, διὰ ÏοῦÏο ÏοÏÏÏαÏον, á½¡Ï á¾¿ÎναξαγÏÏÎ±Ï á¼Î»ÎµÎ³ÎµÎ½, á¼Î»Î»â á½ Ïι ÏοÏÏÏαÏον ἦν, διὰ ÏοῦÏο Ïεá¿ÏÎ±Ï á¼ÏÏεν, á½¡Ï á¾¿ÎÏιÏÏοÏÎÎ»Î·Ï ÏηÏὶν, á½ÏθÏÏαÏα γινÏÏκÏν.81
Thus man is the most intelligent of living beings, and so, also, hands are the instruments suitable for an intelligent living being. For it is not because he has hands that man is the most intelligent, as Anaxagoras says, but rather it is because he is the most intelligent that he has hands, as Aristotle says, judging most correctly.
tr. May, slightly modified
In this reading, the natural teleology of functions would predetermine the mixture of elemental qualities, which, in turn, generates anhomoeomerous parts such as the hand. The elemental qualities themselves then may be called â
ÎÏÏá½¸Ï Î¼á½²Î½ οá½Î½ Ïὸ ÏÏῶÏον κινοῦν, á½ ÏÎµÏ á¼ÏÏὶ Ïὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, á½ÏÎ³Î¬Î½Î¿Ï Î»Ïγον οἱ μÏÎµÏ á¼ÏÎ¿Ï Ïι, ÏÏá½¸Ï Î´á½² Ïὸ κινοÏμενον á½ÏÏοῦν á½Ïâ á¼Î±Ï Ïῶν καὶ ÏοῦÏον μὲν, á¼Î»Î»á½° καὶ Ïὸν Ïοῦ Î´Î·Î¼Î¹Î¿Ï Ïγοῦ.83
Thus, with respect to that which moves first, which is the leading [part of the soul], the muscles have the status of instrument, but with respect to the bone moved by them, they have both the status of instrument and that of âdemiurgeâ.
The meaning here is obvious: the muscles are an instrument (
⦠καÏá½° δεÏÏεÏον δὲ ÏÏÏÏον, á½ Ïι Ïá¿Ï διαÏλαÏÏικá¿Ï á¼Î½ Ïá¿ ÏÏÏει Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÏÏ Î¿á½ Î¼ÎμνηνÏαι ÏεÏνικá¿Ï ÏΠοá½ÏÎ·Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïοá¿Ï Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï ἤθεÏιν á¼ÎºÎ¿Î»Î¿ÏθÏÏ Î´Î¹Î±ÏλαÏÏοÏÏÎ·Ï Ïá½° μÏÏια. ÏεÏὶ ÏαÏÏÎ·Ï Î³Î¬Ï Ïοι καὶ ὠ᾿ÎÏιÏÏοÏÎÎ»Î·Ï á¼ ÏÏÏηÏε, μή ÏοÏÎ á¼Ïα θειοÏÎÏÎ±Ï ÏÎ¹Î½á½¸Ï á¼ÏÏá¿Ï εἴη καὶ οὠκαÏá½° Ïὸ θεÏμὸν καὶ ÏÏ ÏÏὸν καὶ ξηÏὸν καὶ á½Î³ÏÏν. οá½ÎºÎ¿Ï ν á½ÏÎ¸á¿¶Ï Î¼Î¿Î¹ δοκοῦÏι Ïοιεá¿Î½ οἱ ÏÏοÏεÏá¿¶Ï Î¿á½ÏÏÏ á½Ïá½²Ï Ïῶν μεγίÏÏÏν á¼ÏοÏαινÏμενοι καὶ Ïαá¿Ï ÏοιÏÏηÏι μÏÎ½Î±Î¹Ï á¼Î½Î±ÏÎÏονÏÎµÏ Ïὴν διάÏλαÏιν. εá½Î»Î¿Î³Î¿Î½ Î³á½°Ï á½Ïγανα μὲν εἶναι ÏαÏÏαÏ, Ïὸ διαÏλάÏÏον δÎá¼ÏεÏον.84
⦠but also in a second way, in that they do not make mention of the shaping capacity in nature, which is craftsmanlike, and which shapes the parts consequently upon the character traits of the soul. Regarding this capacity, indeed, even Aristotle raised the question whether it might, in fact, be from some more divine source, rather than in accord with the hot, the cold, the dry and the wet. Therefore it seems to me wrong when people make rash assertions on the greatest of issues, attributing the shaping to the qualities alone. For it is reasonable to suppose that these latter are the instruments by which it takes place, while that which does the actual shaping is something else.
tr. Singer and van der Eijk, slightly modified
This shaping or formative power in a primary sense is nature, or Nature with a capital âNâ, a divine cause. From this primary perspective, the elemental qualities and their mixture are instruments, even though they function as (efficient) cause when they are related to the more complex structures or actions they form or cause, just like the muscles are instruments in relation to the brain and causes in relation to the moving of the bones.
It makes sense to interpret the demiurgic dimension of the mixture of elemental qualities in this way since, for Galen, there must be an intelligent cause behind this mixture that can account for the wonderful teleological order of the cosmos:
Îá½¡Ï á¼ÏÏ Ïε δὲ ÏεÏιÏλεκÏμενα, ÏÏανίÏÏ Î¼Îν ÏοÏε ÏÏήÏιμον á¼ÏγάζεÏαι Ïὸ δημιοÏÏγημα, ÏÎ¿Î»Î»Î¬ÎºÎ¹Ï Î´â á¼ÏÏηÏÏÏν Ïε καὶ μάÏαιον. αá½Ïη ÏοιγαÏοῦν αἰÏία Ïοῦ μὴ βοÏλεÏθαι Ïὴν ÏÏÏιν εἶναι ÏεÏνικὴν á¼ÎºÎµÎ¯Î½Î¿Ï Ï ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ á¼Î½Î´ÏαÏ, á½ Ïοι Ïá½° ÏÏῶÏα ÏÏμαÏα ÏοιαῦÏα εἶναι ÏαÏιν, οἷά ÏÎµÏ Î¿á¼± Ïá½°Ï á¼ÏÏÎ¼Î¿Ï Ï Îµá¼°ÏάγονÏÎµÏ Î»ÎÎ³Î¿Ï Ïιν.85
But when they are interwoven in a random fashion, they rarely ever produce a useful work, rather often something useless and futile. This is exactly the reason why those men do not want nature to be skilful, I mean those that say that the primary bodies are such as those that propose the atoms say.
So, we could say the specific mixture of elementary qualities forms the substance of the lower two parts of the soul, and these substances are themselves formed by nature, i.e., a divine, wise and skilful power. But, does this not imply that the lower two parts of the soul are only effective causes in the derivative sense as well? What is primarily active in the lower parts of our soul, particularly in the desiderative or vegetative part seated in the liver, is nature. Therefore, in a way nature is eventually the true agent of the movement of which these parts are said to be the origin in a derivative sense. One beautiful consequence (if you like) of this line of thinking is that, because Galen considers nature itself as something divine and because it turns out to be the true effective cause of the actions and affections of our lower soul-parts, the actions and affections of our lower soul-parts â provided they have the right or ânaturalâ measure, of course â can be considered ânaturalâ in the sense of being divinely motivated much rather than random. We should keep in mind that the soul that is under discussion here, is something that is very closely associated, for Galen, to the rest of creation, and not something peculiar to human beings. In the sixth book of PHP for example, when Galen undertakes his investigation of the desiderative part of the soul, or the powers residing in the liver, he starts from an analysis of plants. This is because the power that is under investigation (
And even though we have seen that, in QAM, the role of nature is primarily associated with the context of the generation of a living being, we can learn from Nat. Fac. that the powers of nature that are manifested in the elemental mixture of the lower soul parts remain in function to guarantee the sustenance of these beings too:
εἰ μὴ Î³á½°Ï Î´ÏÎ½Î±Î¼Î¹Ï ÏÎ¹Ï ÏÏμÏÏ ÏÎ¿Ï á¼ÎºÎ±ÏÏῳ Ïῶν á½ÏγάνÏν á½Ïὸ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏÏεÏÏ Îµá½Î¸á½ºÏ á¼Î¾ á¼ÏÏá¿Ï δοθείη, διαÏκεá¿Î½ Î¿á½ Î´Ï Î½Î®ÏεÏαι Ïá½° ζῷα, μὴ á½ Ïι ÏοÏοῦÏον á¼Ïιθμὸν á¼Ïῶν á¼Î»Î»Î οá½Î´Î ἡμεÏῶν á½Î»Î¹Î³Î¯ÏÏÏν â¦90
If there were not an inborn power given to each of the organs by nature immediately at the beginning, the animals would not be able to last even for a few days, let alone for so many years as they actually do.
tr. Brock, modified
Thus, nature is not only creator, but also maintainer. To a certain extent, at least, the functions of living beings, including functions that we would perhaps be inclined to think of as psychic, can be understood as capacities of nature:
καÏá½° δὲ Ïὴν ÏÏοÏÎÏαν εἰÏημÎνην αἵÏεÏιν οá½Ï á½ÏÏÎÏα Ïῶν ÏÏμάÏÏν ἡ ÏÏÏιÏ, á¼Î»Î»á½° Ïολὺ ÏÏοÏÎÏα Ïε καὶ ÏÏεÏÎ²Ï ÏÎÏα. καὶ ÏÎ¿Î¯Î½Ï Î½ καÏá½° μὲν ÏοÏÏÎ¿Ï Ï Î±á½Ïη Ïá½° ÏÏμαÏα Ïῶν Ïε ÏÏ Ïῶν καὶ Ïῶν ζῴÏν ÏÏ Î½Î¯ÏÏηÏι Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¹Ï ÏÎ¹Î½á½°Ï á¼ÏÎ¿Ï Ïα Ïá½°Ï Î¼á½²Î½ á¼Î»ÎºÏÎ¹ÎºÎ¬Ï Î¸Î á¼ Î¼Î± καὶ á½Î¼Î¿Î¹ÏÏÎ¹Îºá½°Ï Ïῶν οἰκείÏν, Ïá½°Ï Î´Î á¼ÏοκÏιÏÎ¹Îºá½°Ï Ïῶν á¼Î»Î»Î¿ÏÏίÏν, καὶ ÏεÏÎ½Î¹Îºá¿¶Ï á¼ ÏανÏα διαÏλάÏÏει Ïε γεννῶÏα καὶ ÏÏονοεá¿Ïαι Ïῶν γεννÏμÎνÏν á¼ÏÎÏÎ±Î¹Ï Î±á½Î¸Î¯Ï ÏιÏι Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÏι, ÏÏεÏκÏικῠμÎν Ïινι καὶ ÏÏονοηÏικῠÏῶν á¼Î³Î³ÏνÏν, κοινÏνικῠδὲ καὶ ÏιλικῠÏῶν á½Î¼Î¿Î³ÎµÎ½á¿¶Î½.91
According to the first-mentioned teaching, on the other hand, Nature is not posterior to the bodies, but is a long way prior to them and older than they are; and therefore in their view it is Nature that puts together the bodies of both plants and animals; and this she does by virtue of certain capacities which she possesses â these being, on the one hand, attractive and assimilative of what is appropriate, and, on the other, expulsive of what is foreign. Further, she skilfully moulds everything during the stage of genesis; and she also provides for the creatures after birth, employing here other capacities again, namely, one of affection and forethought for offspring, and one of sociability and friendship for kindred.
tr. Brock, modified
According to this view (to which Galen subscribes), nature, the skilful and wise artisan, does not leave its creatures alone after their generation. We can see here how Galen explains some basic emotional functions, such as affection for others, as a natural capacity. This seems to involve the part of the soul seated in the heart, although Galen is much less inclined to conflate this soul-part with nature as he is with the part in the liver. In general, I think that we would do well to understand Galenâs nature not as an external creator that makes autonomous beings other than itself, but as âsomethingâ more immanent that is itself present in the living beings and continues to work its capacities in them, as the guardian of life:
á¼Î½ÎµÏιÏÏÏÏÎµÏ Ïα Î³á½°Ï á¼Î¬ÏανÏÎµÏ Î±á½Ïá½° καὶ ÏÎÏÎ½Î·Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏÎ¿Î½Î¿Î¯Î±Ï á¼Ïημα μÏÎ½Î±Î¹Ï Ïαá¿Ï Ïῶν á½Î»á¿¶Î½ οἰακιζÏμενα ῥοÏαá¿Ï, οá½Î´Î±Î¼Î¿á¿¦ Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÏÏ Î¿á½Î´ÎµÎ¼Î¹á¾¶Ï Ïá¿Ï μὲν á¼Î»ÎºÎ¿ÏÏÎ·Ï Ïὸ ÏÏοÏá¿ÎºÎ¿Î½ á¼Î±Ï Ïá¿, Ïá¿Ï δΠá¼ÏÏθοÏÏÎ·Ï Ïὸ á¼Î»Î»ÏÏÏιον, Ïá¿Ï δΠá¼Î»Î»Î¿Î¹Î¿ÏÏá¿Ï Ïε καὶ ÏÏοÏÏÏ Î¿ÏÏÎ·Ï Ïὸ θÏÎÏον, οá½Îº οἶδΠὠÏÏÏ Î¿á½Îº á¼Î½ εἴημεν καÏαγÎλαÏÏοι ÏεÏί Ïε Ïῶν ÏÏ Ïικῶν á¼Î½ÎµÏγειῶν διαλεγÏμενοι καὶ Ïολὺ μᾶλλον á¼Ïι ÏεÏὶ Ïῶν ÏÏ Ïικῶν καὶ ÏÏ Î¼ÏάÏÎ·Ï Î³Îµ Ïá¿Ï ζÏá¿Ï.92
For if it were conceded that they [the living beings] are without guardianship, devoid of artistry and foresight, governed only by the rule of matter and not by any power such as the attracting of what is appropriate to itself, the rejecting of what is foreign, the alteration and assimilation of that which shall nourish it, then I am sure we would make fools of ourselves discussing natural activities, and even more so discussing psychical activities and, in fact, life as a whole.
It would be ridiculous to even discuss the activity of the soul without assuming that nature, in the form of the natural capacities that are innate in every living being, fulfils a governing and guarding function. We can take that quite literally, since the activities that are described here (and repeated throughout Nat. Fac.) as the activities of nature, are no different than the activities of the lowest part of the soul. Again, we notice that, at least when it comes to the parts of the soul that man shares with other living beings, and particularly the vegetative or desiderative soul seated in the liver, there is nothing about it that hinders an analysis in the same physical terms as the rest of creation. This is another way in which we need to modify the conclusion of the Aristotelian section in QAM, namely that the substance of the soul is a mixture: the conclusion applies only to the lower two soul parts, which are in general considered to be the same as the souls of plants and animals and can to a large extent be understood as the workings of nature itself. This nature, furthermore, is intelligent. That is to say, it works according to a systematic teleology, including in its most primary activities of cooling, drying, heating and moistening.
1.6 Conclusion
To conclude this first paragraph and summarize the results of our analysis, we can extract the following views from the first part of QAM and the earlier work on which it relies.
The substance of the lower parts of the soul is a mixture of the elemental qualities. This mixture is the formal aspect of the smallest component parts (i.e. the homoeomerous bodies) of their respective organs (liver and heart). It is the cause of the (psychic) functions exercised from these organs. This substance itself is formed, and to a large extent also governed by nature. Therefore, nature, in a strict sense, is the cause of those functions and that which is primarily active when these functions are exercised. However, since nature is conceived as skilful and wise, this governance should not be understood as a random determination of functions that we would otherwise understand as being in the control of individual beings, but rather as the manifestation of a divine and beautiful teleological order that is as it should be.
Yet, there is something within this order that makes things more complex, because it shares some of the governing skill of nature without completely coinciding with it. This has been left out of consideration so far. We shall now turn to the next passage in QAM, after the Aristotelian section discussed above, where Galen takes up the postponed discussion of the rational part of the soul. It will turn out that Galen partly explains this highest part of the soul, the only part that is peculiar to human beings (among mortal beings, that is), in the same terms as the other two parts. Galen argues that its substance is a mixture of elemental qualities as well. However, he also attributes to the rational part a rather exceptional status: it shares something with its maker.
2 Plato and the Rational Part of the Soul
2.1 The Substance of the Rational Soul as Mixture
As we have seen, Galen considers the central thesis of QAM proven if it can be shown that the rational part of the soul is mortal and identical to the mixture that constitutes the brain, the highest of the three main organs. This conflicts with the doctrine of contemporary Platonists, who tend to view the rational part of the soul as immortal and capable of existing separately from the body. Thus, what Galen has to do from here on (775â782 K) to prove the proposed thesis, is to prove the impossibility of the immortality and separate existence of the soul. He gives various arguments to this end, most of them in some way showing the dependence of the state of the soul on the body and thus discrediting the idea of the soulâs independent existence. The example of wine, for instance, is recurrent in showing how, upon consumption of it, the capacities of the soul are immediately affected by the change in the bodily mixture.
Galen proceeds to show that the hot, cold, dry and wet, so all four of the elementary qualities that make up the mixture of the brain, each modify the capacities of the rational soul and can even cause death or â as the Platonists would have it â the separation from the body. Now, it is important to note that Galen, by arguing against the immortality and separate existence of the rational part of the soul, i.e. against its independence of a specific bodily constitution, is actually arguing in favour of it being a mixture of the brain. This becomes clear from the disjunction he presents at the outset of the Platonic section:
εἰ μὲν οá½Î½ Ïὸ λογιζÏμενον Îµá¼¶Î´Î¿Ï Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï á¼ÏÏι θνηÏὸν, á¼ÏÏαι καὶ αá½Ïὸ κÏᾶÏÎ¹Ï ÏÎ¹Ï á¼Î³ÎºÎµÏÎ¬Î»Î¿Ï Î ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏάνθΠοá½ÏÏ Ïá½° Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï εἴδη Ïε καὶ μÎÏη Ïá½°Ï Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¹Ï á¼ÏομÎÎ½Î±Ï á¼Î¾ÎµÎ¹ ÏῠκÏάÏει, ÏÎ¿Ï ÏÎÏÏιν Ïá¿ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï οá½ÏίᾳΠεἰ δΠá¼Î¸Î¬Î½Î±Ïον á¼ÏÏαι, á½¡Ï á½ Î Î»Î¬ÏÏν βοÏλεÏαι, διὰ Ïί ÏÏÏίζεÏαι ÏÏ ÏθÎνÏÎ¿Ï ÏÏοδÏá¿¶Ï á¼¢ á½ÏεÏθεÏμανθÎνÏÎ¿Ï á¼¢ á½ÏεÏξεÏανθÎνÏÎ¿Ï á¼¢ á½ÏεÏÏ Î³ÏανθÎνÏÎ¿Ï Ïοῦ á¼Î³ÎºÎµÏÎ¬Î»Î¿Ï , ÎºÎ±Î»á¿¶Ï á¼Î½ á¼ÏεÏοιήκει γÏάÏÎ±Ï Î±á½Ïá½¸Ï á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ ÎºÎ±á½¶ Ïá¼Î»Î»Î± Ïá½° καÏá½° ÏαÏÏην á¼Î³ÏαÏε.93
Thus if the reasoning form of the soul is mortal, it too will be a particular mixture, [namely] of the brain, and then all the forms and parts of the soul will have their capacities dependent on the mixture â that is, on the substance of the soul; but if it turns out to be immortal, as Plato would have it, he would have done well to explain in writing himself why it is separated when the brain is excessively cooled, heated, dried or moistened, as he wrote about the other matters concerning it [i.e. the soul].
tr. Singer, modified
Clearly, we have a dilemmatic structure here: the rational part of the soul is either mortal or immortal. If it is mortal, it is a mixture, as the other two parts have been shown to be. If it is immortal, it should not be dependent for its existence on the condition of the mixture (since that, in any case, is not immortal). Galen is out to argue against the immortality of the soul in this passage, and given the form of the disjunction he presents at the outset, that means that he argues in favour of the rational soul being a mixture.94 And in fact he returns to this disjunction further on in the text (787 K), where he presents it again, saying that if the soul is the form of a homoeomerous body â this formulation should not surprise us anymore by now â the thesis that the capacities of the soul follow the mixture of the body is proven beyond doubt. Again, the only other option is that of a Platonic immortal soul:
εἰ μὲν Î³á½°Ï Îµá¼¶Î´ÏÏ á¼ÏÏιν á½Î¼Î¿Î¹Î¿Î¼ÎµÏÎ¿á¿¦Ï ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á¼¡ ÏÏ Ïή, Ïὴν á¼ÏÏδειξιν á¼Î¾ αá½Ïá¿Ï Ïá¿Ï οá½ÏÎ¯Î±Ï á¼Î¾Î¿Î¼ÎµÎ½ á¼ÏιÏÏημονικÏÏάÏηνΠεἰ δΠá½Ïοθοίμεθα ÏαÏÏην á¼Î¸Î¬Î½Î±Ïον εἶναι ÏÏÏιν ἰδίαν á¼ÏÎ¿Ï Ïαν, á½¡Ï á½ Î Î»Î¬ÏÏν á¼Î»ÎµÎ³ÎµÎ½, á¼Î»Î»á½° Ïὸ γε δεÏÏÏζεÏθαι καὶ Î´Î¿Ï Î»ÎµÏειν Ïá¿· ÏÏμαÏι καὶ καÏΠαá½Ïὸν á¼ÎºÎµá¿Î½Î¿Î½ á½Î¼Î¿Î»Î¿Î³Îµá¿Ïαι â¦95
For if, on the one hand, the soul is the form of a homoeomerous body, we shall have the demonstration based on its very substance, which is the most scientific demonstration possible. If, on the other hand, we would take it to be something immortal, having a nature of itself, as Plato said, even then he himself agrees that it is dominated by, and enslaved to, the body â¦
âThe demonstrationâ here refers to the demonstration of the central thesis of QAM, as the preceding sentences make clear. The most scientific demonstration of this thesis is that proceeding from the very substance of the soul, namely the demonstration that shows that the substance of the soul must be the form of a homoeomerous body, i.e. the mixture of elemental qualities that constitutes this body. Again, such a demonstration would logically imply that the capacities of the soul are dependent on the mixtures, since capacities are dependent on the substance of which they are said to be capacities. Again, this is the exact way Galen views the relation between the general thesis that the capacities of the soul follow the mixtures of the body and the stronger thesis that the substance of the soul is a mixture of elemental qualities: if the latter is true, that is the most scientific demonstration of the former, departing from the very substance of the subject under investigation. And it seems as if Galen takes that demonstration to have been given at this point in the text, after the other leg of the dilemma, the option of the Platonic immortal soul, has been rendered implausible by several objections. But, states Galen, even if we would take the soul to be something immortal (which would mean that the central thesis of QAM would not be directly proven from the substance of the soul itself, as it seems it has been now), then we could still prove the central thesis, even by means of what Plato himself has said (also supported by Aristotle and Hippocrates, as Galen goes on to show). Thus, in this part of QAM, following the passage just quoted, he proceeds to take up the other side of the disjunction, although it seems to have already been repudiated. He argues that even if it would be accepted, QAMâs central thesis that the capacities of the soul follow the mixtures of the body remains true.96 Therefore, in the part after IV 787 K, Galen does not argue for the substance of the soul being a mixture of elemental qualities anymore. From here on, he only argues for the thesis that the capacities of the soul follow the mixtures of the body, showing that this should be admitted even by those who do not agree with his previous argument that the substance of the soul is a mixture of elemental qualities.
However, in the Platonic section, Galen is concerned with disproving the possibility of the soul existing independent of a specific bodily mixture:
⦠Ïολμῶ λÎγειν αá½ÏÏÏ, á½¡Ï Î¿á½ Ïᾶν Îµá¼¶Î´Î¿Ï ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á¼ÏιÏήδειÏν á¼ÏÏιν á½ÏοδÎξαÏθαι Ïὴν λογιÏÏικὴν ÏÏ Ïήν. á¼ÎºÏÎ»Î¿Ï Î¸Î¿Î½ Î³á½°Ï á½Ïῶ ÏοῦÏο Ïá¿· ÏεÏὶ ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï δÏγμαÏι Ïοῦ ΠλάÏÏνοÏ, á¼ÏÏδειξιν δΠοá½Î´ÎµÎ¼Î¯Î±Î½ á¼ÏÏ Î»Îγειν αá½Ïοῦ διὰ Ïὸ μὴ γιγνÏÏκειν με Ïὴν οá½Ïίαν Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï á½Ïοία ÏÎ¹Ï á¼ÏÏιν, á¼Îº Ïοῦ γÎÎ½Î¿Ï Ï Ïῶν á¼ÏÏμάÏÏν á½ÏοθεμÎνÏν ἡμῶν á½ÏάÏÏειν αá½Ïήν.97
⦠I dare to state myself that not every kind of body is suitable to receive the rational soul. For I see this as consequent upon Platoâs doctrine of the soul, but I am not able to state any demonstration for it, because I would not know what kind of thing the substance of the soul is, as long as we assume that it belongs to the class of non-bodily things.
tr. Singer, modified
Interestingly, the âdaringâ (forms of
In Foet. Form., on the contrary, Galen describes how the higher part of the soul comes to be within an existent hylomorphic construct, depending on the food-distribution of the liver and the heat of the heart. The brain of the infant is constructed later than the two other main organs, and its powers â such as perception, voluntary movement and thinking â come to be only after the completion of the organ. Thus, Galen argues that the activity of the rational soul is dependent on a specific organ that in turn presumes other functions which have previously developed in the human body.
Galen then remarks that âthis may also be learned from the book in which I show that the soulâs faculties follow the mixture of the bodyâ.100
To Galen, a soul that exists by itself without being an aspect somehow of a specific bodily construct, is unfathomable. If the soul is considered to be non-bodily, he declares himself unable to understand what it is, as we have seen.
This is not a mere declaration of agnosticism â as it has been read â but much rather a reductio ad absurdum of one side of the previously presented disjunction, namely the Platonic view that the rational part of the soul is immortal and capable of an existence separate and independent of the body.101 Obviously, when Galen states that he is not able to fathom this possibility, even after inquiring into it carefully and considering it often, he does not mean to say that this is merely because of some lack of ability on his part, so that perhaps another, better qualified person could in the meantime have an adequately scientific notion of an immortal soul existing independently of the body. We know enough about Galenâs own estimation of himself and his contemporaries to conclude this much. Again, given the dilemmatic form of the argument, it is an argument for the mortality of the rational part of the soul and, since this was assumed as a consequence of its mortality, for the rational part of the soul being a mixture of elemental qualities.102 In fact, this becomes clearer in the sentences immediately following, where Galen suggests how much more plausible it is to understand the mixture to be the substance of the soul, since it can account for all the observable qualitative differences that he took to be the starting point of his argument at the beginning of the text:
á¼Î½ μὲν Î³á½°Ï ÏÏμαÏί γε Ïá½°Ï ÎºÏάÏÎµÎ¹Ï á½Ïῶ ÏάμÏÎ¿Î»Ï Ïε διαÏεÏοÏÏÎ±Ï á¼Î»Î»Î®Î»Ïν καὶ ÏαμÏÏÎ»Î»Î±Ï Î¿á½ÏαÏÎ á¼ÏÏμάÏÎ¿Ï Î´Î Î¿á½ÏÎ¯Î±Ï Î±á½Ïá¿Ï καθΠá¼Î±Ï Ïὴν εἶναι Î´Ï Î½Î±Î¼ÎνηÏ, οá½Îº οá½ÏÎ·Ï Î´á½² ÏοιÏÏηÏÎ¿Ï á¼¢ Îµá¼´Î´Î¿Ï Ï ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï Î¿á½Î´ÎµÎ¼Î¯Î±Î½ á¼Ïινοῶ διαÏοÏὰν καίÏοι ÏÎ¿Î»Î»Î¬ÎºÎ¹Ï á¼ÏιÏκεÏάμενÏÏ Ïε καὶ ζηÏήÏÎ±Ï á¼ÏιμελῶÏ, á¼Î»Î»Î οá½Î´á½² ÏÏÏ Î¿á½Î´á½²Î½ οá½Ïα Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï Îµá¼°Ï á½ Î»Î¿Î½ αá½Ïὸ δÏναιÏÎ á¼Î½ á¼ÎºÏείνεÏθαι.103
For in the bodies, I see that the mixtures are completely different from each other and very many in number, but with a non-bodily substance able to exist by itself, not being a quality or form of the body, I do not discern any difference, even though I have often considered it and inquired into it carefully â nor, indeed, do I discern how, not being any part of the body, it would be able to extend through the whole of it.
tr. Singer, modified
Again, Galen states that if the soul is to be taken as something other than a form or quality of the body, such as he showed the mixture to be, he does not see a way to explain the observable diversity of individual souls and psychic functions. This clearly refers back to the starting point of the observable differences in the affections and actions of small children. The other option, the soul being the mixture of qualities, simply has superior explanatory value, which is one of the reasons why Galen is more sympathetically disposed towards it, besides it being better matched to his empirical findings. We can find this idea elsewhere in Galen, too, as in the following passage in which he expresses his own carefulness in accepting this (after all) speculative conclusion, as well as the fact that it does seem to be in agreement with his empirical findings:
οá½Î´á½² Î³á½°Ï Î¿á½Î´á½² ÏοῦÏο Ïὸ δÏγμα, ÏÏὶν á¼Î½ á¼ ÏαÏι Ïοá¿Ï καÏá½° μÎÏÎ¿Ï á½Î¼Î¿Î»Î¿Î³Î¿Ï μÎÎ½Î¿Î¹Ï á¼Î¾ÎµÏ Ïεá¿Î½, á¼ÏολμήÏαμεν á¼ÏοÏήναÏθαι. νῦν δΠá¼Ïειδὴ ÏεÏείÏμεθά Ïε Ïὴν οá½Ïίαν Ïῶν Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÏν οá½Î´á½²Î½ á¼Î»Î»Î¿ ÏαÏá½° Ïὴν Ïοιὰν εἶναι κÏᾶÏιν, á¼ ÏανÏά Ïε Ïá½° καÏá½° Ïá½°Ï Î´Î¹Î±Î³Î½ÏÏÎµÎ¹Ï Ïε καὶ ÏÏοÏÏήÏÎµÎ¹Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ θεÏαÏÎµÎ¯Î±Ï á¼Ïὶ ÏοÏÏῳ Ïá¿· δÏγμαÏι ÏÏ Î¼ÏÏνοῦνθΠεá½ÏίÏκομεν, εá½Î»ÏγÏÏ, οἶμαι, καὶ ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ á¼ÏομÎÎ½Î¿Ï Ï Ïαá¿Ï á¼Î½ÏÎ¼Î¬Î»Î¿Î¹Ï Î´Ï ÏκÏαÏÎ¯Î±Î¹Ï Ïá¿Ï ÎºÎ±Î´Î¯Î±Ï ÏÏÏ Î³Î¼Î¿á½ºÏ á¼Î½Ïαῦθα διήλθομεν.104
This is because I did not dare to assert this doctrine before finding out if all particular [observations] are in agreement with it. But now, since we have already been convinced that the substance of capacities is nothing but a particular mixture, and, since we have found that all [observations] regarding diagnosis, prognosis and therapy are in agreement with this view, it was reasonable, I suppose, that we would also give an account on this occasion of pulses that follow the anomalous imbalances of mixture in the heart.
tr. Havrda 2017, slightly modified
Again, Galen writes about âdaringâ to make the statement that the substance of capacities is a mixture, and relates it to the extent of agreement with his practice as a doctor: unlike the Platonic option of the soul as a separate substance, it is a speculative position that is in agreement with his empirical findings. As we have briefly mentioned before, Galen announces in the (earlier) On the Causes of Symptoms that he might have the audacity to make a statement with regard to the substance of the soul in another work (â
It appears as if Galen, after the Platonic section with its arguments against the immortality and supposed separate existence of the soul, indeed considers it proven that the entire soul is a mixture of the elementary qualities. The crucial passage in this respect is Galenâs discussion of the view of Andronicus the Peripatetic (782â83 K), right after the Platonic section. This is not a coincidental position in the text, as should be obvious by now, for Andronicus is credited with espousing the view that the entire soul is a mixture.106 Andronicusâ position is a reflection of the position Galenâs text is reaching at this point. We have already seen that Galen repeats the conclusion of the Aristotelian section â the lower two parts of the soul (or any parts that are mortal) are nothing else than a mixture of the qualities â right after the discussion of the rational part.107 At this point, however, Galen takes the discussion a step further and brings in Andronicus, who apparently stated that the substance of the entire soul is either a mixture or a capacity dependent on the mixture:
á¼Î½Î´ÏÏνικον δὲ Ïὸν ΠεÏιÏαÏηÏικÏν, á½ Ïι μὲν ὠλÏÏ á¼ÏÏλμηÏεν á¼ÏοÏήναÏθαι Ïὴν οá½Ïίαν Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï á½¡Ï á¼Î»ÎµÏθεÏÎ¿Ï á¼Î½á½´Ï á¼Î½ÎµÏ Ïοῦ ÏεÏιÏλÎκειν á¼ÏαÏῶÏ, á¼Ïαινῶ Ïε ÏÎ¬Î½Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ á¼ÏοδÎÏομαι Ïὴν ÏÏοαίÏεÏιν Ïá¼Î½Î´ÏÏÏ â¦108
⦠and as for Andronicus the Peripatetic, because he dared to speak out on the substance of the soul as a whole, as a free man without unclear complications, I praise him highly and I accept the position of the man â¦
tr. Singer, modified
Again, we find a form of the verb
á½ Ïι δâ ἤÏοι κÏᾶÏιν εἶναί ÏηÏιν á¼¢ δÏναμιν á¼ÏομÎνην ÏῠκÏάÏει, μÎμÏομαι Ïá¿ ÏÏοÏθÎÏει Ïá¿Ï Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÏÏ. εἰ Î³á½°Ï á¼¡ ÏÏ Ïá½´ ÏÎ¿Î»Î»á½°Ï á¼Ïει Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¹Ï Î¿á½Ïία ÏÎ¹Ï Î¿á½Ïα καὶ ÏοῦÏâ á½ÏÎ¸á¿¶Ï á¾¿ÎÏιÏÏοÏÎλει λÎλεκÏαι ⦠á½ÏάÏÏειν οá½Îº á¼Î³ÏÏÏεῠá¼Î»Î»Î¿ Ïι ÏαÏá½° Ïὴν κÏᾶÏιν, á½¡Ï á½Î»Î¯Î³Î¿Î½ á¼Î¼ÏÏοÏθεν á¼Î´ÎµÎ¯ÎºÎ½Ï Ïο.112
⦠but surely when he says that it [the substance of the soul] is a mixture or a capacity dependent on the mixture, I disapprove of the addition of capacity. For if the soul has many capacities, while itself being some kind of substance, and this has been said correctly by Aristotle ⦠it is not possible for it to be anything else but the mixture, as has been demonstrated a little before.
tr. Singer, modified
Galen does not just recite Aristotelian doctrine here: Aristotle has âcorrectlyâ (
2.2 The Mixture of the Rational Soul
However, we have also noticed that Galen reserves a special position for the rational part of the soul. This is evident from the very structure of the text. In fact, with his arguments against the immortality and separate existence of the soul, Galen opens up a very Platonic-looking vertical perspective in which knowledge and the intelligence of the rational part of the soul are connected to the stars by virtue of their related dryness.114 Galen argues against the separate existence of the soul by showing that even its rational part is affected by the elementary qualities of dryness and wetness. Yet, at the same time and through the same argument, he connects the part of the soul that does the understanding to the heavenly realm of the stars. Thus, something of the Platonic ideal of
λÎγει Î³á½°Ï á½§Î´Î ÏÏÏ Î±á½Ïοá¿Ï ῥήμαÏιν á¼Î½ Τιμαίῳ καÏâ á¼ÎºÎµá¿Î½Î¿ Ïὸ ÏÏÏίον Ïοῦ ÏÏ Î³Î³ÏάμμαÏοÏ, á¼Î½Î¸Î± ÏηÏὶ ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ Î¸ÎµÎ¿á½ºÏ Î´Î·Î¼Î¹Î¿Ï Ïγá¿Ïαι Ïὸν á¼Î½Î¸ÏÏÏον á¼Î½Î´Î¿á¿¦Î½ÏÎ±Ï Ïὴν á¼Î¸Î¬Î½Î±Ïον ÏÏ Ïὴν âÎµá¼°Ï á¼ÏίÏÏÏ Ïον Ïῶμα καὶ á¼ÏÏÏÏÏ Ïονâ εá½Î´Î·Î»Î¿Î½ á½ Ïι Ïὴν á½Î³ÏÏÏηÏα Ïá¿Ï Ïῶν βÏεÏῶν οá½ÏÎ¯Î±Ï Î±á¼°Î½Î¹ÏÏÏμενοÏ.115
For he [Plato] says something like this in these very words in the Timaeus, in that part of the work in which he states that the gods craft the human being by placing the immortal soul âin a body subject to influx and outflowâ. It is quite evident that this is an oblique reference to the wetness of the substance of infants.
tr. Singer, modified
The reference to the substance of infants reminds us of the starting-point of Galenâs text, where he presented the observable differences between children as proof for our given difference in nature. The crafting of the gods concerns the original formation of the human being that would result, according to Galen, in a given nature in accordance with a certain mixture and also, as we now learn, in a (still) disabled state of the faculty of understanding due to predominant wetness.116
But Galen goes on to cite another passage from the Timaeus (44a8â9), which explains that our soul indeed âbecomes mindless at firstâ but is able to âacquire a calmâ and âbecome intelligentâ when âthe stream of growth and nourishmentâ that comes upon it is reduced. As Galen explains, the reduction of this stream is to be understood as the change from the wet state of the substance of the infant to a more dried state of the mixture. Note the self-evident manner in which Galen can use the words â
The role of the stars in QAM and the likening of the dryness of the intelligent soul to the dryness of the stars are not random and fit with the Platonic doctrine Galen cites from the Timaeus. There, the divine maker of the universe creates from the mixture of the soul of the universe the immortal parts of the human souls, a number equal to the stars, and assigns to each soul a star. If such a soul, after being incarnated, would succeed in mastering its emotions and living just, it would âreturn again to the dwelling of its kindred starâ.118 Particularly in the context of the Timaeus, presented as a follow-up on the Republic, both this mastering and the notion of living justly are about the relation between the several parts of the soul and the extent to which the rational part is in control. In line with this, Galen states that the soul becomes more like a star, if it becomes more understanding and less occupied with the needs and desires of its lower parts. That is to say, in the end, when it lives what is considered a more philosophical life â remember the virtue that the Pythagoreans and Platonists achieved according to Galen, by taking good care of their mixture.119 Thus, when the causal forces that the different soul-parts exercise, are checked and controlled by the rational part in the end, the substance of the soul will become more like the substance of stars. This seems to me an adaptation of the general Platonic doctrine that we also find for example in the (probably near-contemporary) Handbook of Platonism presumably written by Alcinous.120 It is stated there that âsouls which achieved dominance over these affections [sensations, pleasure and pain, fear and anger] and were in no way constrained by them would live justly and return to their kindred starâ.121 Galen merely takes out the notion of the afterlife, which is in fact not needed if we assume that we can liken the substance of our rational soul to that of the stars to some extent during our life.
In QAM, Galen cites one of Heraclitusâ fragments: â
We have seen how one of Galenâs objections against the Platonic doctrine of the soul was that such a soul is not able to stretch out or extend (
á¼Î»Î»Î á½ Ïαν γε ÏÏ Î½Î±ÏθειÏῶν Ïῶν κοιλιῶν á½Î»Î¯Î³Î¿Î½ á½ÏÏεÏον αá½Î¸Î¹Ï αἰÏθάνηÏαι καὶ κινá¿Ïαι Ïὸ ζῷον, οá½ÎºÎÏÎ â¨Î¿á½Î´ÎÏεÏον⩠οἷÏν Ïε Ïάναι Ïῶν εἰÏημÎνÏν á½ÏάÏÏειν ÏÎ¿Ï Ïὶ Ïὸ Ïνεῦμα. βÎλÏιον οá½Î½ á½Ïολαβεá¿Î½ á¼Î½ αá½Ïá¿· μὲν Ïá¿· ÏÏμαÏι Ïοῦ á¼Î³ÎºÎµÏÎ¬Î»Î¿Ï Ïὴν ÏÏ Ïὴν οἰκεá¿Î½, á¼¥ÏÎ¹Ï ÏοÏÎ á¼Î½ ᾠκαÏá½° Ïὴν οá½Ïίαν â οá½ÏÏ Î³á½°Ï ÏεÏὶ ÏοÏÏÎ¿Ï ÏκÎÏÎ¹Ï á¼¥ÎºÎµÎ¹ â Ïὸ ÏÏῶÏον δΠαá½Ïá¿Ï á½Ïγανον Îµá¼´Ï Ïε Ïá½°Ï Î±á¼°ÏθήÏÎµÎ¹Ï á¼ÏάÏÎ±Ï Ïοῦ Î¶á¿·Î¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏοÏÎÏι Ïá½°Ï ÎºÎ±Î¸Î á½Ïμὴν κινήÏÎµÎ¹Ï ÏοῦÏΠεἶναι Ïὸ Ïνεῦμα, διὸ καὶ κενÏθÎν, á¼ÏÏÎ¹Ï á¼Î½ αá½Î¸Î¹Ï á¼Î¸ÏοιÏθá¿, Ïὴν μὲν ζÏὴν οá½Îº á¼ÏαιÏεá¿Ïθαι Ïὸ ζῷον, á¼Î½Î±Î¯ÏθηÏον δὲ καὶ á¼ÎºÎ¯Î½Î·Ïον á¼ÏγάζεÏθαι. καίÏοι γε, εἲÏÎµÏ á¼¦Î½ αá½Ïὸ ἡ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï οá½Ïία, ÏÏ Î½Î´Î¹ÎµÏθείÏεÏÎ á¼Î½ αá½Ïá¿· ÎºÎµÎ½Î¿Ï Î¼Îνῳ ÏαÏαÏÏá¿Î¼Î± Ïὸ ζῷον.130
But when presently, after the ventricles have been closed up, the animal regains sensation and motion, it is no longer possible to accept either alternative. It is better, then, to assume that the soul dwells in the actual body of the brain, whatever its substance may be â for the inquiry has not yet reached this question â and that the soulâs first instrument for all the sensations of the animal and for its voluntary motions as well is this pneuma; and therefore, when the pneuma has escaped, and until it is collected again, it does not deprive the animal of its life but renders it incapable of sensation and motion. Yet if the pneuma were itself the substance of the soul, the animal would immediately die along with the escape of the pneuma.
tr. De Lacy
So the
We have seen how the psychic
ÏÎ¯Ï Î´Î Î¿á½Îº á¼Î½ εá½Î¸á½ºÏ á¼Î½ÎµÎ¸Ï μήθη νοῦν Ïινα δÏναμιν á¼ÏονÏα Î¸Î±Ï Î¼Î±ÏÏὴν á¼ÏιβάνÏα Ïá¿Ï γá¿Ï á¼ÎºÏεÏεÏάÏθαι καÏá½° ÏάνÏα Ïá½° μÏÏια; (â¦) á¼Î»Î»Î ὠμÏÏ á¼Î½Ïαῦθα ÏαίνεÏαι Î½Î¿á¿¦Ï ÏÎ¹Ï á¼ÏικνοÏÎ¼ÎµÎ½Î¿Ï á¼Îº Ïῶν á¼Î½Ï ÏÏμάÏÏν, ἠκαὶ θεαÏαμÎνῳ Ïινὶ ÏαÏαÏÏá¿Î¼Î± Î¸Î±Ï Î¼Î¬Î¶ÎµÎ¹Î½ á¼ÏÎÏÏεÏαι Ïὸ ÎºÎ¬Î»Î»Î¿Ï Ïá¿Ï οá½ÏίαÏ, á¼¡Î»Î¯Î¿Ï ÏÏῶÏον καὶ μάλιÏÏα, μεÏΠαá½Ïὸν δὲ ÏελήνηÏ, εἶÏα Ïῶν á¼ÏÏÎÏÏν, á¼Î½ Î¿á¼·Ï Îµá¼°Îºá½¸Ï, á½ Ïῳ ÏÎÏ á¼ÏÏι καὶ ἡ Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï Î¿á½Ïία καθαÏÏÏÎÏα, ÏοÏοÏÏῳ καὶ Ïὸν νοῦν á¼Î½Î¿Î¹ÎºÎµá¿Î½ Ïολὺ Ïοῦ καÏá½° Ïá½° γήινα ÏÏμαÏα βελÏÎ¯Ï Ïε καὶ á¼ÎºÏιβÎÏÏεÏον.135
Who would not immediately infer that some intelligence possessing amazing power treads the earth and extends through its every part? (â¦) But even here some intelligence appears to be reaching us from the bodies above, and the beauty of their substance forces anyone that sees them to be amazed at once, that of the sun first and foremost, that of the moon after that, and next that of the stars, and it is reasonable to suppose that the intelligence that dwells in them is exactly that much better and sharper than that [which dwells] in the earthly bodies as the substance of their body is purer.
tr. May, slightly modified
The marvellous usefulness of the parts that is praised throughout UP is grounded in an intelligence that primarily dwells in the heavens. In his Epode Galen both affirms the dependence of the observable teleological order on an intelligent principle, as well as the affinity of that principle with our rationality. Some kind of intelligent force reaches down from the heavenly bodies, apparently its primary location, and extends through every part of the earthly beings â as we observed, forming a beautiful analogy with the extension of the psychic pneuma from the brain downwards to the rest of the body.136
In this analogy between our brain and the heavenly bodies, the notion of a
What we can gather from these quotations is that the state of a given substance, and thus the activities it can undertake, is strongly determined by the overall cosmic organization of qualities, in which some qualities predominate certain regions. Thus, because dryness predominates in the higher regions and wetness in the lower ones, a mixture with predominant dryness might be more apt to generate the activities of the higher regions. It seems as if Galen, in line with tradition, generally associates the qualities of hotness and dryness more with activity and the qualities of coldness and wetness with passivity:
Just as cold produces laziness, immobility and weakness, so heat produces energy, movement, and the strength to act. That is why the beginning of youth and wine arouse movement and power, while old age and chilling drugs produce laziness and weakness; they lead, in time, to the annihilation of actions and movements.139
But this notion, that a specific mixture generates specific states and activities and that we can have knowledge of what kind of mixture causes what kind of state and activity, is where the possibility of a second formation of our mixture enters, after that of the first by nature: as soon as our rational faculty is functioning, we can and should develop our soul by adopting a way of life that further enhances our mixture in such a way that we can become more virtuous and understanding.140 That is to say, after being given a certain mixture in the first place, by the gods or nature, we can continue this divine formation ourselves, because we have a rational soul. As Galen remarked at the very beginning of QAM:
⦠διὰ Ïῶν á¼Î´ÎµÏμάÏÏν Ïε καὶ ÏομάÏÏν á¼Ïι Ïε Ïῶν á½ÏημÎÏαι ÏÏαÏÏομÎνÏν εá½ÎºÏαÏίαν á¼ÏγαζÏμεθα κá¼Îº ÏαÏÏÎ·Ï Îµá¼°Ï á¼ÏεÏὴν Ïá¿ ÏÏ Ïá¿ ÏÏ Î½ÏελÎÏομεν, á½¡Ï Î¿á¼± ÏεÏὶ Î Ï Î¸Î±Î³ÏÏαν Ïε καὶ ΠλάÏÏνα καὶ ÏÎ¹Î½ÎµÏ á¼Î»Î»Î¿Î¹ Ïῶν Ïαλαιῶν á¼±ÏÏοÏοῦνÏαι ÏÏάξανÏεÏ.141
⦠for through what we eat and drink and more generally through our daily practices, we bring about good mixture, and through this [good mixture] we shall achieve for the soul a state of virtue, as those around Pythagoras and Plato and some others among the ancients are reported to have done.
This formative capacity of the rational part of the soul is crucial for Galen. It is not just what makes the difference between man and the other animals and guarantees the possibility of ethics. It also contains manâs potential to reach his
For now, what is important to observe for our purposes here, is that Galen retains the vertical connection, the kinship between the heavens and the rational part of the soul offered in Platoâs Timaeus, although he gives it a more material basis, namely that of relative dryness. This aligns with his notion of the substance of the soul being a mixture of the four elemental qualities as well as with his association of the rational soul with the stars. Even though he argues against Platonists where it regards the separate existence and immortality of the soul, Galen retains the special connection of the rational part with the heavens that is fundamental for Platonic ethics. This must be the main reason why he treated the rational part of the soul in a discussion separate from the other two parts in a Platonic context.
2.3 Conclusion
To conclude this section, I believe that on the basis of our discussion of the textual evidence, we have established the following things. Galen, in what I have called the Aristotelian section (773â5 K), argues that the substances of the non-rational parts of the soul are certain mixtures of the elementary qualities forming homeoemerous bodies, that is to say, they are the formal aspect in a hylomorphic composition with prime matter. He argues for the same conclusion for the rational part of the soul in what I have called the Platonic section (775â82 K). After both of these sections he applauds and accepts the view that the substance of the entire soul is a mixture (782â3 K). Furthermore, he takes the proof that the substance of the soul is a mixture as the most scientific proof for his central thesis that the capacities of the soul follow the mixture of the body. However, the rational part of the soul has been assigned a somewhat exceptional position that retains something of a Platonic perspective, in line with Galenâs classing of QAM as a work âOn Platonic philosophyâ. As we shall see below (paragraph 4), this kinship with the heavens of the rational part of the soul plays an important role in the possibility of ethical philosophy in the context of a work that emphasizes the determination of the soulâs activities and affections by the bodily mixture and even identifies the substance of the soul with that mixture. But first, since the reading of QAM presented above differs from much of the preceding scholarly tradition and is not without problems, we shall discuss some of the possible objections to my view that Galen argues for the thesis that the substance of the soul is a mixture.
3 Positioning in the Scholarly Debate
3.1 Preliminary Remarks
Several scholars have argued that the thesis of the substance of the soul being a certain mixture should somehow not be ascribed to Galen or not be viewed as an expression of his own doctrine. We shall critically discuss their views in this section. A few preliminary remarks are in order, however. It is certainly true that QAM is both a somewhat ambiguous work in itself and stands out in the Galenic corpus for its more speculative position. It is also true that Galen seems to firmly reject any knowledge of the substance of the soul in some of his other (partly later) work. On the other hand, as we have seen, Galen also refers to âwhat has been shownâ in QAM in other later works (such as HNH, Loc. Aff. and Foet. Form.), which are considered as works that reflect genuine Galenic doctrine. Thus, apparently Galen himself does take QAM to be consistent enough with these other works to refer to its arguments as support for them. Moreover, as we have also seen, the doctrine that the substance of the soul is a mixture is in line with, and based on, much of his earlier work that is presupposed in QAM. Also, QAM seems to be the only place in the Galenic corpus where Galen actually discusses the question of the substance of the soul at some length. Therefore, it might be a dubious strategy to dismiss what he states there merely on the basis of his reluctance to actually discuss the subject in other works. Finally, given that Galen classified the work as one concerning âPlatonic philosophyâ, it may make sense for him to enter somewhat more speculative or philosophical terrain in this treatise than in one, say, treating of the pulse or respiration. For these reasons, I think that characterizing QAM as vague, of lower quality than other Galenic work, or mere propaganda for the office of doctor, and using such evaluations to set the work aside and skip over its integration into the rest of the Galenic corpus, as has been done in some recent scholarship, will not do.
The difficulty with Galenâs speculative boldness in QAM goes back a long way in scholarship: a certain unease with QAMâs stronger thesis seems already manifest in the editing work of Müller, who omits some of the evidence by bracketing the two sentences after the Aristotelian section that most clearly affirm it.142
Moraux seems to be an early exception in modern scholarship by taking the stronger thesis as the expression of Galenâs view, albeit with a somewhat careful expression: âIn seinen letzten Jahren scheint er davon überzeugt, da
A comparable but more careful position is found in Tieleman: âIn PHP Galen still clings to an agnostic position as to the substance of the soul. Nonetheless he already links psychic part and bodily part (PHP 6.2.5 [=V 515.12â516.1 K]). In the work of his late age, QAM, he takes the next step of actually identifying the substance of the soul with the form of the three main bodily organs, taking form in the sense of the blend of elementary qualities distinctive of each organ. In effect he comes out in favour of the Peripatetic view of the substance of the soul as the form of the body, combining this with the Platonic tripartition-cum-locationâ.144 Mario Vegetti has argued among similar lines in an insightful chapter on Galenâs interpretation of the Timaeus: âIl confronto di Galeno con il Timeo riprende nel Quod Animi Mores (QAM) nel punto, si può dire, dove esso si era interrotto nel PHP. Lâanima è divisa in tre parti, che hanno la loro localizzazione somatica in tre organi âomeomeriâ, rispettivamente il cervello, il cuore e il fegato ⦠Lâanima non sta negli organi somatici come un inquilino in un appartamento. Sarà meglio parlare, seguendo un tesi affermatasi nella scuola di Aristotele, forse ad opera di Andronico di Rodi, dellâanima come âtemperamentoâ (krasis) o come facoltà (dynamis) derivante dal temperamento; anzi, Galeno ritiene sia meglio eliminare del tutto il riferimento alle facoltà e intendere lâanima soltanto come temperamento dellâorgano, dando così una interpretazione molto restrittiva della definizione aristotelica dellâanima come forma del corpoâ.145
I think the analysis given in the first two paragraphs above supports the position of Moraux, Tieleman and Vegetti. However, rather than suggesting a one-way development as Moraux does, my conclusions are restricted to the content of QAM itself and its congruence with both earlier and later work. These conclusions can be taken as an elaboration of the suggestions made by Tieleman and Vegetti. Without trying to unify Galenâs work into one coherent and consistent doctrine with respect to the substance of the soul, we can simply acknowledge that he chose to enter somewhat more speculative terrain in QAM, consistent with the question he âdaresâ to ask there. At the same time, we should acknowledge, based on the analyses offered above, that this speculation is in line with the rest of his work, which makes this particular speculative position, as we have noted above, a reasonable one for Galen.146
On the other hand, Garcia-Ballester, Lloyd, Donini and Singer all seem to agree â though, not all for the same reasons â that Galen does not actually argue for the thesis of the substance of the soul being a mixture in QAM. What these scholars have in common with regard to their interpretation of QAM is the development of an interpretational strategy that enables them to avoid taking the thesis as a serious expression of Galenic doctrine. In other words, their agreement consists in the conviction that there has to be a reason for the presence of this conclusion in QAM other than it being an expression of Galenâs own view. An important and legitimate motive behind the development of such a strategy for all of them seems to be the apparent incongruence of QAMâs stronger thesis with some of Galenâs other work. Before discussing their views in more detail, I would like to briefly go into this general problem, first. The comparison is often made with PHP, which is dated much earlier and therefore not very compelling on its own (one could still argue for a developmental thesis in line with Moraux). But the comparison is also made with Prop. Plac., which is more interesting, because it is later than QAM and seems to advocate the same âagnosticismâ as expressed in PHP and other works. Because Prop. Plac. is a late work in which Galen looks back on his own writings, it would be the most problematic case in this regard. If he clearly expresses his agnosticism with regard to the substance of the soul in that work, should we then not conclude that he has always remained agnostic and that, indeed, we should not take the strong thesis of QAM too seriously? In the next paragraph we shall take a small detour to discuss the relation between QAM and Prop. Plac., before returning to the scholarly debate.
3.2 QAM and Prop. Plac.
In Prop. Plac., Galen explicitly claims several times that he does not know what the substance of the soul is.147 Unfortunately, he does not refer to QAM at all. This is remarkable in itself, for several reasons: (1) he did refer to QAM in many of his other later works, (2) he frequently refers to many of his other works in Prop. Plac. and (3) it is obvious that the subject at hand in Prop. Plac. has strong affinities to QAM at some points. Whatever the reason for the absence of any explicit reference to QAM in Prop. Plac., I do not think it is legitimate to conclude from the apparent contradiction concerning what Galen has to say on the substance of the soul in both works, that what he has to say in QAM is not to be taken seriously. In this regard, it is important to note much rather the strategic aim of Prop. Plac. Galen, finding himself in a similar situation as the poet Parthenios, as he states, is defending himself against wrong interpretations of his works. He explicitly presents this predicament as the very reason for writing the work. In the apt words of Aileen Das: âthis work seems to be as much an apology as a career conspectusâ.148 More specifically, Galen remarks that people have often misunderstood the status of some of the things he wrote. Thus, there has apparently been a mix-up of things he has claimed to know and things he has merely claimed to find plausible (
While Galen, in QAM, might have merely wanted to float the speculative position that is most compatible with the knowledge he has of the human being, tradition shows that it is easy to forget about this distinction and to ascribe to this speculative position in a work on Platonic philosophy the same status as the more empirically verified knowledge that it has to match in order to be accepted as the most likely position on a speculative subject.152 I think it is crucial to recognize this difference in status, which Galen himself emphasizes in Prop. Plac. Surely this is preferable to dismissing his writing on the substance of the soul as simply incongruous with his âagnosticismâ, or as serving some other function than an expression of his own thought.
Despite the fact that Galen does not explicitly refer to QAM in Prop. Plac., the views he elaborates in QAM certainly surface there. In paragraph 7, we find something quite reminiscent of what we read in QAM. Interestingly, we find it right after Galen again remarks that he does not know what the substance of the soul is:
εἶναί Ïε ÏοÏÏÏν γÎνε(Ïιν á¼Îº) Ïá¿Ï ÏÎ¿Î¹á¾¶Ï ÎºÏάÏεÏÏ Ïῶν ÏεÏÏάÏÏν ÏÏοιÏείÏν, καὶ εἴÏÎµÏ (ἡ ÏÏ Ïá½´ ἠμα Ïá¿·) διαÏλάÏÏ(ομενῳ) ÏÏμαÏι, Ïὴν γÎνεÏιν á¼Ïει, (διὰ δὴ Ï(ὴν) Ïῶν ÏεÏÏάÏÏν ÏÏοιÏείÏν κÏᾶÏιν αá½Ïὴν γίνεÏθαι, οá½Îº á¼Î»Î»(ηÏ) (μὲν) οá½ÏÎ·Ï Ïá¿ (ÏÏ )ÏῠγενÎÏεÏÏ, á¼Î»Î»Î·Ï δὲ Ïá¿· αἰÏθηÏικῷ ÏÏμαÏιΠμ(á½´ γὰÏ) εἶναί ÏÎ¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï οá½Ïίαν καθΠá¼Î±Ï Ïήν, (á¼Î»Î»Î οἷ)ον εἶδÏÏ Ïι Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á½ÏάÏÏειν αá½ÏήνΠá¼ÎºÎ¿Ï ε Î´Î Î¼Î¿Ï Î»ÎγονÏÎ¿Ï Îµá¼¶Î´Î¿Ï á½¡Ï ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïὴν Ïá¿Ï á½Î»Î·Ï á¼Î½ÏίθεÏιν, ἥν á¼(Ïοιον) εἶναι νοοῦμεν á½ Ïον Ïὸ á¼ÏÎ á¼Î±Ï Ïá¿.153
And that the generation of them [the perceptive bodies] is from the specific mixture of the four elements, and if the soul has its generation together with the formation of the body, then it itself comes to be because of the mixture of the four elements, since there is not one generation of the soul, and another of the sense-perceiving body; and I suppose that there is not a substance of the soul existing by itself, but that it is a kind of form of the body; understand when I say form I mean the opposite of matter, which we understand to be without quality taken in itself.
Here, almost immediately after saying that he does not know the substance of the soul, Galen proceeds to suggest that the soul â like the organs of perception â comes to be from the mixture of elements, that the soul does not have a generation separate from that of the body, that there is no separate substance of the soul, and that the substance of the soul is rather a kind of form of the body. Particularly his explaining remark at the end is reminiscent of QAM: the form he is referring to here is the opposite of a matter without quality. We have seen that for Galen the most basic building blocks of anything in the cosmos are this prime matter and the four qualities that mix in it. That implies that, like in QAM, Galen is suggesting here that the mixture of qualities (and not the form of any more complex thing such as an organ, the matter of which can after all not be without quality) is the form of the body, i.e. the soul. How is it possible that Galen can say all this about (the substance of) the soul, while at the same time proclaiming that he does not know what the substance of the soul is? The answer to this question lies in the distinction he sets out at the beginning of Prop. Plac., between what he thinks he knows and what he thinks is plausible. The
Further on in Prop. Plac., we find another passage reminiscent of QAM, particularly of the passage on the relation between substance, activities and capacities:
ΠεÏὶ â¨Î´á½²â© Ïá¿Ï οá½ÏÎ¯Î±Ï Ïῶν ÏÏ Ïικῶν Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÏν, á½ Ïι ÏÏ Ïá½´ á¼Ïομεν, á¼ÏίÏÏαμαι á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ ÏάνÏÎµÏ á¼Î½Î¸ÏÏÏοι, θεÏμενοι μὲν á¼Î½Î±ÏÎ³á¿¶Ï Ïá½° διὰ Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï á¼Î½ÎµÏγοÏμενα, βαδιζÏνÏÏν καὶ ÏÏεÏÏνÏÏν â¨ÎºÎ±á½¶â© á¼ÏθΠὠÏε καὶ ÏαλαιÏνÏÏν αἰÏθανομÎνÏν Ïε ÏÎ¿Î»Ï ÎµÎ¹Î´á¿¶ÏÎ á¼Î½Î½Î¿Î¿á¿¦Î½ÏÎµÏ Î´á½² Ïῶν á¼ÏγÏν ÏοÏÏÏν αἰÏÎ¯Î±Ï ÏÎ¹Î½á½°Ï á½ÏάÏÏειν á¼Îº ÏÎ¹Î½Î¿Ï á¼Î¾Î¹ÏμαÏÎ¿Ï ÏÏ Ïικοῦ ÏᾶÏιν ἡμá¿Î½ ÏιÏÏοῦ, καθΠὠμηδὲν á¼Î½Î±Î¹ÏίÏÏ Î³Î¯Î½ÎµÏθαι νοοῦμεν, á¼Î»Î»á½° διὰ Ïὸ μὴ γινÏÏκειν, á¼¥ÏÎ¹Ï á¼ÏÏὶν ἡ αἰÏία Ïῶν á¼ÏγÏν ÏοÏÏÏν, ὠνομα θÎμενοι á¼Ïὸ Ïοῦ δÏναÏθαι Ïοιεá¿Î½ á¼ Ïοιεá¿, δÏναμιν [εἶναι] Ïῶν γινομÎνÏν á¼ÎºÎ¬ÏÏÎ¿Ï ÏοιηÏικήν â¦155
With regard to the substance of the psychic capacities, that we have a soul, I know as all men do, because we clearly see the activities performed through the body, walking and running and sometimes also wrestling, and sense-perception of many kinds, and because we understand that there are certain causes of these actions, on the basis of a natural axioma trusted by all of us, according to which we consider nothing to happen without cause; but because we do not know what the cause of these actions is, we postulate a name based on the being able to do the things that it does, a capacity as the efficient cause of each of the things that happen â¦
As in the passage at the beginning of QAM (IV 769â70 K), the
⦠καθάÏÎµÏ á¼Î»Î»Î¿Î¹ μηδΠεἶναί Ïινα á½ÏαÏξιν αá½Ïá¿Ï ἰδίαν, á¼Î»Î»á½° Ïὴν ἰδιÏÏηÏα Ïá¿Ï Ïοῦ ÏÏμαÏÎ¿Ï Î¿á½ÏίαÏ, ὧν Ïοιεá¿Î½ ÏÎÏÏ ÎºÎµ, ÏοÏÏÏν á¼Ïειν λÎγεÏθαι Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¹Ï, οá½Îº οá½Ïâ¨Î¹â©á¿¶Î½ ÏινÏν á¼ÎºÎµÎ¯Î½Ïν ἰδίαν ÏÏÏιν á¼ÏÎ¿Ï Ïῶν, á¼Î»Î»á½° Ïá¿Ï á¼Î½ÎµÏγοÏÏÎ·Ï Î¿á½ÏÎ¯Î±Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ αá½Ïá¿Ï ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïá½° γινÏμενα διΠαá½Ïá¿Ï Ïε καὶ á½ÏΠαá½Ïá¿Ï Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¹Ï á¼Ïειν λεγομÎνηÏ, ὧν ÏÎÏÏ ÎºÎµ δÏᾶν.159
⦠and according to others [the soul] does not have some existence of its own, but the specific nature of the substance of the body, is said to have capacities of those things which it does naturally; it is not the case that the capacities possess the particular nature of certain substances, but the substance that is acting, that is to say: it with regard to the things that happen through it and because of it, is said to have capacities, for the things which it does naturally.
Again, we find the view that it is the bodily substance, and its peculiar nature, that is the cause of activity which we tend to attribute to a substance we call soul, while this very bodily substance is additionally said to have certain capacities for the things that it does. This seems to be the same view as the one that was contrasted with the notion of incorporeal capacities inhabiting the homoeomerous bodies before, namely that it is rather the substance itself (i.e. the homeomerous body through its constituent qualities) that is the cause of activity, and that it is merely said to have capacities because we observe that it does what it does without perceiving the substance itself as the cause of activity. Previously, Galen gave several options as to what this substance might be, but now, unfortunately, he does not specify what those espousing this view hold to be the substance of the body. Galen proceeds to state that he has positioned himself somewhere midway in this discussion. On some other subjects he has spoken clearly, with regard to some of those he has known the truth and with regard to some others he did not know anything at all. In the discussion at hand, however, he goes as far as stating what is plausible (
3.3 Critical Discussion of Some Previous Scholarship on QAM
In scholarship on Galen it has often been held that Galen does not really hold the view that the soul is a mixture or does not present this view as his own in QAM.
Garcia-Ballester remarks that Galen in PHP and other works explicitly refuses to offer his opinion on the corporeality or incorporeality of the soul, and that in QAM he âmaintains the same attitude surrounded by a certain vaguenessâ.162 It seems that, according to Garcia-Ballester, the differences in content between PHP and QAM are to be understood as due to the latterâs vagueness, as opposed to a development or the context of a different question or point of departure. This is a thought that finds ample resonance in later scholarship.163 The vagueness can again be accounted for in various ways, according to Garcia-Ballester. First, he states that âThe arguments used by Galen in Quod animi mores relating to the subject of the connection between body and soul are not aimed at expounding his personal position. They are hypothetical arguments concerning what Aristotle is committed toâ.164 This fairly general line of interpretation (practically the whole text is about the connection between body and soul, including passages with arguments relying on Plato, the Stoics and Hippocrates) has been worked out in more detail and with much more nuance by Singer, who aims to explain âsome of the more extreme statements and some of the apparent inconsistenciesâ by arguing for the âhypothetical natureâ of Galenâs arguments.165 According to Singerâs reading of QAM, we are to conjecture a âconditional clause with the fundamental sense: âif Aristotle is rightâ, where Galen says or implies that the substance of the soul must be a mixture of the body.166 It is certainly the case that Galenâs use of Aristotelian doctrine is crucial with regard to the thesis that the substance of the soul is a mixture. It is also the case that in QAM Galen uses, quotes from and interacts with various other authors in a way that can make it difficult to disentangle their views from his own. However, I think Singer stretches this strategy too far, perhaps in an attempt to neutralize the boldness of QAM somewhat, and to save Galen from being inconsistent with regard to his âagnosticismâ. The text-analysis offered above in the first two paragraphs, combined with the noted similarities in other works including Prop. Plac., suffices, I think, to prove that the view that Galen is merely presenting an Aristotelian position in QAM, rather than his own, cannot be maintained. I think it is true, though, that Galenâs own position on the matter is close to an Aristotelian one (though with some differences, as has been noted, particularly the emphasis on the primacy of the smallest units when it comes to the location of soul and the seemingly reductionist notion of capacities) and that, in QAM, he is out to back his own position through the use of the authority of Aristotle, among others.167 We may rather conclude, I propose, that Galenâs theses in QAM are Aristotelian to the extent that Galenâs views on the soul are Aristotelian.
The second interpretational strategy that Garcia-Ballester suggests to account for QAMâs âvaguenessâ is âthe involvement of socio-professional interests in motivating the formulation of such an extremely radical naturalism by Galenâ.168 This again fairly general line of interpretation is worked out in more detail by both Donini and Lloyd. Besides being quite unelegant and methodologically problematic because it involves both speculating on the authorâs intentions and suggesting them to be somewhat dubious, there are other problems with this strategy as well. In Garcia-Ballesterâs case at least, it is based on a confused understanding of the relation between doctor and philosopher in QAM. Garcia-Ballester writes that Galen âasserts that medicine is superior to philosophy for the total understanding of manâ.169 To back this claim, he cites as evidence one passage, in which Galen states that those of the philosophers who think all humans are receptive to virtue and those who hold that no one chooses justice for its own sake both have a partial view of human nature.170 Garcia-Ballester then makes it seem as if there is a contrast here with the doctor (who is factually absent in the text), who would apparently be able to have a complete view. For one thing, this interpretation ignores Galenâs repeated expressions of appreciation for the ancient philosophers, as he consistently presents them as paradigms of the possibility of ethical progress through the knowledge of his central thesis in QAM. In fact, Galen expresses such admiration shortly after the passage cited by Garcia-Ballester:
εἰ Î³Î¬Ï ÏιÏ, οá½Îº ὢν á¼ÏιÏÏίÏÏÏν Ïε καὶ ÏιλονείκÏν, á¼Î¸ÎµÎ»Î®Ïειεν á¼Î»ÎµÏ θεÏίᾳ γνÏμῠκαθάÏÎµÏ Î¿á¼± Ïαλαιοὶ ÏιλÏÏοÏοι Ïá½° ÏÏάγμαÏα θεάÏαÏθαι, ÏανÏάÏαÏιν á½Î»Î¯Î³Î¿Ï Ï Ïαá¿Î´Î±Ï εá½ÏήÏει ÏÏá½¸Ï á¼ÏεÏὴν εὠÏεÏÏ ÎºÏÏÎ±Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏαÏÏεÏαι ÏάνÏÎ±Ï Î¼á½²Î½ á¼¡Î¼á¾¶Ï á¼¡Î³Î¿ÏÎ¼ÎµÎ½Î¿Ï Îµá½ ÏεÏÏ ÎºÎναι, διαÏÏÏÎÏεÏθαι δΠá½Ïὸ Ïῶν γονÎÏν Ïε καὶ ÏαιδαγÏγῶν καὶ διδαÏκάλÏν â¦171
For if someone, who is not one of those contentious rascals, would want to observe the matter with free judgement, as the ancient philosophers did, he shall find that there are exceedingly few children naturally well disposed for virtue and he shall cease to hold that we are naturally good but perverted by our parents, guides and teachers.
tr. Singer, modified
Note that what the ancient philosophers understand so well here, is exactly the natural difference in the characters (and thus souls) of children, i.e. the insight that was presented as the starting-point of the whole argument of QAM by Galen in the beginning. In general, it is helpful to note that when Galen writes of âphilosophersâ in a derogatory sense, he is not referring to Plato or Aristotle. That is to say: he quite consistently employs a distinction between the contemporary types and the ancients, and while he wants to distinguish himself from the former, he often, and especially in QAM, praises the latter and presents his own work as a continuation of theirs.172 Galen has no problem whatsoever with philosophy per se. On the contrary, his problem is with certain self-styled practitioners who do not meet the high standards the ancient philosophers have supposedly set, and who do not accept valid evidence when it is presented to them (for the soulâs dependence on the body for example, or for the location of the rational soul in the brain as opposed to the heart). The fact that Galen likes to distinguish himself from the philosophers of his day simply does not mean in any way that he does not consider himself a philosopher.
Lloyd makes a point comparable to that of Garcia-Ballester, although he presents it rather more carefully as a âsuggestionâ: â⦠this would mean that his contributions to the debates on the relations between the soul and body, and to moral philosophical issues, are in places subordinated to a strategic concern with the prestige and power of the doctorâ.173 No scholar will deny that Galenâs specific medical training, outlook and practice as well as his general concern with the status of medicine as a science, will deeply affect his philosophical work. However, if it turns out that all the relevant âplacesâ in which Galen supposedly subordinates his own philosophical aspirations to the âprestige and power of the doctorâ are those places in which he expresses what is considered too âradicalâ a view on the causal role of the physical mixture, I think we have set out the contrast between medicine and philosophy too strongly and have denied Galen the possibility of an empirically and practically informed philosophy in which the body plays a crucial role. I would rather suggest that Galen works out a doctrine of the soul in which the care for the body has some ethical purport and that he presents âthe ancientsâ as proponents of this view (whether justifiedly so or not). Thus, he places himself in what he sees as the tradition of the ancient Pythagoreans and Platonists, rather than indicating a conflicting view of the value of philosophy and medicine for the health of the soul. Lloyd is only able to make this suggestion of a strategic concern with the prestige of the doctor, under the assumption that Galen works from an opposition between doctor and philosopher in QAM and affiliates himself solely with the former role. I think that Galen is not so much concerned with the power of the doctor here as with the power of the body.
Lloyd also makes a sharp distinction between âcitation of authorityâ and Galenâs âown independent observationâ and claims that the balance in QAM is âweighted very heavily towards the formerâ. This is another way to neutralize the apparent radicalism of QAM (because it reduces its status), and it also one that is found in some of the other scholars mentioned. I think this is a seriously problematic general distinction, especially for a writer in Galenâs age. How unusual is it for ancient writers, including Galen (in PHP, for example), to present their own views and observations under the veil of a specific and indeed sometimes rather unorthodox interpretation of more ancient authorities? Often, the whole point with this kind of writing is to blur the neat difference Lloyd is making. Besides, one might also infer that Galen, precisely because he knew his contemporaries might consider the views he expounded in QAM to be radical, purposely and emphatically tried to present them as being in line with traditional authority.
Donini follows Garcia-Ballester and Lloyd, in stating that Galen was mainly occupied with making propaganda for the office of doctor in this âpamphletâ, as he calls QAM (PHP on the other hand is a âgreat treatiseâ).174 His general suggestion is that we should not take QAM as seriously as other work (Galen is speaking at a âdifferent, indeed considerably lower, level than that of PHPâ).175 As long as we consider QAM a âmore or less propagandizing manifesto devoted principally to promoting the image and the office of the doctor ⦠the threatened contradictions with respect to Galenâs other works disappearâ. This is a way for Donini to render âthe thesis of the corporeal nature of the soul itself ⦠more understandableâ.176 Here Donini, in my opinion, makes the same mistake as Garcia-Ballester and Lloyd. To back the hypothesis of QAM as a propagandizing pamphlet for the office of doctor, Donini also cites one single passage (IV 807â8 K), which is supposed to introduce âa further thesis, apparently completely novelâ, namely, the thesis that one should âlook to doctors rather than philosophersâ in order to develop oneâs soul. But in this passage, Galen merely states that he is able to help those people that do not believe in the power of nourishment to develop their souls. Again, the whole opposition between doctor and philosopher is completely projected into the text on the basis of the presupposition that Galen here should be considered solely as a doctor and as such as opposed to a philosopher (again, QAM was classed by Galen as a work treating of Platonic philosophy). Galen even goes on to state that by coming to him, these people âwill greatly enjoy the benefit of ethical philosophyâ.177 That is to say, he explicitly calls this care for the body philosophy. Again, right at the very beginning of QAM, it is the followers of Pythagoras and Plato whom Galen mentions as having actually lived in accordance with the views he expounds in QAM. Rather than opposing medicine to philosophy and declaring the superiority of the former, Galen attempts to integrate both fields, as he does in other work as well. And that is not even such an exceptional activity in Galenâs time, after all: Plutarch, for example, states at the beginning of Advice about keeping well, that philosophers should âmake a single field, as it were, of all honourable studiesâ, among which he mentions medicine as âinferior to noneâ.178 Again, the fact that Galen is a doctor and advocate of the medical science strongly and directly influences his thinking and writing to an extent that is not to be underestimated. However, to explain his supposedly âextremeâ or âradicalâ views on the soul in terms of a kind of power-play between doctor and philosopher, seems to not do justice to Galenâs self-understanding as both a doctor and philosopher and to his constructive and intensive relation towards philosophy (let us not forget here that Galen literally wrote dozens of philosophical works, including commentaries on and polemics with all the major philosophical schools, he is never merely a doctor positioning himself over against philosophy as a field of which he himself is not part in some way).179 What the above-mentioned scholars seem to have in common is that they oblige themselves to come up with some explanation for the conclusions Galen presents in QAM other than the one that seems to lie most at hand. Namely that they are, in the first place, expressions of Galenâs own thought. I think part of the reason to desire such an explanation, besides the assumed contradictions with other work discussed above, is the supposition that these conclusions are âradicalâ or âextremeâ (see the various citations throughout this section). I also think it may be an unfruitful interpretational strategy to judge an authorâs position as radical or extreme first, and then ask what could possibly be the reason for such radicalism, now assuming that the views, being radical, cannot simply be the authorâs views but came to be in his text for some other reason. Quite apart from that, the position presented in QAM does not strike me as radical at all. In any case, I think it may be worth our while to see what the implications of this position are according to Galen himself, when it comes to those beautiful fruits of philosophy. In the final paragraph of this first case-study, we shall work out some of these implications and see how QAMâs âphysicalistâ notion of the soul bears on the possibility of ethics.
4 The Possible Continuity in the Divine and Human Formation of the Bodily Mixture
In QAM, Galen suggests that his conclusions may mislead people into accepting undesirable ethical implications: if a given mixture of elemental qualities determines the actions and affections of the soul, we cannot be praised or blamed for our actions or the state of our soul, it seems.180 After all, as Galen stated at the beginning of QAM, if it were actually the case that the substances of the souls of children were the same, they would perform the same activities and suffer the same affections given the same causes. This implies that at the infant stage, at least, our actions and affections are completely determined by the naturally given mixture.181 But this is exactly the reason, I propose, why the rational part of the soul could not be identified with a particular mixture of qualities straightaway and why it was necessary to have a longer and separate discussion of it, which demonstrates that it shares something with its maker. I propose that the somewhat hasty conclusions that do away with ethical responsibility neglect the difference found in Galenâs texts between the first stage of formation, by divine nature, and the second, by ourselves in virtue of our rational capacity. Arguing this way, in a quite literal sense, is to treat people like children. In this section, we will further elaborate the distinction between these two phases of the formation of the soul and the continuity between them, again by drawing on QAM and other Galenic texts.
After quoting a few passages from Aristotleâs biological works, Galen concludes that according to Aristotle as well, âthe soulâs character traits follow the mixture of the motherâs bloodâ.182 As we have seen, he seeks to prove that both Plato and Aristotle acknowledged the effects of the bodily mixture on the soul. In particular, in this passage, he is referring to the âsoulâs character traitsâ (
Both of these character traits come to be in the same way as all other traits, first by nature, then afterwards by habit; habit is an acquired nature, a second nature as it were.186
This text most clearly expresses the continuity between the divine or natural and the subsequent human, rational formation of our selves: the results of the second can even literally be seen as a second nature. The character traits themselves are indeed a second nature in the sense that Galen defines them as non-rational, as âunthinking motions of the soulâ.187 Someone that is a coward will simply act cowardly. To this extent, the character traits show the same determinative quality as the mixture given to us by nature, but with the essential difference that we, by virtue of the authority of our rational part, are able to improve our character through continuous training and education. In fact, the potential of improvement is such that we can even, through relative neglect of the desires and needs of the lower part of our soul and through the acquisition of wisdom (both defined as activities of the rational part of the soul188), liken ourselves to a god:
⦠there is no honour greater than that of imitating God, so far as is possible for a human being. This is achieved by treating immediate pleasures as of no importance and preferring the beautiful.189
As opposed to the immediate pleasures, the beautiful is presented as the proper object of the rational part of the soul in Character Traits. Both here and in QAM, where the relative abstention of the object desired by the lower part of the soul makes us drier and more intelligent, a discipline of formation of the self is proposed, which springs from the rational part of our soul and likens us to things that possess this rationality to an extreme extent; gods and stars, respectively.190 In fact, perhaps these latter two can even be identified: we have only an Arabic summary of Character Traits and we know that Galen did not write about âangelsâ, of which there is frequent mention in the text. The idea in the text as we have it is that one could become like an angel, if one restricts oneâs bodily desires.191 It could be that there was a plural
In any case, I propose that such formation of the self is not only an imitation of the divine because the self is improved and therefore becomes more similar (in as far as that is possible) to the perfection of the divine. It is also, on a more fundamental level, already an imitation of the divine as causa efficiens by virtue of the activity of formation itself, that is, as long as the formation is directed towards the good and the beautiful. Galen likens us to the divine by virtue of the potential of our rational soul, but the rationality of the divine is demonstrated through its ability to create perfectly designed creatures. Thus, rationality manifests itself primarily as creative and formative activity. By cultivating the state of our given bodily mixture with an eye to the improvement of our soul, we effectively continue the divine work through which we were initially formed. Galen is able to write an extensive ode of praise to the intelligence of our divine maker when it comes to the formation of the natural body (UP), and he is able to prove and emphasize the causal influence of the bodily mixture on the soul, but when it comes to the perfection of our soul that is the goal of ethical philosophy and for which Galen venerates âthe ancientsâ, we enter a second stage of formation. Nowhere is the supreme divine principle that is responsible for our initial formation credited for the wonderful state of the soul of man, even though it has been demonstrated that the soul is dependent on the bodily mixture, which is made by this divine principle. Galen states in another short treatise, which also concerns ethical philosophy and can probably be dated close to both QAM and Character traits,192 the so-called Affections and Errors, that the initial formation by nature has left us unfinished to such an extent that we should spend practically our entire life trying to complete ourselves:
δεá¿Ïαι Î³á½°Ï á¼ÏκήÏεÏÏ á¼ÎºÎ±ÏÏÎ¿Ï á¼¡Î¼á¿¶Î½ ÏÏεδὸν Î´Î¹Î á½ Î»Î¿Ï Ïοῦ Î²Î¯Î¿Ï ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïὸ γενÎÏθαι ÏÎÎ»ÎµÎ¹Î¿Ï á¼Î½Î®Ï.193
For each of us requires training throughout practically the whole of his life in order to become a complete man.
tr. Singer, slightly modified
We may be determined by our given nature but that is not yet our complete form (
In the passage immediately following, Galen admits that such a state may not be feasible for everyone (although it remains a real possibility for some), but that we should at least make sure that our soul does not become âutterly disgustingâ (
καὶ ÏοῦÏÎ á¼Î¿Î¯ÎºÎ±Ïι μάλιÏÏα ÏάνÏÏν οἱ ÏαλαιÏÏαÏοι ÏÏᾶξαί Ïε καὶ κληθá¿Î½Î±Î¹ ÏοÏοὶ ÏαÏá½° Ïοá¿Ï á¼Î½Î¸ÏÏÏÎ¿Î¹Ï Î¿á½Ïε ÏÏ Î³Î³ÏάμμαÏα γÏάÏονÏÎµÏ Î¿á½Ïε διαλεκÏικὴν á¼¢ ÏÏ Ïικὴν á¼ÏιδεικνÏμενοι θεÏÏίαν á¼Î»Î»Î á¼Î¾ αá½Ïῶν μὲν Ïῶν á¼ÏεÏῶν, á¼ÏκήÏανÏÎµÏ Î´Î Î±á½Ïá½°Ï á¼ÏγοιÏ, οὠλÏγοιÏ.197
And it seems that the ancients have practised this most of everyone and have come to be called wise by people not by writing books or displaying dialectical or physical theory but from their own virtues, training themselves in deeds, not in words.
If we take the thesis presented in QAM seriously (and even if we would take only the weaker thesis), all these statements on the cultivation of the soul must imply that Galen ascribes to philosophical training initiated by the rational part of the soul the potential to alter and form the bodily mixtures. So, indeed, the capacities of the soul depend on the mixtures of the body, but that does not mean the mixtures of the body do not depend on anything. As long as we have not established what the state of these mixtures themselves is dependent upon, we have no way of adequately assessing the consequences of the thesis that the actions and affections of the soul are dependent upon the mixtures. In fact, Galen always emphasizes that the mixtures do not come about in a random manner, but are dependent on something rational. First, they depend on a divine maker that creates according to some teleological plan.198 Second, human beings resemble the divine with respect to their rationality and creative capacity. Therefore, they are able to exert influence over their bodily mixtures after their generation (and infantile stage) and able to continue and ideally complete (in as far as possible) the formation initially undertaken by the divine maker (and the better they realize this fact, the better they are able to do so). This is a very simple idea that can take its point of departure from the clear observation that the consumption of wine (to take an example beloved by the ancients) exerts influence on the state of the bodily mixture of our brain and, through it, on our rational capacities. Although some of us may naturally have a greater inclination to drink large amounts of it, we are all able to train our relative need for it through habituation and education. It is also easy to see how knowledge can lead to a change in our mixture here: if we learn that wine is bad for our rational capacities and thus our capacity for virtue, or if we rather learn that for our specific constitution it might be good to have moderate amounts of it on a daily basis because it makes us more gentle, we can decide to change our habits when it comes to wine-drinking, so as to make ourselves more virtuous.199 This is an easy example, of course. What seems more difficult to account for is how this knowledge itself could be understood as something that is a result of mixture. After all, it seems that Galen in QAM also proposes to understand the substance of the rational soul as mixture. Towards the end of QAM (in IV 821 K), Galen seems to make a distinction between the causal influence of habituation and education on the one hand, and that of the bodily mixture on the other. That is to say, a distinction according to which they would both have causal influence, but on different aspects of the soul. The former would cause either good or bad habits and beliefs (
In any case, the passage just referred to is perhaps the clearest evidence in QAM that we can, to some extent, alter and form our own mixtures. For Galen proceeds to explain:
αἱ κÏάÏÎµÎ¹Ï Î´Îαá½Ïαὶ Ïá¿ Ïε ÏÏÏÏῠγενÎÏει καὶ Ïαá¿Ï εá½ÏÏÎ¼Î¿Î¹Ï Î´Î¹Î±Î¯ÏÎ±Î¹Ï á¼ÎºÎ¿Î»Î¿Ï θοῦÏιν, καὶ ÏÏ Î½Î±Ï Î¾Î¬Î½ÎµÎ¹ á¼Î»Î»Î·Î»Î± ÏαῦÏα.201
But the mixtures themselves are consequent on the original formation and the regimens that are productive of healthy humours, and these things mutually increase each other.
tr. Singer, slightly modified
So, again we find the same two causal factors that decide on the state of our bodily mixture, that, in turn, determines the state of our soul: first, the primary creation of the mixture by nature or the divine creator, then the daily regimen we impose on ourselves. It should not come as a surprise that, according to Galen, a certain daily regimen has an effect on something like our relative sharpness of mind, even considered as a long-term capacity as opposed to common daily fluctuations of concentration and astuteness (depending, for example, on the amount of wine one has drunk or how much one has slept). After all, as we have noticed, Galen is concerned with a second nature here, a change in substance. The regimens are productive of certain humours, but the humours are constituted by the four elemental qualities, as we have seen. Thus, the daily regimens could only form the humours if they change the mixture of the elemental qualities, which is exactly what happens when we drink and eat, for example. Thus, instead of some form of determinism, Galen rather ascribes a powerful transformative potency to regimens that we are able to impose on ourselves.
Here it is important to remember the notion of a
ÏÏ Î»Î¬ÏÏεÏαι δὲ á¼ Ïαν á½Ïὸ Ïῶν αá½Ïῶν καÏá½° γÎνοÏ, á½ÏΠὧνÏÎµÏ ÎºÎ±á½¶ διαÏθείÏεÏαι. διαÏθείÏεÏαι δὲ Ïὸ Ïá¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï á¼¦Î¸Î¿Ï á½Ïὸ μοÏθηÏῶν á¼Î¸Î¹Ïμῶν á¼Î½ á¼Î´ÎÏμαÏί Ïε καὶ ÏÏμαÏι, καὶ Î³Ï Î¼Î½Î±ÏίοιÏ, καὶ θεάμαÏι, καὶ á¼ÎºÎ¿ÏÏμαÏι, καὶ Ïá¿ ÏÏ Î¼ÏάÏá¿ Î¼Î¿Ï Ïικá¿. ÏοÏÏÏν ÏÎ¿Î¯Î½Ï Î½ á¼ÏάνÏÏν á¼Î¼ÏειÏον εἶναι ÏÏá½´ Ïὸν Ïὴν á½Î³Î¹ÎµÎ¹Î½á½´Î½ μεÏιÏνÏα, καὶ μὴ νομίζειν, á½¡Ï ÏιλοÏÏÏῳ μÏνῳ ÏÏοÏήκει ÏλάÏÏειν á¼¦Î¸Î¿Ï ÏÏ Ïá¿Ï â¦203
For everything is maintained by the same kind of things as those by which it is also corrupted. The character of the soul is corrupted by bad habits in food and drink, and in exercises, and things seen and heard and the arts in general. Anyone that pursues health should be experienced in all of these things, and should not think that it befits the philosopher alone to shape the character of the soul.
Interestingly, Galen here uses the word
In the broader context of this passage, Galen explains how the shaping of the character of the soul is related to a healthy mixture. Both the shaping of health and that of character can be effected by regulating not only diet and exercise, but also by regulating that which is perceived. Perhaps Galen is thinking of theatre and music here, but possibly also of natural surroundings or perception in a broader sense. And, as becomes clear in the Character Traits, this transformative potency through training, education and regulation applies not only to character but to the rational part of the soul as well:
We ought first to train that capacity of the soul by which we see that which is known by demonstration, so that it may grow; its training consists in geometry, the science of numbers, mathematics, astronomy and the science of music. These sciences increase the capacity and perfection of the soul.204
The capacity and perfection of the rational soul is increased by adopting a certain discipline, namely, that of employing and developing it by learning the sciences. Again, if we take the thesis in QAM seriously, this would imply that the mixture on which the capacities are dependent, in this case mainly that of the brain, would be fundamentally changed by adopting a certain training that is, in turn, a consequence of the rational insight that we âought to trainâ. In line with QAM, we could say that the mixture of the brain changes (presumably becomes more dry, in this case) through intellectual activity and the rational soul therefore becomes more intelligent.205
Of course, one could point out how hard it would be to explain all the complexities of psychological functioning merely in terms of these four elemental qualities. And it seems a bit meagre, indeed, to state that drying the substance of the rational part of the soul will increase oneâs intelligence. In this regard, however, we first have to ask the following question: if one, in Galenâs day, would be interested in speculating about the physiological nature of soul (as a principle of movement) on the basis of argument and observation, what basic elements would one choose to explain the soulâs functioning, given that these would have to be the basic elements of the body or of the organs in which one is convinced that the soul resides? That is to say, Galen discards some other traditional options, such as that of atomism or that of an incorporeal soul, on the basis of reasoning and observation, but what other option could he have come up with? The elements were well established as basic building blocks of the human body and the entire cosmos. The interesting fact remains that Galen, in QAM, might have been making an attempt at a physiological explanation of soul with the terms most suitable for it in his day.206 And it seems to me as though QAM is partly an attempt to think through the possibility of such a physiological approach, including its ethical consequences, while other ethical works, such as the Character Traits, devote less attention to the physiological aspect but do not seem to be at odds with it. In this particular passage of the Character Traits cited above, for instance, there is no reference to the mixture, but it does agree with QAM on the idea that the substance of the rational soul (on which the capacities must be dependent) can be altered through training. The broader question here is: to what extent could Galenâs views on training and development of the (rational) soul, elaborated in his works on psychology, be congruent with his more speculative stance in QAM on the substance of the soul, that is supported by his works on the human body?
It would seem, for example, that the rational insight that we âought to trainâ must itself again be to some extent dependent on a certain given elemental mixture: it would require someone of relative astuteness and philosophical ambition to have it, and those traits must depend on oneâs mixture, it would seem.207 The âwell-mixed manâ that Galen writes about in Temp., can be recognized by his actions, because, due to the balance of his mixture, he is âcheerful, affectionate, generous, intelligentâ. But for exactly the same reason, this man also follows a flawless regimen, which in turn balances his mixture again, presumably, in turn, maintaining or strengthening his intelligence.208 This is where Galen seems to differ from later Neo-Platonists that take up his work. Galenâs reception by Neo-Platonists such as Proclus, Olympiodorus and Philoponus shows that there was some acceptance among them of the views he worked out in QAM, as long as the rational part of the soul remained exempted. Proclus discusses the view that the capacities of the soul follow the mixtures of the body in his commentary on Platoâs Republic and remarks that this thesis only applies in the case of the uneducated (
The seemingly circular notion of the mixture philosophically forming itself, or the soul determining that by which it is determined, is best expressed in Galenâs text through a joke:
á½¥ÏÏε ÏÏÏονήÏανÏÎµÏ Î½á¿¦Î½ γοῦν οἱ Î´Ï ÏÏεÏαίνονÏεÏ, á½ Ïι ÏÏοÏá½´ δÏναÏαι ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ Î¼á½²Î½ ÏÏÏÏονεÏÏÎÏÎ¿Ï Ï, ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ Î´Î á¼ÎºÎ¿Î»Î±ÏÏοÏÎÏÎ¿Ï Ï á¼ÏγάζεÏθαι καὶ ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ Î¼á½²Î½ á¼Î³ÎºÏαÏεÏÏÎÏÎ¿Ï Ï, Ïοὺ δΠá¼ÎºÏαÏεÏÏÎÏÎ¿Ï Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ θαÏÏαλÎÎ¿Ï Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ Î´ÎµÎ¹Î»Î¿á½ºÏ á¼¡Î¼ÎÏÎ¿Ï Ï Ïε καὶ ÏÏá¾´Î¿Ï Ï á¼ÏιÏÏικοÏÏ Ïε καὶ ÏÎ¹Î»Î¿Î½ÎµÎ¯ÎºÎ¿Ï Ï, ἡκÎÏÏÏαν ÏÏÏÏ Î¼Îµ μαθηÏÏμενοι, Ïίνα μὲν á¼Ïθίειν αá½ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ ÏÏή, Ïίνα δὲ Ïίνειν.216
So, then, let those who are unhappy with the notion that nourishment has the power to make some more self-controlled, some more undisciplined, some more restrained, some more unrestrained, as well as brave, timid, gentle, kind, quarrelsome and argumentative â let them now have some self-control, and come to me to learn what they should eat and drink.
tr. Singer
In this joke we find the reciprocity of the body-soul relation that is at the heart of Galenâs ethical ideal in QAM. These people, who have not yet followed the example of those Pythagoreans, Platonists and other ancients to appropriate the thesis expressed in the title of QAM, who have not yet taken it upon themselves to develop their self-control by regulating their mixture, should show some self-control and submit themselves to Galenâs guidance, in order to develop their self-control by adapting their daily regimen and thus bodily mixture.217 In order to start developing they have to exhibit the very quality they wish to obtain. We find the same basic thought in Aristotle as well:
οá½ÏÏ Î´Î á¼Ïει καὶ á¼Ïὶ Ïῶν á¼ÏεÏῶνΠá¼Îº Ïε Î³á½°Ï Ïοῦ á¼ÏÎÏεÏθαι Ïῶν ἡδονῶν γινÏμεθα ÏÏÏÏονεÏ, καὶ γενÏμενοι μάλιÏÏα Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¸Î± á¼ÏÎÏεÏθαι αá½Ïῶν. á½Î¼Î¿Î¯ÏÏ Î´á½² καὶ á¼Ïὶ Ïá¿Ï á¼Î½Î´ÏείαÏÎ á¼Î¸Î¹Î¶Ïμενοι Î³á½°Ï ÎºÎ±ÏαÏÏονεá¿Î½ Ïῶν ÏοβεÏῶν καὶ á½ÏομÎνειν αá½Ïá½° γινÏμεθα á¼Î½Î´Ïεá¿Î¿Î¹, καὶ γενÏμενοι μάλιÏÏα Î´Ï Î½Î·ÏÏμεθα á½ÏομÎνειν Ïá½° ÏοβεÏά.218
The same holds good with the virtues. We become temperate by abstaining from pleasures, and at the same time we are best able to abstain from pleasures when we have become temperate. And so with courage: we become brave by training ourselves to despise and endure terrors, and we shall be best able to endure terrors when we have become brave.
tr. Rackman
This reasoning might appear circular, but (in my view, at least) it also does justice to our experience: the only way to develop character is by exhibiting it. Such a first display of self-control is the step that needs to be taken in order to continue the initial divine formation of our mixture and cultivate our soul. It is the beginning of ethical philosophy, as Galen explains in the sentence immediately following the one cited above:
Îµá¼´Ï Ïε Î³á½°Ï Ïὴν ἠθικὴν ÏιλοÏοÏίαν á½Î½Î®ÏονÏαι μÎγιÏÏα καὶ ÏÏá½¸Ï ÏαÏÏῠκαÏá½° Ïá½°Ï Ïοῦ λογιÏÏικοῦ Î´Ï Î½Î¬Î¼ÎµÎ¹Ï á¼ÏιδÏÏÎ¿Ï Ïιν Îµá¼°Ï á¼ÏεÏὴν ÏÏ Î½ÎµÏÏÏεÏοι καὶ μνημονικÏÏεÏοι γενÏμενοι.219
For then they will greatly enjoy the delight of ethical philosophy and in addition to that they will devote themselves to virtue in accordance with their rational capacities and become more understanding and remember better.
By taking this step, in which we undertake the activity to adapt the mixture that we are dependent on for our activities and affections, we can not only develop our characters, but also gain a better understanding and memory. Thus, Galen proposes an ethical programme of self-amelioration that includes the improvement of the rational capacities as well. This passage is reminiscent of his discussion of the Timaeus, a few pages before â particularly the word
οá½Îº οá½Î½ á¼Î½Î±Î¹ÏεÏÎ¹Îºá½¸Ï á½ Î´â ὠλÏÎ³Î¿Ï á½²ÏÏὶ Ïῶν á¼Îº ÏιλοÏοÏÎ¯Î±Ï ÎºÎ±Î»á¿¶Î½, á¼Î»Î»â á½ÏηγηÏικÏÏ Ïε καὶ διδαÏκαλικÏÏ ÏÎ¹Î½Î¿Ï á¼Î³Î½Î¿Ï μÎÎ½Î¿Ï á¼Î½ αá½Ïοá¿Ï Ïῶν ÏιλοÏÏÏÏν â¦221
This argument, then, is not destructive of the fine things arising from philosophy, but rather is an argument useful for guidance and for teaching of a point within those things of which the philosophers are ignorant.
tr. Singer
That of which the philosophers â again, not Plato and Aristotle, but perhaps particularly the self-styled Platonists referred to earlier â are ignorant, is, as we know by now, the main thesis of QAM and its importance for the practice of ethical philosophy and cultivation of the soul. Apparently, however, there is a reason for the reluctance of other philosophers to appreciate the truth of this thesis: it is considered destructive of the fine fruits of philosophy. This is partly because, as soon becomes clear from Galenâs text, the possibility of assigning responsibility for oneâs actions is considered to be at stake.222 After all, if it is the mixture that causes the state of oneâs soul, how are we to judge people for their being good or bad? Galenâs initial answer is astonishingly simple and direct: it is in our nature to love the good and hate the bad, without asking questions about its origins.223 We simply destroy poisonous spiders, even though they have become what they are not by themselves but simply by nature.224 In other words, I take it, we do not need to have knowledge about the cause of the state of someoneâs soul for the practical purpose of praising or blaming them.225 This is, in fact, undeniably true on a descriptive level: we still do not have complete knowledge about the causes of the states of peopleâs souls, but we have never ceased to praise and blame. However, Galen does not say that we cannot be considered responsible for the state of our soul. For, even if the mixture directly causes that state at any point in time, we do exert influence on the state of this mixture and it is possible for us to realize this and cultivate a mixture that conduces to a stronger character and increased understanding. Where other philosophers consider the thesis of QAM to be a danger, Galen argues rather that the realization of it is a condition for the practice of ethical philosophy and for acquiring freedom: yes, the soul is a slave to the mixture, but the mixture is partly dependent on how we decide to shape it, since this shaping capacity is also a capacity of that same mixture.
Partly, that is, for it is obvious to Galen that our given nature limits the possibilities of this second stage of formation. Our given mixture is not a piece of wax, the capacity for altering and forming our mixture already requires some natural predetermination, as we have seen. Moreover, Galen acknowledges that some peopleâs souls are so corrupt that they are incurable, not capable to be taught by the Muses themselves or to be improved even by Socrates or Pythagoras.226 In this respect, Galen, perhaps partly due to his medical perspective, might be more realistic than many a philosopher has been. We should take responsibility for the state of our mixture, as we have seen, and it is our goal to cultivate our own soul and those of others, and liken ourselves to the divinity and perfection of the heavenly bodies. But most of us undeniably fall short of this ideal. Actually, we could conclude, following Galen, that as a species we are quite hopeless in this respect: many people with a nature that does provide potential hold the wrong beliefs and waste their time writing silly books on how everyone is naturally good, thereby preventing people from attaining the right insights that might lead them to take proper care of their own mixture (especially Stoics seem to act in such manner), and more importantly, most people do not even have the natural potential to become good in the first place.227 As Galen says, anyone who observes the matter with free judgement (and this is a significant qualification, with Galen using the same predicate,
Conclusion
We have seen how Galen, in QAM, speculates on the substance of the soul, a subject he often avoided in other works. Through a discussion with the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions, guided by and based on his own previous work, he argued that the substance of the soul is a bodily mixture. He presented this argument as the best or most scientific proof for the central thesis of QAM, that the capacities of the soul follow the mixtures of the body. Strictly speaking, the identification of the substance of the soul with a bodily mixture is not a materialist position. After all, as we have seen, Galen adopts a hylomorphic approach and considers soul to be the form of the body. As such, he considers it to be the form of the homoeomerous body rather than the organ in which soul resides, because it is the homoeomerous bodies, as the most primary bodies formed by the two principles of form (mixture of the four elemental qualities) and matter (as such without quality), which are primarily active, i.e. which should rightly be considered as principle of movement. More specifically, the homoeomerous bodies residing in the three main organs (liver, heart and brain) primarily carry out the (natural or psychic) functions Galen ascribes to these organs and on the basis of which he locates soul in them. In as far as these particular homoeomerous bodies reside in the respective organs, to which they are entirely peculiar, it can be said that the soul resides in these organs. By locating soul at the micro-level of the body, as far as perception can go, Galen adheres to his general axiom formulated at the beginning of Hipp. Elem.: if we want to find out about the nature of something, we have to look for its smallest component parts that cannot be further divided. It seems that with QAM, Galen applied this axiom to soul (as form of the body), as well.
Although this implies that the cause of our actions and affections are these particular bodily mixtures in the three main organs, as we have seen, this does not need to amount to a form of radical determinism. First of all, these mixtures are themselves subject to continuous change and we are able, to a certain extent, to form them in a way that will be beneficial for the development of our capacity for virtue and thinking. Second, we noted that habits and beliefs are not merely dependent on the mixture, but also on education and habituation, which we can also exercise some control over. Such self-amelioration is possible because, as rational beings, we share to some extent in the intelligence and creativity of our maker, though we do so by virtue of the specific mixture of our brain. This self-amelioration is necessary, in as far as it is a condition for human beings to fulfil their proper function, which is why it is also required from all of us, according to Galen. However, since the desire for such self-amelioration, the sharpness of oneâs mind and other characteristics of peopleâs nature or soul vary across individuals depending on their naturally given mixture, and since, according to Galen, there are only few people equipped with a natural constitution that is well-suited to virtue, it would seem that, far from embracing determinism, Galen saw much work to be done.
QAM is not only one of Galenâs best-known works in modern scholarship, but might have also been one of the best-known ones in antiquity, since we find references to it in several Neoplatonists, see below, paragraph 4, 94â5. The full Latin title is Quod Animi Mores Corporis Temperamenta Sequuntur, so the Latin translation âmoresâ translates
Singer (2013) 335 ff. has argued that we can discern a plurality of strategic aims Galen may have had with this text â giving a clear-cut account of his own views of the soul not being one of them â and that it has a public and rhetorical context that further complicates the disentangling of Galenâs own views on the soul. We shall engage with this reading in the third section of this case-study.
See paragraph 3, below.
QAM 32,5â7 Müller (IV 767,6â7 K). For all references to QAM I shall refer to Müllerâs edition and give the Kühn pages as well, as is customary, except for when I refer to more more general divisions of the text, where it suffices to give the Kühn pages, which are in every other edition. I will often also use Athena Bazouâs edition (2011), however, which is less well-known but sometimes provides a good alternative to Müller. Peter Singerâs translation and notes (2013) have also proven very useful and will often be referred to as well. Choices with regard to the Greek are discussed ad locum when they deviate from Müllerâs text.
Cf. Foucault (1984) 69â70: âSelon une tradition qui remonte fort loin dans la culture grecque, le souci de soi est en corrélation étroite avec la pensée et la pratique médicales. Cette correlation ancienne a pris de plus en plus dâampleur. Au point que Plutarque pourra dire, au début des Préceptes de santé, que philosophie et medicine ont affaire à âun seul et meme domaineâ (mia chôra)â.
Lib. Prop. XIX 46,11â20 K.
See for these objections Donini (1996), 202. Cf. also the objections that philosophers in his own day make according to Galen himself, QAM 73 Müller (IV 814â15 K).
Cf. Gill (2010) for an extensive and insightful comparison of Stoic and Galenic ânaturalistic psychologyâ and the extent to which a fruitful synthesis could have been possible between the two.
QAM 32,14 f. Müller (IV 768 K); cf. Character Traits 30,5â10 Kraus.
Galen returns to this point at the end of the treatise, QAM 74,21 f. Müller (IV 816â9 K).
QAM 33,9â10 Müller (IV 769 K); both Müller and Bazou bracket this sentence as supposedly being an interpolation, but I think Singer is right in his assessment that there are no strong grounds for this and that the sentence fulfils an important role in Galenâs argument (2013, note 10 ad locum and Textual Note 4,5). Besides, there are parallels in other texts, such as PHP VII 440,11â2 De Lacy (V 601 K).
QAM 36,9â20 Müller (IV 772â3 K).
QAM 36,16â9 Müller (IV 773 K).
QAM 36,21 f. (IV 773 K); Cf. Hipp. Elem. 128,1 f. De Lacy (I 481â2 K).
Cf. particularly Temp. I 509â10 K; Opt. Corp. Const. IV 740â41 K. For the dating: Ilberg (1979) 49 f. The Different Kinds of Homogeneous Part (Part. Hom. Diff.) is also relevant, but more difficult to date, cf. Strohmaier (1970) 32, 33. Cf. Kupreeva (2014) 154: âGalen wrote De Elementis ex Hippocrate during his second sojourn in Rome, when he composed a series of physiological treatises which included also Mixtures, Natural capacities, The best constitution of our bodies, Semen, and The shaping of the embryo. Along with The doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato and The function of the parts of the body, these works are regarded as programmatic for his rationalist outlook in medical philosophyâ.
QAM 36,21â37,2 Müller (IV 773 K): â⦠but let us remember, regarding the common substance of all bodies, that this was shown by us to be composed of two principles, matter and form, matter being conceptually without quality, but having in itself a mixture of four qualities, hotness, coldness, dryness and wetnessâ. (tr. Singer); cf. Hipp. Elem. 114,16 f. De Lacy (I 469â70 K): âAnd indeed that the first principles of the generation of fire are the matter which underlies all the elements and is without qualities, and the extreme heat that enters into it, this too has been similarly agreed to â¦â (tr. De Lacy); HNH 17,20 f. Mewaldt (XV 29 f. K); Prop. Plac. ed. Lami and Garofalo 86.
Galen introduces the distinction loosely in QAM 37 Müller (IV 773â74 K). Cf. HNH 6,10 f. Mewaldt (XV 7â8 K); PHP VIII,4 500,3 f. De Lacy (V 673 K); Part. Hom. 45 f. Strohmaier; Hipp. Elem. 126,1 f. De Lacy (I 479â81 K); Opt. Med. 6,14â9 Müller.
QAM 37,5â12 Müller (IV 773â4 K), with different interpunction.
Singer (2013) 380 note 35.
Cf. Aristotleâs PA II; Meteor. IV; GC II. For Galen, as we shall see, this is basic physics and should as such also be an elemental part of the education of a doctor, see The Best Doctor is also a Philosopher I 60 K (II, 6,14â18 Müller). Leith (2015) has shown how the same compositional hierarchy is also used by Alexandrian physicians Erasistratus and Herophilus, with the difference that they emphasize that the elemental level is not for the doctor to study, which is clearly opposite to Galenâs view (cf. Galenâs MM X 184â6 K).
Part. Hom. Diff. 49â50 Strohmaier and his commentary, 109â10. In Temp. I 562â3 K, Galen remarks that such a thorough mixture can only be achieved by God and Nature: âThe total mixing of one with the other [
Hipp. Elem. 126,1â7 De Lacy (I 479â80 K): âNow let me go through the account as it applies to a human being: he is made of the primary and simplest visible elements, those called homoeomerous, fiber, membrane, flesh, fat, bone and cartilage, ligament, nerve, marrow, and all the other (structures) whose parts have the same form. These in turn have been generated from certain other elements closest to themselves, blood, phlegm, and the two kinds of bile, yellow and blackâ. (tr. De Lacy); Hipp. Elem. 138,15â140,14 De Lacy (I 491â3 K); HNH 28,8â24 (XV 51â2 K); PHP VIII 502,19 f. De Lacy (I 676 K).
See for a more extensive discussion of this issue Case-Study II paragraph 1, pp. 115â9
Hipp. Elem. 138,15â17 De Lacy (I 492 K); Nat. Fac. II 134 K; HNH 17,20 f. Mewaldt (XV 29â30 K), 22,4â8 Mewaldt (XV 38 K), 28,10â4 Mewaldt (XV 51 K).
Nat. Fac. II 134 K, see note 24 above for other references.
UP I 18,24â5 Helmreich (III 26 K).
Cf. HNH 6,10â20 Mewaldt (XV 7â8 K).
There are some exceptions to this general rule, as Galen remarks, sometimes the action of a thing is derived not from its specific substance, formed by the four elemental qualities, but from qualities that follow upon the specific substance formed by the elemental qualities (
Phaedo 98b ff.
Hipp. Elem. 126,19â24 De Lacy (I 481 K).
HNH 51,6â13 Mewaldt (XV 97 K).
Nat. Fac. II 10â1 K.
Nat. Fac. II 12â3 K.
Nat. Fac. II 14 K: â
Nat. Fac. II 15 K.
It has been suggested by Havrda (2017) that the first capacity, the alterative one, arises from the mixture and has a certain randomness to it, while the latter arises from nature and is intelligent. The problem with this view, however, is that it would lead to a completely paradoxical view of nature, since Galen clearly states that both of these capacities are capacities of nature (thus nature, in its generative activity, would have to be intelligent on the one hand and random on the other). The correct view, in my opinion, is that the alterative capacity does not arise only from the mixture, but is exercised by nature in the particular mixing of the qualities of which the mixture is a result. This is in line with the text quoted from Nat. Fac. above, where the chilling, heating, moistening and drying are presented as specifications of the alterative capacity of nature. That is to say, the mixture is already a result of intelligent nature, and as such is not random (for, as Galen often asks, how could some random mixing process form beings such as those we observe?).
Hipp. Elem. 58,2â5 De Lacy (I 414â5 K).
This is also the general tendency of HNH, where this method is presented by Galen as that of Hippocrates and Plato, through the repeated reference to Phaedrus 270C-D, see infra Case-Study II paragraphs 2 and 5.
See also further in Hipp. Elem. itself, 136,1â3 De Lacy (I 488 K), where Galen remarks that it does not matter whether the treatise is called âOn the elementsâ, âOn natureâ or âOn substanceâ.
QAM 37,12â15 Müller (IV 774 K).
Aristotle, PA II, 646b10 f.; the fact that this is such a strange choice from an Aristotelian perspective seems to make a case against Singerâs suggestion (2013, introduction and notes ad locum) that Galen is here simply presenting Aristotelian doctrine, rather than his own.
Singer (2013), note 36; Loc. Aff. VIII 161 K: ââ¦
Cf. Hankinson (2014a) 961 for discussion of this passage.
Nat. Fac. II 12â14 K.
Opt. Corp. Const. IV 741 K.
Opt. Corp. Const. IV 737â8 K.
In The Art of Medicine I 312 K, the distinction is described in similar terms.
UP 18â9 Helmreich (III 26â7 K).
Cf. Hankinson (2014a) 959 f.
Opt. Corp. Const. IV 741 K.
Aristotle sometimes also identifies the elementary qualities as a primary kind of
Nat. Fac. II 12 K.
MM X 463 K.
MM X 459 K, he returns to this in 464 K as well.
Hipp. Elem. 72,24 f. De Lacy (I 430â2 K).
See also Hipp. Elem. 72,16 f. De Lacy (I 430 K): âShapes produce shapes and smaller magnitudes produce larger ones, but shapes do not produce magnitudes or magnitudes shapes, and for that reason it cannot be allowed that something different in kind is generated from elements that do not change their qualities; but it can be allowed from elements that do change them. For it is possible that in the course of many intervening changes what was formerly black may in turn become white and what was formerly white may in turn become black and what is now insentient may in turn become sentientâ. (tr. De Lacy) Note here the correspondence in the examples of magnitude, shape and color with the passages which we quoted earlier. Cf. Hankinson (2014a) 967 f.
Nat. Fac. II 118 K; cf. also, e.g., 126â7 K: the cause of the functioning of any organ is eukrasia, the activity (
Nat. Fac. II 7 K.
Black bile and melancholy in Galen are the subject of Case-Study IV.
De Loc. Aff. VIII 175 K.
De Loc. Aff. VIII 181 K; cf. Symp. Caus. VII 221 K, where there is the same distinction between two kinds of affections and âdyskrasiaâ is said to bring about a âweakened capacityâ, while âorganic diseasesâ are said to ânarrow the passagesâ; note that Galen here adds the adjective â
Loc. Aff. VIII 127â8 K.
QAM 33,17 f. Müller (IV 769 K); cf. Hankinson (2006) 242 f. and (2014a) 965 f.
QAM 37,16â21 Müller (IV 774 K); I follow Müller and Bazou and do not take over Singerâs reading
Cf. Tieleman (2003), 150: âIn QAM, as we have noticed (above, p. 143), Galen identifies the soul with the form (
Caus. Symp. VII 191 K: âPerhaps I shall have the audacity to give an opinion about the substance of the soul itself in some other work â¦â (tr. Johnston), more on this below. Cf. Hankinson (2003) 238, who remarks that âit seems that he never did soâ.
QAM 44,12 f. Müller (IV 782 K).
Cf. Donini (2008), 202: â⦠the consequence is that a man is genuinely the product of a series of factors in which his own free will and voluntary initiative may play a very minor or even non-existent part â¦â
QAM 36,15â6 Müller (IV 773 K).
QAM 37,26 f. Müller (IV 774â5 K).
Cf. The reference in Galenâs discussion of the view of Andronicus, 44,6â9 Müller (IV 782 K): â
QAM 37,26â38,4 Müller (IV 774â5 K).
Cf. Singer (2013) introduction to QAM and notes ad locum, see also paragraph 3 below.
Singer states that we seem to need âa way of linking (â¦) two models of explanationâ, namely those of either capacities or mixtures explaining the relationship between soul and body. But he already seems to provide the right way of linking (namely that the capacities are dependent upon the substance of the soul which is a bodily mixture and that therefore the capacities are dependent upon the mixture) in a footnote to this remark (referring to Praes. Puls. IX 305â306 K.): â⦠that Galen can now state that the ousia of a dunamis is a mixture of a particular type â¦â Galenâs text in Praes. Puls. IX. 305â6: â
Caston (1997, 351â2) rather thinks the two theses are in conflict with each other, but that is because he apparently interprets the thesis of QAM wrongly. He states that Galen âis not consistentâ because âThroughout most of the treatise, he argues for the position represented in its title, that the soul is actually a power that follows on the temperament of the bodyâ. The position represented in the title is clear enough, and it does not say that the soul is a power (Caston is perhaps right in recognizing this as the main difference between Galen and Alexander), neither does Galen state anywhere else in the treatise that the soul is a power. It is typical for QAMâs fate in scholarship, I think, that Caston in an otherwise brilliant and acute work makes such a basic mistake in his reading of the very title of the work, and then proceeds to refer to Lloyd (1988) for an analysis of QAMâs ârhetoricâ and âpoor argumentsâ.
See Frede (2003) 94, with reference to Prop. Plac. 13, 7: âWe know that there is a soul, because the soul makes us do the things we as living beings do, like walk or run. But we do not know what it is, and hence also do not know what it does such that as a result of it we walk and run and do all the other things living beings do. Hence we introduce powers named after the observable effects of its activity, of its exercise of its power, for instance the natural powers â¦â; Hankinson (2003) 51, remarks that Galenâs notion of capacity is a kind of âplace-holder for a proper, full-blooded causal explanation, a useful form of words to be employed when such an explanation is not yet available, but by no means a substitute for itâ; see also Tieleman (2003) 144â51; Corcilius (2014) 20â58 on the notion of capacity from Plato to Galen; Chiaradonna (2021) 5: âTherefore, by using the term dunamis, Galen can offer a causal explanation of bodily activities without committing himself to any definite position regarding the factor that acts as a cause. Being a relational term, dunamis is not an absolute distinct factor, which, as Galen says in QAM IV 769 Kühn, inhabits substances in the same way as we inhabit our houses. The term dunamis expresses only the relation between cause and effectâ.
QAM 34,1â10 Müller (IV 769â70 K).
QAM 44,6â9 Müller (IV 782 K), Müller brackets the latter part of the sentence, â
Hipp. Elem. 132,9â13 De Lacy (I 485 K).
Hipp. Elem. 128,11â3 De Lacy (I 482 K).
UP I 3,25â4,5 Helmreich (III 5 K); cf. Aristotle PA IV 10, 687a2 ff.
Cf. UP I 338,20â22 Helmreich (III 464 K) where Galen explains that the first cause for everything that comes to be (
UP II 437,18â21 Helmreich (IV 347 K).
Temp. I 635,16â636,8 K.
UP II 440,20â441,1 Helmreich (IV 351 K).
PHP VI 374,29â32 De Lacy (V 522 K).
Foet. Form. 68,10 f. Nickel (V 665 K); translations Singer (1997).
PHP VI 374,13â21 De Lacy (V 521â2 K).
UP I 226,18â22 Helmreich (III 308â9 K). Cf. Nat. Fac. II 1â2 K. See also De Lacy (1988) 53 f.; Tieleman (1996) 158â9; Havrda (2017), 74; Vinkesteijn (2021) on the vegetative soul in Galen.
Nat. Fac. II 80 K.
Nat. Fac. II 28 K.
Nat. Fac. II 80 K.
QAM 37,1â38,8 Müller (IV 774â5 K), here I follow Bazouâs text (except for her addition of
Cf. Vinkesteijn (2019).
QAM 48,3â8 Müller (IV 787 K), I follow Singer and the MS tradition here, reading
Compare the remark in Loc. Aff. cited earlier: âSince the soul either is a mixture of the active qualities, or is altered by the mixture of these qualities â¦â Galen refers to QAM in this chapter as well.
QAM 38,16â23 Müller (IV 775â6 K).
See also Vinkesteijn (2019).
Galen must be taking over the word âreceivingâ from Aristotleâs De Anima I 3 407b20â27, where Aristotle rebukes thinkers who try to state what the soul is, without also taking the body which receives it (
Foet. Form. 76,10â78,11 Nickel (V 672â74 K); translation Singer (1997).
This passage has been taken as an expression of Galenâs supposed agnosticism with regard to the substance of the (rational part of the) soul by Donini (1996), 198. I think that, as Singerâs translation also brings out, the emphasis should be on if here, which means that this statement serves as a disqualification of one of the legs of the previously given dilemma rather than as a general expression of agnosticism with regard to the substance of the soul (although I certainly agree with Donini that Galen is less explicit on the rational part of the soul than on the other parts).
Cf. also QAM 46,17â23 Müller (IV 785 K), where Galen states that it has been shown that the substance of the soul is composed in accordance with the mixture that forms the homoeomerous bodies, unless one assumes that the soul can exist separately from the body, as Plato does.
QAM 38,23â39,4 Müller (IV 776 K).
Praes. Puls. IX 305,15â306,4 K.
Caus. Symp. VII 191,9â11 K.
I agree with Singer (2013, note ad locum), that Galen presents Andronicus as speaking about the soul as a whole (
Hankinson (2006) 250, on this passage: âThis text sees Galen at his most forthright, at least in regard to the lower two parts of the soul: he seems unequivocally to adopt an identity-theory regarding them. These parts of the soul really must be the appropriate (physical) mixtures, with the powers that result from them being attributes of the souls rather than the souls themselvesâ.
QAM 44,12â7 Müller (IV 782 K).
There might be some irony in Galenâs words here, his praise of Andronicus could be considered somewhat excessive â why would it be so brave to speak on the substance of the soul as Andronicus does? On the other hand, we have seen how this âdaringâ is a recurrent motive in Galenâs talk of the substance of the soul. What is perhaps more striking, is that Galen first praises Andronicus for his clarity, to then proceed to point out that he confused the notions of substance and capacity, which must surely count as a very grave confusion for Galen. Perhaps, therefore, Galen ridicules Andronicus somewhat with his praise in this passage, even though he agrees with his final position (as Galen himself presents it).
It is important to note that the reference here is still to
Cf. Hankinson (2006) 244 f.; Sharples (2006) 178 on Andronicusâ position.
QAM 44,18â45,3 Müller (IV 783 K), following the suggestion to place
Cf. Singer (2013), for the view that Galen refrains from presenting his own doctrine here and in many other places in QAM, but is âmainly concerned to prove what an Aristotelian ought to thinkâ. (361)
QAM 43,19â20 Müller (IV 782 K); QAM 47,14â6 Müller (IV 786 K).
QAM 42,11â7 Müller (IV 780 K).
Cf. Temp I 578 f. K and San. Tu. VI 4â5 K, where the wetness of infants is more elaborately described.
QAM 43,10â44,2 Müller (IV 781â2 K) and 47,9â18 Müller (IV 786 K).
Tim. 42b3â4.
QAM 32,9 ff. Müller (IV 768 K).
Dillon (1993).
Alcinous Handbook of Platonism 16,2 (tr. Dillon).
QAM 47,12 Müller (IV 786 K). Cf. Kahnâs (1979) excellent commentary on fr. CIX (DK 118) in his edition of Heraclitusâ fragments.
Kahn (1979) commentary on fr. CIX, gives references to the relevant fragments. Cf. also Theophrastus On sense perception 3â4, on Parmenides: âParmenides did not define anything at all except that, the elements being two in number, knowledge is in accordance with the one that prevails (
QAM 47,14â6 Müller (IV 786 K).
PHP VII 474,3â7 De Lacy (V 642 K). Cf. also Hipp. Epid. VI, XVIIB 214 K; Loc. Aff. VIII 218 K. This
PHP VII 444,29â33 De Lacy (V 608 K); Loc. Aff. VIII 175 K; Loc. Aff. VIII 233 K; cf. Trompeter (2018) on the relation between these different kinds of pneuma; Äelkyte (forthcoming) for a more extensive discussion on pneuma in Galen.
QAM 39,3â4 Müller (IV 776 K).
Cf. Tieleman (1996), 155.
QAM 45,4 f. Müller (IV 783â4 K).
PHP VII 444,2â11 De Lacy (V 606 K).
Cf. Loc. Aff. VIII 75 K, also referred to above, for the difference between the soul itself and âthe body of the brainâ and the analogous difference between the brain affected as a homoeomerous and an organic part respectively.
Cf. PHP VII 446, 11 f. De Lacy (IV 609 K): â⦠and we also learned that the psychic pneuma is neither the essence of the soul nor its dwelling, but its first instrument â¦â. (tr. De Lacy).
Cf. Hankinson (2006), 236: âpneuma is thus a necessary medium of transmission (like the fluid in a hydraulic system), and perhaps also a fuel for the movement, but not the source of the motion itself: and so it is not the substance of the soulâ. Cf. Trompeter (2018) particularly 193 f.; Äelkyte (forthcoming).
See notes 125â6 above; cf. Caus. Resp. 8 (IV 469 K); UP I 482 Helmreich (III 483 K), II 93 Helmreich (III 813K); in PHP VII, 448,4 ff. De Lacy (V 611 K), Galen questions whether all nerves have pneuma in them. I thank Aiste Äelkyte for some of these references, for a detailed discussion of these and other passages on pneuma in Galen, see her forthcoming The Unity of Galenâs Physiology.
UP II 446,7â19 Helmreich (IV 358â9 K).
Cf. Sem. 136,7â9 (IV 584â5 K): â⦠just as we see externally the distribution of sunlight to the circumambient, and within us (the distribution of quality) from heart to arteries and brain to nervesâ. (tr. De Lacy); Loc. Aff. VIII 66,9â67,6 K; Plotinus, Enneads IV, 8, 4: âSo it is with the individual souls; the appetite for the divine Intellect urges them to return to their source, but they have, too, a power apt to administration in this lower sphere; they may be compared to the light attached upwards to the sun, but not grudging its bounty to what lies beneath itâ. (tr. MacKenna); cf. Frede (2003) particularly 115 ff.
UP II 446,23â47,8 Helmreich (IV 359 K).
Theaetetus 155 d.
Character Traits tr. Davies in edition Singer (2013) 140.
Cf. Hankinson (2014) 103: âIn other words, if the capacities of the soul are dependent upon the constitution of the body, no less, it seems, at least on occasion, can that constitution itself be affected by psychological dispositionsâ.
QAM 32,9â13 Müller (IV 768 K).
See note 71 above.
Moraux (1984) 778.
Tieleman (2003) 168.
Vegetti (2000) 80â1. On the possible Peripatetic precedents for Galenâs position see Kupreeva (2014) and Chiaradonna (2021).
See Gill (2010) 140, who makes the suggestion that âGalenâs general position on the psyche-body relationship, although it sometimes seems needlessly elusive and ill-defined, has a distinct rationale. Broadly speaking, this is that any views he offers on this question should reflect what are, in modern terms, the findings of his research programme and should not consist in ungrounded statements about areas of inquiry where he has not done independent work. This point also illuminates the project of QAM, which is designed, I think, to draw out the implications of one important strand in his philosophy of nature for the question of the psyche-body relationshipâ.
Prop. Plac. 3,1 (Lami and Garofalo 64); 7,1 (Lami and Garofalo 86); 15,1 (Lami and Garofalo 136â8), = 173,16â8, 179,28â9 and 188,27â30 Boudon-Pietrobelli.
Das (2014) 2.
Prop. Plac. 1 (Lami and Garofalo 57â60 = 172,1â30 Boudon-Pietrobelli).
Cf. Frede (2003) 77: âSo Galen does distinguish between definitive answers, backed up by conclusive proof, and answers which, though not supported by proof, are supported by reasonable argument and are not ruled out by considerations to the contrary. Galen allows himself such plausible views, but is hesitant to express themâ.; Chiaradonna (2009) 245 f. and (2014); Tieleman (2018); Vinkesteijn (2019); DeLacy, in his commentary on PHP (p 623), lists instances in which Galen opposes plausibility and truth.
Diogenes Laërtius 7,40; SVF 2.39, 2.40. For a discussion of the division of philosophy in Stoicism see Ierodiakonou (1993), who also concludes that the simile of the garden or orchard is likely to have originated outside of the Stoic school.
Cf. e.g., Robert Burton, who simply states, as if self-evident: âGalen supposeth the soul crasin esse, to be the temperature itself â¦â (Anatomy of Melancholy, 162). Nemesius was apparently more careful, see NH c. 2, p. 23.24â24.4 Morani: âGalen has nothing to say on this point, and he bears witness in his works on demonstration that he had made no declaration about the soul. But, from what he says, he seems on the whole to consider that the soul is a mixture, since from this follows difference in character: his argument is based on those of Hippocratesâ. (tr. van der Eijk)
Prop. Plac. ed. Lami and Garofalo 86 (= Boudon-Pietrobelli 178,29â179,2). Lami and Garofalo are somewhat bolder in their editiorial choices and interventions than Boudon and Pietrobelli have been in their edition, particularly in filling in the gaps of the text, which has resulted in a more complete text. All quotations from Prop. Plac. are from their edition.
Cf. Gill (2010) 145: âIn Prop. Plac. Galen applies a similar approach, and one that presupposes the argument of QAM, but does so in a more methodologically self-aware form, and with greater theoretical cautionâ.
Prop. Plac. 14,1 ed. Lami and Garofalo 128 (187,14 f. Boudon-Pietrobelli).
Cf. Frede (2003) 94; Tieleman (2003) 144â51; Hankinson (2014a) 965 f.
See also Lami and Garofaloâs notes ad locum. Cf. Hipp. Elem. 58,10â25 De Lacy (I 415â6 K): âQuite obviously it is utterly absurd to say that what exists is one in number; that is truly the act of a man who has given no thought to any of the obvious facts. But a person might say that all things are one in form and power, as Epicurus and Democritus and their followers say of the atoms. And of the same chorus with them are those who postulate elements that are least and unattached [
Prop. Plac. ed. Lami and Garofalo 86 (= Boudon-Pietrobelli 178,29â179,2). Cf. also Hankinson (2006) 248â9.
Prop. Plac. 14,3 ed. Lami and Garofalo 132 (188,1â6 Boudon-Pietrobelli).
Prop. Plac. 14,4 ed. Lami and Garofalo 134 (= 188,6â17 Boudon-Pietrobelli).
On this basis, I do not agree with Hankinson (2014) 89, that according to Galen we cannot even establish what the substance of the soul might be with plausibility, though I do agree with Hankinson (2003) 248 f., that Galen favours one of the options for the substance of the soul he discusses in Prop. Plac. (the one that corresponds to QAMâs thesis) and apparently finds it more plausible than the others. Cf. Vinkesteijn (2019).
Garcia-Ballester (2002) 125.
Donini (1996) 201, speculates that âGalen was fully conscious of the fact that in this treatise he was speaking at a different, indeed considerably lower, level than that of PHPâ.
Garcia-Ballester (2002) 127.
Singer (2013) 336.
Singer (2013) 361.
On the possible Peripatetic precedents for Galenâs position see Kupreeva (2014) and Chiaradonna (2021).
Garcia Ballester (2002) 129.
Garcia-Ballester (2002) 129.
QAM 73,6 f. Müller (IV 814 K).
QAM 76,16â22 Müller (IV 818 K); cf. 76,1 f. Müller (IV 817 K) a few lines earlier, where âthe ancientsâ are praised for their virtue and wisdom (one could hardly think that Galen has only doctors in mind here); 32,11â3 Müller (IV 768 K), right at the beginning of the text, where the followers of Plato and Pythagoras and certain other ancients are credited with knowledge of the views expounded in QAM (according to Garcia-Ballester, the reference to Pythagoreans and Platonists right at the beginning of QAM âmakes still vaguer ⦠his statement on the relationship between moral life and physiologyâ.); 79,21â4 Müller (IV 822 K) at the very end of the text, where being a philosopher is opposed to being devoid of understanding (
In PHP II 104,3â4 De Lacy (V 213 K) he calls Aristotle and Theophrastus
Lloyd (1988) 42.
Donini (2006) 184.
Donini (2006) 201.
Donini (2006) 199.
QAM 67,9â12 Müller (IV 808 K).
Plutarch, Advice about keeping well, in Moralia, 122E, Loeb edition (2014); cf. Foucault (1984) 69 ff.
Cf. Devinant (2020), especially his introduction and also 23â9, for what I consider a much more constructive approach in this regard.
QAM 46,1â9 Müller (IV 784 K) and 73,3 f. Müller (IV 814 f. K).
QAM 33,10â4 Müller (IV 769 K).
QAM 54,23â4 Müler (IV 795 K).
Ilberg (1974) 84, 90; Singer (2013) 39â40.
Cf. Singer (2013) textual note 4.2. The Greek MS tradition has
Character Traits 27 Kr (= 139 tr. Davies) âWhen pleasure passes [the bounds] of moderation it becomes harmful and it is the activity of the rational soul to reform it by regulating it and determining the times that may be devoted to itâ.; also 140â41, the metaphors of dog and hunter, horse and rider; and particularly the passage from 40,10 onward (158) is well in line with the âreducing of the stream of nourishmentâ and the becoming like a star that we saw earlier in QAM: âNevertheless, just as, if you could live without food or drink, you would be an angel, in the same way, if you restrict yourself to what is [absolutely] necessary for the life of the body, you will come near to being an angelâ.
Character Traits tr. Davies in ed. Singer (2013) 167.
Character Traits tr. Davies in ed. Singer (2013) 136.
Character Traits tr. Davies in ed. Singer (2013) 139â140.
Character Traits tr. Davies in ed. Singer (2013) 158â9.
Cf. Temp. I 565,15â6 K, âthe peak of intelligenceâ is the natural goal of man, according to Galen, which he says in the context of answering the question what the best mixture for man is.
Character Traits tr. Davies in ed. Singer (2013) 158â9.
Singer (2013) 2.
Aff. Pecc. Dig. 11,15 De Boer (V 14 K).
See UP I 174,19â176,9 and II 446,7â447,21 Helmreich (III 238â40 and III 358â60 K).
Cf. Hankinson (1993) 198 f. on this text and its emphasis on the necessity of training for moral development.
There are many other similarities between these works as well: the repeated emphasis in Character Traits on the importance of the observation of small children as a point of departure for learning about the human soul (Character Traits p 136, 142, 143 in Daviesâ translation) which also formed the point of departure for Galenâs argument in QAM; the possibility of becoming like the divine to some extent by transformation of the self (149, 153, 158â9); the importance of habituation and daily practices for achieving this kind of transformation and the emphasis on the need to subdue the desiderative soul.
QAM 76,1â6 Müller (IV 817â8 K), but Müller conjectures on the basis of the Latin edition: ââ¦
It is clear that the mixtures are always formed by the divine creator, if only because Galen states that it is only God or Nature that can make a complete mixture (Temp. I 563 K).
QAM 39,21 f. Müller (IV 777 K).
This is discussed more extensively in Case-Study IV.
QAM 79,2â4 Müller (IV 821 K), but I follow Bazou with
Again, this is discussed more extensively in Case-Study IV.
San. Tu. VI 40 K.
Character Traits tr. Davies (ed. Singer, 2013) 163. Cf. also 161: âThe rational soul becomes strong by means of the demonstrative sciences, and ought to learn them step by stepâ.
There is a trope among the ancients (and you still find it in Ficino) of the dry philosopher, that becomes dry through excessive study, up until the point that he becomes a skeleton even, cf. Dunbabin (1986).
I could not agree more with Jim Hankinsonâs remark on the risk of further specifying Galenâs theory in modern terms (2014a, 967): âSo does then Galenâs theory involve full reduction, emergence, or mere supervenience? The question is certainly anachronistic, and might also seem misplaced, since if Galen had been presented with such a range of options, he might well have said, characteristically, that he neither knew nor caredâ.
Cf. Hankinson (1993) 221: âThe sort of person one is directly depends upon oneâs physiological structure; hence oneâs dispositions, including oneâs dispositions to have certain types of thought, are at least a partial function of the structureâ.
Temp. I 576 K, tr. Singer and van der Eijk.
Proclus In Rem. 222.
Olympiodorus Commentary on Platoâs Gorgias, 49,6 on 524d5â6, tr. Jackson et al.
QAM 78,12 Müller (IV 820 K), tr. Singer.
Philoponus On Aristotleâs On the soul 50,32 f., translations van der Eijk (see also his notes ad locum).
Ars. Med. I 336â7 K; the distinction corresponds to the one in QAM 78,19â79,4 Müller (IV 820â1 K), but in the latter there is no specific reference to philosophy; cf. van der Eijk (2014) 131 ff.
Philoponus On Aristotleâs On the soul 138,1â10, see also van der Eijkâs note 371 on the previous passage; 155,10 f.
Cf. Hankinson (1993), 222: âWe have, effectively, a model in which the overall state S of some system generates outputs O which causally contribute to the creation of a new state Sâ.
QAM 67,2â9 Müller (IV 807â8 K).
Cf. Singer (2013) 401â2 note 138: âGalen is (if the text is correct) making a sort of joke here: one needs to sõphronein to some extent to realize the fact that bodily factors affect oneâs ability to sõphroneinâ.
EN 1104a33â1104b3.
QAM 67,9â12 Müller (IV 808 K).
QAM 42â3 Müller (IV 780â1 K).
QAM 73,3â6 Müller (IV 814 K) but here I follow Bazou and also keep with MS
Cf. Ciceroâs De Fato 40.
QAM 73â4 Müller (IV 815 K).
Cf. Hankinson (1993) 219: âThe wicked are just like poisonous animals â no one would hold them responsible in the strong sense for what they are, but we do not destroy them because they are responsible for what they are, but simply because they are what they areâ.
Hankinson (1993) esp. 217 f. gives an extensive and nuanced overview of Galenâs position here.
QAM 74,20â2 Müller (IV 816 K); see also Aff. Pecc. Dig. 45,15â20 De Boer (V 65 K): âIt is utterly impossible for who was not born for truth, and who has also been brought up in bad, licentious ways, to hunger for truth, either on the basis of an internal impulse of that kind or through the encouragement of another. I myself have never claimed to be able to assist such a personâ. (tr. Singer)
Cf. Hankinson (1993): âIn some systems, there will be a natural tendency to progress towards the better states; in others, the system will have become too corrupt to be self-ameliorating, and indeed even beyond external repair (just as diseases can progress to the stage where they are incurable)â. I would only add that, according to Galen, some âsystemsâ do not just become too corrupt, but apparently lack the potential for self-amelioration in the first place (see next note); this is already a problem in Aristotle, cf. van der Eijk (2014) 94: â⦠a cursory reading of Aristotleâs works with a view to the various types of people he distinguishes makes one wonder whether the number of individuals who live up to these lofty ideals is higher than perhaps ten percent; and even that estimate may be on the optimistic side. This raises the question why nature, which supposedly arranges everything for the best, apparently does not manage to provide even the capacity to achieve such happiness and fulfilment in all members of the human species. This almost existential question is never directly addressed in Aristotleâs worksâ.
QAM 76,19â20 Müller (IV 818 K): ââ¦